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The National-Populist Mutation of Neoliberalism in
Dependent Economies
The Case of Viktor Orbán’s Hungary
Gabor Scheiring, Bocconi University | gabor@gaborscheiring.com
This is the accepted manuscript version of the article. Online supplement is attached at the end.
The published version is available here.
Cite as:
Scheiring, Gábor. 2022. The National-Populist Mutation of Neoliberalism in Dependent
Socio-Economic Review, Advance access,
published on Feb 15, 2022, doi: 10.1093/ser/mwac007
Abstract
This article offers a new conceptual framework to analyze the national-populist mutation of
neoliberalism in foreign-investment-dependent economies. By extending the emerging
literature on the mutation of neoliberalism, the article challenges the conventional view of
populism as a revolt against liberal capitalism and businesses. Following theory-testing process
tracing, the article substantiates this theoretical framework through a detailed mixed-method
study of the strategic test case of Viktor Orbáns Hungary. Utilizing new empirical material on
businesses and policymakers, the article shows how the polarization of the business class
rooted in global dependency structures, in interaction with a rising group of nationalist
technocrats, has contributed to the national-populist mutation of neoliberalism. National-
populist neoliberalism entails a new power bloc, a new compromise between national and
transnational capital. It has preserved the core tenets of neoliberalism while modifying some
of its peripheral elements and cutting back on avant-garde excesses to ensure the political
viability of neoliberalism.
Keywords: neoliberalism, populism, nationalism, dependency, business power
JEL Codes: B520 Current Heterodox Approaches; O1 Economic development; P16 Political
Economy
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1. Introduction
Populism and neoliberalism are among the most fiercely debated topics in the social sciences
however, the two concepts have produced two disjoined bodies of literature. The conventional
approach to populism has characterized it as (Cherlin, 2019,
p. 747), globalization (Norris and Inglehart, 2019),
describing populist leaders as opposed to business elites and liberal economic principles (de
Sousa et al., 2021; Dornbusch and Edwards, 1990). Businesses are, in turn, frequently
hypothesized to oppose populism (Curran and Eckhardt, 2020). Evidence suggests that, in some
cases, businesses indeed mobilize against populists (Kinderman, 2020). Populist regimes are
often described as leading to state capitalism, which is seen as a break with the liberal world
order (Sallai and Schnyder, 2021). In short, the conventional approach to populism
hypothesizes that populist regimes lead to a clash with most businesses and a divergence from
liberal capitalism . The critical analytical
challenge for this approach is to establish the existence of such a decisive break with
neoliberalism and prove the lack of business support for populism.
In contrast to the conventional approach to populism, neoliberalism scholars have been
more skeptical about the supposed clash between right-wing, nationalist populism and
neoliberalism. Weyland (1999) has shown that populism and neoliberalism can cohabit
comfortably. Harmes (2012) has made an essential distinction between internationalism and
neoliberalism. While internationalists embrace all forms of global political cooperation,
neoliberals oppose forms of political globalization that would entail a new set of international
to enhance capital accumulation (Harmes, 2012, p. 59).
Slobodian (2018) has shown that right-wing populism has emerged within neoliberalism
in Germany and Austria, not in opposition to it. Several supporters of Brexit have also argued
for a return to the British state not to challenge neoliberalism but to shield it from European
regulation (Slobodian and Plehwe, 2020) and embark on a new export-oriented neoliberal
trajectory (Wood and Ausserladscheider, 2021). According to this emerging consensus among
neoliberalism scholars, in many cases, right-wing populism is not a wholesale rejection of
neoliberalism but only a variety of it. This new version remains within the neoliberal
(Callison and Manfredi, 2020). In
contrast to the conventional approach to populism, this emerging neoliberalism literature also
3
implies that some businesses support right-wing populists (Feldmann and Glenn, 2021;
Madariaga, 2020; Slobodian, 2021).
Although neoliberalism scholars have made important headways, the exact content of the
recent mutation of neoliberalism remains unclear. Furthermore, macro-institutional and
ideational perspectives dominate this literature,
1
which has led to a lack of sociological
analyses about the specific conditions under which businesses support the mutation of
neoliberalism. Finally, the neoliberal mutation literature focuses on core capitalist countries;
the same dynamics in dependent economies have received less attention.
2
Thus, the analytical
challenge for the emerging literature on neoliberal mutation is to demonstrate the continuity of
core neoliberal principles in right-wing populist regimes and to show which businesses under
what circumstances support populist regimes in dependent economies.
This article enters the debate by bringing the populism and neoliberalism literatures into
dialogue and addressing their two analytical challenges in parallel through a detailed mixed-
-invoked
textbook case of populism (Mudde and Kaltwasser, 2017; Norris and Inglehart, 2019).
(Magyar, 2016)
practices victimize the majority of businesses. Followers of this perspective argue that except
-Orbán era. Referring
to highly politicized clashes with businesses and the IMF, many argue that Hungary has
abandoned neoliberalism. According to Appel and Orenstein (2018, pp. 160-65), Orbán has
-
The nationalist de-financialization of the banking sector indeed points to a significant
modification of the pre-2010 neoliberal model (Ban and Bohle, 2021; Johnson and Barnes,
(Bluhm and Varga, 2019)(Geva, 2021) discourse plays a vital role in the
legitimation o
changed little (Ban and Bohle, 2021; Bohle and Regan, 2021; Stubbs and Lendvai-Bainton,
1
But see Naczyk (2021) for an important recent exception.
2
Madariaga (2020) is an important exception, though not talking about the mutation but the resilience of
neoliberalism.
4
2020). Fabry (2019), Ban et al. (2021), and Scheiring (2021) have started to apply the notion
-Central Europe and Hungary specifically.
a widely accepted measure of
neoliberal policies compiled by a leading neoliberal think-tanksupports the argument of
neoliberal resilience in Hungary. With Orbán in power, the Heritage Index of Economic
Freedom has remained stable, fluctuating around its 2010 value, as Figure 1 shows. In 2021, it
is 2% higher than it was in 2010. Some dimensions, such as government spending, taxation, or
investment freedom, have become more neoliberal. Other dimensions, most notably business
freedom, have become less neoliberal. According to the Heritage Foundation, property rights
freedom declined until 2016 but climbed back to its 2010 value by 2021.
Figure 1. Stable neoliberal policy mix with changing components, 2010-2021
Note:
economic freedom as defined by Heritag
URL: https://www.heritage.org/index/excel/2021/index2021_data.xls (last access: Jul/18/2021).
neoliberalism in dependent economies and the role of business in populist regimes? This article
develops a new conceptual framework to analyze the mutation of neoliberalism in dependent
economies. Following theory-testing process tracing, utilizing new empirical material on
businesses and policymakers, the article shows how severe foreign investment dependence has
60
70
80
90
100
110
120
130
140
ECONOMIC FREEDOM INDEX
AND SELECTED COMPONENTS, 2010=100%
(THREE-YEAR MOVING AVERAGES)
Government
Spending
Tax Burden
Investment
Freedom
Overall Score
Property
Rights
Business
Freedom
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polarized the business class. In interaction with a rising group of nationalist technocrats, this
polarization has contributed to the national-populist mutation of neoliberalism in Hungary.
National-populist neoliberalism entails a new power bloc comprising both national and
transnational capitalists, preserving the core elements of the neoliberal accumulation strategy
while modifying some of its non-core tenets to ensure its political viability.
The following section defines neoliberalism and juxtaposes it to developmentalism. The
subsequent section proposes a theoretical framework concentrating on dependency and
business power to analyze the mutation of neoliberalism in foreign-investment-dependent
economies. Section 4 briefly outlines the empirical strategy, with further methodological
details presented in the online supplement (Appendix A). Section 5 presents the empirical
results in four sub-sections. First, it describes the institutionalization of globalist neoliberalism,
followed by the polarization of the business class, the rise of nationalist technocrats, and finally,
the institutionalization of national-populist neoliberalism. The last section presents the
concluding discussion.
2. Neoliberalism and its alternatives
Mudge (2008, p. 704) professional
ralism is
-democratic
(Amable, 2010, p. 7)
(Slobodian, 2018, p. 34) to curtail excessive democratic
intervention in business affairs (Madariaga, 2020). Neoliberalism does not dismantle the state
but builds new state institutions to improve the conditions of accumulation (Evans and Sewell,
2013; Harvey, 2005). Market--
neol-faire
doctrine characteristic of the nineteenth- (Evans and Sewell, 2013, p. 43), nor
m in the 1990s and 2000s. Neoliberalism has included
-(Peck and Tickell, 2002, p. 384) to constitute
markets and protect them from democratic intervention (Madariaga, 2020; Slobodian, 2018).
Close to the notion of neoliberalism as a form of politics, I regard neoliberalism as an
accumulation strategy. As suggested by Jessop (1991, p. 161)
-economic
Such accumulation strategies represent temporarily stable ways of the capitalist
circuit, where various fractions of the business class are conjoined, usually under the leadership
6
of a dominant fraction. In core capitalist countries, the Keynesian social-democratic
configuration was the accumulation strategy of the post-war era. At the same time, import-
substitution developmentalismincluding state socialismwas the accumulation strategy in
semi-peripheral countries. Neoliberalism emerged as the alternative to these strategies.
Following Amable and Palombarini (2008), Madariaga (2016), and Ban (2016), I
differentiate the core tenets of neoliberalism (high-hierarchy institutions) and the peripheral
aspects (low-hierarchy institutions). Peripheral, low-hierarchy institutions can change without
jeopardizing core, high-
shocks to ensure
its survival (Madariaga, 2020)
dominant social groups to defend those aspects of a neoliberal policy regime thatin their
viewbetter serve their interests while allowing degrees of freedom in those aspects that they
(Amable and Palombarini, 2008, p. 640).
How can we ascertain whether changes remain within the confines of neoliberalism? At
the core of neoliberalism are a set of institutions designed to serve three primary goals: 1)
credibility with financial markets, 2) trade and financial openness, and 3) competitiveness
(Ban, 2016, p. 10). To differentiate neoliberal adaptation from a switch to an alternative
accumulation strategy in Hungarya typical dependent, semi-peripheral economywe need
to break down the core goals of neoliberalism and developmentalism into a set of key
institutions and policies.
As Table 1 shows, historical versions of developmentalism (e.g., Japan or South Korea)
from neoliberalism in all five dimensions (Ban, 2016; Evans, 1995; Evans and Sewell, 2013;
Madariaga, 2020; Maggor, 2021; Naczyk, 2021; Thurbon, 2016). Activist, sector-specific
industrial policy targeting import substitution and technological upgrading is core to
developmentalism. While the developmental state involves business groups in decision-
making, it retains a high degree of bureaucratic autonomy. Neoliberalism rejects industrial
policy or relies on sector-neutral industrial policy at best. Instead of promoting domestic
productive capacities directly, it promotes economic internationalization and involves
internationally competitive businesses in decision-making. Developmentalist fiscal policy is
expansionary, relying on progressive income and capital taxation. Neoliberalism prizes fiscal
policy credibility and prefers lower progressivity and lower capital taxation. Developmentalist
social coalitions often incorporated strong trade unions and the popular sector (in Latin
America) or relied on corporatism (in East Asia), leading to a regulated labor market and
7
increasing labor income. Neoliberalism leads to a decline in labor share, deregulated labor
markets, and aims to insulate economic policy-making from popular pressures emanating from
trade unions.
Table 1. Core aspects of the two dominant accumulation strategies in dependent economies
DEVELOPMENTALISM
NEOLIBERALISM
INDUSTRIAL
POLICY
* Economic nationalism (import
substitution)
* Embedded autonomy (involving
national capital in decision making
while retaining independent
bureaucracy)
* Promote technological upgrading
to higher value-added production
* Significant state ownership in
strategic sectors
* International competitiveness
* Economic openness,
liberalization
* Involving internationally
competitive (primarily
transnational) businesses into
decision-making
* Neutral industrial policy (R&D,
PPP, etc.)
* Low share of state ownership
(privatization)
FISCAL
POLICY
* Expansionary budget policy
funded through debts
* State investment
* Strongly progressive income
taxation,
* High capital taxation, sectoral
taxes, export and import taxes
* Balanced budget, fiscal policy
credibility
* Declining progressivity of
income taxation
* Low capital taxation
SOCIAL AND
LABOR
MARKET
POLICY
* Redistributive social policy
* Increasing labor share in national
income
* Regulated labor market
* Involving strong unions in
decision-making (LA*) or
corporatism (EA*)
* Declining labor share in national
income
* Deregulated labor market
* Insulating economic decision-
making from trade unions
FINANCIAL
POLICY
* Subordinate finance to
developmental priorities
* Significant state-owned
(developmental) banking
* Central bank subordinated to the
government
* Expansionary monetary policy
* Capital controls
* Domestic debt finance
* Financial market credibility
* Restricted state-owned
(developmental banking)
* Central bank independence
* Monetary policy targeting low
inflation
* Liberalized capital market and
debt finance
LEGITIMACY
* Technological upgrading
* Creating internationally
competitive national capitalists
* National self-sufficiency
sovereignty
* Incorporation of popular pressures
* Economic modernization
* International economic and
political integration
* International credibility
Note:
* LA = Latin America. EA = East Asia
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Developmentalism subordinates finance to developmental goals, while neoliberal
financial policy focuses on maintaining credibility with international financial markets: central
bank independence, inflation targeting, capital market liberalization, and restricted
developmental banking. Developmentalism legitimates itself through technological upgrading,
-sufficiency. Incorporating popular
pressures (either through an active partnership or corporatism) is also an important source of
legitimacy for developmentalist regimes. In contrast, neoliberalism relies on the idea of
modernization as a source of legitimacy. Neoliberalism views international economic and
political integration as important milestones and uses international credibility as the hallmark
of capable leadership.
