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IMISCOE Research Series
MaciejStępka
Identifying
Security Logics
in theEU Policy
Discourse
The"Migration Crisis" and theEU
IMISCOE Research Series
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MaciejStępka
Identifying Security Logics
in the EU Policy Discourse
The “Migration Crisis” andtheEU
ISSN 2364-4087 ISSN 2364-4095 (electronic)
IMISCOE Research Series
ISBN 978-3-030-93034-9 ISBN 978-3-030-93035-6 (eBook)
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-93035-6
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MaciejStępka
Faculty of Political and International
Studies, Institute of European Studies
Jagiellonian University in Kraków
Kraków, Poland
. This book is an open access publication
To my parents Roman and Bożena Stępka
vii
Acknowledgements
I would like to express my sincere gratitude to all the people without whom this
book would have never happened. As this book is based on my doctoral dissertation,
I would like to thank my thesis advisor Prof Dariusz Niedźwiedzki for his guidance,
patience, motivation, and immense knowledge, which encouraged me to look for
difcult truths lurking in the shadows of the migration-security nexus. I could not
have imagined having a better advisor and mentor for my PhD research.
I thank the National Science Centre, Poland, for supporting research presented in
this book and providing me with funds for eldwork (Preludium grant no.
UMO-2015/19/N/HS5/01229) and mobility (Etiuda scholarship no.
UMO-2016/20/T/HS5/00224). The proofreading and open access license fee of the
publication was funded by the Priority Research Area Society of the Future under
the programme “Excellence Initiative –Research University” at the Jagiellonian
University in Krakow.
I also owe my gratitude to the IMISCOE Research Series editorial team, Dr Irina
Isaakyan and Prof Anna Triandafyllidou, whose work also greatly impacted
this book.
Special thanks go to Prof Marieke de Goede, Dr Rocco Bellanova and Dr Natalie
Welfens for their friendship, constructive criticism and support in nding my own
path in studying security and policy critically. Our exchanges and your amazing
work showed me what it means to strive for research quality. I can only hope that
with this book I have managed to follow in your footsteps, at least to some degree.
At this point, I would like to also express my gratitude to the Department of Political
Science at the University of Amsterdam and the Amsterdam Centre for European
Studies for hosting me throughout my eldwork. My sincere thanks also go to Prof
Sebastiaan Princen from Utrecht University and the PhD community of the Utrecht
School of Governance. Thank you for your precious feedback in the early stages of
my research and continuous encouragements to explore new research angles.
I am profoundly grateful to my family and especially Agata, who was there every
step of the way. Thank you for the countless suggestions, feedback and invaluable
support throughout the challenging times of COVID-19 that marked the process of
writing this book.
ix
Contents
1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
1.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
1.2 Migration and Security in Academic Literature . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2
1.3 Aims of the Book . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
1.4 Methods . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
1.5 Clarifying the Scope and Main Characteristics of the Book . . . . . . 9
1.6 Structure of the Book . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
2 The Copenhagen School and Beyond. A Closer Look
at Securitisation Theory . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
2.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
2.2 The Concept of Securitisation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
2.3 Securitisation and the Speech Act Approach . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
2.4 Securitisation the Logic of Exception . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22
2.5 Securitisation and the Audience-Actor Interaction . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24
2.6 Conclusion: Moving Forward with Securitisation Theory . . . . . . . . 26
References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28
3 Securitisation as the Work of Framing . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 33
3.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 33
3.2 Securitisation Beyond Speech Act . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 34
3.3 Securitisation Beyond Exceptionalism . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 38
3.3.1 Security Logics . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 40
3.4 Securitisation Beyond the Actor-Audience Dichotomy . . . . . . . . . . 48
3.5 Dening the Process of Acceptance . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 50
3.6 Including Context in the Securitisation Process . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 51
3.7 Conclusion: Key Points of “Securitisation as the Work
of Framing” Approach . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 54
References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 55
x
4 EU Migration-Security Continuum. Investigating
Security Frames Before the “Migration Crisis” . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 63
4.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 63
4.2 From Maastricht to Lisbon. Tracing “Constitutional”
Securitising Moves and Security Frames . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 65
4.3 Schengen and Border Control – Building “Fortress Europe” . . . . . 69
4.3.1 Frontex and Protection of the EU Borders . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 71
4.4 Detention and Deportation – Reception and Return . . . . . . . . . . . . 73
4.5 Migration and Asylum Policies – Between
“Bogus Asylum Seekers” and Irregular Migrants . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 76
4.5.1 Irregular Migration, Organised Crime and Terrorism . . . . . 78
4.6 Externalisation of Migration Control. Securitisation
Within the Internal-External Security Nexus . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 80
4.7 Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 82
References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 83
5 Analysing Diagnosis and Evaluation of the “Migration Crisis”
at the EU Level . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 93
5.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 93
5.2 Human Security . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 94
5.2.1 Naming and Categorising the Humanitarian Features
of the “Migration Crisis” . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 95
5.2.2 Conceptualising the Push Factors and Dening Threats . . . 97
5.2.3 Dening the Human Referent Object . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 102
5.2.4 Comments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 103
5.3 Risk Management . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 106
5.3.1 Naming and Categorising the Risk-Oriented Features
of the “Migration Crisis” . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 107
5.3.2 Dening Non-human Referent Objects . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 108
5.3.3 Conceptualising Risks . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 109
5.3.4 Comments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 114
5.4 “Exceptionalist” Security . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 115
5.4.1 Human Security – “Exceptionalist” Security . . . . . . . . . . . . 116
5.4.2 Risk Management – “Exceptionalist” Security . . . . . . . . . . 117
5.4.3 Comments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 118
5.5 Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 119
References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 121
6 Analysing the Conceptualisation of Remedial Actions
Towards the “Migration Crisis” at the EU Level . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 131
6.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 131
6.2 Risk Management . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 133
6.2.1 The “Hotspot Approach” . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 134
6.2.2 Returns, Readmission and Detention . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 136
6.2.3 Intelligence Cooperation, Surveillance and Control . . . . . . 139
Contents
xi
6.2.4 EU-Turkey Statement . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 144
6.2.5 Relocation and Resettlement . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 147
6.2.6 Comments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 151
6.3 Resilience . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 154
6.3.1 Reforming Common European Asylum System . . . . . . . . . 156
6.3.2 European Union Trust Funds . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 160
6.3.3 EU Border, Capacity Building
and Assistance Missions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 163
6.3.4 Comments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 165
6.4 “Exceptionalist” Security . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 168
6.4.1 EUNAVFOR MED “Sophia” . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 169
6.4.2 Joint Border Operations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 171
6.4.3 Comments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 174
6.5 Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 175
References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 177
7 Conclusions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 193
7.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 193
7.2 Revisiting Security Logics in the EU Frame-Narrative
on the “Migration Crisis” . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 194
7.3 Reecting on Securitisation as the Work of Framing . . . . . . . . . . . 198
7.4 Final Reections on Risk and Securitisation of Migration
in the EU . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 201
References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 204
Contents
1© The Author(s) 2022
M. Stępka, Identifying Security Logics in the EU Policy Discourse, IMISCOE
Research Series, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-93035-6_1
Chapter 1
Introduction
1.1 Introduction
The relationship between migration and security has always been a complex one,
often generating deeply politicised and polarised debates in political, societal, jour-
nalistic, and also academic circles (Ibrahim & Howarth, 2017; Triandafyllidou,
2018). In the last decade, the rise of trans-border migratory ows and the corre-
sponding increase of radicalisation of public debate and the re-emergence of
extreme nationalism and xenophobia, has only contributed to the complex nature of
the migration-security nexus, making it one of the most contentious and ideologi-
cally charged issues in the European Union (EU) (Rheindorf & Wodak, 2017). In
this respect, the rise of fear-driven narratives of security and uncertainty towards
migrants have become explicitly embedded in global and regional contexts, pro-
foundly stimulating public debates and political discourse (Karyotis & Skleparis,
2013; Squire, 2015; “The Securitisation of Migration in the EU: Debates since
9/11,” 2016).
With deepening political and economic destabilisation in the European Union’s
neighbourhood and escalation of protracted conicts in the Middle East, Africa and
South Asia, the number of civilian populations seeking refuge from war and poverty
has steadily grown in recent years amounting to approx. 80 million by the end of
20191 (UNHCR Website, 2020). While most forced migrants have been internally
displaced or remained in the neighbourhood of their country of origin, the numbers
of those attempting to seek refuge in Europe has substantially increased since 2015,
triggering what has often been described as uncontrollable mass migration to the
1 According to the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR). Globally approx.
55% of refugees come from South Sudan, Afghanistan (UNHCR Website, 2020). In the EU, the
largest inows of refugees are from Syria, Afghanistan, and Iraq (Eurostat Website, 2017b).
2
EU territories2 (Bledsoe-Gardner, 2017; Lucassen, 2017). As reported by Frontex,
in 2015 the number of irregular border crossings into the EU quadrupled in com-
parison to the previous years, reaching more than 1.8 million3 (Frontex, 2015).
Similarly, in 2015 and 2016 the EU Member States recorded an unprecedented
increase of asylum claims, reaching a total of 1.2 million applications in each of
these two years (Eurostat Website, 2017a). In this respect, very quickly the EU has
become a rapidly unravelling site of the so-called “migration crisis”, which has
become one of the most complex security and migration-related challenges Europe
has faced since the end of World War II.
The situation on the borders was quickly reected in the public perception of
migrants and migration in Europe. In the November 2015 Eurobarometer, an
unprecedented 58% of respondents from the EU and candidate countries dened
migration as the leading security concern for the EU, topping such traditional
sources of insecurity as terrorism and economic instability (Eurobarometer, 2015).
It is not without reason as the political and media-driven framing of the “migration
crisis” have lled the collective European imagination with mixed and often contra-
dictory opinions and images of drowning children, invading refugees, terrorists, and
economic migrants, often increasing a sense of confusion, uncertainty and insecu-
rity about the nature and consequences of the crisis (Jaskulowski, 2019; Ragazzi,
2015; Triandafyllidou, 2018). This uneasy situation has provided fertile grounds for
further securitisation of migration in Europe, intensifying narratives and policy
actions that have been pushing migration deeper into the realms of discourses and
practices of security. Under these conditions, the European Union (EU) has been put
at the forefront of political problematisation of the “migration crisis”, becoming one
of the key actors responsible for the shaping of policies and common responses. In
this way, the EU policymaking environment has become an important arena for
further securitisation of migration in the European context.
1.2 Migration andSecurity inAcademic Literature
The “migration crisis” has certainly rekindled scholarly interest in linkages between
migration and broadly understood security, expanding on the already rich and well-
established academic literature (Guild, 2009; Huysmans, 2006; Huysmans &
Squire, 2010; Neal, 2009; van Munster, 2009). The studies on the migration- security
nexus have initially, but not exclusively, caught the attention of the Copenhagen
2 Even though since 2018 there has been a decrease in arrivals, often construed in media reports as
the end of the “migration crisis” the latest developments on the EU borders (e.g. in Greece) suggest
that the next waves of increased migratory ows will take place in the near future and the crisis
should not be treated as a single event (Euroactive Website, 2020).
3 Taking into account that one person could illegally cross the EU external border more than once
(Frontex, 2015).
