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Can conservatives who (de)humanize immigrants the most be able to support them? The power of imagined positive contact

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Abstract

Despite studies examining political ideology, group dehumanization, and intergroup contact as predictors of intergroup support and affect, research on their interplay in shaping such outcomes has been limited. In fact, considering the possibility that conservatives might view immigrants in various ways (as more or less human) is important to understand the impact of interventions (positive imagined contact) on intergroup relations. The results of two experiments (N = 671) with U.S. citizens in relation to two outgroups—Muslim immigrants in Experiment 1 and Mexican immigrants in Experiment 2—consistently showed that imagined positive contact condition (vs. control/no contact condition) influenced intergroup support (i.e., in both experiments) and positive emotions (i.e., in Experiment 2) more for individuals who endorsed a conservative ideology and scored high for dehumanizing immigrants. Participants’ willingness to attribute positive emotions to outgroup members ultimately explained the observed effects. In this research, we discuss the theoretical and practical implications of these findings for intergroup relations and outgroup dehumanization.
J Appl Soc Psychol. 2022;00:1–13. wileyonlinelibrary.com/journal/jasp
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1© 2022 Wiley Periodicals LLC.
1 |INTRODUCTION
In today’s globalized world, immigration seems inevitable, whether
for social, economic, demographic, political, or environmental rea-
sons (Black et al., 2011), resulting in greater diversity in contempo-
rary nation- states (Sides & Citrin, 2007). Because such diversity,
however, tends to provoke adverse reac tions, par ticularly among
conservative quarters of the majority group, factors that may re-
duce interethnic tensions need to be identified (e.g., Thomsen &
Raf iqi, 2019a, 2 019b).
In fact, individuals who endorse a conservative ideology have
demonstrated greater opposition to immigration than their peers
who endorse a liberal ideology (e.g., Chandler & Tsai, 2001; Davidov
& Meuleman, 2012; Rustenbach, 2010; Semyonov et al., 2006; Sides
& Citrin, 2007; Thomsen & Rafiqi, 2019a, 2019b; Wilkes et al., 2008).
The reason why, according to Jost et al. (2003) and Thorisdottir
et al. (2007), is that individuals who endorse a conser vative ideol-
ogy value stability and conformity (i.e., cultural unity) and both ac-
cept and justify inequalities, whereas those who endorse a liberal
ideolog y value diversity, social change, and social equality (see also
Jost et al., 2008). Put differently, an individual with conservative
stances considers that social changes indicate cultural disintegra-
tion, whereas an individual with liberal stances views specific so-
cial changes (e.g., greater ethnic diversity) as valuable progress
(Greven, 2016; Hibbing et al., 2014; Sides & Citrin, 2007; Taber
et al., 2001; Thomsen & Rafiqi, 2019a, 2019b; Zhirkov, 2014).
By extension, political ideology can trigger some individuals
to exclude and dehumanize outgroup members (Cassese, 2019;
Crawford et al., 2013; Markowitz & Slovic, 2020). Indeed, rela-
tive to liberals, conser vatives tend to consider immigrants to be
less evolved and civilized than themselves, and are more inclined
to support aggressive, even inhumane actions against immigrants
and other outgroup members without moral compunction (e.g.,
Ames, 2019; Banton et al., 2020; DeLuca- McLean & Castano, 2009;
Markowitz & Slovic, 2020).
Dehumanization has far- reaching consequences for intergroup
relations (Kteily & Landr y, 2022). Research has shown, for example,
that U.S. residents who scored high for dehumanizing Mexican immi-
grants were more likely to cast them in threatening terms, withhold
sympathy from them, and support measures designed to bar their
entry and deport them, including surveillance, detention, expulsion,
and even erecting a wall between the United States and Mexico.
Received: 22 January 2022 
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Accepted: 5 Feb ruary 2022
DOI : 10.1111/ jasp.1286 4
ORIGINAL ARTICLE
Can conservatives who (de)humanize immigrants the most be
able to support them? The power of imagined positive contact
Islam Borinca1| Pinar Çelik2| Martin Storme3
1Department of Psychology, University of
Limerick, Limerick, Ireland
2Centre Emile Bernheim, Solvay Brussels
School of Economics and Management,
Université Libre de Bruxelles, B russels,
Belgium
3IESEG School of Management, Univ. Lille,
CNRS, UMR 9221 - LEM - Lille Economie
Managem ent, Lille, France
Correspondence
Islam Borinca, Department of Psycholog y,
University of Limerick, V94 T9PX
Limerick, Ireland.
Email: islam.borinca@ul.ie
Abstract
Despite studies examining political ideology, group dehumanization, and intergroup
contact as predictors of intergroup support and affect, research on their interplay in
shaping such outcomes has been limited. In fact, considering the possibility that con-
servatives might view immigrants in various ways (as more or less human) is important
to understand the impact of interventions (positive imagined contact) on intergroup
relations. The results of two experiments (N = 671) with U.S. citizens in relation to two
outgroups— Muslim immigrants in Experiment 1 and Mexican immigrants in Experiment
2— consistently showed that imagined positive contact condition (vs. control/no con-
tact condition) influenced intergroup support (i.e., in both experiments) and positive
emotions (i.e., in Experiment 2) more for individuals who endorsed a conservative
ideology and scored high for dehumanizing immigrants. Participants’ willingness to
attribute positive emotions to outgroup members ultimately explained the observed
effects. In this research, we discuss the theoretical and practical implications of these
findings for intergroup relations and outgroup dehumanization.
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These individuals reacted similarly to Muslim immigrants by, for
example, endorsing the increased surveillance of Muslims, limiting
their entry into the United States, and restricting their religious free-
dom. On top of that, the identified associations held not only for in-
dividuals’ expressed attitudes, but also for their behavior. Individuals
who scored high for dehumanizing Mexican and Muslim immigrants
were more likely to sign petitions against such immigrants that
would enact policies derived from proposals endorsed by former
president Donald Trump during his political campaign (e.g., Kteily &
Bruneau, 2017).
Taken together, prior research indicates— that individuals who
dehumanize immigrants the most, demonstrate less support and
more negative responses toward them, and that such individuals are
more likely to adhere to a conservative ideology instead of a liberal
one (DeLuca- McLean & Castano, 2009; Markowitz & Slovic, 2020).
The question then arises as to whether there are factors that could
mitigate the adverse consequences for intergroup relations (i.e.,
more support and positive emotions toward immigrants) among
people who score high in dehumanization and endorse a conserva-
tive ideology. Even though dehumanization and conservatism are
distinct factors and predict a variety of intergroup outcomes (Kteily
et al., 2016), previous research has insufficiently examined the ef-
fect of relative dehumanization on the ef fects of social interventions
(i.e., positive imagined interaction) as a function of conservative (vs.
liberal) views.
The unique contribution of the current paper is therefore that it
explicitly considers whether relative dehumanization moderates the
effect of positive imagined contact on outgroup support and emo-
tions among people who endorse conservative (vs. liberal) ideology.
1.1  | Imagined positive contact,
dehumanization, and political ideology
Face- to- face contact with out group membe rs may often be to o threat-
ening and/or anxiety- provoking for some individuals (Allport, 1954),
thus limiting opportunities for this type of direct intergroup contact.
