EU missions and operations: practices of learning lessons in the CSDP

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9. EU missions and operations: practices
of learning lessons in the CSDP
Niklas Bremberg and Elsa Hedling
THE EVOLUTION OF THE CSDP
Following the Saint-Malo declaration issued by France and the United
Kingdom (UK), the European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP) was
established in 1999 with the aim of granting the European Union (EU) an
operational capacity to deploy both civilian missions and military operations
(Howorth, 2014). The experience of the devasting civil wars in the Western
Balkans in the 1990s led the member states to agree that the EU should
plan and conduct its own missions and operations in response to interna-
tional crises.1 After setting up decision-making bodies, planning structures
and command-and-control arrangements, the EU launched its first civilian
European Union Police Mission, Bosnia and Herzegovina (EUPM/BiH) and
its first military operation in Macedonia (Concordia) in 2003. Since then, the
EU has launched 36 interventions (21 civilian and 15 military) to meet an
increasing demand for EU assistance. To date, the largest military operation
1 The ESDP meant that European security and defence cooperation, as opposed
to Euro-Atlantic cooperation, could advance further than it had done since the Second
World War. The key was that the UK accepted that the EU should develop a military
component, separable but not separate from the North Atlantic Treaty Organization
(NATO), and France accepted NATO as a cornerstone of European (and not only
Euro-Atlantic) cooperation on security and defence. It has also been suggested that the
1998 Saint-Malo declaration was in many ways the product of a ‘constructive misun-
derstanding’ as the result of the French government seeing ESDP ‘as a tool in which
to further the construction of “Europe politique” [while] it was viewed in London as
an instrument designed to improve military capabilities and that would also revital-
ize NATO’ (Bickerton et al., 2011, p. 3). Others have suggested that it was part of
a British‒French pre-emptive strategy to ‘entangle’ a reunified Germany (Hyde-Price,
2007) or that it should rather be seen as part of long-standing French attempts to under-
mine the United States-dominated NATO that happened to be successful because the
UK Prime Minister at the time, Tony Blair, was caught off-guard (Howorth, 2007,
pp. 38–45).
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launched by the EU is the European Union Force Bosnia and Herzegovina
(EUFOR Althea), which took over from NATO’s Stabilization Force (SFOR)
in 2004 and is still in effect. Other military operations include the naval oper-
ations European Union Naval Force Somalia (EUNAVFOR) Atalanta, which
was launched in 2008 to counter piracy off the Horn of Africa; the European
Union Naval Force Mediterranean (EUNAVFOR MED) Sophia, which was
launched in 2015 to counter human trafficking in the Mediterranean; and
military training missions in Somalia (since 2010), Mali (since 2013), and the
Central African Republic (since 2016). The civilian missions have become
an increasingly important part of EU foreign and security policy, and the
largest mission to date is the European Union Rule of Law Mission in Kosovo
(EULEX Kosovo), which was launched in 2008 to support the development
of rule of law institutions in the country. Other civilian missions include EU
Border Assistance Management missions in Moldova (since 2005), Ukraine
(since 2005), Palestine (since 2005), Georgia (since 2008) and Libya (since
2013).
The gradual and at times seemingly haphazard development of the EU’s
capacity to plan, deploy and conduct civilian missions and military operations
has both been seen as a reflection of the EU’s ambition to strengthen its global
role, and as an attempt to promote stability and security in the EU’s wider
neighbourhood. This rapid expansion has resulted in and from continuous
waves of institutional reforms that have produced a complex web of organ-
izational structures supporting the EU’s external action. In 2009, the Lisbon
Treaty introduced the current name, the Common Security and Defence Policy
(CSDP), and established the European External Action Service (EEAS) with
the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy
and Vice-President of the European Commission (HR/VP) as its head (see
Chapter 7). The continuous enhancement of the EU’s operational capacity as
well as experiences on the local levels of implementation have spurred a need
for institutionalizing ‘lessons learned mechanisms’ to effectively learn how
best to do EU foreign and security policy through learning-by-doing (see
Keohane, 2011; Bossong, 2013; Kirchner, 2013; Faleg, 2017).
The varied conditions under which the missions and operations have been
deployed, carried out and evaluated have led to disputes over inconsistencies
and (the lack of) strategic guidance (Duke, 2011b; Portela and Raube, 2012).
Therefore, a key incentive for the EU has been to better coordinate and assist in
the missions and operations without jeopardizing local ownership. CSDP mis-
sions and operations have been challenged by resource shortages, intermittent
political support from EU member states, and a general lack of coordination
between EU actors (Keohane, 2011). In addition, changes to the external secu-
rity context have profoundly shaped the trajectory of the CSDP.