1 Introduction
3
School and securitisation scholars, who started exploring elite-driven processes
through which migration has been securitised, that is discursively constructed as a
threat to security (Buzan etal., 1998; Wæver etal., 1993). Studies on securitisation
of migration have quickly grown into dynamically expanding research agenda,
focused on exploring new actors (e.g. security practitioners, the EU), sites (e.g.
borders), processes (e.g. technologisation of migration control), all of which con-
tributing to different modes and logics of securitisation (Bigo, 2002; Bourbeau,
2011; Leonard, 2010a; Leonard & Kaunert, 2019).
One of the most prominent strands of literature on securitisation of migration
refers to the politics of fear and insecurity, most commonly observed in national
contexts with powerful actors, such as political parties or the media, capable of
shaping the public imagination (Huysmans, 2006; Wodak, 2015). This type of secu-
ritisation is often reected in exceptionalist, populist, exclusionary, and racial politi-
cal discourses which are supposed to spread suspiciousness and resentment towards
migrant communities (Huysmans, 2006, p.8). This type of securitisation is often
linked to societal security and an idea that the identity of the host society is existen-
tially threatened by the alien newcomers (Buzan etal., 1998). Examples of such
securitisations can be found in analyses of political and media discourses on the
ows of Hispanics into the United States (Ackleson, 2005) or North Africans and
East Europeans to Western Europe (Carling, 2007; Ceyhan & Tsoukala, 2002), each
following a similar narrative, describing migrants, refugees and asylum seekers as
inferior, barbaric and dangerous to the stability and internal order of the host society
(Skleparis, 2016). Wodak points out that these nationalistic, anti-immigrant dis-
courses often serve very utilitarian political purposes, such as mobilisation of elec-
torate and with the aim of gaining and sustaining politcal power (Pohl & Wodak,
2012). They introduce a sense of pride and superiority among members of the host
society and propose a clear denition of an enemy, a scapegoat of sorts, which can
be blamed for all failures and wrongdoings (Wodak, 2015).
Securitisation driven by fear and resentment is often reected in immigration and
integration policies, which abandon the idea of “multicultural integration” in favour
of homogeneity of the state and assimilation of immigrants (d’Appollonia, 2015).
Policies of this type “reproduce a myth that a homogenous national community or
Western civilisation existed in the past and can be re-established today through the
exclusion of those migrants who are identied as cultural aliens” (Huysmans, 2000,
p.758). In this respect, integration policies may have a securitising effect by no
longer focusing on the “equalisation of opportunity, but rather on the discourage-
ment and penalisation of migrants who do not possess certain attributes” and do not
t into a required template (Ryan, 2008, p.312). This feeds the idea of the superior-
ity of the culture and identity of the host society and deepens, often already histori-
cally embedded, divisions between host society (threatened us) and migrant
communities (threatening them) (Klaus, 2017). In this way, securitisation driven by
the politics of fear, resentment and alienation constitutes one of the key ingredients
of the contemporary securitisation of migration at national level (Huysmans, 2006).
1.2 Migration andSecurity inAcademic Literature
4
Numerous scholars have started exploring securitisation of migration beyond the
discourse and politics of fear, turning their attention to administrative practices,
technologies of surveillance and border control, or population proling (Balzacq,
2011; Bigo, 2002; Bourbeau, 2014; Leonard, 2010a). This alternative perspective
has changed the trajectory of securitisation research, steering it to actors and set-
tings that operate in a more mundane realm of security, focused on management of
risks and uncertainties associated with human mobility (Williams & Baláž, 2012).
Many researchers have been trying to merge the discursive and practice-driven
approaches to securitisation, by showing how these two modalities co-exist in a
broader governmental landscape, such as the Schengen Area and its unique border
security regime (Bigo, 2014; Neal, 2009; Sperling & Webber, 2019). For instance,
Huysmans (2000) has been focusing on the correspondence between the political
and the practical aspects of securitisation of migration and the fact that the discur-
sive processes are in fact closely associated with technological and technocratic
aspects of securitisation. Following this thread, van Munster (2009) observes that
the signing of the Schengen Agreement in 1985 began a trend in the securitisation
of migration, which has deeply impacted the EU’s approach to immigrants, refugees
and asylum seekers, beginning a transfer of migration to the technocratic world of
risk and population control. The introduction of Schengen also marked the rst time
when at transnational level migration (especially in its irregular form) has been so
closely associated with international terrorism, transnational crime, and border
security, becoming one of the key domains of the EU internal security policy (Bali,
2008, pp.471–473).4
Many securitisation scholars indicate that the security apparatus within the
Schengen Area has been set to comprehensively control human mobility in the
name of freedom of movement and more efcient governance of the internal and
external borders of the EU (Bigo, 2000; Bossong & Rhinard, 2016; Kaunert &
Leonard, 2010). The question of borders has been playing a signicant role in the
securitisation literature, often being dened as the rst point of contact between
security and the migrant, a site where categories are assigned and decisions are
taken about “who is ‘legitimate’ and who is ‘illegitimate’; who is ‘trusted’ and who
is ‘risky’; who can be allowed to cross freely and who is excluded” (Peoples &
Vaughan-Williams, 2015, p. 175). Walters observes the liberalisation of border
checks caused by Schengen has transformed the traditional idea of borders from
“sharp lines at the outer edge of member states into a more diffused, networked,
control apparatus, substantially increasing the scope of exposure of migrants to
security” practices (Walters, 2002, p.573). In this respect, the locus and scope of
potential sites of securitisation of migration in the EU has dramatically expanded,
transforming the EU’s internal security domain (Area of Freedom, Security and
Justice) into a complex network of securitising discourses, practices, and policies
designed to control risky populations within the EU. As noted by Bigo (2000,
p.185),
4 The historical analysis of securitising practices deployed at the EU level is included in Chap. 4.
1 Introduction
5
security checks are no longer necessarily done at the border on a systematic and egalitarian
basis, but can be carried out further downstream, within the territory, within the border zone
or even upstream with police collaboration in the home country of immigrants, through
visa-gathering systems and through readmission agreements.
Securitisation scholars have devoted much attention to the role of technologies of
surveillance and control in securitisation of migration (Jeandesboz, 2016; Marin,
2017; Stokes-Dupass, 2017). The conceptualisation and implementation of dat-
aveillance and biometric technologies, smart borders packages, a vast interoperable
IT system has become a crucial part of security discourses and practices deployed
in the EU and beyond (Bellanova & Duez, 2016; Jeandesboz, 2017). These tech-
nologies of population surveillance and control have been often described as a
knowledge-driven instrument of “pre-emptive securitisation of migrants”, where
every mobile person is treated as potential risk to security (Jeandesboz, 2017;
Rijpma & Vermeulen, 2015). Jeandesboz (2017) notes that the contemporary con-
struction of security is driven by ows of security knowledge within apparatus of
governance, which assigns social power and legitimises securitisation of migrants
based on a degree of certainty about them being a source of insecurity. This trend in
securitisation has been strengthened by the 9/11 terrorist attacks in 2001 and later
bombings in Madrid (2004) and London (2005), when high technology has become
crucial in management of mobile and risky populations, which had to be identied
and contained before threats come to realisation5 (Leonard, 2010b; Ragazzi, 2016).
This technocratic and technology-driven mode of securitisation of migration is not
centred on denition of existential threats but rather “traceability” of risky migrants
and their neutralisation if the need arises (Dijstelbloem & Meijer, 2011;
Maguire, 2015).
The literature of securitisation of migration has been also focusing on investiga-
tions into the consequences of security discourses and practices on migrants them-
selves, their vulnerability and human security (Gasper & Sinatti, 2016; McDonald,
2010). Guild (2009, p.3) proposes refocusing research on the migration-security
nexus from mass migration-centred, dispassionate inquiries to an analysis of “how
does the individual t into a set of state structural frameworks and become catego-
rised as a threat to security and to state control of migration”. Here, categories
assigned to specic migrants matter, especially in regard to sites of security such as
borders, detention centres or refugee camps, which often reect an amalgamation of
security and humanitarian practices (Pallister-Wilkins, 2015; Williams, 2015). For
instance, Aradau (2008) analyses how security categories applied to counter human
trafcking policies, may turn migrants into threatening criminals, unwanted immi-
grants on one hand or individuals requiring protection on the other. She uses an
example of women categorised as victims who can be admitted to rehabilitation
centres, cared for and/or deported voluntarily, while women categorised as prosti-
tutes will be most likely held in detention centres and eventually forcibly returned
5 Some scholars argue that the terrorist attacks had rather limited impact on securitisation of migra-
tion in the EU (Boswell, 2007).
1.2 Migration andSecurity inAcademic Literature
6
to the country of their origin (Aradau, 2008). In cases such as human trafcking, the
line between irregular migrants and migrants at risk or refugees can be unclear and
might lead to securitisation and victimisation of groups of people that were not sup-
posed to be subjected to security in the rst place (Aradau, 2008). This is a good
example of how practices of making divisions, drawing lines and distinguishing
between different categories of mobile people, in this case trafcked women,
enables the securitisation of migration (Peoples & Vaughan-Williams, 2015, p.173).
The rapidly growing literature on securitisation of migration reveals a rather
complex and fragmented picture, which does not allow this process to be t into one
specic template or modality. Indeed, within the literature there have been many
indications that the construction of security is in fact entangled in a variety of logics,
as well as discourses and practices dictated by them (Balzacq, 2015; Bourbeau,
2015; Kessler&Daase, 2008;Salter etal., 2019). These logics are often conceptu-
alised within broader governmental landscapes of migration, security and border
management. The EU certainly represents such a landscape, which has been expand-
ing and evolving quite dynamically over recent years. For this reason, it is neces-
sary, as this book does, to look more deeply into this tangled nature of the
securitisation of migration and investigate how specic logics of securitisation co-
exist and intertwine with one another at the EU level.
1.3 Aims oftheBook
Having in mind a burgeoning nature of securitisation literature devoted to the
“migration crisis”, this book aims to integrate the existing perspectives and shed a
new light on the policy-driven securitisation of migration at the EU level. It is the
author’s contention that as a result of the crisis there have been important develop-
ments in the ways the relationship between migration and security has been framed
and enacted in the EU. These developments strongly highlighted the inherently
messy and intricate nature of securitisation of migration, reected in the multiplic-
ity of policy actors who have “something to say” in regard to migration and security,
but most importantly in the diversity of perspectives on how security is understood
and enacted (i.e. security logics).
In this regard, this book aims to complement the already rich literature on secu-
ritisation of migration, in which the link between migration and security is most
often viewed through the lenses of a dominant narrative or security logic (e.g. as a
humanitarian or border security matter). Instead of focusing on one distinctive secu-
ritising logic, this book offers the missing link between earlier and current studies,
showing how the securitisation process can be viewed as a complex tapestry. This
“securitising tapestry” is woven out of multiple, colourful threads, each of which
representing a different logic that congures the securitisation process in a distinc-
tive way. These include more traditional notions of security reected in a state of
emergency, as well as newer concepts corresponding with risk, resilience or human-
itarianism. To exemplify, the securitisation analysis presented in this book unravels
1 Introduction
7
how the idea of risky migrant populations becomes interwoven with the militarisa-
tion of EU borders and the notion of protection of vulnerable groups among
migrants. The analytical framework proposed in this book allows examination of
how these patchworks of different logics translate into policy-driven securitisation
in the EU.This unique perspective makes it possible to trace the enactment of and
tensions between different security logics, to investigate the consequences of mul-
tiple security discourses and practices, as well as to question the depoliticising or
desecuritising nature of security logics (e.g. risk) that linger below the threshold of
state of emergency.