As a result, social scholars identified, developed, and tested a bur-
geoning array of different forms of indirect contact. In fact, indi-
rect contact does not occur in a vacuum, but rather within certain
normative settings reflected in legislation, institutions, media, and
political interest (White e al., 2020). One form of indirect contact,
imagined contact (used in our paper), that involves the mental sim-
ulation of a (positive) interaction with outgroup members (Crisp &
Turner, 2009, 2012; White et al., 2020) has been shown to improve
intergroup relations (Crisp & Husnu, 2011; Husnu & Crisp, 2010;
Turner & Crisp, 2010; Vezzali et al., 2013, 2020) even in conflictual
(Bagci et al., 2019; Borinca, Falomir- Pichastor, & Andrighetto, 2020;
Borinca, Falomir- Pichastor, Andrighetto, & Durante, 2021a; Borinca,
Andrighetto, et al., 2021) and high- prejudiced settings (West
et al., 2015).
Scholars have also examined the link bet ween intergroup
contact and group dehumanization in relation to improved
intergroup relations (Brown et al., 2007; Bruneau et al., 2020;
Capozza et al., 2013, 2014, 2017). In multiple studies, positive con-
tact (i.e., direct, extended, imagined, and virtual) was associated with
reductions in the dehumanization of outgroup members (Bruneau
et al., 2020; Capozza et al., 2014, 2017). Other related research
has treated outgroup humanization as a predicting factor, and has
shown that outgroup humanization (i.e., refined, cultured, rational,
and logical) increased willingness for contact with outgroup mem-
bers (Borinca, Falomir- Pichastor, Andrighetto, & Halabi, 2021b)
and that outgroup meta(de)humanization influenced reactions and
understandings of an imagined prosocial intergroup interaction
mediated by positive social emotions and feelings (Borinca, Tropp,
& Ofosu, 2021). Of particular relevance for the present research,
Bruneau et al. (2020) suggested that the degree to which an indi-
vidual initially dehumanizes an outgroup sets the stage for negative,
ambiguous intergroup interactions. Notably, to the extent that indi-
viduals tend to dehumanize outgroup members more strongly than
others, they may react more negatively to adverse or suspicious in-
teractions with outgroup members. Thus, examining how individu-
als, especially those who score high for dehumanizing immigrants,
react to positive, prosocial intergroup interaction (i.e., positive con-
tact) is clearly warranted.
In our research, we investigated how positive intergroup contact
might enhance support for immigrant s and positive emotions toward
them among individuals who dehumanize immigrants the most and
have conservative (vs. liberal) views. We predicted that the positive
effect of imagined contact on support for immigration among con-
servatives would be strongest among those who dehumanize immi-
grants the most. We also explored whether emotions concerning
outgroup members mediate how the interplay between relative de-
humanization and intergroup contact affects support for immigrants
among individuals with conservative (vs. liberal) views.
At first glance, one might think that individuals who endorse the
conservative ideology and who dehumanize immigrants the most
are the least likely to be affected by positive intergroup contact.
Indeed, these individuals are arguably the most opposed toward im-
migrants and reluctant to engage themselves in contact with them.
However, research has indicated that once they experience positive
contact, they change their perception of immigrant s and thus react
more positively (Asbrock et al., 2012; Dhont & Van Hiel, 2009). In
addition, the analysis of political discourses suggests that many indi-
viduals endorsing the conservative ideology oppose immigration for
reasons other than dehumanization, that is, for economic reasons,
arguing, for instance, that the skills of most immigrant workers do
not meet the needs of the host country (Portice & Reicher, 2018).
Thus, a positive contact intervention, as compared to no interven-
tion, may have little impact on conservatives who oppose immigra-
tion for more objective (e.g., economic, no skill, etc.) reasons rather
than human qualities. However, those who dehumanize immigrants
are more likely to be positively impacted by positive contact pre-
cisely because their drive is more affective and less rational. Once
they have established positive contact, they are relatively more
likely to change their perception.
   
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BORINC A et Al.
Our reasoning follows from prior research that has included
beliefs and values as boundary conditions of the effects of inter-
group contact among individuals who scored high for social dom-
inance orientation (SDO) and right- wing authoritarianism (RWA)
(Turner et al., 2020). For instance, West et al. (2017) demonstrated
that imagined contact increased behavioral intentions and positive
implicit attitudes toward stigmatized outgroups among individuals
who endorsed values most opposed to ethnic diversity. Beyond that,
Asbrock et al. (2013) showed that high individuals who scored high
(vs. low) in RWA showed less negative outgroup emotions and were
more willing to engage in future contact with outgroups after imag-
ining positive contact with them. Similarly, Adesokan et al. (2011)
observed that the association between contact and prejudice pos-
itively improved intergroup relations, especially among individuals
who endorsed values most opposed to ethnic diversity (see also
Firat & Ataca, 2021; Hodson, 2008, 2011; Hodson et al., 2009). In
this context, we reason that it will be mainly conservative individuals
that dehumanize immigrants the most who will be most responsive
to positive imagined intergroup contact (vs. no contact).
To our knowledge, no study thus far has examined how the inter-
play between the dehumanization of immigrants (i.e., outgroup de-
humanization) and postive imagined contact can improve intergroup
relations among individuals who endorse a conservative ideology.
Our research was designed to bridge these gaps and illuminate an
additional route by which the interplay between relative dehuman-
ization and imagined contact can prompt improved intergroup reac-
tions and emotions among individuals with conservative views.
2 |OVERVIEW OF THE EXPERIMENTS
In the present research, we examined whether the relative dehu-
manization of immigrants and imagined contact jointly influence
support for and positive emotions toward immigrants among peo-
ple who endorse a conservative political ideology. We conducted
two experiments with U.S. citizens in which the outgroup was ei-
ther Mexican immigrants (Experiment 1) or Muslim immigrants
(Experiment 2). We focused on those two minority groups given
evidence that U.S. citizens blatantly dehumanize Mexican and
Muslim immigrants and that such dehumanization is positively as-
sociated with adverse reactions, emotions, and less support toward
them (e.g., Kteily et al., 2016; Kteily & Bruneau, 2017; Markowitz &
Slovic, 2020; Torres et al., 2011).
In the experiments, we asked participants to imagine either a
positive interaction with an immigrant— a Mexican immigrant in
Experiment 1 and a Muslim immigrant in Experiment 2— or an out-
door scene, which was the control condition in both experiments.
In both experiments, we measured political ideology and intergroup
dehumanization as individual differences, while the main dependent
variables were suppor t for immigrants (i.e., in both experiments) and
positive emotions (i.e., in Experiment 2).