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EU missions and operations: practices of learning lessons in the CSDP 133
CSDP missions and operations also include the participation of inter-
national partners. Non-member states such as Albania, Chile, Morocco,
Switzerland and Turkey have contributed military personnel for EU-led
operations (Bremberg, 2016a). The EU cooperates with several international
organizations in the field of security, most notably the United Nations (UN)
and NATO as well as others such as the African Union (AU), G5 Sahel (for
example, the EU Capacity Building Mission in Niger), and the Organization
for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE). It should also be noted that
the EU relied heavily on NATO resources and capabilities in the early stages
of the CSDP’s development and for the military operations in the Western
Balkans, including EUFOR Althea, in which ‘NATO procedures are used
[and] the operation builds on interoperability standards of NATO and suits
the professional practices associated to NATO’ (Mérand, 2010, p. 371). The
relationship to NATO was initially seen as potentially competitive, especially
in the United States (Hofmann, 2010; Duke, 2016). The resulting close cooper-
ation has instead been considered to contribute to closer ties with NATO. The
cooperation with international organizations as well as the cooperation within
the EU have developed over time, adding to the complexity of ties and insti-
tutional relationships in the fields of peace-building and crisis management.2
However, at times, conflicting ambitions have contributed to contestation
over the CSDP. EU member states have sometimes opted to commit to mis-
sions outside of the CSDP framework. Moreover, EU member states have
even chosen to launch new frameworks, such as the French-led European
Intervention Initiative, a joint military project between 13 European states
launched outside of existing NATO and CSDP structures. In addition, the
UK-led Joint Expeditionary Force that was launched as a NATO initiative
between ten European states includes both non-NATO states (Sweden) as
well as non-EU member states (Iceland). Accordingly, the unique contribu-
tion of the CSDP has often been questioned in ways that highlight diverging
perceptions on the role of European autonomy in the transatlantic partnership
(Smith, 2012). Therefore, the missions and operations are also sensitive sites
in EU foreign policy-making, and have at times sparked controversy within
the EU as well as with its international partners. Nonetheless, the operational
existence of the CSDP has established the EU as a global crisis manager and
strengthened its role as a regional security actor both by serving as a long-term
partner of the UN and through a relatively stable coexistence with NATO
(Faleg, 2017, p. 186).
2 For example, the first High Representative of the CFSP, Javier Solana, had pre-
viously served as Secretary General of NATO; and the Secretary General of the OSCE,
Helga Schmid, has previously served as Secretary General of the EEAS.
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Research on the CSDP missions and operations has followed the general
lines of EU studies (Chapter 3). Realist and rationalist approaches have focused
on the strategic role of the CSDP and the capacity-building functions of mis-
sions and operations (Hyde-Price, 2007; Engelbrekt, 2008). The CSDP is often
debated in relation to whether and how the EU can develop greater strategic
autonomy. Moreover, the effectiveness of EU missions and operations are
often compared to and measured against those of the UN, OSCE and NATO
(see Dijkstra et al., 2019). A key concern has been to balance the top-down
directions and management of EU mandates with ambitions of local ownership
(Ejdus, 2017). In the wake of the first operational experiences (2003–2009),
many studies have assessed EU missions and operations (e.g., Merlingen and
Ostrauskaite, 2005; Emerson and Gross, 2007; Tardy, 2011, 2015).
Scholars drawing on social constructivism have focused on the role of
norms and identities in shaping cooperation in EU foreign and security policy,
including whether an EU strategic culture can emerge around the CSDP
(see Meyer, 2006; Juncos, 2010). Moreover, scholars drawing on practice
approaches have explored EU missions and operations as emerging sites and
communities of routinized interaction and practice in EU foreign and security
policy (Faleg, 2017). In this perspective, CSDP missions and operations enable
micro-processes of EU integration, and the resulting practices become entry
points into the social and political life of EU foreign policy (Klossek, 2020).
This chapter draws broadly on the scholarship on communities of practice
that emerged in connection to large-scale EU civilian and military operations
within the CSDP. We build on previous contributions to map and grasp how
the CSDP enables new practices of EU foreign policy that result from the
practical management of political contestation (Chapter 4). Græger (2016,
2017), for example, has shown how EU‒NATO cooperation in the field of
peace-building and crisis management advances despite gridlocks on the
political level due to informal interactions among EU and NATO officials
alongside with military and civilian practitioners in an emerging community
of practice:
Shared or similar education, training, and career patterns among EU and NATO
staff, in Brussels and in field missions, are particularly important for developing
specific dispositions to act and think in a particular way … The exchange of per-
sonnel between field missions and headquarters, as well as diplomatic and military
postings across organisations, also facilitate the development of a shared repertoire
among EU and NATO staff. (Græger, 2016, p. 495)
The chapter first situates the role of the CSDP missions and operations within
the wider field of everyday making of EU foreign and security policy, by
comparing the conditions for the development of new practices in missions
and operations with other organizational grounds. The chapter then discusses
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EU missions and operations: practices of learning lessons in the CSDP 135
missions and operations as central sites for social learning through practices
of cooperation. Faleg (2017) has demonstrated how the EU has learned to
be a security provider through so-called learning communities during the
evolution of the CSDP. Faleg’s study, focusing on the Security Sector Reform
(SSR) and Civilian Crisis Management (CCM), pinpoints why and how learn-
ing processes have fostered change in the CSDP. We consider Faleg’s notion
of learning communities in relation to recent developments in knowledge
management. Specifically, the chapter analyses the increased importance of
coherent practices of learning lessons from past and ongoing CSDP missions
among officials taking part in these operations, as well as between them (the
agents) and the headquarters (CSDP officials) in Brussels. That is, this chapter
maps the new practices of knowledge management across the institutional
bodies involved in the CSDP since 2016. Here, we also illustrate the key
dynamics of these practices and discuss the processes of lessons learned
from the COVID-19 pandemic in 2020–2021. The analysis of processes and
practices of lessons learned draws on a review of secondary sources and a qual-
itative survey, including nine officials with key responsibilities in the units
involved in the planning, implementation and assessment of CSDP missions
and operations.3 We also conducted in-depth interviews with key personnel in
the Integrated Approach for Security and Peace Directorate (ISPD). Since its
creation in March 2019, the ISPD has become the main coordination hub for
knowledge management and learning lessons.