This list is not exhaustive and does not cover several peripheral aspects of existing
neoliberal regimes differing from country to country. These two models are ideal types based
on historical examples, but different countries might put different weights on various core
aspects. Neoliberalism is constantly evolving (Madariaga, 2020; Peck and Tickell, 2002),
always negotiated by local actors filtered through domestic power struggles and ideational
frameworks (Bohle and Greskovits, 2012), leading to different hybrids (Ban, 2016). However,
as long as politics adheres to these core institutions, neoliberalism remains neoliberalism.
3. The national-populist mutation of neoliberalism
To analyze the process of neoliberal mutation, I rely on an emerging body of scholarship that
attempts re-integrate business power into the study of institutional dynamics (Amable and
Palombarini, 2008; Madariaga, 2016; Naczyk, 2021). In semi-peripheral, dependent
economies, the business class is polarized based on access to international markets and
technology. Compared to transnational capitalists, national capitalists have less access to the
most successful sectors of the global economy. Therefore, the national bourgeoisie of
peripheral states is structurally prone to rely directly on its political connections to compete
with transnational companies. However, transnational capital must also compromise with
domestic political and economic elites to secure the conditions of accumulation (Gates, 2008;
Schrank, 2008).
Technocratspolicymakers possessing high cultural and social capital in decision-
making positions who also occupy key positions in the business sectorprovide interpretative
schemes that shape the trajectory of policymaking (Bandelj, 2008). This way, they align the
interests of businesses and politicians, act as mediators between business and politics and
contribute to elaborating the neoliberal compromise. In the absence of a capitalist class,
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technocrats were also crucial actors in the first phase of the market transition in postsocialist
Hungary (Bockman and Eyal, 2002; Eyal et al., 1998), elaborating and legitimizing
neoliberalism as an accumulation strategy.
Economic crises act as historical contingencies that throw the class compromise between
economic crises and attempt to redefine the political-legal arrangements in ways that facilitate
(Prechel, 2007, p. 6). In these situations, elites need to reach a new
consensus and reconstitute the power bloc (Amable and Palombarini, 2008; Jessop, 1991). The
balance of power determines whether the response to these crises leads to a new accumulation
strategy or a modification of peripheral aspects of the prevailing accumulation strategy
(Madariaga, 2020). If the national capitalist class is strong enough to mobilize but weak to
dominate transnational capital, and if populists can mobilize popular disillusionment with
neoliberalism, then the resolution of the crisis of the neoliberal accumulation strategy will be
the national-populist mutation of neoliberalism.
(Weyland, 1999) liberal
(Harmes, 2012), I regard national-
neoliberal project from po(Hendrikse, 2018, p. 170)
political claims-makingthat is, a way of formulating appeals to a mass public using a
Manichean logic that opposes the virtuous people to corrupt elites and affiliated out-
(Gidron and Bonikowski, 2013, p. 24)
promote their vision of what is right for the country and, in principle, are aimed at producing
(Mazepus et al., 2016, p. 354). National-populist
neoliberalism is thus a compromise between the core of neoliberalism and the political
imperatives of advancing national interests, relying on populism as a legitimation strategy.
In Hungary, national-populist neoliberalism emerged as an alternative to globalist
neoliberalism. However, globalist neoliberalism is not unique to Hungary. It corresponds to
what Nancy Fraser (2017) called progressive neoliberalism in core countries and what Bohle
and Greskovits (2012) labeled as embedded neoliberalism in the foreign-investment-dependent
economies of East-Central Europe.
3
Globalist neoliberalism was a specific accumulation
3
Globalist neoliberalism also differs from the radical neoliberalism exemplified by Chile or the Baltic states in
dependent semi-peripheral countries (Madariaga, 2020)
countries (Peck and Tickell, 2002), which relied on an authoritarian-conservative populist legitimation strategy
(Hall, 1985).
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strategy maintained by the class compromise of transnational corporations (TNCs),
technocrats, and politicians. It institutionalized an industrial policy based on economic
openness and a strict preference for transnational capital. Taxation became increasingly less
progressive, with a race to the bottom on corporate taxation. It also incorporated
redistributionist strategies and some inclusionary social policies to pacify the victims of
neoliberalism, which led to a combination of austerity to maintain fiscal balance and recurring
deficits and cycles of indebtedness. Discursively, globalist neoliberalism offered economic
modernization, a cosmopolitan ideology of human rights, democratization, and European
integration as a source of mass legitimation. It also attempted to depoliticize economic
questions to prevent the political mobilization of economic anger.
The exhaustion of this globalist neoliberal accumulation strategy led to the polarization of
the business class and the growing influence of nationalist technocrats. Facilitated by national-
populist politicians, national capitalists reached a new compromise with transnational capital,
retaining the core aspects of neoliberalism. Figure 2 presents a summary of this process.
Figure 2. The national-populist mutation of neoliberalism in dependent economies
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4. Empirical strategy
I follow theory-testing process tracing, seeking to test the midrange theory outlined in the
previous section (Beach and Pedersen, 2013). I analyze business group advocacy, the
relationship between policymakers and the business class, critical
beneficiaries. I concentrate on four fields: industrial policy, fiscal policy, social and labor
market policy, and legitimation strategy. While these fields do not cover all policies, they are
sufficient to map and differentiate neoliberalism from developmentalism. Financial and
monetary policy is beyond the scope of this study; however, I discuss efforts to change the
I follow a mixed-method approach relying on three primary data sources (see Appendix
A in the online supplement for more details on the data). The first dataset comprises data on
the political connections of Hungarian capitalists encompassing the 2002-2018 period,
including 222 individuals from publicly available publications about the 100 wealthiest
businesspersons (see Table A1, Supplement). I identified the main factions of the national
capitalist class based on the role of political capital in their capital accumulation. Second, I also
gathered and analyzed the press coverage of national capitalists and business advocacy
organizations representing domestic and transnational businesses, covering 1990-2014
(altogether more than 3,600 printed pages). I use these data to analyze the political implications
of the polarization of national and transnational capital, identifying which groups of the
national capitalist class pushed for the amendment of globalist neoliberalism. The results of the
content analysis of the press material are summarized as 20 quotes in Appendix C of the
Supplement.
Third, to analyze how policymakers channel business interests into the policymaking
process, I collected data on 194 policymakers with economic portfolios (ministers and
secretaries of state), covering 1990-2014 (see Table A2, Supplement). I identified left-liberal
and right-wing policymakers and analyzed their embeddedness in the transnational or domestic
economic sectors. Technocrats are a subcategory of policymakers with significant ties to the
business
political positions. I fit logistic regression to identify the odds of ever being employed in a TNC
among left-liberal and right-wing policymakers (see Table A3, Supplement, for descriptive
statistics). I extend this quantitative analysis with a qualitative overview of the most important
policies in the four fields. Finally, I also analyze policy outcomes relying on international
macro-data presented in the Supplement (Appendix B).
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I use the notions of left-liberal and right-wing referring to political positions, not
ideological categories. In the early 1990s, the Hungarian Democratic Forum (MDF), later
, the Hungarian
Socialist Party (MSZP) and its allies (until 2010 dominantly the Alliance of Free Democrats,
SZDSZ) denote the left-liberal political pole (see Table A4, Supplement for a list of
postsocialist governments in Hungary and their political positioning).
5. Businesses, technocrats, and the mutation of neoliberalism in Hungary
5.1 The institutionalization of globalist neoliberalism
neoliberal economic policies in Hungary (Eyal et al., 1998). This technocracy influenced both
right- and left- es. In the 1990-2010
period, left- -
policies (cf. Appel and Orenstein, 2018), going way beyond the core tenets of neoliberalism.
However, right-wing governments also accepted globalist neoliberalism. The strong
embeddedness of left-liberal policymakers in the networks of transnational and financial
businesses shows the power of globalist-neoliberal technocrats within the left-liberal elite.
When globalist neoliberalism exhausted and ran into crisis, this asymmetric embeddedness
paved the way for the economic-nationalist turn of right-wing policymakers in the 2000s.
Nationalist technocrats were crucial to align the interests of national capitalists and right-wing
politicians (Fidesz).
I quantified the embeddedness of left-liberal and right-wing policymakers in the
transnational and domestic business sectors. I found that while 36% of the left-liberal
policymakers occupied key positions in transnational corporations (TNCs) in the 1990-2014
period, only 15% of the right-wing policymakers did so. Focusing on the top of the economic
policy elitei.e., ministers and prime ministersyields the same results. While only 9% of
right-wing ministers and prime ministers took a position in TNCs, 33% of the left-liberal
ministers and prime did so between 1990 and 2014. I found very similar asymmetries
concerning the financial sector. While 38.4% of the left-liberal policymakers held some
position in financial businesses, only 17.5% of the right-wing policymakers did so.
Filtering out the effect of age, place of birth, education, gender, and whether policymakers
had a political career beyond their government position, I found that in the 1990-2014 period,
left-liberal policymakers had 3.83 higher odds of being embedded in the transnational sector
than right-wing policymakers (Table B1, Supplement). Left-liberal policymakers also had 3.2
13
higher odds of being embedded in the banking sector (Table B2, Supplement). The results hold
when including policymakers with dual political affiliations (Tables B3, B4).
On the other hand, ever holding an elected political position is significantly negatively
associated with the odds of being embedded in the transnational sector. This underlines the
importance of technocrats among policymakers, who used their business reputation and
expertise and not political elections to legitimize their role in policymaking. Globalist
neoliberal technocrats connecting the political class and the transnational business class played
a crucial role in translating the interests of TNCs and banks into policymaking and legitimizing
globalist neoliberalism.
Figure 3. The probability of being affiliated with transnational corporations (1990-2014)
Note:
Predictions based on adjusted logistic regression with an added linear fit. Dependent variable: ever affiliated with
a TNC (ref.: no). Model adjusted for age at the first governmental position, born in Budapest, gender, degree in
economics or finance, ever held political office. The model only includes policymakers with an economic portfolio
and excludes policymakers with dual political affiliations. N=156.
Figure 3 summarizes the adjusted association by showing the very large and significant
difference in the predicted probability of ever holding a position in a TNC between right-wing
and left-liberal policymakers. Here, ever holding a position in a TNC is the dependent variable
We would obtain similar results by design
14
when switching the dependent and independent variables. These elementary correlational
models are not designed to ascertain causality or its direction. This is not a mere methodological
limitation but also a corollary of the theoretical framework. The aim is not to ascertain whether
economic affiliation results from political position or whether politics is the outcome driven by
business interests. This analysis aims to show that there is an affinity between business sectors
and political positions. Both politics and business elites are autonomous and also mutually
dependent. Political and economic history unfolds under the impact of multiple causal forces
established by the regression models work in detail, how the balance of competing constitutive
forces changes through time, leading to temporally fragile resolutions.
Industrial policy. In industrial policy, privatization, liberalization, and foreign investment
promotion dominated the globalist neoliberal accumulation strategy of the 1990s and 2000.
The first conservative government introduced an extremely stringent bankruptcy law in 1992,
while international competition skyrocketed with the rapid external opening of the economy.
This led to severe deindustrialization and the loss of integrated domestic business organizations
and networks (Scheiring, 2020). Despite a short-lived effort to facilitate access to credits for
property
was restricted throughout the 1990s and 2000s. The 1994-1998 left-liberal government
accelerated privatization, including the sale of public utility companies to foreign investors.
Hungary spearheaded the competition for TNCs throughout the 1990-2010 period in the
Visegrad region (Appel and Orenstein, 2018; Bohle and Greskovits, 2012). However, these
TNCs operate in isolation from the domestic economy. Productive technology-intensive
transnational corporations generate the bulk of export revenue, while labor-intensive domestic
companies lack access to high-value-added markets.
Fiscal policy. Some fundamental tenets of globalist neoliberalism were contradictory from
the perspective of fiscal policy. The low taxation of capital, the push towards flat income tax,
jobless growth, and pension and social policies designed to pacify the victims of neoliberal
reforms led to recurrent fiscal deficits. These fiscal deficits led to multiple harsh neoliberal
austerity packages between 1990-2010, adhering to the core neoliberal principle of restoring
competitiveness through internal devaluation. With Lajos Bokros as finance minister, the left-
slashing social spending, repressing the real wage, and restraining domestic demand. In the
same year, the government cut the corporate tax rate to half, bringing it to 18%, further reduced
15
to 16% in 2004, eroding fiscal capacity and paving the way for another bout of fiscal deficit in
the second half of the 2000s.
