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Earth System Governance 12 (2022) 100134
Available online 15 February 2022
2589-8116/© 2022 The Authors. Published by Elsevier B.V. This is an open access article under the CC BY-NC-ND license
(http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/).
A preliminary framework for understanding the governance of novel
environmental technologies: Ambiguity, indeterminateness and drift
Florian Rabitz
a
, Marian Feist
b
, Matthias Honegger
c
, Joshua Horton
d
, Sikina Jinnah
e
,
*
,
Jesse Reynolds
f
a
Kaunas University of Technology, Kaunas, Lithuania
b
University of Cologne, Cologne, Germany
c
Perspectives Climate Research, gGmbH, Freiburg i.B., Germany and Utrecht University, Utrecht, the Netherlands
d
Harvard University, Cambridge, MA, USA
e
University of California, Santa Cruz, USA
f
University of California, Los Angeles, USA
ARTICLE INFO
Keywords
Institutions
Technology
Adaptation
Anticipation
ABSTRACT
We propose a conceptual framework to explain why some technologies are more difcult to govern than others in
global environmental governance. We start from the observation that some technologies pose transboundary
environmental risks, some provide capacities for managing such risks, and some do both. For “ambiguous”
technologies, potential risks and risk management capacities are uncertain, unknown or even unknowable.
Governance systems are indeterminate towards ambiguous technologies, as existing norms, rules, scripts and
routines do not imply default solutions under institutional focal points. Indeterminateness can lead to institu-
tional drift, with risks accordingly remaining unmitigated and risk management capacities remaining unex-
ploited. We use the cases of solar geoengineering, gene drive systems and bioinformatics for illustrating this
framework. As technological ambiguity may often be irresolvable, we conclude that it might force us to confront
the limits to anticipatory global decision-making on matters of long-term environmental sustainability.
1. Introduction
Technology is central to Global Environmental Governance (GEG).
Some technologies are sources of transboundary environmental or socio-
ecological risks, for instance cross-border pollution from chemical
manufacturing. Other technologies provide capacities for managing
such risks, for instance solar power or Carbon Capture and Storage
mitigating harmful impacts from climate change. Starting from this
distinction, we ask why some novel technologies appear inherently more
difcult to govern than others? Why are some technologies contested,
disputed and subject to years of deliberations, consultations, and in-
ternational negotiations that may yield little more than least-common-
denominator outcomes, whereas others appear to unproblematically
t into existing governance frameworks?
We develop a theoretical framework that is broadly situated in
cooperation theory (whereby states cooperate on novel technologies to
realize gains or to avoid losses) and utilize a problem-structural lens
(whereby the attributes of a given technology shape the associated
collective action problems and interact with other relevant factors such
as interests or norms; Jinnah et al., 2021). Novel technologies vary on a
spectrum of ambiguity from ambiguous to unambiguous (Rotolo et al.,
2015). Unambiguous technologies tend either to pose transboundary
risks or provide capacities for managing such risks. This facilitates
governance responses: for the former type, the default solution is risk
assessment and management in order to reduce or avoid transboundary
harm. For the latter, it is to facilitate technological development,
deployment or diffusion as a global public good. Conversely, ambiguous
technologies pose some risks and provide some management capacity,
although the extent to which they do so is unclear. Accordingly, they
cannot easily be classied as either a problem or a solution. Ambiguity
can result from scientic uncertainty as well as divergent stakeholder
norms and perceptions. Ambiguous technologies do not have an obvious
institutional solution but instead lead to governance indeterminateness,
with existing norms, rules, scripts and routines failing to provide clear
* Corresponding author.
E-mail addresses: Florian.rabitz@ktu.lt (F. Rabitz), m.feist@uni-koeln.de (M. Feist), Honegger@perspectives.cc (M. Honegger), Horton@seas.harvard.edu
(J. Horton), sjinnah@ucsc.edu (S. Jinnah), jessreyn@gmail.com (J. Reynolds).
Contents lists available at ScienceDirect
Earth System Governance
journal homepage: www.sciencedirect.com/journal/earth-system-governance
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.esg.2022.100134
Received 22 October 2021; Received in revised form 31 January 2022; Accepted 1 February 2022
Earth System Governance 12 (2022) 100134
2
answers to the regulatory challenge. Failing to resolve this indetermi-
nateness results in institutional drift: the “[n]eglect of institutional
maintenance in spite of external change,” which results in “slippage in
institutional practice on the ground” (Streeck and Thelen 2005: 31). In
other words: the indeterminateness of governance systems towards
ambiguous technologies drives political inaction and negligence. We
propose that this framework is sufciently exible and open-ended to be
compatible with a variety of larger theoretical perspectives in Interna-
tional Relations. We rst develop its different conceptual elements and
subsequently highlight its explanatory power for three major instances
of ambiguous technologies in GEG. We conclude with some consider-
ations on the implications of ambiguity for GEG as well as for cooper-
ation theory more broadly.
