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The African Union and The Responsibility to Protect: Towards a Protection Regime for Africa?
... Yet, as Tieku, Obi, and Scorgie-Porter (2014 , 4) note, there is a "research lacuna relate[d] to the near-absence of theoretically grounded discussions on APSA," which points to the incapacity of dominant peace and security theories to "captur[e] APSA's (rather complex) realities." Theorizing these Africa-centered initiatives requires paying close attention to their ideological blueprint, which are to be found in Pan-Africanist principles and Pax Africana ( Edozie 2014 , see also Dersso 2012 ) 21 or what can be referred to as Pax Pan-Africana ( Powell and Tieku 2005a ;Powell and Tieku 2005b ). ...
... Yet, as Tieku, Obi, and Scorgie-Porter (2014 , 4) note, there is a "research lacuna relate[d] to the near-absence of theoretically grounded discussions on APSA," which points to the incapacity of dominant peace and security theories to "captur[e] APSA's (rather complex) realities." Theorizing these Africa-centered initiatives requires paying close attention to their ideological blueprint, which are to be found in Pan-Africanist principles and Pax Africana ( Edozie 2014 , see also Dersso 2012 ) 21 or what can be referred to as Pax Pan-Africana ( Powell and Tieku 2005a ;Powell and Tieku 2005b ). ...
In adopting the Malabo Protocol and creating the African Court of Justice and Human Rights, the African Union has established the first ever regional court with international criminal jurisdiction. This milestone signals once again, the role of African institutions in creating and developing norms in international politics. Yet, both International Relations (IR) theories and debates and official narratives of the historiography of the international legal order tend to omit the sustained contributions of African states and institutions. Echoes of the African Union (AU)’s efforts to define and codify crimes that are of concern to its constituents can be found in the African states’ interventions at the International Law Commission during the 1980s and the negotiations that lead to the creation of the International Criminal Court (ICC) in the 1990s. This article argues that beyond the critique and skepticism about the Malabo Protocol and the AU’s agenda, there is a sustained vision and trajectory that underlies African agency in norms creation and attempts to usher in an international legal order that speaks more directly and equitably to the concerns of the continent. Ultimately, I propose a genealogy of those Pan-African visions for an embedded international justice system that provides a fundamental corrective to the Nuremberg to The Hague narrative.
... 10 The article has been amended to include intervention to 'restore peace and stability' and in response to 'a serious threat to legitimate order'. 11 For a discussion of the importance of the specification of war crimes, genocide, and crimes against humanity, see Powell and Tieku 2005;Weiss 2004. government [in Africa] in the interest of common humanity' (Obasanjo and Mosha 1992, p. 260). ...
... The widespread acceptance of conditional sovereignty paved the way for the introduction of Responsibility to Protect (R2P)-like principles in Africa's international system (Powell and Tieku 2005;Welsh 2010). Indeed, the formation of AU and legalization of languages similar to R2P in the AU Constitutive Act is seen as important in the evolution of R2P at the global level (Okeke 2011). ...
... These three major issues informed the creation of the AU and the drafting of its legal text, called the Constitutive Act of the African Union (CA). To provide a framework for dealing with human insecurity, the CA empowers the Union to prevent, manage and resolve conflicts on the continent ( Powell and Tieku 2005). 2 The hope is that the AU will create conditions in which peace may prevail on the African continent, to make continental Africa a 'zone of peace.' African leaders also felt that regional economic integration could provide a basis for sustainable development; as a result, the CA provides the legal and institutional framework for African states to integrate their economies (African Union 2001). ...
... That is, the OAU's system of complete consensus has been abandoned. Under the AU, a decision on the part of a two-thirds majority of the Assembly is required for intervention purposes ( Powell and Tieku 2005). The AU used the two-thirds majority principle to arrive at the decision to deploy a peacekeeping force to monitor a ceasefire in Burundi in April 2003. ...
... These three major issues informed the creation of the AU and the drafting of its legal text, called the Constitutive Act of the African Union (CA). To provide a framework for dealing with human insecurity, the CA empowers the AU to prevent, manage and resolve confl icts on the continent (Powell & Tieku 2005). 2 It is hoped that the AU will create conditions in which peace may prevail on the African continent; to make continental Africa a 'zone of peace'. ...
... That is, the OAU's system of complete consensus has been abandoned. Under the AU, a decision on the part of a two-thirds majority of the Assembly is required for intervention (Powell & Tieku 2005). The AU used this principle to arrive at the decision to deploy a peacekeeping force to monitor a ceasefi re in Burundi in April 2003. ...