In general terms, this book focuses on the internal complexity and, what could be
described as, the “tangled nature” of securitisation of migration at the EU level. It is
concerned with the ways policy actors operating within the EU promote specic
interpretations of the migration-security nexus and propose policy schemes with
reference to the “migration crisis”. In order to do so, they mobilise different security
logics rooted in existential security, risk management, resilience or human security,
weaving them into the securitisation process. To show how security logics imbue
the EU migration-security nexus, the book provides an insight into specic stages
of EU policy framing of the crisis (i.e. diagnosis, evaluation and response to the
crisis), investigating (1) how different EU policy actors produce and promote their
interpretations of relationship between migration and security; (2) how these inter-
pretations co-exist, intertwine and merge in this process; and (3) to what end. In
doing so, it discusses the purposes and consequences of mobilisation of specic
security logics vis-à-vis migrants and migration. It untangles an interpretative
dynamic of securitisation and traces how the interpretation of the relationship
between migration and security changes within EU security discourse depending on
the stage of policymaking and the type of EU institutional actor involved.
Additionally, from a theoretical standpoint, the book also introduces a refreshed
perspective on securitisation by proposing to look at securitisation of migration in
the EU as the work of policy framing. This has been done in order to break up some
of the most rigid theoretical building blocks of the traditional Copenhagen School’s
iteration of securitisation theory that have been obstructing a more nuanced analysis
of construction of security. In this sense, the presented framework diverts from the
traditional speech act-based approach to the theory and proposes replacing speech
act with policy frames and framing processes as the vehicle of securitisation. This
allows to focus on a processual and iterative character of securitisation of migration
in the EU and analyse it as a dynamic lled with multiple policy actors representing
often contradictory interpretations of security, which are marginalised and/or
emphasised in this process. Further, the book proposes a specic conceptualisation
of interaction between securitising actors (e.g. politicians) and audiences (e.g. wider
society), which have the power to accept or reject proposed interpretations of secu-
rity problems and remedial actions. Here, the EU policy actors, being locked in a
form of dialogical relationship, simultaneously play the role of actors as well as
audiences, while producing specic interpretations as well as accepting or rejecting
them. Finally, the book proposes to treat securitisation of migration in the EU as a
contextually embedded process– a continuum of security discourses and practices
1.3 Aims oftheBook
8
deployed in relation to migrants and migration. In this sense, it recommends view-
ing securitisation of the “migration crisis” through the lenses of security policy
frames that have been developing in the integrating Europe since the 1970s.
1.4 Methods
In order to investigate securitisation of migration on the EU level and its underwrit-
ing logics, the book employs a qualitative method of analysis. It focuses on exami-
nation of the EU frame-narrative which emanates from policy texts on the “migration
crisis” produced by the key policy actors in the EU, namely the European
Commission, the European Parliament, the Council of the European Union and the
European Council between late 2014 and the beginning of 2018. The research also
includes analysis of relevant textual data produced by the key EU agencies involved
in the framing of the crisis, including Europol, Frontex, European Asylum Support
Ofce. Here, the frame-narrative has a rhetoric- and action-oriented character and is
comprised of three main segments, namely diagnosis, evaluation and conceptualisa-
tion of remedial actions. Each of these segments plays a different role in the inter-
pretative process. In respect to securitisation, the diagnosis of the security problem
concentrates on its root causes and sources of threats; the evaluation focuses on
attribution of blame (naming the key actors, culprits responsible for the instigation
of threats and the security problem), as well as parties responsible for dealing with
the problem; lastly, the remedial actions segment is devoted to conceptualisation of
specic policy responses to dened threats. Each of these segments is imbued with
different, often tangled security logics.
In this research, a frame-narrative is construed as a type of policy story, which
underwrites, stabilises and connects the assumptions and interpretations for policy-
making in situations that persist with many unknowns, a high degree of interdepen-
dence, and little, if any, agreement (Schön & Rein, 1994). In this respect, it helps to
clarify the analysed textual material and create a sense of a logical and sequential
interpretative process. More importantly, the frame-narrative approach makes it
possible to esh out specic security interpretations existing in particular stages of
policy framing process and how they co-exist and intertwine in the collective secu-
ritisation of migration at the EU level.
The analysis feeds on three types of data: primary textual (e.g. ofcial EU policy
texts, reports, communications, press releases, materials from ofcial websites,),
secondary contextual (e.g. policy-relevant research and analyses produced by NGOs
and thinks tanks specialising in migration, asylum and border policies), and 15
semi-structured elite interviews with representatives of selected EU institutions and
agencies (ten male and ve female interviewees). The interviews were anonymous
and were conducted between 2016 and 2018 with representatives of EU institutions
and EU agencies involved in the management of the “migration crisis” (the group
included MEPs, DG HOME representatives, European Parliament Research Service
representatives, Frontex, EASO and Europol eld ofcers and case ofcers). It
1 Introduction
9
should be noted that the textual data retrieved from the EU institutions and agencies
served as the primary sources of data, while the interviews were treated as a supple-
mentary material, allowing a more nuanced insight into specic motivations and
possible alternative interpretations hiding behind EU policies. In this sense, the
interviews were conducted after the analysis of primary data and the respondents
were asked to weigh in on the interpretation of more controversial policy initiatives,
and comment on the preliminary ndings. In this respect, data retrieved from the
interviews was used primarily in the sections, which were concluding application of
specic security logics, in a form of closing and summarising comments.
Nonetheless, every method has its limitations and challenges. In terms of the
analysis the greatest challenge of this study was the sheer volume of material to be
coded and scrutinised. In order to mitigate this challenge, I followed suggestions of
the Copenhagen School and built the corpus of data incrementally, starting with the
most relevant, strategic documents, which are seminal for the contestation of anal-
ysed policies. Then the selection proceeded with the identication of inter- discursive
patterns in respect to the hierarchy and order of policy texts produced by the selected
actors. Additionally, I used the concept of “theoretical saturation”, which refers to
the “point beyond which, no additional data are being found whereby the researcher
can develop properties of the analysed item or category” (Glaser & Strauss, 1967,
p.61). That is why additional material data was introduced to the main corpus only
up to the point when it ceased to be of added value for the analysis.
1.5 Clarifying theScope andMain Characteristics
oftheBook
The “migration crisis” has certainly sparked a new academic interest in studying
securitisation of migration at the EU level. This is not surprising, as the crisis repre-
sents a critical case for this type of research, allowing one to look at how different
modalities and dimensions of securitisation have been catalysed by increased migra-
tory ows to the EU.Even though there is a growing literature on securitisation of
migration in the EU, knowledge on securitising practices deployed at the EU level
is fragmented, focused on specic actors (e.g. Frontex) or policies (e.g. EU asylum
policy). Often, the ndings included in these analyses are lacking correspondence
and an answer to a broader question about the nature of securitisation of migration
at the EU level. To this end, there is limited research devoted to a more comprehen-
sive analysis of the EU, which encompasses various framings and security logics,
interpretations and approaches mobilised against migrants and migration. For this
reason, this book focuses on the internal dynamics of the EU securitisation prac-
tices, concentrating on policy discourse on the “migration crisis”, its content and
consequences for human mobility to and within the EU.
In this book, I apply quotation marks whenever I refer to the “migration crisis”
in order to underline the socially constructed and contested nature of this
1.5 Clarifying theScope andMain Characteristics oftheBook
10
phenomenon. There is a multitude of names such as “refugee crisis”, “immigration
crisis” or “asylum crisis” that operate within the academic and non-academic litera-
ture, each imbuing increased migratory ows with a sense of urgency and linking
them with different policy concerns.6 It is not the aim of this book to provide an
ultimate denition of the “migration crisis”, but rather explore how it is framed and
then translated into specic policy actions. That is why I decided to employ the term
“migration crisis” more as a broad linguistic token representing this phenomenon
rather than a name, which is supposed to represent its specic nature. Of course, one
cannot escape from framing one’s research with selected names and categories, but
I believe it is important to be aware of the signicance of such names, especially in
an interpretative study such as this.
Further, I predominantly use the term “migrant”7 in order to refer to the partici-
pants in the mixed migratory ows into the EU.However, in this book I also apply
four supplementary categories of migrants that are prominent within the EU policy
discourse, namely “refugees”,8 “asylum seekers”,9 “economic migrants”,10 and
“irregular migrants”.11 These categories, whenever they are used in this book,
emerge from the analysed material and are used to reect interpretative processes of
the EU policy actors rather than the author’s declaration regarding the type of
migrants that have been a part of the “migration crisis”. As aptly noted by Crawley
and Skleparis (2018, p. 48), most contemporary categories of migration “fail to
capture adequately the complex relationship between political, social and economic
6 It should be noted that the use of the term “crisis” carries a securitising effect. Boin (2005, p.2)
and his colleagues observe that the term “crisis” already suggests an existentially threatening situ-
ation to the basic structures and fundamental norms of a protected system. The term “crisis” also
initiates extraordinary decision-making procedures, which envisage mobilisation of extraordinary
measures under highly uncertain conditions.
7 There is no uniform denition of a migrant in the international legal or policy frameworks. In this
book, I build on International Organization for Migration’s (IOM) conceptualisation of a migrant
who is dened as “any person who is moving or has moved across an international border or within
a State away from his/her habitual place of residence, regardless of (1) the person’s legal status; (2)
whether the movement is voluntary or involuntary; (3) what the causes for the movement are; or
(4) what the length of the stay is” (IOM Website, 2018b).
8 As indicated by the UNHCR, “a refugee is someone who has been forced to ee his or her country
because of persecution, war, or violence. A refugee has a well-founded fear of persecution for
reasons of race, religion, nationality, political opinion or membership in a particular social group.
Most likely, they cannot return home or are afraid to do so” (UNHCR Website, 2018b).
9 An asylum-seeker is dened as a refugee “seeking sanctuary in another country, they apply for
asylum– the right to be recognised as a refugee and receive legal protection and material assis-
tance. An asylum seeker must demonstrate that his or her fear of persecution in his or her home
country is well-founded” (UNHCR Website, 2018b).
10 An economic migrant is dened as a person who engages in cross-border mobility to “improve
his/her live by nding work, or in some cases for education, family reunion, or other reasons”
(UNHCR Website, 2018a).
11 An irregular migrant is dened as a person who engages in cross-border mobility “outside the
regulatory norms of the sending, transit and receiving countries”. This usually involves travelling
illegally through borders, without the necessary authorisation or documents required under immi-
gration regulations (IOM Website, 2018a).
1 Introduction
11
drivers of migration or their shifting signicance for individuals over time and
space”. As often indicated in the literature, strict categories fail to account for the
fact that migratory ows consist of various people with different statuses and moti-
vations for travel, which are often dynamic and change in the course of migration
(Haddad, 2008; Samers & Collyer, 2017). In this respect, an individual migrant may
change his/her status, simultaneously t in two or more categories, or not qualify for
any pre-existing categories at all (Collyer, 2010).
1.6 Structure oftheBook
The book is divided into seven chapters. It opens with the Introduction, which pro-
vides a review of the existing literature on the migration-security nexus, focusing
predominantly on scholarship devoted to studies on securitisation of migration. This
section delivers basic information about the topic of the book, introduces and denes
basic concepts, provides statistics and presents a brief outline of the chapters. The
second chapter is devoted to the Copenhagen School of security and the theory of
securitisation. It explores how this particular theory views the social and discursive
construction of security and discusses its main building blocks such as speech act,
logic of exception, actor-audience interaction, outlining the criticism of the theory
as well as its alternative modalities, which have emerged in the new waves of secu-
ritisation literature. This leads the theoretical discussion to the third chapter, which
sketches out the analytical framework applied in this book by proposing to look at
securitisation as the work of policy framing. This approach makes it possible to
investigate not one specic understanding of security that is supposed to “break
normal politics” (as is suggested by the Copenhagen School), but the whole pleth-
ora of entangled security logics that to different degrees frame migration as a secu-
rity issue as well as shift power relations and control over migration within the
EU.To this end, the chapter provides an overview of specic security logics and
discusses how their application opens the securitisation analysis to a more interpre-
tative reading.