THE ROLE, POSITION AND INSTITUTIONAL
ARCHITECTURE OF THE CSDP
EU missions and operations differ from the other aspects and organs of EU
foreign and security policy discussed in the chapters of this book, as EU
missions and operations are the practical arenas for the implementation of
security cooperation and crisis management. As such, EU missions and
operations are the most visible activities of the EU as an international security
actor. The main goal of the common security and defence framework is to
develop EU autonomy and the capacity to act. Therefore, the role and position
of the CSDP has reflected the status of EU civilian and military capability,
3 These included the Political and Security Committee (PSC), the Politico-Military
Group (PMG), the Committee for Civilian Aspects of Crisis Management (CivCom),
the Crisis Management and Planning Directorate (CMPD), the Civilian Planning and
Conduct Capability (CPCC), the Military Planning and Conduct Capability (MPCC),
the European Union Military Committee (EUMC), the EU Military Staff (EUMS), the
Integrated Approach for Security and Peace Directorate (ISPD), the European Institute
for Security Studies (EUISS) and the European Security and Defence College (ESDC).
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which has gradually been expanded.4 At its inception, the European Council
declared an aim (the Helsinki Headline Goal) of creating a rapid response
force with the ability to deploy up to 60 000 personnel within 60 days and to
sustain this deployment for up to a year, by 2003 (European Council, 1999).
Mimicking practices within NATO, this aim was to be achieved on the basis
of intergovernmental cooperation, with member state contributions to be made
voluntarily at annual Capabilities Commitment Conferences in Brussels and
monitored by the Council. Although the CSDP has evolved significantly since
its inception, the Helsinki Headline Goal was never achieved. In 2004, the
CSDP was instead complemented by the concept of EU Battlegroups, tactical
forces (1500 troops), provided either by single nations or by groups of nations
(known as the Headline Goal 2010). The EU Battlegroup concept was made
operational in 2007, but it has never been put into practice.
Since 1999, the growth of CSDP capabilities has produced a network of
governance bodies and processes. The institutional architecture of the CSDP
has been described as ‘intertwined and complex’ (Hofmann, 2010). The entan-
glement refers to how EU policy in this area overlaps with both member states’
policies and overarching frameworks for international cooperation. Although
the CSDP remains fully intergovernmental (that is, all decisions require con-
sensus among EU member states), the missions and operations are governed
and overseen by and through organs and units that are supranational and
bureaucratic (Faleg, 2017, p. 66; see Howorth, 2014). The complexity refers
to how multiple bodies involved in the governance of missions and operations
are stretched over and across political, strategic and operational levels. In
addition, the institutional architecture has evolved rapidly to meet current and
future challenges. The committees and units are composed of many permanent
representatives, experts and civil servants who are seconded by the member
states or have temporary contracts in Brussels. As a result, the CSDP is in
many ways a site of tension between national governments and supranational
institutions. Attempts to label the governance structure and certain centralizing
tendencies often revolve around the need to understand and explain an increas-
ingly complex reality that is not necessarily captured by the classic theories of
EU integration. This can be seen, for example, in suggested conceptualizations
of the CSDP as ‘supranational intergovernmentalism’ (Howorth, 2012a).
The process of developing new forms of EU capacity required the devel-
opment of new security and defence structures. Owing to the intergovern-
mental nature of the CSDP, these structures were initially located within
4 The CSDP is defined by the Treaty on European Union (TEU) (Articles 41,
42–46 in Chapter 2, Section 2 of Title V (Provisions on the Common Security and
Defence Policy), and in Protocols 1, 10, and 11 and Declarations 13 and 14.
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EU missions and operations: practices of learning lessons in the CSDP 137
the General Secretariat of the Council of the EU. This process resulted in
several central institutional bodies such as the Senior Council Group and the
Political and Security Committee (PSC) (Chapter 6) and supporting units such
as the European Union Military Committee (EUMC), the Politico-Military
Group (PMG) (Chapter 5), and the Committee for Civilian Aspects of Crisis
Management (CivCom). The role of these bodies in preparing Common
Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) and CSDP work within the Council
was initially viewed with some reservations by the Committee of Permanent
Representatives (Coreper). Coreper had previously been alone in the task of
overseeing the institutional complexity of EU foreign policy (Serrano, 2020,
p. 19). In 2003, the European Security Strategy provided new direction, and
the Berlin Plus agreements established EU‒NATO cooperation by enabling
the EU to use NATO’s military crisis management capabilities (Adler, 2008).