This paper interrogates the common official refrain to attribute vandalisation-induced pipeline explosion to poverty in the country. It argues that although poverty has explanatory relevance in terms of the ubiquity of oil pipeline explosion, such attribution conceals more than it reveals: it clearly shows that the poor are the direct and hardest hit in oil pipeline explosion in Nigeria, but conceals the fact that rich vandalisation barons are behind these threats to human security; it conceals the contradiction between the material circumstances of the victims and the sophisticated technology deployed in such nefarious acts. While it reveals the disempowerment of the poor to negotiate their survival outside the lure of fuel scooping, it conceals the power of the barons to easily negotiate their freedom from conviction. Also, it conceals the seeming contradiction of perceptions of security between the government officials and the poor citizens. The paper therefore argues that it is this prevalent situation that not only accounts for the frequency of pipeline vandalisation, but provides reasons that government fails to pay compensation to victims of explosion or to evolve proactive disaster response strategies. Thus, it advocates the integration of a disaster management framework into government's overall effort of poverty reduction in the country.
... These three major issues informed the creation of the AU and the drafting of its legal text, called the Constitutive Act of the African Union (CA). To provide a framework for dealing with human insecurity, the CA empowers the AU to prevent, manage and resolve confl icts on the continent (Powell & Tieku 2005). 2 It is hoped that the AU will create conditions in which peace may prevail on the African continent; to make continental Africa a 'zone of peace'. ...
... That is, the OAU's system of complete consensus has been abandoned. Under the AU, a decision on the part of a two-thirds majority of the Assembly is required for intervention (Powell & Tieku 2005). The AU used this principle to arrive at the decision to deploy a peacekeeping force to monitor a ceasefi re in Burundi in April 2003. ...
... These three major issues informed the creation of the AU and the drafting of its legal text, called the Constitutive Act of the African Union (CA). To provide a framework for dealing with human insecurity, the CA empowers the AU to prevent, manage and resolve confl icts on the continent (Powell & Tieku 2005). 2 It is hoped that the AU will create conditions in which peace may prevail on the African continent; to make continental Africa a 'zone of peace'. ...
... That is, the OAU's system of complete consensus has been abandoned. Under the AU, a decision on the part of a two-thirds majority of the Assembly is required for intervention (Powell & Tieku 2005). The AU used this principle to arrive at the decision to deploy a peacekeeping force to monitor a ceasefi re in Burundi in April 2003. ...
This paper explores the contribution of the African Union (AU) to human security promotion in Africa. It contends that human security concerns informed the formation of the AU. Through the efforts of the AU Commission, the African ruling elite and policy-makers have become aware of human security doctrines. Human security ideas have been integrated into AU binding agreements, declarations, decisions and policies. The commission is now in the difficult, yet most important, phase of trying to persuade significant numbers of the African ruling elite and civil society to accept human security as a guiding principle and the desirable norm. Through the African Citizens' Directorate (CIDO), the commission is using indigenous African civil society groups to institutionalise human security doctrines in Africa. The commission faces serious challenges in its efforts to make human security the only security norm. While member states of the AU that have never been comfortable with the introduction of human security doctrines into the continental integration project are tacitly undermining the CIDO's ability to work with civil society groups to institutionalise the doctrines in Africa, the leaders who enthusiastically supported the integration of human security doctrines into the documents and work of the AU have seemed in recent times to be less resolute in their support of AU Commission's human security work.
... These three major issues informed the creation of the AU and the drafting of its legal text, called the Constitutive Act of the African Union (CA). To provide a framework for dealing with human insecurity, the CA empowers the AU to prevent, manage and resolve confl icts on the continent (Powell & Tieku 2005). 2 It is hoped that the AU will create conditions in which peace may prevail on the African continent; to make continental Africa a 'zone of peace'. ...
... That is, the OAU's system of complete consensus has been abandoned. Under the AU, a decision on the part of a two-thirds majority of the Assembly is required for intervention (Powell & Tieku 2005). The AU used this principle to arrive at the decision to deploy a peacekeeping force to monitor a ceasefi re in Burundi in April 2003. ...
