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THE DYNAMICS OF RIGHT-WING EXTREMISM WITHIN GERMAN SOCIETY
THE DYNAMICS OF
RIGHT-WING EXTREMISM
WITHIN GERMAN SOCIETY
ESCAPE INTO AUTHORITARIANISM
Edited by Oliver Decker, Johannes Kiess
and Elmar Brähler
Translated by David West
Routledge Studies in Fascism and the Far Right
The Dynamics of Right-Wing Extremism within German Society explores
the prevalence of right-wing extremist attitudes in Germany.
The book provides a thorough psychosocial and sociological theory of
general authoritarian dynamics to explain broader societal attitudes, par-
ticularly focusing on right-wing extremism. It provides a uniquely long-term
perspective on the dierent dimensions of right-wing extremism – the an-
ity for dictatorial forms of government, chauvinist attitudes, the trivializa-
tion or justication of National Socialism, anti-Semitism, xenophobia, and
social Darwinism. The rst chapter delineates the theoretical framework
of authoritarian dynamics, while subsequent chapters provide an in-depth
analysis of empirical ndings and distinguish authoritarian and democratic
typologies. The authors focus on recognition of authoritarian statehood and
anti-Semitism; the relationship between religion and right-wing extremism;
and support for the radical-right populist party, Alternative für Deutschland
(AfD). The innovative theoretical approach of this book scrutinizes the the-
ory of authoritarianism in the contemporary world.
This book provides unique empirical data and will be of interest to schol-
ars of German politics, anti-democratic attitudes and prejudices, sociology,
political science, and social psychology.
Oliver Decker is the Director of the Center for the Study of Right-Wing
Extremism and Democracy and the Else-Frenkel-Brunswik-Institute at
Leipzig University, Germany, as well as a Professor for Social Psychology
at the Sigmund Freud University in Berlin, Germany.
Johannes Kiess is the Deputy Director of the Else-Frenkel-Brunswik-Institute
at the University of Leipzig, Germany, and a Postdoctoral Researcher at the
University of Siegen, Germany.
Elmar Brähler is a Professor Emeritus and a Visiting Scholar at the University
of Mainz, Germany.
The Dynamics of Right-Wing
Extremism within German Society
This book series focuses upon national, transnational and global manifesta-
tions of fascist, far right and right-wing politics primarily within a historical
context but also drawing on insights and approaches from other discipli-
nary perspectives. Its scope also includes anti-fascism, radical-right pop-
ulism, extreme-right violence and terrorism, cultural manifestations of the
far right, and points of convergence and exchange with the mainstream and
traditional right.
Titles include:
The Blackshirts’ Dictatorship
Armed Squads, Political Violence, and the Consolidation of
Mussolini’s Regime
Matteo Millan
Male Supremacism in the United States
From Patriarchal Traditionalism to Misogynist Incels and the Alt-Right
Edited by Emily K. Carian, Alex DiBranco and Chelsea Ebin
Fascism in Brazil
From Integralism to Bolsonarism
Leandro Pereira Gonçalves and Odilon Caldeira Neto
The Dynamics of Right-Wing Extremism within German Society
Escape into Authoritarianism
The Fascist Faith Of Romania’s Legion “Archangel Michael” in
Romania, 1927–41
Martyrdom To National Purification
Constantin Iordachi
For more information about this series, please visit: www.routledge.com/
Routledge-Studies-in-Fascism-and-the-Far-Right/book-series/FFR
Routledge Studies in Fascism and the Far Right
Series editors
Nigel Copsey, Teesside University, UK and Graham Macklin, Center for
Research on Extremism (C-REX), University of Oslo, Norway.
Edited by Oliver Decker, Johannes Kiess and Elmar Brähler
Edited by
Oliver Decker, Johannes Kiess
and Elmar Brähler
Translated by David West
The Dynamics of Right-Wing
Extremism within German
Society
Escape into Authoritarianism
We acknowledge support for the Open Access publication by the Saxon
State Digitization Program for Science and Culture.
First published in English 2022
by Routledge
4 Park Square, Milton Park, Abingdon, Oxon OX14 4RN
and by Routledge
605 Third Avenue, New York, NY 10158
Routledge is an imprint of the Taylor & Francis Group,
an informa business
© 2022 selection and editorial matter, Oliver Decker, Johannes Kiess
and Elmar Brähler; individual chapters, the contributors
Translated by David West
The right of Oliver Decker, Johannes Kiess and Elmar Brähler to be
identified as the authors of the editorial material, and of the authors
for their individual chapters, has been asserted in accordance with
sections 77 and 78 of the Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988.
The Open Access version of this book, available at www.taylorfrancis.
com, has been made available under a Creative Commons Attribution-
Non Commercial-No Derivatives 4.0 license.
Trademark notice: Product or corporate names may be trademarks
or registered trademarks, and are used only for identification and
explanation without intent to infringe.
Oliver Decker, Elmar Brähler (Hg.) “Flucht ins Autoritäre:
Rechtsextreme Dynamiken in der Mitte der Gesellschaft”/
Die Leipziger Autoritarismus-Studie 2018 © First published in
German in 2018 by Psychosozial-Verlag, Gießen, Germany,
www.psychosozial-Verlag.de
British Library Cataloguing-in-Publication Data
A catalogue record for this book is available from the British Library
Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data
A catalog record has been requested for this book
ISBN: 978-1-032-10834-6 (hbk)
ISBN: 978-1-032-11149-0 (pbk)
ISBN: 978-1-003-21861-6 (ebk)
DOI: 10.4324/9781003218616
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Notes on Contributors vi
1 Flight into Authoritarianism: The Dynamics of Right-Wing
Extremism at the Centre of Society 1
OLIVER DECKER
2 The Leipzig Authoritarianism Study 2018: Methodology,
Results, and Long-Term Changes 38
OLIVER DECKER, JOHANNES KIESS, JULIA SCHULER,
BARBARA HANDKE, AND ELMAR BRÄHLER
3 The Authoritarian Syndrome Today 79
OLIVER DECKER, JULIA SCHULER, AND ELMAR BRÄHLER
4 Recognition and Authoritarian Statehood 110
OLIVER DECKER, ALEXANDER YENDELL, AND ELMAR BRÄHLER
5 Anti-Semitic Attitudes in Germany: Their Prevalence and Causes 127
OLIVER DECKER, JOHANNES KIESS, AND ELMAR BRÄHLER
6 Religion as a Factor of Conflict in Relation to Right-Wing
Extremism, Hostility to Muslims, and Support for the AfD 154
GERT PICKEL AND ALEXANDER YENDELL
7 Authoritarian Dynamics and Social Conflicts: The Leipzig
Authoritarianism Studies 173
OLIVER DECKER, JOHANNES KIESS, AND ELMAR BRÄHLER
Index 182
Contents
Oliver Decker is the Director of the Center for the Study of Right-Wing
Extremism and Democracy and the Else-Frenkel-Brunswik-Institute at
Leipzig University, Germany, as well as a Professor for Social Psychology
at the Sigmund Freud University in Berlin, Germany.
Elmar Brähler is a Professor Emer itus and a Visiting Sc holar at the Unive rsity
of Mainz, Germany.
Barbara Handke has an M.A. in English and Sociology, and is a freelance
writer, editor, and academic writing teacher in Leipzig, Germany.
Johannes Kiess is the Deputy Director of the Else-Frenkel-Brunswik-
Institute at the University of Leipzig, Germany, and a Postdoctoral
Researcher at the University of Siegen, Germany.
Julia Schuler is a Research Associate at the Else-Frenkel-Brunswik-Institute
and the Research Institute Social Cohesion at Leipzig University,
Ger many.
Gert Pickel is a Professor of Sociology of Religion and Co-Head of the
Project “Radical Islam - Radical Anti-Islam” and of the Center of
Competence on Right-Wing Extremism and Democracy Research at
Leipzig University, Germany.
Alexander Yendell is a Postdoctoral Researcher at the Research Institute
Social Cohesion and Board Member of the Center of Competence on
Right-Wing Extremism and Democracy Research at Leipzig University,
Ger many.
Contributors
DOI: 10.4324/9781003218616-1
Flight into Authoritarianism
The Dynamics of Right-Wing
Extremism at the Centre of Society
Oliver Decker
1
We have been using representative surveys since 2002 to investigate polit-
ical attitudes in Germany, with between 2,500 and 5,000 inhabitants of
the country being interviewed every two years. The immediate backdrop
to our research were the pogroms and politically motivated murders of
the 1990s, a time when hundreds of thousands of people sought refuge
and asylum in Germany. The reaction to this inux of people was severe,
and names like Rostock-Lichtenhagen and Solingen still stand today for
the atrocities that were committed against migrants and refugees there. It
was against the background of these atrocities that the Bundestag passed
the so-called “asylum compromise” in 1993 – a dreadful term for the
de facto ending of the fundamental right to asylum, as the Peace Prize
winner Navid Kermani told Bundestag members in his speech commem-
orating the 65th anniversary of the Basic Law. It was the rst instance
when solidarity with the weakest was withdrawn, long before the reforms
to the labour market that followed at the beginning of the new millennium.
If this “concession” was intended to quell extreme right-wing outrages,
then it has sadly not succeeded. Arson attacks and murders, pogroms,
and terror perpetrated by right-wing extremists – these continue to be part
of German reality, more than 25 years after the “asylum compromise”.
The National Socialist Underground is only the best-known example
here – and at the same time it exemplies the diculties of dealing with
the situation, since, following the long court hearings that brought
some of the perpetrators to justice, there are still many questions left
unanswered.
The police are constantly forced to correct upwards the number of vic-
tims of right-wing extremism. For example, the German government
announced in 2018 that the latest investigations suggest that there have
been an estimated 83 victims of extreme right-wing violence since 1990.1 But
independent observers, such as the Amadeu Antonio Foundation, Pro Asyl,
and victim-support associations, say that their own data show that not even
half of the cases that can be proven to be extreme right-wing killings are
reected in police statistics. For example, the ve victims of the attacks at
the Munich Olympic Shopping Centre are not included in police statistics,
2 O. Decker
even though the experts commissioned by the Munich Oce for Democracy
(Matthias Quent, Christian Kopke, and Florian Hartleb) came to the clear
conclusion that these murders were motivated by xenophobia. And even
the Federal Ministry of the Interior was forced to admit in 2013 that, in
an initial review of unsolved murders between 1990 and 2011, there were
746 cases where there was evidence of an extreme right-wing motivation for
the crime.2
Whenever refugees, those who have a dierent opinion, or migrants are
murdered or attacked, sections of the public have for years reacted in the
same way. First, the actions of right-wing extremists are denied or depolit-
icized (see Schellenberg 2015); and, if this cannot be maintained, then the
actions are relativized as was the case most recently with the hounding of
foreigners in Chemnitz.3 This refusal to accept reality is anked by another
phenomenon that has become increasingly common recently: every mention
of right-wing extremism is countered by the phrase “left-wing extremism”,
an echo that is now as predictable as it is irrational, but that leads to inac-
tion when it comes to the spread of right-wing extremism. Nor is the com-
parison correct, since the extreme left does not simply mirror the extreme
right: they have very dierent political aims and ideologies (the ideology of
the right, unlike that of the left, is an ideology of inequality); and they dier
fundamentally in terms of the violence that they perpetrate, especially vio-
lence against people.4
However, two events in 2000 led to increasing recognition of the danger
posed by the right: the bomb attack on migrants and Jews in Düsseldorf-
Wehrhahn (which is still unsolved), and the attack on the Düsseldorf syn-
agogue a few weeks later. These provoked a new reaction and marked a
rethink. The call made by the then Federal Chancellor Gerhard Schröder
for an “uprising of the decent” brought to an end the widespread denial that
there were sections of the population who were violent and neo-Nazi.
This public mobilization was necessary and, although coming relatively
late, it had an impact because it began discussions over the support in the
population for the extreme right. When questioned, neo-Nazi perpetrators
of violence have freely said that they saw themselves as “executing the will
of the people”, with the proverbial silent majority nodding their heads in
approval when they chased migrants through towns and villages, set re to
refugee shelters, and killed people. This is what led us to examine the politi-
cal attitude of Germans. Our rst survey in 2002 was based on the question:
how widespread are extreme right-wing attitudes in the population? We also
used a questionnaire on extreme right-wing attitudes in a representative
survey for the rst time (Decker et al. 2013), assigning three statements to
each of the six dimensions in the questionnaire (support for a right-wing
authoritarian dictatorship, chauvinism, xenophobia, anti-Semitism, social
Darwinism, and trivialization of Nazi crimes). The respondents given this
questionnaire were asked for their opinion: they could either agree or disa-
gree with these extreme right-wing statements.
Flight into Authoritarianism 3
The results from 2002 were shocking (Decker et al. 2003). For example,
42% of East Germans and 37% of West Germans agreed with the statement
belonging to the dimension of “xenophobia” that “Germany is danger-
ously overrun by the many foreigners living here”; and, taken together, the
three xenophobic statements met with approval among 24% of respond-
ents in West Germany and 30% in East Germany. The proportion of those
with xenophobic attitudes remained almost unchanged in the next sur-
vey of 2004 (Decker & Brähler 2005). The proportion of respondents in
East Germany who agreed with xenophobic statements then rose steadily
to reach almost 39% in 2012, while the proportion in West Germany fell
temporarily to 18% in 2008, although about 22% of West Germans again
expressed xenophobic attitudes during the economic crisis (2008–2012). In
2014, agreement with xenophobic statements fell to just over 22% in the
East and 17% in the West. Although there were still a great number of peo-
ple with xenophobic attitudes (too many for a democratic society), there
were considerably fewer than in the previous survey waves. This number
remained virtually unchanged in 2016 (West, 19.8% and East, 22.7%),
but rose again in 2018 (overview in Chapter 2 of this book), with the pro-
portion of those in the East agreeing with xenophobic statements again
exceeding 30%, and in the West, above 20% again. Devaluation of groups
deemed “foreign” or “deviant” also rose, with negative attitudes towards
Sinti and Roma, asylum seekers, and Muslims continuing to increase. For
example, while in 2010 around 33% of respondents felt that Muslims made
them feel “like a foreigner” in their own country (Heitmeyer 2010), that
gure climbed to 55% in both East and West in 2018 (see Chapter 2).
The centre of society
These ndings led us to speak of right-wing extremism at the “centre of
society”, and to give the study then carried out with the Friedrich Ebert
Foundation in 2006 the title Vom Rand zur Mitte (From the Margins to the
Centre) (Decker & Brähler 2006). Since we noticed for the third time in 2006
that devaluation of other people, the desire for a leader, and chauvinism
were present not only among voters of extreme right-wing parties, but also
and even especially among supporters of democratic parties, i.e. parties
that claim to represent the “centre”, we decided to focus in particular on
right-wing extremism at the centre of society. Our results were not an error
in measurement, as some critics of our study might have wished, and they
have unfortunately been conrmed in recent years by the growth of the
Alternative für Deutschland (Alternative for Germany, AfD) and Pegida.5
There had long been a great potential for extreme right-wing parties, but
such parties as the Nationaldemokratische Partei Deutschland (National
Democratic Party Germany, NPD) could simply not exploit this potential.
But the fact that the spread of extreme right-wing attitudes did not manifest
itself in action should not be a comfort to anyone. And to prevent people
4 O. Decker
from coming to the wrong conclusion and thinking that extreme right-wing
attitudes only occur among so-called “marginal groups”, we attached the
term “centre” to the phrase “right-wing extremism”. That was a decision
that has brought us much criticism since.
Our decision was not completely without precedent, though. For exam-
ple, a study by the sociologist Theodor Geiger of the “old” and the “new
middle class” led him to describe both as the “blessed ground of ideological
confusion” (see Geiger 1930: 641). Where this “confusion” came from was a
question that Georg Simmel had already answered: “The middle class alone
has an upper and a lower border, and such that it continuously receives indi-
viduals from both the upper and the lower layer of society, and gives indi-
viduals to both” (see Simmel 1908: 451–452). Taking up this idea, Geiger
argued that the “confusion” of the middle class is a product of its fear of
being demoted from the centre and falling into poverty: “The false shame of
being demoted is expressed often enough in hatred and disdain” (see Geiger
1930: 646). With this, Geiger had found an explanation that still has rele-
vance today, namely, the threat or reality of being demoted is accompanied
by extreme right-wing or fascist attitudes. For both Geiger and Simmel,
the centre was a position in society that lay on a vertical axis. But Geiger
was wrong in one respect: NSDAP (National-Socialistic German Workers’
Party) voters were often not themselves aected by the economic crisis, and
those who were aected (such as the unemployed) were more likely to vote
for the Social-democratic Party (SPD) or the Communist Party (KPD).
People who voted for the NSDAP did so not because they themselves were
suering, but because the Weimar Republic was going through an economic
crisis (Falter et al. 1983). But the very fact that the economy was able to strip
the rst democratic society on German soil of its legitimacy is anything but
self-evident.
It was here that a gap in the explanation appeared, but one that did not
obstruct the progress of the term “centre”. The US sociologist Seymour
Lipset, who investigated changes in voting behaviour at the end of the
Weimar Republic, was the rst to speak of an “extremism of the centre”
(Lipset 1959), by which he meant the source from which the NSDAP had
recruited its supporters. Unlike Geiger, though, Lipset had in mind not the
centre on a vertical axis, between a lower and an upper layer in society, but
rather the centre on a horizontal axis. In doing so, he was, in fact, taking
up a distinction that has been in use since the French Revolution: in the
French National Assembly of 1789, the restorative, i.e. monarchist, forces
took their place on the right of the plenary hall, those who wanted radi-
cal change sat on the left, and the “moderate” forces positioned themselves
between the two. The political centre has since been regarded as a place
of moderation – and as a shelter for democracy. Lipset, however, ascribed
to the supporters of the centre parties their own extremism: that of fas-
cism (Lipset 1959). Although Lipset’s empirical ndings would be modied
somewhat later, the Mainz political scientist Jürgen Falter describing the
Flight into Authoritarianism 5
NSDAP as a “people’s party” (Volkspartei) whose voters came from various
social backgrounds, even though it had a decidedly “middle-class belly”
(Falter 1981), what remains undisputed is the involvement of the political
“centre” in fascism. As the historian Heinrich Winkler has argued, there
“can be no doubt that the reservoir of NS voters mainly comprised farmers,
the self-employed middle class, and employees and civil servants (Winkler
1972: 181).
However, we also had something dierent in mind to Lipset when choos-
ing the term “centre”, since he had used it primarily to characterize those
in society who had supported National Socialism. We did not want to
explore the essence of the centre – through, for example, investigating the
income groups, level of education, and professions that constitute it – but
rather the dreadful state of aairs in society that produces the potential
for anti-democratic sentiments. The term “centre” is ideally suited to this
purpose, since it is related to one of the oldest ideas in European thought:
namely, the idea of a place in society where can be found the representa-
tives of the normative order. The most important theorists of extremism,
therefore, understand the centre as an “institutional structure of the con-
stitutional state whose aim is to restrain, to guarantee freedom, and to con-
trol power” (Backes & Jesse 2005: 160). Aristotle had in fact already used
the term “mesotes” (“center” or “mean”) in this sense in the fourth century
BC, when in the Nicomachean Ethics he contrasted it with the “most
peripheral”, i.e. the extreme, thus turning both terms into political-ethical
dimensions. For Aristotle, virtue lies in the golden mean between two evils
(namely, those of excess and deciency), so that “in all things the mean is
to be commended, while the extremes are neither commendable nor right
but reprehensible” (Aristoteles & Dirlmeier 1999: 48). This holds true for
the individual, who should moderate her actions according to the golden
mean, as well as for the state, which should justify the hegemony of a
certain economic position in the polis: “the goodness or badness of a con-
stitution or city” depends to a large extent on the “centre” being “strong”.
Here, the centre is for Aristotle, not the group who live their lives in moder-
ation, but the group of middle property: “In all cities”, he writes, “there are
three groups – the very rich, the very poor, and those in the middle”. It is
only where the latter are “strong and more powerful than the two extremes”
that the polis has a “good constitution”, for otherwise uprisings and unrest
may threaten (Aristoteles & Schwarz 2010). We should not ignore the fact
that this statement served to delegitimize democracy as a form of gov-
ernment, since not everyone can have in mind the well-being of the polis,
which for Aristotle is something that only men at the centre of society are
capable of. Nevertheless, Aristotle managed more than 2000 years ago to
give the term “centre” a range of meanings – as a yardstick by which the
individual can moderate her actions, and as a position in the polis. Centre
and moderation are related to a virtuous life and have a horizontal and
a vertical axis. Horizontally, the centre denotes political moderation, the
6 O. Decker
place between extremes; vertically, it denotes a social position, the transi-
tional stage between above and below.
Given this history of the term, we can understand why the “magic of
the centre” (Lenk 1987: 12) was so important for the reality of the Federal
Republic of Germany from the very outset, since it served to separate the
present from the past: National Socialism was deplored as a “loss of the
centre” in the political and normative sense, a phrase coined by Sedlmayr,
who in fact owed his academic career to his strong involvement in the struc-
tures of the NSDAP (Sedlmayr 1948). The folksinger/songwriter Franz Josef
Degenhardt had the gure of the “old notary Bolamus” express the postwar
image that Germany had of itself:
Yes, the old notary Bolamus, he’s got the right recipe.
How to get as old as he is and still live –
And he tells everyone at the pub who wants to hear:
“That’s it”, he says, “all very simple, with moderation and with
purpose
And never, my dear, ever exaggerate anything
Then every organ and everything will be ne!
Then every organ and everything will be ne!”
Yes, the old notary Bolamus, he has
managed to live a good life
Because he was always a little for, and he was always a little against,
and he was always careful!
“Only Auschwitz”, he says, “that was a little too much!”
And he quotes his motto: “Everything with moderation and with
purpose!”
The centre is, as historian Hans Ulrich Gumbrecht put it when looking back
on his childhood in the early Federal Republic, a “latent gure” in post-
war West German history (Gumbrecht 2012).6 The longing for the centre
expressed the latent desire of the postwar period for the destruction of the
war to be healed, for the grievous loss of the ideology of supremacy not to
be suered, for the guilt for millions of murders not to be present. The loss
of the centre seemed to have caused the disaster; its return would provide
the longed-for restitution.
The presence today of the notion of the centre is inseparably linked to the
early history of Europe and to the postwar history of the Federal Republic
of Germany. Having taken its place as a latent gure and invocation, the
centre was adapted in parallel to the development of the Federal Republic.
The centre has long been invoked in the rhetoric of election campaigns, rst
in the early 1970s, when Willy Brandt’s campaign team called on the SPD
to represent the “new centre” (which indicated that structural changes to
working society and the lines of conict shaping it had cost the SPD its
electorate, not because there was no longer a working class, but because
Flight into Authoritarianism 7
the working class saw itself less and less as such). The CDU also sought to
represent the “centre” following the “spiritual-moral turn”, or the change of
government to the Kohl era. But it was only with the Blair-Schröder paper
on the “new middle ground” (1999) that the rhetoric of the centre really took
o, with subsequent election campaigns being conducted with the explicit
aim of winning over the centre. Election campaigners did not want, and
could not aord, to miss out on “the centre” any less than the majority in
parliament. Information on the spiritual state of this centre was also pro-
vided, for example, by Guido Westerwelle, the then Vice-Chancellor, who
spoke out in a guest article in Die Welt for those “who have worked for
everything”: “Ignoring the centre”, he wrote, “is extremely dangerous”
(Guido Westerwelle in Die Welt of 10 February 2010). The title used by the
news magazine Focus in 2009 (“The Centre – a German Fetish”) was more
clairvoyant than perhaps the authors themselves knew. The “centre” is an
idea still alive in the history of the Federal Republic of Germany. Invoking
the centre can be read as a sign of progress: the aim is no longer to be a
people’s party, but a party of the centre. But taking into account the history
of the idea reveals the character of the appeal: to address the centre is to
demand political moderation. Invoking the centre oers the hope of salva-
tion, and it is little wonder, therefore, that pointing to how little the centre
really is the stronghold of the democratic polis should trigger such erce
resistance. Linking “centre” with “right-wing extremism” is akin to slaugh-
tering a holy cow (Decker & Türcke 2016).
Thus, using the coordinates of the social situation simply cannot identify
the centre. To do so would be like taking Max Weber, the doyen of German
sociology, at his word. While examining the close functional link between
Protestantism and capitalism, Weber identied the comfort given by the
promise of salvation through the accumulation of wealth. To establish the
psychological drive behind the accumulation of capital, Weber studied not
all currents of Protestantism, but only those of Calvinism. Had he been
asked to say where this Calvinist could be found, Weber would have shaken
his head in confusion, since for him the Calvinist was an “archetypal corre-
lation of functions” and “could rarely be found in historical reality” (Weber
1904/1905: 55). Such an archetype is by no means a particularly positive
example, but the condensed manifestation of a social process, a special case
that illustrates a general social phenomenon.
It is in this sense that we have also used the notion of the centre, which
for us is a means to reveal a social and historical reality, one that only a
few wanted to acknowledge. Our notion is a montage, a form by which we
can generalize our empirical ndings, the beginning of a “critical typology”
(Adorno 1950). Or, less abstractly, we wanted to make public the fact that
the democratic society is under threat not from its margins, but from within
its apparently stable centre.
Those who criticized our studies because they wanted us to provide a
precise location of the centre (an actual postal address, so to speak) did
8 O. Decker
not understand this – or understood it only too well. Those drawing on
the notion of the centre have usually interpreted it correctly on this point:
namely, it was the canon of views of the extreme right on social and polit-
ical themes deemed acceptable by a broad section of the population
(Butterwegge 2002; Lohmann 1994). Similar constellations are referred to
in political science as the Overton window, named after the US political
advisor Joseph P. Overton, who advised candidates for political oce to
adopt generally accepted views – to shift the discourse in their favour. Or,
to adopt his metaphor, to open the window wider. But the window has long
been wide open to extreme right-wing views.
Our ndings show that the centre does not guarantee stability. The centre
of society has articulated, and is still articulating, views and concerns that
fundamentally contradict how democracy understands itself in the Federal
Republic of Germany. The centre is not a site of moderation, as desirable as
this would be. The history of the notion of the centre reects all this. Thus,
the tension between centre and right-wing extremism can be exposed and
analyzed, but what we used to break a taboo in 2006 has now become a
social reality visible to everyone. The public speeches of the extreme right,
the attacks on shelters for asylum seekers, the new self-condence with
which racists and anti-Semites in the AfD speak out, and representatives of
the AfD demonstrate together with right-wing extremists, as in Chemnitz
in August 2018 – these are clearly visible and clearly audible, and we do not
need empirical social researchers to point to the latent dangers. The fact
that these right-wing slogans are also echoed by democratic parties indi-
cates how wide the Overton window has been opened to racist positions. We
should also note at the same time, though, that the acceptance of extreme
right-wing positions has become weaker rather than stronger in many polit-
ical milieus over the past ten years. In 2016, there were more people living
in democratic milieus, and fewer in authoritarian milieus, than had been
the case ten years earlier (Decker & Brähler 2016). We did not intend this
nding to suggest that the danger had passed. If we wish to understand the
social and psychological processes behind the vicissitudes, then the notion
of the “centre” has its drawbacks. To analyze the social dynamics involved,
we also require something more.
Populism – the increasing popularity of a concept
When we began documenting the spread of extreme right-wing attitudes
among the population, many were surprised at how prevalent such attitudes
were, since there was no extreme right-wing party that came even close to
achieving such a high level of electoral support. However, the social sciences
make a fundamental distinction between attitudes and behaviour, with atti-
tudes not necessarily translating into behaviour. The last few years have
witnessed a change, though, with behaviour now apparently adapting to
the attitudes that had long existed. Not only has there been a surge in the
Flight into Authoritarianism 9
number of violent and criminal acts perpetrated by right-wing extremists;
extreme right-wing attitudes have become increasingly manifest in the way
that people vote. What the NPD did not succeed in doing is currently bene-
ting the AfD: those Germans who had long harboured extreme right-wing
attitudes, be it chauvinism, support for a dictatorship, anti-Semitism, or
xenophobia, but who had previously voted for the SPD or CDU, are now
voting in line with their beliefs, and have found a political home in the AfD
(Kiess et al. 2015).
This does not turn the entire AfD into an extreme right-wing party, but
there has been a clear trend in recent years. The AfD started as a national-
liberal party and was thus initially situated on this side of a political cordon
sanitaire drawn around extreme right-wing parties in Germany. The AfD
was thus able both to secure a place on the party spectrum and to win over
those people who feared having their civic reputation damaged by associ-
ation. University lecturers, psychotherapists, and army ocers would not
have been able to join a party like the NPD without having to fear the
consequences. The AfD then underwent a very quick ideological reorienta-
tion, though, one linked with the names of its rapidly changing party lead-
ers: from the rst leader Bernd Lucke and his national-liberal anti-euro
party to the conservative-nationalist AfD of his successor Frauke Petri,
and the party of Alexander Gauland, where populist-nationalist factions
dominate.
The refugee movement to Europe also gave the AfD the issue that has
since carried it from one electoral success to the other. In 2014 and 2015,
more people were in ight in the world than ever before, and Europe
and Germany were not spared the consequences of the catastrophes that
European countries themselves had (partly) caused. This human misery
was a godsend to the AfD, since the refugees provided something that had
seldom been available before: namely, a political issue that bridged the ide-
ological gap between extreme right-wing and national-conservative milieus,
with the AfD thereby becoming the party that it is today, one comprising
very dierent political currents (not least, populist-nationalist, anti-liberal,
Christian-fundamentalist, and extreme right-wing).
This development is linked to a shift in public debate that warrants our
attention. The distinction introduced in the 1970s between “right-wing
extremism” and “right-wing radicalism” was used to classify political objec-
tives until quite recently. While the former is directed against the liberal-
democratic basis of society and is therefore a case for the protection of the
constitution, the latter (Latin: radix, roots) has a place in the canon of the
democratic process of negotiation. As dicult as it is to distinguish between
them, these terms have always had a primarily practical meaning, as they
originate not from academia, but from the eld of politics (Kiess & Decker
2010). However, talk today is no longer of “right-wing extremism” or “right-
wing radicalism”, but always of “right-wing populism” – and at a time when
there is a party oering a broad platform to the traditional ideas of the
10 O. Decker
extreme right, such as populist-nationalist views, anti-Semitism, and the
trivialization of Nazism.
Although there are also constants that make the concept of populism
appear as a legitimate heir to the concept of extremism (for example, a
distinction is made between a left and a right variant), its current boom is
nevertheless astonishing. The concept of right-wing populism has moved
within a very short time from its academic niche to the political centre.
Populism was already present in academic circles in the 1950s in studies
on political movements in North and South America (Knöbl 2016), and
the editors of a volume on the same subject saw this spectre at work at the
end of the 1960s: “A spectre is haunting the world – populism” (Ionescu &
Gellner 1969: 1). In the 1980s, the Marxist theorist Stuart Hall identied an
“authoritarian populism” (Hall 1982) as a political reaction to the Anglo-
American neoliberalism (“Thatcherism” and “Reaganomics”) emerging at
the beginning of the decade and the devastating social eects that ensued.
According to Hall, such a populism should be opposed by a “popular-
democratic” position.
Although the left may also attempt to use populism for its own purposes
(Moue 2015), populism is driven by the right, which can be seen very clearly
across the world: Viktor Orbán, Donald Trump and Geert Wilders, and the
parties Dansk Folkeparti in Denmark, UKIP in Great Britain, Forza Italia
in Italy, the ÖVP in Austria, and Fidesz in Hungary are all regarded as
right-wing populist. What lies behind these populist movements, parties or
leaders, and what programmes or goals they pursue, can be very dierent
(for an overview, see Priester 2016). It is not without reason that the authors
of a recent study on the spread of right-wing populist attitudes in Germany
have noted that populism is “a multifaceted term, ambiguous and overlaid
with numerous meanings” (Vehrkamp & Wratil 2017: 14).
But this is precisely what could make populism an analytically power-
ful concept, since the object that it describes is itself multifaceted and con-
tradictory, and therefore dicult to pin down. Although academia lacks a
uniform denition of right-wing populism, the denitions that exist all jux-
tapose “people” (Volk) and “elite” (Mudde & Kaltwasser 2017: 5). But that
alone cannot explain populism. As the political scientist Jan-Werner Müller
has already argued, populism also mobilizes against pluralism, since the
“core claim of all populists” is: “We – and only we – represent the true Volk”
(Müller 2016: 26). Here, right-wing populism emphasizes the “Volk”, and the
“true” Volk. It is not concerned with majorities or democracy, but rather
with constructing a homogeneous “Volk” and a threat to the will of the
Volk by – mostly foreign – “elites”. For, populism is for Müller the “idea of
politics in which a morally pure, homogeneous Volk is always opposed by
immoral, corrupt and parasitic elites – with these elites not actually belong-
ing to the Volk at all” (42).
This denition also underlies the Bertelsmann Foundation’s “Populism
Barometer”, a study conducted since 2017 that takes the two elements
Flight into Authoritarianism 11
anti-establishment and anti-pluralism, supplemented by a third dimension,
pro-sovereignty of the Volk (i.e. the demand for more direct democracy), to
determine the “populist attitude” of the population (Vehrkamp & Merkel
2018: 25). Its ndings are signicant: 30.5% of people have an explicitly
populist attitude, and 36.8% a somewhat populist attitude (28), with these
gures on the increase. The greatest increase in the populism thus recorded
is located in a well-known place, since, according to a central nding of the
study, there is a “growing populism in the political centre” (31). Thus, the
threat to democracy that populism poses also does not emanate from
the margins. However, this also cannot close the analytical gap that opens
up in the notion of the centre. On the contrary, it is noticeable that the
authors of the study do not discuss the ideological anchoring or the reasons
for the spread of the “populist attitude”.
Yet, the motives themselves are revealing: the idea of a “homogeneous
Volk” deceived by “foreign elites” clearly expresses more than the desire
for more involvement. Seeing populism as a “weak ideology” (Mudde &
Kaltwasser 2017: 6) cannot account for its “aversion towards the ‘patronis-
ing’ attitude that the functional elites have to the Volk ” (Priester 2012: 4);
rather, populism is absolutely dependent on a more comprehensive ideol-
ogy. The NSDAP also relied on the juxtaposition of a “homogeneous Volk”
and an imagined external threat from the global elite of a “Jewish, raven-
ous nancial capitalism”, and therefore required anti-Semitism as the ide-
ological core of its propaganda. This becomes very clear when we look at
the AfD, whose alliance with representatives of the xenophobic and violent
movement Pegida (in Chemnitz, for example; see Chapter 8 in this volume),
the racism of many of its exponents, and its anti-egalitarian political goals
clearly show that behind its populism there lies a predominantly right-
wing extremist worldview. Its rhetoric is shaped by metaphors of a “popu-
lar uprising” against a “dictatorship”, against “traitors of the people”, the
“lying press”, and “elites”. Representatives of the AfD such as Björn Höcke,
leader of the party faction in the Thuringian state parliament, believe that a
“Schwellenzeit” (“threshold”) has arrived that marks the transition to a new
society.7 The right-wing populist desire for the overthrow and end of plural
democracy is not possible without an extreme right-wing ideology. That is
also true when the desire is expressed a little more quietly.
Party and faction leader Gauland asked himself and his readers in a guest
article in the Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung in October 2018: “Why did
[populism] come into being? What is it a reaction to?” He answers this ques-
tion by talking about “people from business, politics, entertainment and
culture – and above all the new species of those working in digital informa-
tion”. Members of this “globalized class”, he argues, “set the pace cultur-
ally and politically”, since they “control information”. Their “attachment
to their respective homelands” is weak, and they are responsible for the
“rift” that runs through “all Western societies”, a rift “considerably wid-
ened” when “suddenly billions of taxpayers’ money was available to save
12 O. Decker
banks, support bankrupt European states, and help hundreds of thousands
of immigrants” (Gauland 2018: 8). Gauland’s arguments are aimed not sim-
ply at “those up there”. Rather, he uses the same stereotypes as the fascist
propagandists of the 20th century, employing a conspiracy theory that sees
in the background a global, deracinated and exploitative elite at work. With
the help of the “culture industry”, this “elite” manages to manipulate peo-
ple and to create a “rift” in the previously harmonious “homeland”. This is
not only anti-pluralistic; such rhetoric identies actual enemies, deploying
not least the latent image of the “deracinated Jew” (Chapter 5 highlights
how closely this conspiracy theory is related to well-worn anti-Semitic atti-
tudes). What Gauland conceals or fails to recognize, of course, is that the
“rift” in the “homeland” has long been there, and that it is due not to indi-
vidual persons or elites, but to political conicts and social contradictions.
And whether the AfD’s goal really is to heal the rift is at best extremely
doubtful. Although Gauland writes that “globalization looks much nicer
from the penthouse than from social housing”, the radical market pro-
gramme pursued by the AfD suggests that it would abolish not the pent-
house but the social housing (Kim 2018). It is a classic stylistic device of the
agitator to talk about poverty, but not about its economic causes. Instead,
personication is used to legitimize aggression against people. Hostility to
Muslims, anti-Semitism, historical revisionism, and sometimes openly rac-
ist positions – these make clear that right-wing extremism is the ideological
core of this populism. The success of right-wing populists makes discover-
ing its causes ever more urgent.
Despite its public popularity, the concept of “populism” can be of no
assistance. The fact that almost everyone is currently championing the
concept is due to the attempt to introduce into the public debate a kind
of “extremism-light”, which is intended to delegitimize the agitator, but
not those who enthusiastically agree with her. This is not the fault of the
discipline that produced the concept of populism. As the political scientist
Gideon Botsch writes:
The terminological confusion around the concept of populism points
to helplessness. Obviously, “right-wing populism” is intended to
refer to something that is somehow perceived as right-wing and some-
how as unpleasant. It is an avoidance strategy: parts of the public
domain, including state authorities, are reluctant to speak of right-wing
extremism. Right-wing populism becomes a proxy concept. Evaluating
the AfD in terms of right-wing extremism is therefore long overdue
(Botsch, in print).
Those who believe that populists are “disappointed democrats” (Vehrkamp
& Wratil 2017: 9) because they reject a pluralistic society but arm the idea
of democracy are mistaken. What about a democrat who becomes anti-
democratic because she is disappointed with democracy? The right-wing
Flight into Authoritarianism 13
populism that Gauland is presenting to his readers here is instead a form
of propaganda, a technique of agitation that only works because it meets a
need among those to whom it is addressed. But how the willingness arises
to consume and honour this populist propaganda is rarely the object of
research on populism – often explicitly not. Müller, for example, repeat-
edly and sharply distances himself in his essay from such research. “It is a
mistake […] to psychologize populism”, he argues, understandably justify-
ing his demand to “deal with populists on an equal footing”, and polemi-
cizing against the constant talk of “concerned citizens” and “fears” (Müller
2016: 20). The political arena is concerned with political conicts, but
ignoring the subjectivity and irrationality of members of society means only
being able to understand society incompletely. The concept of populism can
perhaps describe – but it cannot understand – the dynamics that lead to the
resentment that people feel towards “elites”, since the concept is too static.
Müller is indeed on the right track when he writes: “Populists should be rec-
ognized not by their supposedly resentful voters – but by their words” (65).
The words of populists are only addressed to an audience that needs to hear
them, and it is only by answering the question of why individuals have this
need that we can hope for change. Social psychology is indispensable. If we
wish to understand the social reality in which right-wing populism thrives,
we cannot simply ignore how this need arose. The agitators do not seduce
people; they address almost somnambulistically the needs of their listen-
ers. The latter are not taken in by the populists; rather, each side creates
the other. This was already addressed in Leo Löwenthal’s classic and now
topical study:
The agitator’s statements are often ambiguous and unserious. It is dif-
cult to pin him down to anything and he gives the impression that
he is deliberately playacting. He seems to be trying to leave himself
a margin of uncertainty, a possibility of retreat in case any of his
improvisations fall at. He does not commit himself for he is willing,
temporarily at least, to juggle his notions and test his powers. […] as
in cases of individual seduction neither partner is entirely passive, and
it is not always clear who initiates the seduction. In seduction there
operates not only mistaken notions or errors of judgment which are
the result of ruses but also, and predominantly, psychological factors
that reect the deep conscious and unconscious involvement of both
parties (Löwenthal 1949: 5).
This and similar passages seem strangely familiar.8 They remind us of
Donald Trump and Björn Höcke, speakers who can be classied as agita-
tors (Löwenthal would probably have called them fascist agitators) and not
as the magicians that they very probably consider themselves to be. They are
the spectre that their listeners conjure up and yet have no control over. To
understand this dynamic academically has nothing to do with psychological
14 O. Decker
insinuations, as Müller claims (Müller 2016: 36); rather, it opens up our view
of a society that itself constantly creates precisely what threatens it. It is per-
haps also these very needs that make the project of a “left-wing populism”
hopeless. People are not ignorant about the goals of the AfD; they vote for
the party not despite its ordoliberal market radicalism, which goes against
the interests of most people, but because of it. Voting for the AfD is for them
about something else.
The fear of freedom
Attentive observers noticed the special political and economic situation in
which the middle strata of society found themselves in the 1920s and 1930s.
Geiger, for example, believed that it was above all their shame and fear of
social demotion that prepared the ground for fascism (see above). But the
sociologist and journalist Siegfried Kracauer also drew a portrait in his
The Salaried Masses (1929) of a stratum that developed during the Weimar
Republic: although seeing themselves as located between the working class
and the middle class that Geiger spoke about, salaried employees were
always in a precarious economic position. As Kracauer noted: “Uniform
professional conditions and collective contracts determine the shape of
existence, which, as will become apparent, is also subject to the stand-
ardizing inuence of enormous ideological powers” (65). Writing in 1935
while already in exile, the social philosopher Ernst Bloch also presented
an inventory of the “articial centre”: “Despite miserable pay, assembly
line, extreme existential insecurity, fear of old age, obstruction by ‘higher’
strata – in short, proletarianization – they still feel in fact like a middle-class
centre” (Bloch 1935: 33). A self-deception with serious consequences. The
employees, Bloch sums up, are “a kind of core group of today’s so-called
National Socialism” (34).
Kracauer and Bloch belonged to the circle of the Institute for Social
Research in Frankfurt am Main, the source of the most inuential empiri-
cal studies on prejudice and fascism, Max Horkheimer’s Authority and the
Family (1936). Begun and planned against the background of the political
and economic crises of the 1920s, it was designed to obtain information
about the political consciousness of workers and employees, and ultimately
to gauge the stability of democracy in the Weimar Republic. The authors
Max Horkheimer, Herbert Marcuse, and Erich Fromm no longer published
their ndings in the Weimar Republic, however, but partly in exile, and
partly also after the end of the Second World War. The impression that they
had gained at the beginning of the 1930s was devastating. By the time that
the Institute had evaluated the rst 700 of the 3,000 questionnaires, Fromm
had already concluded that only 15% of the respondents “could be expected
to put up some kind of defence of democracy in critical times” (Fromm
1937/1938: 188). Most respondents did not attach any value to the equality of
all and the freedom of the individual. And the times were critical. The fact
Flight into Authoritarianism 15
that the authors, like most of the Institute’s sta, had to escape into exile
before the NSDAP’s seizure of power was due not least to these ndings.
The publication also paid special attention to a position in the economic
system: to workers and employees. There was apparently no escaping the
tension in which members of society found themselves on account of their
social and economic situation. But the authors of the study went further by
also exploring the political consciousness of the population, which they did
so not only from the classic perspective of Marxism, i.e. by investigating
people’s position in the economic system. The psychology of fascism could
not be overcome by using a simple stimulus-response model from learn-
ing theory, and Horkheimer and his co-authors therefore drew on Sigmund
Freud’s psychoanalysis to understand the complex formation of conscious-
ness, and indeed its unconscious elements. Through psychoanalysis, they
hoped to discover what eects society had on the individuals living in it.
The starting point was historical analysis. For Horkheimer, every human
society has witnessed the dominance of one human being over another.
There has, however, always been resistance to this dominance, to author-
ity as a principle of dominance, which for Horkheimer is the reason that
authority has gradually moved further and further into the interior of those
dominated (Horkheimer 1936: 357). The agency of control was therefore no
longer something external, but had become part of the personality. Social
theorists of very dierent schools had already made this observation: from
Karl Marx to Friedrich Nietzsche, Max Weber and Emile Durkheim, as
well as Norbert Elias and Sigmund Freud. But Horkheimer was the rst
to emphasize the paradoxical eect that this internalized authority had:
only it can make the subject embrace its own subjugation. But the task that
Horkheimer had set himself was to understand why people embrace their
own subjugation. Authority was the key – that much was agreed. It was
obvious to him from a cultural-historical point of view to start, like Weber,
with Protestantism and Calvinism: liberation from the papal yoke was
followed by the inner, constant self-control of Protestantism. By liberating
themselves from Rome, Protestants had entered into the greatest possible
uncertainty, for while the priest had previously vouchsafed the godliness of
earthly existence and the imminent joy on the other side, both now remained
uncertain in Protestantism. This resulted for Weber in the capitalist’s
restless accumulation of wealth, for the owner of treasure hopes at least to
nd in earthly wealth proof of divine grace. Horkheimer took Weber’s nd-
ings to mean that emancipation from religion had become stuck halfway,
with people’s willingness to depend on authority characterizing the modern
era (384).
Horkheimer drew on Freud’s theory of socialization to analyze not only
consciousness, but also unconscious identication, thereby focusing his
empirical investigation on both individuals and society – and thus on the
ambivalent relationship to authority. For, according to Freud, the needs of
children are dealt with only through violence or the threat of violence, since
16 O. Decker
the child does not renounce the universal pleasure principle, its desires, vol-
untarily, and would not accept the forms of social behaviour through mere
pressure. Thus, the question of what society threatens from within became
relevant to the investigation. There was something about socialization,
about growing into society and its demands, that created a fundamental
ambivalence towards this society. The father was still the dominant image
of violence in patriarchal society at the beginning of the 20th century. He
could demand submission, and in return could promise (his sons) partic-
ipation in his power. It was this submission that created an ambivalence
towards authority: on the one hand, children identied with the goals and
norms of the father, but on the other, they had to leave aside their feelings of
aggression, which had been created by violence and by the fact that they had
had to subjugate their own desires. The weak and apparently deviant pro-
vided a valve for their aggression. That is the “authoritarian personality”,
whose essential characteristics are its readiness to submit to authority, its
authoritarian aggression, its emphasis on conventions, its anti-intraception,
and its projectivity (the last two would now perhaps be called reticence and
the conspiracy mindset). The authoritarian personality needs the group in
which it can identify with a common ideal embodied in authority. Hence,
the longing for a leader who constitutes the mass – from which others per-
ceived as weak and deviant can be persecuted.