In both experiments, Hypothesis 1 (H1) predicted that relative
dehumanization moderates the effect of intergroup contact (i.e., an
interaction between relative dehumanization and intergroup con-
tact) on support for immigrants among individuals who endorse a
conservative (vs. liberal) ideology. More specifically, we predicted
a positive ef fect of the imagined contact condition (vs. control/no
contact condition) on support for immigrants, especially among in-
dividuals who endorsed a conservative ideology and scored high on
dehumanizing immigrants. In experiment 2, we expected the same
pattern regarding participants’ emotions toward the outgroup. More
specifically, Hypothesis 2 (H2) predicted a positive effect of the
imagined contact condition (vs. control/no- contact condition) on
positive emotions toward immigrants, especially among individuals
who endorsed a conservative ideology and scored high for dehu-
manizing immigrants.
Finally, in Experiment 2, we used moderated moderated medi-
ation analysis (Hayes, 2018) to explore whether positive emotions
toward the outgroup account for predicted effect s on support for
immigrants. In prior research, individuals’ feelings and emotions
toward outgroups mediated the relationship between conserva-
tism and the animalistic dehumanization of outgroups (Crawford
et al., 2013), as well as explained the link between dehumanization
and attitudes toward immigrants (Utych, 2018). On top of that,
positive social emotions and greater closeness toward members
of the outgroup have explained why highly ideologically negative
participants have demonstrated the strongest reactions to positive
intergroup contact (Borinca, 2021; Hodson, 2011). Accordingly,
Hypothesis 3 (H3) predicted that positive emotions would mediate
the effect of the positive contact (vs. control condition) on suppor t
for immigrants among conservative individuals scoring high for de-
humanizing immigrants.
3 |EXPERIMENT 1
Examining the intergroup relations between U.S. citizens and
Mexican immigrants, Experiment 1 was designed to test H1, which
expected that participants who endorsed a conservative political
ideolog y and scored high for dehumanizing immigrants would show
greater support for immigrants after being exposed to a positive
contact condition (vs. control condition). Thus, we measured politi-
cal orientation and relative dehumanization as individual differences
and experimentally manipulated imagined contact (i.e., positive vs.
control). The main dependent variable was support for immigrants.
3.1  | Method
3.1.1  |  Participants and design
We invited 476 U.S. citizens to participate in an online sur vey, all
recruited via Amazon’s Mechanical Turk (MTurk). For their time, all
participants were compensated with US $1. After inspecting the
data, we discarded data from 144 participants: 53 whose completion
time was too short (<4 min; mean completion time = 8 min), 89 who
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missed one of the attention checks, and two who did not provide
consent to use their data. Therefore, the final sample consisted of
332 participants, ranging in age from 20 to 74 years (Mage = 3 9.75 ,
SDage = 12.49) and 147 of whom were women. They all were ran-
domly assigned to one of two experimental conditions: the positive
condition (n = 177) or the control condition (n = 155). A sensitivity
analysis conducted with G*Power (ver. 3.1.9.2; Faul et al., 2009) for
a multiple linear regression model with seven predictors (i.e., three
main effects, three two- way interactions, and a three- way interac-
tion), assuming a Cronbach’s alpha (α) of .05 and power of 0.80, re-
vealed that our final sample size was powered enough to detect an
effect size of f2 = 0.04, which conventionally indicates a small effect
size.
3.1.2  |  Procedure
We presented the experiment as a study of how people perceive dif-
ferent social groups. Participants completed a two- part online ques-
tionnaire. The first part asked par ticipants to provide demographic
information (i.e., age and gender) and rate their ideological stances
on social, economic, and political issues as well as to indicate the
extent to which a series of human traits apply to the ingroup (i.e.,
U.S. citizens) and outgroup (i.e., Mexican immigrant s). After ward, the
second part described the scenario (i.e., the experimental manipula-
tion) and our measure of the main dependent variable. Finally, par-
ticipants were fully debriefed, thanked for their participation, and
asked for their consent to use their data.
3.1.3  |  Measures and experimental manipulation
Political orientation
Political orientation was measured using a scale comprising three
items (Kteily et al., 2016). Two items assessed the extent to which
participants rated their social and economic views on a continuum
from 1 (very liberal) to 7 (very conservative), whereas the other as-
sessed t heir political pa rty preference, also on a sca le from 1 (strongly
Democrat) to 7 (strongly Republican). We computed an average score
to obtain each participant’s global score for political views; higher
scores indicated a more conservative ideology (α = 0.92; M = 3.83,
SD = 1.85).
Relative dehumanization of immigrants
We also assessed the amount of humanity that participants
attributed to the ingroup (i.e., U.S. citizens) and the outgroup
being studied (i.e., Mexican immigrants). We measured group
(de)humanization according to Kteily et al.’s (2016) adaptation
of Bastian et al.’s (2013) scale, on which participants indicated
the extent to which a series of human traits generally applied
to the outgroup and ingroup: refined, cultured; rational, logical;
backward, primitive (reverse scored [r]); savage, aggressive (r);
lacking in morals (r); barbaric, cold- hearted (r); scientifically or
technologically advanced; capable of self- control; and mature,
responsible (see also Borinca, Falomir- Pichastor, Andrighetto,
& Halabi, 2021b). Participants replied to items on a 7- point
Likert scale (1 = not at all, 7 = extremely so), and the order of
the target group (i.e., ingroup vs. outgroup) and order of items
within the measures were randomized. Scores for the ingroup
(α = 0.85, M = 5.00, SD = 1.01) and the outgroup (α = 0 .87,
M = 4.71, SD = 1.19) were computed by taking the mean of the
corresponding items. Last, we subtracted the score obtained for
the outgroup from the score obtained for the ingroup, which
resulted in a score of the relative dehumanization of outgroup
members (i.e., Mexican immigrants; M = 0.29, SD = 1.55), such
that higher scores indicated a greater degree of dehumanization
(Bruneau & Kteily, 2017).
Positive interaction
Combining procedures used by Borinca, Falomir- Pichastor, and
Andrighetto (2020); Borinca, Falomir- Pichastor, Andrighetto, and
Durante (2021a) and Crisp and Turner (2009), we asked par ticipants
to imagine either a positive interaction with a Mexican immigrant, or
an outdoor scene (i.e., in the control condition). To strengthen the
relevance of the experimental manipulation, we also asked them to
write what they imagined. The scenario for positive contact read as
follows:
We would like you to take five minutes and imagine
a situation in which you are waiting for a train. When
the train arrives, an elderly woman tries to exit the
train, but she cannot because multiple pieces of
her luggage are blocking her access to the station
platform.
As you go to help the woman, a Mexican immigrant
of the same gender as yours also waiting to board
the train notices the woman’s situation and helps
her by moving her luggage away from the train door.
Upon boarding the train, you and the Mexican im-
migrant are seated next to each other. Some min-
utes later, you start talking with him or her and
continue the conversation for 30 min until you
reach your destination. During the conversation,
you learn some interesting, positive things about
Mexican immigrants.
Now, please close your eyes for a moment and imag-
ine what you would have learned as a result of your
encounter with the Mexican immigrant. After open-
ing your eyes, list what you would have learned below.
By contrast, the scenario for the control/no contact condition read
as follows:
   
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BORINC A et Al.
We would like you to take five minutes to imagine
yourself in an outdoor scene. Try to imagine aspects
of the scene (e.g., whether it is a beach or a forest,
whether there are trees or hills, and what is on the
horizon).