The Treaty of Lisbon introduced a series of changes, most notably a compre-
hensive approach to crisis management and intervention in crisis situations, as
the new guiding principles for capacity-building and institutional reform. Since
2009, both the CFSP and the CSDP have undergone significant reconfigura-
tion, including the more prominent role of the HR/VP and the EEAS (Chapter
7). The EEAS is currently the principal organizational host of key civilian and
military crisis management bodies as well as intergovernmental committees
involved in the CSDP (Duke, 2016). Most importantly, these include the Crisis
Management and Planning Directorate (CMPD), the Civilian Planning and
Conduct Capability (CPCC), and the EU Military Staff (EUMS). Created in
2008, the CMPD deals with strategic planning for CSDP missions and opera-
tions and is tasked with creating synergies between their civilian and military
aspects. The CPCC covers operational planning and the conduct of CSDP
civilian missions. The EUMS carries out early warning, situation assessment
and strategic planning for CSDP activities (Faleg, 2017, p. 67). In 2016, the
launch of the EU Global Strategy gave impetus to new initiatives within the
CSDP as part of a broader so-called Integrated Approach (Dijkstra, 2018).
Furthermore, the European Defence Agency (EDA) was established in 2004
as a platform for EU member states to discuss issues of military modernizing
and defence market integration. EU ministers of defence meet regularly in
the format of the EDA’s Steering Board, and the HR/VP acts as the Head of
EDA.5 The Permanent Structured Cooperation (PESCO) was introduced by the
Lisbon Treaty, but no decision was made to initiate it until 2017. PESCO is
set up as a framework for those member states that are capable and willing to
commit to invest, plan and develop common defence capabilities. The aim is to
5 This is noteworthy since there is no formal defence council in the Council of the
EU, although informal meetings of EU defence ministers are regularly organized.
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further develop capabilities of EU member states for national as well as multi-
national missions and operations (for example, the CSDP, NATO and the UN).
PESCO rests on legally binding commitments for the participating member
states, and around 40 collaborative projects have been launched in areas such
as training and facilities, land, maritime, air and cyber capacities. The EEAS,
EUMS and EDA jointly act as the PESCO Secretariat. Interestingly, the
European Commission has become more involved in the field of EU security
and defence cooperation in recent years, including the European Defence Fund
(EDF), which aims to support cooperation among member states’ defence
industries. However, European defence market integration has become more
complicated as a result of Brexit, since the UK is one of Europe’s leading mil-
itary and defence industry powers, and it is hard to imagine that EU member
states would be able to launch a major military operation or meaningfully
enhance their defence capabilities without somehow involving the UK and the
British defence industry (Blockmans and Crosson, 2019).
Planning, Launching and Implementing Missions and Operations
Most decisions made by the European Council and the Council of the EU
related to the CSDP must be unanimous (TEU Article 42). There are some
notable exceptions relating to the EDA (TEU Article 45) and PESCO (TEU
Article 46), which only require a majority vote. The HR/VP usually issues
the proposals for decisions. Missions and operations are coordinated by the
PSC, the EUMC and the EUMS. The CCPC is responsible for planning and
overseeing civilian CSDP operations. At the beginning of each presidency,
the Council evaluates the global environment based on the geographic and
thematic working groups, consultation activities, and a watch list regularly
updated by the PSC. The PSC is informed by the Commission and the member
states and receives regular updates from the EUMC and CivCom. Crisis
response planning starts when an emerging crisis is identified by the EU at the
political level, but the numerous bodies and structures involved span both the
political strategic level and the military strategic and operational level (Xavier
and Rehrl, 2017, p. 78).
When a crisis is identified, the EEAS geographic desk, supported by all
services and the respective EU delegation, drafts the Political Framework for
Crisis Approach (PFCA). The PFCA provides an analysis of options available
to the EU and mirrors the comprehensive integrated approach. This phase
also involves consultation with international partners (for example, NATO,
the UN, and relevant international, regional, and non-governmental organiza-
tions). Once a decision to launch a mission or operation has been made, the
relevant institutions involved in CSDP action planning (the PSC, CivCom,
and CPCC) draft a Crisis Management Concept (CMC), develop the Concept
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EU missions and operations: practices of learning lessons in the CSDP 139
of Operations (CONOPS) to create a detailed Operation Plan (OPLAN), and
a Council decision is made to launch the operation (Xavier and Rehrl, 2017,
p. 78–82). The CONOPS and OPLAN are produced under the leadership of
the operation commander.6 The majority of assets and personnel required for
missions and operations are then provided by EU member states.
Each mission and operation has its own chain of command. The EUMC
monitors and reports on execution to the PSC. For civilian missions, the
Head of Mission reports back to and is accountable to the PSC. For military
operations with an executive mandate, an operational headquarters is often
provided by the member state acting as a framework nation (for example,
Italy in the case of the maritime operation EUNAVFOR MED Irini). It is also
possible to use NATO command structures under the Berlin Plus agreements
(for example, EUFOR Althea in Bosnia Herzegovina) or activate the European
Union Operations Centre (EU OPCEN) (for example, operations in the Horn
of Africa since 2012). Moreover, the military training missions in Africa (the
Central African Republic, Mali and Somalia) all operate under one command
located within the Military Staff of the EEAS in Brussels – that is, the Military
Planning and Conduct Capability (MPCC) – with the aim of ensuring better
coordination and cooperation between military and civilian actors. The CMC
is regularly evaluated and revised by the PSC. Missions and operations are
terminated according to the end date specified by the Council or through a new
Council decision.