This preparatory work was followed in the 1940s by a study group
that became known as the Berkeley Group after its research centre at the
University of California. It included Theodor W. Adorno (an exiled mem-
ber of the Frankfurt Institute for Social Research), Elke Frenkel-Brunswik
(a psychologist and psychotherapist who had ed from Austria), and the US
social psychologists R. Nevitt Sanford and Daniel J. Levinson. The group
presented a study based on interviews and questionnaires in 1950, which
was called The Authoritarian Personality (Adorno et al. 1950). However,
the authors described not only one personality type that had authoritarian
traits, but in fact, six types of authoritarian “high scorer” and ve types
of the democrat.
Horkheimer, Marcuse, and Fromm, as well as the Berkeley Group,
used the idea of an authoritarian personality to criticize society. Thus,
their criticism was focused not on individuals or their prejudices and
anti-democratic attitudes, but on society, which formed people into
authoritarian personalities. To this end, socialization was understood as a
process that mediates the demands that society places on its members, and
ensures that these demands are met. How is it that people behave as they
are intended to behave, and still feel that their behaviour is the product of
their own wishes?
The insight underlying this question is that domination takes the form of
brutal command only in the rarest of cases. There is no need in such cases
for social theorists to give clever explanations as to why people obey when
they are threatened by violence. But the exercise of domination is usually
Flight into Authoritarianism 17
much more subtle, and requires the insights of social psychology. The crucial
decision made by the Frankfurt Institute at the end of the Weimar Republic
and by the Berkeley Group was to use psychoanalysis – not as a method
of treatment, but as a psychology to explain development. Psychoanalysis
helped to reconstruct how society conveys what is desired and what is not, a
process that begins in early childhood. The wishes and hopes that motivate
the behaviour of adults, even if they are usually unaware of what motivates
their behaviour, are formed in childhood. The child absorbs who she is to
other people. If all goes well, she forms a stable idea in this stage of life
of who she is and what her wishes are, and can separate herself from the
demands of the outside world.
The Berkeley Group therefore understood human behaviour primarily
as an expression of the desires and conicts that extend from the child-
hood past into the adult present. Embedded in the psychological structure
of ego and super-ego, early desires make their presence felt retrospectively,
enabling people to confront society with their own will and therefore to
respond to their environment in a way that is more complex than is allowed
for in the stimulus-response model.
The Berkeley Group researchers who were studying authoritarianism at
the turn of the 20th century saw the family as the prominent site of social-
ization. When things went wrong, this socialization produced an authori-
tarian personality – something that had long been the rule rather than the
exception. This was also described by artists and writers such as Heinrich
Mann, who condensed the authoritarian personality of the German Empire
into the gure of Diederich Heßling (Man of Straw, 1914).
The norms of patriarchal society were often imposed by force. A person’s
ability to recognize her own desires was more a product of chance, with
identication with the father leading much more often to what psychoana-
lysts call “identifying with the aggressor”: instead of distancing herself from
the patriarchal norms, the person would internalize them. This obedience
was “compensated” for by the promise of participation in the power of the
authoritarian father, as long as that person conformed. As Fromm put it,
the father and all subsequent authoritarian gures provide the authori-
tarian personality with a “‘the security of a prosthesis”: the world thereby
loses […] its chaotic character” (Fromm 1936: 179). Hence, the “ight into
authoritarianism” always remains a great temptation (Fromm 1941: 300).
The “worshipping of authority” is a metaphor, but it points to the fact that
it is used as a protective power against unforeseeable threats (Horkheimer
1936: 366).
From a psychoanalytical perspective, the whole ambivalence of the desire
for identication with an authoritarian gure, hatred of weakness, and
emphasis on conventions is the result of the resolution of the Oedipal con-
ict. When the child gives up competing with the father and replaces her own
desires with identication with the superior power of the father, she arms
her own submission and directs the aggression that results from this at those
18 O. Decker
who appear to be precisely what forced her to abandon her desires: namely,
weak. Fromm understood the resentment that a person feels towards others
as being both anger at her own weakness and hatred for the father.
But because parents also had a self-will that could not be reconciled
entirely with social norms, the family also provided a shelter at the begin-
ning of the 20th century, one where early interaction (especially with the
mother) could coagulate into what psychoanalysts call “psychic structure”.
The term “structure” is also, of course, a metaphor, and it suggests that
identity has something to do with a person’s ability to disengage. For a per-
son to give up her own wishes from need or coercion must rst know that
these wishes exist. Initially, the world is undierentiated for the infant, and
it is only over time that, through contact with the mother, the infant forms
an idea of who she is: that is, who she is for the mother. Developed grad-
ually in early childhood, this basal ego structure allows the adult at best
and despite later repression to recognise her own wishes and to deal with
conicts – and to reconcile these wishes with the demands both of society
and of other people.
These studies are almost 90 years old and describe a social landscape that
no longer exists. Horkheimer already pointed out that, although authority
is a constant of human existence, it manifests itself dierently over time,
with the authority that people submit to and that they long for also varying
widely. In the 1960s, Herbert Marcuse described a fundamental change to
socialization, since the family now had to share its central role with social
institutions. The economic hegemony of the father could still be defended
for some time, but his direct claim to power over his own property was
gradually restricted. According to Marcuse, this led paradoxically to the
psychic residuals of the individual becoming smaller. The father’s loss of
power did not lead to a new social tolerance, since the more open the family
became, the more the mass media, peers, and social institutions took over
responsibility for conveying norms and rules (Marcuse 1963). Socialization
still, of course, takes place in the family today, but Marcuse already saw
in the last century how the constant media attack enabled social norms to
penetrate the inner space of the family, and thus impact on the child much
more directly. And what he had in mind were only television and radio; not
smartphones and the Internet.
Going back is barely an option for parents. On the contrary, it is they
who, with their permanent duty to receive and transmit, demonstrate to
the child the rights of access that society has. The fact that authority is not
represented through the parents should be clear even to children whose par-
ents try to evoke the bugaboo of past greatness. The constant imperatives
of media attention weaken people’s ability to disengage, and therefore also
their ability to defer action and impose their own will (Türcke 2012). Thus
(to continue the spatial metaphor), the psychic structure becomes more per-
meable, which (and critical theorists are still agreed on this point today)
increasingly impacts on individual freedom.
Flight into Authoritarianism 19
The philosopher Helmut Dubiel (1986) divided the historical process by
which domination is internalized into “three sequential types of cultural
character”. The rst, the character led by tradition, existed up until the
19th century (265). This was followed by the character guided inter-
nally, which corresponds to “the capitalist societies of the 19th and early
20th centuries, in which the conformity of social behaviour is produced
by the individual internalization of norms” (265). This goes hand in hand
with the autonomy of the ego, distancing from society, and an orientation
towards instrumental work – whose costs for society lay in authoritarian
aggression. According to Dubiel, though, this character also belongs to the
past, and has been replaced by the character guided externally, one whom
the “loss of autonomy […] brings to conformity through orienting it to the
expectations of others” (265). Thus, for Dubiel: “External control takes
place through social objects, indirectly through the mass media, political
propaganda and social institutions” (265). The process described by Dubiel
has implications for the notion of the authoritarian personality today.
“It’s the economy, stupid!” – authoritarian
dynamics in modern societies
Theodor Geiger was very clear about what led to the strengthening of
fascism: “panic in the middle layer of society” at the prospect of demo-
tion, shame, and anger at the loss of respectability. Although this did not
yet clarify why panic broke out, an important element for describing the
authoritarian personality is also to take account of the economic situa-
tion, which leads in most cases to explaining the anti-democratic attitude
as the product of the experience or fear of social demotion. This explana-
tion is still popular today, and is the starting point for a number of con-
temporary studies. However, the debate about the impact of the economic
situation is not nished, especially as the situation seems to be worsening
for large sections of the population (Goebel et al. 2010; Grabka & Frick
2008). The argument often forwarded is that, when incomes drift apart,
then society also becomes polarized politically. But it is an argument that
is contradicted almost as often: AfD voters have not been left behind; they
are simply xenophobic (Schröder 2018).
The most recent debate on this issue was triggered by a 2017 article in
the Cologne Journal for Sociology and Social Psychology by the sociologist
Holger Lengfeld (2017), who disagreed with the thesis that it those who
are aected negatively by modernization who are more prone to right-wing
extremism. The data from a nationwide representative survey that he drew
on and his analysis of AfD voters showed that, among the inuences that
explain anity for the AfD, a person’s own economic situation is neg-
ligible. Lengfeld’s claim did not go unchallenged, and not least because
the sample that he used contained hardly any unemployed people. Other
research groups then joined the debate, and drew on representative data
20 O. Decker
to argue that the economic situation certainly does have an inuence on a
person’s support for the AfD (Lux 2018). Moreover, although another study
found less evidence of a direct link between a person’s economic situation
and support for the AfD, it did suggest as a more likely cause a shift in
society’s system of values (Rippl & Seipel 2018). In other words, AfD voters
see a threat not to their own economic status, but, as Susanne Rippl and
Christian Seipel have noted, to the traditional value system that they feel is
being eroded by the opening of society to more diversity and tolerance. But
Lengfeld stuck to his core thesis, even though there are more AfD voters
among those with a precarious status in society, among the working class,
and among those with a low level of social resources (such as a low level
of education). According to Lengfeld, redistributing social wealth would
therefore not deter AfD voters from voting for the party, since that is simply
not why they vote in such a way (Lengfeld 2018).
The question of why people vote for the AfD, therefore, remains con-
tested. It is, in any case, clear that people vote for a party that not only
attracts the votes of many right-wing extremists, but that also pursues a
radical market programme. That supports Lengfeld’s thesis. But the con-
spiracy mindset that underlies Gauland’s ideas supports Rippl and Seipel,
and their argument that people’s perception of threat is signicant.
Contradictory ndings can also sometimes be found within a single
work. For example, Oliver Nachtwey’s 2016 book Die Abstiegsgesellschaft
(Germany’s Hidden Crisis: Social Decline in the Heart of Europe) traces the
shift from the “social modernity” of the postwar period, which mitigated
the risks of poverty, to the “regressive modernity” of the present, which
falls short of these social standards (Nachtwey 2016: 75). For Nachtwey,
the precarious situation in which many people currently nd themselves
results in a “regressive rebellion against a democracy that conforms to
the market” (218), the consequences of which are “neo-authoritarian cur-
rents” (217) and “authoritarian mindsets”, since “many people are forced
to give subjective armation to the imperatives of the market” (222).
However, the current situation cannot really be described as a society in
decline. Indeed, this also occurs to Nachtwey, who wonders whether the
“ndings presented are sucient to speak of a society in decline? After all,
there are still more people on their way up than there are people on their
way down” (161). But he concludes nonetheless that, even if the escalator is
not going down, then for many people it is also no longer going up. However,
does the fact that the promise of social ascent is apparently kept less fre-
quently today really result in “normative uncertainties”, because there is a
divergence between the claims and reality of the “ascending society”? That
must be doubted, if Nachtwey’s other observation is correct: namely, that
people are increasingly resorting
to strategies of self-optimization. These result in an intensied, and
almost total, devotion to competition. […] Many people […] occupy
Flight into Authoritarianism 21
themselves productively every day and around the clock. They do
without demands on the good life, […] they push themselves faster and
faster (165).
It is true that self-optimization – techniques to full and anticipate the
ever-increasing demands of society – has shaped almost everyone into an
“entrepreneurial self” (Bröckling 2007). But, where people expend all that
energy on meeting standards of performance, they are clearly not uncer-
tain, but indeed quite clear, about social norms: the norms to which they
submit themselves are known. If such submission is carried out voluntarily,
then it is part of an authoritarian dynamic. But this is not simply a sub-
jective armation (Nachtwey 2016: 22). If the economy combines with an
authoritarian dynamic, then submission can be secured not only by coer-
cion, but also by people’s needs.
However, the integration of the economy into an authoritarian dynamic
is not new. Drawing on Horkheimer’s suggestion that there are strong links
between the armation of authority, capitalist accumulation, and the
anticipation of salvation, Herbert Marcuse predicted more than 50 years
ago that “capitalism” would take on the position of authority (Marcuse
1963). Scholars have spoken increasingly in recent years of an authoritarian
market radicalism (Butterwegge 2008). The French social theorist Michel
Foucault also observed at the end of the 1970s: “We have in contemporary
Germany a state that can be called a radically economic state, if ‘radical’
is understood in the strict sense of the term: it is completely economic at its
roots” (Foucault 1979: 126).
But this analysis of the authoritarian state often suers from the
same aws as Nachtwey’s. When speaking of “authoritarian populism”,
Alexander Demirović means a strategy of crisis management used by the
middle class, the authoritarian attitudes of the population has to mobilized
in a second step, is not the driving force but the bitter end of an ideolog-
ical manipulation (Demirović 2018: 17). The social psychologist Wilhelm
Heitmeyer does focus on character, but even this does not close the gap to
the interior of the psyche: “The inevitable enforcement of the obligation to
become exible […] is just as much a part of the new character of an authori-
tarian capitalism as the deliberate violation of human integrity” (Heitmeyer
2001: 501). By “character”, Heitmeyer means not the interior of capitalist
society, but the complete disinterest of this society in the human costs of
the economic imperative. Yet, as Heitmeyer’s criticism of the enforcement
of exibility and Nachtwey’s reference to the end of the welfare state in the
West Germany of the 1970s suggest, this development is not new. On the
contrary, this market radicalism has a long history. And it is also this that
makes the AfD’s radical market programme so tempting for those who can
in fact not hope to benet from it.
Heitmeyer is indeed right: a society that moulds its members and leaves
them hardly any choice is authoritarian. But, although the authoritarian
22 O. Decker
dynamic is not merely the characteristic of individuals, it also cannot
take hold if it does not nd a xed anchor point within individuals. In
other words, social authority must nd an echo in the individual. We have
also described the economy as a “secondary authoritarianism” (Decker
2015b), by which we meant the psychological causes and the eect of this
authority, since it is a matter of identication and articial security. The
object of identication is secondary, because, unlike the authoritarian
dynamic that prevailed until the mid-20th century, it manages without
personal authority; an authoritarian dynamic requires neither father nor
leader (Führer) to be set in motion. A mass is constituted by an ideal-
ized object with which all members are identied. This idea derives from
Freud, who distinguished between primary masses, who have a leader,
and secondary masses, who are bound together by an abstract ideal
(Freud 1921). Football fans are an example of a secondary mass: a football
club is an important source of identity for its fans, something that welds
complete strangers together. The mechanism is very similar with author-
itarian masses; the prosperous economy of postwar West Germany was
one such idealized object. Our analysis of numerous group discussions
throughout the country shows that this idealized object gave people the
feeling that they belonged to the new system, provided the young democ-
racy with legitimacy, and allowed Germans to regain their self-condence
after 1945. The German economic miracle was then able to safeguard –
permanently, at least in West Germany – the lost narcissistic dimension
that should have been abandoned after the end of the Third Reich. This
was made all the easier because an economic miracle had in fact already
taken place in 1936. Fired by the production of war material, the econ-
omy prospered under the National Socialists, and the “German Economic
Miracle” (Deutsche Wirtschaftswunder), as it was already called at the time
(Priester 1936), provided Hitler and the NDSAP with additional legiti-
macy. What was astonishing was that the population did not notice any-
thing of the economic boom in their everyday lives, with the standard of
living for most people actually declining. But that did not alter the eect:
the authority of the Führer shone all the more brightly, since he gave the
Germans a grandiose experience economically, too. This made it very
easy after the war to isolate this part from the whole, and use the economic
boom as a narcissistic bolster (Decker 2015b).
As mentioned above, Foucault attested a particular market radicalism
to Germany at the end of the 1970s, identifying in it “the basic features
of a German governmentality, whose programmatic design seems to me
to be one of the basic features of this German neoliberalism” (Foucault
1979: 123). Foucault had a very similar research programme to Critical
Theory. He was concerned with how domination is enforced in society.
One of his central claims was that the way a society is organized – how
needs, crimes or diseases are managed within society – has an eect on
the mindset of all its members. He called this link governmentality. And it
Flight into Authoritarianism 23
is precisely with governmentality that the economy in Germany has been
concerned since the Second World War:
A stable Deutsche Mark, a satisfactory growth rate, increasing pur-
chasing power, a favourable balance of payments – these are certainly
the eects of good government in contemporary Germany, but it is
also […] the way in which the state-founding consensus is constantly
manifested and strengthened (126).
This growth economy served as the latent gure of the centre that postwar
Germany desperately needed. Having manifested itself to a certain extent in
economic growth, this new centre gave stability to the young republic. This
new centre not only legitimized democracy in post-fascist West Germany,
but also allowed links to be made with the past. If the Protestant still saw
individual wealth as guaranteeing salvation, there developed after 1945 and
after the new authority had been found that was so urgently desired a new
hope for salvation: “In the Germany of the 20th century, the arbitrary sign
of a person’s election by God is not the enrichment of a private person, but
the enrichment of the totality” (125). This hope for salvation was not with-
out precedent, for even the prot of the rst economic miracle consisted not
in the happiness of the individual, but more in the proof that it gave that the
German Volk were the chosen people.
Given this background, it is not surprising that the AfD does not wish
to be reminded of the war of annihilation waged by the Germans, since it
is a party that initially rejected the euro as a currency and interventions by
the central bank to support states, then became nationalist-conservative,
and nally developed into a populist-nationalist party. The AfD has, so to
speak, engaged reverse gear and is in a psychosocial regression. It promises
the restitution of past greatness, while at the same time not relinquishing
its Federal Republican surrogate. The picture is completed by the fact that
its handling of the shame and guilt handed down from one generation to
the next also fulls the psychological act of denial.
The capitalist economy was perhaps only able to take on the function in
Germany that we have described as narcissistic reassurance, because it has
this function in countries other than Germany and not only since the Second
World War. But fascism and the post-fascist restitution laid the capitalist
economy bare as seldom before. Religious hope is manifested not only when
individuals accumulate wealth, but also when modern society, in its xation
on growth, betrays its longing for tomorrow, which will bestow legitimacy
and meaning on everything in the present. Nachtwey was absolutely right
when he spoke of a regressive modernity. Because of the great importance
of the economy, there is always the danger that economic regression will
be accompanied by psychological and political regression. After examin-
ing every nancial crisis between 1870 and 2014, the economists Manuel
Funke, Moritz Schualrick, and Christoph Trebesch concluded in their study
24 O. Decker
“Going to extremes” that “policy uncertainty rises strongly after nancial
crises as government majorities shrink and polarization rises” (Funke et al.
2016). This is worrying news, not only because crisis is part of capitalism
like autumn is part of the seasons, but also because economic growth is
nearing its end.
The period of economic growth is over because ecological and human
exploitation no longer allows any other possibility. This “secular stagna-
tion” had already begun in the previous century: “sick recoveries which die
in their infancy and depressions which feed on themselves” (Hansen 1939: 4).
Wars still seem the only way to generate growth: rst, by producing the nec-
essary weapons; second, by rebuilding what has been destroyed. However,
the dual term “secular stagnation” reveals something of the hope for salva-
tion provided by growth. While saeculum initially designated in its original
Latin a human age or a generation (often in the clearly measured unit of
33 years of life), it was later used to designate a further time span. Its present
meaning of “world” or “pushed into the existing world”, however, was only
given to the term in medieval Latin. A secularized monastery, for example,
loses not only its religious function, but also its ability to point beyond the
existing, to transcend it. What comes to a standstill in secular stagnation
is not simply the economy, but the hope for a redeeming tomorrow to be
achieved through growth. With the current emphasis on the importance of
industry 4.0, we are witnessing such an “economy of hope”.9 It is not easy to
see the limits of growth: there is a desperate search for the next long wave
of growth, the next Kondratie cycle, be it in the commodication of those
areas still excluded from the market, such as the human body (Decker 2011).
Capitalism lives o this hope, as Stephan Lessenich emphasizes:
The accumulation dynamics of modern capitalism – which does not
want to end, and somehow is not designed to end – meets the deeper
human desire for an eternal future. In its processuality of the endless
“Keep it up”, capitalism binds people’s psychic energies to itself; it ties
them in their fear of the end to its compulsive programme of bound-
lessness: so that it may go on and on with life as we live it (Lessenich
2016: 73–74).
Hence, the constant acceleration, the devaluation of the present in favour
of tomorrow. It is the breathlessness of a time that has rationalized, but not
abandoned, the messianic idea of redemption. But capitalism does not have
to tie anyone to itself, since people’s longing produces and fuels capitalism
at the same time. As strong as the orientation of modernity to the future
may be, its source of strength lies in the past. Modern society and capi-
talism carry with them an “inheritance from pre-capitalist times” (Dubiel
1986: 273). With this orientation towards the future itself reveals this, for it
is a radicalized expectation on this side that has not given up the Christian
promise of resurrection and reconciliation, but transformed it.
Flight into Authoritarianism 25
Authoritarianism and recognition in the barter society
The economy was already a central factor in the Weimar Republic, in Nazi
Germany and in the post-fascist landscape of postwar Germany. It is a key-
stone of German history and also of German reality in the present, which
becomes apparent whenever economic regression results in a psychologi-
cal regression. Whatever is said about “exibilized” or “new” capitalism
(Sennett 1998), its survival strategies have not fundamentally changed.
German history shows how this economic model is enduringly embedded
in an authoritarian dynamic. Our socio-psychological perspective has led
us to denote as “secondary authoritarianism” the way that many people
identify not with a personal “leader”, but with an abstract object (the econ-
omy). The identication with a never fully secularized promise of salvation,
with the radicalized expectation of this life that is set aside in capitalism
(Benjamin 1921; Deutschmann 1999: 12), leads in moments of its crisis to
a shift into the fascist identication with an authoritarian leader. For, the
economy that is committed to growth may indeed hold out the prospect of
articial security for the future, but only once a fully developed economy
has put the forces of nature at the service of humankind. But for now, the
economy, like any authority, rst of all needs self-sacrice. If, as again like
any authority, it also indicates that the status of being chosen is in fact out
of reach, then it reveals itself as being a kind of “halved authoritarianism”
(Menz & Nies, 2019), which must remain as committed to security in the
here and now as the Christian religion that it inherited. While it is true that
people are very patient while waiting for the promise to be fullled, second-
ary authoritarianism turns cyclically into primary authoritarianism when
the pent-up aggression and lack of articial security make the iron casing of
bondage intolerable. Then awakens the longing for the primary leader who
allows people to shake o the yoke of self-control without having to give up
the promise held out by the capitalist economy.
This constant threat of regression makes it urgently necessary to clarify
authoritarian dynamics as well as factors to protect democracy. For, it is
becoming increasingly apparent that an economy aimed at growth will not
safeguard the basis of human life in the long term, but rather endanger it.
And it will also never be able to keep the immanent promise of growth to
abolish the niteness of being. The fact that the limits of growth were iden-
tied decades ago, but that modern society is still as addicted as ever to the
promise of growth, illustrates the magnitude of the task.
Authoritarianism is the concept that we use to analyze developments in
society in which right-wing extremism threatens to unleash this destruc-
tive potential. Like all approaches, authoritarianism also needs to be con-
stantly updated if it is not to degenerate into a rigid concept that divides
people into “sheep and goats” (Horkheimer & Adorno 1952: 363). To do so
means addressing the question of which authority permeates society, what
its rationality is, and which social contradictions are manifested in the
26 O. Decker
irrationality of members of society. Another important element of empiri-
cal research on authoritarianism is the question of how subjective identi-
cation with authority comes about, i.e. how socialization takes place. This
means reconstructing not only early childhood, but also lifelong socializa-
tion. The latter will not be the same for all people, and their experience of
society and of the authority that governs it must also be distinguished both
temporally (between generations; for example, through a changed style of
parenting) and in terms of social space (the position in the economic sys-
tem). If we do not take into account the social situation, then we will not
be able to understand authoritarianism, but the social situation is only one
piece of the puzzle. Situation also means, to emphasize this once more, not
only the individual economic situation, but also the position in the social
system in which people experience not only the recognition of their person
or function, but also social contradictions.
Authoritarianism is the generic term for a phenomenon that has an
individual and a social side. The individual side we call the “authoritarian
syndrome”; the social side, the “authoritarian dynamic”. The opposite of
authoritarianism is democracy (and thus we also have a “democratic syn-
drome” and a “democratic dynamic in society”). The dening feature of the
authoritarian syndrome is a person’s anity with rigid ideologies, which
allow her to submit to an authority, to share in its power, and to call for
others to be devalued in the name of the system. This longing for author-
ity can be satised by ideologies other than just right-wing extremism.
Distinguishing them according to “left-wing” or “right-wing” (Altemeyer
1988) obscures the two essential characteristics of the original concept.
First, the authoritarian character is less about the ideology with which the
individual justies – or, better, rationalizes – her aggressive need. Second,
such a political classication prevents us from analyzing those authorities
that cannot be classied according to a political scheme. This is especially
the case when religion becomes a factor of conict.
When we nd authoritarian aggression, authoritarian subservience,
and conventionalism in a respondent, we do not speak in our study of
an authoritarian personality, but of an authoritarian syndrome. As with
the concept of the authoritarian personality, we assume that society
shapes human needs and psychological abilities in a lifelong process of
socialization, so that the authoritarian syndrome is the expression and
consequence of this ongoing authoritarian dynamic in society. Drawing
on concepts of personality in research on political attitudes is also still
topical, whether it is embedded in social theory (Brede 1995; Busch
2007), is based on learning theory (Oesterreich 2001), or is descriptive
(Sibley & Duckitt 2008). The concept of personality has also enjoyed a
renaissance in political science, rst as a predictor of electoral behaviour
(Schumann 2002), and second as a result of experiences of socialization
(Schumann 2005; Seipel & Rippl 1999). However, we agree with Angelika
Ebrecht’s assessment that, like the changes in early socialization, the
Flight into Authoritarianism 27
concept of personality needs to be redened (Ebrecht 2010). However,
this is not possible at this point.
What Adorno said about the authoritarian personality also applies to
authoritarian syndromes formed under current social conditions: “The
extremely prejudiced person tends toward ‘psychological totalitarianism’,
something which seems to be almost a microcosmic image of the totalitar-
ian state at which he aims” (Adorno et al. 1950: 632). Our focus will there-
fore be on those aspects of subjectivity that are related to the authoritarian
syndrome (see chapter 3 in this volume). The term syndrome enables us to
establish a connection between various phenomena of the authoritarian.
Like personality, it also comes from psychology. Syndromes are dierent
symptoms that frequently occur together and for which there is assumed to
be a common cause or underlying illness. How these characteristics relate
to each other is not specied (for example, whether they are in a causal rela-
tionship or are independent of each other in the strength of their expres-
sion). The same is true of the elements of the authoritarian syndrome, with
authoritarian aggression, authoritarian subservience, and conventionalism
often occurring together in one individual; and, while the elements can
be of varying intensity and their interrelations cannot be clearly dened,
they always lead to democratic coexistence being threatened. Although we
cannot specify either the relationship between the symptoms or the causal
factors behind the formation of the syndrome, it is undisputed that, if peo-
ple with an authoritarian syndrome make up the majority of society, then
this poses a threat to democracy.
The research group led by the social psychologists Andreas Zick and
Wilhelm Heitmeyer arrived at a similar nding in their study series
Deutsche Zustände (The German State of Aairs). They also speak of a syn-
drome in the case of the group-focused enmity that they found (Zick et al.
2008): if, for example, a person is shown to be prone to devaluing Muslims,
then it is very likely that that person will also withhold respect from the
homeless and women. However, the syndrome of group-focused enmity
merely describes the visible phenomenon of devaluing others, i.e. that ele-
ment of the authoritarian syndrome that we call authoritarian aggression.
We, therefore, intend to understand group-focused enmity as part of the
authoritarian syndrome: this syndrome is authoritarian aggression. As
Fromm already pointed out, the object of hatred is relatively arbitrary.
Those harbouring these aggressions create the objects to devalue:
If [the seemingly weaker] do not prove themselves sucient (women,
children, animals), objects of sadism are as it were created articially,
be it by throwing slaves or captured enemies into the arena, or classes
or racial minorities (Fromm 1936: 174).
The authoritarian syndrome is therefore also more complex than the
syndrome of group-focused enmity because it is composed of several
28 O. Decker
authoritarian needs on the part of the individual. As we have seen, a per-
son’s political standpoint can comprise elements that completely contradict
each other, such as support for democracy, the demand for civil liberties,
and the call for fundamental rights to be denied to “others”. The fact that
an authoritarian syndrome can manifest itself through contradictory and
divergent positions within one and the same person makes it impossible to
speak of a syndrome. And, indeed, it can be composed of dierent types
(Adorno 1950), which contain in their mixture not only anti-democratic,
but also democratic and liberal, goals. The balance varies between author-
itarian aggression, the willingness to be subjugated, and conventionalism
on the one hand, and democratic, respectful, and non-destructive needs on
the other.10
Cognitive psychology also describes reactions that depict a ight into
authoritarianism (Tajfel & Turner 1979). Its basic claim is that every per-
son has a fundamental need for self-esteem and approval, which she can
satisfy by identifying with a group that is positive for her. As part of this
group, she can then revel in its size and splendour, and gain assurance of
her own value. This identication means that the norms and goals of a per-
son’s group become the central maxims of her own actions. We could say
that the increase in self-esteem is balanced out by a decrease in self. Social
psychology has been able to show that people take the path or shortcut to
self-esteem via the group especially when they cannot achieve self-esteem
through their own eorts. When under threat, people give undue emphasis
to the norms of their own group.
This mechanism described by Tajfel and Turner is well documented, but
it is not simply the eect of a static desire for positive identity. A psychology
that would accept this mechanism runs the risk of returning to Pavlov’s dog,
and progress cannot be made here without analyzing the social framework
that produces the identity whose desire for individual recognition can be
satised by belonging to a group. If the shortest path to a positive identity
involves the appropriation of a group identity, then this is more a symptom –
a weakness of the ego on the part of the individual. But if this does not
remain an individual fate, but occurs in masses, it is the symptom of a social
process, which makes clarifying the concrete motives an urgent task.
Unlike other psychological theories, we assume here a dynamic uncon-
scious that contains the essential motives of human action, these motives
resulting from processes of identication and the mediation of permissible
or impermissible needs, as well as the means of their satisfaction. For us, the
reasons for an action are already a compromise between social demands and
a person’s own desires on the one hand, and at the same time unconscious
desires on the other. The sum of these desires also results from a person’s
lifelong socialization, as well as her ability to interact with the environment
and to turn her desires into actions as part of her own personality. We claim
that these personality traits are all the more rmly anchored the earlier the
desires are mediated and the abilities developed.
Flight into Authoritarianism 29
Since we do not assume that there is one authoritarian personality, we
use the term authoritarian syndrome. Authoritarian syndromes can dier in
terms of their appearance, composition, and strength of individual elements,
but they share the characteristics of authoritarian aggression, authoritar-
ian subservience, and conventionalism. Furthermore, we assume that the
authoritarian syndrome also includes the conspiracy mindset. The author-
itarian syndrome also manifests itself in a reticence and lack of ability to
give recognition to and perceive others in their independence. In contrast,
the democratic syndrome is characterized by an openness and acceptance
of dierence, the rejection of authoritarian aggression and of the desire for
submission to an authority, and a lack of rigidity in enforcing norms.
No society is without authoritarian dynamics, since authority under-
lies domination, which itself marks the history of all previous societies,
and bringing into existence a society free of authority is a task for the
future. However, societies dier in the degree to which they exert pressure
on individuals, and how much freedom they allow them to develop their
personality and to full their own wishes. A distinguishing feature of an
authoritarian dynamic can be those demands that require the subjugation
of the individual to the domination of a general principle. The authoritar-
ian dynamic aims to subordinate as much as possible the wishes and life
goals of the individual for the benet of this social ideal. This can also take
place quietly, through a “hyperadminstrative state” (Foucault 1979: 135),
which weakens the individual and denies her recognition.
The balance of power between the general and the particular, i.e. between
society and individual, has shifted in recent years to the detriment of the
latter, and the new police laws, for example, suggest that it will probably
continue to shift in this direction. Research should therefore focus on the
lifelong mediation of domination and redene the residuals of freedom. As
a core hypothesis, we claim that behind the authoritarian dynamic lies a
person’s experience of being denied recognition and of being socialized in
an authoritarian manner, which we understand within the framework of
the spheres of recognition outlined by the social philosopher Axel Honneth.
Honneth developed these three spheres on the basis of Hegel’s “struggle
for recognition”. The rst sphere is the legal relationship in which individ-
uals are recognized as bearers of universal rights and may thus be “certain
of the fullment [of] claims” (Honneth 1992: 174), since they “belong to the
class of morally responsible persons” (182–183). This sphere is anchored in
the normative foundations of society, i.e. its laws and basic rights, and has
its origins in the legal safeguarding of the contractual capacity of market
subjects: “In this respect, any modern legal community, simply because
its legitimacy depends on the idea of a rational agreement between equal
individuals, is founded in the assumption of the moral accountability of
all its members” (184–185). This shows that Honneth meant by this sphere
not only political rights of participation, welfare and freedom, but also
property rights, “which protect the person from unauthorized interference
30 O. Decker
by the state with regard to her freedom, her life and her property” (186),
with this legal recognition laying the foundations for lasting “self-respect”
(195). The second sphere is the contribution that a person makes to society
through her own work: “A person can only feel ‘valuable’ if she knows
that she is recognized for achievements that she does not share indiscrim-
inately with others” (203). Unlike in premodern societies, where people
gained recognition through belonging to a guild, professional group or
trade, today “the social prestige of subjects is measured by the individ-
ual contributions that they make to society within the framework of their
particular forms of self-realization” (207). The third sphere of recogni-
tion are relationships of love, all “primary relationships […] as far as they
consist of strong emotional ties between a few persons according to the
pattern of erotic relationships between two people, of friendships, and
of parent-child relationships” (153). It is important that such relationships
provide emotional security, and that “the person loved maintains her
aection even after independence” (173).
The interaction between children and parents, between colleagues at
work, and between citizens is a lasting experience of society. Identity is
formed in these experiences – that much is true. And yet, conicts are not
simply about the normative recognition of rights, which is what Honneth
argues. What becomes visible in social conicts and in the authoritar-
ian syndrome is not “generally weakened social morality, but rather the
social destruction of what is to be held together subjectively by identity”
(Gruschka 1998: 18). This reveals the contradictoriness at the heart of
society, not just the disintegration of legal norms and legal reality. Critical
science should task itself not only with criticizing this disintegration, but
with examining it: the issue is why society cannot help but come into con-
ict with its own norms. What is clear is that social contradictions emerge
as conicts of the individual, and the authoritarian syndrome reveals that
identity is just as much a coercive relationship as the precondition of indi-
vidual freedom. These experiences underlie the individual’s identity and
are repeatedly brought into the interaction by the individual. The refusal
of recognition does not turn into an experience of disintegration, however,
as Honneth suspects; on the contrary, it is integrated into an authoritarian
dynamic. What the person at the job centre feels when she notices that her
rights as a citizen no longer matter is not disintegration (Türcke 1996), but
an authoritarian dynamic that robs her of property rights and exposes her
to authoritarian aggression. The “identity claims acquired through social-
ization” (Honneth 2000: 89) are thus themselves the object of social criti-
cism within the framework of a theory of authoritarian dynamics (Mohan
& Keil 2012: 252). It has already become apparent in the employment rela-
tionships described by Nachtwey, and in the reaction of individuals to opti-
mize themselves, that society has a strong tendency to enforce its general
principle at the expense of the particular – namely, of individuals. And
that it can count on the alliance of the subjects themselves. Our aim in this
Flight into Authoritarianism 31
study is to understand that state of integration into society that presup-
poses that people are willing to forego their own wishes and hopes in life
for the benet of the general.
How fully a person is integrated into the totality of the barter society
becomes clear much earlier than with the example of the lost job, however.
As shown by the developmental psychology to which Honneth refers, the
infant is already integrated. The mother, Honneth states, provides “prac-
tical supplements” (Honneth 1992: 158), allowing the infant to determine
herself, thereby beginning to perceive the child as “a component of a single
cycle of action” (159). Recognition is a mutual act, since the infant must
also quickly recognize that the mother belongs to an “objective reality”
(163). Until then, “the mother must [survive] her destructive attacks without
revenge”. A century ago, it was still a matter of growing into a patriarchal
and authoritarian society, and the central developmental conict was there-
fore Oedipal. Today, though, it seems to be the separation from the exclu-
sive relationship between mother and infant. Initially taking possession of
the mother, the infant manages to separate herself from this maternal pos-
session through “transitional objects”, through the “strong inclination of
children at the age of a few months towards objects of their material envi-
ronment” (165). Honneth is right, but we should take what he is describing
more seriously. This psychoanalytical theory of development traces social-
ization in a barter society, one in which even mother and infant take pos-
session of each other – a “fetishistic transaction” (Smirno 1972) by which
the infant both internalizes the dominating principle of barter and becomes
acquainted in the material “transitional objects” with the consolation of the
commodity, which substitutes for the lost fantasy of fullness in maternal
symbiosis (Decker 2015a).
Notes
1 Der Tagesspiegel, report of 18 June 2018, “More deaths due to right-wing vio-
lence since 1990 than previously thought”; https://www.tagesspiegel.de/politik/
bundesregierung-korrigiert-zahlen-mehr-tote-durch-rechte-gewalt-seit-1990-
als-bekannt/22700008.html (accessed 14 October 2018).
2 Neue Osnabrücker Zeitung of 4 December 2013, “Possibly more extreme
right-wing crimes than previously thought”; https://www.noz.de/deutschland-
welt/politik/artikel/433434/moglicherweise-mehr-rechtsextreme-verbrechen-
als-bekannt (accessed 14 October 2018).
3 Helmut Kohl’s government had already launched federal programmes as a
reaction to neo-Nazi outrages. The rst was called “Programme of Action
against Aggression and Violence, AgAG” (1992–1996), the title illustrating
the attempt to turn the political problem into an issue of juvenile violence.
Responsibility for the AgAG lay with the then Minister of Family Aairs,
Angela Merkel.
4 Statistics on politically motivated crime provided by the Federal Ministry of
the Interior for 2017 show 7,170 cases of hate crime committed by the right, of
which 821 were violent crimes against human beings. In contrast, there were
44 cases of hate crime committed by the left, of which 11 were violent crimes
32 O. Decker
(https://www.bmi.bund.de/SharedDocs/downloads/DE/veroeentlichungen/
2018/pmk-2017-hasskriminalitaet-2001-2017.pdf?_ _blob=publicationFile&v=2,
accessed 17 October 2018).
5 On the repeated criticism of our methodology, see the statement by Elmar
Brähler and Oliver Decker: http://home.uni-leipzig.de/decker/Leipziger%20
%E2%80%9EMitte%22-Studie_Stellungnahme.pdf.
6 How far there was a dierent latent gure in the postwar history of the GDR
has not yet been investigated. It is plausible, for example, that after the end
of the war the functional elites were recruited much less from the Nazi elites
than from the Hitler Youth and Flakhelfer generation, who identied dier-
ently, but certainly not less, with Nazi Germany. Subsequent developments
also show remarkable parallels, though, such as the economic miracle as an
important factor of identication to legitimize the two new German states
(Merkel & Böske 1996).
7 Third Kyhäuser meeting of the “wing” on 2 September 2017; https://www.
youtube.com/watch?v=7ALZpg3g IGk (15 October 2018).
8 Gauland’s contribution in the FAZ is a lesson in such agitation; every ele-
ment has already been described by Löwenthal, along with the conspiracy
mindset that pervades the contribution: “The agitator lays responsibility on
an unvarying set of enemies, whose evil character or sheer malice is at the
bottom of social maladjustment” (Löwenthal 1949: 7).
9 A formulation that Christoph Türcke used in a personal conversation. I also
thank him for pointing out the etymology of the word saeculum.
10 This is certainly one reason why the explained variation remains relatively low
in many models on the inuence on anti-democratic orientation. Where soci-
ety is contradictory in itself, equally democratic in its composition, and often
anti-democratic in reality, the individuals living in it cannot be free of contra-
dictions – and therefore social research cannot grasp the individual accord-
ing to the criterion of freedom from contradiction. Hence, our subsequent
attempt to use a cluster analysis (which is a statistical, but basically heuristic
procedure) to record the manifestations of the authoritarian syndrome up to
the democratic type in its dierent hues (see Chapter 3). For, as little as there
is a “thoroughly” authoritarian personality, as little can an ideal type of dem-
ocratic personality be found.
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DOI: 10.4324/9781003218616-2
The Leipzig Authoritarianism
Study 2018
Methodology, Results, and
Long-Term Changes
Oliver Decker, Johannes Kiess, Julia Schuler,
Barbara Handke, and Elmar Brähler
2
Our research group has been recording extreme right-wing attitudes in
Germany since 2002, conducting representative surveys of between 2,500
and 5,000 people every two years. Our research is based on a notion of
right-wing extremism that sees extreme right-wing attitudes as part of an
authoritarian syndrome and that contrasts them with democratic atti-
tudes (Decker et al. 2012a; Kiess 2011; see Chapter 1 in this volume). We
dene extreme right-wing attitudes as “attitudinal patterns that are uni-
ed by notions of inequality. These are expressed in the political sphere in
the anity for dictatorial forms of government, chauvinist attitudes, and
a trivialization or justication of National Socialism, and in the social
sphere by anti-Semitism, xenophobia, and social Darwinism” (Decker
et al. 2012a: 18).
The survey is designed to record attitudes, and not to observe behaviour,
although anti-democratic and therefore extreme right-wing attitudes are
a prerequisite for anti-democratic behaviour. Studies of attitudes may not
allow us to predict behaviour, but they do allow us to draw conclusions
about behavioural potential, such as the propensity to vote for extreme
right-wing parties. They also allow us to draw conclusions as to which
motives are deemed acceptable for a particular type of behaviour.
In this chapter, we present the distribution and forms of extreme right-
wing attitudes in Germany. We rst describe the methodology used in the
2018 survey and then present our main results. Finally, we focus on people’s
attitudes to democracy and their acceptance of democratic norms, but also
on the related attitudinal dimensions of hostility to Muslims, antiziganism,
devaluation of asylum seekers, and the propensity for violence.
Methodology and sample
Since the beginning of our research in 2002, the Leipzig Authoritarianism
Study has had at its core the Leipzig Questionnaire on Extreme Right-
Wing Attitudes (Decker et al. 2013).1 In 2018, extreme right-wing attitudes
were again recorded using the same six dimensions as before: namely,
The Leipzig Authoritarianism Study 2018 39
advocacy of a right-wing authoritarian dictatorship, chauvinism, xeno-
phobia, anti-Semitism, social Darwinism, and trivialization of National
Socialism.
This questionnaire was supplemented in the survey waves by further
questionnaires that record additional attitudinal dimensions or help to
identify causes. In 2018, these were questions about acceptance of democ-
racy. We also widened the recording of elements of authoritarian personal-
ity, since our focus has increasingly shifted in recent years to authoritarian
dynamics in society (see also Chapter 1). In 2018, we surveyed authoritarian
aggression, authoritarian subservience, and the emphasis on conventional
values (Beierlein et al. 2014), as well as the conspiracy mindset (Imhof &
Decker 2013). These two questionnaires gauge the authoritarian personality
through people’s demands for strictness and severity in society, and through
their belief in secret powers that are at work in the background. In contrast,
the third questionnaire on the authoritarian personality focuses more on
how respondents see themselves (Oesterreich 1998). The results on this issue
are presented in Chapter 4.
As in 2014 and 2016, people’s propensity to devalue certain groups of
people was gauged with questions on group-focused enmity (Heitmeyer
2012). In 2018, we focused on attitudes to Muslims (hostility to Muslims),2
Sinti and Roma (antiziganism), and asylum seekers (or their admission
to Germany).3 As in 2006 and 2016, we also used a questionnaire to
gauge people’s acceptance of and propensity for violence (Ulbrich-
Herrmann 1995).
To provide a more nuanced picture, we recorded as standard dierent
socio-demographic characteristics in each wave of the study: besides age,
gender and place of residence (federal state), the highest educational quali-
cation attained, religious aliation, monthly net household income, mar-
ital status, and occupation (see Table 2.1). Respondents were also asked to
assess the political and economic situation (of the country and individu-
ally). These questionnaires serve as indicators of subjective political and
economic deprivation.
As with all our previous surveys, the 2018 survey was conducted by an
independent opinion research i nstitute (https://www.usuma.com/&lang=en).
It consisted of two parts. The rst collected the sociodemographic char-
acteristics face-to-face from respondents, and put these on a list. The sec-
ond asked respondents to ll in the attitudinal questionnaires on their
own, without the interviewers being given information on their answers.
People tend to be more open in such a “paper-and-pencil” approach than in
surveys in which the statements are read out by the interviewer, who then
makes a note of the answers (e.g. in telephone surveys). Since the procedure
remained constant since 2002, the results obtained between 2002 and 2018
are comparable.