Now, please close your eyes for a moment and imag-
ine what you would have seen in the outdoor scene.
After opening your eyes, list what you would have
learned below.
3.1.4  |  Dependent variable
We introduced two attention checks. The first determined whether
participants were paying attention to the survey (i.e., “This ques-
tion serves only to identify participants who are not reading and
responding to the survey carefully. Please do not answer this ques-
tion”), whereas the second determined whether they could accu-
rately remember the scenario that they were required to imagine in
the experimental manipulation.
Support for immigrants
Last, we assessed participants’ overall support for Mexican immi-
grants with a 20- item scale adapted from Kteily et al., 2016 (e.g.,
“The United States should offer to absorb and provide shelter for
as many Mexican immigrants as needed” and “The United States
should implement health education and awareness programs among
disadvantaged Mexican immigrants”). The order of the items was
randomized, and responses ranged from 1 (not at all) to 7 (absolutely).
From the responses, we computed an average score of support for
immigrants (α = 0.96; M = 4 .69, SD = 1.52).
3.2  | Results
We regressed the dependent variable on political orientation (i.e.,
standardized scores), relative dehumanization (i.e., standardized
scores), and intergroup contact (i.e., positive vs. control), as well as
all interactions between these three factors. Table 1 provides esti-
mated means and standard errors for the primary dependent varia-
ble, and Table 2 provides linear regression analyses for all predictors.
3.2.1  |  Support for immigrants
The regression analysis indicated the main effect of participants’
political ideology (B = −0.53, SE = 0.07), t(324) = −7.19, p < .001,
95% CI = [−0.67, −0.38], η2
p = 0.13. In short, more conser vative par-
ticipants showed less support for immigrants. The main effect of
relative dehumanization was also significant (B = −0.63, SE = 0.08),
t(324) = −7.8 6, p < .001, 95% CI = [−0.79, −0.47], η2
p = 0.16. As such,
dehumanization of immigrants was associated with less support for
immigrants. The main effect of intergroup contact was significant as
well, t(324) = 1.97, p = .049, 95% CI = [0.001, −0.26], η2
p = 0.01, and
was qualified by both the interaction between contact and dehu-
manization, t(324) = 2.16, p = .031, 95% CI = [0.33, 0.01], η2
p = 0.01
and the interaction between political orientation and dehumaniza-
tion (B = 0.22, SE = 0.05), t(324) = 4.24, p < .0 01, 95% CI = [0.12,
0.33], η2
p = 0.05. More importantly, the effect was qualified by
the predicted three- way interaction between contact, relative de-
humanization, and political ideology, t(324) = 3 .51, p = .001, 95%
CI = [0.08, 0.29], η2
p = 0.03 (see Figure 1).
Exploring the three- way interaction, the main effect of relative
dehumanization was significant among participants who endorsed
a liberal ideology (B = −0.86, SE = 0.11), t(324) = −7.49, p < .001,
TABLE 1 Dependent variables as a function of political ideology, dehumanization and contact
Liberals Conservatives
Low dehumanization (−1 SD)
High dehumanization
(+ 1 SD)
Low dehumanization
(−1 SD)
High dehumanization (+
1 SD)
Experimental manipulation of imagined cont act
Experiment 1 (N = 332)
Outgroup support (DV)
Control condition 5.81 (0.14) 4.10 (0 .29) 4.67 ( 0.21) 3.12 (0.13)
Positive condition 6.11 (0.14) 4.35 (0. 25) 4.20 (0.19) 4.11 ( 0.12)
Experiment 2 (N = 339)
Outgroup support (DV 1)
Control condition 5.48 (0.11) 4.42 (0.20) 4.60 (0.18) 3 .31 (0 .10)
Positive condition 5.64 (0.12) 4.00 (0.19) 4.33 (0.15) 3.85 (0.10)
Positive emotions (DV 2)
Control condition 6.33 (0.13) 5.35 (0.24) 5.19 (0.22) 4.05 (0.12)
Positive condition 6.36 (0.15) 5.06 (0.23) 5.10 (0.19) 4.81 (0.13)
Note: Means and standard errors (in parentheses) for ingroup contact (vs. control) at condition levels of dehumanization among liberals and
conservatives.
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95% CI = [−1.09, −0.63], η2
p = 0.14. Nevertheless, the interaction
between contact and relative dehumanization was not significant,
t(324) = −0.10 , p = .915. Among participants who endorsed a con-
servative ideology, the main effect of relative dehumanization was
also significant (B = −0.41, SE = 0.07), t(324) = −5.50, p < .0 01, 95%
CI = [−0.55, −0.26], η2
p = 0.08. More relevant to our hypotheses,
the interaction between contact and dehumanization was signif-
icant, t(324) = 4.86, p < .001, 95% CI = [0.21, 0.51], η2
p = 0.06.
In line with H1, the decomposition of that interaction indicated
that conservatives who scored high for dehumanizing immigrants
showed more support for them in the positive contact condition
than in the control condition (+1 SD), t(324) = −5.40, p < .001,
95% CI = [−1.34, −0.62], η2
p = 0.08, and this difference was not
significant among conservatives who scored high for humanizing
immigrants— that is, ones who scored low for dehumanization (−1
SD), t(324) = 1.59, p = .111.
Additional analyses of participants who endorsed a conservative
ideolog y indicated that dehumanization was associated with less
support for immigrants in the control condition (B = 0.77, SE = 0 .10),
t(324) = −7. 34 , p < .001, 95% CI = [−0.98, −0.56], η2
p = 0.14, but not in
the positive contact condition (B = −0.04, SE = 0.10), t(324) = −0.45,
p = .65.
3.3  | Discussion
The results of Experiment 1 provided evidence in support of
Hypothesis 1, according to which the relative dehumanization of
immigrants moderated the effect of intergroup contact among con-
servative individuals. More specifically, participants with conserva-
tive views who scored high for dehumanizing immigrants increased
support for immigrants in the positive contact condition than in the
control condition. We did not find these effects among conserva-
tive participants scoring low on dehumanizing immigrants and par-
ticipants with liberal political views. To provide consistent evidence
in suppor t of H1 and to test H2 and H3 (i.e., positive emotion as a
mediator), for the first time, we conducted a second experiment in
which we added a measure capturing positive emotions toward the
outgroup.