Social and labor market policy. Globalist neoliberalism entailed deepening
neoliberalization of social and labor market policies, combined with initial attempts at
pacifying the victims of economic reforms through pension schemes and other inclusionary
social policies. The left-liberal Medgyessy government (2002-2004) also made a short-lived
effort to stimulate internal demand by raising public sector wages. However, these wage gains
eroded in the following years. After Medgyessy was forced to resign in 2004, his follower, PM
Ferenc Gyurcsány, returned the left-
indebtedness through foreign currency loans. The labor market also became more and more
responsibility for unemployment to the unemployed and restricted access to social benefits. On
paper, trade unions were supposed to be involved in economic policy decisions; however, in
practice, unions were sidelined when implementing critical neoliberal policiesa
(Ost, 2000).
Legitimation strategy. Strategic pensions, i.e., extending early retirement, were central to
the legitimation of globalist neoliberalism (Bohle and Greskovits, 2012; Bruszt, 2006). The
policy agenda was dominated by economic modernization and competitiveness as reference
points to justify painful reforms. This economic modernization discourse was more broadly
embedded in a cosmopolitan discourse of human rights, democratization, and European
integration, emphasizing maintaining credibility with international financial markets. There
was little desire to include the popular masses in policymaking. Elites regularly tried to
depoliticize the discourse around economic issues. Agnes Gagyi (2016) has labeled this
human rights. Later, this allowed the political right to mobilize majoritarian sentiments and
(Scheiring and Szombati, 2020).
5.2 Business-class polarization and the mobilization of national capitalists
Analyzing data on the 100 richest Hungarians, Scheiring (2020) found that national capitalists
gradually abandoned their ties to the left-liberal political elite during the 2000s and favored
Fidesz while still in opposition. Starting from 2005, national capitalists were predominantly
16
oriented towards the political right. Extending on this research, this article identifies the most
significant segments of the national capitalist class based on the role of their political relations
in their business strategies in the 2010-2018 period, as well as the relationship of the two main
Figure 4
Note: Note:
The size of the circles corresponds to the size of the specific segment of the business class. The overlaps indicate
that it is possible to move between the segments. For example, some emerging capitalists have become political
capitalists, while some political capitalists fell out with Fidesz and became passives.
Political capitalists (13 people) are billionaires whose capital accumulation largely
depends on public procurement and other state-dependent markets. Fidesz started with a
efforts at building an economic hinterland were pre-meditated, systematic, and aggressive
compared to the passive strategy of the Socialist Party, which built on its inherited network
(Quote Q1, Appendix C, Supplement). Political capitalists are loyal to Fidesz because they
accumulate wealth relying on their political connections. They are in the limelight of media
attention and corruption research; therefore, there is no need to illustrate their activities here
further.
Committed conservatives (11 people) are billionaires whose capital accumulation is not
directly related to the state; they accumulated their wealth on the market. They are vocal
supporters of conservative right-wing politics on an ideological basis. Committed
conservatives play an essential role in the media sector and make great efforts at coalition-
Transnational capitalistsNational capitalists
Political
capitalists
Passives
Committed
conservatives
Emerging
capitalists
Opposition
capitalists
Coopted
capitalists
Industrial export capital
Finance and
service capital
17
building and establishing the right-wing ideological hegemony. Gábor Széles is the most well-
known figure of this group, who frequently represents the interests of the whole national
capitalist class as the head of the Confederation of Hungarian Employers and Industrialists
(MGYOSZ). He played a critical role in bringing national capitalists and the political right
closer. He already tried this in 1991 (Quote Q2, Supplement). However, the right-wing political
elite was ambivalent towards the capitalists in the 1990s: they had a political aversion against
managers of ex-state socialist companies who dominated the emerging national capitalist class
in the early 1990s (Böröcz and Róna-Tas, 1995). The proposition put forward by Széles caused
an uproar within the conservative parliamentary group and was quickly rejected. The position
of national capitalists was nothing better under subsequent left-liberal and right-wing
governments, including the first Orbán-government (Quote Q3, Supplement).
The turning point came in the second half of the 2000s. In 2004, Széles bought Magyar
Hírlap, the hitherto liberal daily. This represented a significant step towards building a right-
wing media empire, which was soon followed by the establishment of Echo T.V., a right-
leaning news channel. Even though his relationship with the political right was not very close
(Quote Q4, Supplement), Széles continued to use his network and newfound media influence
to push his economic nationalist agenda. His efforts started to bear fruit in the second half of
the 2000s. He played a crucial role in nurturing the rise of nationalist technocrats who played
a central role in Fide-nationalist policy turn, as section 5.3 will demonstrate.
Emerging capitalists (20 people) are investors whose capital accumulation is also not
directly related to the state; they accumulated their wealth on the market. The key reason for
their loyalty to Fidesz is their belief that Fidesz is more capable of tackling economic dualism
and supporting national capitalists than left-liberal parties are. During the 2000s, with the left-
liberal coalition in power continuing to push for neoliberal reforms, many emerging capitalists
concluded that Fidesz was more open to promoting national capital accumulation (Quote Q5,
Supplement). Some of them, such as Béla Karsai, the owner of a company producing basic
materials for the plastic industry, even joined Fidesz. He decided to run for mayor in
Székesfehérvár (Quote Q6, Supplement). Several emerging capitalists are directly involved in
in developmental states, direct access to policymaking is not conditioned on strict performance
criteria monitored by the bureaucracy to push national capitalists to higher value-added
production (Evans, 1995; Maggor, 2021). The government supports national capitalists to
continue their low-tech, labor-intensive, low value-added mode of production. One of them,
18
national capitalists are not necessarily opposed to attacks on liberal democracy if it favors their
economic interests (Quote Q7, Supplement).
György Wáberer, the one-
ive example of emerging capitalists.
Wáberer has sought contact with MSZP politicians but complained that they appeared aloof
and unopen to improving the situation of national capitalists. He only gained access to
policymaking when György Matolcsy became M
government (Quote Q8, Supplement). Later on, the Orbán government invited Wáberer to join
the board of the Rába Automotive Group, a newly nationalized company with a long pedigree.
This again shows that not only
nationalization-privatization activities. The next turn came in 2015 when Wáberer was
appointed ministerial commissioner for logistics. His first actions included introducing stricter
rules for inspecting foreign truck drivers and reducing administrative burdens for domestic road
haulage operators.
The co-opted capitalists (10 people) comprise capitalists who maintained good
connections with left-liberal governments but later changed their allegiance. The accumulation
of their original wealth was unrelated to Fidesz. Co-opted capitalists are the heavyweights of
the Hungarian capitalist class. The best examples are the two best-known Hungarian
billionaires, Sándor Demján and Sándor Csányi. They were committed to bringing Fidesz to
power before 2010 and keeping it there. Demjánwho was also the president of the National
Association of Entrepreneurs and Employers (VOSZ) representing Hungarian entrepreneurs
frequently topped the list of the 100 richest Hungarians. He openly stood up for Fidesz in an
interview before the 2010 government change (Quote Q9, Supplement). Demján also argued
that MSZP failed to realize the importance of creating a national bourgeoisie and did not go far
enough in restricting social policies (Quote Q10, Supplement). Sándor Csányi also advocated
for Fidesz in 2009, with the left-liberal coalition still in power, praising Viktor Orbán for being
more interested in his opinion than the left-liberal government (Quote Q11, Supplement). In
2018,
(OTP), Csányi emphasized that keeping Orbán in power would benefit the banking sector,
highlighting that the relationship between financial institutions, the central bank, and the
government is excellent (Quote Q12, Supplement).
The story of another co-opted capitalist, János Kóka, exemplifies how the alliance of
national capitalists and Fidesz can overwrite previous liberal political commitments. Kóka,
19
100 richest persons in the early 2000s, was the chairperson of the
neoliberal Alliance of Free Democrats (SZDSZ) between 2007 and 2008 and minister of the
-liberal government. However, Kóka started cooperating
with the post-2010 Orbán-government; he even received a diplomatic passport. In an interview,
justification (Quote Q13, Supplement). Orbán is, in fact, explicit in his efforts to co-opt high-
profile left-liberal capitalists into his regime (Quote Q14, Supplement).
Passive capitalists (140 people)
rules of the game without challenging or criticizing national-populist politics. Their capital
accumulation is also not connected to Fidesz directly. The only group whose members
occasionally voice criticism of the government is the shrinking group of opposition capitalists
(6 people). They are capitalists who expressed their dissatisfaction with the government or were
previously closely affiliated with left-liberal governments without a sign of having changed
their allegiance. They are under increasing pressure from the government to change their
position.
TNCs in the manufacturing export sector
mobilization of disgruntled national capitalists, transnational capital retained its dominant
position in the most significant sectors of the economy. As section 5.4 will show in more detail,
Orb
profitability of transnational manufacturing capital. As a consequence, the majority of
According to Marie-
Theres Thiell, Vice President of the German-Hungarian Chamber of Commerce, 95% of
German companies are satisfied with Orbán (Quote Q15, Supplement). Jan Mainka, chief
editor Budapester Zeitung, a leading local German-language newspaper, came to a similar
conclusion, stating that 90% of German investors in Hungary would vote for Orbán (Quote
Q16, Supplement).
Transnational industrial policy, centered on EU subsidies, plays a vital role in maintaining
the coalition with transnational capital (Medve- . As German
capital is a significant beneficiary of these subsidies, German conservatives, including Angela
Merkel, provided critical background assistance in smoothing the tensions around Orbán in
European and German politics until recently (Kelemen, 2017). According to the European
Anti-Fraud Office, the Hungarian government is the most corrupt in Europe concerning how
EU funds are spent (OLAF, 2019). Nevertheless, when visiting Hungary in 2019, Merkel
20
5.3 The rise of nationalist technocrats
The economic nationalism of national capitalists met with the views of a rising group of
nationalist technocrats who provided a new interpretation of the exhaustion of globalist
neoliberalism. Nationalist technocrats became stronger, while globalist neoliberals became
gradually more peripheral on the political right. The share of nationalist technocratsright-
wing policymakers with ties to the domestic business sectorgrew from the initial 46% in the
first conservative government to 59% in 2010-2014 (Figure B1, Supplement). On the other
hand, the share of right-wing policymakers embedded in the transnational business sector was
only 11% between 2010 and 2014, the lowest in the 1990-2014 period.
Three nationalist technocrats played a crucial role in translating the mobilization of
national capitalists into a new nationalist economic policy: László Parragh, Kristóf Szatmáry,
2002 and 20102013), and governor of the Hungarian National Bank (MNB) since 2013
time of the first Orbán government. Although he occupied important positions, the ministry of
finance and other close allies around
accumulation strategy during the 1998-2002 Orbán government. After losing power in 2002,
Orbán broke up with his globalist neoliberal advisers and entrusted Matolcsy with coordinating
nomic strategy. In doing so, Matolcsy relied heavily on the proposals of
national capitalists at the Hungarian and the Budapest Chamber of Commerce. The need to
correct the dominance of foreign capital gradually gained momentum in the economic program
deve
speeches.
The ex-businessman László Parragh also played a crucial role in the economic-nationalist
rent already under the first
Orbán government in 2001, when his company received significant financial support. After his
company went bankrupt, he switched to business advocacy. He first became the vice president
of the Confederation of Hungarian Employers and Industrialists (MGYOSZ) as a protégé of
Hungarian Chamber of Commerce and Industry (MKIK), representing the interests of
domestically owned small- and medium-sized enterprises. MKIK cooperated with Fidesz when
it was in opposition after Fidesz lost in the 2002 election. In 2006, Parragh justified this by
21
criticizing the left- favoring transnational capital (Quote Q18,
Supplement).
Parragh made the critical step of pushing Kristóf Szatmárya former member of the
to become the head of the Budapest
the 1994 elections. The chairperson of the national caucus of the Entrepreneurs Party was
Kristóf Szatmáry. As Fidesz integrated the Entrepreneurs Party into itself, Szatmáry became a
Fidesz MP in 2006, bringing his business networks. In 2008, still under the left-liberal
government and supported by László Parragh, Szatmáry was elected to be the president of
BKIK for four years, then in 2012, he was re-elected. Thus, Szatmáry and Parragh acquired
power positions through the chamber system while Fidesz was in opposition. These positions
provided substantial organizational resources, allowing these technocrats to act as crucial
network hubs to translate the interests of national capitalists into policy under the aegis of the
political right.
A group of political theo
most influential think tank, aided these nationalist technocrats (Buzogány and Varga, 2018).
-statist thinking into Hungarian conservativism,
arguing for a break with cosmopolitanism and a return to national sovereignty. However, as
Bluhm and Varga (2019, p. 652)
a rejection of all neol
technocrats did not represent a total break with neoliberalism: their main goal was to accelerate
domestic capital accumulation. They supported neoliberal social and fiscal policy and only
wanted to change the one-sided preference for foreign investment. In an interview in May 2011,
-
reforms of the Slovakian Dzurinda government as the example that informed the Orbán
After losing the 2002 election, Fidesz carried out a strategic turn. The party leadership
detected the growing frustration of national capitalists, increasingly distanced itself from
globalist neoliberalism, and positioned itself as the sole representative of the national
bourgeoisie. Showing the influence of nationalist technocrats and signaling a departure from
the hostility that characterized the relationship of national capitalists and the right in the 1990s,
in the run-up to the 2010 election, Viktor Orbán visited several domestically owned big
businesses, promising better treatment if his party wins the election. Soon after the government
22
change, Viktor Orbán confirmed his intention to provide outstanding support for national
capitalists (Quote Q20, Supplement).