The start of each new year brings the familiar pundit forecasts for the political and economic year ahead. At continental level numerous issues are calling for attention. These include the burning violence in Sudan's Darfur region; northern Uganda's fl edgling peace process between the Museveni regime and the Lord's Resistance Army (LRA); and the now- deteriorating situation in the Horn of Africa - a result of the clashes between Ethiopian troops and the Union of Islamic Courts (UIC) on Somalian territory towards the end of 2006. The fallout from these hostilities has meant that the Horn of Africa may receive more prominent international attention, which it has not enjoyed since the ill-fated US foray into Somalia in 1993. At global level it is clear that the 'war on terror' remains the ultimate foreign policy imperative for the US administration. It can also be expected to play a major infl uencing factor on the foreign policy orientation for the UK and the European Union. * Mariam Jooma is a researcher with the Africa Security Analysis Programme at the Institute
... In fact, Obasanjo (2015) notes that the major change under the AU has been a renewed emphasis on building a continental security regime that is capable of managing and resolving African conflicts, which as of now is intense, intractable, involves a lot of actors and explained by different factors (boundary and territorial disagreements; secessionist ambitions; resource control; poverty; perceived and real injustices). To provide the framework for dealing with issues pertaining to the new forms of security threats, the AU is empowered through its CA to prevent, manage and resolve conflicts on the continent (Powell and Tieku 2005). In particular, the CA states that the AU has 'the right to intervene in a Member State pursuant to a decision of the Assembly in respect of grave circumstances: namely war crimes, genocide and crimes against humanity' (African Union 2000). ...
The last two decades have seen African countries adopt a new security approach through the activities of regional economic communities (RECs) and the African Union’s (AU) African Peace and Security Architecture (APSA). This article argues that despite progress in conflict prevention and the promotion of peace, defence and security through the APSA and RECs, challenges do remain. In particular, factors such as financial costs involved, the inadequate funds available for peace and security missions, conflicting interests and lack of agreement, poor co- ordination and inadequate human and logistics capacity have constrained the ability of African countries to achieve their peace and security agenda. Thus, for peace and security efforts being undertaken by the AU and RECs to be effective, the actors involved should have not only the requisite capacity but also political will and commitment, and cooperation among members and with the international community should remain crucial to the process.
... It is also establishing an African Standby Force to enable it to respond earlier and more effectively to humanitarian tragedies such as the one unfolding in Western Sudan. (Powell andTieku, 2004a and2004b) Box 2: The IACHR and Guatemala in 1995 ! ! ! ...
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY In the context of the Global Partnership for the Prevention of Armed Conflict (GPPAC), civil society organizations (CSOs) in North America, Latin America and the Caribbean have been engaged in dialogue about the specificities of conflict prevention challenges and options in the Western Hemisphere. This paper opens with a review of the evolution of inter-American norms and institutions that deal, directly or indirectly, with conflict prevention in the hemisphere. It looks at four pillars of conflict prevention practices: i) the peaceful settlement of inter-state disputes and the new hemispheric security agenda; ii) the protection of human rights; iii) the defense and promotion of democracy; and iv) other aspects of structural prevention, especially the work of the Inter-American Development Bank and the Free Trade Agreement of the Americas (FTAA) as a catalyst for conflict. The review finds that regional mechanisms for conflict prevention have improved, but there are still many deficits and weaknesses that need to be addressed. Based on these findings, the paper suggests five aspects of inter-American relations that could be the focus of common CSO engagement over the coming years. Promising strategies for hemispheric level conflict prevention include the Organization of the Americas States (OAS) mechanisms for the peaceful settlement of inter-state disputes; the OAS defence of democracy regime; early warning mechanisms of the inter-American human rights machinery (including norms and mechanisms related to the responsibility to protect); policies of the IDB; and activities aimed at creating a coherent approach to conflict prevention in the hemisphere. The evidence suggests that some inroads have been made already. Recently, there has been an emergence of CSO networks committed to conflict prevention providing a space to engage CSOs and officials working on more traditional development and security issues; this has helped to foster the synergies required to build a true culture of prevention in the Americas.
This chapter examines the African Union (AU) peace and security institutions. It shows that they are among the most ambitious and novel continent-wide security governance mechanisms to emerge in the world since the end of the Cold War. They are drawn from collectivist security ideas, the Responsibility to Protect (R2P) framework and the human security paradigm. Some of them are informed by lessons learned from the practice of vertical postwar reconstruction exercises. The AU peace and security ideas are codified in the Constitutive Act of the AU, and outlined in detail in the Protocol Relating to the Establishment of the Peace and Security Council (PSC protocol) of the AU, in the African Non-Aggression and Common Defence and Security Pact, and in the Post Conflict Reconstruction and Development Policy (postwar reconstruction policy).1 They are managed by a fifteen-member PSC, which has turned the AU into a major peace and security decision maker. Indeed, the work of the PSC has placed the AU in a position where it increasingly shares with the United Nations (UN) the responsibility of maintaining peace and security in Africa. The power- and burden-sharing arrangement between the AU and the UN goes beyond the UN Charter’s paternalistic attitude to regional organizations. The absence of a legal cover in the UN Charter for the role that the AU is playing in the arena of peace and security is creating a number of frictions between the pan-African organization and the UN Security Council (UNSC).
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