4 |EXPERIMENT 2
Experiment 2 involved using methods similar to those in Experiment 1,
albeit with a focus on Muslim immigrants. The measure of immigrant
suppor t was the same as in Experiment 1, b ut we added a new measur e
Outgroup support bSE tp95% CI
Experiment 1
Dehumanization −0.63 0.08 −7. 8 6 <.001 −0.79; −0.47
Political ideology −0.53 0.07 −7.19 <.001 0.67; −0.38
Contact 0.13 0.06 1.97 .049 0.01; 0.26
Contac t × PI −0.003 0.07 −0.03 .970 0.14; 0 .14
Contac t × Deh 0.17 0.08 2.16 .031 0.01; 0.33
Deh × PI 0.22 0.05 4.24 <.001 0.12; 0.33
Contac t × Deh × PI 0.18 0.05 3.51 <.001 0.08; 0.29
Experiment 2
Dehumanization −0.56 0.06 9.39 <.001 −0.67; −0.44
Political ideology −0.43 0.05 −8.56 <.001 −0.5 4; −0.31
Contact 0.002 0.05 0.03 .969 −0.10; 0 .10
Contac t × PI 0.06 0.05 1.11 2.66 −0.04; 0.17
Contac t × Deh 0.02 0.06 0.49 .622 0.08; 0.14
Deh × PI 0.11 0.04 2.57 .011 0.02; 0.20
Contac t × Deh × PI 0.17 0.04 3.87 <.001 0.08; 0.26
Positive emotions
Dehumanization −0.46 0.07 −6.35 <.0 01 −0.66; −0.32
Political Ideology −0.49 0.07 −7. 05 <.001 −0.62; −0.35
Contact 0.05 0.06 0.821 .412 −0.07; 0.18
Contac t × PI 0.11 0.07 1.63 .103 −0.02; 0.25
Contac t × Deh 0.06 0.07 0.90 .368 −0.07; 0.20
Deh × PI 0.10 0.05 1.90 .058 −0.004; 0.21
Contac t × Deh × PI 0.15 0.05 2.71 .007 0.04; 0.25
Notes: The acronym PI stands for political orientation, and Deh for dehumanization.
TABLE 2 Results of the linear
regression analyses on outgroup support
(Experiments 1 & 2) and positive emotions
(Experiment 2) with political ideology,
dehumanization and contact and their
interactions as predictors
   
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 7
BORINC A et Al.
to assess positive emotions toward immigrants. In addition to H1, we
hypothesized that participants who endorse a conservative ideology
and score high for dehumanizing immigrants would show the strong-
est increase in positive emotions toward them after being exposed to
a positive contact (vs. a control) condition (H2). We also hypothesized
that positive emotions would mediate the effect of the interplay be-
tween relative dehumanization and intergroup contact on support for
immigrants among individuals with conservative views (H3).
4.1  | Method
4.1.1  |  Participants and design
We invited 535 U.S. citizens, all recruited via Amazon’s Mechanical
Turk (MTurk), to participate in an online sur vey. For their time, they
were compensated with US $1. After inspecting the data, we dis-
carded data from 196 participants: 143 whose completion time was
too short (<4 min; approx. Mean completion time = 9 min), 48 who
missed one of the attention checks, and five who did not provide
consent to participate. Therefore, the final sample consisted of
339 participants, ranging in age from 20 to 81 years (Mage = 36. 67,
SDage = 10.93) and 139 of whom were women. They all were ran-
domly assigned to one of two experimental conditions: the positive
condition (n = 170) or the control condition (n = 169). A sensitivity
analysis similar to the one in Experiment 1 revealed that our final
sample size was powered enough to detect an effect size of f2 = 0.04,
which conventionally indicates a small effect size (Faul et al., 2009).
4.1.2  |  Independent variables
As in Experiment 1, we assessed political orientation (α = 0.92;
M = 3 .5 9, SD = 1.83) and relative dehumanization (M = 0.41,
SD = 1.77). After that, we introduced the experimental manipulation
in which participants were randomly assigned to one of two condi-
tions (i.e., positive contact with a Muslim immigrant vs. the control/
no contact condition).
4.1.3  |  Dependent variables
We also introduced similar attention checks as in Experiment 1
while assessing suppor t for Muslim immigrants (α = 0.95; M = 4 .4 9,
SD = 1.25). Last, we additionally assessed positive emotions toward
Muslim immigrants with a 7- item scale— for example, Anger (r) and
Sympathy— adapted from Kteily et al. (2016) and responded to on a
7- point scale, from 1 (strongly disagree) to 7 (strongly agree; α = 0.86;
M = 2.67, SD = 1.38).
4.2  | Results
We regressed the dependent variables on political orientation (i.e.,
standardized scores), relative dehumanization (i.e., standardized
scores), and intergroup contact (i.e., positive vs. control), as well as
all interactions between these three factors. Table 1 provides esti-
mated means and standard errors for the primary dependent varia-
ble, and Table 2 provides linear regression analyses for all predictors.
4.2.1  |  Support for immigrants
The regression analysis showed a main effect of participants’ politi-
cal ideology (B = −0.43, SE = 0.05), t(331) = −8.56, p < .001, 95%
CI = [−0.54, −0.31], η2
p = 0.14, indicating that more conservative
participants showed less suppor t for immigrants. The main effect of
relative dehumanization was also significant (B = −0.56, SE = 0.06),
t(331) = −9.39, p < .001, 95% CI = [−0.67, −0.44], η2
p = 0.21, mean-
ing that the more that participants dehumanized immigrants, the
less support they showed toward them. That effect was qualified by
the interaction between political orientation and dehumanization,
(B = 0.11, SE = 0.04), t(331) = 2 .57, p = .011, 95% CI = [0.02, 0.20],
η2
p = 0.2, and by the expected three- way interaction between con-
tact, relative dehumanization, and political ideology, t(331) = 3 .87,
p < .001, 95% CI = [0.08, 0.26], η2
p = 0.04.
Exploring the three- way interaction, the main effect of relative
dehumanization was significant among participants who endorsed
FIGURE 1 Support for Mexican
immigrants among individuals with
conservative versus liberal views as a
function of intergroup contact (positive
contact with an immigrant vs. control
condition) to which they were exposed
and their low (−1 SD) or high (+1 SD) levels
of relative dehumanization, experiment 1.
*p < .05. ***p < .001
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
Low (-1 SD) High (+1 SD)Low (-1 SD)High (+1 SD)
Support
Dehumanization
Contact
Control/No contact
Positive
Liberals Conservatives
8 
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    BO RINCA et A l.
a liberal ideology (B = −0 .67, SE = 0.08), t(331) = −7. 96 , p < .001,
95% CI = [−0.84, −0.50], η2
p = 0.16. However, the interaction be-
tween contact and relative dehumanization was not significant,
t(331) = −1 .7 0, p = .089. Among participants who endorsed a con-
servative ideology, the main effect of relative dehumanization was
also significant (B = −0.43, SE = 0.05), t(331) = −7.0 6, p < .001, 95%
CI = [−0.56, −0.32], η2
p = 0.13. More relevant to our hypotheses,
the interaction bet ween contact and dehumanization was signific ant
as well, t(331) = 3.24, p = .001, 95% CI = [0.08, 0.32], η2
p = 0.03.
As precited by H1, the decomposition of that interaction revealed
that conservatives who scored high for dehumanizing immigrants
showed more support for them in the positive contact condition
than in the control condition (+1 SD), t(331) = −3. 58, p < .001, 95%
CI = [−0.83, −0.24], η2
p = 0.03, and this difference was not signifi-
cant among conservatives who scored low for dehumanizing immi-
grants (−1 SD), t(331) = 0. 27, p = .254.
From the other perspective, the negative link between relative
dehumanization and support was significant in both control and
positive contact conditions, albeit stronger in the control condition
(B = −0.64, SE = 0.08), t(331) = −7.5 0, p < .0 01, 95% CI = [−0. 81,
−0.47], η2
p = 0.14, than in the positive contact condition (B =0.24,
SE = 0.09), t(331) = 2.63, p = .009, 95% CI = [−0.42, −0.06],
η2
p = 0.02.