LESSONS LEARNED AND COMMUNITIES OF
PRACTICE IN CSDP
The remainder of this chapter seeks to explain and understand the produc-
tion of EU foreign and security policy as an expanding repertoire of actions
undertaken by the EU in this field, by examining lessons learned from CSDP
missions and operations. Practices of lessons learned in and from CSDP mis-
sions and operations have been explored in previous research. One lesson that
EU member states are said to have agreed on from the early phase of CSDP,
in particular EUFOR Althea, is that military operations should always include
an end date in their mandates so that the operation can only be prolonged if all
member states agree (Palm, 2017, p. 81). This can be seen as an example of
learning from past experiences at the highest political level in the EU, but it
6 For military operations, the procedure is slightly different. The Initiating Military
Directive (IMD) is developed by the EUMS and guides the operation commander in the
development of the CONOPS, the Statement of Requirements (SOR) and the OPLAN.
It is then up to the PSC to approve the IMD and request the authorization of the EUMC.
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also suggests that decision-making regarding the use of military force contin-
ues to be a considerably sensitive issue among EU member states (Palm, 2017,
p. 81). However, there are numerous examples of practical lessons learned
from one mission and applied to another, such as lessons from European Union
Training Mission (EUTM) Somalia being used in EUTM Mali ‘to build a more
effective relationship between its mission commander and the local authori-
ties’ (Minard, 2017, p. 90).
The EU has created procedures for learning lessons in the CSDP such as
annual reports summarizing experiences and providing recommendations
(Dijkstra et al., 2019, p. 536). It has been suggested that the complex institu-
tional structure and the fact that it often takes time for EU member states to
agree on new initiatives have led EU officials to use existing rules as flexibly
as possible to fit the practical needs that they have identified as a result of their
everyday work. This is particularly noticeable ‘in the financial domain, where
budgetary officials have relaxed the EU rules’ (Dijkstra et al., 2019, p. 537).
Moreover, research on learning in the CSDP has gradually come to focus on
broader themes related to how local experiences from missions and operations
are transferred to the level of planning at the EEAS, and political negotiation
and decision-making at the level of the PSC and Foreign Affairs Council
(FAC), as well as how and to what extent this process supports self-reflexive
institutional reforms in the EU (Smith, 2018). Of particular interest here is
how various lessons are transformed into policy-relevant knowledge through
different feedback and training processes, and whether such knowledge is
applied in the planning and decision-making ahead of future missions and
operations. Summarizing the results from an EU-funded research project about
the EU’s capabilities in conflict prevention and peace-building (EU-CIVCAP,
2016–2018), Smith (2018, p. 219) suggests that there is an emerging ‘complex
learning culture’ within the CSDP and that it has helped to improve the conduct
of peace-building tasks by the EU and its partners. Nonetheless, the ‘mission
approach’ (that is, that each new CSDP mission involves the recruitment of
new personnel both from EU institutions in Brussels and from member states)
is said to present an obstacle for learning from past missions and for fostering
a specific learning culture in the EU. Despite this obstacle, the CSDP in many
ways is said to rest on a broader ‘network of professionals who rely on the
same policy-relevant knowledge base and who share the same views regarding
a specific policy domain’ (Smith, 2018, pp. 220–221; see Græger, 2016, 2017;
Mérand, 2010).
In the following analysis, we take a slightly different approach to institu-
tional learning in the CSDP, guided by the analytical framework presented
in Chapter 4. First, we assume that EU missions and operations or even the
institutional units that coordinate or monitor them are staffed with officials
and personnel who rely on their previous knowledge and lived experience as
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EU missions and operations: practices of learning lessons in the CSDP 141
well as established networks from previous posts. That is, we do not consider
missions and operations to be blank slates for new practices to develop. Rather,
the complex learning of enacting EU foreign policy in CSDP missions and
operations highly depends on the many institutional legacies and different dis-
positions of the individuals involved. Second, we assume that the communities
of learning in the CSDP engage in reflection of how their practices are shaped
and contribute to shaping EU foreign and security policy. These preconditions
for lessons learned can be observed in the ways in which the informal learning
has been institutionalized in the EU and in the emerging epistemology of
CSDP knowledge management.
Formalizing Informal Learning
In the history of the CSDP, learning lessons has always been emphasized. Early
on, it became clear that the EU would need to learn from its past experiences to
improve its capacity and efficiency as a security provider. In the first years of
missions and operations, there were no formalized processes for recording or
sharing lessons. Instead, the field of the CSDP organically developed multiple,
contextual and fluid learning communities (Faleg, 2017). These communities
of practice stemmed from both the composition of new groups of experts
and practitioners in civilian missions or military operations as well as from
pre-existing networks shaped through the institutional legacies of the staff
involved. Learning in these communities relied foremost on informal mech-
anisms through personal relationships, corridor talk and information-sharing.