A total of 215 interviewers were deployed, with each conducting an aver-
age of twelve interviews. The interviewers also selected the persons to be
40 O. Decker, J. Kiess, J. Schuler, et al.
Table 2.1 Sociodemographic description of the sample (only German nationals,
14–91 years of age)
Total group
(N = 2,416)
Age in years Mean 48.19
Standard deviation 17.6
Absolute in %
Age groups Up to 24 258 10.7
25–34 358 14.8
35–44 402 16.6
45–54 449 18.6
55–64 466 19.3
65–74 309 12.8
75+174 7.2
Gender Male 1,093 45.2
Female 1,323 54.8
Marital status Married/living together 1,024 42.5
Married/living apart 67 2.8
Single 743 30.8
Divorced 377 15.6
Widowed 199 8.3
Partnership Yes (living in a partnership) 1,415 59.5
No (not living in a partnership) 964 40.5
School-leaving
qualication Without a school-leaving qualication 81 3.4
Basic school-leaving qualication /year 8 741 30.7
Secondary-school qualication/GCSEs 788 32.7
Polytechnic secondary school in the East/
year 10 141 5.9
College 105 4.4
A-levels/without university degree 269 11.2
University degree 224 9.3
Pupil in a general school 62 2.6
Occupation Full time with ≥ 35 h/week 1,064 44.5
Part time with 15–35 h/week 275 11.5
Part time with ≤ 15 h/week 76 3.2
Voluntary work or maternity/parental leave 24 1.0
Unemployed/short-time working 129 5.4
Retired/early retired 570 23.8
Not working/housewife/ househusband 72 3.0
In vocational training 38 1.6
In school education 145 6.1
Household net
income/month Less than 750 € 60 2.6
750 to < 1,250 € 271 11.6
1,250 to < 2,000 € 608 25.9
2,000 to < 3,500 € 976 41.6
Above 3,500 € 429 18.3
Religious
aliation No 619 26.4
Yes 1,729 73.6
East German 498 20.6
West German 1,918 79.4
The Leipzig Authoritarianism Study 2018 41
surveyed according to USUMA guidelines. They also briey described the
research and the study objectives to respondents, and explained to them
the data protection arrangements in line with the European General Data
Protection Regulation (EU-GDPR). They obtained informed consent to
participate; for persons aged between 14 and 18, in consultation with a par-
ent or guardian.
Participants were selected using a stratied random sample, for which
258 sample points (210 for the old federal states, and 48 for the new fed-
eral states) were drawn on the basis of a non-overlapping division of the
federal territory. Interviewers then selected the households using the ran-
dom-walk method, and identied the target person in each household
using the Kish grid. They then sent the completed questionnaires back to
USUMA, which created a digital dataset that it gave to our research group
for evaluation.
All interviews were conducted between 7 May and 8 July 2018. The
response rate was 47.3%, which is high, especially compared to other
methods such as telephone surveys. A total of 5,418 households were vis-
ited in order to achieve the objective of 2,500 interviews. In all, 2,516
interviews were conducted. However, not all interviews were included
in the evaluation, but only those with persons with German citizenship
(N = 2,416).
We present our central results by giving the values for East and West
Germany, and for Germany as a whole. Despite having used this method
of presentation since 2002, we discuss the reasons behind our decision
to do so each time. We dierentiated between East and West Germany
in 2018, too, a decision that had a number of motives. Although extreme
right-wing attitudes are strong throughout Germany, there are also people
all over the country who have attitudes that are consistently positive and
democratic. As in previous years, the sample size allows us to make a rep-
resentative statement above all for the Federal Republic, for East and West
Germany, and for the heavily populated federal states. There are also dif-
ferences between states in the north and south of West Germany, although
these dierences are not as great as between East and West Germany.
It is in no way our intention to single out the population of one part of
Germany. On the other hand, the history of Germany means that there are
many similarities (but also dierences) in political culture between East
and West (Mannewitz 2015; Pickel & Pickel 2006). At the level of attitudes,
the strength of extreme right-wing attitudes is just as great in the West
German state of Bavaria as it is in the East German state of Mecklenburg-
Vorpommern (Decker et al. 2015); however, at the level of behaviour, there
is currently a stronger mobilization of the extreme right in East Germany,
which also makes the attitude of the population there particularly inter-
esting in terms of what it can tell us about the acceptability of the extreme
right. It is for this reason that we also often present the results for 2018
separately for East and West Germany.
42 O. Decker, J. Kiess, J. Schuler, et al.
The results of the Leipzig Authoritarianism Study 2018
To present the main results of the Leipzig Authoritarianism Study, we
focus to begin with on the Leipzig Questionnaire on Extreme Right-Wing
Attitudes: rst, the rates of agreement with the statements of the question-
naire; second, the changes in extreme right-wing attitudes between 2002
and 2018; and, third, the correlations between these attitudes and sociode-
mographic features.
Extreme right-wing attitudes in Germany, 2018
The Leipzig Questionnaire on Extreme Right-Wing Attitudes records
extreme right-wing attitudes according to six dimensions: advocacy of
a right-wing authoritarian dictatorship, chauvinism, xenophobia, anti-
Semitism, social Darwinism, and trivialization of National Socialism. Each
dimension comprises three statements (see Figures 2.1–2.6). Respondents
were asked to rate these statements on a ve-point scale (see Table 2.2),
ranging from “completely disagree” (value = 1) to “completely agree”
(value = 5), with higher values therefore reecting stronger agreement than
lower values. Table 2.3 lists the rates of agreement with the 18 statements
according to the ve possible answer categories. Using the ve-point scale
allows us to depict the degree of agreement incrementally. For the sake of
clarity, though, the Figures combine the answer categories “mostly agree”
and “completely agree”.
However, what we can quickly overlook is that respondents who choose
the “undecided” option for a statement already show a certain proximity
to the idea contained in that statement. The option to choose the middle
answer category and thereby to avoid having to commit themselves allows
respondents to adapt their agreement to social norms by keeping their –
socially undesirable – views within what has been termed with regard to
anti-Semitism in communication latency (Bergmann & Erb 1986). However,
the “undecided” answer also gives respondents the space to admit an
indecisiveness that suggests a latent potential for right-wing extremism in
Germany. We would therefore like to give greater emphasis to a distinction
Table 2.2 Overview of the answer categories used in the Leipzig Questionnaire on
Extreme Right-Wing Attitudes
Answer
category Completely
disagree Mostly
disagree Undecided Mostly
agree Completely
agree
Value on the
scale 12345
Content-
based
classication
Disagreement Latent
agreement Manifest agreement
The Leipzig Authoritarianism Study 2018 43
Table 2.3 Leipzig Questionnaire on Extreme Right-Wing Attitudes – agreement at
the level of item (in %; N = 2,416)
Completely
disagree Mostly
disagree Undecided Mostly
agree Completely
agree
1 Under certain
circumstances, a
dictatorship better
serves the national
interest.
54.4 19.1 18.6 6.5 1.4
2 Had it not been for the
Holocaust, Hitler
would be regarded as
a great statesman
today.
53.7 19.4 17.9 7.3 1.7
3 Germany needs a
strong single party
that represents the
ethnic community
(Volksgemeinschaft)
as a whole.
38.1 18.6 24.0 14.3 5.1
4 We should have a
leader (Führer) that
rules Germany with a
rm hand for the
benet of all.
52.4 20.0 16.6 8.1 3.0
5 Just as in nature, the
strongest in a society
should always get
their way.
45.2 23.4 21.6 7.9 1.9
6 Foreigners only come
here to abuse the
welfare system.
18.1 16.4 29.8 19.5 16.2
7The inuence of the
Jews is still too strong. 45.9 23.4 20.7 6.9 3.2
8 We should dare to have
strong nationalist
feelings again.
18.7 15.1 29.7 24.5 12.0
9The Germans are
actually superior to
other people by nature.
47.9 20.2 20.5 9.2 2.1
10 When jobs are scarce,
foreigners should be
sent home.
27.0 19.9 26.7 15.6 10.9
11 The crimes of National
Socialism have been
greatly exaggerated.
51.5 21.0 19.5 5.8 2.3
12 Today our country
needs to rmly and
energetically enforce
its interests against
other nations.
17.7 17.3 31.3 21.4 12.2
(Continued)
44 O. Decker, J. Kiess, J. Schuler, et al.
already made in the past: namely, between extreme right-wing attitudes that
are manifest or latent.
By “manifest agreement”, we mean the openly expressed agreement with
extreme right-wing statements (“agree”). In contrast, we classify the two
answer categories “completely disagree” and “mostly disagree” as disagree-
ment with extreme right-wing statements. By “latent agreement”, we mean
a position on extreme right-wing statements that at least partly arms the
ideas contained in those statements (“undecided”). We then combined the
manifest statements in the dimensions: those who on average agree with all
the statements in each dimension have a closed outlook (e.g. a closed xeno-
phobic outlook).
In the following, we will see dierences in attitudes when it comes to
groups and survey waves (2016 and 2018). Where these dierences are
signicant (i.e. statistically signicant), they are marked by asterisks and
explained under the Figures and Tables.
The rst dimension, “advocacy of a right-wing authoritarian dictator-
ship”, was measured with three statements that stand for anti-democratic
positions; the fact that fascist, nationalist, or ethnicist motives underlie
Table 2.3 Leipzig Questionnaire on Extreme Right-Wing Attitudes – agreement at
the level of item (in %; N = 2,416)
Completely
disagree Mostly
disagree Undecided Mostly
agree Completely
agree
13 More than other
people, the Jews use
dirty tricks to achieve
their goals.
50.8 20.1 21.5 5.6 2.0
14 The highest aim of
German politicians
should be to ensure
that Germany has the
power and
recognition it
deserves.
24.9 21.2 29.2 18.1 6.6
15 There is worthy and
unworthy life. 61.2 14.9 13.8 7.2 2.9
16 Germany is losing its
identity because of
the large number of
foreigners.
19.9 16.4 28.1 20.2 15.4
17 The Jews just have
something peculiar
about them and don’t
really t in with us.
49.3 21.5 20.1 6.7 2.4
18 National Socialism
also had positive
aspects.
49.3 20.5 21.8 6.7 1.7
(Continued)
The Leipzig Authoritarianism Study 2018 45
these positions allows us to categorize them as belonging to an extreme
right-wing mindset (“dictatorship” in the “national interest”, “leader”
(Führer) as a term with a clear historical link to National Socialism, and
“ethnic community” (Volksgemeinschaft) as a description of an ancient and
homogeneous community with a shared destiny). Figure 2.1 shows both the
percentage of manifest agreement (“mostly agree” and “completely agree”),
and the percentage of latent agreement (“undecided”).
It was the third statement that attracted the strongest manifest agree-
ment, with about 20% of Germans wanting a “strong single party”. What is
noticeable with the rst two items (8% and 11% agreement, respectively) is
the stark contrast between the two dierent parts of the country. More than
13% of respondents from the new federal states (“East”) agree with these
statements manifestly, and 20% latently; although respondents from the old
federal states (“West”) do not consistently reject dictatorship as a form of
government, the rates of agreement are lower (6.5% manifest, and 16.6%
latent), and by some distance for the statement that a leader should rule the
country “with a rm hand for the benet of all” (10.3% manifest, and 15.6%
latent; 11% manifest agreement across the country as a whole).
The next dimension, “chauvinism”, which gauges exaggerated and
aggressive national feelings towards third parties, shows high levels of
agreement nationwide, with these levels again being somewhat lower in the
West than in the East (Figure 2.2). The rst statement hinges in particular
on the formulation “again”, since it implies that all nationalist feelings are
Figure 2.1 Manifest and latent agreement with the statements in the dimension of
“advocacy of a right-wing authoritarian dictatorship” (in %)
Pearson’s chi-squared test: **p < .01
46 O. Decker, J. Kiess, J. Schuler, et al.
suppressed here. The second and third statements foreground Germany’s
right to assert itself vis-à-vis other countries, this right being based on the
feeling that Germany has less than “it deserves”. Although Germany has
a hegemonic position in Europe, and despite its economic success as the
world’s leading exporter, a third or a quarter of all respondents agree with
these statements manifestly.
The dimension of “xenophobia” has particularly high rates of agreement
across the whole of Germany (Figure 2.3). Complementary to a person’s
valorization of her own group (chauvinism), xenophobia gauges the deval-
uation and aggression shown to a constructed out-group, “the foreigners”,
who are bundled together and accused of abusing the welfare system, who
are only tolerated on the labour market for a limited time, and whose pres-
ence is seen as threatening German “identity”. Thus, this dimension gauges
racist ideas of competition at the workplace (economically motivated xeno-
phobia) on the one hand, and the ethnicist idea that the nation is losing its
identity through foreigners on the other.
It is especially respondents in the new federal states who strongly agree
with the statements in this dimension, with almost every second person
agreeing manifestly with them in some cases. But every third or fourth per-
son in the old federal states also deems them worthy of agreement. What
is also noticeable is that only a minority of respondents disagree explicitly
with these three statements. Xenophobia thus continues to be widespread
Figure 2.2 Manifest and latent agreement with the statements in the dimension of
“chauvinism” (in %)
Pearson’s chi-squared test: **p < .01, *p < .05
The Leipzig Authoritarianism Study 2018 47
throughout the country, and what is more so does the attitude that research-
ers see as an “entry drug” to right-wing extremism: the threshold preventing
people from agreeing with extreme right-wing groups on this issue is par-
ticularly low.
Figure 2.4 shows the rates of agreement for the dimension of “anti-
Semitism”, with the three statements expressing classic anti-Semitic stere-
otypes. Since latent communication has been most strongly documented
for anti-Semitism (Bergmann & Erb 1986), we can expect a dark or hidden
eld here, which is the reason that in 2018 we undertook a more compre-
hensive study of the dierent forms in which anti-Semitism is expressed
(see Chapter 5). In the dimension used in each study to measure anti-
Semitism, 10% of Germans have the manifest (and 21%, the latent) belief
that the “inuence of the Jews is still too strong”. While manifest prejudice
is more widespread in West than in East Germany, the opposite is the case
for latent prejudice. Moreover, almost 8% of Germans have the manifest
view that Jews use “dirty tricks”, and over 9% consider Jews to be “pecu-
liar”, which is also why they do not “t in with us”. East Germans express
a greater degree of manifest agreement with these two statements. Overall,
classic anti-Semitic prejudices are manifest in at least every tenth respond-
ent, while latent prejudices are even more widespread among the popula-
tion: almost 30% responded with “undecided” in the new federal states, and
almost 20% in the old federal states (see also Chapter 5).
Figure 2.3 Manifest and latent agreement with the statements in the dimension of
“xenophobia” (in %)
Pearson’s chi-squared test: **p < .01
48 O. Decker, J. Kiess, J. Schuler, et al.
Figure 2.5 presents the rates of agreement with the statements in the
dimension of “social Darwinism”, which is an insight arrived at by Charles
Darwin for evolution that is wrongly transferred to society. This biologism,
which is a component of almost all ethnicist ideologies, emphasizes the sur-
vival of the “strongest”, i.e. the idea that the stronger the human being is, the
more adapted she is to the demands of life. Thus, dierences between people
are understood as social imperatives.
Nearly 10% of respondents believe that the strongest should “get their
way” in human coexistence, with agreement being higher in the East (15.1%)
than in the West (9.8%). The latent dierences are even clearer: while 19.3%
of respondents opted for the answer category “undecided” in the West, that
gure was 30.4% in the East. In addition, over 11% of respondents believe
that the Germans are superior to other people “by nature” – a clearly racist
position. The third statement explicitly formulates the ideology of inequal-
ity that underlies the extreme right-wing worldview by speaking in terms of
“unworthy life”. However, one person in ten still agrees with this statement,
although the dierence between the two parts of the country is striking:
9% of West Germans, but almost 15% of East Germans, agree with this
statement.
Finally, Figure 2.6 shows the rates of agreement in the last dimension,
“trivialization of National Socialism”. The three historical revisionist
statements are directed against the open reappraisal of German crimes
Figure 2.4 Manifest and latent agreement with the statements in the dimension of
“anti-Semitism” (in %)
Pearson’s chi-squared test: **p < .01
The Leipzig Authoritarianism Study 2018 49
Figure 2.5 Manifest and latent agreement with the statements in the dimension of
“social Darwinism” (in %)
Pearson’s chi-squared test: **p < .01
Figure 2.6 Manifest and latent agreement with the statements in the dimension of
“trivialization of National Socialism” (in %)
50 O. Decker, J. Kiess, J. Schuler, et al.
during the National Socialist era, and instead seek to downplay and gloss
over these crimes. In 2018, almost one person in ten agreed with the state-
ment that, had it not been for the Holocaust, “Hitler would be regarded
as a great statesman today”, and a further 18% were “undecided”. A good
8% of respondents also agreed with each of the statements that the crimes
of National Socialism “have been greatly exaggerated” and that National
Socialism also had “positive aspects”. Although the rates of agreement with
two of the three questions are slightly higher in the East than the West, this
is not statistically signicant.
Changes in extreme right-wing attitudes in Germany
between 2002 and 2018
We now turn to the question of how the proportion of Germans with
extreme right-wing attitudes has changed since 2002. To do so, we will
again look at the six dimensions and summarize the three items per dimen-
sion. We will only present those respondents who have an extreme right-
wing mindset in the respective dimension, and we identify them according
to their answers: as already said, the scale runs from 1 to 5, which means
that, with three statements per dimension, the value can range from 3 to
15. We only take into account here those who reached or exceeded a value
of 12 per dimension, and therefore at least predominantly agreed on aver-
age with the statements (manifest agreement). This results in some cases
in lower rates of agreement than for the individual items. But this value is
suitable from our point of view for depicting over time the proportion of
manifestly extreme right-wing respondents with a closed mindset in each
dimension.
Figure 2.7 shows how agreement in the dimension of “advocacy of a right-
wing authoritarian dictatorship” has changed over time. In 2018, there was
3.6% manifest agreement, which is relatively low, especially compared to the
years 2002 and 2004. However, agreement only decreased in the old federal
states (2002: 6.5% vs. 2018: 2.7%), while there was no long-term decrease in
the new federal states (2002: 8.9% vs. 2018: 7.0%).
There was a strong rise in the dimension of “chauvinism” (Figure 2.8)
in East Germany in 2008, 2010 and 2012, followed by a rapid fall in
2014. We explained this uctuation in 2014 by pointing to the nancial
crisis across the globe, which also led to similar trends in xenophobia
(Figure 2.9) and anti-Semitism (Figure 2.10). Given the all-encompassing
processes of transformation in the 1990s, reaction to economic crises appears
to be more intense in the East. In 2014, Germany’s “economic insularity”
created a temporary acceptance of basic democratic values in both parts of
the country (Decker et al. 2014). In 2016 and 2018, there was a return to the
2002 level, as well as an alignment between East and West. Apart from the
important rogue result in the middle of the time series that we have already
The Leipzig Authoritarianism Study 2018 51
Figure 2.7 Proportion of manifest agreement in the dimension of “advocacy of a
right-wing authoritarian dictatorship”, 2002–2018 (in %)
Signicant decline in Germany as a whole and in West Germany between 2016 and 2018
(Pearson’s chi-squared test: p < .05); signicant dierence between East and West Germany
(Pearson’s chi-squared test: p < .01)
Figure 2.8 Proportion of manifest agreement in the dimension of “chauvinism”,
2002–2018 (in %)
Signicant increase in Germany as a whole and in East Germany between 2016 and 2018
(Pearson’s chi-squared test: p < .05)
52 O. Decker, J. Kiess, J. Schuler, et al.
mentioned, agreement in this dimension seems to be permanently located
at around the 20% mark.
The curve is similar for the dimension of “xenophobia” (Figure 2.9). Here,
too, there was a strong rise in East Germany between 2008 and 2012, and
a subsequent fall. But, as with “chauvinism”, this fall was also (as we now
know) temporary, with xenophobia having now returned to its original level
in the new and the old federal states (slightly weaker in the latter), at a very
high rate of 24.1%, which means that a quarter of the population have a
closed xenophobic mindset. Seen positively, this does not exceed earlier
rates, despite the ubiquitous rhetoric of crisis and the feverish debates on
immigration. On the other hand, though, the normalization of intercultural
exchange does not seem to lead to a widespread dismantling of prejudices.
“Foreigners” remain a familiar enemy.
As Figure 2.10 shows, the proportion of those with a closed anti-Semitic
mindset decreased over the time period (2002: 9.3% vs. 2018: 4.4%). But
this does not mean that anti-Semitism actually shrank. Since anti-Semitic
statements are subject to a high level of social ostracism, the reality is that
the proportion is probably larger, and all we can say here with certainty
is that this ostracism still has an eect (on the manifest and latent anti-
Semitic mindset, see Chapter 5). As for dierences between East and West,
the closed anti-Semitic mindset was almost always more widespread among
West than among East Germans between 2002 and 2016. However, agree-
ment with anti-Semitic statements rose sharply in the East between 2008
Figure 2.9 Proportion of those with a closed and manifest xenophobic mindset,
2002–2018 (in %)
Signicant rise in Germany as a whole and in East Germany between 2016 and 2018
(Pearson’s chi-squared test: p < .01); signicant dierences between East and West Germany
in 2018 (Pearson’s chi-squared test: p < .01)
The Leipzig Authoritarianism Study 2018 53
and 2012. While the rates in East and West were very similar between 2008
and 2010, the proportion of those with a closed anti-Semitic mindset in the
East rose well above the West German level during the period of the nan-
cial crisis and the subsequent global economic crisis. After aligning again in
2014 and 2016, the rates in 2018 were slightly higher in the East (5.2%) than
in the West (4.2%).
Agreement in the dimension of “social Darwinism” is relatively low
and has a downward trend (2002: 5.2% vs. 2018: 3.2%; Fig ure 2.11). While
the decline was slow and continuous over the entire time period in the old
federal states, the curve shows large uctuations in the new federal states.
Overall, agreement with social-Darwinian statements was also signicantly
higher in the East (except in 2008) than in the West, including for the 2018
survey wave (West: 2.8% vs. East: 4.6%).
The rates of agreement in the nal dimension of “trivialization of
National Socialism” declined slightly over the time period, although there
was a recent increase (from 2.1% in 2016 to 2.7% in 2018; Figure 2.12). As
with social Darwinism, the rates in the West fell relatively steadily (until
2016), while the curve in the East oscillated strongly. Agreement in the
East was initially lower than in the West, but the two parts of the country
have since converged. The rates in East Germany in 2018 were for the sec-
ond time (after 2012) slightly higher than those in West Germany.
A further rate that indicates how strong and widespread these atti-
tudes are is the proportion of respondents with a closed right-wing mind-
set. We dene those respondents who reach a rate of at least 63 across all
Figure 2.10 Proportion of those with a closed and manifest anti-Semitic mindset,
2002–2018 (in %)
Signicant dierences between East and West Germany (Pearson’s chi-squared test: p < .05)
54 O. Decker, J. Kiess, J. Schuler, et al.
dimensions as having such a mindset, since they reach an average rate of
3.5 for the individual statements and thus agree on average with all 18 state-
ments of the questionnaire on extreme right-wing attitudes. We call this
mindset manifest because such respondents agree expressly with the state-
ments, and do not use the opportunity to choose an evasive answer (“unde-
cided”); and closed because it extends over all six dimensions. Unlike with
Figure 2.11 Proportion of those with a closed and manifest mindset in the dimen-
sion of “social Darwinism”, 2002–2018 (in %)
Figure 2.12 Percentage of those with a closed and manifest mindset in the dimen-
sion of “trivialization of National Socialism”, 2002–2018 (in %)
The Leipzig Authoritarianism Study 2018 55
the dimensions, we opted with the index for the overall scale for a slightly
lower average value to determine the manifest and closed mindset.
In 2018, the proportion of respondents with a manifest and closed
extreme right-wing mindset remained roughly at the level of the two pre-
vious waves at 6% (2014: 5.7%; 2016: 5.4%; Figure 2.13). This is surpris-
ing, since the number of politically motivated crimes and acts of violence
against refugees and those with dierent opinions rose sharply between
2014 and 2016:4 from 17,020 politically motivated right-wing crimes
in 2014, through 22,960 in 2015, and up to 23,555 in 2016 (Federal Ministry
of the Interior 2017: 3). The fact that this increase at the level of action is
not accompanied by an increase in the number of right-wing extremists is
something that we explained in our previous survey by pointing to the rad-
icalization of right-wing authoritarian milieus (Decker & Brähler 2016),
which transformed attitude into action. A comparison of the two parts of
the country reveals that there was a peak in 2012 in East Germany (15.8%), a
gure that was not repeated in the subsequent survey (2014: 7.4%). However,
the proportion of manifest right-wing extremists in the new federal states
has risen again since then to 8.5%, and there has also been a slight increase
in the West from 4.8% to 5.4%. However, the dierence between East and
West in 2018 was signicant (p < .01).
Extreme right-wing attitudes and sociodemography
We will now look at the distribution of right-wing extremists according
to selected sociodemographic features, which we use to gauge the spread
Figure 2.13 Proportion of respondents with a closed right-wing extremist mindset,
2002–2018 (in %)
56 O. Decker, J. Kiess, J. Schuler, et al.
of anti-democratic attitudes among population groups, but not to iden-
tify their cause. Gender, for example, is not a factor in itself, even though
extreme right-wing attitudes are more common among men.
Where signicant dierences are indicated under the Tables, these were
calculated using Pearson’s chi-squared test, with levels of signicance corre-
sponding to the values given. No signicance tests were performed where the
number of cells was too large or where some were not lled (see, for example,
Table 2.8). In such cases, the signicance values found cannot be meaning-
fully categorized or interpreted, since dierences between all cells are tested.
The information below the Tables relates to these chi-squared tests.
Let us begin with the place of residence of respondents in the new or old
federal states (Table 2.4), where there are clear dierences for some of the
dimensions: in particular, xenophobia, the advocacy of a right-wing author-
itarian dictatorship, and social Darwinism are more rmly anchored in
East Germany. This does not mean, however, that all West Germans have
a democratic mindset. Rather, the dierence between the two parts of the
country is slight, and the proportion of people in the West who also agree,
for example, with chauvinistic and xenophobic statements is by no means
negligible.
Most noticeable perhaps is the correlation between extreme right-wing
attitudes and level of education, with people who have achieved at least
A-levels (Abitur) being signicantly less likely to have an extreme right-
wing mindset across all dimensions (with the exception of the dimension
of social Darwinism) than those without A-levels (Table 2.5). This raises
the hope that a higher level of education and learning about history and
society could help break down misanthropic attitudes. We should also
bear in mind, though, that a higher level of education also leads to people
being more aware of statements that are socially desirable (Heyder 2003;
Rippl 2002; for anti-Semitism, Beyer & Krumpal 2010), with people with
A-levels revealing extreme right-wing attitudes less often than those with-
out A-levels – even in anonymous surveys. If we take this into account, then
the eect of education may well be weaker.
Table 2.4 Closed and manifest extreme right-wing attitudes by dimension in West
and East Germany (in %)
Total East (N = 498) West (N = 1,918)
Advocacy of a right-wing
authoritarian dictatorship** 3.6 7.0 2.7
Chauvinism 19.0 18.5 19.2
Xenophobia** 24.1 30.9 22.3
Anti-Semitism 4.4 5.2 4.2
Social Darwinism* 3.2 4.6 2.8
Trivialization of National Socialism 2.7 3.0 2.6
Pearson’s chi-squared test: **p < .01, *p < .05.
The Leipzig Authoritarianism Study 2018 57
Compared to previous survey waves, dierences between the genders
(Table 2.6) widened in 2018, with men recording higher rates than women
across all dimensions.
Having already drawn attention to the dierent age structure of right-
wing extremists in East and West Germany in 2013, we were particularly
interested in this distribution in 2018, too (Decker et al. 2013: 104–105).
Looking at extreme right-wing attitudes in a comparison of generations
is especially revealing if we take into account the East-West dierence
(Table 2.7). For the rst dimension, “advocacy of a right-wing authoritarian
dictatorship”, agreement increases with age in the East, while in the West it
is the other way round. There is no dierence between East and West when
it comes to the dimension of chauvinism, however, with the older cohorts
being more chauvinistic, and the younger cohorts being relatively hostile to
nationalism, in both parts of the country. A similar picture emerges with
anti-Semitism. In the case of xenophobia, which is the dimension with the
highest values, the proportion is lowest among younger West Germans (at
15.8%), with this gure rising with age (to 26.8% for West Germans who
are 61 and over). In the dimension of “social Darwinism”, it is only this
age group 31–60 that has the highest values (6.3%). The dimension of
Table 2.5 Closed and manifest extreme right-wing attitudes by dimension and
level of education (in %)
A-levels (N = 493) Without A-levels
(N = 1,918)
Advocacy of a right-wing dictatorship* 2.0 4.0
Chauvinism** 10.5 21.2
Xenophobia** 12.6 27.0
Anti-Semitism** 2.0 5.0
Social Darwinism 2.0 3.5
Trivialization of National Socialism* 1.0 3.1
Pearson’s chi-squared test: **p < .01, *p < .05.
Table 2.6 Closed and manifest extreme right-wing attitudes by dimension for men
and women (in %)
Men (N = 1,093) Women (N = 1,323)
Advocacy of a right-wing dictatorship** 4.8 2.7
Chauvinism 21.1 17.3
Xenophobia* 26.3 22.2
Anti-Semitism* 5.3 3.6
Social Darwinism* 4.1 2.4
Trivialization of National Socialism** 3.7 1.8
Pearson’s chi-squared test: **p < .01, *p < .05.
58 O. Decker, J. Kiess, J. Schuler, et al.
“trivialization of National Socialism” has the lowest agreement among the
youngest East Germans, while the same age group in the West has relatively
high values (3.1%).
Table 2.8 shows how extreme right-wing attitudes are distributed among
dierent occupational groups. It was the unemployed who most frequently
agreed with the statements presented, closely followed in the dimensions
of “xenophobia”, “chauvinism” and “anti-Semitism” by pensioners. For
both groups, there are probably strong overlaps with the factors of edu-
cation and age. There are also overlaps for those respondents still in
Table 2.7 Closed and manifest extreme right-wing attitudes by dimension,
according to age (in %)
14–30 (East:
N = 92; West:
N = 387)
31–60 (East:
N = 237; West:
N = 1,062)
61 and over
(East: N = 169;
West: N = 469)
Advocacy of a
right-wing dictatorship East 4.4 7.2 8.3
West 3.4 2.8 1.9
Chauvinism East 12.0 19.1 21.3
West 13.7 19.2 23.7
Xenophobia East 27.2 36.7 24.9
West 15.8 22.7 26.8
Anti-Semitism East 3.8 4.6 6.6
West 3.4 4.1 5.0
Social Darwinism East 2.2 6.3 3.6
West 2.9 2.8 2.6
Trivialization of
National Socialism East 1.1 3.4 3.6
West 3.1 2.2 3.0
Pearson’s chi-squared test: ** p < .01.
Table 2.8 Closed and manifest extreme right-wing attitudes by dimension,
according to occupational groups (in %)
School/
vocational
training
(N = 207) Employed
(N = 1,415) Unemployed
(N = 129)
Housewife/
husband
(N = 72) Retired
(N = 570)
Advocacy of a
right-wing
dictatorship**
2.9 3.4 9.4 3.5
Chauvinism** 12.1 17.2 30.5 12.7 24.3
Xenophobia** 16.9 22.9 32.0 25.0 27.3
Anti-Semitism* 1.6 3.8 6.4 8.5 6.0
Social Darwinism 1.9 3.1 6.3 1.4 3.4
Trivialization of
National Socialism 1.5 2.4 4.7 1.4 3.5
Pearson’s chi-squared test: **p < .01, *p < .05.
The Leipzig Authoritarianism Study 2018 59
vocational training, but these overlaps operate conversely, with this group
having the lowest proportion of right-wing extremists in all dimensions.
The largest group, comprising employees, have average values. On the one
hand, housewives and househusbands are relatively seldom manifestly
chauvinistic, but on the other are more xenophobic and anti-Semitic than
the other groups.
Of particular socio-political relevance is the question of how extreme
right-wing attitudes are distributed among party voters (Table 2.9), with
respondents therefore being asked whether they would vote if the Bundestag
elections were to take place next Sunday, and, if so, which party they would
vote for. We do not make an election forecast here, since, for example, we
interviewed people under the age of 18, who are not yet eligible to vote.
Rather, we want to investigate the link between political attitudes and party
preference.
What is immediately noticeable is that there are hardly any dierences
between supporters of the Social-democratic Party of Germany (SPD) and
the Christian-democratic Union (CDU/CSU) when it comes to the propor-
tion of people with a manifestly extreme right-wing mindset. Among these
supporters, as among Free Democratic Party (FDP) supporters, it is above
all xenophobia that is relatively high, at around 20% in each case. The FPD
also has a comparatively large following (6.5%) with social-Darwinist views.
What is surprising is the proportion of supporters of Die Linke (the Left)
who agree with historical-revisionist statements. Supporters of the Green
Party have the lowest values when it comes to agreeing with extreme right-
wing statements, although they do not reject certain extreme right-wing
statements consistently (chauvinism: 11.6% and xenophobia: 11.0%).
Alternative for Germany (AfD) voters dier greatly, however. As in our
2016 survey (Decker et al. 2016b: esp. 74–77), their values were by far the
highest in all dimensions in 2018, too. This again conrms a nding from
other recent studies: namely, those who vote for the AfD dier primarily
from voters of other parties in terms not of sociodemography (e.g. place of
residence or income), but above all of political attitudes, which very often
means xenophobic and anti-democratic attitudes (see Chapter 1; see above
all Schröder 2018; but also Eversberg 2017; Lengfeld 2017).
Table 2.10 shows how those respondents whom we claim have a closed
extreme right-wing mindset answer the question of how they would vote.
Thus, the calculation is now based only on those respondents who exceeded
the value (> = 63) for the entire questionnaire on extreme right-wing atti-
tudes, a total of 138 people. Of these, 73.2% said that they would vote, with
a third voting for the AfD, almost 20% for the CDU/CSU, and almost 10%
for the SPD. By way of comparison, a quarter of this group had said in
2014 that they would vote for the CDU/CSU, and a further quarter for the
SPD, which conrms an observation from the previous survey: namely, that
voters with a closed and manifest extreme right-wing mindset have found
a form of political expression in the AfD. While older extreme right-wing
60 O. Decker, J. Kiess, J. Schuler, et al.
Table 2.9 Closed and manifest extreme right-wing attitudes by dimension among party voters (in %)
CDU/CSU
(N = 444) SPD
(N = 425) FDP
(N = 92) Greens
(N = 173) The Left
(N = 167) AfD
(N = 160) Non-voters
(N =312 )
Undecided
in terms
of party
(N = 137)
Undecided
in terms of
whether
to vote
(N = 202)
Advocacy of a
right-wing
dictatorship**
2.3 1.9 4.3 1.2 1.8 13.1 4.5 3.7 2.5
Chauvinism** 17.5 19.5 15.4 11.6 12.7 40.0 19.2 12.4 18.7
Xenophobia** 22.0 22.8 18.5 11.0 15.0 55.6 26.6 18.3 26.2
Anti-Semitism** 2.5 4.3 3.3 1.2 3.7 12.5 7.1 3.7 1.5
Social Darwinism** 2.9 2.1 6.5 1.2 1.2 7.5 3.5 2.2 4.5
Trivialization of
National
Socialism**
0.9 0.9 – – 3.0 10.0 4.2 2.9 2.5
Pearson’s chi-squared test: ** p < .01, ** p > .05.
The Leipzig Authoritarianism Study 2018 61
parties such as the NPD were unable to establish themselves in the politi-
cal spectrum, the AfD has managed to tap into the long-standing potential
(a potential that we have demonstrated since 2002). Our gures also show
that the number of people with a closed extreme right-wing mindset who
intend to vote corresponds approximately to the actual number of people in
the total population who do vote, which contradicts the notion that right-
wing extremists are politically excluded in this respect. We know from other
studies that it is social exclusion that plays a role in elections, with people
from the lower social strata rarely using their right to vote (Schäfer 2013,
2014). In other words, it is not right-wing extremists that are politically mar-
ginalized, but socially disadvantaged people.
Table 2.11 shows the correlations between the sociodemographic feature
of church aliation and the dimensions of extreme right-wing attitudes.
Overall, dierences between members of the Protestant Church, of the
Catholic Church, and people with no religious aliation are negligible.
In some dimensions (such as the advocacy of a right-wing authoritarian
dictatorship, anti-Semitism, and the trivialization of National Socialism),
those with manifestly extreme right-wing attitudes are often found amongst
people without a religion. In other dimensions, though, it is those tied to a
denomination that more often agree with extreme right-wing statements;
Table 2.10 How do right-wing extremists vote (in %)?
Total (N = 138) Among those voting (N = 101)
Those
voting Not
voting
Undecided
whether to
vote CDU/
CSU SPD FDP Greens The
Left NPD AfD
Not yet
decided
as to
which
party
2018 73.2 15.9 6.5 18.8 9.9 5.0 1.0 6.9 4.0 33.7 7.9
Table 2.11 Closed and manifest extreme right-wing attitudes by dimension and
church aliation (in %)
Protestant
(N = 904) Catholic
(N = 808) No religious
aliation (N = 633)
Advocacy of a right-wing
dictatorship 3.1 2.7 5.0
Chauvinism 18.5 20.2 18.3
Xenophobia 24.4 25.8 22.5
Anti-Semitism 3.6 3.9 6.4
Social Darwinism 2.7 3.6 3.6
Trivialization of National
Socialism* 1.6 2.8 4.1
Pearson’s chi-squared test: *p < .05.
62 O. Decker, J. Kiess, J. Schuler, et al.
for example, chauvinism and xenophobia are strongest among Catholics.
With one exception (“trivialization of National Socialism”), the dierences
are not statistically signicant, so that we can claim that extreme right-wing
attitudes among church members reect how these attitudes are distributed
in society as a whole.
Democracy, plurality and equality; hostility to Muslims,
antiziganism, and devaluation of asylum seekers
Besides extreme right-wing attitudes, we have also been recording since
2006 the extent to which the population accepts democracy, with respond-
ents being asked about their agreement with “democracy as an idea”, with
the constitutional norm (“democracy as laid down in the constitution”), and
with the constitutional reality (“democracy as it functions in Germany”).
Overall, the majority of respondents expressed satisfaction with democracy
(Figures 2.14 –2.16).
What is also apparent, however, is that the more abstract the idea of
democracy becomes, the higher the level of agreement. For example, the
highest acceptance among the population is for “democracy as an idea”,
with a total of 93.3% favouring democracy over other forms of government
(Figure 2.14). Support for “democracy as an idea” continued to rise in the
new federal states after 2016, and, at 95.2%, was higher in the East in 2018
than in Germany as a whole. There was a slight decline at an overall high
level for West Germany. However, this is an abstract norm (also emphasized
by the term “idea”), and can contain very dierent ideas.
Figure 2.14 Agreement with “democracy as an idea”, 2006–2018 (in %)
The Leipzig Authoritarianism Study 2018 63
In 2018, the more concrete question about satisfaction with the form of
democracy enshrined in the German constitution was answered positively
by 76.4% of respondents, which is a signicantly lower proportion than
above (Figure 2.15). The entire period of the study saw only slight changes
in the old federal states, while satisfaction slowly increased in the new
Figure 2.15 Agreement with “democracy as laid down in the constitution”,
2006–2018 (in %)
Signicant increase in East Germany between 2016 and 2018; Pearson’s chi-squared test: p < .01
Figure 2.16 Agreement with “democracy as it functions in Germany”, 2006–2018 (in %)
Signicant dierences between East and West Germany in 2018; Pearson’s chi-squared test: p < .01
64 O. Decker, J. Kiess, J. Schuler, et al.
federal states after 2010 (55.3% in 2010 to 76.5% in 2018). The proportion of
those satised in the East also grew signicantly after 2016, and is now even
greater than in Germany as a whole.
In contrast, “democracy as it functions in Germany” was met with
approval by only 53.2% of respondents, the lowest value of the three items
on democracy. The long-term increase of recent years continued in the new
federal states, although the rates of agreement also remained signicantly
higher in the old federal states in 2018 (East: 46.9% vs. West: 54.9%).
A comparison of the rates of agreement for democracy across the three
items reveals three things. First, the idea of democracy meets with broad
agreement and still seems to be regarded as a normative ideal. Second, in
2018, only half the respondents were satised with the actual functioning of
democracy, and the other half not. Third, agreement with democracy only
increased continuously in the new federal states.
The clear dierences between how people evaluate the idea of democ-
racy, the constitutional norm, and (not least) the constitutional reality
indicate a problem for representative democracy: namely, that people do
not have a strong sense that they themselves can inuence politics (see
Table 2.12). This sense of being excluded from the political domain is
called political deprivation. Although the constitution and the democratic
polity oer numerous opportunities for involvement, political deprivation
is very strong in Germany, and is again much more common in East than
in West Germany.
Since “democracy” has many dierent associations, we developed a fur-
ther questionnaire for the 2018 survey. This investigated people’s identica-
tion with (more concrete) norms of equality and plurality, with respondents
being asked to rate ve statements (Table 2.13) on a ve-point scale (from 1,
“completely disagree”, to 5, “completely agree”).
Those statements pointing at the equal rights and chances of everybody
in society are supported by a clear majority (statement 1: 80.9%; state-
ment 4: 76.5%). However, the demand for certain groups to be exempted is
also supported by a majority, with more than half the respondents (53.7%)
agreeing with statement 2. We interpret this contradiction as meaning that
respondents probably see the demand for rights of freedom for everybody
Table 2.12 Political deprivation (in %)
Total East West
People like me don’t have any inuence on what
the government does anyway.** 70.0 78.3 67.9
I think it’s pointless for me to be involved in
politics.** 58.2 69.0 55.4
Pearson’s chi-squared test: ** p < .01.
The Leipzig Authoritarianism Study 2018 65
as relating to their own person and group, and think of others when denying
these rights. If we summarize statements 1 and 4 as norms of equality, and
statements 2, 3 and 5 as norms of anti-plurality,5 then the following distri-
bution emerges (Table 2.14).
Table 2.13 shows the proportion of those who agree with each statement
on average (equality > 6; anti-plurality > 9). This results in the same picture
as at item level: although the majority of respondents would like to see the
safeguarding of universal rights of freedom, there is also a sizeable pro-
portion who are against extending these rights to everybody. Agreement
with both egalitarian and anti-plural demands is slightly higher in the East
than in the West, where agreement with the latter is just under half (47.7%).
Table 2.13 Evaluation of statements on norms of equality and plurality (in %)
Completely
disagree Mostly
disagree Undecided Mostly
agree Completely
agree
1 An important political
goal is to ensure equal
rights for everybody.
1.2 2.5 15.3 22.6 58.3
2 Some groups should
not be surprised if
the state restricts their
rights.
6.4 9.5 20.4 29.3 24.4
3 Those who do not
work should not have
the same rights as
others.
22.4 29.0 28.2 17.7 12.8
4 Everybody should
have the same
chances to stand up
for their interests.
1.6 3.5 18.4 32.0 44.5
5 The rights of the
individual should take
a backseat to the
interests of society as
a whole.
11.2 19.1 39.2 20.7 9.8
Table 2.14 Support for principles of equality, and
rejection of plurality in society (in %)
Total East West
Equality 86.2 88.3 85.6
Anti-plurality** 47.3 57.0 47.7
Pearson’s chi-squared test: ** p < .01.
66 O. Decker, J. Kiess, J. Schuler, et al.
This conrms once again that people like to claim their own rights of free-
dom, but half of those surveyed do not accept the rights of people who are
perceived as members of a dierent group.
We can substantiate this explanation by examining the attitudes of the
German population to those g roups perceived as dierent or foreign. Besides
the Leipzig Questionnaire on Extreme Right-Wing Attitudes, we have also
been collecting data on hostility to certain groups perceived as homoge-
neous (e.g. homosexuals, Sinti and Roma, and Muslims) since 2014. To do
so, we use some of the questionnaire in the study series Deutsche Zustände
(Conditions in Germany), which the social scientists Wilhelm Heitmeyer and
Andreas Zick used from 2001 to 2011 (Heitmeyer 2012).
By gauging hostility to Muslims, antiziganism, and the devaluation of
asylum seekers, we focused in 2018 on those groups that are currently par-
ticularly aected by prejudice and xenophobia (see Decker et al. 2016a).
Respondents were asked to evaluate the statements presented to them on
each group on a four-point scale (from 1, “completely agree”, to 4, “com-
pletely disagree”), with response categories 1 and 2 being summarized as
agreement in Figu res 2.17–2.23.
The results show that hostility to Muslims has continued to rise, with
44.1% of respondents now agreeing with the statement that “Muslims should
be prohibited from migrating to Germany” (Figure 2.17), and this gure
even rising to 50.7% in the new federal states. The proportion of those who
“feel like a foreigner” in their own country because of the “many Muslims
Figure 2.17 Hostility to Muslims: “Muslims should be prohibited from migrating to
Germany”, 2014–2018 (in %)
Signicant increase in West Germany; Pearson’s chi-squared test: p < .01
The Leipzig Authoritarianism Study 2018 67
here” rose to 55.8% in 2018 (Figure 2.18). These ndings appear paradoxical
at rst: on the one hand, immigration has drastically fallen since the peak of
2015, while on the other Muslim immigration is still felt to be something that
has a signicant eect on society. The authoritarian syndrome can explain
this paradox, however, since the devaluation of “the Muslims” is less a reac-
tion to the (at least imagined) threat posed by a foreign group, and more an
opportunity to express aggression. The devaluation of Muslims is decidedly
anti-democratic, as it violates both the norm of equality for everybody and
religious freedom.
The rejection of Sinti and Roma also continues to be a social reality, with
56% of respondents saying that they would be opposed to Sinti and Roma
living in their area (Figure 2.19). Agreement with this statement is particu-
larly high at 60.3% in the new federal states. Nationwide, almost every other
respondent (49.2%) thinks that “Sinti and Roma should be banned from
town centres” (Figure 2.19). The proportion of respondents who believe that
Sinti and Roma are prone to crime has also risen again slightly (to 60.4%)
(Figure 2.21), with 69.2% of those surveyed agreeing with this view in East
Ger many.
The devaluation of asylum seekers increased in 2018, with 79.1% of
respondents rejecting generosity when it comes to the processing of asy-
lum applications (Figure 2.22). In addition, 61.5% still could not or did not
want to believe that asylum applications are justied, and agree with the
view that “most asylum seekers do not really fear persecution in their home
Figure 2.18 Hostility to Muslims: “The many Muslims here sometimes make me
feel like a foreigner in my own country”, 2014–2018 (in %)
Signicant increase between 2016 and 2018 in West Germany and in Germany as a whole;
Pearson’s chi-squared test: p < 0.1
68 O. Decker, J. Kiess, J. Schuler, et al.
country” (Figure 2.23). These statements also cast doubt on democratic val-
ues and norms, in this case the right to asylum, which was enshrined in
the Basic Law after the Second World War precisely because of the crimes
of National Socialism: those who escaped the Nazis only did so by being
allowed to enter other countries.