The fourth chapter of the book marks the beginning of the securitisation analysis.
It investigates which security logics and policy actors have been most prominent in
the shaping of the migration security nexus in the EU prior to the “migration crisis”.
Here, a distinction in the securitisation of migration in the EU is made between
“constitutional securitisation” of migration stimulated by the treaties, and “second-
ary securitisation” stimulated by EU legislation. In this way, the chapter unravels
the so-called migration-security continuum in the EU, reecting historically and
institutionally embedded security frames, which have been inuencing the EU
approach to migration. It discusses how the notions of control and management of
possible risks and security decits generated by increased liberalisation of border
control have been gradually coming to dominate the EU’s migration policies, mak-
ing the logic of risk management a key feature of securitising practices deployed at
the EU level.
1.6 Structure oftheBook
12
The fth chapter focuses on the rst segments of the EU frame-narrative (i.e.
diagnosis and evaluation) and discusses how the EU has mobilised and emphasised
different security logics while framing the crisis. In this regard, the chapter dis-
cusses how human security has deeply saturated the discourse on the “migration
crisis”, becoming the most relevant logic during the diagnostic and evaluation seg-
ments of policy framing. It examines specic policy actors such as the European
Parliament, which played the role of the key promotor of this logic, employing a
humanitarian perspective while diagnosing the root causes and assigning the blame
for the crisis. The chapter also focuses on risk-centred interpretations, which visibly
inuenced the rst stages of the framing process. It provides an analysis on how the
interpretation of the crisis shifted into more risk-oriented logics when the crisis
“entered” the Schengen Area, which deeply inuenced the interpretation of the
nature of the crisis, referent objects, security concerns and their causal effects. With
the shift of logic, the locus of the framing process also changed, introducing the
European Commission and the Council of the European Union as key promotors of
this type of framing. The discussion on specic logics is divided into sub-sections,
each concluded with summarising comments extracted from the interviews.
The sixth chapter focuses on the last segment of the EU frame-narrative on the
“migration crisis,” analysing the discursive institutionalisation of security logics hid-
ing behind policy actions proposed and mobilised vis-à-vis increased migratory
ows. It discusses how in this last stage of the framing process the prominence of the
logics has changed as compared to the diagnosis and evaluation stages. Elements of
human security, so visible in the previous segments, have become less evident, and
rather deemphasised and dispersed between risk management, “exceptionalist” secu-
rity and resilience. In this sense, most of the remedial actions conceptualised at the
EU level and discussed in the chapter included “humanitarian concern”, although to
different degrees and ends. However, the prominence of the broadly understood risk
logic remained and split into risk management and resilience-oriented policy actions
In this respect, the EU policy discourse on management of risks was proliferated
with calls for policy initiatives directed at normalisation and control of migratory
ows, as well as stabilisation of the situation on the EU borders, while resilience-
oriented actions concentrated on the robustness of the administrative capabilities of
the EU asylum system, border security system, as well as the EU neighbourhood and
countries of origin. Further, the chapter discusses how risk management, resilience
and human security intertwine with the logic of exceptional security reected in the
militarisation of policy responses. Here, such existential threats as trans-border
organised crime or terrorism are strategically deployed as reasons for mobilisation of
extraordinary, often militarised means such EUNAVOR “Sophia” or EU border oper-
ations. Similarly, as in the previous chapter, sub- sections corresponding with specic
security logics are concluded with comments extracted from the interviews.
The book ends with conclusions devoted to revisiting of patterns of securitisation
and security logics in the EU frame narrative on the “migration crisis”. This chapter
summarises the ndings of the book and provides concluding remarks. It is supple-
mented with a table encompassing the whole structure of the EU policy framing
process. It revisits how security logics intertwined and inuenced each other within
1 Introduction
13
the whole EU frame-narrative produced in response to the “migration crisis”, indi-
cating points of convergence and divergence in the securitisation process.
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1 Introduction
17© The Author(s) 2022
M. Stępka, Identifying Security Logics in the EU Policy Discourse, IMISCOE
Research Series, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-93035-6_2
Chapter 2
The Copenhagen School andBeyond.
ACloser Look atSecuritisation Theory
2.1 Introduction
The aim of the chapter is to provide a closer look at the Copenhagen School of
security1 and its proposition of securitisation theory. In doing so, it will focus on the
discussion on the main conceptual building blocks of the theory, outlining their
characteristics and critique reected in the current securitisation literature. For the
past years, the Copenhagen School has inspired a plethora of studies and theoretical
reections on different modes and characteristics of the construction of security,
becoming particularly relevant for migration-security nexus research (Huysmans,
2006; Lazardis, 2011; Leonard & Kaunert, 2019; van Munster, 2009). In this book
the Copenhagen School, along with criticism of it, serves as a point of refence for
further elaboration of the framing centred securitisation and discussion on the inter-
twining of security logics in the process of intersubjective construction of security.
The chapter is structured as follows. The rst section provides an overview of the
mechanics of the securitisation theory, dening its key constituents– speech act,
logic of exception, and actor-audience interaction. Further, it moves to discussion
on each of these elements, elaborating their specic role within the theory, but also
outlining their specic limiting effects on securitisation research. The last section
discusses how the debate on securitisation has been expanding, opening the door to
new conceptual frameworks as well as elaborations of security.
1 The term was rst introduced by Bill McSweeney (in McSweeney, 1996).
18
2.2 The Concept ofSecuritisation
In the past 30 years, the Copenhagen School and its securitisation theory have
become increasingly relevant in the academic discussion on the widening of secu-
rity (moving beyond the military) and deepening the pool of its referent objects
(moving beyond the monopoly of the state as something that can be threatened)
(Buzan & Hansen, 2009, p.187). The beginnings of the theory can be traced back
to a series of articles by Barry Buzan and Ole Wæver (Buzan, 1997; Buzan &
Wæver, 1997; Wæver, 1995a, b; Wæver etal., 1993), which eventually resulted in a
seminal publication entitled Security: A New Framework for Analysis (Buzan etal.,
1998). The securitisation framework as presented by the Copenhagen School aligns
with the constructivist approach, committing to the discursive and linguistic turn in
International Relations and security studies. It builds upon the notion that “language
is not only concerned with what is ‘out there’, as realist and neorealist assume, but
is also constitutive of the social reality it describes” (Balzacq, 2010, p.56). The
Copenhagen School argues that security is not a given but it is constructed through
inter-subjective social and discursive interactions between powerful actors who pro-
pose denitions of threats and relevant audiences who acknowledge these deni-
tions (Buzan etal., 1998). Over the years, securitisation theory has proved to be an
attractive framework and a starting point for contemporary scholars, who are chal-
lenging the notion of a materialist ontology and uncovering the philosophy, meth-
ods and dynamics hiding behind processes, which “push” or “pull” issues, actors, or
processes into the realm of security (see Bigo, 2014; Bourbeau, 2015; Neal, 2009).
Even though securitisation is commonly described as a bridging theory, encom-
passing elements of constructivist and mainstream security studies, its founding
fathers prefer to describe it as an example of “radical constructivism” (Buzan etal.,
1998). In the broadest terms, securitisation theory allows one to understand how
security is constructed with language, and more specically performative utter-
ances– speech acts (Wæver, 1995b, p.55). As opposed to the realists, the Copenhagen
School is not concerned with identifying objectively construed “real” threats and
consequently does not engage in the discussion on the materiality of security (Buzan
& Wæver, 1997). Instead, it allows one to peek behind the curtain of security and
look at it as a “quality actors inject into issues by securitising them, which means
staging those issues on the political arena in the specic way that makes them
acceptable as a security problem, sanctioning security actions and defensive moves”
(Buzan etal., 1998).
With securitisation theory, Buzan and his colleagues outline a framework, which
combines security as an inter-subjective social construct with elements of Austin’s
speech act and Schmitt’s idea of “exception” (Buzan etal., 1998). In his early writ-
ings on securitisation theory, he proposes treating security as a speech act, a perfor-
mative utterance which when spoken by a relevant actor (i.e. securitising actor)
brings security into being. As he puts it:
By saying it, something is done (as in betting, giving a promise, naming a ship). By uttering
“security” a state-representative moves a particular development into a specic area and
2 The Copenhagen School andBeyond. ACloser Look atSecuritisation Theory
19
thereby claims a special right to use whatever means are necessary to block it (Wæver,
1995b, p.55).
It the later iteration of the theory, Buzan and Wæver (1997) put a stronger empha-
sis on the rhetorical structure of speech acts, underlining the importance of raising
the securitised issue above the threshold of so-called “normal politics”. Here, pow-
erful societal actors produce security discourses, by framing an issue as an existen-
tial threat to a specic referent object (a valued object that require protection). In
other words, the securitisation process is concerned with
the staging of existential issues in politics to lift them above politics. In security discourse,
an issue is dramatized and presented as an issue of supreme priority; thus, by labelling it as
security, an agent claims a need for and a right to treat it by extraordinary means (Buzan
etal., 1998p. 26).
According to the Copenhagen School, the fact that powerful societal actors use
securitising speech acts to declare a particular issue, dynamic or actor to be an exis-
tential threat does not by itself produce security. Here, speech acts represent securi-
tising moves, an attempt, which needs to gain societal and political saliency and
more importantly the approval of a relevant audience (e.g. wider society) (Buzan
etal., 1998). It is the audience’s acceptance that ultimately empowers securitising
moves, turning them into an inter-subjectively constructed threat (Côté, 2016). The
Copenhagen School builds on the assumption that securitisation is not uniform
across different issues. In order to better understand specic nuances of securitisa-
tion, it introduces the concept of security sectors, which reect different dynamics
of securitisation, including the way its constitutive elements, such actors, audiences,
referent objects and vulnerabilities to security, are dened and incorporated in the
act of constructing security (Buzan etal., 1998). In this regard, securitisation builds
on previous work by Buzan (most notably his book People, State and Fear) indicat-
ing ve distinctive areas, corresponding with different aspects security, namely: the
military, environmental, economic, societal and political (Buzan, 1991; Buzan
etal., 1998).
This general overview of the framework allows one to isolate three building
blocks, which underlie securitisation, namely: (1) speech act, (2) logic of exception,
(3) actor-audience interaction. In the next part of this chapter, I will discuss these
elements of the theory, focusing on their unique features, functions as well as cri-
tique within a broader securitisation literature. This discussion will serve as a point
of reference for further elaboration of the securitisation framework, as applied in
this book.
2.3 Securitisation andtheSpeech Act Approach
As already indicated, securitisation theory is invested in John L.Austin’s and John
Searle’s theory of speech acts, translating the idea of performativity of language to
the concept of security (Austin, 1975; Searle, 1969). According to Austin, language
2.3 Securitisation andtheSpeech Act Approach
20
is not comprised solely of statements that carry content and can be judged in terms
of true or false but is performative and introduces change into social reality (Austin,
1975, p.10). Of course, not every utterance has performative power, as it needs to
meet certain conditions and requirements. To describe this, Austin gives an example
of a wedding. Here, an authoritative gure (e.g. a priest) creates a social fact of mar-
riage though a series of utterances that culminate in the words “I pronounce you
husband and wife” (Austin, 1975, p.13). In this sense, the power of speech is based
on the following elements. Firstly, the physical act of speech itself (i.e. locution)
and the conventionalised script which the speaker has to follow in order to infuse the
utterances with performative power (i.e. illocution); secondly, the power of the g-
ure that engages in performing the speech act (i.e. authority); lastly, the effect of the
speech on the audience, reected, for example, in fullment of an order (i.e. perlo-
cution) (Austin, 1975, p.17; Rosaldo, 1982).