4.2.2  |  Positive emotions
The regression analysis showed the main effect of participants’ po-
litical ideology (B = −0 .4 9, SE = 0.07), t(331) = −7. 05 , p < .001, 95%
CI = [−0.62, −0.35], η2
p = 0.13, such that more conservative partici-
pants showed less positive emotions for immigrants. The main effect
of relative dehumanization was significant (B = −0.46, SE = 0.07),
t(331) = −6. 35, p < .0 01, 95% CI = [−0.60, −0.32], η2
p = 0.10, meaning
that the dehumanization of immigrants was associated with fewer
positive emotions. Most importantly, that effect was qualified by the
precited three- way interaction between contact, relative dehumani-
zation, and political ideology, t(331) = 2.71, p = .007, 95% CI = [0.04,
0.25], η2
p = 0.02.
Exploring the three- way interaction, the main effect of relative
dehumanization was significant among participants who endorsed
a liberal ideology (B = −0.56, SE = 0.10 ), t(331) = −5.46, p < .001,
95% CI = [−0.77, −0.36], η2
p = 0.08. However, the interaction be-
tween contact and relative dehumanization was not significant,
t(331) = −0.80, p = 0.420. Among participants who endorsed a con-
servative ideology, the main effect of relative dehumanization was
significant (B = 0.35, SE = 0.07), t(331) = −4.65, p < .001, 95%
CI = [−0.50, −0.20], η2
p = 0.06. More relevant to our hypotheses, the
interaction between contact and dehumanization was significant as
well, t(331) = 2.80, p = .005, 95% CI = [0.06, 0.36], η2
p = 0.02. In line
with H2, the decomposition of the interaction indicated that conser-
vatives who scored high for dehumanizing immigrants showed more
positive emotions toward them in the positive than in the control
condition (+1 SD), t(331) = −4.16, p < .001, 95% CI = [−0.12, −0.4 0],
η2
p = 0.05, and this difference was not significant among conserva-
tives who scored high for humanizing immigr ants— that is, scored low
for dehumanization (−1 SD), t(331) = 0.32, p = .748.
Additional analyses among participants who endorsed a conser-
vative ideology indicated that relative dehumanization was associ-
ated with less positive emotions toward immigrants in the control
condition (B = −0.57, SE = 0.13), t(331) = −5.42, p < .001, 95%
CI = [−0.78, − 0.36], η2
p = 0.08, but not in the positive contact condi-
tion (B = −0.14, SE = 0.11), t(331) = −1.27, p = .202.
4.2.3  |  Mediation analysis
We tested our moderated moderated mediation hypothesis within
the framework of structural equation modeling (SEM) in the lavaan
package in R (Rosseel, 2012), which entailed estimating bootstrap
confidence intervals based on 5000 bootstrapped samples. As
shown in the conceptual representation of the model (see Figure 2),
we entered intergroup contact as the predictor, relative dehumani-
zation as the first moderator, political orientation as the second
moderator, and support for immigrants as the dependent variable.
In addition, the measure of positive emotions was entered as the
me diator.
First, we computed the index of moderated moderated media-
tion described by Hayes (2018) in order to test the presence of a
moderated moderated mediation in our data. In line with H3, we
found that the index was significant (Index = 0.04, 95% boot strap
CI [0.001, 0.07]). As recommended by Hayes (2018), we next com-
puted the conditional indirect effect at different levels of the first-
stage and second- stage moderators (±1 SD) in order to uncover the
specific pattern of the moderated moderated mediation. More spe-
cifically, we found that positive emotions mediated the relationship
between intergroup contact and support for immigrants only among
FIGURE 2 The conceptual path model
tested in experiment 2
Support for immigrant
Intergroup contact
(-1 control, 1 positive)
Positive Emotions
Dehumanization
1 Moderator
Political Orientation
2 Moderator
   
|
 9
BORINC A et Al.
participants who endorsed a conservative ideology and scored high
for dehumanizing immigrants (B = 0.30, 95% bootstrap CI [0.09,
0.50]). Positive emotions did not mediate the relationship between
intergroup contact and support for immigrants, neither among par-
ticipants who endorsed a conservative ideology and scored high for
humanizing immigrants (B = −0.04, 95% bootstrap CI [−0.31, 0.24])
or among ones who endorsed a liberal ideology and regardless of
whether the latter dehumanized immigrants (B = −0.11, 95% boot-
strap CI [−0.41, 0.19]) or not (B = 0.02, 95% bootstrap CI [−0.11,
0.14]).
5 |DISCUSSION
Consistent with those observed in Experiment 1, the results of
Experiment 2 provided further evidence in support of Hypothesis
2 while focusing on a different intergroup relation, that of U.S. resi-
dents and Muslim immigrants. Participants with conservative views
who scored high for dehumanizing immigrants showed more posi-
tive emotions toward immigrants in the positive contact condition
than their peers in the control condition. Beyond that, Experiment 2
provided preliminary evidence in support of Hypothesis 3, according
to which the effect of the interaction between relative dehumaniza-
tion and intergroup contact on support for immigrants among con-
servatives is mediated by positive emotions toward the outgroup.
More specifically, participants who endorsed a conservative ideol-
ogy and scored high for dehumanizing immigrants showed greater
support for immigrants in the positive contact condition than in the
control condition. That pattern emerged because these participants
generated more positive emotions than their counterparts toward
immigrants. However, the results of the mediation analysis were
not significant among conservatives who humanized immigrants or
among participants who endorsed a liberal ideology regardless of
whether they dehumanized immigrants.
6 |GENERAL DISCUSSION
To our knowledge, our research is the first to show that the rela-
tive dehumanization of immigrants and positive imagined contact
interact to influence emotions toward immigrants and support for
immigrants (i.e., Muslim and Mexican immigrants) among individuals
with conservative views. Across two experiments, we consistently
demonstrated that relative dehumanization moderates the effects
of intergroup contact on intergroup support among individuals with
conservative views. In the second experiment, we showed that this
is also the case concerning intergroup emotions. More specifically,
individuals who scored high for dehumanizing immigrants and en-
dorsed a conservati ve ideology showe d more support fo r immigrants
(i.e., in both experiments) and generated more positive emotions to-
ward them (i.e., in Experiment 2) when they were encouraged to en-
vision positive contact with an immigrant (i.e., a Muslim immigrant in
Experiment 1 and a Mexican immigrant in Experiment 2) than when
they were encouraged to envision an outdoor scene (i.e., the control
condition in both experiments). Finally, E xperiment 2 also explored
the mechanism at work behind the observed effects on the main
dependent variable (i.e., support for immigrants) using a moder-
ated moderated mediation approach. Results showed that positive
emotions toward immigrants explained the effect of intergroup
contact on support for immigrants among individuals endorsing a
conservative ideology and dehumanizing immigrants. As expected
and consistent with previous literature, this was not the case among
individuals with conservative views who humanized immigrants, or
among liberals regardless of whether they dehumanized immigrants
or not (DeLuca- McLean & Castano, 2009; Dhont & Van Hiel, 2009;
Hodson, 2008).