Figure 2.19 Antiziganism: “I would be opposed to Sinti and Roma living in my
area”, 2014–2018 (in %)
Figure 2.20 Antiziganism: “Sinti and Roma should be banned from town centres”,
2014–2018 (in %)
Signicant increase in East Germany; Pearson’s chi-squared test: p < .01
The Leipzig Authoritarianism Study 2018 69
In summary, the groups that we focus on here face considerable hostil-
ity, with asylum seekers facing the greatest hostility, followed by Sinti and
Roma, and nally Muslims (whom are nonetheless viewed negatively by
half the population). Behind this hostility is the fact that these groups are
on the one hand imagined as a threat to culture, security and economic
Figure 2.21 Antiziganism: “Sinti and Roma are prone to crime”, 2014–2018 (in %)
Signicant increase in East Germany; Pearson’s chi-squared test: p < .01
Figure 2.22 Devaluation of asylum seekers: “The state should not be generous when
processing asylum applications”, 2014–2018 (in %)
Signicant increase in East Germany; Pearson’s chi-squared test: *p < .05
70 O. Decker, J. Kiess, J. Schuler, et al.
well-being, and on the other made into lightning rods for people to chan-
nel their aggressions (both their own and those arising from other causes).
While many respondents expressed the propensity to devalue migrants only
latently (see Figure 2.3), with one third being “undecided”, this propensity
came to the fore in relation to actual groups that are imagined as being
weaker. The four-point scale, which forces people to take a position, cer-
tainly also contributed to these clear ndings. Moreover, the devaluation
of these groups shows clearly once again the anti-democratic force of such
attitudes, since people claim democratic norms as the privilege of their own
group, while wishing to withhold such norms from other groups.
Acceptance of and propensity for violence
As in 2006 and 2016, we investigated in the 2018 survey how respondents
relate to violence as a means of asserting their interests. The questionnaire
that we used dierentiated between behavioural intention, i.e. people’s pro-
pensity to use violence themselves, and the acceptance of violence when
used by others (Ulbrich-Herrmann 1995). In our last publication, we showed
that, although the extreme right-wing mindset had not grown between 2006
and 2016, the propensity to use, and acceptance of, violence had. This was
true in particular of extreme right-wing milieus, which became more radical
and increasingly deemed the use of violence for their own interests as legit-
imate (Decker et al. 2016a).
Figures 2.24 and 2.25 show how the attitude to violence developed over
the three points in time. In 2018, about one in six respondents (13.9%) stated
that they were prepared to use physical violence to assert their own interests.
Figure 2.23 Devaluation of asylum seekers: “Most asylum seekers do not really fear
persecution in their home country”, 2014–2018 (in %)
The Leipzig Authoritarianism Study 2018 71
Figure 2.24 Propensity for violence: “In certain situations, I am quite prepared to
use physical violence to assert my interests”, 2006, 2016 and 2018 (in %)
Signicant decline in West Germany and in Germany as a whole; Pearson’s chi-squared test:
**P< .01; in East Germany, Pearson’s chi-squared test: * p < .05
Figure 2.25 Acceptance of violence: “I would never use violence myself, but it’s
good that there are people who let their sts do the talking when things
can’t be solved any other way”, 2006, 2016 and 2018 (in %)
Signicant decline between 2016 and 2018 in East Germany; Pearson’s chi-squared test: p < .01
72 O. Decker, J. Kiess, J. Schuler, et al.
However, the acceptance of violence when used by others only declined
slightly nationwide. This slight decline since 2016 can be seen only in rela-
tion to Germany as a whole, but it is composed of contrary developments in
the two dierent parts of the country: the acceptance of violence by others
fell signicantly in the East (2016: 31.2% vs. 2018: 19.0%), whereas it rose
slightly in the West (2016: 21.6% vs. 2018: 22.2%; Figure 2.24).
Summary and discussion
Since 2002, we have documented every two years people’s advocacy of a
dictatorship, chauvinism, xenophobia, anti-Semitism, social Darwinism,
and the trivialization of National Socialism as components of an extreme
right-wing mindset. In 2018, we conducted for the ninth time a repre-
sentative survey of extreme right-wing and political attitudes among the
German population. In all, 2,516 people throughout Germany were inter-
viewed in their homes by trained interviewers, and 2,416 questionnaires
were evaluated.
To conclude this chapter, we wish to summarize and discuss once again
the central ndings, and then present the in-depth analyses in the chapters
that follow (3, 4, and 5). Our summary follows the structure of the chap-
ter, i.e. it begins with the 2018 results, and then moves on to the long-term
developments.
Extreme right-wing attitudes, 2018:
• Advocacy of a dictatorship: 11.0% of respondents would like a “leader”
(Führer), 19.4% a “strong single party”, and a further 24.0% are not
entirely averse to either of these options (“undecided”).
• Chauvinism: 36.3% of respondents openly demand “strong nationalist
feelings”, 33.7% for Germany’s interests to be enforced “rmly and ener-
getically”, and 24.8% “power and recognition” for Germany. The propor-
tion of “undecided” responses is approximately one third in each case.
• Xenophobia remains the most widespread anti-democratic attitude in
Germany, with 35.7% of respondents believing that migrants “abuse the
welfare system”, a gure that rises to 47.1% among East Germans, and
35.6% (44.6% in the East) fearing that Germany is “losing its identity
because of the large number of foreigners”. Also high in this dimension
is the additional latent agreement, since between 26% and 30% can only
answer “undecided” in each case.
• Anti-Semitism is the attitude in Germany that has a particularly high level
of latent communic ation. Nevertheless, around 10% of respondents openly
agreed with the anti-Semitic statements presented to them. The real (but
hidden) situation can be gauged by the fact that 20% of all answers nation-
wide are “undecided” (and in the new federal states, about 30%).
The Leipzig Authoritarianism Study 2018 73
• The proportion of manifest agreement in the dimensions of “social
Darwinism” and “trivialization of National Socialism” ranges from
8.1% to 11.3%, although the element of latency is signicant here, too,
with around 20% partially agreeing with each of the two statements.
• Both latent and manifest agreement with the extreme right-wing state-
ments is almost consistently lower in the old federal states than in the
new federal states.
Extreme right-wing attitudes over the time of the studies:
• The proportion of respondents with a closed extreme right-wing mind-
set was 6.0% in 2018 (East: 8.5%, West: 5.4%), which represents a slow
decline over the time series as a whole, from 9.7% in 2002 (East: 8.1%,
West: 11.3%). Until 2008, the proportion of people with such a mindset
was higher in the old federal states, but now the situation is reversed. In
addition, the gures in the new federal states vary considerably between
the survey years.
• There is still considerable agreement with extreme right-wing state-
ments. This is most evident in the dimension of “xenophobia”, which,
despite some uctuations, has now returned to its 2002 level. Closed
xenophobia increased between the penultimate and the last survey wave
(2016: 20.4% vs. 2018: 24.1%), with this increase being more drastic in the
new federal states (2016: 22.7% vs. 2018: 30.9%).
• We can see a similar development in how people evaluate their own
group. While 18.3% of respondents manifestly agreed with chauvinistic
statements at the beginning of the survey series in 2002, that gure was
19.0% in 2018, so that here, too, the levels of agreement stagnated at a
high level, both in the old and new federal states. As with the dimension
of “xenophobia”, the gures rose again slightly between 2016 and 2018
(from 16.7% to 19.0%).
• As for the number of people with a closed anti-Semitic mindset, the
time series paints a more positive picture (2002: 9.3% vs. 2018: 4.4%),
but caution is required (see the presentation of results on latent anti-
Semitism above; see also Chapter 5).
• More respondents agreed with the statements trivializing National
Socialism in 2018 than in 2016 (2016: 2.1% vs. 2018: 2.7%). Overall,
though, this gure had fallen slightly since 2002 (4.1%). Nevertheless,
the threat to democracy should not be underestimated here (proportion
of “undecided” answers).
• The rates of agreement for the dimensions “advocacy of a right-wing
authoritarian dictatorship” and “social Darwinism” fell slightly over
the time series, a trend that continued between 2016 and 2018. In the
rst case, from 7.7% in 2002 to 3.6% in 2018, and in the second from
5.2% in 2002 to 3.2% in 2018.
74 O. Decker, J. Kiess, J. Schuler, et al.
Attitude to democracy:
• “Democracy as an idea” is held in high esteem in Germany (93.3%). In
the East, agreement rose further after 2016, and was at 95.2% in 2018, a
proportion higher than in the West (92.8%).
• Similarly, large sections of the population are committed to the consti-
tutional democratic order (76.5%), with the proportion of East Germans
(79.9%) again being higher than for West Germans (75.6%).
• Only about half the respondents (53.2%) were satised with the democ-
racy that they experience in real life, the level of agreement being higher
in the old federal states (54.9%) than in the new (46.9%).
• Despite an increase in satisfaction with democratic practice in East
Germany, political deprivation is a clear warning signal for represent-
ative democracy, since people do not experience representative democ-
racy as something that they can help shape. This subjective perception
does not say anything about attempts made or actual opportunities
to shape the democratic process, but it does show that there is a rift
between people and the institutions of democratic mediation.
• If, however, we consider this level of agreement in the light of actual
democratic demands, then it becomes apparent that democracy is
understood to mean very dierent and contradictory things. The
demand for equal rights for everybody is questioned by very few people,
but where these rights are to apply to others as well, then anti-pluralist
attitudes prevail: only 47.3% of Germans believe that rights of freedom
apply equally and unconditionally to all groups.
• Thus, the more abstract democratic principles are, the more they are
welcomed: the idea and constitutional form of democracy, as well as
individual rights of freedom, are met with a high level of agreement.
But, where matters become concrete, many respondents arrive at a dif-
ferent assessment, are dissatised with the democracy that they expe-
rience, and have anti-pluralist attitudes. In the reality of democracy,
however, the democratic rights of freedom are a stumbling block when
they benet others, and are then rejected by a majority.
Hostility to Muslims, antiziganism, devaluation of asylum seekers:
• Hostility to Muslims continued to rise, with 44.1% of respondents
agreeing with the demand to prohibit Muslims from migrating to
Germany, a gure that is once again much higher in the new federal
states (50.7%) than in the old (42.2%). Moreover, 55.8% agree with the
statement that they “feel like a foreigner” in their own country because
of the “many Muslims here” (54.8% in the East, and 56.1% in the West).
Both items saw an increase of 10 percentage points since 2014.
• Sinti and Roma are the object of even more aggression than Muslims:
56.0% of respondents “would be opposed to Sinti and Roma” living in
The Leipzig Authoritarianism Study 2018 75
their area, 49.2% want to ban them from town centres, and 60.4% say
that this group of people are prone to crime. All three items show that
antiziganism is more widespread in the new federal states than in the
old, where the underlying level is already very high.
• However, the group that attracts the most hostility are asylum seekers:
79.1% of respondents believe that generosity should not be shown by the
state when processing asylum applications, and 61.5% think that most
asylum seekers do not fear persecution in their home country. The levels
of agreement are 7 to 8 percentage points higher in East Germany than
in West.
Acceptance of, and propensity to use, violence:
• 13.9% of respondents said in 2018 that they were prepared to use vio-
lence, which is signicantly less than in 2016. In East Germany, the
sharp rise to 20.1% that we measured in 2016 fell to 15.1% in 2018.
• 21.6% of respondents said in 2018 that they accepted the use of vio-
lence by others. Since this gure is roughly the same as in 2006, the
increase to 23.6% in 2016 can be regarded as a temporary blip. East
Germans now accept violence less often than West Germans (East: 19%,
West: 22.2%).
Outlook
German society is permeated by extreme right-wing attitudes. This is true
of the population in the West, but even more so of those in the East. The
high propensity to devalue others is manifestly demonstrable; in addi-
tion, a large proportion of respondents do not unequivocally acknowl-
edge the equal position of all people in society (“undecided” answers,
or so-called latency). A potential threat to democracy becomes visible
in people’s ambivalence towards democratic norms (their own rights of
freedom, yes; universal rights, no): namely, some of the population can
be mobilized for extreme right-wing goals. Hostility to groups that are
perceived as foreign or dierent is manifest or at least latent in both East
and West Germany.
The question of what conditions foster democratic, or indeed extreme
right-wing, objectives is therefore an issue of real contemporary relevance,
and is the focus of the following chapters. In order to identify the social
conditions fostering anti-democratic attitudes, we rst examine (Chapter 3)
the factors inuencing right-wing extremism (in particular, authoritari-
anism and recognition). We then describe (Chapter 4) with the help of a
typology the people who are particularly prone to extreme right-wing prop-
aganda, and those who have built up the greatest resilience to authoritarian
temptations. Thereafter, we deal (Chapter 5) in detail with anti-Semitism in
Ger many.
76 O. Decker, J. Kiess, J. Schuler, et al.
Notes
1 This publication also describes the cut-o scores and the internal consistency
of the questionnaire. Using the survey from 2018, we can replicate the factor
structure described there: Cronbach’s alpha for the total scale in 2018 is .94,
and for the individual dimensions: 1) .77; 2) .81; 3) .89; 4) .90; 5) .77; 6) .81.
2 The term hostility to Muslims is taken from Pfahl-Traughber (2012). We no
longer use the term Islamophobia for several reasons. On the one hand, the
questionnaire of the research group “Conditions in Germany” that we adapt
contains two anti-Muslim statements, while Islam as a religion is not an issue.
The statements reect resentment towards members of this religious group
and not objections to the religion, as the term Islamophobia suggests. On the
other, the conceptual clarication counteracts the argument repeatedly put
forward that criticism of Islam as criticism of a religion is stigmatized by the
term Islamophobia. Criticism of religion is an academic task; and religious
freedom in the Enlightenment sense means not least the right to freedom
from religion. However, our survey does not measure criticism of religion, but
resentment (Decker et al. 2012b).
3 We could not include other dimensions in 2018. On the dimensions of homo-
phobia and sexism, see the 2016 survey (Decker et al. 2016a).
4 Police crime statistics comprise reported oences that the investigating
authorities classify as “politically motivated”. The number of unreported
cases is therefore higher.
5 A factor analysis conrms the two dimensions of the questionnaire. State-
ments 1 (.863) and 4 (.860) relate to a factor (equality), and statements
2 (.727), 3 (.719) and 5 (.616) to a second factor (anti-plurality). The internal
consistency (Cronbach’s alpha) of the dimension of equality was acceptable
(α = .70), whereas the internal consistency of the dimension of anti-plurality
was only α = .45.
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DOI: 10.4324/9781003218616-3
The Authoritarian
Syndrome Today
Oliver Decker, Julia Schuler,
and Elmar Brähler
3
There is one thing that Germans can agree on immediately: that democ-
racy is the ideal form of government. In 2018, about 94% of respondents
supported the “idea of democracy” (on this and the following results, see
Chapter 2). As good as this news is, though, we must temper it for several
reasons. Seventy percent of people feel that they have no inuence on poli-
tics, and almost 60% deem it pointless to be involved politically. It is, there-
fore, not surprising that only about 50% are satised with how democracy is
practised in Germany. Thus, many seem to lack the opportunities to partic-
ipate in representative democracy. This is not a recent development: a decit
in the legitimacy of parliamentary democracy was already identied in the
1970s (Habermas 1973), and the reputation of democratic practice has been
further damaged in recent years by the apparent “lack of alternatives” to
political decisions (Blühdorn 2013; Crouch 2008).
However, the results of the 2018 survey continue to show that respondents
are dissatised not only for these reasons; they are also dissatised because
fundamental rights are granted to others, too. While 86% of respondents
explicitly agree with the notion that the individual has protective rights, it
is also clear that people believe that these rights should not apply equally to
everybody: almost 50% of respondents in West Germany, and 57% in East
Germ any, want to restr ict the rights of certain groups. This is alar ming, since
individual protective rights are among the most important prerequisites of
a plural democracy, and recognizing these rights cannot be separated from
democracy itself (see Chapter 4). In other words, either fundamental rights
apply universally, i.e. to everybody, or they do not guarantee to anybody
what is implied by their nomenclature: fundamental protection.
If we look at the situation in greater detail, it becomes clear what many
respondents (about half in each case) associate with fundamental demo-
cratic rights: they would welcome the restriction of rights along ethnocen-
tric or culturalist lines, e.g. when it comes to banning Sinti and Roma “from
town centres”. But it is not only apparent foreignness that underlies this
devaluation of people: 30% of respondents also demand restrictions on the
rights of people who do not work. Both examples also show how irrational
and charged with resentment such demands are. In a sense, what shows
80 O. Decker, J. Schuler, and E. Brähler
itself here is the inner core of society, the subjectivity of its members, who
represent a “paradoxical inner environment” of society (Habermas 1973: 19)
when they express hostility and at the same time advocate democracy.
Members of society are its product, and at the same time confront society
with their own self-will (Adorno 1955: 49). In other words, if this self-will
contradicts the basic democratic values of a plural society, then a problem
of this society is expressed within it.
It is clear that these negative attitudes threaten democracy. A person
who demands her own rights of freedom while at the same time denying
the rights of others is sawing at the branch that she is sitting upon, and is
therefore behaving irrationally. Devaluing others undermines democratic
society, which needs protective rights for the individual to ward o the inter-
ventions both of the majority and of state institutions (Buchstein & Jörke
2003). For, democracy must be understood as a process in two senses: as a
process to negotiate various interests in the present, but also as an unlimited
and potentially illimitable process by which society is democratized (see
Buchstein & Jörke 2003). Giving recognition to the other is prerequisite and
test for both processes.
This aspiration is directed on the one hand at the democratic society as a
demand to ensure the legal and institutional recognition of individuals (see
Chapter 4), and on the other at the members of society themselves: “Being
or becoming democratic involves self-reexivity and the openness to revise
one’s own views in line with new experiences and instructive encounters
with others, a willingness to cooperate and broaden one’s horizons, as well
as respect for other opinions” (Saar 2013: 409–410). In other words, there are
not only democratic and undemocratic societies, but also individuals who
support democratic or anti-democratic societies.
The seemingly contradictory demands for individual rights of freedom
and for these rights to be restricted for the “other” emerge from almost
identical needs: a person wants to be protected from the majority, while
at the same time being able to devalue “others” from within this majority.
This shows the contradiction between the ideal of democratic recognition
and the reality of competition in the market society. The less regulated the
market is, the more its rule results in the devaluation of others. This cannot
be rationalized as “exclusive solidarity”, since the market selects: “What is
unt is left behind”. Human labour is also a commodity in this logic, and
people suer when they themselves are dispensed with (Türcke 2002: 61).
But it is only “those who had previously been integrated into the constraints
of the collective” that can be “excluded” from the market (62–63). A person’s
experience of being left behind is all the worse, the more tightly she had been
integrated into these market constraints and had integrated them herself
(or, in psychological terms, identied with them so that they can no longer
be separated from her own will and aspirations). A person’s readiness to
submit to the authority of the market, and her uncertainty at the degree to
which she participates in its power, lead to resentment, which is manifested
The Authoritarian Syndrome Today 81
in the willingness or even desire to be subjugated to a strong authority, in
the emphasis on conventions, and not least in the demand for harsh pun-
ishments when these conventions are violated. Authoritarian subjugation,
conventionalism, authoritarian aggression, and the propensity to devalue
others – these are the core elements of a “potentially fascistic individual”
(Adorno et al. 1950: 1; see also Fromm 1936). The recognition of dierence
is opposed by the idea of a “homogeneous” ethnic population (Staatsvolk)
(Saar 2013), an idea that excludes people from democratic participation. But
this devaluation of others also satises individual needs, which can be seen
altogether as a desire for control (Fritsche et al. 2017), for a positive identity
(Tajfel & Turner 1979), and for self-esteem (Greenberg et al. 1986), or as the
narcissistic phantasm of a unied and strong nation (Bohleber 1992; Decker
2015). In any case, they reveal the need that people have to ward o the
experience of their own weakness and of being under threat, a need that is
well-founded:
“Today anyone who fails to comply with the economic rules will
seldom go under straight away. But the fate of thedéclassélooms on the
horizon. […] the refusal to play the game arouses suspicions and exposes
oenders to the vengeance of society even though they may not yet be
reduced to going hungry and sleeping under bridges.” (Adorno 1955: 48).
In this chapter, we will therefore rst describe the distribution and char-
acteristics of authoritarianism. We will then identify how this syndrome is
manifested, which means using the last dataset to form authoritarian types
of people and to contrast them with democratic types.
Elements of the authoritarian syndrome
and how they are distributed
As in earlier survey waves, we also used a questionnaire on authoritarian-
ism in 2018 (Beierlein et al. 2014, abbreviated version), which enabled us to
describe the characteristics of the authoritarian syndrome along the three
core dimensions (Table 3.1). What is noticeable is the very high level of
agreement given to the rst statement, “Troublemakers should be made very
aware that they are unwelcome in society”, with two thirds of respondents
agreeing explicitly and one in ve latently (“partly agree”), which means
that only one person in six actually rejects authoritarian aggression. The
second statement, “Important decisions in society should be left to its lead-
ers”, measures people’s authoritarian subservience (Table 3.1). Although
the proportion of those who manifestly agree with this statement is lower,
more than 50% of the population still partially support such subservience
or think that it is good. The third statement gauges the level of convention-
alism. Here, more than 70% of respondents are against the questioning of
tried and tested practices (39.8%, manifest and 31.1%, latent). These results
82 O. Decker, J. Schuler, and E. Brähler
reveal a risk to democracy, since they show how responsive people are to
an authoritarian form of government. Even if the vast majority of people
agree with democracy as an abstract idea, this idea itself has little to do with
democracy in the sense of equal and pluralistic coexistence.
Figure 3.1 shows that there was a drop overall in the level of manifest
agreement (“mostly/completely agree”) with the rst statement (authori-
tarian aggression) between 2016 and 2018, although the level of agreement
was still very high in 2018 at almost 65%. The drop only occurred in West
Germany, though, while in the East there was a slight rise. There is a similar
pattern, albeit at a lower overall level, with the second statement (authori-
tarian subservience): while agreement fell slightly in the West, it increased
dramatically in the East. Finally, tried and tested practices were defended
even more strongly nationwide in 2018 than in 2016, meaning that conven-
tionalism is now present in about 40% of the population.
A further element of the authoritarian syndrome is the belief that there
are foreign “powers” at work, i.e. the propensity to discern conspiracies in
the world (Imho & Decker 2013). The conspiracy mindset is based on the
notion that there are persons or groups in the background that are con-
trolling political and social processes. We are not denying here that some
interest groups in society are in a better position to assert their interests
than others; and nor that it is often dicult to see through social and polit-
ical processes or to understand their dynamics. It is not our intention to
discredit criticism of opaque structures. Rather, we are gauging here a
mindset (Graumann & Moscovici 1987), one that sees in the world planned
and coordinated action by groups that act mostly in bad faith, and in any
case stealthily and secretly. Such a mindset does not criticize structural
Table 3.1 Agreement or disagreement in the dimensions of authoritarianism,
2018 (in %)
Dimensions of
authoritarianism Completely/
mostly disagree Partly agree Mostly/
completely agree
1 Troublemakers should be
made very aware that they
are unwelcome in society.
(N = 2,396)
14.3 21.0 64.6
2 Important decisions in
society should be left to its
leaders. (N = 2,406)
43.4 33.3 23.3
3 Tried and tested practices
should not be called into
question. (N = 2,396)
29.2 31.1 39.8
Scaling: 1 = “completely disagree”, 2 = “mostly disagree”, 3 = “partly agree”, 4 = “mostly agree”,
5 = “completely agree”; a factor analysis (Oblim) determined a common factor, all three state-
ments show high factor loadings (statement 1 = .731; statement 2 = .767; statement 3 = .835);
Cronbach’s alpha = .674.
The Authoritarian Syndrome Today 83
conditions or social interests, but rather identies threatening and overpow-
ering persons or groups that control society down to the smallest units, and
that, once identied, can be fought against. While this mindset helps people
to have a sense of control over their own lives, it also allows them to satisfy
authoritarian aggression.
Table 3.2 shows how the conspiracy mindset is distributed. A majority
of respondents reject the statements on “secret organizations” and “secret
Figure 3.1 Agreement with authoritarianism in Germany as a whole, and in an
East-West comparison (in %)
2018: signicant dierences between East and West; Pearson’s chi-squared test: p < .01
Table 3.2 Agreement with the conspiracy mindset (in %)
Disagree (1–3) (4) Agree (5–7)
1 Most people do not realize how far our
lives are determined by conspiracies that
are concocted in secret. (N = 2,405)
57.9 20.7 21.3
2 There are secret organizations that have a
great inuence on political decisions.
(N = 2,401)
51.2 19.8 29.0
3 Politicians and other leading gures are
only puppets of the powers behind them.
(N = 2,392)
48.2 21.0 30.8
Scaling from 1 = “completely disagree” to 7 = “completely agree”; no semantic classication in
the intermediate stages; a factor analysis (Oblim) determined a common factor, all three state-
ments show high factor loadings (statement 1 = .867; statement 2 = .928; statement 3 = .892);
Cronbach’s alpha = .877.
84 O. Decker, J. Schuler, and E. Brähler
conspiracies”, but more than half do not deem the idea that politicians are
“puppets” to be false.
Figure 3.2 shows the proportion of people who reach a value greater than 12
(i.e. average agreement across all three statements). The proportion of
respondents across the country who agree manifestly did not change sig-
nicantly between 2016 and 2018, with 30.7% of respondents still revealing
a conspiracy mindset in 2018. Worth noting, however, is the decline in East
Germany between 2016 and 2018 (from 40.5% to 33.9%).
Besides the usual three dimensions of authoritarianism and the conspir-
acy mindset, we have also used three statements from the authoritarianism
scale developed by Detlef Oesterreich (Oesterreich 1998), who formulated
his questionnaire to gauge authoritarian personality traits in interper-
sonal contacts (Table 3.3). We selected which statements to use according
to whether they featured recognition of and openness to the interests of
others, since we were concerned with empirically investigating the pre-
conditions for plural democracies outlined above. By assessing people’s
willingness to take their own stance against a majority, we also wanted
to gauge their capacity to behave autonomously with regard to a majority
(statement 3). Our aim was to bring authoritarian and democratic person-
ality traits into the analysis. The rst two statements show that dierence
is accepted by part of the population, but not by the majority, with a large
proportion either rejecting the two statements or placing caveats on them.
Figure 3.2 Manifest conspiracy mindset, 2012, 2016, and 2018, with three items
summarized (in %)
Pearson’s chi-squared test: **p < .01 (East/West dierences are given/stated in the year, and
dierences between the years in the legend; case number at the given place and Chapter 2)
The Authoritarian Syndrome Today 85
In contrast, two thirds claim that they can take their own stance against
a majority, although the eect of what is socially desirable undoubtedly
played a role in yielding this high gure.
We then created an index value that combines statements 1 and 2 into
the dimension of “openness” (Table 3.4). This shows that only about 25%
of the population are open to unfamiliar ideas and give recognition to
dierence; more than half are partially open; and about 21% are not open
at all (these gures are not depicted).
Table 3.5 presents selected correlations between sociodemographic
characteristics (e.g. place of residence, age, education) and elements of the
authoritarian syndrome. We can see that almost one in four East Germans
and one in ve West Germans describe themselves as closed. Authoritarian
aggression is particularly strong in East Germany (at 70.8%), but author-
itarian subservience and the emphasis on conventions are also much
more widespread in the East. The factor of age is also signicant, since
there are clear dierences across all elements of the syndrome: the older
people are, the higher the proportion of those who are authoritarian.
Table 3.3 Agreement with statements in the dimension of “openness and
autonomy” (in %)
Completely
disagree Undecided Completely agree
1 I enjoy dealing with
unfamiliar ideas. (N = 2,410) 39.9 30.0 30.8
2 I like spontaneous people,
even if they’re somewhat
unpredictable. (N = 2,407)
23.3 32.7 44.0
3 I take my own stance in
discussions, even if it diers
from the majority opinion.
(N = 2,413)
13.8 23.9 62.4
Unlike Oesterreich, we chose a simple ve-step Likert scale (1 = “completely disagree”, 5 = “com-
pletely agree”). A factor analysis yielded a single factor, all three statements show high factor
loadings 1 (.737), 2 (.802), and 3 (.676); the internal consistency is satisfactory (Cronbach’s
alpha = .613). We use in the following a dimension from statements 1 and 2 as a measure of
openness; they both load on a common factor (.926) and gauge the recognition of dierence
(Cronbach’s alpha = .636).
Table 3.4 “Openness to others and dierence” in
Germany (in %)
Openness (N = 583) 24.3
Limited openness (N = 1,325) 55.1
Closedness (N = 498) 20.6
Values from 2 (disagreement) to 10 (agreement).
Openness: >= 8, medium openness: 5–7, Closedness: <= 4.
86 O. Decker, J. Schuler, and E. Brähler
We cannot ignore the fact that authoritarian aggression is very common
across all sociodemographic characteristics. Conventionalism and the con-
spiracy mindset are consistently present in at least one third of people. Half
the respondents with A-levels show authoritarian aggression, and a quarter
also emphasize conventions or are prone to a conspiracy mindset; it is only
authoritarian subservience that is low among this group, while openness
towards others is widespread. Not surprisingly, then, a higher level of edu-
cation at least partly counteracts the tendency towards authoritarianism.
Having a negative view of the national nancial situation leads to a much
Table 3.5 Elements of the authoritarian syndrome, sociodemographic
characteristics, and political self-assessment (in %)
Authoritarian
aggression Subservience Conventionalism Conspiracy
mindset Closedness
** ** ** *
East (N = 492) 70.8 33.7 46.2 33.9 23.7
West (N = 2,196) 63.1 20.6 38.1 29.8 19.8
Age groups ** ** ** **
14–30 (N = 478) 56.3 20.1 29.4 28.8 14.3
31–60
(N = 1,298) 65.5 21.8 38.1 31.5 18.1
61 and older
(N = 637) 69.2 28.8 51.0 30.3 30.7
Own nancial
situation * ** **
Good, so-so 65.0 23.8 40.6 28.7 19.6
Bad 62.4 19.9 33.8 45.0 27.9
National
nancial
situation
** ** **
Good, so-so 64.7 34.1 39.6 28.7 19.7
Bad 64.3 22.2 41.0 49.1 29.6
Level of formal
education ** ** ** ** **
No A-levels
(N = 1,915) 68.2 25.8 43.6 32.2 23.5
A-levels
(N = 493) 50.5 13.4 25.1 24.9 9.2
Political
self-assessment ** ** ** ** **
Far left (N = 50) 48.0 16.0 32.0 34.0 20.0
Left (N = 766) 59.2 22.5 32.6 26.9 16.8
Centre
(N = 1,037) 63.9 19.7 38.3 28.0 19.4
Right (N = 486) 75.7 31.5 53.6 40.8 26.6
Far right
(N = 20) 80.0 35.0 40.0 52.6 45.0
Pearson’s chi-squared test: **p < .01.
The Authoritarian Syndrome Today 87
more conspiratorial mindset, a lack of openness, and the desire for a strong
authority to provide orientation in life. This is not the case for those who
have a negative view of their own nancial situation. It is noticeable that
those who have a positive view of their own nancial situation are much
more likely to emphasize conventions.
We also asked respondents to assess their politics on a scale from “far
left” to “far right”. As expected, authoritarian aggression, conventionalism,
and the conspiracy mindset are present regardless of political orientation.
However, authoritarian subservience is very rare among those who posi-
tion themselves on the political left, whereas the traits of the authoritarian
syndrome are particularly strong among those who position themselves on
the political right or far right. It is only the emphasis on conventions that
does not increase linearly when it comes to the “far-right” group. Although
people on the far left are often a little more closed than those on the left and
in the centre, these three groups dier little from each other. The dierence
becomes clearer when we look to the right of the centre: those on the right
or the far right are more often closed to other people and to their “unpre-
dictability” and “ideas”. Thus, we should emphasize once again that the
authoritarian syndrome can express itself independently of concrete polit-
ical ideas and therefore illustrates the anti-democratic potential that exists
across society as a whole.
In the following, we examine the correlations between elements of the
authoritarian syndrome and various factors in the authoritarian dynamic,
beginning with how respondents remember their upbringing. The individ-
ual adopts social norms in the process of socialization and upbringing, this
applying equally to authoritarian and democratic tendencies. Early work
on the authoritarian character surmised that authoritarian structures in
the family are responsible for inculcating these norms (Fromm 1936), an
idea that more recent studies have adopted (Hopf & Hopf 1997; Oesterreich
2000). However, reference was also made in as early as the 1960s to changes
in social conditions, which shifted socialization away from the family and
to social entities instead (Marcuse 1963) – for example, to peer groups for
young people (Friedrichs & Sander 2010), but also to more abstract entities
that have an eect on a person’s entire lifespan and that impart authoritar-
ian statehood, such as the media (Decker & Türcke 2018) and bureaucracy
(Adorno 1953). It was for this reason that we surveyed how respondents
remember their upbringing in three dimensions: memories of emotional
closeness, which indicate a style of parenting based on recognition (“Did
your parents comfort you when you were sad?”); memories of harsh pun-
ishments, which indicate a style of parenting that is authoritarian (“Did
your parents punish you harshly, even for minor things?”); and memories
of excessive demands, which indicate a style of parenting geared towards
norms of social achievement (“Did your parents try to drive you to be ‘the
best’?”). (All questions from Schumacher et al. 2000). We also used the
three spheres of recognition outlined by Honneth (1992; for a theoretical
88 O. Decker, J. Schuler, and E. Brähler
justication, see Chapter 1; for a test-statistical description, see Chapter 4):
recognition as a citizen, as a person, and as a working human being.
People who as children experienced harsh punishments and little emo-
tional closeness from their parents are more likely to display an author-
itarian syndrome in adulthood (Table 3.6), although there are signicant
dierences in only two areas: those who remember harsh punishments
emphasize conventions more strongly and are more closed to other people;
and those whose parents made excessive demands of them are much more
likely as adults to be closed to others and more strongly bound by conven-
tions, with the conspiracy mindset being slightly but not signicantly more
prevalent among this group (Table 3.6).
Tab le 3.6 also yields a surprising result, since those who experienced emo-
tional closeness to their parents tend towards authoritarian aggression, i.e.
are more likely to demand sanctions against deviant groups. However, this
value is an exception in an otherwise consistent picture, with the other ele-
ments of the authoritarian syndrome being weaker in this group: people who
had a loving upbringing are more open to dierence and less willing to sub-
mit to authority. Thus, it seems to be precisely the dimension of “openness”
Table 3.6 Elements of the authoritarian syndrome and upbringing (in %)
Authoritarian
aggression Subservience Conventionalism Conspiracy
mindset Closedness
Harsh parental
punishments ** **
Yes, often/
always
(N = 226)
67.7 23.2 42.1 40.5 38.4
No/occasionally
(N = 2,165) 64.2 23.3 39.5 29.6 18.7
Excessive
parental
demands
* **
Yes, often/
always
(N = 567)
66.3 23.3 41.4 33.3 21.7
No/occasionally
(N = 1,805) 64.1 23.2 34.6 29.8 17.1
Emotional
closeness to
parents
* * **
Yes, often/
always
(N = 1,432)
66.3 21.7 40.1 29.2 16.4
No/occasionally
(N = 976) 61.9 25.6 39.1 32.7 26.9
Pearson’s chi-squared test: **p < .01, *p < .05.
The Authoritarian Syndrome Today 89
that is strongly correlated with style of parenting: the more emotional rec-
ognition from parents, the more open the child is (and later the adult); the
more demands or harsh punishments, the less open.
One claim that we make is that the authoritarian syndrome is also inu-
enced by a person’s later, i.e. lifelong, authoritarian or democratic socializa-
tion, which means that it is important for a person to experience recognition
not only in childhood (few harsh punishments, much emotional closeness),
but also in adulthood (Table 3.7).
The ndings are unequivocal: an authoritarian syndrome is much more
frequent among people who experience no recognition as a citizen, which
supports our claim that lifelong social dynamics have an eect on whether
the authoritarian syndrome emerges. Subservience and conventionalism are
no longer signicant, but they are nonetheless stronger among this group.
Experiencing no recognition as a citizen is also accompanied much more
often by a conspiracy mindset and closedness, while recognition as a person
Table 3.7 Elements of the authoritarian syndrome and recognition (in %)
Authoritarian
aggression Subservience Conventionalism Conspiracy
mindset Closedness
Recognition as
a citizen ** ** **
No recognition
as a citizen
(N = 557)
74.9 25.8 42.3 48.7 28.6
Recognition as
a citizen
(N = 1,837)
61.5 22.6 39.0 25.2 18.2
Recognition as
a working
human being
** **
No recognition
as a working
human being
(N = 172)
61.8 27.3 50.6 33.1 50.3
Recognition as
a working
human being
(N = 2,231)
64.9 23.0 38.9 30.5 18.4
Recognition as
a person * **
No recognition
as a person
(N = 81)
53.3 25.9 42.5 35.1 46.9
Recognition as
a person
(N = 2,325)
65.0 23.2 39.7 30.5 19.7
Pearson’s chi-squared test: **p < .01, *p < .05.
90 O. Decker, J. Schuler, and E. Brähler
and as a working human being increases a person’s capacity for respecting
dierence, with those who experience recognition in these spheres being
more open to other people and more accepting of dierence.
Interestingly, two phenomena that already occurred in connection with
parental upbringing occur once again here. If parental recognition was
associated with a higher level of authoritarian aggression, then recognition
as a person (i.e. by other people who are important) is more often associated
with a propensity for authoritarian aggression. And, like parental demands
to achieve, not having recognition as a working human being is more often
accompanied by conventionalism. Those who do not experience recogni-
tion in their working life are also more likely to believe that there are pow-
erful groups secretly controlling society.
Democratic, ambivalent, and authoritarian syndromes
The state of democracy is evident not only when support for democratic
(or, conversely, extreme right-wing) positions is surveyed explicitly, but
also where the focus seems at rst to be on something else: namely, on the
capacity to accept dierence and diversity. This capacity does not seem
at rst to have anything to do with how people assess themselves politi-
cally or with their support for a democratic party, but the idea that it does
was something already pointed out by one of the rst investigations into
attitudes: namely, Erich Fromm, Max Horkheimer, and Herbert Marcuse’s
Studies on Authority and Family. This may not have been as methodolog-
ically mature as today’s surveys, but this milestone in empirical social
research (Fahrenberg & Steiner 2004) took an interesting approach to
social dynamics. Using psychoanalysis to investigate the interior of soci-
ety, the authors found a social dynamic that led to the emergence of an
authoritarian personality structure in the individual. These early studies
on authority and family showed that the authoritarian tendency is not, or is
only loosely, linked to politically left-wing or right-wing ideas. Indeed, pro-
gressive political goals can exist alongside regressive psychological needs
in the same person at the same time. But, where authoritarian aggression,
authoritarian subservience, and conventionalism exist in a respondent, we
do not speak in terms of an authoritarian character or an authoritarian
personality, but of an authoritarian syndrome (see Chapter 1). This is not to
reject the basic tenets of critical theory and psychoanalysis, but is due to
the diculty of adequately developing the concept of personality in a way
that follows current psychoanalytical debates.
In order to identify the manifestations of authoritarian and democratic
syndromes in the population, we have calculated a cluster analysis (k-means
clustering). Cluster analyses are generally used to search for patterns in a
dataset, and are employed in social research to describe people who are
particularly similar to each other and easily distinguishable from other
respondents in terms of certain characteristics. The procedure is similar
The Authoritarian Syndrome Today 91
to the description of political milieus that we undertook in our 2016 study
(Decker & Brähler 2016). This time, though, we focused not on the political
climate, but on aspects of personality, with our search being for similarities
and dierences in terms of openness and autonomy (see Table 3.3), the con-
spiracy mindset (see Table 3.2), and authoritarian aggression, authoritarian
subservience and conventionalism (see Table 3.1). In doing so, we found a
total of two types (or syndromes) with a democratic tendency, three that are
susceptible to authoritarian escapism, and four strongly authoritarian types
(Table 3.8; for results of the cluster analysis, see Table 3.9).
Table 3.8 Political syndromes in the population
(proportion in %)
Political syndromes Proportion
I The democrats
I.1 The conservatives 14.0
I.2 The performers 14.8
II The ambivalents
II.1 The adapted 9.6
II.2 The borderless young 7.7
II.3 The stability-oriented 10.9
III The authoritarians
III.1 The subservient 5.2
III.2 The new-right functional elite 12.9
III.3 The paranoid conformists 14.7
III.4 The closed conventionalists 9.2
Table 3.9 Results of the cluster calculation (active variables; mean values)
Syndrome
I.1 I.2 II.2 II.2 II.3 III.1 III.2 III.3 III.4
Openness and
autonomy 9.07 12.22 5.90 12.01 9.09 5.31 12.64 9.63 8.74
Belief in internal
control 8.71 9.09 7.85 6.96 5.82 5.03 8.82 8.73 7.98
Belief in external
control 3.75 3.71 4.31 6.94 5.46 6.94 4.84 4.03 7.31
Conspiracy
mindset 1.86 2.01 2.91 4.48 2.96 3.62 4.15 4.63 4.02
Authoritarian
aggression 3.42 3.51 3.56 3.36 3.56 4.07 4.43 4.31 4.25
Authoritarian
subservience 2.20 2.20 2.61 2.14 2.57 3.18 3.29 2.91 3.37
Conventionalism 2.76 2.63 3.25 2.40 3.01 3.61 3.70 3.49 3.59
92 O. Decker, J. Schuler, and E. Brähler
The names for the syndromes are the result of an interpretative process
or montage (Decker 2018), based on questionnaires where respondents
describe their personality, their essential values, and their political orien-
tation. Personality includes on the one hand a person’s assessment of who
has control over her own life (belief in internal or external control; Kovaleva
et al. 2014), and on the other the six dimensions from the Gießen test (social
resonance, dominance, control, underlying mood, permeability, and
social potency). Using this psychoanalytical personality test, respondents
described themselves in their interactions with other people (Beckmann
et al. 2012), and we then related this description of personality to the parental
style of upbringing that respondents remember (see Table 3.6; Schumacher
et al. 2000) and to the spheres of recognition (see Chapter 4).
We also used a questionnaire to gauge respondents’ essential values
(Boer 2014), since, even if people share the same values in principle, it is ini-
tially unclear which values the individual particularly esteems. Values can
be individual objectives or express a preference for social norms, and both
have been recorded here. Finally, we drew on the Leipzig Questionnaire
on Right-Wing Extremism to describe a person’s political outlook (Decker
et al. 2013), and expanded the questionnaire in two ways. First, to include
questions on the acceptance of democracy, support for norms of equality,
and anti-pluralism; on political self-assessment, and the propensity to use
and acceptance of violence; and on antiziganism, hostility to Muslims, and
the devaluation of asylum seekers (see Chapter 2). And, second, to include a
questionnaire on anti-Semitism in communication latency (see Chapter 5).
All this information was supplemented by where a person locates herself on
the left-right political scale and by her preference for a particular political
party.
We based our interpretation on the results for each syndrome, either on
the mean values and the distribution in the syndrome, or on the percentages
of agreement. Reference point for the interpretation was in each case the
total mean value or the strength of the characteristic in comparison to other
syndromes. In the following, we will present the democratic, ambivalent,
and authoritarian syndromes separately.1
I. The democrats
Two types can be regarded as strong pillars of democracy, and they account
for 28.2% of the population. Men and women are represented equally, but
there are more West Germans and fewer East Germans than in the distri-
bution across Germany as a whole. Democrats have a disproportionately
high level of education (33.3% with A-levels), and have very seldom been
unemployed. Younger people up to the age of 30 are comparatively numer-
ous among democrats.
I.1 The conservatives (N = 312, 14%; 47.4% men, 52.6% women; 18.5% East
Germ ans, 81.5% West Ger mans): Senior and qualied employees, upper-grade
The Authoritarian Syndrome Today 93
civil servants; rarely blue-collar workers; hardly any self-employed people.
Above-average positive evaluation of the country’s and their own economic sit-
uation in the present and the future.
While conservatives do not perceive themselves as closed, they are also
not marked by any particular openness towards other people, and they do
not search for experiences of dierence. They see the eect that they have
on their social environment as consistently positive; they receive a great deal
of resonance from their fellow human beings, and are able to pursue their
interests in life. They know how to make use of the opportunities available to
them. Although they claim that they can take a stance that diers from the
majority opinion, they are in fact quite willing to adapt. They have a certain
tendency to subordinate themselves, which is also expressed in their ability
to control their impulses. This makes them appear less dominant, but very
controlled. In terms of their personality, they tend towards order and show
little inclination for uninhibited behaviour. They are the most compulsive
of all the types. Their mood is balanced, and they are self-condent, have
a low level of anxiety, and can also express their dissatisfaction. They also
know how to build close relationships with other people, to articulate their
wishes openly, and to face the world with an underlying feeling of trust.
Conservatives did not experience excessive parental demands or violence in
their childhood, and as adults they are sure of gaining recognition in their
private and working lives, and in their interaction with state institutions.
Their values are independent thinking and creativity, as well as the appre-
ciation of people and nature. Although social prestige and personal success
are important to them, they are less important than they are to other people,
which is also true of sensuous pleasure and the appeal of the new. Their val-
ues are geared towards tolerance and the well-being of others. Complying
with social norms and expectations is important to them, as is the stabil-
ity and well-being of society. They belong to those people who demand the
acceptance of traditions, customs and religions.
Conservatives nd their political home mainly in the CDU (Christian
Democratic Union); no other type vote so often for this party. In contrast,
the AfD (Alternative for Germany) is certainly not an option for them, and
they would instead tend to vote for the SPD (Social Democratic Party of
Germany), the Greens or the Left. They locate themselves in the politi-
cal centre. Conservatives do not comprise people with manifestly extreme
right-wing attitudes. And, even if they are not averse to devaluing out-
groups, their prejudices are clearly weaker than is the case with other peo-
ple. Conservatives oppose authoritarian subservience and conventionalism.