In the Copenhagen School approach, the locutionary and illocutionary aspects of
speech acts are supposed to create a rupture in the common understanding of an
issue and propose its introduction into the framework of security (Vuori, 2008). In
this vein, the script of securitising speech act should incorporate two key elements–
a denition of an existential threat and a referent object (Stritzel, 2007). The deni-
tion of an existential threat is necessary as it introduces a sense drama and extreme
urgency that has the potential to validate extraordinary measures and suspension of
normal politics (Vuori, 2008, p.70). The referent object should be, at least to some
extent, commonly acknowledged as socially relevant and refer, for instance, to
shared values, identities, or issues that resonate with a wider part of the targeted
audience (Buzan etal., 1998). Keeping these two elements in mind, a securitising
actor has a chance to produce a successful securitising speech act that is commonly
accepted as a legitimate and dominant security problem requiring exceptional secu-
rity measures.
Apart from the conventionalised speech itself, the authority of the speaker plays
an important role in the speech act approach to security. The Copenhagen School
describes securitising actors as “those who speak security”– a person, or a group,
who performs the securitising speech acts from the position power that can substan-
tiate introduction of extraordinary measures (Buzan et al., 1998, p. 40). In this
regard, Buzan and Wæver point towards broadly understood political elites, govern-
mental agencies, bureaucrats, and pressure groups, that hold a special position in
dening and implementing security (Wæver, 1995b, pp.49–50). This catalogue can
be expanded with any actor, who is expected and able to dene threats to the refer-
ent objects valued by the groups they represent or belong to (Williams, 2003).
Buzan and Wæver argue that the actors are usually not the referent objects, but they
regularly claim to speak on their behalf (Buzan etal., 1998, p.40). A popular exam-
ple of such a securitising behaviour is a political party or a non-governmental organ-
isation producing security speech acts in defence of national identity (Huysmans,
2006) or religious values (Bagge Laustsen & Wæver, 2000). In such situations,
especially political actors often apply securitisation as an instrument for gaining
2 The Copenhagen School andBeyond. ACloser Look atSecuritisation Theory
21
control over specic areas of social and political life, dominating the discourse, set-
ting out the tone for further actions and policies (Skleparis, 2016, pp.97–99).
Regardless the power of securitising actors and the contents of speech acts, the
inter-subjective character of the theory requires perlocution, in other words, the
consent of empowering audiences (McDonald, 2008). As Buzan and his colleagues
indicate, the element of
security is not held in subjective and isolated minds; it is a social quality, a part of discourse,
socially constituted, inter-subjective realm. For individuals or groups to speak security does
not guarantee the success (Buzan etal., 1998, p.31).
In this vein, the Copenhagen School does not leave much space for discussion
about the role of the audience, clearly indicating that “successful securitization is
not decided by the ‘securitizer’ but by the audience of the security speech act”
(Buzan etal., 1998, p.31). The element of audience is visibly problematic from the
analytical point of view. Even though the theory clearly indicates what the audience
is supposed to do, it does not elaborate on who or what the audience is (Jarvis &
Legrand, 2017, pp.150–151).
Critics of the speech act approach point out that the Copenhagen School does not
equally embrace the locutionary, illocutionary and perlocutionary dimensions of the
theory. It is evident that the locutionary and illocutionary aspects of speech act play
more signicant role in securitisation framework. It is reected in the static and
decisionist interpretation of securitisation theory, which has been promoted by the
Copenhagen School. Indeed, it has been explicitly indicated that “the structure of
the theory is organised around securitisation as an act, a productive moment (…)”
(Wæver, 2011, p.468). This act or moment of securitisation is predominantly built
around the articulation of the speech by an actor, who enjoys control over securitisa-
tion. As Wæver points out in his earlier writings, “something is a security problem
when the elites declare it to be so” (1995b, pp.54–55). In this sense, the Copenhagen
School depicts securitisation more as a directive or static event, unnecessarily mar-
ginalising iterative and incremental processes that are so typical for the social con-
struction of reality. Further, the Copenhagen School strongly emphasises and
elaborates upon the role of securitising actors, consequently downplaying the perlo-
cutionary dimension of the theory and the role of audience. As Stritzel puts it:
the more emphasis is put on the notion of ‘illocution’, the less important the concept of
‘audience’ seems to become, as the modus of security could be thought of as being consti-
tuted by the illocutionary utterance itself (Stritzel, 2011, p.349).
In the light of this criticism, it could be argued that the Copenhagen School’s
proposition of securitisation theory is somewhat paradoxical (Balzacq, 2005; Floyd,
2007). It is supposed to be radically constructivist and inter-subjective, but the origi-
nal reading of the theory puts much emphasis on speech act decisions and self-
referential elements. It is not completely clear where the real centre of gravity of
securitisation theory lies.
2.3 Securitisation andtheSpeech Act Approach
22
2.4 Securitisation theLogic ofException
Securitisation theory is devoted to explaining the process of creating security out of
objects, issues and dynamics that normally “existed” outside security frameworks
(Bourbeau, 2015). It is dedicated to studying how security “gains new grounds” and
widens its scope through discursive practices. Yet, this raises concerns of turning
“security” into a concept which encompasses so many areas that it in the end
becomes blurred and empirically useless. As Peoples and Vaughan-Williams point
out, that there are “intellectual and political dangers in simply tacking the word
security onto an ever wider range of issues”, making the concept of security too
broad and empirically useless (Peoples & Vaughan-Williams, 2015, p. 93). The
Copenhagen School, trying to escape this “making everything a security” trap,
introduces conceptual limitations linking securitisation to the Schmittian idea of
“exception” as a way of breaking “normal politics” and entering into realm of secu-
rity (Buzan etal., 1998; Buzan & Wæver, 1997). It conceptualises normal politics in
terms of standardised everyday forms of political interaction that allow for contesta-
tion and deliberation over an issue in the public space within the bounds of norma-
tive and causal procedures (Pram Gad & Lund Petersen 2011:320). As Waever puts
it, “the place of security in the theory is as an anti-politics or the politically consti-
tuted limit to politics” (Wæver, 2011, p.478). In this way, the Copenhagen School
looks at the process of constructing security as locked between securitisation (intro-
duction of an issue to non-political exceptionality) and desecuritisation (reintroduc-
tion of an issue to normal politics) (Wæver, 1995b).
Indeed, the securitisation framework is very much concerned with the idea of
security based on an exception, driven by “existential threats and the radical enmity
between friends and foes” (Rothe, 2016, p. 48). In Schmittian philosophy, “’the
exception’ is a situation of radical danger and contingency for which no prior law,
procedure or anticipated response is adequate, it is a perilous moment that exceeds
the limits of precedent, knowledge, legislation and predictability” (C.A.S.E., 2007,
p.465). Exception-driven security introduces a constitutive antagonism, which con-
stantly threatens a political community and prepares it for the possibility of intro-
duction of exceptional measures and the breaking of the established normative and
legal order in the name of the common security (Pram Gad & Lund Petersen, 2011,
p.318). For the Copenhagen School securitisation is a form of radicalisation and
“extreme politicisation”, marking a moment when an issue breaks the barrier of
normal politics, ends the political discussion and is handled with extraordinary mea-
sures (Patomäki, 2015). Consequently, an issue can pass through different forms of
politicisation before reaching the level of security. As Buzan and his colleagues
explain:
in theory, any public issue can be located on the spectrum ranging from non-politicized
(meaning the state does not deal with it and it is not in any other way made an issue of
public debate and decision) through politicized (meaning the issue is part of public policy,
requiring government decision and resource allocations or, more rarely some other form of
communal governance) to securitised (meaning the issue is presented as an existential
2 The Copenhagen School andBeyond. ACloser Look atSecuritisation Theory
23
threat, requiring emergency measures and justifying actions outside the normal bounds of
political procedure) (Buzan etal., 1998, pp.23–24).
According to Schmitt, it is the sovereign who decides on the exception and con-
sequently the direction of the securitisation process (Schmitt, 2010, p.5). The basis
for such a decision is the identication of existential threats, external to the inner
order and the consequent demarcation between friends and enemies (Rothe, 2016,
p.48). This decision of taking politics into “security mode” ascribes nearly unlim-
ited and unconstrained prerogatives to the political authority, which acts in the name
of survival of the sovereign (Pram Gad & Lund Petersen, 2011, p.318). Authority
thus construed often plays the role of a securitising actor, holding control over
groups’ identity as a political community, stimulating its sense of insecurity and
strengthening or weakening its coherence based on the perceived threats and realised
antagonisms (Williams, 2003, p.518).
The Copenhagen School does not elaborate on the mechanics and modes of
descuritisation. Some of the most pivotal research in this area is presented by
Huysmans, who uses the example of migration to show three possible pathways of
downgrading already securitised issues (1995, 1998). He suggests the existence of
an “objective strategy” (framing migrants an non-threatening to “our” identity); a
“constructivist strategy” (developing a broader understanding of the phenomenon of
migration, so that further securitising moves have a lesser impact on the common
perception of immigrants); and a “deconstrucitivist strategy” (desecuritisation
through interpersonal experiences with migrants and breaking down exclusionary
divisions of “us” and “them”) (Huysmans, 1995, pp.66–67). Nonetheless, the lit-
erature also indicates the cases of “entrenched” or “deep” securitisations, where
security narratives are so imbued into the very denition of an issue or a group (e.g.
ethnic groups) that it becomes extremely problematic to develop strategies for its
desecuritisation (Abulof, 2014).
This brings the discussion to the point concerned with the normative dimension
of the securitisation theory, focusing on the question whether it is a “negative” con-
cept. The Copenhagen Schools is quite clear about this, indicating that the process
of constructing security indeed has a “dark side” (Wæver, 1995b, p.64). In some
ways, securitisation may be obstructive to developing creative policy solutions, lim-
iting the political space “required to thinking through often complex issues and
instead introducing an unhelpful degree of enmity and urgency” (Peoples &
Vaughan-Williams, 2015, p.100). Wæver uses an example of environmental secu-
rity, arguing that statist solutions driven by the logic of security might lead to unnec-
essary centralisation and militarisation of environmental issues (1995b). He also
points out societal dangers, associated with increased securitisation such as increase
of hate speech, discriminatory discourses and consequent reinforcement of antago-
nisms driven by “us” versus “them” logic (1995b, p.65). This is when in most cases
desecuritisation becomes a more desirable and effective option, downgrading a
problem from security to the world of process-type remedies on “normal political
deliberation and haggling” (Wæver, 1999, p.335).