5.4 The institutionalization of national-populist neoliberalism
The exhaustion of globalist neoliberalism became apparent during the 2008 financial crisis, but
it started much earlier (Bandelj and Finley, 2019). The polarization of the business class pushed
the national bourgeoisie to mobilize for interest realignment within the power bloc. The
exhaustion of globalist neoliberalism also eroded the legitimacy of globalist technocrats,
shifting the policymaking field in favor of economic nationalists. Combined with the
disillusionment of large swaths of the population with postsocialist neoliberalism, these
dynamics led to an overwhelming Fidesz victory at the 2010 parliamentary election. Viktor
class, the national bourgeoisie, and transnational capital.
Industrial policy. The promotion of export-oriented foreign investment still dominates
industrial policy. However, economic nationalism also significantly influences non-
technological sectors that play a minor role in generating export revenue. These measures led
to a relative decline in the foreign direct investment (FDI) stock from 68% of the GDP in 2010
(78% in 2012) to 60% in 2019 (see Figure B2, Supplement). While foreign manufacturing and
logistics companies are clear winners, the share of TNCs in the service sector declined (Figure
B3, Supplement). Energy services experienced the most significant shift, where the share of
FDI declined by more than 40%. Financial nationalism also led to a temporary drop in the share
of financial sector FDI. However, it increased in recent years, so the share of foreign investment
in the financial sector was the same in 2019 as in 2010. At the same time, the FDI stock in
manufacturing as a percentage of the GDP doubled between 2010 and 2019, significantly
increasing the dependence in this sector, particularly increasing the power of German
automotives . Measured by the share of value added, the role of
transnational capital increased significantly in transportation and manufacturing, which is by
far the most important branch of the economy, while declined in finance, mining, info-
communication, construction, and energy (Table B5, Supplement).
4
In 2018, the economy-
wide share of value added by TNCs in Hungary was still the second-highest in Europe, only
surpassed by Ireland (Table B6, Supplement).
4
National capitalists lobbied heavily to reduce the role of foreign investors in retail trade also. However, they
were less successful than domestic bankers, with the exception of tobacco trade (for more details see Scheiring,
2020, pp. 263-66).
23
The large decline in finance in terms of foreign share of the total value added (-19%
between 2010-2018) shows that financial nationalism significantly impacts the sector (Johnson
. However, the share of foreign value added was
still 50% in the financial sector in 2019, above the economy-wide average (47%), still high by
international standards. In addition to shifting the ownership structure of finance, the
government also pushed for financial deleveraging by drastically curtailing foreign currency
loans (Ban and Bohle, 2021). The costs of this operation were in part levied on banks. Monetary
policy moved towards a more heterodox approach, including increased finance to domestic
companies and stricter regulation of consumer lending et al., 2021). Despite these
heterodox moves, inflation remained stable until 2020, down from 4.9% in 2010 to 3.3% in
2020. The special tax levied on banks since 2011 has also been significantly reduced following
an agreement with the EBRD in 2015. Credibility with international financial institutions also
remained high on the agenda. After a long decline between 2006-
has been steadily improving since 2012 (Figure B4, Supplement).
Despite the economic-nationalist turn of industrial policy, the ability of Hungarian-owned
companies to take advantage of global value chains remains exceptionally low. The domestic
in the OECD (Table B7, Supplement). Hungarian-owned companies would need to exploit the
potential inherent in higher value-added segments of the value chains to increase their
productivity and export capacity. Such upgrading would require technological improvement,
product and process innovation, more successful marketing, and outstanding services. Such
technological development is knowledge- and resource-intensive and requires long-term
planning and commitment to upgrading, facilitated by a developmental state, relying on an
embedded-autonomous bureaucracy (Evans, 1995). Although the government has improved
access to capital since 2010, aspects of the knowledge component and long-term planning have
been pushed into the background. The quality of education declined as measured by the PISA
standards, while higher education enrolment has plummeted (Figure B5, Supplement).
Universities have been privatized and are now led by national capitalists, and research and
higher education have become neoliberalized . The state bureaucracy
has become subordinated to the short-term needs of the power bloc, leading to what Scheiring
(2020)
Fiscal policy. In terms of taxation, the government introduced a flat 9% corporate tax in
2016, effectively transforming the country into a tax haven offering the lowest corporate tax
rate in Europe. In 2021, Orbán was among the fiercest opponents of the OECD/G20 effort to
24
introduce a global minimum corporate tax. Transnational capitalists receive further tax reliefs
and use various avenues to avoid paying tax. The government also distributes direct financial
subsidies both to national and international capitalists. These subsidies are more targeted
towards national capitalists than before, but transnational capitalists are still the biggest
beneficiaries (Figure B6, Supplement).
-
middle class was the introduction of a flat 16% personal income tax in 2011, further reduced
to 15% in 2015. In parallel to reducing the top tax rate, the government increased the taxation
at the bottom of the income scale by eliminating the tax exemption for low-income workers.
tory debt break into the constitution, implying that
public debt has to decrease each year until below 50% of the GDP. The government kept the
budget deficit below 3% after 2012, and total general government expenditure declined year
by year. This was achieved through deep budget cuts to public services (Figure B7,
Supplement).
Social and labor market policy. External competitiveness remained the central goal in
social and labor market policy, achieved through austerity and labor market deregulation.
Figure B7 of the Supplement also shows that while spending on economic affairs increased,
public health, education, and especially social protection spending declined significantly
between 2010 and 2019. The value of universal family benefits (family allowance, maternity
benefit) dropped, while newly introduced subsidies target high-income families, such as tax
breaks, baby loans, and loan forgiveness. New punitive measures accompany welfare
retrenchment, such as criminalizing homelessness, deepening segregation in schools,
establishing patron-client relations through the public works program, and excluding the
unemployed from various forms of housing support (Stubbs and Lendvai-Bainton, 2020;
Szikra, 2014).
The government successfully repressed real wage growth until 2016. Nevertheless,
economic growth combined with massive emigration caused labor shortages, which led to a
significant real wage increase since 2016. However, these gains are increasingly unequally
distributed, with the Gini coefficient jumping from 24.1 in 2010 to 28.3 in 2020 (Figure B8,
Supplement). The government regularly intervenes in the labor market to offset the growing
labor code
on two occasions, disbanding the standing tripartite body, rendering strikes for public service
workers technically impossible, increasing the maximum amount of overtime allowed, and
reducing the unemployment benefit duration to 3 months, the lowest in Europe. To offset labor
25
shortages, even though anti-
legitimations strategy, the government began expediting work permits for foreign workers in
2018, leading to a 43% increase in the number of guest workers in one year (Wall Street
Journal, 2019). Facing continued labor shortage, in July 2021, the government decided to
increase the share of foreign workers that TNCs can employ from 10% to 20%.
Legitimation strategy. To protect itself against a possible political backlash from the losers
of polarizing economic policies, Fidesz occupied all democratic institutions, undermined the
system of checks and balances, and obstructed the channels of direct democracy. This
amounted to a centralization of power in the hands of the executive. However, this institutional
authoritarianism is only one of the strategies deployed by the regime. The ruling party also
seeks to manufacture consent through a national-populist legitimation strategy that pulls even
some victims of neoliberal reforms into the new national-populist hegemony. This includes the
-immigration
campaigns, popular family policies for majoritarian upper-middle-class families, a wide-
ranging public works program, and a move towards a work-
(Fabry, 2019; Stubbs and Lendvai-Bainton, 2020; Szikra, 2014). In
short, nationalist populism is used as a legitimation strategy hiding the polarizing tendencies
of neoliberalism, channeling distributive conflicts towards identity politics.
Table 2 summarizes the most important features of globalist and national-populist
neoliberalism. National-populist neoliberalism is sustained by a power bloc formed by TNCs,
the national bourgeoisie, national-populist politicians, and technocrats. It combines economic
openness, a strong preference for TNCs in the manufacturing export sector, with selective
economic nationalism. It relies on labor market deregulation as a source of external
competitiveness with selective nationalization to change the ownership structure in specific
service sectors. It prioritizes upward redistribution, welfare state retrenchment, exclusionary
social policies, -
conservative fiscal policy, with a low deficit and decreasing debt. Taxation continues to move
towards declining progressivity with extra-low corporate taxation. It utilizes national-populism
as a way of mass legitimation through emphasizing national sovereignty, domestic capital
accumulation, and a re-valuation of traditional majoritarian values against cosmopolitanism. It
re-politicizes some economic questions but frames them in new moral and cultural hierarchies
to avoid the need for mass redistribution.
26
Table 2. A comparison of globalist and the national-populist neoliberalism
GLOBALIST NEOLIBERALISM
NATIONAL-POPULIST
NEOLIBERALISM
INDUSTRIAL
POLICY
* Economic openness
* Strict preference for TNCs across the
board
* Involving TNCs into decision-making,
sidelining national capital
* Privatization, liberalization
* Economic openness, combined with
selective economic nationalism
* Preference for TNCs in the
manufacturing export sector
* Involving TNCs and national capital
into decision-making
* Nationalization, privatization
SOCIAL &
LABOR
MARKET
POLICY
* Labor market deregulation
* Illusory corporatism
* Redistributionist pacification, with a
strong emphasis on pensions to protect
the victims of neoliberalism
* Labor market deregulation
* Exclusion of trade unions
* Welfare state retrenchment, upwards
redistribution, exclusion of the victims of
neoliberalism
FISCAL
POLICY
* Normative preference for a balanced
budget, tendency towards high deficit,
and cycles of indebtedness
* Move towards flat income tax
* Declining capital taxation
* Strict normative preference for a
balanced budget, tendency towards low
deficit, and declining indebtedness
* Fully-fledged flat income tax
* Declining capital taxation
LEGITIMACY
* Economic modernization
* International economic and political
integration, financial credibility
* Cosmopolitanism, human rights,
democratization
* Technocratic depoliticization of
economic questions
* Economic growth, capital accumulation
* National sovereignty and international
financial credibility
* Nationalism and populism, the majority
against cosmopolitan elites
* Identarian repoliticization of economic
questions
6. Concluding discussion
This article offered a novel conceptual framework to analyze the national-populist mutation of
neoliberalism in foreign-investment-dependent economies. Following theory-testing process
tracing, the article substantiated this theoretical framework through a detailed mixed-method
l on
businesses and policymakers, the article demonstrated how foreign investment dependence
polarized the business class. National capitalists and nationalist technocrats pushed for a new
compromise with transnational capital, contributing to the national-populist mutation of
neoliberalism. Giving more room to economic nationalism in certain sectors, national-populist
neoliberalism has modified some of the peripheral elements of neoliberalism and cut back some
of the avant-garde excesses while preserving the core tenets of neoliberalism.
27
This paper offers three contributions to the populism and neoliberalism literatures. First,
by demonstrating , the
article challenges the conventional approach to populism that sees populists as opposed to
businesses (Curran and Eckhardt, 2020; de Sousa et al., 2021; Dornbusch and Edwards, 1990).
The severe dependence on foreign investment galvanized national capitalists and nationalist
technocrats to support populists in amending globalist neoliberalism. However, they were too
weak to challenge the dominance of transnational capitalists occupying the commanding posts
of the economy. Therefore, manufacturing TNCs remained central to the power bloc and are
amo
Argentina, national capitalists were stronger and could push for more thorough
developmentalist interventions that amounted to a genuine break with neoliberalism
(Madariaga, 2020; Naczyk, 2021). In short, the balance of power within the business class
matters for how the crisis of neoliberalism is resolved. Both political and business elites have
agency; both contribute to outcomes, but the structural field of forces strongly influences their
capacities. As Naczyk (2021) and also highlighted recently, followers of the
conventional approach to populism need to relax their politics-centered focus and pay more
attention to broader class cleavages and the role business elites.
The paper foregrounded the role of business class polarization as a neglected part of
populist social coalitions. However, this does not imply that this would be a comprehensive
neoliberal populism in Viktor relies on his ability to legitimize this new
accumulation regime through populist politics designed to pull at least part of the victims of
essential role in the electoral success of despite its highly divisive
socioeconomic policies.
5
Business-class polarization itself would have been insufficient; Orbán
played a crucial role in negotiating a new class compromise within the power bloc.
Second, Orbáns regime is a continuation of neoliberalism, not a switch to
developmentalism. Economic nationalism led to significant changes in the ownership structure
of the info-communications, mining, finance, and some other service sectors. However, foreign
investors retained their dominant position in manufacturing and continue to dominate
Hungarys export and accumulation strategy. Embracing economic nationalism in industrial
5
For more details on the role of populist legitimation strategies in stabilizing neoliberalism in Orbá
see Scheiring and Szombati (2020).
28
policy did not challenge the core of neoliberalism; the accumulation strategy remains driven
by the goals of 1) credibility with financial markets, 2) trade and financial openness, and 3)
competitiveness (Ban, 2016, p. 10). Fiscal policy and social and labor market policy became
significantly more neoliberal (Fabry, 2019; Stubbs and Lendvai-Bainton, 2020; Szikra, 2014).
The sphere of finance experienced the most momentous change (Ban and Bohle, 2021; Johnson
. However, these moves either only remedied
-(Appel and Orenstein, 2018), such as pension
privatization or foreign currency loans, or did not significantly diverge from the global shift
towards more heterodox monetary policy after the 2008 crisis (Reinhart et al., 2011). Overall,
macro-policy remained conservative, and international financial credibility has improved since
2012. Despite noisy nationalism, these policy changes have not reached a threshold to be
considered developmentalism in practice. As Alami and Dixon (2020) also argued, the
literature on the new developmentalism and state capitalism needs to pay more attention to the
cooptation of economic nationalist goals into neoliberal strategies.