They occasionally display authoritarian aggression, but to a much lesser
extent than the rest of the population. This is also the type that tends least
towards the conspiracy mindset, and conservatives are not receptive to
authoritarian relations.
I.2 The performers (N = 358, 14.8%; 48.6% men, 51.4% women; 14.8% East
Germans, 85.2% West Germans): Self-employed, independent professions,
94 O. Decker, J. Schuler, and E. Brähler
senior and qualied employees, middle-, upper- and higher-grade civil serv-
ants; fewer blue-collar workers. Extremely positive evaluation of the country’s
and their own economic situation; expectation that the country’s economic sit-
uation will remain as it is, and that their own situation will improve.
Performers describe themselves as being very open, and they do not
avoid experiences of dierence. At the same time, they are also willing to
express their opinion in an environment that is predominantly dierent.
They lead their lives in a very self-determined way and believe that they
hold their destiny in their own hands. Performers describe themselves as
being highly respected and popular. They are well received and very rarely
experience frustration. No other type manages has so much resonance in
social contacts. Performers are hardly ever caught up in conicts, and
internal psychological conicts do not result in impulsive reactions; on
the contrary, performers describe themselves as patient. Hence, they also
see themselves as being very conscientious or even perfectionists. They are
the most self-controlled of all the syndromes, with this feature being
accompanied, though, by a lack of exuberance. This does not aect the
autonomy of performers, who are very sure of themselves and value their
independence. They are not familiar with a subdued mood or with anxiety.
This also relates to their willingness to compete, which in turn under-
scores their self-condence. It is not surprising that performers hardly
ever remember harsh parental punishments, but instead an emotionally
loving upbringing in which social norms of achievement were not passed
on in a manner that they found excessive. As adults, they nd recognition
in all areas: hardly any experience no recognition as a person, almost all
report a high level of recognition as a working human being, and as citi-
zens they feel just as much recognition as conservatives.
Very important to performers, however, is the gratication of their
desires, and social status, personal success and an exciting life are also
more important to them than to conservatives. Especially important for
them are independent thinking, creativity, and the courage to embrace
the new. Universal and humanistic values are important to them, and they
avoid breaking with social expectations and norms. Similar to conserva-
tives, they have a high level of acceptance when it comes to traditions and
customs. They place a very high value on stability in society and in per-
sonal relationships.
Politically, performers position themselves further to the left than all the
other types, although they do not vote for the Left (die Linke) any more
than the population as a whole. Instead, they often vote for the Greens,
but the FDP (Free Democratic Party) also has more supporters among
this type than it does among the other types. Performers are completely
opposed to extreme right-wing attitudes, and they display hardly any prej-
udices to specic out-groups. They give the strongest support to egalitarian
norms, which, as with conservatives, is accompanied by a strong plural-
ism. Moreover, no other type reject violence to assert their own interests as
The Authoritarian Syndrome Today 95
vehemently as performers. They identify very much with democratic ideas
of society.
II. The ambivalents
Three types cannot be assigned clearly to either the democrats or the
authoritarian syndrome, with the ambivalents accounting for 28.2% of the
population. With them, it is open as to whether they support plural democ-
racy and how susceptible they are to escaping into authoritarianism. The
proportion of East Germans (18.9%) and West Germans (81.1%) in this cat-
egory is about the same as in the population as a whole. Women are over-
represented (57.2%) and the level of educational attainment is lower than
among democrats (17.8% with A-levels or higher). Half have already been
unemployed at some point, and about a third more than twice in their lives.
The middle age group is somewhat underrepresented among this group,
while young and older people are represented somewhat more frequently.
II.1 The adapted (N = 227, 9.6%; 41.9% men, 58.1% women; 21.1% East
Germans, 78.9% West Germans): Blue-collar workers shaped by social
democracy and low-level employees; represented equally in East and West
Germany. Majority assess the country’s and their own economic situation as
being good, and do not expect fundamental changes in either case.
The adapted are characterized by a very high level of closedness. They
avoid experiences of dierence, i.e. with unknown people and unfamiliar
ideas. Where the majority opinion diers, the adapted would rather remain
silent than defend their opinions with condence. Whether their own lives
are shaped by external inuences or by their own achievements is a ques-
tion that they do not deem relevant. However, they are more likely than
other types to reject authoritarian aggression, inconspicuous with regard
to authoritarian subservience, but emphasize conventions. They tend not
to have a conspiracy mindset, which reveals a positive side to the lack of
imagination that prevails as a personality trait in this type.
The adapted experience little resonance in interpersonal contact and
contact with people at work, but also hardly any frustration, which can be
explained by their relatively low inclination to compete and to set their own
creative goals. Their tendency to appear dominant with regard to others is a
sign not of self-condence or of having their own goals, but instead of their
underlying mood: they lack self-reection and self-awareness, e.g. of feelings
or wishes. That this makes them appear rather closed to others is something
of which the adapted are aware, which reveals a factor of doubt or shame
that can derive from an early phase of life. The adapted experienced less
emotional warmth as children, and more harsh parental punishments, which
may have led to less autonomous and more distrustful and contact-avoiding
behaviour in personal contact with others. Hence, the adapted are rarely
high-spirited and tend instead to be compulsive. They also tend to be incon-
spicuous in terms of their sociability, being neither particularly sociable nor
96 O. Decker, J. Schuler, and E. Brähler
especially inhibited. They are given an average level of recognition as citi-
zens, as working people, and as private individuals.
The adapted are also unremarkable in terms of the values that they deem
important in life. They say that they nd universal values relevant, but not
personal success, social power, or prosperity. Nor do they attach much
importance to having an exciting life, and simply want to be able to enjoy
life as it is. More important to them, however, is conformity and the curbing
of behaviour that could disturb others or break with social conventions.
What is noticeable is their strong desire for security, both in their own per-
sonal relationships and in relation to society as a whole.
These personality traits are reected in their socio-political attitudes.
For example, the adapted have neither a high propensity for violence, and
nor do they advocate the use of violence by others. Although the adapted
emphasize universal values at a manifest level, they also reject equal rights
for everybody more often than most other types. Alongside the subservient,
the adapted agree the least with the idea of democracy and the German
constitution. The adapted are comparatively seldom manifestly right-wing
extremist, but what they do show is anti-Semitism and antiziganism. This
is all the more striking because they devalue neither asylum seekers nor
Muslims. Besides solidarity with migrants, this group also display tradi-
tional prejudices against those whom they deem “foreign”.
The adapted vote most often for the SPD, followed by the CDU and
the Left. The FDP and the Greens have the fewest supporters among this
group, but the AfD and the NPD also have little appeal for them.
Although the adapted do not give right-wing parties a high level of sup-
port and do not present themselves as particularly authoritarian, they
do locate themselves on the far right of the political spectrum, and are
therefore close to the paranoid conformists in terms of how they vote and
where they locate themselves politically. Nonetheless, they dier mark-
edly in their rejection of authoritarian aggression and their immunity to
the conspiracy mindset.
This type is particularly noticeable in terms of age structure (especially
prevalent among persons older than 61, but rare among those between 31
and 60) and level of education (seldom with A-levels). The age structure
of this group probably also explains why its members experienced more
often than many other types harsh punishments and little emotional
warmth in their upbringing. The adapted have found their place in society
and are not looking to change the status quo. They do not pose a threat to
democracy, but do not give it much support, either.
II.2 The borderless young (N = 182, 7.7%; 50.5% men, 49.5% women; 18.1%
East Germans, 81.9% West Germans): Borderless young people in the neo-
liberal, meritocratic society; highest level of educational achievement, self-
employed, freelancers, trained employees. Evaluate the country’s economic
situation somewhat negatively, and their own denitely negatively, with the
same applying to how both will develop in the future.
The Authoritarian Syndrome Today 97
The young borderless are unusually contradictory. They are open to
new ideas and to spontaneous people, and are very prepared to argue
their position against a majority, but nevertheless tend to see themselves
as avoiding conict. They are not particularly concerned with creating a
positive impression on their surroundings, while also managing not to give
oence: they do not feel that they make either a particularly good or a par-
ticularly bad impression on their fellow human beings. Nor do they tend
towards authoritarian roles and are even more willing than others to sit
back and watch, something that they are helped in by the fact that they have
(self-)control without being compulsive. As their avoidance of conict
has already made clear, the borderless form their social relations without
aggression, not even in a sense of suppressed aggression. They are much less
open than most people, experience others as distant, and hold back their
own needs. This shows uncertainty about their own abilities and a some-
what diminished self-condence. Although they did not experience harsh
punishments in their upbringing, what seem to have been present were
social norms of achievement. At the same time, they experienced less emo-
tional closeness and comfort from their parents. Similarly, they are given
less recognition than other types in their private life and at work. Alongside
the closed conventionalists, this group experience the least recognition as
citizens in their interaction with authorities and institutions.
Social status and prestige tend to be unimportant to them. What is cer-
tain, however, is that they attach great importance to self-determination.
Also important are universal and humanistic values. They also empha-
size the value of traditions and the importance of avoiding behaviour and
impulses that could harm or annoy others, which corresponds to the fact
that they mention harmony and stability in society and personal relation-
ships as goals. This type is also concerned with security.
They are in favour of a plural society, and they have the lowest values for
the three elements of the authoritarian syndrome (authoritarian aggression,
subservience, and conventionalism). However, and here is where the contra-
diction really becomes visible, this type is strongly susceptible to the con-
spiracy mindset, and see even their own lives as being shaped essentially by
external forces. And, although they uphold the idea of democracy, they are
the most dissatised with the constitutional norm and reality of democracy
in Germany. Their longing for solid ground in a dynamic and confusing
world is condensed in their desire for traditions and stable relationships, as
well as in their conspiracy mindset. This is probably why they are prepared
to use violence to ght for their own interests if necessary; but they are less
willing to accept the use of violence by others.
Their rejection of authorities and a conspiracy mindset are accompa-
nied by a polarized pattern of voting. The CDU and the Greens meet with
very little approval, while the Left is the party that this group most often
vote for, followed by the SPD. Surprisingly, it is this type that also votes
disproportionately often for the AfD, with the party having the highest
98 O. Decker, J. Schuler, and E. Brähler
explicit popularity among members of this type after the SPD and the
Left. Also, the second largest group of NPD voters (after the subservient)
can be found among this type, and only the new-right functional elite and
the closed conventionalists have a similarly high preference for the AfD.
Unlike the latter two authoritarian syndromes, though, the majority of
this type tend to locate themselves politically to the left of the centre.
This ambiguous picture becomes further complicated on closer inspec-
tion. For example, this type believes somewhat more often than other types
that an authoritarian dictatorship would better serve the national interest.
While this type agrees comparatively little with traditional anti-Semitism,
they certainly nd anti-Semitism attractive in communication latency; they
also trivialize National Socialism somewhat more frequently than others.
What should concern us is that this type has relatively often achieved a
high level of formal education, and that they are young (people under 30
are overrepresented among this type). It is dicult to predict whether they
will pose a threat to democracy in the long run. On the one hand, they tend
towards extremism: anti-Semitism, the conspiracy mindset, trivialization
of Nazism, propensity for violence, and sometimes preference for extreme
right-wing parties. On the other, they reject most strongly authoritarian
aggression, authoritarian subservience, and conventionalism. In other
words, they are still looking for their niche.
II.3 The stability-oriented (N = 257, 10.9%; 38.1% men, 61.9% women;
17.5% East Germans, 82.5% West Germans): Low-level employees and
middle- and higher-level civil servants. Mostly assess the country’s economic
situation positively, but their own economic situation negatively; do not expect
changes to either in the future.
This type shows very little willingness to express their own, dierent
opinion in public or in groups, and their openness to other people is com-
paratively small. They do not have a resonating eect on their surround-
ings, but they also do little to present themselves, and indeed are not able
to do so well and have little inclination. If the social situation and their
role allow it, they can be high-spirited. Their underlying mood uctuates
between irritation and an anxious, more dependent attitude. Although
this type describes themselves as neither particularly open nor closed,
their greater social mistrust and low openness are stronger than in the
other types. Their self-condence is relatively low, which is shown in their
less competitive attitude, but also in their reserve and lack of ideas. But
what really marks this type out is their low level of belief in their ability
to inuence relevant aspects of their lives and their environment through
their own actions, holding on instead to tried and tested practices. Their
parents brought them up a little more harshly and with less emotional
closeness than is the case with other types. They usually feel recogni-
tion as citizens and actually always as people. It is only in their working
environment that there is a decit of recognition in comparison to other
types.
The Authoritarian Syndrome Today 99
They tend to prioritize enjoyment and rewarding themselves. They also
feel committed to traditions and avoid violating social expectations and
norms. They consider the harmony and stability of society and interper-
sonal relationships to be important values. This corresponds to how they
vote, with this type not voting for the Left and rarely for the AfD; indeed,
hardly any other type so clearly position themselves in the political centre.
However, they also have a tendency to trivialize National Socialism and
reveal their anti-Semitism in communication latency, although they devalue
Sinti and Roma, Muslims and asylum seekers much less than the population
as a whole.
It is all the more surprising, then, that this type should have an increased
propensity for violence and do not reject violence when it is used by others.
This is probably where the personality trait comes into play that goes hand
in hand with the propensity to channel anger externally. This type is the
least egalitarian and agree much more often than others with anti-pluralist
statements. They are certainly not a threat to democracy, but to what extent
they are willing and able to protect democracy is unclear.
III. The authoritarians
The authoritarian syndromes are present in 42% of the population (in 23.9%
of the population in the East, which is somewhat higher than the propor-
tion of East Germans in the population as a whole). In contrast, the sexes
are represented proportionally (women, 55%). The four authoritarian types
are made up of people with little education (only 13.1% with A-levels). The
majority have already experienced unemployment (53%), a quarter more
than twice (25.9%). Most people with an authoritarian syndrome are aged
between 31 and 60 (57.5%), and the fewest are under 30 (15.1%).
III.1 The subservient (N = 125, 5.2%; 34.1% men, 65.9% women; 27%
East Germans, 73% West Germans): Traditional proletarian milieu, low-
level employees, blue-collar workers, no management or employment requir-
ing qualications, below-average level of education, many more women and
East Germans, more experience of unemployment. Negative assessment of the
country’s and their own economic situation; tend to expect the situation of both
to deteriorate in the future.
The subservient are very closed and strongly reject spontaneous people
and those with a dierent opinion. They would also never express their own
dissenting opinion in a group. They do not believe that they can actively
shape their lives through their own eorts, but feel instead that their destiny
depends on uncontrollable external factors. The subservient receive little
positive feedback from their surroundings, and can also nd it dicult to
gauge the wishes and expectations of others. They are headstrong, and in
a complicated way dominating and impatient. Although they cannot be
high-spirited, they also lack steadiness and the ability to control themselves.
Their underlying mood is often very gloomy and marked by fear, and they
100 O. Decker, J. Schuler, and E. Brähler
more often tend to react impulsively to the pressure of internal conict.
To compensate for their lack of self-condence, they enter into relation-
ships of dependency with others. But they do not feel close to these people,
either, and can barely feel any aection. They are insecure and inhibited
with others, which leaves unfullled their need for recognition and conr-
mation. Undoubtedly related to this is the fact that as children they were
often harshly punished by their parents, and were given no comfort or emo-
tional aection. They were also never required or driven to perform better.
In short, they report of a neglected childhood marked by parental violence.
It is also striking that in adulthood the subservient experience hardly
any recognition as citizens, and rarely any recognition in their social and
working environment. They claim that social status is unimportant to them,
and they also dismiss ambition. Like the young borderless, however, they
also nd it dicult to free themselves entirely from the desire for personal
success. They express themselves less ambivalently with regard to self-
determination, since they set great store by this value. Most important for
them, though, is respect for customs and traditions.
In terms of political opinion, the subservient are the type that most
strongly reject the idea of democracy, and they are also the most dissatis-
ed of all the types with constitutional democracy in Germany and how it
functions. The desire within the personality structure to enter into support-
ing and dependent relationships is reected in the socio-political domain
in their desire for authority. Their emphasis on conventions visibly serves
to legitimize their authoritarian aggression against those who deviate from
the norm and against people who oppose authority. Not surprisingly, the
conspiracy mindset is also very prevalent, with the subservient seeing dark
forces at work that secretly control the world. The manifestly extreme right-
wing mindset is most common among this type. They reject “foreigners”
and “others”, regardless of the group: Jews, Sinti and Roma, asylum seek-
ers, Muslims, and migrants in general. The subservient are also strongly
anti-Semitic, which is particularly evident in communication latency. They
have a strong propensity for violence and very much support the use of vio-
lence by others. They reject equality and diversity in society, and therefore
locate themselves to the right or the far right of the political spectrum. They
often do not vote; when they do, they sometimes vote for the NPD. They do
not vote for the SPD, FDP, or Greens. They support the CDU, AfD, and the
Left, but no more or less than the population as a whole. All elements of the
authoritarian syndrome are pronounced among the subservient, and they
would very much approve of a strong authoritarian leadership instead of a
plural democracy.
III.2 The new-right functional elite (N = 312, 12.9%; 47.4% men, 52.6%
women; 22.1% East Germans, 77.9% West Germans): Self-employed, low-
level and trained employees, middle-, upper- and higher-level civil servants,
less often blue-collar workers. Largely positive assessment of the country’s
economic situation and more positive assessment of their own economic
The Authoritarian Syndrome Today 101
situation than the rest of the population; expectations for the future are also
more positive, in terms both of their own economic situation and that of the
country as a whole.
The new-right functional elite present themselves as being open. None
of them feel that they are unwilling to accept other opinions. They are
also always prepared to voice their own opinions against a majority. They
feel that others have little inuence on them, and are condent that they
can inuence their lives through their own actions. People from this new-
right functional elite tend to feel that others gravitate towards them, and
they come out of their shell more often. However, they are anxious not to
rub people up the wrong way. They rarely come into situations of conict
and are willing to toe the line. They are very controlled and controlling,
with order being very important to them. Members of this type are rarely
gloomy; they can show their displeasure and are rarely anxious. One out-
standing personality trait is their openness; they are open-minded and can
approach others well, which also shows a high degree of self-condence.
They value sociability and are natural, though competitive, in social inter-
action. They remember from their childhood loving and devoted parents,
hardly any harsh punishments, but the strong presence of social norms of
achievement – that is, the new-right functional elite were driven by their par-
ents to be better than others. This type receives a great deal of recognition
in their work and in their social relationships, and also more recognition as
citizens than most ambivalent and authoritarian syndromes. However, they
complain more often about the lack of recognition as citizens than is the
case with the democratic types, who have a similar occupational embedding
and a comparable educational background.
Social status is important to them, but not more important than it is for
others, and the same is true of personal success. Much stronger is their
hedonistic desire to lead an exciting life and to enjoy it to the full. Self-
determination is just as important to them as universal and humanistic
goals, and they therefore also agree with egalitarian values. When asked
about the rights of actual groups, however, they are clearly anti-pluralistic –
they reject an open society more than other people. The new-right func-
tional elite have a very strong desire for security, both in their social
relations and in society, and feel excessively committed to traditions.
This type votes especially often for the AfD, but also for the CDU. Some
can also identify with the FDP and SPD, but they clearly locate themselves
to the right of the political spectrum. Like the subservient, they have a
clear tendency towards right-wing extremism. They advocate a right-wing
dictatorship, are very nationalistic, xenophobic, and more anti-Semitic
than the majority in society. A distinctive feature is also their strong social
Darwinism: in line with their achievement ethos, they believe that those who
do not work should not enjoy the same rights. This type is the most hostile
to asylum seekers. They also devalue Sinti and Roma, as well as Muslims,
albeit to a lesser extent. They use communication latency to express their
102 O. Decker, J. Schuler, and E. Brähler
anti-Semitism. They are more likely to nd the statement that “some people
nd Jews unpleasant” plausible than all the other types. Nevertheless, they
have little propensity to engage in violent conicts themselves, but welcome
the use of violence by others.
In short, it is among the new-right functional elite that the authoritarian
syndrome is at its strongest. In addition, they also have a particularly strong
propensity for the conspiracy mindset. Although they generally support the
idea of democracy, people with this syndrome clearly oppose plural socie-
ties. The majority of those who expressly advocate a right-wing dictatorship
can be found among this type. Since they are well-educated and commu-
nicative functionaries in the middle stage of life, the threat that they pose to
democracy is all the greater.
III.3 The paranoid conformists (N = 346, 14.7%; 46% men, 54% women;
22.8% East Germans, 77.2% West Germans): Low level of education; low-
level, middle-level and trained employees; middle and senior civil servants;
skilled blue-collar workers. Negative assessment of the country’s economic sit-
uation, but predominantly positive assessment of their own economic situation;
expect hardly any change for the country, but tend to expect their own situation
to improve.
The paranoid conformists are closed to other opinions and reject dif-
ference in society. Although they claim that they also voice their opinions
against a majority, they also describe themselves as being overlooked and
unable to assert themselves. They seem to gain little conrmation of their
self-condence, and instead tend to nd themselves in a relationship com-
prising authoritarian roles. They therefore see themselves as being very
compliant, which contradicts their claim that they are autonomous in
expressing their opinion. Although they depend on the support of others,
they tend to discharge anger or pressure impulsively on those weaker than
them. Besides this impulsiveness, they also have over-controlled and com-
pulsive personality traits that contribute to their being hard-working and
diligent, but not creative or high-spirited. Nevertheless, they are seldom
gloomy or anxious, and tend to be trusting with people that they know.
Like the new-right functional elite, they largely escaped harsh parental pun-
ishments and were instead given somewhat more emotional aection, but at
the same time were strongly exposed to the social demands to achieve. They
now feel recognition in social relationships and in the work context, and do
not feel any less recognition as citizens than others – also similar to the new-
right functional elite.
This type states that social status and prestige are not particularly impor-
tant to them, and they also tend to attach little importance to personal
success. On the other hand, pleasure and fulllment of desires, but also
self-determination, are of great value to them. When asked about the spe-
cic rights of individual groups, they respond in a much more anti-pluralistic
way than most other people. They feel committed to traditions, and also
value the curbing of behaviour that violates social expectations and norms.
The Authoritarian Syndrome Today 103
They also emphasize the importance of protecting harmony and stability in
society.
The conformists consistently locate themselves to the far right of
the political spectrum, but usually vote for the SPD in elections. They
support the AfD a little more, but give little support to the Greens and
FDP. Particularly strong among members of this type are chauvinism and
xenophobia. They are especially hostile to asylum seekers, while their hos-
tility to Muslims is below average. On the other hand, their strong anti-
Semitism is especially noticeable, particularly in communication latency.
It is therefore not surprising that the conspiracy mindset is also extremely
prevalent among members of this type – to such an extent, in fact, that we
can speak of a paranoid personality trait. Their authoritarian aggression is
noticeable: although they vehemently reject the use of violence as a means
to push through a political agenda, they do welcome the use of violence by
others. Their strong resentment makes them a threat above all to individ-
ual groups in society. The impulsiveness of their character makes planned
action against others unlikely, and they at least seem to follow the norm
of non-violence; but they would be prepared to place severe restrictions on
the rights of others, and to use opportunities to release their authoritarian
aggression.
III.4 The closed conventionalists (N = 216, 9.2%; 46.3% men, 53.7% women;
26.4% East Germans, 73.6% West Germans): Low formal education, low-
level blue-collar workers, skilled workers, low- and middle-level employees,
but also civil servants at all levels. Predominantly positive assessment of the
country’s and their own economic situation, with changes for the worse only
expected for their own situation.
The conventionalists are closed to other opinions and ways of life, and do
not appreciate the experience of dierence. Although they would not hold
back their opinion in a group where the majority holds a dierent opin-
ion, they tend to avoid conicts. They are very controlled and tend towards
compulsiveness. Emotionally, they are particularly inhibited and less able
to gauge the needs of others. They nd it dicult to deal openly with peo-
ple. In relationships, they rarely feel interesting or attractive, and tend to
be unsociable. Their childhood seems to have been marked by neglect: they
have no recollection of emotional warmth, but almost as rarely of demands
and control. These experiences have continued into their current lives, albeit
in a modied form: although they feel too little recognition as citizens, they
do feel at least partial conrmation in their personal and working lives.
It is important to them to achieve success in line with social standards
through their own eorts. They are interested not in new stimuli and hedon-
istic pleasures, but instead in controlling and dominating other people. They
are opposed to the plurality of society, which links them to the other author-
itarian syndromes; what distinguishes them is their rejection of norms of
equality, whereas other authoritarian syndromes claim a kind of exclusive
freedom. This type emphasizes the importance of customs and traditions,
104 O. Decker, J. Schuler, and E. Brähler
as well as the observance of social norms. Particularly important to them
are the protection and harmony of society.
The closed conventionalists vote more often than the average, with espe-
cially the AfD nding more voters among this type than among the pop-
ulation as a whole. Even more striking is that they state their support for
parties that are not currently in the Bundestag. This type stands out due to
their strong authoritarian attitudes; they demand massive sanctions to be
taken against deviations from the norm, have a high propensity for subser-
vience, and only the new-right functional elites insist just as strongly on con-
ventions. They are not averse to conspiracy theories, and also believe more
strongly than all the other types that their own lives are shaped by external
forces. Extreme right-wing attitudes are particularly prevalent, something
that they themselves are aware of, since they very often locate themselves
to the right or far right of the political spectrum. Not only is the desire
for an authoritarian dictatorship much stronger among this type than it is
among others; this type is clearly anti-democratic in the other dimensions of
extreme right-wing attitudes, too. Most evident is their hostility to Muslims,
whom they reject even more strongly than they do asylum seekers. But they
are also hostile to Jews, which they show not only in classic anti-Semitic
tropes, but also in communication latency. Their own propensity for vio-
lence is not particularly strong, but they do welcome the use of violence by
others. People with this syndrome are willing to support authoritarian rule,
and reject a plural society and the recognition of others.
Discussion and summary
To describe the authoritarian syndrome, we supplemented the distribution
of the elements of authoritarianism with further data such as the conspiracy
mindset. Particularly widespread and powerful among the German popu-
lation are authoritarian aggression and the propensity to devalue others.
In addition, many respondents in all syndromes attach importance to their
own norms, and demand that everybody observe them. It is also important
to stress this in order to recall the eect that an authoritarian dynamic has
on democratic syndromes, too: this shows indirectly that there is still an
authoritarian dynamic in society. Such a rigid emphasis on conventions is
a symptom of social crisis, suggesting as it does polarization, but also the
desire for control and a strong sense of threat. One third of the population
satisfy this desire for control through a conspiracy mindset. In contrast,
there is currently a low level of openness to dierence among a signicant
proportion of the population, especially in authoritarian syndromes, with
25 to 40% lacking understanding for the interests of others. Although this
openness is the basis for a plural society, our analysis shows that it is in fact
limited. This shows how strong the need is for an escape into authoritarian
security. The susceptibility to authoritarian temptations is great, be they the
temptations of right-wing extremism or of other ideologies. Authoritarian
The Authoritarian Syndrome Today 105
reactions are particularly widespread in the new federal states, and the
desire for an authoritarian leadership has clearly become ever more urgent
in the East.
In order to account for these authoritarian reactions in a nuanced way,
we identied nine political syndromes, which indicate the form in which
the authoritarian propensity for subservience and aggression is anchored
in society. More than 40% of respondents show a manifest propensity to
support an authoritarian system – this is the section of the population with
an authoritarian syndrome. In contrast, just under 30% are explicitly dem-
ocratic and advocate values of plurality and equality, with a further third
being undecided. The strength of creating this typology on a test-statistical
basis lies in the fact that it allows us to understand various factors and to
identify correlations and causes. This procedure makes sense especially
because a simple causal correlation between dierent factors cannot be
expected.
Possible causes for the emergence of an authoritarian syndrome in the
individual are upbringing and socialization, but also regressive tendencies.
We can see how authoritarian and anti-democratic experiences in upbring-
ing and socialization are correlated with personality traits, which in turn
correlate with political goals. People who were brought up with violence
as children, or who were confronted with great social demands to achieve,
tend to develop an authoritarian syndrome in later life. But experiences in
adulthood also play a role; social conditions that give recognition to people
and are thus democratic have an eect here, with people of the democratic
type (the conservatives and the performers) usually experiencing recogni-
tion as citizens, while the other types usually do not.
Although people with authoritarian syndromes also often consider their
own economic situation to be good, we can see that the two democratic
types belong to an upper educational level that also ensures better career
positions. With the exception of the new-right functional elite, the author-
itarian types mostly consist of people with little education and in subal-
tern jobs. This nding coincides with the conclusion made by other studies
that a resigned and authoritarian social milieu (Vester 2003) is more likely
to be found among the former working class (Scheuregger & Spier 2007)
or among the victims of modernization (Rippl & Seipel 2018). The latter
are aected in the rst instance not economically, but rather in the loss of
security and the respectability of their class. We can therefore surmise that
a cultural backlash is inaming authoritarian syndromes, i.e. the longing
for safe times when apparently traditional values and norms provided some
kind of orientation. The fact that this escape into authoritarianism is also
accompanied by a loss of equality and emancipation is forgotten in the face
of the desire for authoritarian subservience.
What distinguishes the “initial conditions” of the new-right functional
elites from the two democratic milieus is above all the strong presence in
childhood of social norms of achievement. They share these norms not
106 O. Decker, J. Schuler, and E. Brähler
only with the other authoritarian syndromes, but also with the ambiva-
lent and the borderless, the latter belonging to a layer of young and well-
educated people who, despite having managed to achieve respectable profes-
sional positions, show great decits in terms of recognition – economically,
in their working life, and as citizens. They internalized the social norm of
achievement in their childhood and, although they no longer unreservedly
accept this norm, their education and occupation nevertheless indicate that
they do full the norm. However, and although the borderless attach great
importance to self-determination, they do not feel that they have control
over their own lives, which results in a conspiracy mindset and in great dis-
satisfaction with democracy in Germany. Many even seem to nd appeal-
ing the idea of an authoritarian dictatorship under such conditions, since it
would provide for clear relations. This also matches the ndings of a study
by the Hans Böckler Foundation: namely, that it is particularly those who
feel the eects of globalization (digitization, lack of control over life) who
tend towards authoritarian populism (Hilmer et al. 2017: 48).
It is possible that the eects of globalization and digitization will have
an eect on the binding power of the abstract authority accepted by the
German population up to now: namely, the national economy. Those who
have a negative assessment of the economic situation are more likely to
want a strong authority. The situation is of course more complicated in the
syndromes, but there are similar inuences among the authoritarians. We
know that almost all Germans seek to identify with the strong German
economy as a secondary authoritarianism (Decker 2015), but there still
seems to be a “halved authoritarianism”, as Wolfgang Menz and Sarah
Nies have noted: if the authority of the economy is not questioned either,
then it obviously also oers an increase in self-esteem for those who iden-
tify with it, since it provides the articial security that people hope for from
authoritarian rule (Menz & Nies, 2019). The fact that people do not gain
gratication from their own subservience releases authoritarian aggression
against those who seem dierent or deviant or who do not bear the traces
of subservience. And it increases the need for escape into authoritarian
security. Whoever oers authoritarianism to these people does not seduce
them, but satises a need.
Note
1 We draw here on the criteria that Adorno formulated for a critical typology
(Adorno 1950: 749–750).
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DOI: 10.4324/9781003218616- 4
Recognition and Authoritarian
Statehood
Oliver Decker, Alexander Yendell, and
Elmar Brähler
4
Introduction1
Extreme right-wing attitudes are widespread in German society, but what
causes them is a matter of debate. People’s concerns about their material
status are often cited as an explanation: those who are worse o or who
fear a decline in their economic status are presumed to have a higher pro-
pensity for extreme right-wing slogans and demands. At rst glance, this
thesis has always had on its side the link between economic and democratic
crises: hardly had the unemployment gures risen at the end of the Weimar
Republic than voters ocked to the Nationals-Socialist German Workers’
Party (NSDAP). But whether the individual was motivated to embrace the
fascist movement by her economic situation cannot be proven empirically.
This is true also of the most recent rise of a party that has in parts an extreme
right-wing agenda, the Alternative for Germany (AfD, see also Chapter 1 in
this volume; Falter et al. 1983; Lengfeld 2017; Schröder 2018). Nevertheless,
the economic explanation has lost none of its pull to this day. While it is
very dicult to discern whether right-wing extremists fear economic decline
at an individual level (Rippl & Seipel 2018), it has been clear in recent years
that extreme right-wing attitudes are fuelled by the subjective perception of
a national economic crisis (Decker et al. 2013; Rippl & Baier 2005).
There is certainly a pragmatic reason for claiming that the economic
decline of the individual (or her fear of such a decline) is the cause of
extreme right-wing radicalization: the social issue is a core component of
social-democratic, social-liberal, and left-wing politics. To use this issue
to counter the threat to democracy is very tempting, but we should think
hard as to why the answer to economic inequality is to devalue others, and
especially those who are worse o or whose position in society is seen as
being even weaker. A more eective solution would surely be solidarity
with other disadvantaged people in society, and above all a joint call for
resources to be shared more equitably.
Social psychology and sociology have put forward a dierent explana-
tion for the growth of extreme right-wing attitudes (Asbrock et al. 2012;
Fuchs 2003): namely, authoritarianism shapes the perception of crisis
Recognition and Authoritarian Statehood 111
(Cohrs & Ibler 2009) and conicts in contacts with people perceived as
belonging to other groups (Asbrock et al. 2010). Those who are prepared to
devalue others (authoritarian aggression), to bow to an authority (author-
itarian subservience), and to emphasize rigid rules (conventionalism) also
tend to absorb the slogans of the extreme right.
While there is little dispute in the research that authoritarianism plays a
role, it is unclear how it emerges. Authoritarianism means that the individ-
ual is subjugated to an authoritarian rule, and that she embraces this rule.
This propensity to bow to an authority has always been a central compo-
nent of the notion of the authoritarian character. However, when the theory
of authoritarianism was rst developed in the early 1930s (Fromm 1936),
the focus was still on socialization in the family: the more authoritarian the
parental home, the greater the likelihood of the child developing an author-
itarian character. Regardless of theoretical perspective, the importance of
early experiences are still given emphasis today (Oesterreich 2000), but quite
how this works remains open. Are social norms really still conveyed in the
parental home through authoritarian subservience? And what is the eect of
lifelong socialization? Erich Fromm, who gave the notion of the authoritar-
ian character its foundations in social psychology, already pointed out that,
although the authoritarian character is sown in childhood, it requires an
authoritarian society to survive in adulthood (Fromm 1936: 147). However,
social psychology and sociology have now largely abandoned the psychoan-
alytical approach to development, and thus also the reconstruction of how
the authoritarian dynamic emerges. And there is also some evidence that the
eect of upbringing should be redened, since the media, the strengthening
of children’s rights, and the expansion of educational institutions have made
the parental home more open, meaning that social rules are communicated
less and less by parents. Thus, the personality structure with which the
grown-up leaves the family must also change (see Chapter 4 in this volume).
The social philosopher Helmut Dubiel described the social character
that he observed in the 1980s in the “advanced capitalism” of the Thatcher
years as “externally directed” (Dubiel 1986: 264). For him, this character
contrasted with the “internally directed character” of the 19th and early
20th century, when the individual adopted the social rules by identifying
with the parental authorities, internalizing the norms and roles expected
of her, and making them an integral part of her personality. This resulted
for adults in the autonomy of the ego, social distancing, and an instrumen-
talist work ethos. In contrast, the externally directed character faces the
pressure to conform, which is conveyed via permanent external control (or
appeal in today’s terms), through the ubiquitous media and through social
institutions (Dubiel 1986: 264–265). The factors inuencing the externally
directed character have developed into important research issues in the
social sciences over the past few years, such as with governmentality studies
(Bröckling et al. 2000) or criticism of the sensation- and attention-decit
culture (Türcke 2011).
112 O. Decker, A. Yendell, and E. Brähler
This chapter undertakes an empirical investigation of social institutions:
Do they contribute to the authoritarian dynamic? And is it possible to iden-
tify the relationship between these institutions and the familial reality?
Society is unimaginable without organization, whether as institution or
as process, and this applies not only to the modern period. Organization is
the prerequisite for human coexistence. But what conditions turn admin-
istration and bureaucracy into what Max Weber called the “legal” and
“rational” type of rule? The tying of bureaucracy to rules, the separa-
tion of oce and person, the impersonality of decisions, and rationality –
these are all the civilizational achievements of modern statehood. They
strengthen the position of the individual in the social fabric because they
ensure that state decisions are transparent and open to scrutiny. Everyone
is subject to the same law, even those who apply the law (Weber 1922).
But not everything is open to scrutiny of course; and bureaucratic proce-
dures are not that transparent. The administration has always had a dou-
ble character, for even if the ideal of legal rule were to be achieved, it still
remains rule. This “organizational violence” characterizes the “horror
of the bureaucratized world” (Adorno 1953: 442). However, recent years
have seen a crucial development, one whose eect can be understood as
authoritarian socialization. This development has been accelerated by the
apparently inherent urge on the part of the bureaucracy to expand (“The
immanent logic of the economic process is the tendency towards abso-
lute bureaucracy” (Horkheimer 1936/1937: 42)), but also by the increas-
ing transfer of decisions from parliaments to administrative and executive
bodies. These have nothing to do with the sensible organization of society,
and everything to do with economic interests. While in exile in the US in
the 1930s, Max Horkheimer wrote:
The contradiction between the consciousness of freedom and the
de facto dependence on the most diverse powers in society is also
expressed in the contradictory personality of the modern human. The
uncertainty of existence gives rise ultimately to the psychological need
for submission to and security in a power with which the person can
identify (Horkheimer 1936/1937: 64).
This is clearly less about the fascist state, from which Horkheimer had just
ed, and more about modern societies, since they are societies of organiza-
tion. The fact that this permanent expansion of administration is accom-
panied by an increasing dismantling of individual rights of protection in
the bureaucratized world is no coincidence. Such “organizational violence”
(Nadai 2006) ca n be seen in the eect that liberalized employment conditions
have, and in the reforms to the labour market and “Hartz IV”, which disen-
franchised people who (have to) depend on solidarity. Those who become
unemployed lose their protective rights vis-à-vis the state, which does not
exclude them, but which captures them completely (Decker et al. 2009;
Recognition and Authoritarian Statehood 113
Weißmann 2016). But this shift can also be seen in the way that federal
states have tightened police legislation and dismantled civil liberties. We
can describe such a dynamic as “authoritarian statehood”, even though
Nicos Poulantzas, who coined the phrase, meant something slightly dier-
ent (Poulantzas 1977). As the social psychologist Helmut Dahmer puts it:
“The ‘insecure’ are powerless on all sides in the face of the intangible and
abstract conditions in which they are positioned, and their feeling of power-
lessness turns into anger” (Dahmer, 2019).
This contradicts not only the idea of a free society, but the ideals of
modern societies per se. The sociologist Thomas H. Marshall traced the
emergence of civil rights, a process closely linked to the development of
modern societies, arguing that the civil right of citizenship came rst (in the
18th century), followed by the political and social (in the 19th and 20th century,
respectively) (Marshall 1950). Thus, the right to freedom of expression (in
civil law) was not yet linked to the political right to vote or to assume a
political mandate (just as little, incidentally, as the right of citizenship was
linked to social protection, even if from today’s perspective such protection
was the only way to guarantee that people could participate in society at all).
For Marshall, the 20th century then saw the rights of citizenship combine
in the factories into an “industrial citizenship” (Brinkmann & Nachtwey
2017). This extended the rights of citizenship to the economic domain, the
trade union movement leading to the parallel establishment of a political
and economic right of citizenship (Marshall 1950: 63–64). The fundamental
democratization of companies was ensured by the right to elect a body to
represent particular interests, with workers being granted those civil and
political rights that they had outside the factory or oce. However, this
development was the product of political pressure; it had to be fought for
through a workers’ movement. In practice, these events involved the formal
recognition of people as subjects in the core areas of everyday life, with peo-
ple thereby being granted the fundamental capacity and right to participate
in the life of society, and to enjoy protective and participatory rights in soci-
ety and the political domain. This legitimized civil society, and thus gave it
the power to integrate people. The social conditions of the class society were
not aected fundamentally, but civilizational standards were brought into
the foundations of the social edice: fundamental rights recognized each
member of society as entitled and able to participate equally in social pro-
cesses, while at the same time guaranteeing a minimum standard of living.
As we have seen in Chapter 2, almost every citizen now sees the impor-
tance of individual freedoms. Unfortunately, though, people’s readiness to
restrict the freedoms of others is almost as great, and is part of the anti-
democratic dynamic that we are examining here. Freedoms are by no means
abstract: their very declaration has an eect, even if they are not perceived
actively. Suering ensues when they are withdrawn, and not least where the
state makes its presence felt: in its agencies and bureaucracy, where people
experience either responsibility and integrity as citizens, or humiliation in
114 O. Decker, A. Yendell, and E. Brähler
“authoritarian institutions”. Thus, drawing on Marshall’s history of citi-
zenship rights, the Israeli social philosopher Avishai Margalit wrote that
“a decent society does not [violate] the civil honour of its members … There
cannot be any second-class citizens … The rst form of discrimination
occurs when certain rights are denied to some citizens or are applied une-
qually” (Margalit 1996: 154).
The balance of power between the general and the particular, i.e. between
society and the individual, has shifted in recent years to the disadvantage
of the latter. At the same time, domination is being transmitted less and less
within the family, which may no longer even be the most important factor.
Hence, our focus here will be on the lifelong transmission of domination,
and on redening the residuals of freedom. In order to dene the relation-
ship between authoritarian and democratic socialization, we draw on the
spheres of recognition outlined by the social philosopher Axel Honneth
(Honneth 1992; see also the discussion in Chapter 1). Behind this is the idea
that the experience of recognition can be used as an experience of dem-
ocratic society. Recognition can thus be understood as a complementary
notion to authoritarian dynamics.
The three spheres of recognition that Honneth outlines and that we use to
explain the experience of recognition and of authoritarian socialization are:
love, law and work/solidarity (Honneth 1992). As our core hypothesis, we
assume that extreme right-wing attitudes are based on negative recognition
and authoritarianism. The three spheres of recognition can be translated
for empirical social research as
• love: recognition as a person,
• law: recognition as a citizen, and
• work/solidarity: recognition as a working person.
This gives rise to two research questions. First, which forms of recogni-
tion can be discerned today, and how do they correlate with two central
socio-structural features (education and income)? Second, how do the
spheres of recognition correlate with authoritarianism, right-wing extrem-
ism, and the conspiracy mindset?
Results
For the Leipzig Authoritarianism Study of 2018, we developed nine state-
ments to measure the recognition that people actually experience or that
they perceive (Table 4.1), with respondents being asked to take a position
on these statements. Table 4.1 shows a factor analysis that reveals three
extracted factors. Factor 1 denotes recognition as a person, and comprises
the statements: “I have someone very close whom I can always count on
for help”; “When I am ill, I can without hesitation call on friends to sort
out important things for me”; and “If I ever feel down, I know whom I can
Recognition and Authoritarian Statehood 115
go to without further ado”. Factor 2, recognition as a citizen, comprises
the three statements: “I often feel at the mercy of authorities and adminis-
trative bodies”; “I sometimes feel that I am being treated as a second-class
person”; and “I sometimes have the impression that my rights exist only on
paper”. Factor 3, recognition as a working person, comprises the following
statements: “What I do is appreciated by my colleagues and fellow human
Table 4.1 Factors of recognition
Factor Statement Recognition as
a person Recognition as
a citizen Recognition as
a working person
1 I have someone very close
whom I can always
count on for help.
(79.8%)
.854
When I am ill, I can
without hesitation call
on friends to sort out
important things for me.
(80.3%)
.869
If I ever feel down, I
know whom I can go to
without further ado.
(77.5%)
.854
2 I often feel at the mercy
of authorities and
administrative bodies.
(35.2%)
.740
I sometimes feel that I am
being treated as a
second-class person.
(29.2%)
.894
I sometimes have the
impression that my
rights exist only on
paper. (35.0%)
.851
3 What I do is appreciated
by my colleagues and
fellow human beings.
(64.2%)
.796
I have the feeling that I
make an important
contribution to society.
(47.6%)
.822
I give a lot, but also get a
lot back from other
people. (55.0%)
.743
Factor analysis: main axis analysis (Oblimin); Cronbach’s alpha for total scale: .813; for recogni-
tion as a person: .894; for recognition as a citizen: .867; for recognition as a working person: .828.
The percentages after the statements refer to the agreement categories “partly agree” and “com-
pletely agree”.
116 O. Decker, A. Yendell, and E. Brähler
beings”; “I have the feeling that I make an important contribution to soci-
ety”; and “I give a lot, but also get a lot back from other people”. The rates
of agreement for the individual statements (Table 4.1, in brackets) show that
the majority of the population experience recognition as people and in their
work, while about one third do not feel recognition as citizens.
The question now is: who experiences a lot of recognition, and who
receives little? We will also clarify how the three forms of recognition are
distributed across the social structure. To do so, we calculated the mean
value of the three statements for each of the three factors. This showed that,
with regard to gender, there is only one signicant correlation: women expe-
rience recognition somewhat more often than men in the social environ-
ment (M: 4.3 vs. 4.2). As for place of residence, a signicant dierence is
that East Germans more often feel a lack of recognition as citizens than
West Germans (M: 3.1 vs. 2.9), which is also apparent from the percentages
(Table 4.2).
There is no signicant or relevant correlation between the forms of recog-
nition and age (correlation: Pearson’s r = −0.057, p < 0.01), with older people
feeling slightly less recognition in their work than younger people.
Not surprising, but nonetheless still interesting, are the correlations
between recognition and education. Since education is a central resource
that has gained enormous importance in the “post-industrial” society
(Hradil 2001: 148–149), its unequal distribution inevitably leads to problems
that may also impact on the recognition that people experience in various
areas of society. Figure 4.1 shows that those who experience more recogni-
tion as people have a high level of education, while those who experience less
recognition have a low level of education, although this only really becomes
clear for those who have no qualications at all.