2. Novel technologies and governance responses
Novel technologies can present sources of transboundary risks and/
or provide capacities for the management of such risks. Transboundary
risks entail environmental harm as well as adverse socio-ecological
impacts that result from novel technologies either creating novel types
of inequity or reinforcing existing ones. We choose the term “risks” to
denote that such negative effects are probabilistic rather than deter-
ministic. Risk management capacities are technology-based or
technology-supported ways for assessing, managing or eliminating risks.
Such capacities can serve to reduce the environmental footprint of
human societies or assist them in adapting to harmful environmental
changes, regardless of whether these have anthropogenic or natural
origins. The purpose of relevant international institutions varies
depending on whether a given technology is a source of transboundary
risk or whether it offers risk management capacity. For the former
category, this purpose is to avoid or reduce adverse transboundary ef-
fects, with institutional design typically having to account for negative
externalities and upstream-downstream problems (Mitchell and Keil-
bach 2001). For the latter category, the purpose of international in-
stitutions is to supply risk management capacities as a global public
good, which can entail either the technology itself or its effects (such as
the global benets from domestic renewable energy sources). The sup-
ply of global public goods faces various specic governance challenges
that notably differ from those associated with the avoidance or reduc-
tion of adverse transboundary effects (Barrett 2007, National Academic
of ScienceEngineering and Medicine, 2021). Novel technologies that
constitute sources of risk require different governance approaches than
novel technologies that offer risk management capacities; these ap-
proaches are not substitutable. In other words, institutional design must
be t for purpose. We note that international institutions can provide
various other functions in regards to novel technologies, for instance
regarding monitoring, enforcement or nancial and technical assistance.
However, we consider such functions as secondary, in the sense that they
support the primary institutional functions of realizing gains or averting
losses.
3. Ambiguity, indeterminateness and drift
Governance systems thus generally address technological risks from
the perspective of reducing or avoiding transboundary harm and tech-
nological risk management capacities from the perspective of global
public goods. The boundary between the two categories is often fuzzy,
meaning that some technologies will predominantly fall into one cate-
gory yet partially also into the other. Wind power, for instance, provides
risk management capacities in terms of avoiding climate change, yet also
poses some limited risks for some migratory species of birds. Solar power
similarly has strong public goods characteristics in combination with
some limited risks in its supply chain. Conversely, coal power technol-
ogy and associated carbon dioxide emissions have some very limited
benecial effects (e.g. possibly on plant growth) although their harmful
impacts are obviously incomparably greater.
Some technologies, in other words, predominantly constitute sources
of risk or predominantly provide risk management capacities. These
technologies are unambiguous in the sense that they have obvious
governance implications. This greatly simplies political responses.
Once certain ozone-depleting substances were found to cause signicant
transboundary harm that far outweighed their limited economic utility,
the international institutional response amounted to a comprehensive
global phase-out of production and consumption (differences across
substances and in country-specic obligations notwithstanding; Parson
2003). This is not to trivialize the challenge of effective international
cooperation on such and other matters of transnational harm. In cases
like this, institutional responses might still be hampered by problems of
collective action and the distributional implications of regulation. The
same applies to international cooperation for ensuring that the benets
associated with a technology which primarily provides risk management
capacities will be supplied as a public good. Yet in these cases, the
overall objectives of existing governance frameworks are relatively
straightforward: while governments and other stakeholders might
disagree on operational details, international institutions reect the
fundamental normative consensus that, in principle, transboundary
harm should be reduced or avoided and public goods should be pro-
moted for the benet of the global community.
Yet there are other technologies that present uncertain, unknown or
even unknowable mixtures of these two factors: they may have some
public good characteristics and may cause some harm, yet the balance
between the two cannot readily be discerned. Such technologies are
ambiguous in the sense that it is unclear whether they should be
considered as a problem or as a solution. This ambiguity results from two
interlinked factors. First, novel technologies can come with signicant
scientic uncertainties regarding their costs, benets, risks, feasibility,
scalability and so forth. Such uncertainty is in part an unavoidable fact
of life (Jasanoff 2007) yet can increase to the point where the relative
benets of different international regulatory choices become difcult to
ascertain (Dimitrov 2003). Second, ambiguity may also result from
differences in norms and perceptions. Differences in risk tolerance, so-
cial discount rates or social values can lead to differences in how states
evaluate the relative benets and drawbacks of a given technology.