Third, extending the recent scholarship on the populist mutation of neoliberalism (Callison
and Manfredi, 2020; Hendrikse, 2018; Slobodian, 2021; Wood and Ausserladscheider, 2021),
the paper has identified the accumulation strategy of Orbáns regime as national-populist
neoliberalism. Neoliberalism is not the same as it was in the 1990s and 2000s. Certain
peripheral, low-hierarchy institutions could be abandoned; avant-garde excesses could be
corrected without jeopardizing the core of the neoliberal project. This national-populist
neoliberalism is a compromise between the core of neoliberalism and the political imperatives
of advancing national interests, relying on populism as a legitimation strategy (see also Fabry,
2019; Geva, 2021). While economic nationalism serves to pacify and incorporate national
capitalists, populism works as a legitimation strategy that systematically draws a large segment
of the population into the orbit of the governing party (Scheiring and Szombati, 2020). Populist
campaigns against migrants and cosmopolitanism are designed to pacify even those segments
of society that are relative victims of Orbáns polarizing policies by reframing distributive
conflicts as issues of identity politics.
Neoliberalism is mutating, not just in Hungary but in several key dependent economies
such as the Philippines (Duterte), or Brazil (Bolsonaro),
countries, in the U.K. (Brexit, Johnson), and the U.S. under Trumps presidency. The
theoretical framework developed here offers insights into other instances of the national-
populist mutation of neoliberalism. Local idiosyncrasies shape the various mutations of
neoliberalism; thus, the theory has to be modified to apply in other contexts. Nevertheless,
29
push countries toward national-populist
neoliberalism. Applying to core capitalist would require the
most adjustment. Here, the balance of forces within the business elites is different; most core
countries are less dependent on foreign direct investment. However, the polarization of the
business elite based on access to global markets and the degree to which they benefit from the
globalist neoliberal accumulation regime is likely important. Other dependent economies are
closer to Hungary, even though Hungary is an avant-garde case, so the ruptures between
domestic and transnational corporations are more pronounced. Nevertheless, the degree of
influences political dynamics. Ban et al. (2021) and Scheiring (2021) have already shown the
fruitfulness of similar theoretical frameworks in comparative political-economic analyses of
recent developments in East-Central Europe.
Neglecting the embeddedness of populism in the business class and its compatibility with
neoliberalism leads to a misunderstanding concerning the roots of the current populist wave.
e
equally important to tackle the sources of the backlash against globalist neoliberalism within
business elites. The article contributed to this endeavor by bringing the neoliberalism and
populism literatures into closer dialogue and offering a new conceptual framework about the
national populist mutation of neoliberalism.
***
Funding
-Curie grant agreement No 890187.
30
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1
Online supplement
The National-Populist Mutation of Neoliberalism in Dependent Economies:
The Case of Viktor Orbán’s Hungary
CONTENTS OF THE SUPPLEMENT
APPENDIX A. METHODOLOGICAL APPENDIX................................................................ 3
Case selection (Hungary) ..................................................................................................................... 3
Data sources ......................................................................................................................................... 3
Table A1. List of billionaires who made it to the top 100 any year between 2002-2018 ..................... 5
Table A2. List of economic policymakers (1990-2014) ...................................................................... 7
.................... 11
Table A4. List of governments in postsocialist Hungary (1990-2022) .............................................. 12
APPENDIX B. SUPPLEMENTARY RESULTS.................................................................... 13
Figure B1. The embeddedness of right-wing policymakers in the domestic business sector ............ 13
Figure B2. FDI stock in the Visegrad region (2010-2019)................................................................. 14
Figure B3. The changing composition of the FDI stock in Hungary (2010-2019) ............................ 15
Figure B4. S&P credit rating of Hungary (1992-2020) ...................................................................... 16
Figure B5. Higher education enrolment rates in the Visegrad region (2009-2017) ........................... 17
Figure B6. Special Government Decision (SGD) company subsidies ............................................... 18
-2019 ....... 19
Figure B8. Income inequality in the Visegrad region (2010-2020) ................................................... 20
Table B1. The odds of being affiliated with transnational corporations (1990-2014) ....................... 21
Table B2. The odds of being affiliated with banks (1990-2014) ........................................................ 22
Table B3. The odds of being affiliated with transnational corporations (1990-2014) ....................... 23
Table B4. The odds of being affiliated with banks (1990-2014) ........................................................ 24
Table B5. The share of value added by foreign-controlled enterprises (2008-2018) ......................... 25
Table B6. Value Added in Foreign Controlled Enterprises in Europe, top 10 countries ................... 26
Table B7. Domestic value added in gross exports in the OECD, bottom ten countries ..................... 27
2
APPENDIX C. INTERVIEW QUOTES ................................................................................. 28
Q1. Viktor Orbán, 1994 ...................................................................................................................... 28
Q2. Gábor Széles, 1991 ...................................................................................................................... 28
Q3. Gábor Széles, 2001 ...................................................................................................................... 29
Q4. Gábor Széles, 2017 ...................................................................................................................... 29
Q5. Levente Balogh, 2011 .................................................................................................................. 30
Q6. Béla Karsai, 2006 ........................................................................................................................ 30
Q7. Zsolt Felcsuti, 2011 ..................................................................................................................... 31
Q8. György Wáberer, 2016 ................................................................................................................ 31
Q9. Sándor Demján, 2010 .................................................................................................................. 32
Q10. Sándor Demján, 2014 ................................................................................................................ 32
Q11. Sándor Csányi, 2009 .................................................................................................................. 32
Q12. Sándor Csányi, 2018 .................................................................................................................. 33
Q13. János Kóka, 2015....................................................................................................................... 33
Q14. Viktor Orbán, 2016 .................................................................................................................... 33
Q15. Marie-Theres Thiell, 2018 ......................................................................................................... 34
Q16. Jan Mainka, 2018....................................................................................................................... 34
Q17. Angela Merkel, 2019 ................................................................................................................. 35
Q18. László Parragh, 2006 ................................................................................................................. 35
Q19. László Parragh, 2011 ................................................................................................................. 35
Q20. Viktor Orbán, 2011 .................................................................................................................... 36
3
Appendix A. Methodological appendix
Case selection (Hungary)
Hungary is a strategic case for two reasons. First, it is a paradigmatic populist country globally,
with a stable populist regime. Hungary is emerging as a laboratory again: turning from the
laboratory of globalist neoliberalism into a laboratory of national-populism. Second, Hungary
is also an important center of gravity for populist forces in East-Central Europe with potential
implications for the European project. Viktor Orbán expressed increasing interest in
restructuring the conservative intellectual and political landscape in Europe, investing
tremendous money in new right think tanks and networking. Even though it is not likely that
Western Europe would succumb to the same type of populism, the national-populist mutation
of neoliberalism in Hungary might show a potential future that might unfold elsewhere.
Data sources
The first dataset is used to analyze the polarization of the business class and the mobilization
of national capitalists. This dataset comprises data on the wealth, the business background, and
the political connections of Hungarian capitalists, encompassing the 2002-2018 period. The
dataset is based on publicly available publications (Napi Gazdaság, Népszabadság) about the
100 wealthiest businesspersons in Hungary and their media coverage. The dataset comprises
222 individuals altogether. I reconstructed the national capitalists profiles based on the
available media information, drawing on the press database of the Library of the Hungarian
Parliament, which provides access to press coverage between 2000 and 2018. I found
information about 163 of the 212 billionaires, which amounted to 3,659 printed pages. The
strength of the database is that it includes many articles that are not available online. I extended
this press database with information from online desk research.
With the assistance of the Library of the Hungarian Parliament, I also gathered the press
coverage of business advocacy organizations representing domestic and transnational business,
covering 1990-2014. I analyzed the media coverage of these business advocacy activities to
identify businesses economic policy preferences and how they were applied in government
decision-making. This press dataset includes the following organizations that represent
domestic businesses: the Hungarian Chamber of Commerce and Industry (MKIK), the
Confederation of Hungarian Employers and Industrialists (MGYOSZ), the National
Association of Entrepreneurs and Employers (VOSZ), the Hungarian Industrial Association
(OKISZ), National Association of Traders and Caterers (KISOSZ), the Hungarian Association
4
of Craftmens Corporation (IPOSZ), the National Federation of Agricultural Co-operators and
Producers (MOSZ) and the Hungarian Banking Association. In addition, the following
business advocacy organization were included representing transnational capital: Joint Venture
Association (JVSZ), American Chambers of Commerce (AmCham), the German-Hungarian
Chamber of Commerce (DUIH).
The third data source is used to analyze the role of the technocracy and the revolving
doors. This dataset contains data on 194 members of the economic policy elite, covering the
period between 1990 and 2014, based on a list provided by the Information Services for M.P.s
of the Library of the Hungarian Parliament. The dataset includes every prime minister and
minister, secretaries of state, and deputy secretaries, whose portfolios included economic areas
(e.g., minister of finance, minister of economy, international economic relations). I collected
biographical data on these 194 policymakers using parliamentary almanacs, political
yearbooks, and biographies available on the web. Based on this information, I created a dataset
that in addition to basic demographic and biographical information contains codes in
categorical variables about education, occupation, and economic affiliation.
I identified a left-liberal technocracy and right-wing technocracy based on the parties that
formed the government they worked for. I use the notions of left-wing and right-wing
concerning the elites in the sense of political positioning. In the Hungarian political system, the
left refers to the Hungarian Socialist Party (Magyar Szocialista Párt, MSZP) and its allies. At
the same time, the right was represented by the Hungarian Democratic Forum (Magyar
Demokrata Fórum, MDF) and later FIDESZ and its allies. Thus, in this article, the notions of
political left and right do not refer to the ideological content of their politics but only to their
position on the political map. Technocrats were coded embedded in the transnational or
domestic economic sector when she/he was a high-level employee or owner of a domestic
company or a transnational company. The literature on revolving doors revealed that both sides
of the revolving doorswhen people enter governmental roles from business organizations
and when they leave governmental roles for business organizationsimpact regulatory
behavior. Therefore, I did not distinguish between the entry and the exit sides: I coded
technocrats as embedded in the transnational or domestic economic sector when they came
from a particular sector and when a person left for a particular sector. This also implies that
these logistic regressions are not designed to ascertain causality or its direction, to test whether
economic elites determine political outcomes or whether political elites occupy business
positions. This analysis aims to show that there is an affinity between business sectors and
political positions. I created and analyzed the dataset using STATA 13.0.