2.4 Secur itisation theLogic ofException
24
The rule of exceptionality has been widely contested in the securitisation litera-
ture, generating substantial criticisms on three interrelated grounds. Firstly, it has
proven to be empirically limiting. By arguing that successful securitisation moves
an issue outside normal democratic politics, the Copenhagen School unnecessarily
restricts itself to domestic norms and democratic governments, limiting the applica-
bility of the theory within non-state, non-democratic and international contexts
(Stritzel, 2011; Wilkinson, 2007). This problem is specically visible in research on
securitising practices in transnational settings, such as the European Union, where
the political process is not attuned to the state of democratic normalcy, but embed-
ded in various forms of high level and technocratic politics (Huysmans, 2000;
Sperling & Webber, 2019; van Munster, 2009). Abrahamson voices similar con-
cerns arguing that “exceptional securitization does not fully capture the dominant
mode of security politics, which is most often gradual and incremental, with issues
only rarely moving directly from normalcy to emergency” (Abrahamsen, 2005,
p.71). Secondly, exceptionality can never fully eliminate the political haggling or
political debate from the securitisation process. As Huysmans indicates, even excep-
tionalist securitisation is never simply an imposition of the end of normal politics as
it “always entails the opening up of a political terrain of contestation of democratic
political organisation and authorisation” (Huysmans, 2014, p.69). It is a process,
which brings into play various actors and political rationalities, engaging them in
contestation of exceptionality of the situation.
Thirdly, due to the premise of exceptionality, the Copenhagen School tends to
apply the realist vocabulary of security, closing the theory to alternative notions of
security and securitisation. Indeed, contemporary security practice has much less in
common with exceptional politics and can be more associated with, for instance,
humanitarianism or the concept of risk and the logic of governance reected in
long-termism and precautionary measures (Corry, 2012, p.248). In this regard,
exceptional securitisation ignores a whole plethora of security practices and dis-
courses that operate below the threshold of exceptionality, but still remain in the
realm of security (Lund Petersen, 2012; Rasmussen, 2006).
2.5 Securitisation andtheAudience-Actor Interaction
The third building block of securitisation theory, the conceptualisation of audi-
ence, is also rather problematic as the Copenhagen School does not offer any sub-
stantial denition or discussion on this matter. Audience can be intuitively dened
as the society or a different entity2 capable of accepting and legitimising deni-
tions of existential threats and the consequential introduction of exceptional
security measures (Côté, 2016, p.548). This rather ambiguous conceptualisation
2 Among others: government branch (Salter, 2008b), technical experts (Rothe, 2016), international
community (Vaughn, 2009), local society (Buraczyński, 2015).
2 The Copenhagen School andBeyond. ACloser Look atSecuritisation Theory
25
has generated some confusion in the securitisation literature, resulting in vigorous
discussion on the criteria of identication of relevant audience(s) (Salter, 2008b;
Vaughn, 2009), its interaction with powerful actors (Côté, 2016) and modes of
acceptance of security narratives and measures (Buraczyński, 2015; Stritzel &
Chang, 2015).
In order to identify a relevant audience in securitisation research, one rst has to
understand what an audience actually does. In the Copenhagen School, the role of
an audience is construed as mostly passive and conceptualised around two essential
functions: listening and reacting (Rothe, 2016, p.35). Audience as “listeners” can
be described as “a strategic resource that has to be won over” for the successful
nalisation of the securitising move (McSweeney, 1996). In the traditional reading
of the theory “audience is there to enjoy the show” or “sit and listen”, while the real
spectacle is controlled by powerful actors, who woo the audience with various
methods and attractive scripts in order to secure the favourable reception of the
securitising act (Stritzel, 2012). This leads to the second, and key, function of audi-
ence, which is reacting to securitising moves. The Copenhagen School identies
two types of audience responses – acceptance and non-acceptance of proposed
threat denitions and security measures (Buzan et al., 1998:43). Here, audience
enjoys rather limited inuence over the process, with no particular ways of express-
ing more nuanced reactions to securitising moves. Referring to this traditional con-
ceptualisation, Côté argues that audience is in fact an “agent without agency”,
stripped of any real possibility of inuencing the actor and doing what it is supposed
to, that is engage in inter-subjective construction of security (2016). This limitation
is partly recognised by Buzan etal., who point out that
one danger of the phrases ‘securitization’ and ‘speech act’ is that too much focus can be
placed on the acting side, thus privileging the powerful while marginalizing those who are
the audience and judge of the act (Buzan etal., 1998, p.41).
Indeed, without further conceptualisation of audience, securitisation risks
becoming more of a self-referential directive produced by securitising actors, than a
site of negotiations and an inter-subjective process (Balzacq, 2005, pp.179–180).
One of the “ways out” would be strengthening and exploring the perlocutionary
effects of security speech acts and more meaningful incorporation of the concept of
audience into the analytical scheme. This, however, would necessitate a recongu-
ration of securitisation theory in terms of power and agency that could be ascribed
to the involved agents, as well as the repositioning of actors and audiences in the
framework.
The traditional idea of audience has sparked a lot of criticism and fruitful discus-
sions on the role, denition and interaction of relevant audience and securitising
actors. The main line of argument is the extent of power that should be identied
with audience. Numerous researchers argue that without power and agency audi-
ence is incapable of playing its part in the securitisation process (Balzacq, 2011;
Côté, 2016; Stritzel, 2012). It has to be an agent, which has a standing in political
and societal contestation of the problems. In this sense, audience should have
agency and the means to challenge denitions and measures proposed by powerful
actors, beyond a simple “yes” or “no” (Emerson, 2017). In this approach,
2.5 Securitisation andtheAudience-Actor Interaction
26
securitisation scholars, when identifying audience, look for powerful agents such as
the international community, scientic community, or development aid donors, who
have some positional power and an opportunity to shape the way security problems
are construed and dealt with (Côté, 2016; Salter, 2008a; Vaughn, 2009).
On the other hand, some scholars make an interesting case against devoting that
much attention to audience and its responses to securitising moves (Floyd, 2007;
Taureck, 2006). Floyd argues that the recent xation on the power of an audience
may in fact deteriorate the real picture of securitisation and lead to false results
(2016, pp. 689–691). Sometimes, powerful actors do not engage in meaningful
interactions with their potential audiences. This is because at times securitising
actors do not need an audience to move forward with their specic denition of a
threat and implementation of security measures (Floyd, 2016, p.692). In certain
political contexts, especially non-democratic regimes, an audience may be unneces-
sary for the success of the process (Taureck, 2006). A similar situation can also be
observed in policymaking contexts, where an issue may be securitised with policy
tools and security actions without any specic audience-actor interaction (Sperling
& Webber, 2019). As Taureck notes, in many types of securitisations, the incorpora-
tion of audience is not obligatory as it creates persistent theoretical and empirical
complications (2006, p.55). In this regard, Floyd goes as far as proposing that, if the
context allows it, a researcher should consider removing the concept of audience
from his/her securitisation framework and focus on exploration of different types of
securitising actors (Floyd, 2016).
The securitisation literature does not really offer any coherent guidelines as to
how audience and its interaction with powerful actors should be viewed. There is a
growing body of research that shows that the nature of interaction between different
audiences and actors should be treated as highly context sensitive and exible in
nature (Bourbeau, 2011; Stritzel, 2007; Wilkinson, 2007). For example, drawing on
Goffman’s work, Salter puts forward the idea that there are different types of audi-
ences corresponding with different types of settings (e.g. political, technocratic,
scientic) and that they vary in degree of power, agency and tools that allow them
to engage powerful actors and inuence the process (2008b). In a similar tradition,
Kaunert and Leonard argue that it is necessary to distinguish different types of audi-
ences which are engaged by securitising actors (2013). Depending on the situation,
they may relate to and interact with each other in the production of security mean-
ings and responses to threats (e.g. academics may collaborate with the media),
potentially increasing their agency and role in the construction of security.
2.6 Conclusion: Moving Forward withSecuritisation Theory
The Copenhagen School has created a unique intellectual space for discussion of
the construction of security, expanding our understanding of how specic issues
have been incorporated and used within international and national security frame-
works. Building on criticism and theoretical debates, securitisation scholarship has
2 The Copenhagen School andBeyond. ACloser Look atSecuritisation Theory
27
been dynamically expanding, moving beyond the traditional theory as proposed by
the Copenhagen School. Numerous scholars have been reaching out to other disci-
plines and theoretical traditions, supplementing, deconstructing and reconstructing
securitisation theory, developing their own “schools” and methodologies (Bigo &
McCluskey, 2018; C.A.S.E., 2006; Hansen, 2011; Wæver, 2004). Consequently,
securitisation scholarship has evolved into a diverse research programme exploring
a variety of securitising practices and loci, at the same time providing a better under-
standing of processes of constructing security and threats.
The biggest revision of securitisation theory has been introduced and promoted
by the Paris School. This sociological model of securitisation distances itself from
speech act and the linguistic aspects of the original theory. Instead, it commits to the
idea of securitisation as driven by security practice, which is institutionalised
through repetitive actions and the interaction of security actors within the eld of
security (Balzacq, 2010, p.13). As argued by Bigo,
it is possible to securitise certain problems without speech or discourse and the military and
the police have known that for a long time. The practical work, discipline and expertise are
as important as all forms of discourse (Bigo, 2000, p.194).
The Paris School argues that securitisation does not always require denition and
existential threats, drama and breaking from normal politics. It may take place
though routine, over time and, on some occasions, even outside political discourse
(Bigo, 2014). In this regard, the sociological take on securitisation breaks not only
with the linguistic approach but also the idea of exceptionality of security. Here,
security operates below the threshold of extraordinary measures, being embedded in
normalised security practices such as policing, surveillance and control. For this
reason, in the Paris School, securitising actors do not necessarily have to be authori-
tative or in position of power that allows them to shape collective understanding of
security. They can be mundane practitioners, such as police and military forces,
customs ofcers or humanitarian workers, who “manage unease” by constituting a
security eld within which specic problems such as migration or climate change
are framed and practiced as threats to security (Bigo, 2002, pp.63–65).
Bigo’s work has opened up the securitisation framework to a more context-
sensitive, processual thinking about the construction of security. In this regard, new
perspectives have come to light. For instance, Strizel proposes viewing securitisa-
tion through the lenses of translation, proposing radically processual interpretation
using the concept of translation (2011). Here, securitisation is treated as a produc-
tive rearticulation of the meaning of security in a new locale. In a different interpre-
tation, Rothe reinvents securitisation using hegemonic discourse as a point of
reference (2016). He builds on poststructuralist arguments and proposes treating
securitisation as a process embedded in larger governmental landscapes, driven by
the struggle between discourse coalitions which problematise novel issues as secu-
rity problems. Leonard and Kaunert look at securitisation from the angle of policy
studies, building on a policy venue perspective and underlining the importance of
institutional settings and historical contextual factors inuencing the construction of
security (Leonard & Kaunert, 2019). Of course, the list of new contributions to
2.6 Conclusion: Moving Forward withSecuritisation Theory
28
securitisation studies is much more exhaustive and diverse. The contemporary lit-
erature on securitisation is burgeoning with new ideas and reconceptualisations of
the theory in an attempt to make it better aligned with different modes of discourse
and practice (including technology-driven) and ever dynamic complexities that
accompany social construction of security (Jeandesboz, 2016).
That being said, this diversity of approaches has a certain “blind spot” which is
reected in its commitment to specic security logics, primarily existential security
and risk, that underlie different perspectives on securitisation (Watson, 2012,
p.182). This is specically visible in the migration-security nexus literature. On one
hand, some scholars focus on elites and their political discourses revolving around
fear, exceptional understanding of security and different forms of extraordinary
measures and policies proposed in political debates (Armillei, 2017; Ceyhan &
Tsoukala, 2002). On the other hand, research on technologies and the security prac-
tices of control tends to focus on risk management and the mundane activities of
security experts, thus downplaying the securitising role of extraordinary and elite-
driven discourses (Bigo etal., 2013). Though different perspectives on securitisa-
tion provide a unique insight into the process in their own right, they also tend to
entrench themselves in their respective security logics and pathways. An unintended
consequence of most securitisation research is marginalisation of voices and aspects
of security that do not fall under the assumed logics and parameters. That is why in
this book I propose a less rigid and more inclusive way of analysing securitisation
and put forward framing as one of the theories that could expand and reinvigorate
the debate. The next chapter is devoted to the notion of framing and its different
conceptualisations. It discusses its main theoretical building blocks and prepares
grounds for its incorporation into the securitisation framework.