Our findings could be valuable in several domains of research.
First, previous research has shown that the more individuals dehu-
manize immigrants, the more likely they are to express less support
and more animosity toward them as well (Kteily & Bruneau, 2017),
which tends to be the case especially among individuals with con-
servative views (Markowitz & Slovic, 2020). Our research extends
previous research and makes a novel contribution by showing that
individuals who scored high for dehumanizing immigrants and en-
dorsed a conservative ideology displayed more support for and
positive emotions toward immigrants after they had envisioned a
positive, pleasant interaction with them.
Second, our findings tie together previous research on the rela-
tionship between relative dehumanization and intergroup contact in
relation to individuals’ conservative views on social, economic, and
political matters. Despite research demonstrating that prejudice and
dehumanization play distinct roles in intergroup relations (Borinca,
Tropp, & Ofosu, 2021; Kteily et al., 2016), researchers have thus far
investigated only prejudice’s moderating role on imagined interac-
tion regarding intergroup attitudes and affect (Borinca, Falomir-
Pichastor, & Andrighetto, 2020). However, to our knowledge, no
research has examined the moderating role of relative dehumaniza-
tion among individuals with conservative views, despite the fact that
the association between contact with outgroup members and de-
humanization has been investigated (Bruneau et al., 2020; Capozza
et al., 2014). In our research, we examined how the interplay be-
tween relative dehumanization and intergroup contact affects inter-
group support and emotions among individuals with conservative
views. Thus, our findings enrich the literature on intergroup relations
by showing that there is hope for improved intergroup relations even
among individuals who most oppose ethnic diversity (i.e., individuals
with conservative views and who score high for dehumanizing immi-
grants; Dhont & Van Hiel, 2011; Hodson, 2011; West et al., 2017).
Our findings are also consistent with prior research showing that
individuals who score high in right- wing authoritarianism exhibited
lower levels of prejudice after having experienced more positive
contact (Asbrock et al., 2013).
Third, our research is also relevant to the literature on
imagined positive contact (Crisp & Turner, 2009, 2012; White
et al., 2020). Previous research has shown that intergroup contact
may be a means of improving intergroup relations within the most
10 
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    BO RINCA et A l.
conflict- laden intergroup contexts (Bagci et al., 2019) and with in-
dividuals who endorse ideologies most opposed to ethnic diversity
(Asbrock et al., 2013). As a case in point, if individuals (e.g., who
score high for dehumanization and endorse a conservative ideology)
have positive interactions with outgroup members whom they may
not have engaged with previously, then they could see a side of the
outgroup that is inconsistent with their degree about the outgroup
human qualities (Esses et al., 2013). Because intergroup contact has
the potential to reveal that an outgroup is more capable (e.g., cogni-
tively complex and sophisticated) than might have been assumed, it
also has the potential to specifically af fect attributions of humanity
(Bruneau et al., 2020), as it could be the case with emotional attribu-
tion in our research, which might have consequently impacted indi-
viduals’ support for immigrants.
Finally, our other findings additionally revealed the moderating
role of intergroup contact on relative dehumanization in terms in-
tergroup support for immigrants and emotions toward immigrants
among people with conservative views. In particular, the negative
link between dehumanization and support (i.e., in both experiments)
and positive emotions (i.e., in Experiment 2) was either weaker or
non- significant in the positive contact condition when compared
to the control condition (i.e., in both experiments). That finding is
consistent with literature showing that intergroup contact dissolves
the link between intolerant viewpoints and negative intergroup atti-
tudes (Borinca, Andrighetto, et al., 2021).
7 |LIMITATIONS AND DIRECTIONS FOR
FUTURE RESEARCH
Despite the novelty and importance of our findings, we should ac-
knowledge our research’s limitations and propose directions for fu-
ture studies. First, it is worth noting that, given past findings that
individuals who score low in right- wing authoritarianism or in so-
cial dominance orientation display similar reactions to intergroup
relations whether or not they have positive contact with outgroup
members (e.g., Dhont & Van Hiel, 2009; Hodson, 2008), we did not
anticipate any significant differences between positive contact and
the control condition among individuals who endorsed a conserva-
tive ideology but humanized immigrants (i.e., scored low for dehu-
manization). Indeed, we presumed they would show nearly positive
identical reactions (e.g., similarly high intergroup support and emo-
tions) regardless of experimental manipulation. Although our results
for those individuals were consistent with previous findings regard-
ing the limited impact of positive contact, researchers should also
examine ways in which individuals with conservative views who
humanize immigrants may benefit from positive intergroup contact
compared to other experimental conditions (i.e., control or negative
contact conditions).
Second, whereas our research focused on group dehumanization
as an individual difference, researchers could determine whether
similar effects arise when using other operational definitions of de-
humanization, for example, by experimentally manipulating it (e.g.,
Capozza et al., 2017; Utych, 2018). Third, another limitation relates
to the vignette methodology used to investigate intergroup contact.
We experimentally manipulated intergroup contact by encouraging
parti cipants to envisio n a positive, plea sant interact ion with a specif ic
immigrant (e.g., Borinca, Falomir- Pichastor, & Andrighetto, 2020;
Borinca, Falomir- Pichastor, Andrighetto, & Durante, 2021a; Crisp
& Turner, 2009). Because we did not examine any other types of
intergroup contact, additional research is needed to replicate our
findings— for instance by using a different type of contact (e.g., ex-
tended, virtual contact or electronic contact; Paolini et al., 2004;
White et al., 2019, 2020) or by placing participants in a real situa-
tion (i.e., lab experiments). Furthermore, because imagined contact
exerts an inconsistent impact on long- term change (Ioannou, 2019),
researchers should also examine whether our findings of inter-
group interactions can be extended to long- term changes through
experimental- longitudinal studies.
Fourth, we used only self- reported measures as outcomes
(i.e., support for immigrant and intergroup emotions) instead of
assessing participants’ behavioral intentions or real behaviors.
Although research has shown that the degree of dehumaniza-
tion influences individuals’ behaviors (Kteily & Bruneau, 2017),
researchers should examine whether the combined effect of
relative dehumanization and intergroup contact also emerges in
relation to the actual behaviors of individuals with conservative
views. Finally, in this research, it is worth noting that we only
examined our observed findings in the context of U.S. in relation
to Muslim and Mexican immigrants, and future research should
therefore replicate these findings in a different intergroup con-
text (e.g., between dif ferent natives and immigrants, refugees
and/or social, ethnic minorities).
8 |CONCLUSION
As Western societies become increasingly diverse, both ethnically
and culturally, mutual support and positive affect between dif fer-
ent ethnic communities are far from normative. Indeed, in recent
years, overtly dehumanizing viewpoints toward social minorities
have emerged in political debates, public opinion, and mass media
(e.g., Markowitz & Slovic, 2020; Mudde, 2013; Utych, 2017, 2018).
The rise in extreme conservatism and anti- immigration political par-
ties is a clear illustration of that phenomenon (e.g., Greven, 2016).