Even clearer is the correlation between education and recognition as a
citizen (Figure 4.2),2 with those who have completed only basic secondary
school having a signicantly lower mean value than those with higher qual-
ications. These discrepancies are likely to become sharper in the future as
education becomes an even more important resource in the ght for jobs.
The correlation already identied is also evident when we consider the
mean values for the dimension of “recognition as a working person”, where
it is particularly those with a low level of qualications or (as yet) no quali-
cations who experience little recognition (Figure 4.3).
Table 4.2 Recognition as a citizen: lack of
recognition in East and West (in %)
East West
Feel like a second-class person 33.6 28.2
My rights exist only on paper 40.0 33.6
Feel at the mercy of authorities 37.8 34.7
Recognition and Authoritarian Statehood 117
Figure 4.1 Experience of recognition as a person according to level of education
(mean values: max. value = 5, min. value = 1)
Recognition as a person
For individual statements, see Tabl e 4.1; analysis of variance: p < 0.001
Figure 4.2 Experience of recognition as a citizen according to level of education
(mean values: max. value = 5, min. value = 1)
Recognition as a citizen
For individual statements, see Tabl e 4.1; analysis of variance: p < .01
118 O. Decker, A. Yendell, and E. Brähler
There are similar correlations between the dimensions of recognition and
income (Figure 4.4). In the rst dimension, “recognition as a person”, those
who experience more recognition are those who earn more.3
However, Figure 4.5 shows that income also correlates positively with
recognition as a citizen, with people from high-income households being
less likely to experience a lack of recognition as citizens than those on
low incomes. Thus, greater nancial resources seem to give people more
chance to represent their own interests as citizens – for example, by tak-
ing legal advice in disputes with the authorities. A further explanation
could be the habitus of the higher earners, which is reected in their
dealings, for example, with the authorities. In addition, recognition as
a citizen has been objectively limited for the lower groups of the labour
force. For example, the “Hartz IV” reforms have permanently curtailed
the rights of the unemployed as citizens – by reversing the burden of
proof when they deal with the “Employment Agency”. The state thus
conveys to them that they no longer have the moral integrity accorded
to them by their rights of citizenship (Lessenich 2006). We can assume
that there are more people who are dependent on transfer payments in
the lower income groups.
There is a similar correlation between income and recognition as a work-
ing person (Figure 4.6), with the lower income groups tending to experi-
ence less recognition. Higher income therefore means higher recognition,
Figure 4.3 Experience of recognition as a working person according to level of edu-
cation (mean values: max. value = 5, min. value = 1)
Recognition as a working person
For individual statements, see Tabl e 4.1; analysis of variance: p < .01
Recognition and Authoritarian Statehood 119
Figure 4.4 Experience of recognition as a person according to household income
(mean values: max. value = 5, min. value = 1)
Recognition as a person
For individual statements, see Tabl e 4.1; income is based on information given to the
question: “In which group would you classify your household from the total monthly net
income?”; analysis of variance: p < .01
Figure 4.5 Experience of recognition as a citizen according to income group (mean
values: max. value = 5, min. value = 1)
Recognition as a citizen
For individual statements, see Tabl e 4.1; income is based on information given to the
question: “In which group would you classify your household from the total monthly net
income?”; analysis of variance: p < .01
120 O. Decker, A. Yendell, and E. Brähler
probably also because well-paid jobs are often accompanied by a higher
degree of social prestige than simple and less well-paid jobs, which are also
therefore given less recognition. In addition, a higher household income
enables more social participation and involvement, which in turn creates
opportunities for experiencing recognition.
In summary, both education and income are important resources for the
gaining of recognition, which is distributed according to the Matthäus prin-
ciple: those who already have a lot of education and income also receive a
lot of recognition, while people with a low level of education and income
receive less recognition in their social environment, as citizens and in their
work.
Recognition in correlation with authoritarianism, the
conspiracy mindset, and right-wing extremism
Recognition, then, is distributed unequally in society. We will now examine
the correlation between the dimensions of recognition and authoritarian-
ism, the conspiracy mindset, and extreme right-wing attitudes. Besides the
dimensions of recognition, we will now also look at signs pointing to lack
of recognition in the parental home, which we summarize in Table 4.3 as
“harsh parental punishments”.
Figure 4.6 Experience of recognition as a working person according to income
group (mean values: max. value = 5, min. value = 1)
Recognition as an active human being
For individual statements, see Tabl e 4.1; income is based on information given to the
question: “In which group would you classify your household from the total monthly net
income?”; analysis of variance: p < .01
Recognition and Authoritarian Statehood 121
We thus follow Axel Honneth’s argument that recognition already plays
a decisive role in a child’s development (Honneth 1992: 161), and include
the experiences of recognition on the part of respondents both today and in
the past. We also consider as factors the propensity for authoritarianism, the
mean value of the three statements in the questionnaire on authoritarian-
ism, and the conspiracy mindset. We measure extreme right-wing attitudes
through the sum of the answers given to all the statements in the question-
naire on extreme right-wing attitudes; the higher the value, the clearer the
extreme right-wing attitudes (see Chapter 2).
Table 4.3 shows the correlations that we found. It is clear that a lack of
recognition as a citizen correlates particular strongly with the conspir-
acy mindset and right-wing extremism. However, recognition at work and
harsh parental punishments also play a statistically signicant role when
it comes to right-wing extremism, although the correlation is weaker. The
other correlations are either not signicant or weak. What is surprising
is that the correlations with authoritarianism are weak or not signicant
at all.
Which factors inuence extreme right-wing attitudes?
Table 4.3 shows that the dimensions of recognition correlate with extreme
right-wing attitudes. Let us now turn to the question of how recognition as
a factor behaves when we take into account other indicators derived from
prominent theories explaining right-wing extremism. What, then, inu-
ences right-wing extremism? What role is played by recognition, authori-
tarianism, the conspiracy mindset, and the forms of economic deprivation
discussed at the beginning, and how do these factors interact?
The regression model in Table 4.4 shows the inuence of various indi-
cators on extreme right-wing attitudes. For the linear regression analysis,
we used the following indicators: the three dimensions of recognition,
the denial of recognition (harsh parental punishments), authoritarianism,
the conspiracy mindset, two statements on trust (“In general, people can be
Table 4.3 Recognition in correlation with authoritarianism, the conspiracy
mindset, and right-wing extremism (correlation coecients)
Harsh
punishments in
childhood Recognition
as a person Recognition
as a citizen
Recognition
as a working
person
Authoritarianism .046** n.s. −.095** n.s.
Conspiracy mindset .097** −.087** −.278** −.079**
Right-wing extremism .149** −.102** −.250** −.118**
Average values for the three dimensions of recognition; for individual statements, see Table 4.1;
correlation coecient: Kendall’s tau coecient b, p < .01.
122 O. Decker, A. Yendell, and E. Brähler
trusted” and “You can no longer rely on anyone today”), a person’s assess-
ment of the general economic situation in Germany at present and in one
year, a person’s own economic situation at present and in one year, as well
as age, gender, frequency of unemployment, income, A-levels (yes/no), and
place of residence in West or East Germany.
What we notice at rst is that for research in the social sciences the overall
model with a corrected R2 has a high explained variance of .438. The most
important result of this regression analysis is that it is authoritarianism that
has the greatest inuence on extreme right-wing attitudes (Beta = .397, **p),
followed by the conspiracy mindset (Beta = .258, **p), recognition as a
citizen (Beta = −.126, **p), and a person’s assessment of the general economic
situation in Germany today (Beta = .104, **p). Still signicant, but weak, are
recognition as a person and the lack of recognition as a child (harsh paren-
tal punishments), as well as the statement that no one can be trusted. Those
who have a positive assessment of their own current economic situation are
more likely than others to be right-wing extremists. Women are less so than
men, and education is also a factor: respondents without A-levels are more
likely to be right-wing extremists. Place of residence does not play an impor-
tant role, with East Germans being only slightly more likely to be right-wing
extremists than West Germans.
Table 4.4 Indicators of right-wing extremism (linear regression model)
Indicator Regression
coecient Beta p
Recognition as a person −1.446 −0.089 **
Recognition as a citizen −1.606 −0.126 **
Recognition as a working person n.s.
Lack of parental recognition (harsh punishments) 1.413 0.067 **
Authoritarianism 6.616 0.397 **
Conspiracy mindset 2.320 0.258 **
Trust 1: general trust n.s.
Trust 2: no reliance on people −0.860 −0.047 **
General economic situation in Germany today
(good) 1.772 0.104 **
General economic situation in Germany in one year n.s.
Own economic situation today (good) −1.289 −0.073 **
Own economic situation in one year (bad) 1.312 0.057 **
Age n.s.
Sex −1.259 −0.043 *
Unemployment (frequency) n.s.
Income n.s.
A-levels −2.828 −0.079 **
East/West −1.747 −0.048 **
Corrected R2.438
Values unweighted, *p < .05, **p < .01.
Recognition and Authoritarian Statehood 123
The signicant results show that an individual’s good economic situa-
tion has at least a slight eect on extreme right-wing attitudes – the eect
being that such attitudes increase. This ts in with the fact that a person’s
anticipation of economic decline also causes extreme right-wing attitudes to
increase. What seems decisive is therefore not a respondent’s current eco-
nomic situation, but her sense of impending threat. What could be making
their presence felt at this point are secondary authoritarianism and the fra-
gility of accomplishments (Menz & Nies, 2019), although we should empha-
size that these are in any case very weak eects – more important are a
person’s propensity for authoritarianism and the conspiracy mindset.
Not signicant are recognition as a working person, general trust in peo-
ple, assessment of the general economic situation in one year, unemploy-
ment, age and income. These results are also interesting. It is clear that the
eect of living in the East is only slight, and the objective factors of indi-
vidual economic deprivation, such as income and unemployment, do not
aect extreme right-wing attitudes, something already seen in the fact that
respondents who had a positive assessment of their economic situation were
less likely to reject extreme right-wing statements. Nevertheless, it should be
noted that these three factors (place of residence, income, unemployment)
have already been explained by the factor of education: due to the emigration
of highly educated people from East Germany, the level of education is lower
there, and a low level of education is accompanied by a higher risk of unem-
ployment and a low income, making the inuence of these factors disappear.
Summary
In the Leipzig Authoritarianism Study of 2018, we investigated not only the
dimensions of right-wing extremism, but also the three dimensions of rec-
ognition: recognition as a person, as a citizen, and as a working person. It is
in particular the lack of recognition as a citizen that correlates with extreme
right-wing attitudes, although the eect is by no means as strong as it is in
the correlation between extreme right-wing attitudes and the propensity for
authoritarianism, the latter proving in a multifactorial hypothesis model
to be the strongest and thus the decisive factor. It is far more relevant than,
for example, a person’s subjective assessment of her own and Germany’s
economic situation. The East-West dierence has hardly any impact, either:
there is a stronger propensity for extreme right-wing attitudes in the East,
but this is caused by the proven inuence of education.
The likelihood of right-wing extremism increases among those who feel
that they are second-class people, who often feel at the mercy of ocial
institutions, and who believe that their rights exist only on paper. This con-
rms our initial thoughts, with the conspiracy mindset tting into this over-
all picture as another important factor: those who see themselves as being at
the mercy of depersonalized forces can regain control by believing that the
world is being shaped by secret groups in the background; this at least gives
people the feeling that they know who is controlling them.
124 O. Decker, A. Yendell, and E. Brähler
The dismantling of social, civil or industrial rights of citizenship will prob-
ably lead to the strengthening of authoritarian dynamics – weakening the
individual in her dealings with authorities and state agencies will increase the
number of right-wing extremists. However, we could not conrm the notion
that there is a direct correlation between recognition and authoritarianism.
Since we see authoritarianism as a personality trait, it does not seem to be
inuenced by a lack of recognition. What is certain, however, is that both
factors – authoritarianism as a variable of personality and the experience of
authoritarian statehood – have an inuence on extreme right-wing attitudes.
The more the state strengthens the position of authority (for example, in police
laws, labour law, or in dealing with the weakest members of society), the more
this fuels the authoritarian dynamic. What we should emphasize once again
is that this dynamic is triggered not only by those whose rights have already
been eroded. All other members of society are also caught up in the authori-
tarian dynamic, since they are always potentially at risk of losing their rights
of citizenship, and therefore also their rights of protection.
We cannot completely clarify the proportion of objective reasons for a
subjective lack of recognition, since it was only the latter that we investi-
gated. However, the analysis of how recognition is distributed across society
indicates that the lack of recognition increases among those who have a low
income and who ended their education particularly early. This represents a
socio-political and educational challenge.
We obtained the results presented in this chapter through a factor analy-
sis and a regression analysis. To broaden the perspective, we will now pres-
ent in Chapter 4 a typology of democratic and authoritarian personalities,
thereby supplementing the analysis with further factors of personality or
socialization, and dierentiating between dierent elements in the devalu-
ation of others.
Notes
1 We briey repeat here the detailed theoretical presentation of the rst chapter.
2 Due to the negative wording, we have recoded the dimension “recognition as
a citizen” in such a way that the mean values now also rise in the direction of
rejection. High values now also therefore mean a high level of recognition; low
values, a low level of recognition.
3 In the lower two categories, the mean value does not continue to decrease as
expected. This is probably due to the fact that these are increasingly people
who live on the income of others, e.g. spouses or the nuclear family.
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DOI: 10.4324/9781003218616-5
Anti-Semitic Attitudes in Germany
Their Prevalence and Causes
Oliver Decker, Johannes Kiess, and
Elmar Brähler
5
2018 marked 80 years since the Reichspogromnacht. The night from 9 to
10 November 1938 represents the moment when the anti-Semitism deeply
rooted in the German population turned into the annihilation of Europe’s
Jews. The central role of anti-Semitism for fascism in Nazi Germany is
well known: Jews were the absolute enemy in National Socialist ideology.
In the 1930s, the longstanding rejection, devaluation and exclusion of Jews
in Europe, and especially in Germany, oered ideal conditions to mobilize
people for Shoah and a war of aggression, which is the reason that anti-
Semitic crimes and the spread of anti-Semitic attitudes are still the focus of
great attention today. Although anti-Semitism is more strongly ostracized
by a social norm than, for example, xenophobia (Bergmann & Erb 1986;
Beyer & Krumpal 2010), it is still anchored in the thinking of many peo-
ple, and can be seen as a core element of extreme right-wing attitudes (see
Chapter 2). At the same time, there has been an increase in recent years in
anti-Semitic crimes, with Jewish cemeteries being desecrated and acts of
violence against Jews on the rise.
In this chapter, we therefore deepen our empirical analysis of the
spread of anti-Semitism in Germany, and explore in more detail how anti-
Semitism emerges. We will rst deal with its forms and the question of
what role it plays in the authoritarian dynamic of modern society. In doing
so, we will follow on directly from the central nding in Chapter 3: namely,
that authoritarianism is and remains even in contemporary society the
most powerful anti-democratic factor. In order to dierentiate between
elements of anti-Semitism, we will then clarify the concept. This is fol-
lowed by an analysis of the spread of anti-Semitism, and then nally an
examination of the factors inuencing anti-Semitism. Our initial ques-
tions are: How far is it possible to dierentiate between dierent forms
of anti-Semitism empirically? What sociodemographic and biographical
features are linked to anti-Semitism? Can anti-Semitism at an individual
level be understood as part of the authoritarian syndrome? In other words,
is anti-Semitism closely correlated with certain personality traits? And,
nally, can the authoritarian dynamic in contemporary society be linked
to this individual syndrome?
128 O. Decker, J. Kiess, and E. Brähler
Anti-Semitism as part of the authoritarian syndrome
The term anti-Semitism1 denotes prejudice against Jews, and is largely used
uniformly in empirical social research and public debate. In general, prej-
udices are also directed against other people as soon as they are perceived
as members of a group, for example as a French person or a woman. When
we speak of prejudice in our research, we are drawing on a notion that was
shaped mainly by research in cognitive psychology.
Cognition in the broader sense rst of all means thought processes. In the
narrower sense of psychology, this denotes the processing of information.
For the developmental psychologist Jean Piaget, cognitive processes are
attempts to reduce the multitude of sensory impressions. Put simply, people
arrange their sensory impressions according to previous experiences, with a
new experience, such as meeting an unknown person, being linked to earlier
experiences. This schematization of experience begins in early childhood
and lasts a lifetime, and it is only when the schemata used prove too crude
that they are rened or supplemented by new ones. Categorizing therefore
means assigning new impressions to old experiences. According to this
principle, stereotypes about people are the eects of such categorization.
People are assigned to a group, and the characteristics attributed to this
group are then also expected from the actual individual. On the other hand,
if the experience with an actual person is generalized to the entire group,
this is also the result of schematization.
Prejudices may not be identical to stereotypes, but they are based on
them. Prejudice is accompanied by a feeling or motivation, such as a per-
son’s desire to shore up her own self-worth by devaluing others. The signif-
icance of prejudice for a person’s self-esteem is the basis of group conict
theory (Tajfel & Turner 1979), and when we today speak of anti-Semitism as
a prejudice, we are (maybe unknowingly) making use of this concept from
cognitive psychology.
It is obvious that the psychological understanding of anti-Semitism
also requires taking account of emotions and aects, since anti-Semitism
openly manifests hatred for Jews. That anti-Semites have a motive, i.e. a
drive, for their hatred is also plausible – but this is not always as obvious
as the aect. However, there is an important reservation regarding how
cognitive psychology explains anti-Semitism, since group conict theory
would imply a link between a person’s experience of Jews and her deval-
uation of them, which would suggest that one of the causes of aggression
against Jews is experience of them (a similar criticism is also made by
Fein 2012: 67; and, in more detail, by Ranc 2016). This is the reason that
the researcher on anti-Semitism Julijana Ranc argues that such an expla-
nation of anti-Semitism seeks to understand in scientic terms what the
core of anti-Semitism is, and to explain the negative image of Jews
through their behaviour. As Ranc argues, to do so is a causal deception
(Ranc 2016).
Anti-Semitic Attitudes in Germany 129
For, anti-Semitism works without any previous contact, something that
Adorno pointed out when he wrote in the Minima Moralia: “anti-Semitism
is the rumour about the Jews” (Adorno 1954: 125). Brian Klug, another
researcher on anti-Semitism, put it as follows: “In short, anti-Semitism is
the process of turning Jews into ‘Jews’” (Klug 2003: 137). In other words, the
idea of the Jew already exists before the contact, with the actual person then
being adapted to this idea. This process can be illustrated with the story of
Bertolt Brecht’s Herr Keuner:
“What do you do”, Herr K was asked, “when you love a human being?”
“I make a sketch of the person”, said Herr K, “and see to it that the one
becomes like the other”. “What? The sketch?” “No”, Herr K said, “the
person” (Brecht 1995: 336).
What Herr Keuner does when he comes into contact with a person whom
he loves is precisely what the anti-Semite does before she has contact with
Jews: the anti-Semite already has a grudge against Jews, which she then
rationalizes by pointing to the behaviour of “the Jews”. She sketches a neg-
ative picture of a Jew, regardless of whether Jewish people actually give her
reasons for her negativity. Anti-Semitism is therefore not a prejudice, since
it is not based on a (false) judgement.
There are other reasons why anti-Semitism should not be seen as a prej-
udice. For example, the sociologist and philosopher Zygmunt Bauman dis-
tinguishes between the juxtaposition of friend and foe that creates order on
the one hand, and the gure of the other that questions this quasi-natural
dierence on the other: “The threat of the other is more frightening than the
threat of the foe. The other threatens socialization itself – the very possibil-
ity of socialization” (Bauman 2005: 95). First, the other “brings to light the
naked ‘historicity’ of existence” (102) – that is, the other confronts people
with the nitude of their own lives. Second, the other questions the alleged
naturalness of the nation and its ethnic identity – and thus also its persis-
tence. It is therefore never quite clear whether the gure of the other is an
unfaithful friend or a cunningly disguised enemy (104), and the other repre-
sents – for the anti-Semite, in the ideal form of the Jew – “a constant threat
to the order of the world” (101).
A further indication that anti-Semitism is not a prejudice links sociol-
ogy to psychoanalytical theory. As the sociologist Robert Michels put it
in 1925: “The other represents the unknown” (see Michels 1925: 303), and
symbolizes uncertainty. But, according to Freud, this unknown is all too
familiar (Freud 1919), since it is precisely what a person cannot allow and
represses under the pressure of social norms that seems particularly alien
in the other, which is why the “other” is both tempting and threatening
(Graumann 1997): the other reminds a person of her own desires and pro-
hibits them anew. But the “other” also oers a solution to this conict, since
what a person had to repress can be fought particularly well in the gure of
130 O. Decker, J. Kiess, and E. Brähler
the “other”. Indeed, these motives shaped the anti-Semitic caricatures that
appeared in the Nazi weekly newspaper Der Stürmer from 1923 to 1945,
and can be found today in the resentful fantasies about the wonderful lives
of “foreigners”, full of everything that is frowned upon: drugs, happiness
without having to work, a fullled sexual life (see Decker et al. 2008). People
can therefore use the other to give free rein to their own aggression and jus-
tify doing so both to themselves and others, pointing out, for example, that
they feel persecuted by evil powers or are simply punishing the violation of
social rules. This dual psychological function is also behind anti-Semitism:
the projection of what is repressed onto Jews, and also the valve for people’s
anger at their own abstention.
Thus, the authoritarian dynamic feeds on a person’s own submission to
an authority (representative of the social norm that makes a person sup-
press her own wishes) and on authoritarian aggression towards those who
have apparently not submitted themselves. This dynamic is expressed as
authoritarian aggression in anti-Semitism, and therefore arises not from a
(false) judgment about Jews, but from submission to an authority. Such an
authority does not always have to be a fascist agitator. Indeed, there are
today mainly secondary authorities in the form of collective ideals, such as
the nation: that there is a link between perceived threats to national identity
and anti-Semitism can be proven throughout Europe (Bergmann 2008).
But identifying with a nation does not always have to manifest itself as
nationalistic bluster. Nationalism can also express itself as a defence of the
economic location, where all conicting interests are apparently abolished.
In the constant emphasis on economic constraints and people’s willing-
ness to recognize these constraints as collective imperatives, the German
economy is one such “secondary authority” (see Chapter 1; Decker 2015).
Reference to the economy can allow for deep cuts to be inicted on people’s
lives. And, like every authoritarian submission, the submission to economic
rationality is not merely forced on people, but is also something that people
choose and accept. Their motivation is the hope that they can boost their
self-worth by feeling part of something bigger, such as a strong national
economy, the “engine of Europe” or the “world’s leading exporter”. But this
authority also needs sanctions, and is represented at present by the admin-
istration, which monitors observance of economic rationality and punishes
all those who do not meet the demands of authority by withdrawing recog-
nition (see Chapter 3). This threat by the more powerful authority is also
part of the authoritarian dynamic.
However, submission remains ambivalent and is accompanied by a per-
son’s latent anger at her own not-lived life. This anger becomes manifest at
the latest when authority is perceived as weak. Its strength was the reason
for submission: both because the person had to bow to a stronger power
and because she wanted to bow to it. If a person has accepted its rules, then
the weakness of authority is an aront. Not only is there no gratication in
being part of something big and strong; a person’s humiliation is reinforced
Anti-Semitic Attitudes in Germany 131
by the fact that she had submitted herself to something so weak. Her anger
is not directed against authority, however, since the goal is to restitute
authority; it is directed against those deemed weaker. Research in social
psychology has shown that a threat to group norms leads to an authoritar-
ian reaction (Duckitt & Fisher 2003; Fritsche et al. 2017), and especially in
people who were authoritarian from the outset (Cohrs & Ibler 2009). The
attempt to master the feeling of threat and loss of control can only succeed
at the expense of reality in anti-Semitism, too. As with any other group
formation, the perception of reality is adapted to the psychological needs of
group members (Freud 1921).
Another element of the authoritarian syndrome comes into play here:
namely, the conspiracy mentality, which has a special link to anti-Semitism.
Anti-Semites imagine Jews as other, and attribute special powers to
them as a collective. As the social philosopher and researcher on anti-
Semitism Moshe Postone has pointed out: “It is not only the extent but
also the quality of the power attributed to the Jews that distinguishes anti-
Semitism from other forms of racism. The Jews stand for a tremendously
powerful and incomprehensible international conspiracy” (see Postone
1982: 244). It may seem paradoxical that security is oered precisely by the
idea that there are powerful groups secretly pulling the strings. In the logic
of the psyche, though, this hallucination creates the much-needed sense
of control over the relevant areas of life: people think that they know who
controls the destiny of the world and where the enemy stands. It is for this
reason that the conspiracy mentality is just as much a part of the author-
itarian syndrome as it is of anti-Semitism (Graumann & Moscovici 1987;
Imho & Decker 2013).
It is clear that modern societies demand from the individual the con-
stant recognition of a rationality that does not grow out of her own desires
and goals in life – a rationality whose rule and operation are becoming
increasingly inscrutable. As the rumours about “the Jews” and their alleged
involvement in conspiracies show, it is especially anti-Semitism where the
“unease with modernity” (Berger et al. 1975, our translation) manifests, an
unease reinforced by constant acceleration and social upheavals (Decker &
Kiess 2013; Rosa 2005).
Whether a person is only exposed to these processes, or whether she
can play some part in shaping them depends on individual factors such as
occupation, income, education, habitus and wishes. It has been shown, for
example, that a person’s (job-related) position in current modernization
processes inuences authoritarian attitudes (Kiess et al. 2017), but also that
it is those who feel dependent on “decisions made somewhere else in the
world” and who are at the mercy of digital acceleration that vote for the
right-wing authoritarian AfD (Hilmer et al. 2017: 49). If everyday life con-
stantly forces a person into submission, then this inuences how she per-
ceives the world; the manifold processes of modernization therefore help to
form the authoritarian character. This process of creating the authoritarian
132 O. Decker, J. Kiess, and E. Brähler
syndrome is what we call the authoritarian dynamic; it continues to perme-
ate contemporary society.
Forms of anti-Semitism today: primary and secondary
anti-Semitism, communication latency and indirect
communication2
Information from the Federal Ministry of the Interior on hate crime shows a
high number of anti-Semitic crimes, almost 90% of which are committed by
right-wing extremists.3 According to the independent documentation portal
Research and Information Centre on Anti-Semitism (RIAS), the number
of anti-Semitic crimes is increasing signicantly.4 If we look at the results
of the 2018 survey, however, we notice that only 4.4% of the population
are manifestly anti-Semitic, with the trend being one of apparent decline.
We must, therefore, begin with a paradoxical observation: there are no
longer any, or at least only very few, anti-Semites in Germany (Horkheimer
& Adorno 1944: 230). In other words, we are living in a period of “anti-
Semitism without anti-Semites” (Marin 1979: 546).
But that only means that a handful of anti-Semites reveal themselves. For,
although anti-Semitic attitudes exist and are expressed in insults and even
violence against Jews, hardly anyone still admits to harbouring such atti-
tudes. Even those who agree with anti-Semitic statements or have commit-
ted anti-Semitic crimes themselves usually deny being anti-Semites. They
feel misunderstood and insist that the Jews really have something peculiar
about them. This reveals a shift within anti-Semitism from, for example,
the Nazi era. The phrase “anti-Semitism without anti-Semites” denotes an
altered anti-Semitism, a post-Holocaust anti-Semitism.
This was something that Peter Schönbach described in his doctoral
thesis at the Frankfurt Institute for Social Research in the early 1960s. In
his investigation he was interested in the rst wave of anti-Semitic distur-
bances in the young Federal Republic at the end of the 1950s and in the
motives behind the series of attacks, and put forward as an explanation a
phenomenon that he termed “guilt-deecting anti-Semitism”, a “reaction of
deance that keeps traditional anti-Semitic ideas alive for the sake of justi-
fying them, be they a person’s own or their parents’ ideas” (see Schönbach
1961: 80). It was also Schönbach who coined the term “secondary anti-
Semitism” for this (80). This secondary anti-Semitism appears not despite,
but because of, Auschwitz (Claussen 1987). And it is more frequent than
“traditional anti-Semitism”. It was for this reason that we included an addi-
tional questionnaire on secondary anti-Semitism in the survey of 2012, and
indeed respondents were much more willing to agree with these statements
compared to statements measuring traditional anti-Semitism (Heyder et al.
2005; Ullrich et al. 2012).
Anti-Semitism has therefore by no means disappeared, although it now
only occasionally manifests itself in the public domain. The reasons for this
Anti-Semitic Attitudes in Germany 133
probably lie in socio-cultural changes. Acts of public remembrance have
anchored anti-anti-Semitism in Germany since the 1970s, and especially
since the 1980s, when the Holocaust received greater global attention. Since
then, anti-Semitism has been less tolerated in the public domain; it is subject
to a social norm that makes it taboo, but does not eliminate it or make it
less potent.
Drawing on similar ndings, Werner Bergmann and Rainer Erb spoke
in 1986 of “anti-Semitism in communication latency” (Bergmann & Erb
1986).5 They were explicitly concerned not with whether anti-Semitism is
conscious or unconscious for the individual (225), but rather with anti-
Semitism expressed publicly, and came to the conclusion that the commu-
nication of anti-Semitism is kept out of the public eye, is privatized, or is
given new forms of expression. This creates an indirect communication that
camouages anti-Semitism – for example, through “criticism of Israel” or
through the use of other terms as ciphers that can be easily understood by
people with the same attitudes, such as anti-Americanism and “East Coast
capital” (Beyer & Liebe 2010).
Anti-Semites pretend to be more naive than they really are, as Julijana
Ranc’s qualitative study has recently shown. Drawing on a multitude of
group discussions and individual interviews, she described the communi-
cation of anti-Jewish attitudes, concluding that those who “communicate
anti-Semitism know full well, or at least have a good idea of, what they are
doing and are by no means unaware that they are pricking a taboo, the anti-
Semitism taboo” (Ranc 2016: 31). The compulsion to be anti-Semitic
is apparently so great that it seeks detours if it is not allowed to express
itself directly. But manifest itself it must, since the psychological motive is
too strong, be it in the form of “traditional”, secondary or Israel-related
anti-Semitism.
These ndings in no way make superuous the survey of primary anti-
Semitism that we have been conducting since 2002. Although anti-Semitism
has changed its face over the centuries, there are still continuities in what
motivates it and periods when anti-Semitism is particularly strong. Since
the proportion of open anti-Semites in the “traditional” form increased in
East Germany to over 10% in the years of the nancial crisis (see Chapter 2),
open agreement with anti-Semitism may also rise again in the future.
Table 5.1 presents the terms that we use to describe the forms in which
anti-Semitism is communicated. To distinguish between manifest and
latent communication, we use a threshold value: those who agree explic-
itly with the statements communicate anti-Semitic attitudes manifestly, and
those who partly agree and partly disagree display a latent communication.
This distinction can apply both to traditional anti-Semitism and to anti-
Semitism in indirect communication. The former is aimed directly against
Jews and has no secondary form (post-Holocaust anti-Semitism), whereas
the latter comprises primary and secondary anti-Semitism, with anti-
Semitism seeking to express itself by shifting communication to seemingly
134 O. Decker, J. Kiess, and E. Brähler
harmless areas (“turn the Jewish state into a ‘Jewish’ state”, as Klug (2003:
125) has put it).
The question that arises here is how much agreement with anti-Semitism
there is if we take into account latent communication and indirect commu-
nication. We would also like to know whether our ndings on people’s atti-
tudes correlate with the high and apparently rising number of anti-Semitic
crimes.
To investigate this, we again measured secondary anti-Semitism in the
2018 survey wave by using an additional questionnaire with ve state-
ments that we compiled on the basis of previous studies. Table 5.2 shows
the exact wording of the statements. Statements of both primary (directly
targeting Jews) and secondary (post-Holocaust) anti-Semitism belong to the
anti-Semitism expressed in indirect communication thus measured.6
Table 5.1 Forms of communication of anti-Semitism
Communication Traditional Indirect
Manifest
(explicit agreement
in questionnaire)
Primary anti-Semitism
(e.g. “Jews have too
much inuence”)
Primary anti-Semitism (e.g. “Israeli
politics make Jews unlikable”)
Secondary anti-Semitism (e.g.
“Holocaust industry benets
clever lawyers”)
Latent
(part agreement, part
disagreement in
questionnaire)
Primary anti-Semitism
(e.g. “Jews have too
much inuence”)
Primary anti-Semitism (e.g. “Israeli
politics make Jews unlikable”)
Secondary anti-Semitism (e.g.
“Holocaust industry benets
clever lawyers”)
Table 5.2 Questionnaire to measure anti-Semitism (indirect communication)
Statement Factor loading Year used
1 I can well understand why some people
nd Jews unpleasant. .763 1999, 2002, 2003
2 Israeli politics make Jews increasingly
unlikable. .786 2012
3 It makes me angry that the expulsion of
Germans and the bombing of German
cities are always regarded as more minor
crimes.
.795 2012
4 Reparations claims against Germany often
do not benet the victims at all, but a
Holocaust industry of clever lawyers.
.802 2012
5 We should focus more on current problems
than on events that took place more than
70 years ago.
.712 2012
Factor analysis: principal component analysis (Oblimin); internal consistency: Cronbach’s
alpha .828.
Anti-Semitic Attitudes in Germany 135
The rst two statements refer directly to Jews and the attributes ascribed
to them (primary anti-Semitism). Statement 1 (“I can well understand …”)
makes it easier for respondents to express their anti-Semitism since it
requires them to reveal little about themselves. Statement 2 oers an indi-
rect communication related to Israel, and the nal three statements inquire
into the secondary anti-Semitism (“despite or because of” Auschwitz) dis-
cussed above. Statements 2 to 5 are taken from the questionnaire designed
by the social psychologist Roland Imho (Imho 2010), which we already
used in 2012 (Ullrich et al. 2012). We already used statement 1 in 1999, 2002
and 2003 (Brähler & Decker 2003). The factor analysis produced one factor
on which all ve statements load, which suggests that the ve statements
measure the same thing: namely, anti-Semitism.
The internal consistency of the questionnaire is sound (.828), and its valid-
ity can also be demonstrated by the link with other questionnaires on related
constructs (Table 5.3). For example, there is a very clear link to the “anti-
Semitism” dimension in the Leipzig Questionnaire on Extreme Right-Wing
Attitudes (FR-LF; correlation coecient of .675). This high value suggests
that the questionnaire on indirect communication also measures anti-
Semitism. Moreover, those who trivialize National Socialism tend to agree
with the statements on anti-Semitism in indirect communication. The clear
correlation with hostility to Muslims reveals that the argument often put
forward by anti-Muslims that their hostility serves to protect Jews is spe-
cious. Rather, people with a high level of agreement with anti-Semitic state-
ments are also more likely to devalue asylum seekers and Sinti and Roma,
and to reject the pluralistic society in general. In addition, those who locate
themselves to the right or the far right of the political spectrum show sig-
nicantly higher levels of anti-Semitism. Finally, the propensity to use and
acceptance of violence are more widespread among anti-Semites. These
Table 5.3 Correlations between anti-Semitism in indirect communication and
other dimensions of devaluation and of anti-democratic attitudes
Anti-Semitism in indirect
communication
Dimension of anti-Semitism, Leipzig Questionnaire on
Extreme Right-Wing Attitudes (N = 2,382) .675**
Dimension of Nazi trivialization, Leipzig Questionnaire
on Extreme Right-Wing Attitudes (N = 2,392) .539**
Hostility to Muslims (N = 2,379) .389**
Devaluation of asylum seekers (N = 2,372) .355**
Antiziganism (N = 2,342) .336**
Anti-pluralism (N = 2,391) .338**
Political self-assessment: left/right (N = 2,348) .285**
Propensity to use violence (N = 2,392) 117**
Acceptance of violence (N = 2,388) .172**
Measure of correlation: Kendall’s tau b; signicant double-sided ** p < .01.
136 O. Decker, J. Kiess, and E. Brähler
ndings suggest that behind the devaluation of other people, and especially
of Jews, there is an authoritarian aggression that is part of the authoritarian
syndrome. This aggression is also expressed in anti-pluralism, in the rejec-
tion of equal rights for all members of society.
The anti-Semitic attitude: facets of a worldview
We will rst present the items that we have consistently used in the
Leipzig study since 2002, and distinguish between manifest and latent
anti-Semitism over this period. We will then present the results, which are
based on the additional questionnaire used. We will then turn to socioec-
onomic factors and the correlation between anti-Semitism and personality
traits. Finally, we will examine how the authoritarian syndrome is involved
in the emergence of anti-Semitism, and the extent to which this can be
proven empirically.
Traditional anti-Semitism
The idea that “the Jews” have had a particularly strong inuence on (the
history of) the world is one of the classic narratives of anti-Semitism, and
clearly shows that what is at stake is more than “just” the devaluation of a
group of “others”. Rather, Jews as a collective are ascribed some kind of
special power. As Figure 5.1 shows, manifest agreement with this statement
declined between 2002 and 2018. However, we can also observe an increase
Figure 5.1 Agreement with the statement “The inuence of the Jews is still too
strong”, 2002–2018 (in %)
Anti-Semitic Attitudes in Germany 137
in the manifest and latent expression of anti-Semitism in the period from
2008 to 2012, which means that the decline was not continuous. Overall,
the proportion of those who agreed with, or at least partially accepted, this
anti-Semitic topos did not fall below 30%. The East-West comparison is also
interesting. While half the respondents clearly disagreed with this statement
in 2002 in the East, that gure was only a good third in the West. Moreover,
while the proportion of manifest agreement in 2018 in the East was still
below the gure in the West, the proportion of latent anti-Semites was larger
in the East.
Figure 5.2 shows the distribution of responses to another anti-Semitic
statement, one that accuses “the Jews” of using “dirty tricks” more than
others do. While agreement in West Germany has steadily declined (from
a comparatively high level), we can observe uctuations in the East, where
the peak was reached in 2012 and agreement in 2018 was only slightly lower
than in 2002 (and higher than in 2006).
The third statement captures the idea that people perceive Jews as being
“dierent” and as not belonging to their own group, as “peculiar” and alien
in the sense discussed above. Agreement with this statement (both latent
and manifest) has also declined since 2002 (Figure 5.3). Once again, though,
the level of agreement declined steadily in the West, while there were uc-
tuations in the East. It is clear that the “anti-anti-Semitism” norm does not
work across the board.
In summary, we can say that both manifest and latent agreement with
the anti-Semitic statements declined continuously and more strongly in the
East than in the West between 2002 and 2006. Agreement in East Germany
Figure 5.2 Agreement with the statement “More than other people, the Jews use
dirty tricks to achieve their goals”, 2002–2018 (in %)
138 O. Decker, J. Kiess, and E. Brähler
then increased sharply in 2008, however, and in parts remained at a higher
level than in West Germany during the years of economic crisis. This period
saw the decline in anti-Semitism stagnate in the West, before the downward
trend was then resumed. This suggests that the population is highly suscep-
tible to anti-Semitism in situations of crisis.
Anti-Semitism in indirect communication
Statements that give indirect expression to anti-Semitism tend to meet with
more agreement than traditionally anti-Semitic statements (Figure 5.4).
This is particularly the case for statement 5, with the majority of respond-
ents explicitly supporting the view that we should focus more on current
problems than on past events, with only about one person in every ve
openly disagreeing with this statement. There are also signicant dier-
ences for all statements between East and West: there is almost consistently
higher manifest agreement in the West, but higher latent agreement in the
East. The fourth statement, “clever lawyers” benet from reparations to vic-
tims, is the only one that East Germans more often agree with manifestly
(41.9%). This statement expresses both the desire for a clean break with the
past and the idea of Jews as “greedy”. Nevertheless, there is also widespread
agreement with this statement in the West, too (34.5%). Moreover, we can
see that agreement with the rst two statements (primary anti-Semitism) is
lower than it is with the other statements (secondary anti-Semitism) at least
in the West. Put simply, agreement with the topos of having a clean break
is greater than the direct and indirect devaluation of Jews, although, as our
Figure 5.3 Agreement with the statement “The Jews simply just have something
peculiar about them and don’t really t in with us”, 2002–2018 (in %)
Anti-Semitic Attitudes in Germany 139
statistical investigations suggest, this topos is also closely correlated with
anti-Semitism.
Figure 5.5 shows a positive result: the number of people agreeing with the
statement “I can well understand why some people nd Jews unpleasant”
was much lower in 2018 than in any other survey year. What is noticeable
Figure 5.4 Latent and manifest anti-Semitism in indirect communication (for com-
plete statements, see Table 5.2) (in %)
Figure 5.5 Manifest anti-Semitism in indirect communication, 1999, 2002, 2003,
2018 (rounded-o agreement: “I can well understand why some people
nd Jews unpleasant”) (in %)
140 O. Decker, J. Kiess, and E. Brähler
are the high values in 2002, probably an eect of the anti-Semitic election
campaign run in 2002/2003 by the late FDP politician Jürgen Möllemann,
who in interviews made anti-Semitic remarks especially in indirect com-
munication about Israel. It is likely that this public breach of taboo led to
a temporary shift of the social norm, thereby exposing the potential for
anti-Semitism in Germany (Grünberg 2002).
For the other four statements, we only have representative comparative
values for 2012 (Figure 5.6). Overall, they also show a decrease in anti-
Semitism in indirect communication. This can mean on the one hand that
anti-Semitism is still present in latent communication, i.e. has not disap-
peared but only gone underground, and on the other that the cause can
at least partly lie in cohort and educational eects, since dealing with the
Holocaust (e.g. in schools or in the culture of public remembrance) is more
a matter of course now than it was in the 1980s. Not least, important memo-
rials such as the Memorial to the Murdered Jews of Europe in Berlin have
only been erected in the recent past.
In summary, anti-Semitism in indirect communication is as expected
much higher than traditional anti-Semitism as measured by the Leipzig
Questionnaire on Extreme Right-Wing Attitudes (Chapter 2). We should
also emphasize with regard to the extended questionnaire that there is
a very high level of agreement with the statements measuring second-
ary anti-Semitism, which conrms our suspicion that anti-Semitism is
veiled by a social norm, but is nonetheless deeply rooted in German
society. This at least partly explains the paradoxical situation that the
(apparently) decreasing number of people with anti-Semitic attitudes is
not accompanied by a decrease in anti-Semitic crimes. The barely veiled
anti-Semitism can serve as a breeding ground and as a “justication” for
such crimes.
Figure 5.6 Manifest anti-Semitism in indirect communication, 2012 and 2018 (in %)
Anti-Semitic Attitudes in Germany 141
Anti-Semitism as a problem across society
Empirical social research uses sociodemographic characteristics to describe
the susceptibility of a particular statistical group to anti-Semitism.7
Conversely, looking at such groups can also show whether an attitude is
spread across the entire population. We also pointed out in Chapter 1 and
the introduction to this chapter that anti-Semitism is not an isolated phe-
nomenon, but is closely related to other dimensions of the authoritarian
syndrome. We can therefore expect that both certain attitudes (intention
to vote in a particular way, conspiracy mentality, left-right classication,
propensity to use and acceptance of violence), and factors of socialization
(a person’s memory of how her parents brought her up, recognition as an
adult) are correlated with anti-Semitism.
We will rst look at how widespread anti-Semitism is in indirect com-
munication in certain statistical groups (Table 5.4; for traditional anti-
Semitism, see Chapter 2). A linear eect can be clearly seen with regard to
age: the older the group, the higher the proportion of those who show them-
selves to be manifestly anti-Semitic. As for gender, men more often agree
with the statements. Even clearer is the dierence when it comes to formal
qualications: respondents who have passed their A-levels at least are less
likely to hold anti-Semitic views.
Another important factor for the development of anti-Semitic attitudes
is the frequency with which a person has experienced unemployment
(Table 5.5). The answers to the extended questionnaire also show that the
higher the frequency of unemployment, the higher the values tend to be for
anti-Semitism. However, people who have never experienced unemployment
also agree with relevant parts of the statements, which again shows that the
phenomenon of anti-Semitism cannot be reduced to one factor alone (in this
case, that of job (in)security).
Table 5.4 Sociodemography and manifest anti-Semitism in indirect
communication (in %)8
Manifest anti-Semitism
Absolute %
Age** 14–30 66 13.9
31–60 231 17.9
61+159 25.3
Gender* Female 228 17.4
Male 228 21.0
Education** A-levels 56 11.5
No A-levels 399 21.0
Residence* East Germans 115 23.4
West Germans 341 17.9
Pearson’s chi-squared test: ** p < .01; * p < 0.5.
142 O. Decker, J. Kiess, and E. Brähler
Table 5.6 shows that a person’s assessment of her own economic situation
has no inuence on anti-Semitic attitudes. On the other hand, a person’s
assessment of her country’s situation does have a strong eect, i.e. those
who have a negative assessment of the national economic situation are much
more likely to be manifestly anti-Semitic.
Table 5.7 shows the correlation between anti-Semitism on the one hand,
and voting behaviour on the other. The statistical groups were formed by
using the answers to the question, “If there were elections to the Bundestag
next Sunday, would you vote and, if so, for whom?” There is manifest agree-
ment in almost equal proportions in most groups, although agreement is
at its lowest among supporters of the Green Party (9.2%) and at its high-
est among AfD voters (42.5%) – the latter far higher than it is among non-
voters (19.4%). The historical-revisionist and anti-Semitic statements of
AfD gures are apparently falling on fertile ground.
We also measured how respondents position themselves on the left-right
political spectrum, which reveals a clear correlation with anti-Semitism
(Table 5.8): the further to the right, the higher the level of agreement with
the anti-Semitic statements in indirect communication (“far right”, 55%;
“right”, 33.5%). In contrast, agreement is much rarer among those respond-
ents who see themselves on the other side of the political spectrum: agree-
ment with these anti-Semitic statements among those dening themselves as
“left” and “far left” is much lower (12.2% and 14.3%, respectively).
A decisive role in explaining authoritarianism is also played by upbring-
ing, socialization, and a person’s relationship to her parents (see Adorno
et al. 1950; Altemeyer 1988; Decker et al. 2012; Horkheimer et al. 1936). As
Table 5.5 Frequency of unemployment and manifest anti-Semitism in indirect
communication (in %)
Frequency of
unemployment Never
(N = 1,318) Once
(N = 486) Twice
(N = 281) Three times
(N = 137)
Four times
or more
(N = 155)
Manifest
anti-Semitism** 16.6 21.8 19.2 24.8 26.5
Pearson’s chi-squared test: ** p < .01.