EU officials working on the CSDP (henceforth CSDP officials) are well
aware of these communities and the continued difficulty in facilitating shared
learning (EEAS-1, 2021; ESDC-1, 2021; EEAS-5, 2021; EEAS-6, 2021). The
gradual efforts of formalizing learning lessons have attempted to institutional-
ize these communities and their practices as essential activities in the making
of EU foreign policy, to better allow experience to guide future actions. A key
ambition has been to move knowledge management from ad hoc activities to
a systematic process that can be used to produce deliverables (EEAS-4, 2021).
Efforts to formalize learning lessons date to the beginning of the first missions
and operations (2003), but the most notable stint of institutionalization resulted
from the commitment to the Integrated Approach in 2009 (EEAS-5, 2021;
EEAS-7, 2021).
The process of formalizing informal learning has resulted in new processes
and mandates, but recording these insights remains difficult. One of the
challenges to integrating a systematic approach to learning lessons has been
to capture the role of situated practical understandings. CSDP officials have
dispositions and previous experience that guide them in how they identify and
make sense of learning lessons. This constraint has become more apparent and
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therefore more reflected on since the EU Global Strategy (EUGS) introduced
knowledge management and learning lessons as explicit deliverables in EU
foreign policy (EEAS-3, 2021).
Practices of Learning Lessons
The formal lessons process follows the phases of CSDP decision-making.
The CMPD, CPCC and EUMS each have had their own system for learning
lessons. These processes build on some efforts of cooperation and exchange,
but remain fluid (Faleg, 2017). The lessons learned processes are generally
similar to NATO methodology; a result of close cooperation and the military
background of many CSDP officials (EEAS-3, 2021). The process looks dif-
ferent for civilian missions, as the military processes are more comprehensive
and led by the EUMS (European Parliament, 2012; EEAS-4, 2021). It has
been suggested that the sensitive nature of various aspects of CSDP tend to
hamper the dissemination of practical lessons and experiences from missions
and operations throughout the organizational structures of EU foreign and
security policy. This is often portrayed as stemming from a range of political
sensitivities that EU member states might have in terms of where, how and
what CSDP missions and operations should be launched, and that some issues
are not being discussed at the level of the PSC or in the FAC even though other
CSDP units might do so (Minard, 2017, pp. 88–89). In this regard, flexible
and fluid processes have been used to manage and circumvent contestation in
learning lessons.
In terms of routines, CSDP officials engage in multiple structured practices
of learning such as working groups, shared evaluations, workshops and writing
reports. CSDP lesson learning practices can be divided into three broad catego-
ries: collecting lessons, knowledge exchange and training efforts. These activ-
ities take place in multiple venues and across the political and tactical levels.
The records of lessons learned are collected from all missions and opera-
tions and are archived in the lessons database (EEAS-1, 2021; EEAS-7, 2021)
and used to produce annual reports. A key problem has been the lack of sys-
tematic contributions to the database, as reported lessons seem to be random
and focused on successes rather than failures (EEAS-3, 2021). In addition,
there are many identification tools used in the process that are either connected
to the specific mandate of missions or operations, or to the institutional back-
grounds of the individuals reporting them. At the level of specific missions
or operations, the collection of lessons is often related to needs assessments.
Therefore, the information that goes into the lessons database does not allow
for any systematic analysis, but the fact that it can be used to produce the
annual report was seen as valuable, as doing something rather than nothing
seems to be acceptable if not encouraged (EEAS-7, 2021).
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The annual lessons report is presented to EUMC and as an annex to the
EEAS annual Conflict Prevention and Crisis Response (CPCR) Report, and
finally presented to the PSC (EEAS-3, 2021). This process, however, has been
undergoing some changes recently. The report was produced by the CMPD
between 2013 and 2016. In 2017 and 2018, the CPSS and EUMS presented
their own CSDP Lessons Reports. Since 2019, the new EEAS Integrated
Approach for Security and Peace Directorate (ISPD) (with an explicit knowl-
edge management mandate) has taken over the responsibility for the overar-
ching annual EEAS CPCR Lessons Report (essentially by putting together the
different reports) (EEAS-3, 2021).
The ISPD now hosts the knowledge management process and it attempts to
record all lessons learned, but the CSDP officials engaged in this process often
look for different lessons depending on their own institutional position. In
addition to the civilian‒military divide, lessons are distinguished by the level
of their (political/strategic) impact, and prioritized areas or specific mandates
such as security sector reform and gender aspects (EEAS-3, 2021). The main
advantage of the annual EEAS CPCR Lessons Report was described as the vis-
ibility that the broadness of the report brings, and therefore also the attention
it generates from the PSC.
Although the general view was that the state of the lessons collection
process is problematic, several respondents highlighted the lessons process
following the first wave of the COVID-19 pandemic in 2020 as a success
(EEAS-2, 2021; EEAS-3, 2021; EEAS-4, 2021; EEAS-7, 2021). The respond-
ents described how the timing of the pandemic meant that they were already
equipped to start the lessons process on the CSDP and COVID-19. The EEAS
facilitated a task force with members from the CCPC, EUMS and ‘all other
relevant actors’ that started to collect lessons both from a headquarters (HQ)
perspective (decision-making) and on the ground (EEAS-3, 2021). Lessons on
key issues such as duty of care towards the personnel deployed in EU missions
and operations allowed better preparation for the second wave. The response to
the COVID-19 pandemic was seen as proof that, although not perfect, the new
institutional processes and a shared methodology for learning lessons could
produce useful results. Representatives from the ISPD spoke of the pandemic
as a moment that raised the profile for knowledge management in the CSDP
(EEAS-3, 2021; EEAS-7, 2021).