5
Table A1. List of billionaires who made it to the top 100 any year between 2002-2018
Albrecht Ottó
Anka Márton
Antal Péter
Bába István
Bagaméry István
Bajka Zoltán
Bakonyi Árpád
Bálintfy Gábor
Balogh Ákos
Balogh Levente
Bárány László
Baranyi Sándor
Bárdi István
Barkász Sándor
Bartha Ferenc
Bayer József
Béres József
Berkes Mihályné
Berki István
Bige László
Bihari Vilmos
Birgés Tibor
Bleuer István
Bodrogai Ferenc
Bojár Gábor
Bolgár György
Boros József
Botos Attila
Braun Péter
Claessens Péter
Csák Máté
Csányi Sándor
Csebi Pogány Alajos
Csipak Péter
Csitkovics Tibor
Csonka Gábor
Darvalics Lajos
Darvas Ferenc
Deák Géza
Demján Sándor
Derry Márta
Derzsi András
Dunai György
Egri Gábor
Fazekas Zsolt
Felcsuti Zsolt
Folláth György
Földvári Gábor
Futó Péter
Fülöp Gábor
Fülöp László
Füzesi Attila
Garancsi István
Gáspár Gyula
Gasztonyi László
Gattyán György Zoltán
Gerendai Károly
Gyárfás Tamás
Gyetvai Zsolt
Gyurcsány Ferenc
Haris György
Harsányi Zsolt
Herdon István
Hernádi Zsolt
Horváth Ferenc
Hovány Márton
Imre István
Ináncsy Miklós
Jákob Zoltán
Jámbor János
Jászai Gellért
Jellinek Dániel
Jüllich Ádám
Kapolyi László
Kárpáti László
Karsai Béla
Kasza Lajos
Kautz István
Kedves Ferenc
Kenyeres Imre
Kenyeres Sándor
Kertész Viktor és Attila
Kieselbach Tamás
Kóka János
Kolosi Tamás
Kósa Erika
Kostevc Péter
Kovács Attila
Kovács Gábor
Kovács Gáspár
Krankovics István
Kristyán Judit
Kuna Tibor
Kutvölgyi Pál
Kürti Sándor
Lakatos Benjámin
Lakatos Péter
Láng Róbert
Lantos Csaba
Lantos Péter
Lázár Vilmos
Leisztinger Tamás
Lepp Gyula
Lévai Ferenc
Losó József
Lovas Péter
Magyar József
Majoros Béla
Markovszky György
Máté László
Matyi
Mészáros Csaba
Mónos Péter
Móré Attila
Nagy András
Nagy Elek
Nagy György
Nagy Imre
Nagy Sándor
Nagygyörgy Tibor
Nagyházi Csaba
Németh Imre
Nobilis Kristóf
Novotni Lajos
Nyerges Zsolt
Nyíri Viktor
Nyúl Sándor
Paár Attila
Palásti József
Pálos Titusz
Pap Géza
Petrás István
Petre Gábor
Petró Sándor
Petrusz Béla
Pintér József
Pintér Zoltán
Pistrui László
Póczik Péter
Pocsai Attila
Polony István
Pólus Péter
Rákosi Tamás
Réti Attila
Révész Bálint
Román Gyula
6
Róna Péter
Rudas László
S. Nagy Sándor
Sándor József
Sánta János
Scheer Sándor
Schepp József
Scheuer Gyula
Seszták Imre / Seszták
Tamás
Simicska Lajos
Sinkó Ottó
Somfai Róbert
Somody Imre
Sopronyi János
Spéder Zoltán
Szabó András
Szabó Miklós
Szatmári Zoltán
Szaxon Attila
Székely Péter
Széles Gábor
Szemerey Tamás
Szeremley Huba
Szilvássy Csilla
Szima Gábor
Szíjj László
Tamás István
Tari István Gábor
Tarr János
Tarsoly Csaba
Tolnay Lajos
Tolnay Tibor
Tolvaly Ferenc
Tornai Tamás
Tóth József
Tóth Lajos
Töröcskei István
Schmidt Mária
Vajna András György
Váradi József
Varga József
Varga Károly
Varga Mihály
Varga Zoltán
Várszegi Gábor
Vasas István
Veres Tibor
Vermes András
Virág Attila
Vitézy Tamás
Wáberer György
Wachter István
Wenckheim István
Wicha József
Wolf László
Wossala György
Zelnik István
Zettwitz Sándor
Zombori Antal
Zwack Péter
7
Table A2. List of economic policymakers (1990-2014)
Government code
(which government he/she worked for)
Name
Gov1
Gov2
Gov3
Gov4
Gov5
Gov6
Gov7
Gov8
Gov9
Adamecz Péter
0
0
0
1
0
0
0
0
0
Akar László
0
0
1
0
0
0
0
0
0
Antall József
1
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
Apatini Kornélné
0
0
0
0
1
1
0
0
0
Auth Henrik
1
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
Bagó Eszter
0
0
0
1
0
0
0
0
0
Bajnai Gordon
0
0
0
0
0
0
1
1
0
Bakay Árpád
1
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
Balás Péter
0
0
1
1
0
0
0
0
0
Balázs Ágnes
0
0
1
0
1
0
0
0
0
Balázs Péter
1
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
Balla Gergely
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
1
0
Balog Ádám
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
1
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
1
Baráth Etele
0
0
0
0
1
1
0
0
0
Barátossy Györgyné
0
0
0
1
0
0
0
0
0
Bartfai Béla
1
1
1
1
0
0
0
0
0
Bathó Ferenc
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
1
Becker Pál
0
1
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
Becsey Zsolt
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
1
Békesi László
0
0
1
0
0
0
0
0
0
Bencsik János
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
1
Berényi Lajos
1
1
1
0
0
0
0
0
0
Beszteri Sára
0
0
0
0
1
0
0
0
0
Bod Péter Ákos
1
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
Bogár László
1
1
0
1
0
0
0
0
0
Bokros Lajos
0
0
1
0
0
0
0
0
0
Bóna Ákos
0
0
0
0
0
0
1
0
0
Boros Imre
0
0
0
1
0
0
0
0
0
Boross Péter
1
1
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
Botos Balázs
1
1
1
0
0
0
0
0
1
Botos Katalin
1
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
Bozzay Erika
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
1
0
Budai Zoltán
0
0
0
1
0
0
0
0
0
Burány Sándor
0
0
0
0
1
1
1
1
0
Chikán Attila
0
0
0
1
0
0
0
0
0
Csáky Bernadett
0
0
0
0
0
0
1
1
0
Cséfalvay Zoltán
0
0
0
1
0
0
0
0
1
Csepreghy Nándor
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
1
Cserés Ákos
0
0
0
0
1
0
0
0
0
Csiha Judit
0
0
1
0
0
0
0
0
0
Csillag István
0
0
0
0
1
0
0
0
0
Csizmadia Norbert
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
1
Csobánczy Péter
0
0
1
0
0
0
0
0
0
Czomba Sándor
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
1
Dányi Gábor
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
1
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
1
0
Dióssy Gábor
0
0
0
0
0
1
1
0
0
Draskovics Tibor
1
0
1
0
1
1
0
0
0
Dunai Imre
0
0
1
0
0
0
0
0
0
8
Egyed Géza
0
0
0
0
0
1
1
0
0
Fazakas Szabolcs
0
0
1
0
0
0
0
0
0
Fellegi Tamás
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
1
Felsmann Balázs
0
0
0
0
0
0
1
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
1
Fónagy János
0
0
0
1
0
0
0
0
1
Forrai István
1
1
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
Frajna Imre
0
0
0
1
0
0
0
0
0
Gaál Gyula
0
0
0
0
1
0
0
0
0
Garamhegyi Ábel
0
0
0
0
0
1
1
1
0
Gilyán Görgy
0
0
1
1
0
1
1
0
0
Glattfelder Béla
0
0
0
1
0
0
0
0
0
Gombocz Zoltán
1
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
Gondos Judit
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
1
Gulácsi Gábor
1
1
1
1
0
0
0
0
0
Gyarmati András
0
0
1
0
0
0
0
0
0
Gyurcsány Ferenc
0
0
0
0
1
1
1
0
0
Halasi Tibor
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
1
Hatvani György
0
0
0
0
1
1
0
0
0
Hegmanné Nemes Sára
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
1
Hegyháti József
0
1
1
0
0
0
0
0
0
Heil Péter Bálint
0
0
0
0
0
0
1
1
0
Herczog László
0
0
0
1
0
0
0
0
0
Hidvéghi Balázs
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
1
Hónig Péter
0
0
0
1
0
0
0
1
0
Horn Gyula
0
0
1
0
0
0
0
0
0
Horváth Endre
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
1
Horváth Viktória
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
1
Horváth Zsolt Csaba
0
0
0
0
0
1
0
0
0
Jánosi Andrea
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
1
Járai Zsigmond
0
0
0
1
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
1
1
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
1
Juhász Endre
0
1
1
0
1
0
0
0
0
Kádár Béla
1
1
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
Kákosy Csaba
0
0
0
0
0
1
1
0
0
Karácsony Imréné
0
0
0
0
0
1
1
1
0
Kardkovács Kolos
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
1
Kármán András
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
1
Katona Tamás
0
0
0
0
1
1
1
1
0
Kékesi László
0
0
0
1
1
0
0
0
0
Keller László
0
0
0
0
0
0
1
0
0
Király Péter
1
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
Kisgergely Kornél
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
1
Kiss Elemér
0
0
1
0
1
0
0
0
0
Kiss Péter
0
0
0
0
1
1
1
1
0
Kocsis István
0
1
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
Kóka János
0
0
0
0
0
1
1
0
0
Kolber István
0
0
0
0
0
1
0
0
0
Kovács Álmos
1
0
0
1
1
1
1
1
0
Kovács Ferenc
0
0
0
0
1
1
0
0
0
Kovács Pál
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
1
Kovács Tamás Iván
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
1
0
0
0
1
0
0
0
0
0
Kraft Péter
0
0
0
1
0
0
0
0
0
9
Kupa Mihály
1
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
László Csaba
0
0
1
1
1
0
0
0
0
1
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
Latorcai János Miklós
0
1
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
Locsmándi Béla
0
1
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
Mádi László
0
0
0
1
0
0
0
0
0
Magyari László
0
0
0
0
1
1
0
0
0
Major István
1
1
1
1
0
1
0
0
0
Markó Andrea
0
0
0
0
0
0
1
0
0
Marsi Erika
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
1
0
Martonyi János
1
1
0
1
0
0
0
0
1
Matolcsy György
1
0
0
1
0
0
0
0
1
Medgyessy Péter
0
0
1
0
1
0
0
0
0
Merényi Miklós
0
0
0
0
0
0
1
0
0
Mester Zoltán
0
0
0
0
0
0
1
1
0
Mészárosné Peredy Gabriella
0
0
0
0
0
1
1
0
0
Mihályi Péter
0
0
1
0
0
0
0
0
0
Mohos László
0
0
0
1
0
0
0
0
0
Molnár Ágnes
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
1
Molnár Albert
0
0
0
0
0
1
0
0
0
Molnár Csaba
0
0
0
0
0
0
1
1
0
Nagy Róza
0
0
0
1
1
0
0
0
1
Nagy Sándor
0
0
0
0
1
1
0
0
0
Nagy Zoltán
1
1
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
Naszvadi György
1
1
1
1
0
0
0
0
1
Nátrán Roland
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
1
Navracsics Tibor
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
1
Németh Gyuláné
1
1
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
Németh Lászlóné
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
1
Nyikos Györgyi
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
1
Nyitrai Zsolt
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
1
Olajos Péter
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
1
Orbán Gábor
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
1
Orbán Viktor
0
0
0
1
0
0
0
0
1
Oszkó Péter
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
1
0
Pál Béla
0
0
0
0
1
1
0
0
0
Pál László
0
0
1
0
0
0
0
0
0
Pálffy Ilona
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
1
Pankucsi Zoltán
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
1
Pleschinger Gyula
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
1
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
1
Pohankovics István
1
1
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
Pongorné dr. Csákvári Marianna
0
0
0
1
1
1
0
0
0
Pongrácz Tibor
1
1
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
Puch László
0
0
0
0
0
0
1
0
0
Rabár Ferenc
1
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
Radnai György
0
0
0
0
0
1
0
0
0
Réthy Imre
0
0
0
0
1
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
1
Sághy Zoltán
0
0
0
0
0
1
0
0
0
Salgó István
0
0
0
0
1
1
0
0
0
Schagrin Tamás
1
1
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
Schváb Zoltán
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
1
Seres László
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
1
Simóka Kálmánné
0
0
1
0
0
0
0
0
0
10
Somogyi Zoltán
0
0
1
1
0
0
1
0
0
Soós Károly Attila
0
0
1
0
0
0
0
0
0
Stumpf István
0
0
0
1
0
0
0
0
0
Suchman Tamás
0
0
1
0
0
1
0
0
0
1
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
Szabó Iván
1
1
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
Szabó Pál
0
0
0
0
0
0
1
0
0
Szabó Tamás
1
1
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
Szalay-Berzeviczy Gábor
0
0
0
0
1
0
0
0
0
Szaló Péter
0
0
0
0
0
0
1
1
0
Szanyi Tibor
0
0
0
0
0
1
0
0
0
Szatmáry Kristóf
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
1
Székács Péter
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
1
Szilvásy György
1
1
1
0
0
1
1
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
1
stván
0
1
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
T. Asztalos Ildikó
0
0
1
0
0
0
0
0
0
Tállai András
0
0
0
1
0
0
0
0
0
Tátrai Miklós
0
0
0
0
0
0
1
0
0
Terták Elemér
0
0
0
1
1
0
0
0
0
Tétényi Tamás
0
0
1
0
0
0
0
0
0
Thuma József
1
1
1
1
1
0
0
0
0
Thuma Róbert
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
1
Vályi-Nagy Vilmos
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
1
Várfalvi István
0
0
0
0
1
1
1
1
0
Varga István
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
1
0
Varga Mihály
0
0
0
1
0
0
0
0
1
Varju László
0
0
0
0
0
0
1
1
0
Vasváriné Menyhárt Éva
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
1
Végh Szabolcs
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
1
0
Veres János
0
0
0
0
1
1
1
0
0
Vízkelety Mariann
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
1
Völner Pál
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
1
Zsarnóci Csaba
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
1
Note:
List in alphabetical order (N=194). Types of positions included are governmental roles with an economic
portfolio: prime ministers, ministers, states of secretary, deputy secretaries in ministries.
11
Table A3. Descriptive statistics for the models on policymakers business affiliations
N
%
Ever affiliated with a TNC
No
146
76
Yes
46
24
Total
192
100
Ever affiliated with a bank
No
141
73.4
Yes
51
26.6
Total
192
100
Policymakers
Right-wing
98
50.5
Dual affiliation
22
11.3
Left-liberal
74
38.1
Total
194
100
Born in Budapest
No
129
66.5
Yes
65
33.5
Total
194
100
Gender
Men
162
83.5
Women
32
16.5
Total
194
100
Degree in economics or finance
No
97
50
Yes
97
50
Total
194
100
Ever held political office
No
135
70.3
Yes
57
29.7
Total
192
100
Age at first governmental position
N
Mean
178
45.26
12
Table A4. List of governments in postsocialist Hungary (1990-2022)
Political
position
Political
cycle
Government
code in the
dataset
Duration of
Government
Prime
minister
Parties
Involved
Right-
wing
1990-1994
Gov1
May 23, 1990
December 12, 1993
József Antall
(MDF)
MDF, FKgP,
KDNP
Gov2
December 12, 1993
July 15, 1994
Péter Boross
(MDF)
Left-
liberal
1994-1998
Gov3
July 15, 1994 July
6, 1998
Gyula Horn
(MSZP)
MSZP,
SZDSZ
Right-
wing
1998-2002
Gov4
July 6, 1998 May
27, 2002
Viktor Orbán
(Fidesz)
Fidesz,
FKgP, MDF
Left-
liberal
2002-2010
Gov5
May 27, 2002
September 29, 2004
Péter
Medgyessy
(Ind.)