Table 5.6 Assessment of the economic situation and manifest anti-Semitism in
indirect communication (in %)
Good or neither/nor Bad
Manifest
anti-Semitism Own economic situation 18.6 21.9
Country’s economic situation** 17.9 30.1
Pearson’s chi-squared test: ** p < .01, N = 2,395.
Anti-Semitic Attitudes in Germany 143
Table 5.7 Voting behaviour and manifest anti-Semitism in indirect communication (in %)
Electoral participation Party preference**
No participation
(N = 310) Participation
uncertain
(N = 201)
CDU/CSU
(N = 443) SPD
(N = 424) FDP
(N = 91) Green
(N = 173) The Left
(N = 166) AfD
(N = 160) Do not yet know
which party
(N = 136)
Manifest
anti-Semitism 19.4 18.4 18.5 19.1 14.3 9.2 16.9 42.5 15.4
Pearson’s chi-squared test: p < .01.
Table 5.8 Anti-Semitism in indirect communication and left-right classication (in %)
Left-right classication** Far left (N = 49) Left (N = 761) Centre (N = 1032) Right (N = 486) Far right (N = 20)
Manifest anti-Semitism in
indirect communication 14.3 12.2 17.2 22.5 55.0
Pearson’s chi-squared test: ** p < .01.
144 O. Decker, J. Kiess, and E. Brähler
expected, the results in Table 5.9 show a clear correlation between a person’s
experience of a harsh upbringing and lack of aection on the one hand, and
anti-Semitism in indirect communication on the other (unlike the other two
statements, the rst statement is formulated negatively).
We saw in Chapter 3 that extreme right-wing attitudes are linked to lack
of recognition as a citizen, and we are therefore interested in whether the
various dimensions of recognition (as a citizen, as a person, as a working
person; see Chapter 3) also have an inuence on anti-Semitism in indirect
communication. A simple group comparison shows that there is only a cor-
relation for those who feel no recognition as citizens, i.e. those who experi-
ence authoritarian statehood (Table 5.10).
Table 5.11 shows the correlation not previously documented between
manifest traditional anti-Semitism and the presence or absence of recog-
nition. What becomes clear is that the three spheres of recognition do have
an eect on the propensity for traditional anti-Semitism, with manifest
anti-Semites being much more often in the group of those who experience
both authoritarian statehood and a lack of recognition in their working
lives.
We have already argued that anti-Semitism is more than “just” a preju-
dice. This is evident in the fact, for example, that anti-Semitic stereotypes
devalue Jews while ascribing certain characteristics or power to them
as a collective. The conspiracy mentality should therefore be strongly
correlated with anti-Semitism, and this is in fact the case for anti-Semi-
tism in indirect communication (Table 5.12), with respondents without a
conspiracy mentality agreeing with the anti-Semitic statements much
less frequently (5.6%) than respondents with a strong conspiracy
mentality (24.5%).
Table 5.13 presents the correlation between anti-Semitism and authoritar-
ianism. As expected, there is also a strong correlation here: those who are
authoritarian are also more anti-Semitic.
Table 5.9 Parents’ parental behaviour and manifest anti-Semitism in indirect
communication (agreement at item level) (in %)
No/occasionally Yes
Manifest
anti-Semitism Did your parents punish you
harshly, even for minor
things?** (1)
18.4 25.5
Did your parents try to drive you
to be “the best”? (2) 19.7 17.0
Did your parents comfort you
when you were sad?* (3) 21.2 17.6
Pearson’s chi-squared test: **p < .01; *p < .05.
1 No/occasionally total: N = 2,159; yes total: N = 231
2 No/occasionally total: N = 1,816; yes total: N = 571
3 No/occasionally total: N = 962; yes total: N = 1,425
Anti-Semitic Attitudes in Germany 145
Table 5.11 Recognition and manifest traditional anti-Semitism (in %)
Recognition No recognition
Manifest traditional
anti-Semitism Recognition as a citizen** (1) 2.8 9.1
Recognition as a person (2) 4.2 7.4
Recognition as a working
person** (3) 4.0 8.1
Pearson’s chi-squared test: **p < .01.
1 Recognition total: N = 1,853; no recognition total: N = 560
2 Recognition total: N = 2,335; no recognition total: N = 81
3 Recognition total: N = 2,244; no recognition total: N = 172
Table 5.12 Anti-Semitism in indirect communication and the conspiracy
mentality (in %)
No manifestation
(N = 840)
Average
manifestation
(N = 1,210) Strong manifestation
(N = 310)
Conspiracy mentality ** 5.6 11.7 24.5
Pearson’s chi-squared test: **p < .01.
Table 5.13 Authoritarianism and manifest anti-Semitism in indirect
communication (in %)
Disagree Agree
Troublemakers should be made very aware that they are
unwelcome in society.** 60.7 83.1
Important decisions in society should be left to its leaders.** 19.8 37.9
Tried and tested practices should not be called into question.** 34.7 61.5
Pearson’s chi-squared test: ** p < .01.
Table 5.10 Spheres of recognition and manifest anti-Semitism in indirect
communication (in %)
Recognition No recognition
Manifest
anti-Semitism Recognition as a citizen** (1) 15.5 30.9
Recognition as a person (2) 19.1 18.5
Recognition as a working
person (3) 18.9 21.2
Pearson’s chi-squared test: **p < .01.
1 Recognition total: N = 1,839; no recognition total: N = 553
2 Recognition total: N = 2,314; no recognition total: N = 81
3 Recognition total: N = 2,225; no recognition total: N = 170
146 O. Decker, J. Kiess, and E. Brähler
Finally, Table 5.14 presents the correlation between anti-Semitism and
the propensity for violence, this propensity being higher among those who
agree with the anti-Semitic statements.
We can now identify the factors behind agreement with anti-Semitic
statements. There are dierences between age groups, but also between
gender. Moreover, we found evidence of an authoritarian dynamic at
work: rst, the focus on the national economy indicates that this acts as
a secondary authority; second, both the lack of recognition as a citizen
and the experience of violence in childhood show how crucial authori-
tarian socialization is for the emergence of anti-Semitism. The fact that
anti-Semitism in indirect communication is embedded in an authoritar-
ian syndrome is shown by the support given to the right-wing authoritar-
ian AfD, but also by the strong correlations with conspiracy mentality,
authoritarianism and the propensity to use and acceptance of violence. In
the following section, we wish to validate our preliminary ndings so that
we can draw a conclusion.
Anti-Semitism and authoritarianism
Our theoretical reections lead us to assume that there are several factors
involved in the emergence of the authoritarian dynamic in society, which
includes submission to an authority – something that we can currently see
in people’s identication with a strong national economy. This submission is
invoked by authoritarian upbringing as a child and by authoritarian state-
hood, the latter experienced as a lack of recognition in adulthood. This
authoritarian dynamic leads to an authoritarian syndrome that is mani-
fested in conspiracy mentality and authoritarian aggression, authoritarian
submission, and conventionalism. We therefore expect that people who are
exposed to this multifactorial phenomenon will be anti-Semitic.
Table 5.15 shows the correlations between these dimensions and anti-
Semitism. To measure the correlations, we calculated total values for each
case: for anti-Semitism including both forms (“traditional” and “indirect
communication”); for authoritarianism including the three dimensions of
aggression, submission and conventionalism; and for conspiracy mentality
based on the three statements, “conspiracies that are concocted in secret”,
Table 5.14 Propensity for violence and manifest anti-Semitism in indirect
communication (in %)
Disagree Agree
Propensity to use violence** (1) 18.3 23.5
Passive acceptance of violence* (2) 18.0 23.1
Pearson’s chi-squared test: ** p < .01, * p < 05.
1 Disagree total: N = 2,060; agree total: N = 332
2 Disagree total: N = 1,872; agree total: N = 516
Anti-Semitic Attitudes in Germany 147
“secret organizations that have a great inuence”, and “leading gures are
only puppets” (the questionnaires are presented in Chapter 3). Moreover,
we measured the spheres of recognition with our own questionnaire (see
Chapter 4), based on the theory of recognition outlined by Axel Honneth
(Honneth 1992). We used a further abbreviated questionnaire to record in
three dimensions how respondents recollect being brought up by their par-
ents (see Chapter 3; Schumacher et al. 2000).
As expected, the bivariate correlations are statistically signicant
throughout. Authoritarianism and conspiracy mentality correlate strongly
with anti-Semitism, and we can therefore assume that these factors have a
strong inuence on the emergence of the authoritarian syndrome. The var-
iables summarized under the heading “authoritarian or democratic social-
ization” also have statistically signicant correlations with anti-Semitism.
To validate the inuence of the dierent variables, we conducted a mul-
tivariate regression analysis, which not only tests the inuence of several
variables on a dependent variable, but also weights the variables against
one another. This allowed us, for example, to examine how important an
individual’s socioeconomic situation is compared to ideological factors.
To verify the results, we added mistrust and locus of control (i.e. whether
respondents think that they can shape their own lives) to the variables of
personality, and included some sociodemographic features (Table 5.16).
Our regression model explains .293 of the variance of the dependent
variable (anti-Semitism), a good value for an investigation in the social
sciences; moreover, the model allows for detecting reciprocal eects. First,
the regression analysis shows that education, age and gender have a weak
but statistically signicant inuence on anti-Semitism: older people, men
and respondents with a lower level of education are more anti-Semitic. In
contrast, unemployment, low income, and place of residence in East or
West Germany have no eect. This shows that in many cases dierences
between individual statistical groups cannot explain, or can only inade-
quately explain, the complexity of the phenomenon. Second, it conrms our
Table 5.15 Correlation between anti-Semitism and elements of authoritarianism
Anti-Semitism
Authoritarian character
Authoritarianism .463**
Conspiracy mentality .375**
Authoritarian or democratic socialization
No recognition as a person −.041*
No recognition as a citizen .281**
No recognition as a working person −.112**
Harsh parental punishments .157**
(Not) comforted by parents −.045*
Signicant correlations: Kendall’s tau b **p < .01, *p < .05; no signicant correlation: parental
pressure to succeed.
148 O. Decker, J. Kiess, and E. Brähler
ndings that there is a clear correlation between authoritarianism and con-
spiracy mentality on the one hand, and anti-Semitism on the other. With
beta weights of .671 and .683, the authoritarian syndrome has the strongest
inuence on the emergence of anti-Semitic attitudes.
Third, the weak but signicant eects of socialization also t in here. The
experience of authoritarian parents and of harsh punishments does indeed
have an inuence on the emergence of anti-Semitism, as do experiences of
authoritarianism in adulthood, where the lack of recognition as a citizen
has the highest correlation with anti-Semitism. Fourth, the locus of con-
trol among anti-Semites is signicant: they feel that they have their own
lives under control. The projection of “secret powers”, i.e. the conspiracy
mentality, clearly helps them to feel that they are in control, which also cor-
responds to the fact that anti-Semites feel a high level of recognition as peo-
ple. Their attempt to stabilize their own relationship to the world through
anti-Semitism can also be a factor here.
Linear regression with gradual exclusion of cases, without signicant inu-
ence: East/West, unemployment, net household income, own economic situ-
ation, recognition as a working person, comforted by parents, external locus
of control, mistrust; level of signicance as indicated in each case in column p.
Summary of results
High prevalence of anti-Semitism in Germany
Anti-Semitism is widespread in Germany. About 10% of respondents from
the most recent Leipzig Authoritarianism Study (2018) explicitly agreed
with traditional anti-Semitic statements, while between 10% and over 50%
Table 5.16 Results of the regression analysis (high beta weights correspond to high
level of inuence)
Indicator Regression
coecient Beta p
Authoritarian character
(High) authoritarianism .671 .366 .000
(High) conspiracy mentality .683 .231 .000
Internal locus of control (high) .152 .053 .007
Current economic situation in Germany (bad) .196 .038 .046
Authoritarian or democratic socialization
No recognition as a citizen .126 .089 .000
Harsh parental punishments .499 .073 .000
Recognition as a person .119 .067 .001
Sociodemography
Education (low) −.680 −.057 .002
Gender (male) −.448 −.046 .009
Age (high) .011 .041 .023
Corrected R2.293
Anti-Semitic Attitudes in Germany 149
agreed with anti-Semitic statements that are formulated in such a way that
they allow anti-Semitism to be communicated indirectly. If we also take
into account communication latency (“undecided” answers), then in 2018
the proportion of traditional anti-Semites rose to almost 40% in the East,
and to over 25% in the West, and in indirect communication to between
about 40% and slightly over 80% in the East, and to between 30% and almost
80% in the West. The highest rates of agreement were with post-Holocaust
demands for a clean break with the crimes that the Germans committed
during the Second World War.
Simultaneous decline in anti-Semitism since 2002
As for anti-Semitism that is communicated openly, the rates were highest in
West Germany in 2002. Over the period covered by our study (2002–2018),
we can discern a decline in manifest anti-Semitism, which pertains both to
the questionnaire used throughout, and to the supplementary questionnaire
on anti-Semitism in indirect communication. There is no alteration to the
trend if we take into account not only manifest but also latent agreement
with anti-Semitic statements. However, there were also uctuations over the
period, which suggests that the strength of anti-Semitic attitudes among the
population correlates with the stability of social norms, and that the poten-
tial for anti-Semitism is even greater than our study could gauge.
We should point out once again here that the representative survey was
conducted in the households of respondents, where the interviewer gave the
questionnaire to the respondent to ll out herself. The respondent is there-
fore in a private and familiar environment, and can reveal her real opinions
on the statements without fearing social norms. We can therefore assume
that disclosure is easier in this anonymous form than using other meth-
ods (e.g. telephone surveys, participant observation, group discussions).
However, the social norm will still dampen to a certain degree the respond-
ent’s willingness to disclose her opinions, since the social norm is not disa-
bled completely through the anonymous survey situation.
Violence and anti-Semitism
Anti-Semitic attitudes and the propensity to use or acceptance of violence
correlate with one another, albeit weakly. Combined with the high level
of latently anti-Semitic individuals, this correlation provides an explana-
tion for the increase in anti-Semitic crimes and the simultaneous decline in
anti-Semitism: people’s underlying propensity for violence and their knowl-
edge that there is an acceptance of violence among like-minded people lead
them in the current social situation to convert their attitudes more often
into action than was the case a few years ago. This also matches our ndings
on the radicalization of right-wing authoritarian milieus (Decker & Brähler
2016: 95).
150 O. Decker, J. Kiess, and E. Brähler
The authoritarian dynamic fosters anti-Semitism
Anti-Semitism is fostered by the authoritarian dynamic in society, since
it is a reaction to experiences of authoritarianism as children and adults.
Anti-Semitism is part of an authoritarian syndrome in the individual, who,
in submitting to the rules of economic rationality, needs a valve for the
aronts produced by this submission. Many people seem to nd this valve
in anti-Semitism. Through projection, the conspiracy mentality gives peo-
ple the feeling that they are keeping their bearings in a confusing world.
And the higher rates of manifest agreement in the years of economic crisis
from 2008 to 2012 indicate the threat posed by this attitude.
Notes
1 The term emerged in the second half of the 19th century and, unlike the usual
terms anti-Jewishness and anti-Judaism, referred explicitly to the racist justi-
cation for rejecting Jews. It has been used since the 1940s to denote hostility
to Jews.
2 Latency refers to agreeing partially to ant-Semitic statements (level 3 of a
5-step scale), whereas indirect communication is the (full) agreement with
statements that use ciphers like “US East Coast capital” instead if directly
using the word Jew/Jewish.
3 See, for example, the answer to the last inquiry made by the Bundestag dele-
gates Petra Pau, André Hahn, Gökay Akbulut, other delegates and the parlia-
mentary group the Left, German Bundestag printed matter 19/3522.
4 https://report-antisemitism.de/ (19 September 2018).
5 By that, they did not mean psychological latency. This misunderstanding can
easily occur, since latency is also spoken of with regard to the individual when
a person is not aware of her own wishes. Bergmann and Erb, however, were
concerned with social latency in the sense of indirect communication, and not
with psychological repression.
6 For a comparison with our usual questionnaire, see chapter 2.
7 A statistical group, such as “all women” or “all men aged between 31 and 60”,
is not a social group in the sense that its members are in some way related to
each other. A statistical group is formed solely on the basis of the common
characteristic “female gender” as determined in the survey.
8 Here and in the following, we use a threshold value of 18≥ to measure manifest
anti- Semitism in indirect communication (see Table 5.1). Respondents evaluate
each statement on a scale of 1 to 5. With a minimum of 5 and a maximum of
25 points, the value 18 is higher than the average value of a person who always
gives “undecided” answers (15). For us, 18 represents manifest agreement.
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DOI: 10.4324/9781003218616-6
Religion as a Factor of Conict
in Relation to Right-Wing
Extremism, Hostility to Muslims,
and Support for the AfD
Gert Pickel and Alexander Yendell
6
Religion, authoritarianism, and right-wing extremism
Discussions in extreme right-wing circles today are strongly shaped by cur-
rent migration. In this context, there is (quite heated) debate within extreme
right-wing movements and parties about how best to exploit issues at the
centre of society, although the potential for right-wing extremism among
the German population far surpasses the devaluation of refugees and asy-
lum seekers. It is not yet clear how far these attitudes towards refugees
and immigration are the rst signs that extreme right-wing attitudes are
spreading in society. Also unclear is whether the polarization of citizens
in their attitudes towards ight and migration endangers social cohesion
and the democratic political culture in Germany (Almond & Verba 1963;
Pickel & Pickel 2006), and radicalizes sections of the population (Pickel &
Pickel 2018).
One way to understand this dynamic could be to explore how public
debates refer to the religious aliation of refugees, and in particular to reli-
gious fanaticism and the lack of cultural t between immigrants (especially
Muslim immigrants) and Christian and secular Europe. These debates
also connect up with demands for the “Christian Occident” to be defended
against the Muslim “inux”. All this raises the question of the position
taken by the Christian churches to ight, migration, Islam and right-wing
populism (Adida et al. 2016; Hidalgo & Pickel 2018). What is contested is
the precise position that the churches take, and whether this position is
adopted by the faithful. The dierent viewpoints can be mapped according
to two questions. First, do religious aliations and Christian beliefs act
as immunizing factors against authoritarianism and right-wing extremism?
The leaders of the two main Christian churches in Germany have taken
a clear stance on refugees, and, as position papers and public statements
make clear, they assume, or at least hope, that the church can exercise an
inuence in this area. Second, though, is it not also the case that belong-
ing to a Christian church and sharing its beliefs can actually increase peo-
ple’s openness to authoritarianism and right-wing extremism? A number
of ndings make such a claim plausible, with recent studies pointing to the
Religion as a Factor of Conict 155
interdependence of specic religious attitudes and prejudices, and showing
that attitudes such as religious dogmatism and authoritarianism are linked
statistically (Hunsberger & Jackson 2005; PEW 2018).
But we should not see religion simply as a factor that promotes author-
itarianism, xenophobia, and hostility to Muslims. Belonging to a religion
can also serve as a point of reference for rejecting such attitudes and preju-
dice. It is clear that those sections of the population that are open to extreme
right-wing propaganda reject not only immigration (Pickel & Pickel 2018),
but also and especially Muslim immigration. This allocation of people to a
group based on their religion is conrmed in demonstrations, such as by
Pegida in Dresden, or in statements by Alternative for Germany (AfD) pol-
iticians, where great play is made of the threat posed to Germany and its
culture by Muslim immigration (generalized as the Islamist threat). It is still
unclear how deep this image of an “enemy” is embedded in the population,
and how far it undermines the basic principles of a pluralistic democracy.
What cannot be denied, though, is that, despite its loss in social signi-
cance in terms of membership and number of believers, religion still plays
an important role in public discussions today (Pickel 2017; Pollack & Rosta
2015), and the idea that a certain religious aliation is particularly threat-
ening is held by secular people, too.
A further question concerns the impact that these perceptions have on
political behaviour and on attitudes to democracy. Recent studies have
shown the signicance of anti-Muslim attitudes for the election of populist
parties, and especially in Germany of the AfD (Arzheimer 2015; Häußler
2016; Hambauer & Mays 2018; Lengfeld 2017, 2018; S. Pickel 2018; Rippl
& Seipel 2018). What is unclear, though, is the signicance that these atti-
tudes have in comparison to other factors. The electoral successes of the
AfD could also be due to pure protest, to people’s own experiences of being
devalued (for example, as a member of the social group of East Germans),
or a mixture of underlying authoritarian attitudes. What is interesting is to
see whether the focus on Muslims as the “enemy” could lead to a breach
in the dam that has so far kept openly extreme right-wing positions at bay.
For example, research on populism talks in terms of uid borders between
positions classied as right-wing populist on the one hand, and right-wing
extremist on the other (Mudde & Kaltwasser 2017; Priester 2007), with the
core attitude of populism (against elites and for the Volk) allowing overlaps
with the goals pursued by the political right. Conversely, there is discussion
as to whether it is at all legitimate to associate those who vote for the AfD
with right-wing extremism. Thus, the attitude to Muslims and refugees is
central in public debate. What is dicult to deny is the major role that the
distinction between religions plays in the successes of extreme right-wing
movements and the AfD (Wodak 2017).
These are the questions that we address in this chapter. First, we examine
whether religious aliation (or no aliation) is correlated with authoritar-
ian attitudes.1 Our thesis is that this correlation is only minor, since the
156 G. Pickel and A. Yendell
composition of church members barely diers from the composition of
the population as a whole. Second, we turn to the attitudes of Germans
to Muslims, and attempt to classify these attitudes according to a frame-
work of authoritarian attitudes. Finally, we analyze the impact of hostility
to Muslims on attitudes to democracy and voting behaviour.
Aliation to Christianity as an immunizing factor?
There has been repeated discussion of the role that religious aliation and
identity play in authoritarian attitudes and people’s openness to right-wing
extremism (Adida et al. 2016; Liedhegener 2016; Pickel 2018). Who should
want to remain in the church in modern, secular times, except dogmatists
and people lacking rationality? If we take seriously the claim that religious
dogmatism and authoritarianism are closely related, then this should also
aect political attitudes (Pickel 2017). A recent study by the Pew Research
Centre (PEW 2018) caused something of a stir. Not only did it challenge
the common assumption that Christianity acts as a kind of buer against
authoritarianism, extremism and populism; it even came to the opposite
conclusion, arguing that Christians, and especially active Christians (meas-
ured according to regular churchgoing), reject immigrants and people from
other religious communities more strongly. These ndings do not corre-
spond to the ndings of other surveys, however, with similar calculations
directly contradicting the Pew Centre’s ndings, and suggesting that mem-
bers of Christian churches have a more positive attitude to migration (Pickel
2018). The data of the Leipzig Authoritarianism Study of 2018 do conrm
the ndings of the Pew Research Centre in one respect, though: members of
Christian churches seem to be somewhat more open to authoritarian atti-
tudes than those without a religion (Figure 6.1).
However, the dierences are minor. The willingness to follow and the
desire for security that are contained in the items for authoritarianism seem
to appeal to some church members, and it is quite possible that there are
overlaps between dogmatic religious groups and extreme right-wing groups
in terms of voting. But this also applies to the group of non-religious peo-
ple, who dier only slightly from church members. The fact is, though, that
Christianity in general does not protect people from authoritarian attitudes.
Figure 6.2 illustrates this once again. It shows that the average values on the
overall scale of right-wing extremism (these values are calculated from the
rates of agreement with the 18 extreme right-wing statements; see Chapter 2)
do not in fact vary between Catholics, Protestants and those without a reli-
gion. This also shows, on the other hand, that there is no evidence that being
a Christian strengthens extreme right-wing attitudes. Thus, church mem-
bership neither prevents people from adopting extreme right-wing attitudes,
and nor acts as a breeding ground for such attitudes.
Appropriately, there is also no signicant dierence between Catholics,
Protestants and the non-religious when it comes to selected group-
focused prejudices that we recorded with statements from the survey of
Religion as a Factor of Conict 157
Figure 6.1 Patterns of authoritarian attitudes by denomination (in %)
Agreement with the three statements (answer categories: partly agree, mostly agree,
completely agree)
Figure 6.2 Extreme right-wing attitudes and the propensity for violence by
denomination
Proportion: closed extreme right-wing mindset by denomination in %; presentation of
average values by denomination on the basis of all 18 statements measuring right-wing
extremism (see Chapter 2); propensity for violence = agreement with “I am quite prepared in
certain situations to use physical violence to assert my interests”
158 G. Pickel and A. Yendell
group-focused enmity (Heitmeyer 2012; Zick et al. 2016) (Figure 6.3): reli-
gious aliation (or no religion) is not a decisive factor in anti-Semitism,
antiziganism, or hostility to Muslims. The dierences between Christians
and the non-religious regarding the individual statements in the Leipzig
Authoritarianism Study of 2018 amount to a maximum of three percentage
points, which means that church members per se are neither more positive
nor more negative to people, with the same applying to their attitude to
foreigners in general. What is worth noting, though, is that church members
are much less willing to use violence to assert their beliefs, with only just
under 12% agreeing with the statement “I am quite prepared in certain sit-
uations to use physical violence to assert my interests” (in contrast to 20%
for the non-religious).
Table 6.1 shows the correlation between voting behaviour and denomina-
tion: the SPD is the most popular party among Protestants, and the CDU/
CSU is the most popular party among Catholics. The Left is the most pop-
ular party among those without a religion. The proportion of AfD voters
among the non-religious is 16%; among Protestants and Catholics, 8% and
7%, respectively. This dierence cannot be explained solely by the fact that
the proportion of those without a religion is higher in the East than in the
West, since the proportion of AfD voters among the non-religious is compa-
rable in the East and West (14% vs. 17%). What is important here (besides the
Figure 6.3 Group-focused enmity by denomination (in %)
Group-focused enmity
Percentages for answers “partly agree” and “completely agree” for the rst four statements;
percentages for answers “mostly agree” and “completely agree” for the last statement
Religion as a Factor of Conict 159
strong tradition that dictates how someone votes, e.g. CDU-Catholic) is the
low propensity among the non-religious to vote for the mainstream parties.
Hostility to Muslims among the German population
The question remains as to the signicance of religious aliation for author-
itarian attitudes. One possibility is the devaluation of members of a cer-
tain other religion. The toolbox to measure group-focused enmity has been
added to in recent years to include the devaluation of Muslims (Zick et al.
2016), which can be seen as a reaction to the increasing hostility to Muslims
that rst became visible in public discourse at the latest when the “refugee
crisis” began. Following this discourse and the political points of attack,
especially those made by the AfD, we can see that the focus on members of
“Islam” has become an anchor point for the dynamization of authoritarian
attitudes. A distinction must be made here between two groups: people with
a closed extreme right-wing mindset, and people without such a m indset who
are nonetheless opposed to immigration, Muslim immigration, and Islam.
The rejection of Islam and its members seems very much to exceed the hard
core of right-wing extremists in the German population, something true not
only of Germany, but also of other European countries (Strabac & Listhaug
2007). Critics of religion usually argue that the rejection of Muslims is
linked to scepticism and criticism of Islam, and has less to do with preju-
dice and xenophobia. “Justied criticism of Islam” is then occasionally used
to legitimize what are actually anti-Muslim statements, i.e. attitudes that
hugely devalue a specic group of people. It was for this very reason that the
Leipzig Authoritarianism Study of 2018 explicitly investigated hostility to
Muslims and not Islamophobia (see Chapter 2), and drew on the construct
of group-focused enmity, even though some of the statements may depict
not so much hostility as discomfort (“Muslims make me feel like a foreigner
in my own country”). The results show that 44% of respondents believe that
Table 6.1 Party preference by denomination (in %)
Protestant Catholic No religion
CDU/CSU 24.0 42.0 12.1
SPD 34.4 20.1 18.1
FDP 5.0 5.3 6.8
Greens 10.1 10.7 10.1
Left 7.3 4.1 22.7
AfD 8.1 7.1 15.7
NPD 0.5 0.8 1.3
Other 1.9 2.1 3.5
Explicit refusal to vote 11.3 13.1 16.7
Answers to the question: “If there were elections to the Bundestag next
Sunday, would you vote and, if so, for whom?”
160 G. Pickel and A. Yendell
Muslim migration to Germany should be prohibited (although only 15%
agree with this statement completely; see Figu re 2.17 in Chapter 2). More
than half said that Muslims made them feel like foreigners in their own
country (see Figure 2.18 in Chapter 2). Thus, negative attitudes to Muslims
and their migration to Germany have increased again since 2016 (Decker
et al. 2016: 50), which is hardly surprising given the prevalence of public
debates and discussions on Muslim immigration. Indeed, what is surprising
is that, despite all the debates, the majority of Germans still reject such a
prohibition on immigration. The rates of agreement with a prohibition on
immigration are sometimes lower in other surveys (Pickel & Yendell 2016;
SVR 2016; Zick et al. 2016), which is due to the dierent survey methods
used (here: self-completion in face-to-face surveys). But, regardless of how
high rates of agreement are exactly, there has nowhere been a decline in the
time period covered in criticism of Muslim immigration, not even after the
signicant decline in real immigration after the 2015 peak. We can see a
comparable trend regarding attitudes to asylum seekers, which are closely
linked to hostility to Muslims. Although only two thirds of the refugees are
Muslims, many Germans see them all as Muslim (Pickel 2018).
What is noticeable is how consistent the discrepancy is between the old
and the new federal states: about half the respondents in the East advo-
cate imposing a prohibition on Muslim immigration, while in the West that
gure is 42%. This attitude is particularly strong in areas where the pro-
portion of Muslims in the population is less than 1%. This corresponds to
other results (Pickel & Yendell 2016), which see the reason for this attitude
as lying partly in the lack of contact with this “foreign group” (Tajfel 1982).
This provides fuel for extreme right-wing movements and the AfD, and
explains why East Germans, who are often already negatively inuenced
by the media, are easier to mobilize against Muslims, refugees, and those
speaking out in their defence. Apart from this regional dierence, socio-
structural characteristics make hardly any dierence in people’s attitudes
to Muslims and asylum seekers (Table 6.2): anti-Muslim attitudes tend to
be more common among men than women, among people without A-levels,
and among those from lower income groups. What is noticeable is the high
proportion of those advocating a prohibition on immigration among people
in the youngest age group studied. In general, the older generations have a
somewhat more negative attitude to Muslims, and older citizens are some-
what more likely to suspect asylum seekers of not really feeling persecuted.
More interesting is the fact that the generations dier only slightly from
each other in their attitude to Muslims. Social status (income) and level of
education represent a line that distinguishes the attitudes of the population.
At the same time, the social structure contributes relatively little to explain-
ing hostility to Muslims.
On the other hand, the inuence of attitudinal patterns on how people
see members of the Islamic religious community is much stronger, with the
statistical correlations between authoritarianism and hostility to Muslims
Religion as a Factor of Conict 161
being considerable. If we assume that, as personality traits, authoritarian
attitudes are more deeply rooted in the reservoir of attitudes that people
have than attitudes to individual social groups, then the causality is clear:
such attitudes promote a negative attitude to Muslims. This is something
that the statistical results of the Leipzig Authoritarianism Study conrm
(Table 6.3). Extreme right-wing and anti-Muslim attitudes correlate highly
with each other, as is shown by calculating the measures of correlation.
Unsurprisingly, the dimensions of group-focused enmity and openness
to right-wing extremism correlate closely, with many respondents thereby
having negative attitudes to more than just one social group. Their group-
focused prejudices (Allport 1979) combine to form a general misanthropy
directed against various social groups (Zick et al. 2016). At the same time,
the rejection of Muslims is prominent since it (like the rejection of asylum
seekers and Sinti and Roma) is particularly widespread.
Table 6.3 provides statistical evidence of the correlation already men-
tioned between hostility to Muslims and the devaluation of asylum seekers.
Religious aliation (to an Islamic religious community) is the central point
of reference for negative and authoritarian attitudes, with many respondents
seeing a link between attitudes to refugees, asylum seekers, and Muslims.2
Devaluing Muslims unites dierent groups of people. On the one hand are
people who, due to insec urity and fear of ter rorism, distance themselves from
Islam and Muslims (Hafez & Schmidt 2015; Pickel & Yendell 2016; Yendell
& Pickel 2017). They come from the centre of society, are not necessarily
anti-democratic, but have often internalized aspects of social inequality. On
the other are people hostile to Muslims who have clearly authoritarian or
extreme right-wing attitudes. This rejection of Muslims is promoted by a
Table 6.2 Agreement with statements expressing hostility to Muslims and
devaluation of asylum seekers by sociostructural characteristics (in %)
Muslims should be
prohibited from migrating
to Germany
Most asylum seekers do
not really fear persecution
in their home country
Female 42.2 58.2
Male 46.4 65.4
A-levels 27.2 48.4
No A-levels 48.4 64.9
14–19 46.8 57.9
20–39 40.7 60.0
40–59 45.2 62.0
60+45.6 62.9
Income below 1,000 euros 47.2 61.8
Income 1,000–1,999 euros 44.2 63.5
Income 2,000+ euros 40.8 57.1
East 50.7 67.3
West 42.4 60.0
162 G. Pickel and A. Yendell
fear anchored in sections of the population of a cultural “swamping” by for-
eigners (Pickel & Pickel 2018; S. Pickel 2018), with people deeming Islamic
beliefs to be incompatible with their own culture, be it Christian or secular.
This fear is closely linked in turn to authoritarian attitudes and the desire to
solve (supposed) immigration problems by sealing o borders. Immigrants
are regarded as being essentially “dierent” and these cultural dierences
as being static, which is based on the idea of an immutable cultural essence.
Interestingly, what people cite as the reasons for rejecting Muslims are pre-
cisely their purported unwillingness to compromise, religious dogmatism,
and the propensity for violence, with the rejection of Muslims being fostered
by references to their strong religiosity and their dogmatism (Koopmans
2017). Those hostile to Muslims also often draw on fake news and conspir-
acy theories, and dramatize individual cases to justify their goals.
Data from the 2018 Leipzig Authoritarianism Study and from the other
studies cited reveal a potential problem for German society, one that gives
shape to the otherwise often empty statements about a “return of religions”,
with this return to be understood largely as a discussion about Islam and
the integration or inclusion of its members into German society and cul-
ture. Stereotypes, group-focused prejudices, and the perceived link between
Islam, Islamism, and terrorism play just as important a role in how peo-
ple position themselves as the sense of a “cultural swamping” by an Islam
deemed culturally alien (Pickel & Yendell 2016; Pollack et al. 2014). This view
of Islam is transferred to its members, making them a particularly prom-
inent and critically perceived group in the German population. The link
Table 6.3 Correlations between hostility to Muslims and authoritarianism
(measures of correlation)
Muslims make me feel
like a foreigner in my
own country
Muslims should be
prohibited from
migrating to Germany
Troublemakers should be made
very aware that they are
unwelcome in society.
.213** .219**
Important decisions in society
should be left to its leaders. .147** .213**
Tried and tested practices should
not be called into question. .174** .197**
Right-wing extremism .374** .408**
Devaluation of asylum seekers .373** .317**
Conspiracy mindset (scale) .202** .228**
Propensity for violence .134** .160**
Right-wing extremism = overall index of all 18 statements; devaluation of asylum seekers = index
from the two statements “The state should be generous when processing asylum applications”
and “Most asylum seekers do not really fear persecution in their home country”; measure of
correlation: Kendall’s Tau-b; ** = p < .01.
Religion as a Factor of Conict 163
between this perceived threat and the consequent devaluation of Muslims
in society matches the otherwise cautiously expressed idea of Islamophobia
(Halliday 1999; Helbling 2012).
Is voting for the AfD a political consequence of
authoritarianism and hostility to Muslims?
What conclusions can be drawn from these observations? If we look at the
public debates, strongly marked as they are by slogans against Muslims, the
question arises as to how these attitudes are reected in modes of behav-
iour. Voting behaviour is of particular importance for democracies, since
political power is distributed through the election of political representa-
tives. It is striking here that various parties have recently adopted positions
that emphasize security and the restriction of immigration (and of Muslim
immigration in particular).
The AfD takes a particularly clear position here. Their programme,
as well as the public statements made by their politicians, are explicitly
opposed to immigration and to what they see as the spread of “Islam” in
Germany, and they criticize multiculturalist ideas and how Germany deals
with Muslims. We can, therefore, assume that the AfD is particularly
attractive for voters who are hostile to Muslims, and that they, more than
supporters of other political parties, tend towards ideas of inequality. These
assumptions were conrmed in the Leipzig Mitte Study of 2016 (Decker
et al. 2016: 67–94; Yendell & Pickel 2017), and the picture did not change sig-
nicantly in 2018, either (Table 6.4): by far the strongest hostility to Muslims
and rejection of asylum seekers can be found among AfD voters, with 74%
thinking that Muslims should be prohibited from migrating to Germany
(compared to less than 50% of voters for other parties), and 84% agreeing
Table 6.4 Voter preferences by hostility to Muslims and devaluation of asylum
seekers (in %)
Muslims should be
prohibited from
migrating to
Germany
Asylum seekers do
not really fear
persecution in their
home country
Germany is being
dangerously swamped
by foreigners
CDU/CSU 44.1 62.1 33.7
SPD 38.8 59.0 35.8
FDP 34.4 65.6 24.7
Left 32.9 47.9 24.0
Greens 24.3 42.8 18.5
AfD 73.8 83.8 67.3
Don’t know 36.5 60.0 32.6
Explicit non-voters 52.1 64.7 42.9
Prohibit immigration as a scale with ve response categories; statements on asylum seekers and
Muslims: as a scale with four response categories.
164 G. Pickel and A. Yendell
with the statement that asylum seekers do not really fear persecution in their
home country (compared to less than two thirds of voters for other parties).
Although the proportion of those agreeing with such statements is high in
general, the gap to those voting for the AfD is nonetheless wide. They are
most closely followed by the group of non-voters, who (still) choose the exit
option over the protest option, although many have similar attitudes to AfD
voters when it comes to Muslims.
The radicalization of the AfD electorate already described in 2016 did
not abate in 2018 (Decker et al. 2016: 77–78, 93). At the opposite pole to
AfD voters are still those who vote for the Greens, who agree the least with
extreme right-wing statements, although there are still people among them
with anti-Muslim views (albeit fewer than in the other established parties)
(Figure 6.4). The scale depicting right-wing extremism makes clear the rad-
icalness of the AfD electorate (minimum value 18, maximum value 90).
As was the case in 2016 (Decker et al. 2016: 78), AfD voters are by far the
highest on this scale, and again reached a value above 52 in 2018. This also
means that the increase in the number of AfD voters has hardly altered the
structure of the party electorate since 2016, and that the party can motivate
an above-average proportion of people with extreme right-wing attitudes to
vote for the AfD. The party is thus proving to be a reservoir for anti-Muslim
voters from both the right-wing conservative and the right-wing extremist
camps.
Figure 6.4 Extreme right-wing attitudes by voter behaviour (in %)
Right-wing extremism
Average values for all statements in the Leipzig Questionnaire on Extreme Right-Wing
Attitudes (FR-LF) (min. 18 = completely disagree, max. 90 = completely agree)
Religion as a Factor of Conict 165
However, how people vote does not depend on one factor only. Especially
for the AfD, there is still a lack of experience and empirically sound knowl-
edge that would enable us to identify all the factors behind a person’s deci-
sion to vote for the party. Because the AfD is a recent phenomenon, for
example, people do not identify with the party as strongly as they perhaps
do with the established parties, even though there are initial signs of this;
also, because there is a dearth of candidates for leadership positions at fed-
eral and state level, there has not yet developed a focus on certain gures. In
this way, the issues and ideas that the AfD represents remain the same like
the voters want.
Table 6.5 depicts a binary logistic regression model that shows the inu-
ence of various indicators on voting or not voting for the AfD. It takes the
following indicators into account: the overall right-wing extremism index,
the overall conspiracy mindset index, the overall hostility to Muslims index,
the overall devaluation of asylum seekers index, the three dimensions of
recognition (as a person, as a working person, as a citizen), two statements
on trust (“In general, people can be trusted” and “You can no longer rely
on anyone today”), people’s assessment of the general economic situation in
Germany at present and in one year, a person’s own economic situation at
present and in one year, as well as age, gender, frequency of unemployment,
income, A-levels (yes/no), and region (West and East Germany).
Table 6.5 Regression models on voting for the AfD
Indicator Beta p
Right-wing extremism (scale) .057 **
Position towards asylum seekers n.s.
Hostility to Muslims .426 **
A lot of recognition as an individual n.s.
A lot of recognition as a citizen n.s.
A lot of recognition as a working person n.s.
Harsh parental punishments n.s.
Authoritarianism (scale) .324 *
Conspiracy mindset (scale) .175 **
Trust 1: general trust .367 **
Trust 2: no reliance on people n.s.
Negative assessment of general economic situation in Germany n.s.
General economic situation in Germany in one year n.s.
Negative assessment of own economic situation today .228 *
Negative assessment of own economic situation in one year n.s.
Age .018 **
Gender .537 **
Unemployment (frequency) n.s.
Income n.s.
A-levels n.s.
East/West n.s.
Nagelkerke’s R2.266
166 G. Pickel and A. Yendell
Which factors, then, explain voter preference for the AfD? The calcula-
tions show that hostility to Muslims is a central factor. Also important are
the eects of authoritarianism, the conspiracy mindset, and people’s nega-
tive assessment of their own current economic situation. A lack of trust in
fellow human beings (the central indicator for measuring (a lack of) social
capital) also encourages people to vote for the AfD. Extreme right-wing
attitudes also play a role, but the statistical eect in the multivariate model
clearly lags behind the eects of authoritarian attitudes and hostility to
Muslims. Besides age having a weak eect, it is also men who tend to vote
for the AfD. What is interesting is that objective factors of deprivation such
as low income or unemployment are not decisive in comparison to other
explanatory factors. In other words, these results suggest that social depri-
vation, fear of social demotion, and fear of being excluded from the labour
market are of only minor signicance. Voting for the AfD is instead moti-
vated more by fears of a “cultural swamping”, an ethnocentrism that has
perhaps long existed, and the massive rejection of Muslims. Also plausible
is the nding that voting for the AfD goes hand in hand with a conspiracy
mindset, since the AfD often paint the press and its fake news as an (addi-
tional) enemy.
The results of the Leipzig Authoritarianism Study of 2018 conrm cur-
rent explanatory models for why people vote for the AfD. There is much
to be said for the cultural backlash thesis, which states that people turn to
right-wing populist slogans or parties from a mixture of fear of a cultural
“swamping” and rejection of (sometimes never accepted) modern values
and changes (Inglehart 2018: 173–199; see also Inglehart & Norris 2016;
Rippl & Seipel 2018). The results of the 2018 study also support the idea that
voting for the AfD is based on cultural factors, on authoritarianism and
xenophobia, and in particular on hostility to Muslims (Bieber et al. 2018;
S. Pickel 2018). On the other hand, what proves unsound as an explanation is
the idea that modernization has left AfD voters behind in socio-structural
terms (Lengfeld 2017, 2018). The fundamental argument here is that those
socio-structurally disadvantaged sections of the population have (or at least
think they have) fallen behind in the context of accelerated modernization
and globalization. This then leads people to be defensive regarding alter-
ation and social change, and to glorify the past and their own group, the
Germans. If we look at the data a little more closely, however, then there
is actually not much to suggest that AfD voters are primarily losers in
the process of modernization. They may feel a little more often that they can
no longer keep up with the developments of globalization and are thus fall-
ing behind, but this is not the most important factor behind how they vote.
Rather, how they vote is due to a mixture of authoritarianism, political
alienation (manifested primarily in disenchantment with politicians and
political parties), and concern about a “cultural swamping”. This attitude
nds its enemy in various groups in society that are perceived as dierent,
such as Muslims. Openness to extreme right-wing positions and voting for
Religion as a Factor of Conict 167
the AfD comes about through a mixture of dierent factors: people’s mis-
trust in the established elites, fear of a “cultural swamping”, social margin-
alization and nationalism, the feeling that their own identity is devalued, and
the devaluation of social groups perceived as dierent. But AfD voters are
above all, and more often than average, both hostile to Muslims and author-
itarian. This also reveals the close proximity of AfD voters to supporters of
the Pegida movement (Vorländer et al. 2016; Yendell et al. 2016).
We will now examine what this voting behaviour means for people’s atti-
tudes to democracy. Following Lipset (1981) and Pickel and Pickel (2006),
research on political culture distinguishes between how people assess
democracy today and political legitimacy (i.e. democracy as a princi-
ple of government). There were three items in the 2018 survey: agreement
with democracy as an idea, with democracy as laid down in the consti-
tution, and with democracy as it functions in Germany (see Chapter 2,
Figures 2.14–16). The data show that dissatisfaction with democracy as an
idea is barely stronger among AfD voters than it is among voters of other
parties. However, this positive attitude changes as we approach the existing
political system. For example, dissatisfaction with the constitution and with
how democracy functions in Germany is far greater among AfD voters than
it is among voters of other parties, and even among non-voters, who already
exhibit a high level of dissatisfaction with democracy (see Table 6.6). Besides
the protest nature of this attitude, AfD voters are disproportionately often
close to an extreme right-wing position that rejects the democratic and
constitutional form of government. Since the AfD also proposes few con-
structive alternatives regarding political action, and generally resorts to
(populist) polarizations between a (homogeneous) Volk and the political
elites (or those not deemed part of the Volk), what the AfD is primarily
making the enemy here is the understanding of democracy as pluralistic
and liberal. Such an understanding of democracy is certainly a threat to the
democratic form of government (Mounk 2018).
Table 6.6 Voting for the AfD and satisfaction with democracy (in %)
Dissatisfaction with
democracy as an idea
Dissatisfaction with
democracy as laid down
in the constitution of
the Federal Republic
of Germany
Dissatisfaction with
democracy as it functions
in the Federal Republic
of Germany
CDU/CSU 6.1 15.1 34.2
SPD 5.2 19.0 32.8
Left 3.0 25.7 50.9
Greens 3.0 9.0 27.2
AfD 6.3 42.5 76.3
Non-voters 10.8 30.7 59.8
168 G. Pickel and A. Yendell
Political polarization and dealing with religious-cultural
dierences in the population
As we have seen, belonging to a Christian church shields people from nei-
ther authoritarian nor extreme right-wing attitudes. The key factor is how
the believer understands the values that she associates with Christianity.