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References
33© The Author(s) 2022
M. Stępka, Identifying Security Logics in the EU Policy Discourse, IMISCOE
Research Series, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-93035-6_3
Chapter 3
Securitisation astheWork ofFraming
3.1 Introduction
In the previous chapters, I provided an overview of the basic characteristics and
criticism of the Copenhagen School and its securitisation theory. By committing to
a rather rigid framework driven by speech act theory and exceptionalism, the
Copenhagen School has overlooked the complexities, embeddedness and depth of
the process associated with the construction and application of security. Building on
the already existing criticism of securitisation, this chapter proposes an alternative
reading of the theory, addressing the shortcomings of the traditional approach and
making the framework more sensitive to (1) the tangled nature of security reected
in the variety of security logics and interpretations that intertwine and coexist in the
processes of securitisation; (2) contexts such as the EU policy making environment,
where a clear dichotomy between securitising actors and empowering audiences is
not evident. To this end, I propose looking at securitisation from an interpretative
angle, placing policy framing at the heart of the framework.
In the next part of this chapter, I will reect upon the original building blocks of
securitisation theory, i.e. speech act, exceptionality, audience-actor dichotomy,
acceptance and context and discuss how the framing approach might constructively
inform the original conceptualisation of securitisation. At the same time, I will dis-
cuss how the existing criticism ts into this reading of the theory, elaborating upon
the idea of acceptance as well as the importance of embeddedness and contextuality
in securitisation analysis. At this point, I should underline that in the following dis-
cussion I do not propose a new comprehensive theory of securitisation but rather an
alternative reading of it, which could be used when analysing securitisation prac-
tices proliferated with multiple conceptions of security so typical in policymaking
settings. The following chapter is structured as follows. First, it focuses on an over-
view of the speech act-oriented approach to securitisation and discusses how fram-
ing literature can help addressing some of its main shortcomings. Further, the
chapter moves to discussing the use of “exceptionality” in the securitisation research
34
and offers to supplement it with an idea of security logics, thus opening the analyti-
cal framework to an inquiry into different notions of security that underlie processes
of securitisation. Thirdly, the chapter focuses on actor-audience interaction, show-
ing how the traditional division between “speakers” and “listeners” of securitising
moves might not t to all instances of securitisation, policy-driven securitisation
being one of them. In the next two parts of the chapter, the discussion moves to
issues of acceptance of securitising moves and the role of context, elaborating on
the importance of these two elements in securitisation research. The chapter con-
cludes with a summary of the “securitisation as the work of framing” approach,
outlining its most important features.
3.2 Securitisation Beyond Speech Act
The speech act approach has generated substantial criticism among scholars. It has
committed securitisation framework to an idea of the linguistic securitising act of a
decisionistic nature, more driven by the content of the speech and power of the
speaker rather than actual effects it has on the audience. The speech act approach
has narrowed securitisation down to a concentration of single acts, self-referential
directives produced by powerful actors entitled to “speak security” to relevant audi-
ences. As often pointed out by the critics of the Copenhagen School, the traditional
reading of the theory has made application of the securitisation framework in empir-
ical research problematic, especially in highly politicised and contestation-driven
contexts such as policy making environment, which is inherently driven by interac-
tional and dialogical processes of collective sense making (Balzacq, 2015b; Sperling
& Webber, 2019; Stritzel, 2007). In order to address the shortcomings outlined in
this criticism, I propose to look at securitisation as the work of framing– an inter-
subjective practice of meaning making that triggers a particular security-oriented
mind-set and shapes the perception of both the nature of the problem and actions
undertaken to deal with it (Huysmans, 2006, p.24). The inclusion of framing opens
securitisation to a more processual and iterative aspects of linguistic and non-
linguistic construction of security, allowing one to look at this process as inherently
diverse and proliferated with a various and often conicting security-centred inter-
pretations of the problem.
Studies on frames and framing constitute a conceptually rich though incoherent
body scholarship (de Vreese, 2012; Entman, 1993). Framing research falls under
the interpretative paradigm, focusing the attention on diversity, creativity and con-
ict within the human process of interpreting and dealing with problematic, socially
relevant, and new situations (Neufeld, 1993). It is concerned with different compet-
ing views and interpretations of the problem and investigate how they interact and
contribute to the process of collective “making meaning together” (Bacchi, 2015,
p.5). In this regard, Entman (1993, p.52) proposes dening framing as a process of
“selecting of some aspects of a perceived reality and making them more salient in a
communicating text, in such a way as to promote a particular problem denition,
3 Securitisation astheWork ofFraming
35
causal interpretation, moral evaluation, and/or treatment recommendation”. He fur-
ther describes framing as a practice of problematising and constructing social real-
ity by “culling a few elements of perceived reality and assembling a narrative that
highlights connections among them to promote a particular interpretation” (Entman,
2007, p.167). In this vein, framing is often described as a mixture of interactive,
inter-subjective and contextually embedded processes through which interpretative
schemata, or in other words frames, are constructed and communicated to relevant
audiences in order introduce a “way of thinking and acting” about a specic prob-
lem or an issue (van Hulst & Yanow, 2016, p.93). The framing approach has been
commonly applied in research on the problematisation and contestation of socially
signicant events and occurrences, where relevant actors engage in negotiations and
sometimes struggle over dominant interpretations, meanings and solutions (Chesters
& Welsh, 2004; Daviter, 2007; Eising etal., 2015). In this way, framing research has
inspired numerous academic inquiries into processes and modes of collective sense-
and meaning-making, contributing predominantly, but not exclusively, to media and
communication studies (Brüggemann, 2014; D’Angelo, 2002; Jorg Matthes &
Kohring, 2008), social movement research (Benford & Snow, 2000; Resnick, 2009;
Snow, 2007) and last but not least policy studies (Boräng & Naurin, 2015; Rhinard,
2010; Schön & Rein, 1994; van Hulst & Yanow, 2016). As this book aims to discuss
securitisation occurring in policymaking contexts, I will use policy framing as the
main point of reference for further theoretical discussion.
Policy framing scholarship builds on the assumption that one of the core respon-
sibilities of a policymaker is to interpret uncertain situations and remove or mitigate
parts of this uncertainty, by grounding the problem in a familiar context and propos-
ing suitable solutions (Rhinard, 2010, p.15). As indicated by Laws and Hajer (2006,
p.252), policy actors should seek “stability and act in a social world that is a kalei-
doscope of potential realities”. By engaging policy-relevant problems, they struc-
ture this reality and dene what is the essence of the problem, “what is at stake?”
and “what should be done about it?” (Daviter, 2007, p.656). Rein andSchön (1977)
conceptualise this practice as the essence of framing, that is a process where policy
actors produce structures of belief, perception and appreciation. Consequently, pol-
icy framing can be seen in broad terms as a “process in and through which policy-
relevant actors inter-subjectively construct the meanings of the policy-relevant
situations with which they are involved, whether directly or as onlookers and stake-
holders” (van Hulst & Yanow, 2016, p.97). In this process, they translate worries
into solvable problems by highlighting specic features of the situation, ignoring or
selecting out other features, and binding the highlighted features together into a
coherent and comprehensible pattern (Aukes etal., 2018).
One of the strengths of the framing approach lies in a variety of mutually inclu-
sive, yet distinctive productive and iterative practices that assign meanings and con-
struct interpretations: sense-making, selecting, and storytelling. From the
sense-making perspective, policy framing is an iterative activity which allows actors
to translate an ongoing complexity into a “situation that is comprehended explicitly
in words and that serves as a springboard into action” (Weick etal., 2005, p.409).
It enables actors to make sense of the situation they are confronted with and imagine
3.2 Securitisation Beyond Speech Act
36
possible scenarios in the light of prior notions concerning the ways of dealing with
similar issues (van Hulst & Yanow, 2016, p.98). In this aspect, sense-making has an
important action component, as it organises prior knowledge and experiences and
guides future response (Rein & Schön, 1977). It locks policy actors into a very spe-
cic temporal dimension, where the past and the future interlock in social construc-
tion of reality. On the one hand, policy actors reect upon the situation considering
a model of the world, prior knowledge and previously evoked frames of reference,
on the other, they look into the future while imagining and planning collective
actions (Bacchi, 2004; Rich & Oh, 2000). Rein and Schön (1996, p.124) call this
process a “normative leap from what “is” to what “ought to be”.
The process of selecting is commonly reected in practices of naming and cate-
gorising. Naming essentially gives a “face” to a selected feature of the situation. It
is understood as a practice that focuses audience’s initial attention on specic fea-
tures using for example a metaphor (e.g. “refugee tsunami”) in order to strengthen
a specic interpretation, make it more digestible, communicable, and/or captivating
(Collyer & De Haas, 2012; Crawley & Skleparis, 2018; Stone, 1989). In this respect,
categorising is a form of naming, but more explicit focused on specic taxonomy
(Rogan, 2006). Categorising often offers a differentiation (e.g. “Eastern”, as not
Western “legal”, as not illegal) and often grounds possible future courses of action
(van Hulst & Yanow, 2016, p. 99). For example, describing migrants as “illegal”
consequently criminalises (and even dehumanises) them, suggesting that, as in the
case of other criminals, they are threatening and should be prosecuted for breaking
the law and consequently removed from the host society (Aradau, 2004; Schuster,
2011). There are cases when naming and categorising alone can have a powerful
impact on problem denition, increasing a sense of urgency and preparing grounds
for the mobilisation of specic policies (e.g. “war on drugs”); however, more often
than not, framing also requires an element that gives a sense of continuity and con-
nection between selections, names and schemes – a story or a narrative (Prior
etal., 2012).
Storytelling internally binds different elements of framing together, provides a
“plot” and stabilises the framing process binding together various features of the
situation, making it coherent and comprehensible (Rein & Schön, 1996, p.44). In
Rein and Schön’s policy-oriented approach, frame-narratives have a framing effect,
yielding particular problem denitions and guiding action. They “frame subjects as
they narrate them, explicitly naming their features, selecting and perhaps categoris-
ing them as well, explaining to an audience what has been going on, what is going
on, and, often, what needs to be done” (van Hulst & Yanow, 2016, p.107). In this
respect, framing should communicate a credible and coherent story, which makes
sense as a whole. It should set the stage for the audience, explain the situation in
which actors nd themselves, explain its origins and root causes, assign blame and
responsibility, and nally provide remedial actions and lead to a desirable “happy
end” (Boin etal., 2009). Framing through storytelling has an ongoing and dynamic
character. It is sensitive to change, adaptable to unfolding events and challenges
whenever they arise (Laws & Hajer, 2006, p. 261). As argued by Weick (1995,
p. 61), a good story has to be accurate and plausible, it has to hold disparate
3 Securitisation astheWork ofFraming
37
elements together long enough to energise the audience and inform action. In this
respect, it is present throughout the whole policy cycle and created not only during
policy design but also in the processes of policy implementation and evaluation.