Some states might perceive a novel technology as a game changer
whereas others hold a more cautious attitude. Perceptions will also
differ when technological impacts are likely to be asymmetrical, for
instance when some states are prone to face relatively large risk or
expect relatively large benets from technological risk management
capacities.
The lack of an obvious and default way of responding to these
ambiguous technologies implies governance indeterminateness: existing
norms do not clearly dene relevant standards of appropriate behavior;
transaction costs impede identifying ways of applying or adjusting
existing operational rules to enable cooperative gains; or decision-
makers lack behavioral scripts and cognitive routines for rapidly pro-
cessing the technological challenge and devising an adequate course of
action. Differences in the larger ontological and epistemological outlook
imply differences in how we understand the specic causes of indeter-
minateness. However, its mere existence as a relational property of
governance systems, in regards to an ambiguous technology, appears
consistent with a wide range of theoretical approaches in International
Relations. Regardless of how we conceive of its causes, the consequence
of indeterminateness is to complicate governance responses as a result of
divergent technology assessments, a lack of agreed default solutions as
well as the risk of regulatory mismatch from unknowingly choosing a
governance approach that later turns out to be inconsistent with the
technology in question. Indeterminateness can thus lead to a situation of
institutional drift, that is, the failure of institutions to adapt to important
changes in their respective functional domains (Streeck and Thelen
2005; Rabitz 2019a). As above, the link connecting indeterminateness to
drift can be approached from different theoretical vantage points. A
rationalist perspective, for instance, might emphasize how governments
F. Rabitz et al.
Earth System Governance 12 (2022) 100134
3
with vested interests in the status quo may use indeterminateness as a
pretext for inaction until improved scientic knowledge will supposedly
enable meaningful regulatory choices at an undened point in the
(distant) future (Helm 1998). Sociological accounts might emphasize
how indeterminateness obscures the normative implications of inter-
national rules and thus prevents consensus on desirable behavioral re-
sponses from emerging. We suggest that the explanatory power of our
framework is independent from such larger questions and, in the
following three sections, briey show how it sheds light on the gover-
nance challenges of three major instances of ambiguous technology in
GEG.
4. Solar geoengineering
Solar geoengineering (sometimes called solar radiation modica-
tion), principally through the injection of aerosols into the stratosphere,
is a proposed method for reducing climate change and the associated
risks through the partial reection of incoming solar energy (Reynolds
2019). A global solar geoengineering program via stratospheric aerosol
injection seems to require a fraction of the costs associated with climate
impacts (Barrett 2008), and its benecial temperature effects would also
manifest quickly. While there is close to zero commercial interest in the
technology, a variety of modelling exercises highlight its apparent
technical feasibility and efcacy for partially limiting the global rise in
temperatures and thereby contributing to sustainable development.
These potential benets co-exist with signicant potential risks,
including the chance of environmental harm (by damaging the ozone
layer or by disrupting regional precipitation patterns) and
socio-environmental challenges that are being discussed under labels
such as “moral hazard”, “slippery slopes” or the “termination problem”,
among others. While a detailed discussion is well beyond the scope of
this paper, the magnitude, or in some cases even the very existence, of all
these risks and opportunities is a matter of substantial dispute (Reynolds
2021). Solar geoengineering is thus an ambiguous technology.
This ambiguity translates into governance indeterminateness. Again,
cutting short a voluminous literature, there is no obvious focal point
providing default rules, procedures, scripts and heuristics for resolving
the issue in its entirety. For instance, it remains unclear whether solar
geoengineering would, or should, constitute an essential tool for
achieving the temperature targets of the 2015 Paris Agreement on
climate change; whether it would have negative impacts on global
biodiversity goals or whether it might rather serve to protect biodiver-
sity from climate impacts (McDonald et al., 2019); or the extent to which
research and deployment would, or should, be subject to the precau-
tionary principle, considering both the risks of the technology itself and
the risks which the technology is intended to manage (Reynolds 2019).
Despite a plethora of proposals for how governance could be constructed
for this issue (e.g. Chhetri et al., 2018; National Academic of Scien-
ceEngineering and Medicine, 2021), governance responses have been
minimal so far, primarily amounting to three non-binding governing
body decisions under the Convention on Biological Diversity (CBD).
With existing governance frameworks thus being largely indeterminate,
governance questions pertaining to research into and potential deploy-
ment of solar geoengineering technology remain unaddressed. This has
resulted in institutional drift with potential risks remaining unmitigated
and risk management capacities unexploited.