CSDP officials also engage in efforts to capture lessons through structured
opportunities of talking to others involved in other aspects of missions and
operations. The activities include conferences, seminars, panels and work-
shops. Some of these activities are organized in Brussels by the CSDP officials
themselves, but many are organized in the member states and by other organ-
izations. Despite efforts to organize opportunities for knowledge exchange,
CSDP officials experienced fragmentation and difficulties finding common
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ground. In fact, representatives from the ISPD found that the digitalization
resulting from the COVID-19 pandemic improved the coherence in knowl-
edge exchange. In their view, virtual meetings had facilitated the process of
exchanging information ‘from one island to another’ (EEAS-7, 2021; EEAS-6,
2021). CSDP officials are busy, and learning lessons is only one aspect of
their responsibilities. Moreover, the usually crowded Brussels calendar makes
it difficult to bring people together for knowledge exchange. Another reason
for the difficulty of facilitating knowledge exchange was the rather commonly
held view among many CSDP officials that they ‘had already learnt’ the rele-
vant lessons; a disposition that tended to make them hesitant to participate in
knowledge exchange exercises (EEAS-3, 2021). Therefore, a key obstacle was
to decrease the perceived burden of participation in these exchange processes.
Finally, the lessons process involves workshops and exercises on best prac-
tices, such as those organized by the European Security and Defence College
(ESDC). For example, the main task of the ESDC’s Working Group on CSDP
Missions and Operations Related Training (WG-MOT) is to propose new
training activities based on the EEAS lesson learning process. In general, exer-
cises might include military training, concept development and standard oper-
ating procedures (EEAS-4, 2021). Training sessions are both standard courses
aimed at different personnel, and adapted based on need. This is an area where
innovative ways of learning lessons are being explored. With the new knowl-
edge management mandate in the ISPD, training is now more closely linked to
concrete deliverables and therefore approached more systematically.
Epistemic Practices
Learning in the context of CSDP missions and operations is also an exercise
in learning how to learn the EU way. EU institutional learning is governed by
specialized language, frameworks and concepts, so practices of learning are
context-based to match the EU model for knowledge management. However,
the legacy of multiple learning processes has resulted in disparities across the
CSDP institutional landscape, and much effort has been focused on increasing
coherence and assuring the recognition of the added value of learning pro-
cesses themselves. This goal of seeking agreement around what constitutes
knowledge, or how lessons are identified and best captured, has materialized
in various epistemic practices (see Bueger, 2016). In this context, epistemic
practices establish CSDP lessons learned as a recognized knowledge produc-
tion. In this way, learning how to engage in learning is a way of becoming
socialized into the institutions by sharing a pragmatic understanding on the
need to identify lessons and to act on them. Since the inception of the EEAS,
a key ambition has been to align concepts and common definitions in the
Comprehensive Approach, which refers to efforts to increase coherency in the
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EU missions and operations: practices of learning lessons in the CSDP 145
EU’s external relations (see Chapter 7). In the context of the CSDP, this has
been done through joint training sessions on learning methodologies and tools
for the EUMS, CPCC and CMPD (EEAS-3, 2021).
The ISPD representative reflected on how it was easier to talk about lesson
learning processes that were different but had some similarities, than to receive
recognition for their mandate to do knowledge management, which they said
was often confused with information management (EEAS-3, 2021). This was
seen as an obstacle because the EUGS framed knowledge management in
relation to leveraging objectives (that is, lessons leading to change). Moreover,
CSDP officials shared a common understanding of the importance of develop-
ing the lesson learning processes.
Although the EU lesson learning approach has succeeded in formalizing
some of the practices of shared learning, communities of practice and their
informal mechanisms still exist outside the institutionalized framework of
knowledge management. The continued separation between formal and infor-
mal practices of learning is notable in the formal record of lessons. When
asked about successful processes of lessons learned from the CSDP, the
respondents of our survey often referred to knowledge gaps that could be
addressed through additional training.7 Moreover, the lesson learning pro-
cesses have developed from an expressed wish to avoid ‘shaming and blaming
exercises’, as these often discourage cooperation (European Parliament, 2012).
In the shared understanding of what constitutes learning lessons, how to avoid
tensions remained important; CSDP officials emphasized the importance of
delivering ‘quick wins’ (EEAS-7, 2021). They also, however, reflected on the
possibility that the fear of issues being too politically sensitive (and therefore
risking push-back from the member states) is sometimes overestimated within
EU institutions. Being overly sensitive to the political red lines was seen as
a constraint to developing lesson learning processes (EEAS-3, 2021). These
practices of contestation management were perceived as a shared repertoire
but still resisted among some of the officials. Although the resistance was not
loud and vocal, they described how at times they would try to see whether
something new ‘would pass’, and how they were often surprised when it did
(EEAS-7, 2021).