And even that may not be decisive if the individual’s religion is strictly sep-
arated from political ideas, as is often the case in secularizing societies. For
a deeper analysis of the eects of dierent forms of religiosity, be it the ten-
dency towards religious dogmatism or prosocial values, we require further
data than those provided by the Leipzig Authoritarianism Study of 2018.
However, the data collected conrm what other surveys also show: namely,
that being a Christian alone does not immunize people against extreme right-
wing or authoritarian attitudes.
Religious aliation comes into play elsewhere – as a point of reference for
xenophobia, ethnocentrism, dissociation from others, and the perception of
a looming “cultural swamping”. And it is here in particular that Muslims,
i.e. a social group identied solely by religious aliation, are deemed (more
so in East than in West Germany) to be dangerous, unmodern, and incom-
patible with Germany (see Chapter 2, Figu res 2.17 and 2.18; Pickel & Pickel
2018; Pickel & Yendell 2016; Pollack et al. 2014). Religious aliation is to a
certain extent ethnicized and transferred to all Muslims living in Germany,
whether they have just entered the country or have now been here for two
or three generations. Other studies (Pickel & Pickel 2018) have shown that
rejection of Muslims is based less on personal experience than on charac-
teristics attributed to Muslims and group-focused prejudices. This rejection
of Muslims is fostered by authoritarianism, xenophobia, and other attitudes
from the spectrum of group-focused enmity. The media (Pickel & Yendell
2016) and sections of the academic discourse (Bleich 2011; Helbling 2012) are
also helping to make aliation to a particular religion an important factor
in current political debates. The negative assessment of Muslims oers the
opportunity to identify them as a foreign and hostile group, an opportunity
seized by a large proportion of the German population. We should not con-
fuse here the far-reaching rejection of Muslims with the legitimate criticism
of Islam or its representatives, but be careful not to overextend the argument
justifying criticism of Islam. Data from the Leipzig Authoritarianism Study
of 2018 also show that hostility to Muslims exceeds general xenophobia.
Muslims are often burdened with additional characteristics (e.g. refugees or
asylum seekers), which compounds their position as outsiders in Germany
(and other countries).
The AfD would not have been so successful had there not been a ref-
ugee debate linked to Islam: the party benets from the verbal struggle
against the “cultural swamping” caused by Muslim immigration. In fact,
this is simply a (re-)adoption of the widespread thesis of a “clash of cul-
tures” (Huntington 1996). AfD politicians thus disregard basic democratic
Religion as a Factor of Conict 169
principles of equality, while at the same time immunizing their support-
ers against criticism and arguments from other sections of society by
encouraging a conspiracy mindset. Voting for the AfD is to absorb this
rhetoric. It is above all the clear rejection of immigration, especially by
Muslims, that motivates people to vote for the AfD – a multi-causal anal-
ysis shows that this is the most important explanatory factor. The pro-
found political alienation of this electorate from the established political
system (or, rather, parties and politicians) is the necessary basis for this
development. There occurs a cultural backlash (Inglehart 2018; also dis-
cussed by Lengfeld 2017), with a return to nativism, an ethnicist national-
ism (Holtmann 2018), and authoritarianism serving to defend the country
against cultural swamping.
Earlier data from the Leipzig Mitte studies show that the radicalization
of the AfD electorate has continued; or that, despite the increase in the
number of its voters, the AfD has maintained its radicalism. Although the
AfD also wants to establish its electoral base in the conservative political
milieu, the political attitudes of its electorate indicate that it is more its
extreme right-wing rhetoric that counts, with the great majority of AfD
voters displaying ideas of inequality and attitudes that are not (or at least
not always) compatible with the basic democratic values of Germany.
Through its tactic of escalation and its strong symbolism, the AfD pursues
policies with this clientele in mind that help to polarize society, thereby
encouraging its supporters to adopt a position that sometimes crosses
the border to right-wing extremism (Pickel & Decker 2016). Some already
had such extreme right-wing beliefs; others are susceptible to such beliefs
through the rejection of certain elements of democracy. AfD voters have
a disproportionately strong tendency towards authoritarianism. The AfD
electorate is thus made up largely of authoritarian nationalists and ethno-
centric citizens from the centre of society, whose stance on democracy as
it has established itself in Germany ranges from the sceptical to the thor-
oughly negative. How far the growth of this electorate threatens democracy
in Germany is still open, as is the size of this electorate that democracy
can cope with (Levitsky & Ziblatt 2018). Polarization is seen as a particu-
lar danger to the fundamental and longstanding consensus on how to deal
with one another, and poses a threat to the social cohesion of the German
population. But what does “social cohesion” mean in a largely heterogene-
ous and individualized society? It is perhaps above all dealing sensibly with
other people and their opinions, as well as accepting social pluralism. And,
despite all the alarming results presented here, it is important to remem-
ber that the majority of the German population are not hostile to Muslims
(almost 60% reject a prohibition on Muslim immigration) and can let other
people live their lives (most recently, SVR 2018). It is important to agree
on what the central values of a democracy are, and they should certainly
include rejecting the exclusion of certain social groups and accepting an
essentially pluralistic society.
170 G. Pickel and A. Yendell
Notes
1 Due to the small number of cases, it is not possible to gain reliable insights for
religious groups other than Christians and those without a religion.
2 Unfortunately, it was not possible to survey another central point of attack
that the extreme right-wing spectrum makes on democratic and pluralistic
ideas of society – namely, anti-genderism, which is closely linked to group-
focused prejudices.
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DOI: 10.4324/9781003218616-7
Authoritarian Dynamics and
Social Conicts
The Leipzig Authoritarianism
Studies
Oliver Decker, Johannes Kiess, and
Elmar Brähler
7
The Leipzig Authoritarianism Studies working group has been surveying
political attitudes in Germany since 2002. In this book, we have reected on
the theoretical ideas and the ndings up to 2018, and we now wish to provide
an outlook of what from our point of view these ndings imply, with regard
to political developments not only in Germany, but also beyond.
What is unique about our investigations: continuous
study of extreme right-wing attitudes
This series of investigations was prompted by an unprecedented wave of
right-wing extremist attacks in un ied Germany in the 1990s. There was ver y
little political reaction initially, the then CDU/FDP (Christian Democratic
Union and Free Democratic Party of Germany) Federal Government
of Chancellor Helmut Kohl actively denying that there was a right-wing
extremist background to the attacks. For example, the Ministry for Family
and Youth Aairs, then led by Angela Merkel, launched a programme in
response to the attacks, but all its activities were initiatives against violence
only, while it ignored the political motivation behind the attacks. At the
same time, Chancellor Kohl had been repeating the mantra “Germany is
not a country of immigration” since his government policy statement of
1989. Hence, it can be assumed in retrospect that there was tacit agreement,
if not with the violence, then with the ideological goals of the xenophobic
attacks. The rst visible reaction to right-wing extremism was the establish-
ment of the Amadeu Antonio Foundation in 1998, named after a refugee
from Angola who had been murdered in Eberswalde in eastern Germany
in 1990. Since then, the foundation has documented more than 200 murders
committed by right-wing extremists.1
The foundation was established as a result of private commitment, and
was by no means an expression of a developing awareness of the dangers
of right-wing extremism among the political elites. Thus, resistance to the
extreme right formed initially in civil society. At the same time, there was
an upsurge of scholarly research on the threat to democracy, including
174 O. Decker, J. Kiess, and E. Brähler
social-psychological research in Germany. This scholarly research com-
prised two series of studies, each unique in terms of the international com-
parison that they made. On the one hand, these studies documented the
spread of ideologies of inequality among the population, while on the other
seeking to determine the causes for this threat to democracy. The initial
question that they sought to address can be summed up as follows: How
widely did the general population share ideologies of inequality?
After a number of smaller studies in the 1990s, the Bielefeld social-
psychologist Wilhelm Heitmeyer (2002) launched the study series “German
Conditions” (Deutsche Zustände) in 2001 to focus on the spread of group-
related prejudices – or, to use Heitmeyer’s phrase, group-focused enmity
(gruppenbezogene Menschenfeindlichkeit). Just a year later, in 2002, we also
began our study of right-wing extremist and authoritarian attitudes in
Germany (Decker, Niedermayer & Brähler 2003). While Heitmeyer’s series
of annual studies was designed to last for ten years and concluded in 2011
(Heitmeyer 2012), our longitudinal, biannual study continues to this day.
Both study series – Heitmeyer’s and our own – made use of representative
surveys based on standardized questionnaires. However, while Heitmeyer’s
was oriented more toward models of social cognition, assuming as it did
that various forms of group-focused enmity were caused primarily by inter-
group processes, ours looks more closely at the connection between social
contradictions and psychological reactions to them. Therefore, we use the
questionnaire on right-wing extremist attitudes to record not only group-
related devaluations of other people (captured in our questionnaire by the
dimensions of anti-Semitism, xenophobia, and social-Darwinism), but also
people’s desire for authoritarian structures in society and their idealization
of Nazi Germany (captured by the following dimensions: advocacy of a
right-wing authoritarian dictatorship, chauvinism, and the trivialization of
Nazi crimes; see Chapter 2).
To take account of what we consider to be the most important factor of
inuence, we also included from the beginning a questionnaire on author-
itarian orientation. It is this particular focus on the political level of the
extreme right-wing worldview that allows us to develop a comprehen-
sive view of the phenomenon, and that makes our study series unique in
Germany and beyond: to our knowledge, there are as yet no similar stud-
ies (Kiess & Decker 2016). Although phenomena such as historical revi-
sionism and anti-pluralist, pro-dictatorship attitudes are also prevalent in
other societies, the division of research that is common internationally into
(social-psychological) research on prejudice on the one hand, and research
(mainly in political science) on authoritarianism on the other, means in our
view that central elements of authoritarian dynamics in modern contempo-
rary societies are not captured adequately.
Both study series, Heitmeyer’s and our own, are able to provide an unam-
biguous answer to the initial question: from the outset, a key nding was
how widespread and how consistent anti-democratic and authoritarian
Authoritarian Dynamics and Social Conicts 175
attitudes have been over the years among large segments of the popula-
tion. Xenophobia, it became clear, was the gateway to right-wing extrem-
ism; almost every second person shared this core element of right-wing
extremism (i.e. xenophobia) in one way or another. Moreover, in socio-
demographic and political terms, prejudice and elements of right-wing
extremist ideology are prevalent at the center of society, rather than at its
fringes. It was for this reason that until 2016 we called our series the Leipzig
“Center” Study. In doing so, we drew on the ideas of Seymond Lipset (Lipset
1959) and Theodor Geiger (Geiger 1930; Decker & Brähler 2016), who were
able to show that NSDAP voters in the 1920s and 1930s did not develop their
political orientation from the social margins, but rather migrated from par-
ties of the “center” (cf. Falter 1981). The paradoxical notion of a “right-wing
extremism of the center” indicates that the threat to democracy even in the
new century is not limited to the fringes of society, as may be suggested by
the term “extremism” and by the state-sanctioned horseshoe theory, which
postulates the idea that there is an extremism-resistant “center” and equiv-
alent dangers at the fringes. Heitmeyer’s title was also intended to empha-
size the scandalous normality of prejudice and right-wing extremism. When
it came to the details and analyses of such extremism, however, our study
diered signicantly to Heitmeyer’s.
Our approach goes well beyond the social-cognitive conception in con-
temporary social psychology in terms not only of its underlying precept
(right-wing extremism of the center rather than group-focused enmity), but
also of its theoretical orientation. Focusing much more on the causes of
such phenomena, our approach has given increasing weight to the concept
of authoritarianism. This can be seen in the present publication, where
we have also highlighted our focus on authoritarian dynamics in the title.
Moreover, we distinguish between the notion of authoritarian dynam-
ics and that of authoritarian syndromes, the former being used to denote
social conditions, and the latter, individual responses to socialization. This
distinction is obviously based on the classical studies of the authoritar-
ian character, which, using the psychoanalytic social psychology of Erich
Fromm, Theodor Adorno, and Else Frenkel-Brunswik, gauged the impact
on the individual of the social relations of power and violence (Fromm
1936; Adorno et al. 1950). Like these early studies on authoritarianism, we
also use focus groups and in-depth methods in addition to representative
surveys. For this purpose, we regularly conduct group discussions in vari-
ous projects and analyze these discussions using depth-hermeneutic meth-
ods (e.g. Decker et al. 2008). Again in our view, this combination of methods
allows for analyses of contemporary modern society that are much more
subtle.
With a series of studies that has been conducted for almost 20 years, it
is perhaps not surprising that the research design should undergo constant
development in response to ndings made and to additional group discus-
sion studies. The research results presented in this book show how much,
176 O. Decker, J. Kiess, and E. Brähler
for example, the conspiracy mindset is related to authoritarian attitudes,
and it therefore occupies a special position in the authoritarian syndrome.
Scholarly attention has focused increasingly in recent years on an individ-
ual authoritarian need (albeit, one that is shared by many), this focus being
the result especially of recent social and political developments, and the
increasing global impact of conspiracy narratives during the COVID-19
pandemic. Like xenophobia and anti-Semitism, the conspiracy mindset
can, on account of its prevalence, serve as a hinge or code among anti-
democratic milieus that primarily share a rejection of liberal and pluralis-
tic society. This and other ndings of the Leipzig Authoritarianism Studies
have relevance beyond the German context, as we would now like to explain
in the remainder of this conclusion.
The classical concept of authoritarianism:
potentials for international research
The concept of authoritarianism has recently undergone three reductions
in the way that it has been perceived and adopted, these reductions having
signicant implications for the analytical strength of the concept. First,
following Bob Altemeyer (Altemeyer 1981), the reduction to three dimen-
sions of authoritarianism; second, the reduction to a social-cognitive
understanding of prejudice that abandons the insights on socialization
provided by psychoanalysis (Sibley & Duckitt 2008). Both reductions
result in the complete concealment of the context both of intergroup
conict and of the emergence of the need for group identity. Third, the
sociological literature understands authoritarianism today primarily as
a form of domination, rather than as a need, one whose emergence may
well be shaped by society and certainly by the prevailing violence and
contradictions within it, but which cannot be understood without taking
account of the subject’s own logic. One example of this reduction is the
understanding developed in the wake of Stuart Hall’s work (Hall 1982;
Demirović 2018; Heitmeyer 2018) of authoritarianism as a neo-liberal
strategy of crisis management.
The Leipzig Authoritarianism Studies attempt to address these decits
by using both a psychoanalytical understanding of subjectivation, and a
critical-theoretical understanding of social change. The latter characterizes
continuous social change in modern society in terms of existing antago-
nisms, each of which derives from present relations of power and author-
ity, but equally in terms of historically overarching (though not ahistorical)
fault lines of processes of emancipation from natural relations. The two
central authors of Critical Theory, Max Horkheimer and Theodor Adorno,
summed up this perspective in the double denition of resentment, and
especially of anti-Semitism, in the well-known formulation: the “rancor
of the dominated subjects of the domination of nature” (Horkheimer &
Adorno 1944, 238).
Authoritarian Dynamics and Social Conicts 177
Exemplary for this research, as well as for the relevance of our empirical
results for authoritarianism research outside of Germany, can be the dynam-
ics of a “secondary authoritarianism” that we have described elsewhere
(Decker 2019). The prevailing image within the public and scholarly debate
of authoritarian movements as comprising a “leader” obscures the view of
authoritarian social dynamics that are entirely devoid of personal leaders.
In his Group Psychology and the Analysis of the Ego (Massenpsychologie und
Ich-Analyse, Freud 1921), Freud described how groups or masses are consti-
tuted as the result of communal processes of identication; in the terminol-
ogy of psychoanalysis, authority in the psychic structure of group members
takes on the character of an ideal that replaces the ego.
As an ego ideal, this leader performs three functions. First, it allows
for the binding of anxieties through participation in fantastic greatness
and power; by submitting to authority, all group members can share in
this power. Authority thereby draws in patriarchal societies on the father
of early childhood: the violence of the father forces children to accept his
rules, and they are then compensated for their obedience with the prospect
of sharing in his power. Second, this early experience of the father includes
aggression and hatred for the father precisely because of the violence expe-
rienced: it is only the threat, or the actual experience, of violence that gives
recognition to the reality of the paternal law and turns the father into the
ideal. Third, the authoritarian mass oers a simple solution to these acts of
aggression: they can be directed from the group at those who do not belong
to the group.
This description has some justication, and is also supported empir-
ically by social-cognitive research on inter- and intra-group relations
(Stellmacher & Petzel 2005). What often becomes lost, however, is the
“secondary mass” also described by Freud, i.e. that group which is indeed
produced by identication with a common ideal – through being tied not
to a person, however, but to (for example) a theory or ideology. In post-
Nazi Germany, the economy assumed the position of such an idealized
authority, one that can secure a person’s self-worth if she identies with it
and that may require submission to its demands, as a “narcissistic lling”
(Decker et al. 2013). It substituted for the lost Herrenmenschen ideology
as much as it suppressed guilt and shame for the war of aggression and
extermination waged by Germans.
This has repercussions to this day: it was not during the 2015 movement
of refugees that xenophobia and anti-Semitism rose to alarming levels in
Germany, but in 2012, at the height of the global economic crisis (at a time
when the situation in Germany had in fact already improved, but when
the crisis still loomed and posed a threat in Europe and globally; see Kiess
& Lahusen 2018). When the idealized object is threatened, authoritarian
resentment is at its strongest. This means that authority depends much more
on the needs of the group than on the seductive skills of the fascist propa-
gandist. What is more, we can only understand authoritarian dynamics in
178 O. Decker, J. Kiess, and E. Brähler
the rst place if we take into account the needs of individuals, which can be
manipulated, put into service, and used for social conict. What is crucial
for understanding authoritarian needs is the question of the social genesis of
desires and wounded subjectivity. It is precisely this question that the anal-
ysis of contemporary society and its authoritarian dynamics must address.
This nding is relevant beyond Germany for two reasons. First, we must
reckon with an increasing authoritarian dynamic even when there seems
to be no personal authority. In general, the function of authority seems to
have changed, this ideal following less of an identication with the father
(as it was still described at the beginning of the 20th century), and more a
fusion with an all-powerful (mother) gure. This change is also of great rele-
vance for the societal structure. While the father authority oers power and
prosthetic security, it also demands that its claims in reality be recognized.
Only, the actual father no longer has this prominent position in the family.
This development cannot pass the gure of authority by without leaving a
trace; the character of the leader is also no longer the same as it was at the
beginning of the 20th century. Not only has the father lost his legal and
economic supremacy (Federn 1919; Mitscherlich 1969), the function of the
leader in the authoritarian group has also changed with the demise of the
Oedipus complex. Not that authority has disappeared completely – but it
is now no longer the ambivalent father-imago that is re-constituted by the
group through identication.
This does not mean that the need for authority has disappeared, and nor
has the authoritarian dynamic with its acts of aggression toward “others”.
But even in groups where a leader is to be found – such as Trump, for
example – it is no longer the leader but the group itself that serves as
wish-fullment and prosthetic security: authority is represented no longer
by a paternal power in which the group participates, but exclusively by the
group itself. Leo Löwenthal already showed in his analysis of fascist propa-
gandists that it is not so much that such propagandists seduce the audience
as that they read the audience’s wishes from their eyes and deliver what
they want to hear (Löwenthal 1949). He already characterized the essential
element of the fascist propaganda of the rst half of the 20th century as
ambiguous and unserious. This presupposes something other than a father
proclaiming his own law. Moreover, this high sensitivity to the moods of
the audience can be found in today’s agitators, whose success depends
even more on their own need for recognition from the group in front of
them. They are much more part of the group and the group illusion. For,
fusion in the group is now intended to heal the narcissistic wound so that
there is no need to acknowledge the oending reality (Chasseguet-Smirgel
1975). This suggests that it is not about the father, but about an earlier love
object whose power is to be reinstated. In this respect, the importance of
the person Donald J. Trump (or other right-wing populist politicians such
as Vladimir Putin, Boris Johnson, and Jair Bolsonaro) is clearly overesti-
mated, but the authoritarian dynamics within the United States and other
Authoritarian Dynamics and Social Conicts 179
societies are underestimated to at least the same extent. Identication with
authority in terms of a mother bond serves to empower thought and deny
reality (Chasseguet-Smirgel 1975). This aspect is especially important for
understanding the conspiracy mindset and superstition as a component of
the authoritarian syndrome.
The second reason why this nding is relevant beyond Germany is that the
idealization of economic strength in Germany sheds light on the signicance
of capitalist modes of production in general. After all, economics could only
have acquired such a signicant function in postwar Germany because the
economic sector had already had such a function. Marx pointed out that
private wealth can only be accumulated because it has been extracted from
elsewhere; in other words, wealth is based on a fraud that permanently leads
to conict in societies with a capitalist mode of production (Marx 1867).
The fact that the cause of the conict is hidden partly because this expro-
priation of surplus value also contradicts the ideological self-understanding
of bourgeois society as a system that comprises market subjects, equal in
rights and acting under free and fair conditions. Therefore, according to
Marx, people lead themselves up the garden path and establish a fetish in
the middle of society. Marx’s explanation is perspicacious on the one hand.
On the other, though, despite all the religious metaphors in his writings,
Marx ignored the fact that there is a close relationship between religion and
capitalist commodity production. Why the compulsion not only to constant
accumulation, but also and especially to permanent growth?
The sociologist Max Weber (Weber 1904/1905) saw this more clearly
when he exposed the motive behind capitalist accumulation. The communal
working of nature by humans has always had the goal of satisfying sensual-
bodily needs through providing the means for survival. But the ever fur-
ther renement of this activity, i.e. the working of nature, also had another
drive that points beyond the moment of the mere satisfaction of needs in
the here and now. One could also say: by always rening the means of pro-
duction and always using the forces of nature ever more comprehensively,
the species still pursues the desire to step out of the mere compulsion of
nature, not only to satisfy needs, but to eliminate scarcity in the long run.
Hence, the dread of stagnant growth, which threatens not only the status
quo, but also capitalism’s specic promise of salvation. If Weber is correct,
then this thesis will not only apply in Germany, but also (in part) decide on
the legitimacy of the political system in other societies.
It is here that the points mentioned separately come together. The author-
ity of the capitalist economy derives its power from the promise of salva-
tion. The absolute wealth that is available to individuals places the entire
range of commodities at the service of the satisfaction of needs – or, in terms
of drive psychology, promises the unrestricted satisfaction of all sensual-
bodily needs (Deutschmann 1999). And, even if the circle of persons who
have these means at their disposal must remain limited, the unfolding of the
productive forces has been conated with the promise to eliminate suering
180 O. Decker, J. Kiess, and E. Brähler
and death since the beginning of capitalist commodity production. In this
respect, the shift of the authoritarian dynamic can also be described in terms
of psychodynamics. Instead of acknowledging the reality of the paternal
law, the group’s fantasy of omnipotence helps to deny the mortifying reality,
which is a mystical-political conviction (Chasseguet-Smirgel 1975, 90). Not
only those who directly reveal their authoritarian need through their ideol-
ogy are aected by an authoritarian dynamic; the dynamic must also leave
its mark elsewhere. If this understanding of the authoritarian dynamic is
correct, then we must concede that its eect can also be observed in groups
that pursue emancipatory goals, but operate in the reality of the group ideal
(Pechriggl 2013).
Note
1 https://www.amadeu-antonio-stiftung.de/todesopfer-rechter-gewalt/
(accessed 25 August 2021).
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adapted (political syndrome) 91, 95–96,
129
Adorno, Theodor W. 16, 27, 106n1, 129,
175, 176
advanced capitalism 111
age structure and extreme right-wing
attitudes 57, 58
aggression see authoritarian aggression
Akbulut, Gökay 150n3
Altemeyer, Bob 176
Alternative für Deutschland (Alternative
for Germany, AfD) 3, 8, 12, 93,
96–101, 110, 155; and closed conven-
tionalists 98, 104; and conformists
103; and economic situation of peo-
ple 20; ideological reorientation of 9;
ordoliberal market radicalism 14;
political attitudes 59; radicalization
of electorate 164, 169; and refugees
issue 9; regression models on voting
for 165; right-wing authoritarian
131, 146; support for 154–170; voter
preference for 166; voting for, and
satisfaction with democracy 167;
voting for, as consequence of author-
itarianism 163–167; voting for, as
consequence of hostility to Muslims
163–167
Amadeu Antonio Foundation 1, 173
ambivalents (political syndrome) 91,
95–99
ambivalent syndrome 90–104
Anglo-American neoliberalism 10
anti-Americanism 133
anti-democratic attitudes 16, 56, 59, 75,
135
anti-Jewishness see anti-Semitism
anti-Judaism see anti-Semitism
anti-Semitic attitudes: anti-Semitism
in indirect communication 138–140;
facets of worldview 136–140; in
Germany 127–150; traditional
anti-Semitism 136–138
anti-Semitism 11–12, 47, 48, 52–53, 53,
72, 150n1; authoritarian dynamic
fostering 150; and authoritarianism
146 –148; in communication latency
42, 92, 99, 132–136; and conspiracy
mentality 145; crimes 127, 132, 134,
140, 149; forms of 132–136; forms of
communication of 134; high preva-
lence of 148–149; in indirect commu-
nication 135, 138–140, 145; as part
of authoritarian syndrome 128–132;
primary 132–136, 138; as a problem
across society 141–146; question-
naire to measure 134; secondary
132–136; simultaneous decline since
2002 149; traditional 98, 132–133,
136–138; and violence 149; see also
Jews
antiziganism 38, 66, 67, 68, 69, 74–75
Aristotle 5
articial centre 14
asylum compromise 1
asylum seekers 3, 8, 38–39; devaluation
in Germany 67–69, 69, 70, 75, 163;
devaluation of, by sociostructural
characteristics 161
authoritarian aggression 90–91, 93,
95–98, 100, 103–104, 106, 111, 130,
136, 146
Index
Note: Page references in italics denotes gures, in bold denotes tables and
with “n” denotes endnotes.
Index 183
authoritarian attitudes 21, 104, 131,
155–156, 161–162, 166, 168, 174; and
conspiracy mindset 176; and identity
156; patterns, by denomination 157;
and religious aliation 156, 159
authoritarian dynamics 26, 29; and
authoritarian syndrome 87; and
economy 21; fostering anti-Semitism
150; and modern societies 19–24; and
social conicts 173–180
authoritarianism 154–156; agreement
or disagreement in dimensions of 82;
and anti-Semitism 146 –148; in barter
society 25–31; and Berkeley Group 17;
classical concept of 176 –180; corre-
lation between anti-Semitism and
elements of 147; correlations between
hostility to Muslims and 162; East-
West comparison 83; empirical
research on 25–26; halved 25, 106;
individual side 26; institutions 114;
and international research 176 –180;
and manifest anti-Semitism 145; rec-
ognition in correlation with 120–121,
121; scale 84–85, 85; secondary 22,
25, 106, 123, 177; social side 26; voting
for AfD and political consequence
of 163–167; see also authoritarian
dynamics
The Authoritarian Personality
(Adorno) 16
authoritarian populism 10, 106;
Demirović on 21
authoritarians 16, 17, 26–27, 91, 99–104
authoritarian statehood 110 –124, 144, 146
authoritarian subservience 90–91, 93,
95, 98, 105, 111
authoritarian syndrome 26–29, 90–106,
127–128, 131, 136, 141, 146–148, 150;
anti-Semitism as part of 128–132; and
authoritarian dynamic 87; conspir-
acy mindset distribution 82–84, 83;
and democratic socialization 89;
elements of 81–90, 86, 88, 89, 97; and
hostility to Muslims 67; and new-
right functional elite 102; see also
authoritarianism
Authority and the Family (Horkheimer) 14
barter society, authoritarianism in
25–31
Basic Law 1, 68
Bauman, Zygmunt 129
Bergmann, Werner 133, 150n5
Berkeley Group 16–17
Bloch, Ernst 14
Bolsonaro, Jair 178
borderless young (political syndrome)
91, 96–97
Botsch, Gideon 12
Brahler, E. 3
Brandt, Willy 6
Brecht, Bertolt 129
Bundestag 1, 59, 104, 142
Calvinism 7, 15
capitalism 7, 25, 179; advanced 111;
authoritarian 21; nancial 11; exibi-
lized 225; Lessenich on 24; Marcuse
on 21; modern 24; new 225; and
Protestantism 7
CDU/CSU (Christian Democratic
Union) 7, 9, 59, 93, 96, 97,
100 –101
centre of society: fascism 4–5; and
Federal Republic of Germany 6;
Geiger views on 4; Gumbrecht views
on 6; Lipset views on 4–5; right-
wing extremism at 3–8; theorists of
extremism on 5
chauvinism 2, 3, 39, 45–46, 46, 50–52,
51, 72
Christianity 156; aliation to, as
immunizing factor 156 –159; extreme
right-wing attitudes 157; group-
focused enmity by denomination 157;
party preference by denomination
159; patterns of authoritarian
attitudes by denomination 157;
and propensity for violence by
denomination 157
“Christian Occident” 154
Christians 156, 158, 170n1
“clash of cultures” 168
closed conventionalists 91, 97–98,
103–104
cluster calculation 91
cognitive psychology 28, 128
Cologne Journal for Sociology and
Social Psychology (Lengfeld) 19
communication latency: anti-Semitism
in 42, 92, 99, 133; and indirect com-
munication 132–136
conservatives 91, 92–93
conspiracy mindset 16, 20, 29, 39,
95–98, 100, 102–104, 106, 120–121,
184 Index
123, 166, 169, 176, 179; recognition in
correlation with 121
constitutional democracy 74, 100
conventionalism 93, 97, 98, 111, 146
COVID-19 pandemic 176
crimes: anti-Semitic 127, 132, 134, 140,
149; hate 31n4, 132; politically
motivated 31n4, 55; violent 31n4
Critical Theory 22, 176
cultural backlash 105, 166, 169
cultural swamping 162, 166 –169
Dahmer, Helmut 113
Degenhardt, Franz Josef 6
Demirović, Alexander 21
democracy 26, 92; acceptance in East
Germany 62, 62–64, 63; acceptance
in Germany 62, 62–64, 63, 79; accept-
ance in West Germany 62, 62–64, 63;
attitude to 74; central values of 169;
constitutional 74, 100; and devalua-
tion of others 80–81; and inequality
in granting of fundamental rights
79–80; plural 11, 79, 95, 100, 155;
threat to 98–99, 110; voting for AfD
and satisfaction with 167
democratic socialization 89
democratic syndrome 90–104
democrats 91, 92–95
Der Stürmer 130
Deutsche Zustände (Conditions in
Germ any) 66
devaluation: of asylum seekers 67–69,
69, 70, 75, 163; of asylum seekers by
sociostructural characteristics 161
dictatorship approval 101–102, 174
Die Abstiegsgesellschaft (Nachtwey) 20
domination 16; and authority 29; and
cultural character 19
Dubiel, Helmut 19, 111
Durkheim, Emile 15
East Germany 3; advocacy of right-
wing authoritarian dictatorship
44–45, 45, 50, 51; anti-Semitism 47,
48, 52–53, 53; chauvinism 45–46,
46, 50–52, 51; closed and mani-
fest extreme right-wing attitudes
by dimension in 56; democracy
acceptance in 62, 62–64, 63; extreme
right-wing attitudes in 41; social
Darwinism 48, 49, 53, 54; trivializa-
tion of National Socialism 48–50, 49,
53, 54; xenophobia 46–47, 47, 52, 52;
see also Germany
Ebrecht, Angelika 26–27
economy: and authoritarian dynamic
21; in Nazi Germany 25; as second-
ary authoritarianism 22
education: and authoritarianism 86;
and extreme right-wing attitudes 56,
57; recognition as a working person
according to level of 118; recognition
as citizen according to 117; recogni-
tion as person according to 117
Elias, Norbert 15
Erb, Rainer 133, 150n5
European General Data Protection
Regulation (EU-GDPR) 41
experience of recognition see
recognition
extreme right-wing attitudes: changes
between 2002 to 2018 in Germany
50–55, 73; continuous study of
173 –176; dened 38; by dimension
among party voters 60; dimensions
42, 44–50, 45–49; in East Germany
41; factors inuencing 121–123; in
Germany in 2018 42–50, 72–73; latent
agreement 44; Leipzig Questionnaire
on Extreme Right-Wing Attitudes
38–39; manifest agreement 44; and
propensity for violence by denom-
ination 157; and sociodemogra-
phy 55–62; by voter behaviour
164; in West Germany 41; see also
authoritarianism
extremism 156, 175; left-wing 2, 14,
26, 90; right-wing see right-wing
extremism
Falter, Jurgen 4–5
fascism 4–5, 14, 127; Geiger on
strengthening of 19; psychology of 15
FDP (Free Democratic Party) 59, 94, 96
Foucault, Michel 21, 22
Frankfurt Institute for Social Research
17, 132
Frenkel-Brunswik, Elke 16, 175
Freud, Sigmund 15, 129, 177; on
primary masses 22; socialization
theory 15–16
Fromm, Erich 14, 16–18, 27, 90, 111, 175
Funke, Manuel 23
Gauland, Alexander 9, 11–12, 20
Geiger, Theodor 4, 14, 175; on strength-
ening of fascism 19
gender: and anti-Semitism 141, 146–147;
and extreme right-wing attitudes 56, 57
Index 185
“German Conditions” (De utsche
Zustä nd e) 174
“German Economic Miracle”
(Deutsche Wirtschaftswunder) 22
Germany: anti-Semitic attitudes in
127–150; changes in extreme right-
wing attitudes between 2002 to 2018
50–55; democracy acceptance in 62,
62–64, 63; and devaluation of others
in democracy 80–81; economic
insularity 50; extreme right-wing atti-
tudes in 2018 42–50; high prevalence
of anti-Semitism in 148–149; hostility
to Muslims 66, 66–67, 67
governmentality 22–23
Greens 10, 93–94, 96–97, 100, 159, 163,
164, 167
group-focused enmity 175; by denomi-
nation 157
Group Psychology and the Analysis of
the Ego (Massenpsychologie und
Ich-Analyse) (Freud) 177
“guilt-deecting anti-Semitism” 132
Gumbrecht, Hans Ulrich 6
Hahn, André 150n3
Hall, Stuart 10, 176
halved authoritarianism 25, 106
Hans Böckler Foundation 106
“Hartz IV” reforms 112 , 118
hate crimes 31n4, 132
Heitmeyer, Wilhelm 21, 27, 66, 174
Herrenmenschen ideology 177
Hocke, Bjorn 11, 13
“homogeneous Volk” 11
Honneth, Axel 29–31, 114, 121, 147
Horkheimer, Max 14–15, 16, 18, 90, 112,
176; on economy and authoritarian
dynamic 21
hostility to Muslims 74, 76n2, 154 –170;
among German population 159–163;
and authoritarian syndrome 67;
Germany 66, 66–67, 67; see also
Muslims
hyperadminstrative state 29
idea of democracy 12, 62, 64, 79; see
also democracy
Imho, Roland 135
income group: recognition as a citizen
according to 119; recognition as a
working person according to 120
indirect communication: anti-
Semitism in 133–135, 135, 138–140,
141–146; authoritarianism in 14 5;
communication latency and 132–136;
and economic situation 142; and
latent anti-Semitism in 139; and
parents’ parental behaviour 144;
and propensity for violence 146; and
sociodemography 141; and spheres of
recognition 145; and unemployment
142; and voting behaviour 14 3
industrial citizenship 113
Islam 154, 159, 161–163, 168; see also
Muslims
Islamophobia 76n2, 163; see also
hostility to Muslims; Muslims
Jews 100, 102, 104, 127–139, 136, 137,
144, 150n1; devaluation and exclusion
of 127, 138, 144; Germans view on
47; as greedy 138; hostility against
104, 150n1; and National Socialist
ideology 127; prejudice against 128;
violence against 127, 132; see also
anti-Semitism
Johnson, Boris 178
Kermani, Navid 1
Klug, Brian 129, 134
Kohl, Helmut 173
Kracauer, Siegfried 14
latency: dened 150n2; psychological
150n5; social 150n5
latent agreement, in extreme right-
wing attitudes 44, 73
latent anti-Semitism in indirect
communication 139
Left 93–94, 96–100, 150n3, 158, 159,
163, 167
left-wing extremism 2, 14, 26, 90
Leipzig Authoritarianism Study 2018
114, 123, 148, 156, 173–180; accept-
ance and propensity for violence
70–72, 71; antiziganism 66, 67, 68,
69; asylum seekers 67–69, 69, 70;
hostility to Muslims 66, 66–67, 67;
methodology and sample 38–41, 40;
overview 38; results of 42–62; Sinti
and Roma, rejection of 66, 67, 68, 69;
study of extreme right-wing attitudes
173 –176; unique about investigations
173 –176
Leipzig Mitte Studies 163, 169
Leipzig Questionnaire on Extreme
Right-Wing Attitudes 38–39, 92, 135,
140; agreement at the level of item
43–44; answer categories used in 42;
186 Index
extreme right-wing attitudes dimen-
sions 42, 44–50, 45–49
Lengfeld, Holger 19–20
Lessenich, Stephan 24
Levinson, Daniel J. 16
Lipset, Seymond 167, 175
Lipset, Seymour 4
Löwenthal, Leo 13, 32n8, 178
Lucke, Bernd 9
manifest agreement: authoritarian
aggression 82, 82; and authori-
tarianism 145; decline in 149; and
economic situation 142; in extreme
right-wing attitudes 44, 55, 73; and
frequency of unemployment 142; in
indirect communication 139, 140,
141; and parents’ parental behaviour
144; and propensity for violence 146;
and spheres of recognition 145; and
voting behaviour 143
Mann, Heinrich 17
Marcuse, Herbert 14, 16, 18, 90; on
capitalism 21
Margalit, Avishai 114
Marshall, Thomas H. 113 –114
Marx, Karl 15, 179
Marxism 15
Menz, Wolfgang 106
Merkel, Angela 173
Michels, Robert 129
Minima Moralia (Adorno) 129
Möllemann, Jürgen 140
Muller, J.-W. 13–14
Muslims 92; agreement with statements
expressing hostility to 161; and
authoritarianism 162; hostility to,
among German population 159–163;
immigration 67, 155, 159–160, 163,
168–169; voter preferences by hos-
tility to 163; voting for AfD, and
hostility to 163–167; see also Islam
Nachtwey, Oliver 20
Nationaldemokratische Partei
Deutschland (National Democratic
Party Germany, NPD) 3, 9, 61, 96, 98,
100, 159
nationalism 57, 130, 167; ethnicist 169
National Socialism 5–6, 10, 14, 98–99,
135; trivialization of 38–39, 42, 48–50,
49, 53, 54, 58, 72–73, 127
National Socialist Underground 1
Nationals-Socialist German Workers’
Party (NSDAP) 4, 5, 6, 11, 15, 110, 175
Nazism see National Socialism
neo-Nazi 2, 31n3
new-right functional elite 91, 98,
100 –101
Nicomachean Ethics (Aristotle) 5
Nies, Sarah 106
Nietzsche, Friedrich 15
NPD (National Democratic Party
Germany) 3, 9, 61, 96, 98, 100, 159
NSDAP (National-Socialistic German
Workers’ Party) 4, 5, 6, 11, 15, 110, 175
occupational groups, and extreme
right-wing attitudes 58, 58–59
Oedipus complex 178
Oesterreich, Detlef 84
Orban, Viktor 10
organizational violence 112
“paper-and-pencil” approach 39
paranoid conformists 91, 96, 102–103
patriarchal society 16–17
Pau, Petra 150n3
performers 91, 93–94
Petri, Frauke 9
Pew Research Centre 156
Piaget, Jean 128
Pickel, G. 167
Pickel, S. 167
plural democracy 11, 79, 95, 100, 155
political deprivation 64, 74
politically motivated crimes 31n4, 55
political polarization 168–169
political syndromes 91, 105
population: hostility to Muslims among
159–163; and political polarization
168–169; political syndromes in 91;
religious-cultural dierences in
168–169
populism 8–14, 156; authoritarian 10,
21, 106; core attitude of 155; dened
10; driven by right-wing 10; overview
10; research on 155; right-wing 9–10,
12–13, 154
Populism Barometer 10–11
post-industrial society 116
Postone, Moshe 131
Poulantzas, Nicos 113
prejudice 93–94, 128, 144, 155, 174–
176; group-focused 156, 161–162,
168, 170n2, 174; against Jews 128;
Index 187
traditional 96; see also anti-Semitism;
Jews
primary anti-Semitism 132–136, 138
Pro Asyl 1
“Programme of Action against
Aggression and Violence, AgAG”
31n3
Protestantism 7, 15
psychic structure 18, 177
psychoanalysis 15, 17, 90, 176–177
psychological latency 150n5; see also
latency
psychological totalitarianism 27
Putin, Vladimir 178
Ranc, Julijana 128, 133
recognition 29–31; and authoritarian
statehood 110 –124; as a citizen 116,
118, 121–122, 123, 124n2, 144; as a
citizen according to education 117; as
a citizen according to income group
119; in correlation with authoritar-
ianism 120–121, 121; in correlation
with conspiracy mindset 120–121; in
correlation with right-wing extrem-
ism 120–121; factors of 115; lack of
recognition in East and West 116;
and manifest traditional anti-Sem-
itism 14 5; as person according to
education 117; as a person according
to household income 119; as work-
ing person according to education
118; as working person according to
income group 120
refugees: crisis 159; as political issue for
AfD 9; see also asylum seekers
Reichspogromnacht 127
religion 154 –156; and conict in
relation to right-wing extremism
154–170; and cultural dierences
168–169; religious aliation 39, 61,
154–159, 161, 168; see also Islam
Research and Information Centre on
Anti-Semitism (RIAS) 132
reticence 16, 29
right-wing authoritarian dictatorship,
advocacy of 44–45, 45, 50, 51, 72
right-wing extremism 1–3, 120–121,
154–156; of the center 175; at centre
of society 3–8; indicators of 122;
recognition in correlation with 121;
religion as factor of conict 154–170;
vs. right-wing radicalism 9; and
voting 61; and voting method 9; see
also extreme right-wing attitudes
right-wing extremists 96, 110, 122, 124,
132, 155, 159, 164, 173 –175
right-wing populism 9–10, 12–13, 154;
and social psychology 13; see also
populism
right-wing populists 10 –12, 155, 166, 178
right-wing radicalism: vs. right-wing
extremism 9
Rippl, Susanne 20
The Salaried Masses (Kracauer) 14
Sanford, R. Nevitt 16
Schönbach, Peter 132
Schroder, Gerhard 2
Schualrick, Moritz 23
secondary anti-Semitism 132–136
secondary authoritarianism 22, 25, 106,
123, 177
secondary authority 130
Second World War 14, 23, 68, 149
secular stagnation 24
Seipel, Christian 20
self-optimization 21
Simmel, Georg 4
Sinti and Roma, rejection of 66, 67, 68,
69, 74–75, 79, 99–101, 135; see also
antiziganism
social conicts 173–180
social Darwinism 48, 49, 53, 54, 101
Social-democratic Party (SPD) 4, 6, 59,
93, 96–98, 100–101, 103, 158, 159, 163,
167
socialization theory 15–16; and authori-
tarian personality 16
social latency 150n5; see also latency
social psychology 28, 110–111, 131, 175;
and right-wing populism 13
social status and prestige 97
sociodemography 40, 141, 148; and
age structure 57, 58; education 56,
57; and extreme right-wing attitudes
55–62; gender 56, 57; occupational
groups 58, 58–59
sociology 110–111, 129
SPD (Social Democratic Party of
Germany) 4, 6, 59, 93, 96–98,
100 –101, 103, 158, 159, 163, 167
stability-oriented (political syndrome)
91, 98
Studies on Authority and Family (Fromm,
Horkheimer, and Marcuse) 90
188 Index
subservience 97, 104–106
subservient (political syndrome) 91, 96,
98–101
Thatcher, Margaret 111
traditional anti-Semitism 98, 132–133,
136–138
Trebesch, Christoph 23
trivialization of National Socialism
10, 38–39, 42, 48–50, 49, 53, 54, 58,
72–73, 98
Trump, Donald J. 10, 13, 178
violence: acceptance and propensity
for 70–72, 71, 75; and anti-Semitism
149; extreme right-wing attitudes
and propensity for 157; organiza-
tional 112
violent crimes 31n4
Vom Rand zur Mitte (From the Margins
to the Centre) (Decker & Brahler) 3
voter behavior/preferences: and
devaluation of asylum seekers 163;
extreme right-wing attitudes by 16 4;
and hostility to Muslims 163; and
manifest anti-Semitism in indirect
communication 143
voting: for AfD and consequence of
authoritarianism 163–167; for AfD
and hostility to Muslims 163–167; for
AfD and satisfaction with democ-
racy 167
Weber, Max 7, 15, 112, 179
Weimar Republic 110
Westerwelle, Guido 7
West Germany 3; advocacy of right-
wing authoritarian dictatorship
44–45, 45, 50, 51; anti-Semitism 47,
48, 52–53, 53; chauvinism 45–46,
46, 50–52, 51; closed and manifest
extreme right-wing attitudes by
dimension in 56; democracy accept-
ance in 62, 62–64, 63; economy of
postwar 22; end of welfare state in
21; extreme right-wing attitudes in
41; social Darwinism 48, 49, 53, 54;
trivialization of National Socialism
48–50, 49, 53, 54; xenophobia 46–47,
47, 52, 52; see also Germany
Wilders, Geert 10
Winkler, Heinrich 5
xenophobia 2–3, 39, 42, 46, 47, 52, 52,
58–59, 72, 103, 127, 159, 166, 174–177;
closed 73; economically motivated
46; as extreme right-wing attitude 9;
and manifest and latent agreement
47; murders motivated by 2; and
Muslims 168; people’s advocacy of
72; and religion 155; and religious
aliation 168; see also anti-Semitism;
Jews
Zick, Andreas 27, 66