5. Gene drive systems
Gene drive systems are a proposed technique for biasing patterns of
biological reproduction (NASEM 2016). They would allow for genetic
modications to be “driven” through entire target populations. For
species with short reproductive cycles, they would thus enable rapid
population replacement (i.e. switching wild types to transgenic species)
or even eradication (Esvelt et al., 2014). In principle, gene drives allow
for unprecedented biological control at the ecosystem scale. In addition
to combatting vector diseases such as malaria, they might be highly
effective for protecting vulnerable ecosystems from biological invasions
and for proong agricultural systems against pests. As gene drives are
likely to diffuse widely and potentially uncontrollably, including in a
transboundary context, they present biosafety risks that are likely
signicantly greater than those associated with conventional Geneti-
cally Modied Organisms (GMOs). The magnitude, nature and man-
ageability of these risks is a matter of ongoing dispute. No clearly
appropriate risk assessment methodologies presently exist for gene
drives (see Dolezel et al., 2020). Various technological solutions to the
biosafety problem are currently being explored, such as methods for
reversing the effects of gene drive releases or for limiting geographic
spread, although these might also end up introducing new problems,
including from unpredicted interactions among system components.
Gene drives being an ambiguous technology that might either
endanger biodiversity or provide an effective tool for its conservation,
global biodiversity governance is so far indeterminate (Rabitz 2019). Do
gene drives pose a threat to the CBD’s conservation objective or a po-
tential tool for its implementation? How do gene drives t into the
obligation on CBD parties to “control or eradicate” invasive alien species
(Article 8. h), considering that drives might either be a tool for control or
eradication, or might constitute invasive alien species themselves? How
would the provisions of the CBD’s Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety
(notably regarding risk assessment and Advance Informed Agreement)
apply to gene drives? So far and as with solar geoengineering, the CBD
has merely passed a series of nonbinding governing body decisions on
the wider categories of “synthetic biology” that emphasize and reiterate
the need for case-by-case risk assessment and precautionary
decision-making. As the negotiations for the CBD’s post-2020 Global
Biodiversity Framework unfold, it looks increasingly unlikely that
parties will adopt more detailed and stringent regulation at the 15th
Conference of the Parties, to be held in 2022. While a robust interna-
tional regulatory framework is absent, pilot projects are moving rapidly
towards initial open eld experiments, constituting a textbook denition
of institutional drift.
6. Bioinformatics
The fusion between biotechnology and information technology leads
to an increasing use of digitalized genetic sequences for research and
development across the life sciences, notably including agriculture and
pharmaceuticals. The increasing efciency of DNA sequencing and
digital storage solutions is giving birth to vast digital genomic libraries,
the content of which can be analyzed at a hitherto unprecedented scale
via new applications in machine learning and big data analytics. Bio-
informatics holds signicant potential for improving human well-being,
as well as for environmental sustainability, conservation and food se-
curity (Gaffney et al., 2020). At the same time, the gradual displacement
of physical samples with digitalized electronic sequences in the
contemporary life sciences is raising questions regarding the fair and
equitable sharing of benets resulting from the utilization of genetic
resources, a core objective of the CBD, the International Treaty on Plant
Genetic Resources for Food and Agriculture (ITPGRA) and other in-
struments (Lawson et al., 2019). This objective is based on the ethical
principle that the countries, communities or other organizations that
have cultivated and conserved genetic resources should participate in
commercial and other benets that are derived from their utilization.
Bioinformatics is an ambiguous technology because, on one hand,
the unfettered access to genetic sequence data could facilitate research
and development with pay-offs for environmental sustainability: by
stimulating innovation in green technologies and by contributing to
biodiversity conservation (Halewood et al., 2018). On the other, the
technology potentially undercuts fair and equitable benet-sharing: the
utilization and transfer of genetic sequence data is notoriously difcult
to monitor, which aggravates the compliance problem in ABS,
commonly and broadly referred to as “biopiracy” (Rabitz 2015). This
F. Rabitz et al.
Earth System Governance 12 (2022) 100134
4
would raise questions of social justice and prevent benets from being
channeled into projects for nature conservation. Yet the nancial vol-
ume which could be leveraged through benet-sharing from genetic
sequence data is uncertain, as is the extent of spin-off benets from
innovation on the basis of such data. We neither know which monetary
(and other) resources benet-sharing could mobilize for nature conser-
vation; nor do we know the degree to which benet-sharing and its
associated compliance procedures would hamper innovation in the life
sciences.