The emphasis on the lesson learning process and efforts to strengthen CSDP
knowledge management in some ways appeared more important than actually
learning from past experiences, as the processes were heavily constrained by
7 This is likely also a reflection of the restricted access to lessons documents that
may identify more sensitive lessons at the strategic or political level.
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The everyday making of EU foreign and security policy
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the institutional boundaries and restrictions for information-sharing. Several
success stories referred to attempts of improving the lesson learning process:
EU military missions and ops Force HQs did not have access to share knowledge
from lessons among each other and from other CSDP stakeholders given that they
could not use the classified lessons database in restricted network. As an outcome
EEAS information technology in close cooperation with EUMS and other EEAS
stakeholders developed a project and established the unclassified CSDP lessons
database and online tool. All missions and ops could request for access to learn from
past lessons learned, to upload their lessons, to share with others. (EEAS-4, 2021)
Here, being able to learn together from past experiences was recognized as
a first step towards establishing the common grounds of a learning community
centred around the CSDP.
CONCLUSIONS
This chapter has examined the development of the CSDP, the institutional
architecture surrounding EU missions and operations, and the practices of
learning lessons. The CSDP is an institutionally complex landscape, and EU
missions and operations constitute a field in which practices of EU foreign and
security policy are intertwined in the cultures of cooperation across the EU’s
participation in international security frameworks, most notably the UN and
NATO. As previous research has demonstrated, EU missions and operations
draw together communities of practice with shared understandings of what it
means to enact EU foreign and security policy. These communities of prac-
tice differ from others explored in this book, because of the role of military
institutional legacies. CSDP officials engage in practices that largely build
on previous military practices that have been adapted and evolved through
the interaction with civilian staff. From an institutional learning perspective,
it has been difficult to record or institutionalize the emergence of these
micro-processes of EU integration. There is consensus among CSDP officials
that learning processes take place through informal practices that mainly
depend on the dispositions and shared repertoires of the staff. At the same
time, formalizing and synthesizing learning has been identified as essential to
knowledge management in the Integrated Approach, especially since the aim
is to use the EU’s foreign policy instruments more wisely. Although a general
socialization in matters of CSDP learning appears absent, there is strong com-
mitment to learning-by-doing as a guiding ethos in the field.
The communities of practice that have emerged from EU missions and
operations are to some extent mirrored by learning communities that engage
in multiple lesson learning processes (Faleg, 2017). Attempts to coordinate
shared learning have resulted in practices of knowledge management that
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EU missions and operations: practices of learning lessons in the CSDP 147
are not widely recognized and established. As a result, activities of learning
lessons and the knowledge they produce are far from systematic, and largely
depend on the cooperation and commitment of the actors that engage in them
and their previous experience. Moreover, learning activities are hampered by
the political sensitivities in the CSDP. Therefore, lessons recorded often reflect
a desire to avoid contestation and emphasize identifying practical change that
can easily be achieved. This has led to an overrepresentation of lessons of
knowledge gaps that can be addressed through training efforts.
Despite the difficulty in assessing the impact of institutional learning in the
CSDP, the COVID-19 pandemic has demonstrated the value of established
practices for learning lessons. During the first wave of the pandemic, lessons
learned were immediately recorded through the working routines developed
through the gradual formalization of learning activities. Once analysed, these
lessons resulted in tangible efforts to better prepare EU missions and opera-
tions for future waves. The successful implementation of learning processes
in 2020–2021 signals that the institutional processes were mature enough to
produce coordinated practices in the face of new crises, despite the fragmenta-
tion of practices in this field.
These findings are highly interesting in relation to our book’s focus on the
everyday making of EU foreign and security policy. The multitude of experi-
ence that EU officials and personnel have gathered in the course of almost 20
years of planning and conducting CSDP civilian missions and military opera-
tions provides a rich repertoire of practical understandings on what works (and
what does not) when it comes to EU actions vis-à-vis a wide range of tasks
(for example, peace-building, counter-piracy, border management, military
training and promoting the rule of law). The analysis of the lesson learning
processes and epistemic practices that have emerged in the CSDP suggests
that EU institutions primarily (albeit not exclusively) related to the EEAS are
increasingly sites where various communities of practice in the field of mili-
tary and civilian crisis management are brought together, and this is a resource
that in many ways makes EU actions possible.
Therefore, rather than focusing on, for instance, diverging preferences
among EU member states, the rivalry between the EU and other international
organizations in the field, or the lack of common EU military and defence
capacities as possible obstacles to forming a coherent or effective EU foreign
and security policy, as many contributions in international relations and EU
studies often tend to do, our analysis advances knowledge on how practical
dispositions and situated understandings among CSDP officials in Brussels
and elsewhere have changed as a result of an increasingly institutionalized
practice of learning from past EU mission and operations. That is, this analysis
helps to reveal what these officials ‘think from’ rather than ‘think about’ when
it comes to future EU actions in the field of foreign and security policy. As
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The everyday making of EU foreign and security policy
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the CSDP has evolved, it has become clear that what is increasingly at stake is
the struggle to define the lessons learned from past missions and operations.
Although CSDP officials certainly do not always agree on exactly what lessons
to draw, they are increasingly interacting on the basis of common epistemic
practices of ‘learning the EU way’. This also seems to be incrementally chang-
ing what it is that is perceived to make the CSDP work in practice.
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