MSZP,
SZDSZ
Gov6
September 29, 2004
June 9, 2006
Ferenc
Gyurcsány
(MSZP)
Gov7
June 9, 2006 April
14, 2009
Gov8
April 14, 2009
May 29, 2010
Gordon
Bajnai (Ind.)
Right-
wing
2010-2022
Gov9
May 29, 2010 June
6, 2014
Viktor Orbán
(Fidesz)
Fidesz,
KDNP
June 6, 2014 May
18, 2018
May 18, 2018
present
13
Appendix B. Supplementary results
Figure B1. The embeddedness of right-wing policymakers in the domestic business sector
14
Figure B2. FDI stock in the Visegrad region (2010-2019)
Source:
OECD (2021). FDI stocks, Inward, % of GDP, 2005 2020. URL: https://data.oecd.org/fdi/fdi-stocks.htm (last
access: Jul/18/2021), OECD.
15
Figure B3. The changing composition of the FDI stock in Hungary (2010-2019)
Source:
OECD (2021). Inward FDI stocks by industry. URL: https://data.oecd.org/fdi/inward-fdi-stocks-by-industry.htm
(last access: June/6/2021), OECD.
16
Figure B4. S&P credit rating of Hungary (1992-2020)
Source:
http://www.worldgovernmentbonds.com/credit-rating/hungary/
Orbán regime, 2010 -
17
Figure B5. Higher education enrolment rates in the Visegrad region (2009-2017)
Source:
World Bank (2021), World Development Indicators; The World Bank, Washington D.C., URL:
http://data.worldbank.org/data-catalog/world-development-indicators (last access: May/31/2021).
18
Figure B6. Special Government Decision (SGD) company subsidies
Source:
Authors estimates based on Hungarian Government (2018). Projects Funded from the Discretionary Fund of the
Government, Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade.
19
Figure B7. Orbáns fiscal policy: austerity for the masses, subsidies to businesses, 2010-2019
Source:
Eurostat (2020), General Government Expenditure by Function [Cofog]; Eurostat, gov_10a_exp, URL:
http://appsso.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/nui/show.do?dataset=gov_10a_exp&lang=eng (last access: Jul/18/2020).
20
Figure B8. Income inequality in the Visegrad region (2010-2020)
Source:
Eurostat (2020), Gini Coefficient of Equivalized Disposable Income; Eurostat [ilc_di12], URL:
https://appsso.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/nui/show.do?dataset=ilc_di12&lang=en (last access: Jul/18/2021).
21
Table B1. The odds of being affiliated with transnational corporations (1990-2014)
Dependent variable
Ever affiliated with a TNC (ref.: No)
(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)
(5)
(6)
Policymakers (ref.: Right-wing)
Left-liberal
3.58**
3.72**
3.64**
3.63**
3.23**
3.83**
(1.44)
(1.51)
(1.48)
(1.49)
(1.35)
(1.66)
Age at first governmental position
0.98
0.98
0.98
0.98
0.99
(0.02)
(0.02)
(0.02)
(0.02)
(0.02)
Born in Budapest (ref.: No)
Yes
1.25
1.22
1.28
1.12
(0.51)
(0.50)
(0.53)
(0.48)
Gender (ref.: Men)
Women
0.32
0.32
0.24
(0.25)
(0.25)
(0.19)
Degree in economics (ref.: No)
Yes
2.13
1.68
(0.91)
(0.74)
Ever held political position (ref.: No)
Yes
0.28*
(0.14)
Constant
0.16***
0.41
0.39
0.39
0.27
0.28
(0.05)
(0.44)
(0.42)
(0.42)
(0.30)
(0.32)
N
156
156
156
156
156
156
* p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001
Note:
Odds ratios with standard errors in parentheses. Estimates from logistic regression. Models include policymakers
with an economic portfolio only and exclude the policymakers with dual political affiliations.
22
Table B2. The odds of being affiliated with banks (1990-2014)
Dependent variable
Ever affiliated with a bank (ref.: No)
(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)
(5)
(6)
Policymakers (ref.: Right-wing)
Left-liberal
3.40**
3.36**
3.26**
3.25**
2.83**
3.20**
(1.31)
(1.29)
(1.26)
(1.26)
(1.13)
(1.32)
Age at first governmental position
1.01
1.01
1.01
1.01
1.02
(0.02)
(0.02)
(0.02)
(0.02)
(0.02)
Born in Budapest (ref.: No)
Yes
1.50
1.50
1.58
1.43
(0.58)
(0.58)
(0.64)
(0.59)
Gender (ref.: Men)
Women
0.91
0.89
0.73
(0.52)
(0.52)
(0.44)
Degree in economics (ref.: No)
Yes
3.23**
2.71*
(1.37)
(1.18)
Ever held political position (ref.: No)
Yes
0.41
(0.19)
Constant
0.19***
0.12*
0.11*
0.11*
0.06*
0.06*
(0.05)
(0.12)
(0.11)
(0.11)
(0.07)
(0.07)
N
156
156
156
156
156
156
* p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001
Note:
Odds ratios with standard errors in parentheses. Estimates from logistic regression. Models include policymakers
with an economic portfolio only and exclude the policymakers with dual political affiliations.
23
Table B3. The odds of being affiliated with transnational corporations (1990-2014)
Dependent variable
Ever affiliated with a TNC (ref.: No)
(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)
(5)
(6)
Policymakers (ref.: Right-wing or dual
affiliation)
Left-liberal
3.10**
3.24**
3.11**
3.12**
2.87**
2.90**
(1.19)
(1.26)
(1.21)
(1.23)
(1.15)
(1.17)
Age at first governmental position
0.97
0.97
0.97
0.97
0.98
(0.02)
(0.02)
(0.02)
(0.02)
(0.02)
Born in Budapest (ref.: No)
Yes
1.58
1.50
1.55
1.43
(0.59)
(0.57)
(0.59)
(0.56)
Gender (ref.: Men)
Women
0.29
0.29
0.24
(0.22)
(0.22)
(0.19)
Degree in economics (ref.: No)
Yes
1.90
1.67
(0.74)
(0.66)
Ever held political position (ref.: No)
Yes
0.37*
(0.18)
Constant
0.16***
0.58
0.51
0.50
0.37
0.38
(0.05)
(0.59)
(0.52)
(0.52)
(0.39)
(0.41)
N
178
178
178
178
178
178
* p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001
Note:
Odds ratios with standard errors in parentheses. Estimates from logistic regression. Models include policymakers
with an economic portfolio only and policymakers with dual political affiliations.
24
Table B4. The odds of being affiliated with banks (1990-2014)
Dependent variable
Ever affiliated with a bank (ref.: No)
(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)
(5)
(6)
Policymakers (ref.: Right-wing or dual
affiliation)
Left-liberal
3.01**
3.04**
2.93**
2.93**
2.67**
2.72**
(1.10)
(1.12)
(1.08)
(1.08)
(1.02)
(1.04)
Age at first governmental position
0.99
0.99
0.99
0.99
0.99
(0.02)
(0.02)
(0.02)
(0.02)
(0.02)
Born in Budapest (ref.: No)
Yes
1.55
1.55
1.60
1.50
(0.56)
(0.56)
(0.60)
(0.57)
Gender (ref.: Men)
Women
1.04
1.06
0.94
(0.55)
(0.58)
(0.52)
Degree in economics (ref.: No)
Yes
3.30**
3.03**
(1.28)
(1.19)
Ever held political position (ref.: No)
Yes
0.53
(0.24)
Constant
0.19***
0.29
0.26
0.26
0.14
0.14
(0.05)
(0.28)
(0.25)
(0.25)
(0.14)
(0.15)
N
178
178
178
178
178
178
* p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001
Note:
Odds ratios with standard errors in parentheses. Estimates from logistic regression. Models include policymakers
with an economic portfolio only and policymakers with dual political affiliations.
25
Table B5. The share of value added by foreign-controlled enterprises (2008-2018)
2008
2009
2010
2011
2012
2013
2014
2015
2016
2017
2018
-18
Transportation and storage
21.5
23.0
24.0
28.6
30.5
32.5
37.0
36.2
35.8
37.9
39.9
15.9
Manufacturing
66.2
66.8
67.9
69.4
69.3
69.9
71.2
73.9
73.6
72.7
71.7
3.8
Administrative and support service activities
33.0
36.3
37.9
37.7
38.2
36.2
37.8
39.5
40.1
37.9
37.5
-0.4
Professional, scientific and technical activities
32.3
29.3
30.2
30.5
31.5
29.0
30.9
29.4
30.8
30.1
29.0
-1.2
Repair of computers, personal & household goods
15.9
12.1
14.0
18.5
15.9
16.2
16.4
14.5
14.6
-1.3
Water supply; sewerage, waste management
10.1
10.0
9.5
12.5
11.4
11.2
9.6
9.6
7.2
8.5
8.2
-1.3
Wholesale and retail trade; repair of motor vehicles
44.7
45.8
46.6
49.9
49.0
48.4
47.0
47.1
45.9
45.9
44.4
-2.2
Accommodation and food service activities
21.6
24.9
24.7
24.4
26.0
26.2
25.0
23.7
20.2
22.7
21.5
-3.2
Electricity, gas, steam and air conditioning supply
59.1
61.5
59.7
61.9
63.3
62.8
58.7
53.0
54.5
52.0
53.8
-5.9
Construction
16.1
22.2
19.7
16.7
18.9
17.4
15.4
13.0
12.4
10.6
11.1
-8.6
Real estate activities
27.6
33.7
34.3
36.6
36.7
33.5
32.3
31.4
28.8
27.6
24.5
-9.8
Information and communication
65.1
69.1
67.4
70.4
71.5
68.7
65.2
63.5
61.8
57.7
57.0
-10.4
Mining and quarrying
66.7
58.7
59.3
55.0
51.9
44.2
44.2
58.8
53.0
52.0
46.0
-13.3
Finance and insurance
68.1
67.4
67.8
63.2
61.5
63.3
54.3
44.0
45.3
49.4
49.0
-18.8
Source:
HCSO (2021). Data of foreign-controlled financial subsidiaries by economic sector and the registered office of the ultimate owner. URL:
https://www.ksh.hu/stadat_files/gsz/hu/gsz0026.html (last access: Jul/18/2021); HCSO (2021). Size and share of the production value of foreign-controlled non-financial
subsidiaries by branch of the national economy and the place of business of the ultimate owner. URL: https://www.ksh.hu/stadat_files/gsz/hu/gsz0021.html (last access:
Jul/18/2021), Hungarian Central Statistical Office.
26
Table B6. Value Added in Foreign Controlled Enterprises in Europe, top 10 countries
2010
2011
2012
2013
2014
2015
2016
2017
2018
Ireland
54.39
56.15
57.12
53.09
59.22
42.99
62.75
66.76
Hungary
49.26
51.89
51.69
52.23
52.66
52.46
51.39
49.98
47.43
Slovakia
36.47
38.23
39.93
35.44
43.59
45.83
48.07
48.14
46.99
Romania
42.71
40.75
45.47
45.05
43.9
43.87
43.97
44.18
44.72
Luxembourg
42.18
42.42
42.93
44.82
47.04
47.58
44.63
43.73
43.85
Czechia
42.87
42.94
41.56
42.05
42.33
41.78
43.31
42.86
42.84
Estonia
44.61
43.76
42.22
41.13
40.74
40.97
39.29
40.14
41.63
Poland
33.71
35.07
33.2
34.78
35.38
35.47
36.77
36.97
36.97
Bulgaria
29.91
32.28
31.77
31.16
33.05
32.71
32.85
32.2
34.14
Latvia
29.34
30.47
30.3
32.06
31.06
33.51
32.87
33.75
32.48
Source:
Eurostat (2020), Value Added in Foreign Controlled Enterprises; Eurostat, URL:
http://appsso.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/nui/show.do?dataset=egi_va1&lang=en (last access: Jul/18/2021).
27
Table B7. Domestic value added in gross exports in the OECD, bottom ten countries
2009
2010
2011
2012
2013
2014
2015
2016
Luxembourg
40.98
39.62
39.35
37.1
35.9
33.16
31.16
32.6
Malta
37.73
35.72
32.1
34.34
35.69
38.48
40.85
40.73
Slovak Republic
58.11
56.12
53.26
53.39
53.23
54.08
55.22
55.49
Hungary
56.51
52.52
52.17
53
53.93
54
56.9
55.86
Viet Nam
62.8
59.49
58.2
59.15
58.31
57.58
55.48
56.4
Ireland
60.86
59.32
59.92
57.16
56.76
55.33
59.81
58.33
Singapore
57.95
58.73
56.48
56.24
57.17
56.97
59.07
60.55
Czech Republic
66.67
62.77
61.34
60.73
61.09
60.33
60.72
62.33
Mexico
66.36
66.05
67.68
66.22
65.44
65.87
63.9
63.59
Malaysia
60.23
59.43
60.56
61.94
62.81
63.44
63.09
63.92
Source:
OECD (2021), Domestic Value Added in Gross Exports, Total, Percentage, 2008 2016, URL:
https://data.oecd.org/trade/domestic-value-added-in-gross-exports.htm (last access: Jul/18/2021).