However, our research has shown that interventions aimed at
promoting positive or prosocial interethnic encounters enhance
intergroup support for and positive emotions toward outgroups, in-
cluding immigrants, even among individuals most opposed to ethnic
diversity (i.e., individuals who endorse a conservative ideology and
who score high for dehumanization).
CONFLICTS OF INTEREST
The authors declare that there are no potential conflicts of interest
with respect to the research, authorship, and/or publication of this
article.
   
|
11
BORINC A et Al.
INFORMED CONSENT
Informed consent was obtained from all individual participants in-
cluded in the study.
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How to cite this article: Borinca, I., Çelik, P. & Storme, M.
(2022). Can conservatives who (de)humanize immigrants the
most be able to support them? The power of imagined
positive contact. Journal of Applied Social Psychology, 00,
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How do social stereotypes shape and reflect images formed in the mind’s eye? Visual mental imagery has long been assumed crucial in creating, maintaining, and perpetuating stereotypes and prejudice. Surprisingly, research in social cognition has only recently begun to explore the causal role of mental images in these phenomena. In contrast, cognitive neuroscience research on visual mental imagery (VMI) has explored the pivotal role of imagery in various consequential cognitive and behavioral phenomena. However, cognitive neuroscience has largely neglected how stereotypes influence mental imagery. This article provides a historical overview of the development of these two fields in terms of mental imagery and discusses recent advances at their intersection. Opportunities for additional integration are highlighted, and suggestions for furthering the dual study of stereotyping and mental imagery are provided. Public Abstract How can social stereotypes impact and mirror visual imagination? It has long been assumed that visual mental imagery plays a central role in forming, maintaining, and strengthening stereotypes and prejudice. Yet, until recently, there has been limited exploration within social psychology and cognitive neuroscience on the explicit connection between visual mental images and social stereotypes. We describe the historical progression of these fields concerning visual imagery and explore recent advancements that unite stereotyping and mental imagery research. Furthermore, we propose avenues for future research to deepen our understanding of how individuals utilize mental images in stereotyping and how mental imagery can modify stereotypes.
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How people perceive outgroup prosocial behaviors is an important but under-researched aspect of intergroup relations. In three experiments conducted in two cultural contexts (Italy and Kosovo) and with two different populations (adolescents and adults; N = 586), we asked participants to imagine being offered help by an outgroup versus ingroup member. Participants attributed fewer prosocial motives to and were less willing to accept help from the outgroup (vs. ingroup) member. This was particularly true for highly prejudiced participants and when the outgroup was described negatively. Participants' perceptions of the outgroup helper's prosocial motives and expected quality of the interaction with the helper mediated the effect of helper's group membership on willingness to accept the help (Experiment 3). We discuss the theoretical and practical implications of these findings for intergroup relations. K E Y W O R D S: altruistic motives, empathy, ingroup, outgroup, prejudice, prosocial behavior
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This research investigated whether ingroup norm moderates the effect of positive or prosocial interactions on the understanding of intergroup prosocial behaviors. Among four experiments in three different cultural samples (US Americans, Kosovan-Serbs, and Kosovan-Albanians; N = 808), results showed that participants attributed fewer prosocial motives and reported less willingness to accept the help when the helper was an outgroup than an ingroup member. However, these effects were weaker or non-significant in the tolerant norm condition, as compared to intolerant norm or control conditions. In addition, participants were more willing to interact with the outgroup (vs. ingroup) helper in the tolerant norm condition, as compared to intolerant norm or control conditions. Finally, normative expectations, the attribution of prosocial motives to the helper, and the anticipated quality of the interaction with the helper sequentially explained the observed effects. The theoretical and practical implications of these results for intergroup help and intergroup contact literature are discussed. Keywords: intergroup relations, prosocial behavior, positive contact, ingroup norms, empathy, altruism
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The present research investigated whether learning that an outgroup humanizes the ingroup (i.e., meta-humanization) enhances how people react to intergroup prosocial behaviors and their willingness to engage in intergroup contact. In three experiments conducted in two cultural contexts (Kosovo and North Macedonia; n = 601), we manipulated meta-humanization by informing participants that their ingroup is perceived to be as human as the outgroup by outgroup members. We compare this meta-humanization condition with a meta-dehumanization condition in which the participant's ingroup is perceived to be less human than the outgroup (Experiments 1 & 3), a meta-liking condition in which the participant's ingroup is liked as much as the outgroup (Experiment 2), and a control condition (Experiments 1 & 2). Overall, results showed that participants in the meta-humanization condition attributed more empathy and prosocial motives to a potential outgroup helper, and were more willing to accept outgroup help and engage in future intergroup contact than participants in the other conditions. In addition, positive perceptions of the outgroup helper mediated the effect of meta-humanization on willingness to accept outgroup help and engage in intergroup contact. We discuss the theoretical and practical implications of these findings for intergroup relations and reconciliation efforts. Keywords: Meta-Humanization, Meta-Dehumanization, Intergroup Contact, Prosocial Behavior
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In a world characterized by divisive rhetoric, heightened xenophobia, and other forms of prejudice, it is increasingly important to find effective ways of promoting functional intergroup relations. Research on the relationship between intergroup contact and individual differences substantially contributes to achieving this goal. We review research considering the role played by individual differences in moderating the relationship between contact and prejudice and predicting contact, but also as an outcome of contact. We then outline potential directions for future research, including identifying underlying mechanisms, examining the role of context at an intergroup and societal level, and considering how positive–negative contact asymmetry may be influenced by individual differences. We then call for a broader range of individual difference and contact outcomes to be explored and encourage utilization of new methodological advances in the study of intergroup contact.
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In post-conflict societies, individuals often respond negatively to the prosocial behaviors of their former opponents. To identify forms of intergroup apology that facilitate positive reactions to offers of intergroup help, three experiments (N = 698) were conducted in the post-conflict context of Kosovo that involved offering help to participants following their exposure to different types of apologies for past misconduct. The results indicated that participants attributed greater prosocial motives to offers of help from an outgroup member (i.e., former opponent) and were more willing to accept such help when an outgroup member issued the apology (i.e., interpersonal apology) or when outgroup members supported the apology (i.e., normatively supported or normative apology) than when offered by an institution, when rejected by the majority of outgroup members, or when no information about the apology was provided. Beyond that, participants felt more at peace with the outgroup and were more willing to interact with outgroup members following apologies in the interpersonal and normative apology conditions than in the other experimental conditions. Overall, the participants’ willingness to humanize outgroup members explained the observed effects. This article discusses the theoretical and practical implications of these findings for intergroup help and literature on intergroup relations. Keywords: altruistic motive, empathy, intergroup apology, misperception, outgroup humanization, positive contact, prosocial behavior
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Citizens and Politics: Perspectives from Political Psychology brings together some of the research on citizen decision making. It addresses the questions of citizen political competence from different political psychology perspectives. Some of the authors in this volume look to affect and emotions to determine how people reach political judgements, others to human cognition and reasoning. Still others focus on perceptions or basic political attitudes such as political ideology. Several demonstrate the impact of values on policy preferences. The collection features chapters from some of the most talented political scientists in the field.