The CBD and the ITPGRFA generally require the sharing of benets
from the utilization of physical genetic resources. The extent to which
they do (and should) apply to genetic sequence data is an explosive
political issue which has already wrecked a multi-year reform process
under the ITPGRFA and has become a major sticking point in the ne-
gotiations on the CBD’s post-2020 Global Biodiversity Framework
(Rohden and Scholz 2021). The indeterminateness of governance
frameworks has contributed to institutional drift: while biotechnological
research and development increasingly shifts towards genetic sequence
data, questions of access and benet-sharing remain unresolved. In
practice, this means that the biotechnology industry (in predominantly
developed countries) continues utilizing genetic sequence data without
appropriate international and national regulations that would ensure
the fair and equitable sharing of benets with the stakeholders (pre-
dominantly from developing countries) that have cultivated and
conserved the corresponding physical specimens. This highlights the
distributional implications of indeterminateness and drift.
7. Conclusions
The growing relevance of technology for GEG requires an appro-
priate conceptualization of their relationship. We have here provided a
preliminary conceptual approach that centers on technological ambi-
guity as a key factor inuencing governance responses. Our framework
is sufciently exible and open-ended to be compatible with a variety of
theoretical traditions, such as rationalist or sociological approaches to
international cooperation and institutions. In other words, we do not
aim to provide a competing account but rather propose a middle-range
conceptualization which can be integrated into different ontological and
epistemological frameworks in order to (hopefully) enable a more ne-
grained analysis of novel technologies in GEG.
As we propose, and as the cases of solar geoengineering, gene drives
and bioinformatics highlight, ambiguous technologies pose substantial
governance challenges and tend to be met with political inaction,
negligence or indecisiveness. This appears to be the case outside of the
environmental sphere as well. Contemporary developments in Articial
Intelligence, machine learning and big data, for instance, may offer vast
improvements to human well-being while simultaneously raising major
questions on issues such as algorithmic discrimination, civil rights im-
plications of facial recognition software or the status of lethal autono-
mous weapon systems under international humanitarian law. There and
elsewhere, the indeterminateness of governance systems towards
ambiguous technology implies a threat of systematic under-regulation.
As ambiguity can result not just from scientic uncertainty but also
from divergent norms and perceptions, expert advice is no silver bullet
and might even be detrimental if the existence of genuine differences in
values or in technology assessment criteria is treated as a mere lack of
scientic information (Jasanoff 2007). Somewhat schematically,
governance choices for ambiguous technologies boil down to restrictive
regulation (thus reducing or avoiding harm but possibly missing out on
critical capacities for the management of environmental risks) or
enabling regulation (thus seeking to unlock management capacities but
possibly incurring harm in the process). Neither sound science nor
precaution offers an easy way out of this dilemma: as both can lead to
enabling regulation for technologies that turn out to predominantly
constitute sources of risk, or inappropriately restrictive regulation for
technologies that might otherwise have provided important capacities
for reducing anthropogenic impacts on nature or for making human
societies more resilient to environmental changes. Crucially, there is no
solid basis for preferring either approach ex ante. A powerful illustration
of this problem is the debate on solar geoengineering: given the systemic
political failure in the global efforts for climate change mitigation,
foregoing a potential future use of solar geoengineering might be folly –
yet developing or deploying such measures might just as well turn out to
be dangerous. All of this raises the uncomfortable question whether
technological ambiguity presents a hard limit to what GEG can accom-
plish? This might seem to suggest there are situations that demand a
regulatory leap of faith – that is, locking-in a regulatory choice on the
prohibition-facilitation spectrum without the possibility to resolve am-
biguities, and without the option of deferring to overarching principles
such as sound science or precaution as general heuristics. However, the
key lies in accepting ambiguity and embarking on a deliberative
governance pathway that ‘keeps an eye’ on the evolving risk landscape,
builds up diverse decision-making capacities in appropriate governance
institutions, and maintains the requisite governance adaptability that
does not preclude future regulatory choices – once such decisions
emerge as appropriate responses to the evolving risk landscape.
Declaration of competing interest
The authors declare that they have no known competing nancial
interests or personal relationships that could have appeared to inuence
the work reported in this paper.
Acknowledgements
We are grateful for the comments from the anonymous reviewers. We
are also grateful for inputs from Oskar Gstrein, Ina M¨
oller, Valentina
Nakic, Marielle Papin, and Karsten Schulz on prior versions of this
manuscript. Sikina Jinnah’s contribution to this article was in part
supported by a fellowship from the Andrew Carnegie Corporation of
New York. Florian Rabitz’ contribution to this article was supported by
the Research Council of Lithuania, project no. P-MIP-19-513, “Institu-
tional Adaptation to Technological Change”.
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