28
Appendix C. Interview quotes
Q1. Viktor Orbán, 1994
(Viktor Orbán, Hungary’s Prime Minister in 1998-2002 and since 2010. He was Chairman of
Fidesz in 1994. Fidesz lost the 1994 elections, though they were leading the polls for some
time.)
; we only have what we acquire. In contrast, our
opponents made a great deal of money in the past forty years and stockpiled for tough times,
or can use their position in government to ensure their financial foundations. If we cannot
compete with them, then we will not be able to convey our ideas to the electorate. We will have
no publications, no offices, no employees, and we will fail even if we have the best possible
Source: Origo (2012). The economic empire built around Fidesz is out of the shadows
[In Hungarian: ]. URL:
http://www.origo.hu/itthon/20120305-a-fidesz-gazdasagi-hatorszaganak-epulese-i-
resz.html, orgio.hu, March 6, 2012.
Q2. Gábor Széles, 1991
(Gábor Széles, President-CEO of Videoton, is the most well-known committed conservative.
From 1990 till today, he has been the president, then honorary president of the Confederation
of Hungarian Employers and Industrialists, MGYOSZ. Among Hungary’s 100 richest persons
since 2002, when the economic daily Napi Gazdaság started to compile the list of Hungary’s
richest people).
genuine partners and not the underdogs of foreign capital that is so crucial for us, which would
otherwise divide and fritter away our developing economy and force the country under the rule
s power elite can cope with it only if it can
reconcile and join forces with the [nationa
29
Source: Kocsis, A. and G. Széles (1991). For a New Compromise [In Hungarian:
Második kiegyezést!], Magyar Hírlap, 3 August 1991, p. 7.
Q3. Gábor Széles, 2001
pected more from the whole Széchenyi
Plan. We were there right at the start and were promised by the economic governance, several
times at the ministerial level, to involve our members in the decision-making. They still owe
that to us. The other problem is which is supported by statistical data as well that a
substantial part of the winners of different tenders is foreign-owned companies. That is to say,
right now,
the plan mistaken from the point of view that it practically does not provide anything for
Hungarian-owned medium-
governments standpoint was evident already at the announcement of the Széchenyi Plan:
Prime Minister Viktor Orbán did not come to MGYOSZ to present the details of the plan; he
went to AmCham [The American Chamber of Commerce, the interest representation body of
Source: Magyar Gyáripar (2001). The value of Hungarian capital [In Hungarian: A
]. URL:
https://www.mgyosz.hu/gyaripar/2001szeptember/szeles.htm Magyar Gyáripar,
September 2001, mgyosz.hu.
Q4. Gábor Széles, 2017
However, I do not think I would have been appointed even then because Lajos Simicska [who
was at that time in control of Fideszs economic hinterland] always considered me his enemy.
I do not know why; we must have spoken no more than twice in my entire life. He would have
been the one to prevent my appointment
Source: Eger Hírek (2017). Gábor Széles: Simicska would not have let me to become
finance minister. Helga Molnár talks with Gábor Széles. [In Hungarian: Széles Gábor:
Simicska megfúrta volna, hogy gazdasági miniszter legyek. Molnár Helga beszélgetése
30
Széles Gáborral]. URL: http://www.egerhirek.hu/2017/11/24/szeles-gabor-simicska-
megfurta-volna-hogy-gazdasagi-miniszter-legyek/kozelet/molnarhelga, Egerhirek.hu, 24
November 2017.
Q5. Levente Balogh, 2011
(Owner-CEO of Szentkirályi, one of Hungary’s leading bottled mineral water companies.
Among Hungary’s 100 richest persons since 2006.)
-owned companies can treat Hungarian manufacturers this way
Source: Magyar Demokrata (2011). Szentkirályi is not for sale: interview with Levente
Balogh [In Hungarian: A Szentkirályi nem eladó: Interjú Balogh Leventével], Magyar
Demokrata, 20 July 2011.
Q6. Béla Karsai, 2006
(Owner-CEO of Karsai Holding, a company producing basic materials for the plastic industry.
Among Hungary’s 100 richest persons between 2002 and 2007.)
and we support some of them, such as
Hankook. Although it is not a problem in itself, it does raise a big question: if Hungarian
enterprises had been the recipients of such enormous financial support, wouldnt that have
Source: interview in Business Hungary, quoted on pp. 101-102 in Kolosi, T. and I.
Szelényi (2010). How to become a billionaire? Neoliberal ethics and the spirit of
postcommunist capitalism [In Hungarian: Hogyan legyünk milliárdosok: A neoliberális
etika és a posztkommunista kapitalizmus szelleme]. Budapest, Corvina.
31
Q7. Zsolt Felcsuti, 2011
(Major shareholder of the MPF Industry Group. He is also Co-President of the Confederation
of Hungarian Employers and Industrialists and the adviser of the Hungarian Minister for
National Economy since 2013. Among Hungary’s 100 richest persons since 2003.)
Our principle is that we do not need to bother producing something if it can be made cheaper
elsewhere; we would never have a chance to win in the market anyhow. I would be the happiest
person if we could manufacture all the products in our profile, but that is impossible in Europe.
Here we have a mighty democracy that is costly; the administration is way too huge compared
to a Far-Eastern basis.
Source: Világgazdaság (2013). The advisor of Minister of Finance Mihály Varga: You
can cut sectors that have money - Interview with Zsolt Felcsuti [In Hungarian: Varga
Mihály tanácsadója: "elvonni onnan lehet, ahol van" - Interjú Felcsuti Zsolttal],
Világgazdaság, 13 June 2013. Világgazdaság (2011). The Hungarian Multinational [In
Hungarian: A magyar multi]. URL: https://www.vg.hu/manager-magazin/a-magyar-
multi-348086/, Ilona Kocsi, Világgazdaság, Menedzser Magazin, 8 May 2011.
Q8. György Wáberer, 2016
(Founder, CEO, and majority shareholder of Waberer’s Holding, Hungary’s biggest
transportation company. Ministerial Commissioner for logistics since 2015, then ministerial
commissioner for regional development of the Tokaly region. Among Hungary’s 100 richest
persons since 2003.)
the most open to
Source: Magyar Narancs (2016). The sky is the limit - For how much was Waberers
sold? [In Hungarian: Majdnem az égig - Miért adták el a Wabererst?]. URL:
http://magyarnarancs.hu/belpol/majdnem-az-egig-100416, Magyar Narancs, 2016/32, 11
August 2016.
32
Q9. Sándor Demján, 2010
(Businessman, entrepreneur, chairman of TriGránit. Among Hungary’s 100 richest persons
since 2002, died in 2018. He topped the list in several years.)
-2003. It was predictable because the [left-liberal]
Source: Fidesz.hu (2010). Demján: A Fidesz victory at the election is in the best interest
of the country [In Hungarian: ]. URL:
http://www.fidesz.hu/hirek/2010-03-24/demjan-az-orszag-erdeke-a-fidesz-gy337zelme/,
Fidesz.hu, 24 March 2010.
Q10. Sándor Demján, 2014
based on means-testing,
Source: Népszabadság (2014). Demján: If we were not members of the EU we would kill
each other [In Hungarian: Demján: Ha nem lennénk az EU-ban, le is gyilkolnánk
egymást]. URL: http://nol.hu/gazdasag/hungaro-siitak-szunnitak-1501219,
Népszabadság, 28 November 2014.
Q11. Sándor Csányi, 2009
(Chairman and CEO of OTP Bank, one of the largest financial groups in the CEE Region.
Among Hungary’s 100 richest persons since 2002. He topped the list in several years.)
; he regularly asks my
opinion. This does not mean that I am in conflict with Ferenc Gyurcsány. However, he is indeed
much less interested in my opinion than Viktor
Sources public affairs [In Hungarian:
Politikai frontvonalak: Csányi Sándor ügyei
2009.
33
Q12. Sándor Csányi, 2018
s government remaining in power after Aprils parliamentary election would help
the banking sector continue to operate in a supportive environment. Hungarian banks
relationship with the government and the central bank is now excellent under the administration
led by Prime Minister
Source: Bloomberg (2018). Top Bank CEO Votes for Stability in Hungarian Election,
Interview with Sándor Csányi by Gabriella Lovas. URL:
https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2018-03-02/top-bank-ceo-votes-for-stability-
in-hungarian-election-race, bloomberg.com, 2 March 2018.
Q13. János Kóka, 2015
(IT entrepreneur, Minister of Economy and Transport between 2004 and 2007, Chairman of
the Alliance of Free Democrats (SZDSZ) from 2007 to 2008. Among Hungary’s 100 richest
persons in 2002-2003.)
Source: Magyar Narancs (2015). I told Szijjártó that I was offended: Interview with János
Kóka [In Hungarian: Elmondtam Szijjártónak, hogy rosszulesett. Nagy Gergely Miklós
interjúja Kóka Jánossal]. URL: https://magyarnarancs.hu/belpol/elmondtam-szijjartonak-
hogy-rosszulesett-96057, Gergely Miklós Nagy, Magyar Narancs, 2015/33, 13 August
2015.
Q14. Viktor Orbán, 2016
must be based on a national basis only. A good industrial policy creates opportunities and gives
t opens doors, cooperates, and concludes contracts and long-term
34
Source: Heti Válasz (2016). Orbán has turned the switch - A new era begins (In
Hungarian: Orbán megnyomta a gombot ). URL:
http://valasz.hu/itthon/Orbán-megnyomta-a-gombot-es-most-tenyleg-uj-korszak-
kezdodott-117190, valasz.hu, 5 Februry 2016.
Q15. Marie-Theres Thiell, 2018
(Vice President of the German-Hungarian Chamber of Commerce.)
ding to the German-Hungarian Chamber
of Commerce. Economically, Hungary is now in a good position again. Orbán has restructured
the budget, reduced corporate tax and non-wage labor costs, and ensured full employment. That
has worked and led to growth.
Source: WirtschaftsWoche (2018). Deutsche Firmen in Osteuropa: Geschäfte machen
beim Europafeind. URL: https://www.wiwo.de/my/politik/europa/deutsche-firmen-in-
osteuropa-geschaefte-machen-beim-europafeind/20903608.html, Simon Book,
WirtschaftsWoche, wiwo.de, January 30, 2018.
Q16. Jan Mainka, 2018
(Chief editor Budapester Zeitung, a leading local German-language print weekly newspaper,
founder of The Budapest Times.)
O
Source: Quoted in G7.hu (2018). A német cégek annyira jól érzik magukat
Magyarországon, hogy ha tehetnék, Orbán Viktorra szavaznának. URL:
https://g7.hu/kozelet/20180129/a-nemet-cegek-annyira-jol-erzik-magukat-
magyarorszagon-hogy-ha-tehetnek-Orbán-viktorra-szavaznanak/, Wiedemann Tamás,
2018. január 29, g7.hu.
35
Q17. Angela Merkel, 2019
(Chancellor of Germany, 2005-2022)
happy to have contributed to that
Source: Quoted in Hungary Today (2019). Did Merkel Really Praise Hungary for Use of
EU Funds? Proof Ends Debate. URL: https://hungarytoday.hu/did-merkel-really-praise-
hungary-for-use-of-eu-funds-proof-ends-debate/, Péter Cseresnyés, Aug 21, 2019.
Q18. László Parragh, 2006
(Entrepreneur and business advocate, president of the Hungarian Chamber of Commerce and
Industry since 2000, member of the National Competitiveness Council since 2017.)
s in Hungary. By and large, we have handed over our heavy
industry [to foreigners] that was the price of the regime change. The industry should generate
the bulk of the profit of national capitalists; it is tied to us culturally and financially. However,
only small- and medium-
Source: Magyar Demokrata (2006). Its a cat and mouse game, says László Parragh: The
main decisions are made by the chief accountant [In Hungarian: Macska-egér játék -
Parragh Lá]. URL:
http://www.demokrata.hu/cikk/macska-eger-jatek-parragh-laszlo-fokonyvelo-hozza-
donteseket Magyar Demokrata, 2006/48, 29 December 2006.
Q19. László Parragh, 2011
The upcoming period will see some very painful changes, which will resemble the reforms
implemented by the Dzurinda government. They may have been extremely shocking for
specific regions and social groups in Slovakia, but they galvanized the labor market.
Source: Napi Gazdaság (2011). A labour market shock therapy is ahead - should we
suspend the minimum wage? [In Hungarian: - Fel
36
kellene függeszteni a minimálbért?]. URL:
https://www.napi.hu/magyar_gazdasag/munkaeropiaci_sokkterapia_jon_fel_kellene_fug
geszteni_a_minimalbert.482859.html, Napi Gazdaság, 2011. május 12.
Q20. Viktor Orbán, 2011
becoming a global economy, the role of national industry and national capital persists. That is
precisely what constitutes the basis of the national economies, i.e., that a Hungarian employs a
Source: Heti Válasz (2011). Viktor Orbán: The national economy is the base of strength
and success [In Hungarian: Orbán Viktor - ].
URL: http://valasz.hu/itthon/az-eroforras-ma-is-a-nemzetekben-es-a-nemzeti-
gazdasagokban-van-41906, Heti Válasz, 2 October 2011.