That is why framing actors and policy storytellers are not only those who “speak
policy” from the position of decision makers, but also practitioners and street level
bureaucrats who serve as boots on the ground, dealing with cases and providing
feedback on the applicability of specic solutions (van Hulst & Yanow, 2016,
p.101).
Policy framing offers a fruitful contribution to securitisation studies, allowing it
to move beyond the speech act-based approach and further grounding securitisation
in a more dynamic and processual reading. By substituting speech acts with fram-
ing, securitisation assumes a more nuanced character, where security-driven inter-
pretations of a given problem, event or dynamic shape collective perceptions,
attitudes and inform collective actions. In this regard, securitisation is a matter of a
specic security interpretation produced, communicated and contested in a given
context. Framing distances the original understanding of securitisation from its
decisionist and act-driven nature and focuses on repeated articulations, which create
distinctive, often linguistic patterns of security meanings which are then applied to
make sense of societally relevant issues (Keren, 2010). In the framing approach, it
is the iteration, not a powerful directive, that makes security interpretations salient,
increasing their chances to be recognised and embraced by audience as an accept-
able and applicable way of “thinking and doing” (Jörg Matthes, 2012).
Securitisation as the work of framing is not limited to authoritative speech but
reected in a variety of interrelated practices such as sense making, categorising and
storytelling, which together weave a web of security meanings around an issue,
pulling it into the realm of security discourses and eventually practices. In this
regard, repeated articulations, names and categories of security result in the devel-
opment of strong associations with a specic issue, inuencing collective judgment
of the situation and mobilising support for security action (Chen etal., 1999, p.48).
One of the strengths of framing is the acknowledgment of the messiness of social
construction. It is reected in the dynamic nature of security-driven framings, which
may change through time depending on the evolving nature of a situation that is
being framed as well as interests and attitudes framing actors and audiences.
In framing-centred reading, securitisation should be treated as a continuous and
intersubjective process, which is driven by contestation and dialogical relationship
between relevant actors and audiences. Negotiations and struggle over meanings are
inherent to framing. Van Hulst and Yanow (2016, p.99) observe that especially in
policy-oriented framing
various relevant actors bring different and conicting experiences, expectations, desires,
and fears to policy situations or develop these in them, struggles over the interpretation(s)
and meaning(s) of these narrated stories can be expected, and negotiations over their
meaning(s) may take place.
This competition between produced frames naturally organises actors and audi-
ences, gathering them around shared stories and turning them into opponents or
3.2 Securitisation Beyond Speech Act
38
collaborators (Vandenbussche etal., 2017). In this struggle between different fram-
ings, meanings are produced, reproduced and even transformed, opening the pro-
cess to more engaged and inter-subjective construction of a societally relevant issue.
3.3 Securitisation Beyond Exceptionalism
The Copenhagen School applies the notion of exceptionalism in order to clearly
dene the boundaries of security and avoid falling into the “everything is security”
trap. Consequently, it equates successful securitisation with the state of exception,
which breaks from normal politics, and builds on the idea of security driven by
survival and mobilisation of extraordinary measures. As argued by Doty (1998,
pp.79–80), this “exceptionalisation” of security puts the securitisation framework
in a “straight jacket”, eliminating the possibility of analysing other relevant articula-
tions of security that exist below the threshold of exception. This limitation has been
often criticised in more contemporary securitisation literature, indicating the need
for a more inclusive conceptualisation of security (Corry, 2012; Hammerstad &
Boas, 2014; Lupovici, 2014).
One of the main benets of framing centred reading of securitisation theory is
that it opens the framework to a more political and dynamic understanding of secu-
rity, looking into its different shapes and shades that manifest through collective
processes of meaning making. It diverts the focus of securitisation from the excep-
tional state of “no discussion” and extraordinary measures to the idea of multiple
security interpretations that are negotiated and contested by relevant actors
(Bourbeau, 2013; van Munster, 2009). Through collective sense making, naming
and storytelling, actors mobilise and promote their specic ways of thinking and
responding to a problem, imbuing it with their own understanding of what security
is and what security does. As pointed out by Huysmans (2014), security is essen-
tially contested and enacted within this political realm. A more political understand-
ing of “security” is dynamic, “constantly written and rewritten, challenged, and
therefore inherently unstable” (Pram Gad & Lund Petersen, 2011, p. 318). As
Campbell (1992, p.2) suggests in his post-Cold War analysis of the United States’
foreign policy, conceptions of danger and security are not xed and ascribed to one
single interpretation, but culturally and contextually dened. As he aptly points out,
“events or factors which we identify as dangerous therefore come to be ascribed as
such only through an interpretation of their various contexts and dimensions of
dangerousness”. In the same spirit, Fierke (1997) notes that the meaning of security
is uid and susceptible to dynamic language used by actors to describe relationships
between enemies and friends, perceived threats and referent objects.
Securitisation scholarship has been gradually incorporating the idea of opening
the framework to alternative interpretations of security that operate below the
threshold of exceptionalism (Bigo, 2000; Bourbeau, 2013; Gray & Franck, 2019).
For instance, Corry (2012) proposes distancing the theory from the realist vocabu-
lary and look at “riskication”, as a concept more attuned to contemporary
3 Securitisation astheWork ofFraming
39
articulations of security. He proposes a risk-centred conceptualisation of securitisa-
tion as driven by management of uncertainty and mobilisation of precautionary
measures (Corry, 2012, p.248). As he points out,
rather than engendering a politics of exception, emergency time-frames and violent and
secretive means as a securitisation does, ‘riskication’ leads to long-termism, the defusing
of friend-enemy relations as the construction of external existential threats is replaced by
focus on internal vulnerabilities, resilience and a focus on conditions of possibility for
harm, rather than direct causes of harm (Corry, 2013, p.5).
In a similar fashion, numerous securitisation scholars have been incorporating alter-
native notions of security into the framework, investigating human security (Watson,
2011) or resilience (Bourbeau, 2013), as some of the logics that shape specic
modes and consequences of the securitisation process.
Different notions of security in securitisation research do not have to be treated
in isolation. As Rothe (2016, pp.56–57) argues, different logics of security such as
routine and exception are essentially two sides of the same governmental coin and
may co-exist in the same securitisation process. Sharing this assumption, with the
help of the policy framing approach, I propose to dig deeper into these different
notions, modalities, vocabularies and practicies of security and explore how they
become “tangled” in the process of securitisation. Here, the element of “tangle-
ment” is reected in how different logics of security such as exception, risk, resil-
ience or human security, collide and intertwine at various stages and in different
dimensions of the framing process. This will allow one to look at securitisation
beyond a singular interpretation of security meanings that guide collective action,
investigating its internal complexity and dynamics.
In order to avoid the problem of “making everything security”, I propose to
employ Watson’s (2012, p.291) view on securitisation as not xed in the state of
exceptionality or even risk, but embedded within a broader institutionalised constel-
lation of meanings, here understood as the “security master frame”. The concept of
a master frame can essentially be viewed as a broad historical and/or institutional
system of meanings (Gahan & Pekarek, 2013). It is a generic frame or repertoire of
interpretations wide enough to integrate other issue-specic frames, which address
a given problem (Mooney & Hunt, 1996, p.178). Benford and Snow (2000, p.619)
dene amaster frame as generic and very “broad in interpretive scope, inclusivity,
exibility and cultural resonance”. A master frame is an overarching idea, such as
justice, which can be translated and deployed across different contexts and issues
(Benford, 2013). In this respect, the term justice can be applied in different discus-
sion on social justice or legal justice, meaning different things to different people,
while staying within commonly recognised boundaries and meanings of what jus-
tice means. Even though a master frame is inherently inclusive and adaptable to new
circumstances, and therefore not static, it is also stable and not easily manipulated
(Carroll & Ratner, 2008). As pointed out by Huysmans (2006, p.25) in his discus-
sion on security meanings, even though different framings of the problem might
invoke different conceptions of security, they still operate within a stable “constel-
lation of security meanings, which draws upon historically constituted and socially
3.3 Securitisation Beyond Exceptionalism
40
institutionalised set of interpretations”. As he later observers, like grammar of a
language, security meanings evolve over time but cannot be changed arbitrarily
(Huysmans, 2014, p.31). Taking this into account, I contend that looking at security
as a stable and inclusive master frame allows retaining continuity in how securitisa-
tion process renders security meanings, but at the same opens up to various security
logics and problem denitions resulting from different interpretive communities,
experiences and perceptions.
3.3.1 Security Logics
In order to operationalise specic meanings that operate within the security master
frame, I propose to use the term security logic. “Security logic” has become rela-
tively popular among securitisation scholars, being extensively used in several
works on securitisation practice and theory (Balzacq, 2015; Bourbeau, 2014;
Esposito et al., 2020; Niemann & Schmidthäussler, 2014). In security literature,
there have been very few but notable attempts to conceptualise what security logic
entails (Balzacq, 2015; Huysmans, 1998, 2006). In general terms, security logic is
viewed as discursively embedded ensemble of rules that is immanent to security
practice, dening that practice in its specicity (Huysmans, 2006, p.28). Balzacq
(2015a, p.1) proposes looking at security logic as the essence of a security notion,
reduced to the rules of grammar applied to make sense of security objects, risks and
vulnerabilities and dene suitable course of security action. As he argues, different
theories of security disagree over their understanding of security logic (Balzacq,
2015a, p.2). For instance,
a realist rendition of the logic of security would hold that military rules inform the charac-
teristic grammar of security practices and the concept of “existential threats” provides the
background condition, which enables the different components of security practices to
operate in a distinctive way” (Balzacq, 2015a, p.2).
In this book, I use the term “security logic” to describe a pronunciation of secu-
rity, connected with distinctive forms of security grammar and practice. It should be
noted that te logics presented are described as ideal types and in reality, they are
much more complicated and often mixed with other iterations of security. In my
discussion, I follow and build on the works of van Munster (2009) and Niemann and
Schmidthäussler (2014) who use “security logics” to identify specic rationale
employed by policy actors in constructing and applying security oriented problem-
atisation within the EU policy realm. Van Munster (2009, p.10) argues that the way
actors represent threats and other security problems, dene security measures, and
identify their nal security objectives is indicative of specic security logics. This is
later expanded by Niemann and Schmidthäussler (2014, p.15), who point out that
security logics reect not only how actors describe threats but also referent objects
and other types of vulnerabilities that require protection by security providers.
Consequently, both discussions propose a conceptual framework for debating
3 Securitisation astheWork ofFraming
41
“security logics” as reected in representation of security problems, referent objects
and vulnerabilities, security measures (including their nature and duration), and the
nal security objective. In the subsequent part of this sub-chapter, I briey overview
and operationalise four logics– “exceptionalist” security logic, risk management,
resilience, and human security, which serve as a point of reference for the analysis
presented later in this book (see Table3.1).
“Exceptionalist” Security Logic
Critical security scholarship has been using the realist concept of security as a
stepping- stone for developing new and alternative conceptions and frameworks of
security. Nonetheless the realist-traditional security logic has prevailed in contem-
porary security thinking and even, to some extent, new schools of security (i.e.
Copenhagen School of Security) (Buzan etal., 1998; Wæver, 1995). Van Munster
(2005, p.2) observes that the traditional-realist logic of security is often linked to
the notion of exceptionality, reected in existential character of threats and mobili-
sation of extraordinary security measures. As he points out, the realist, or in other
words “exceptionalist” security logic, is a “binary, zero-sum game of identity-
formation that establishes an intense and particularly forceful relationship between
the opposing groups” (van Munster, 2009, p.8). Here, threats have often a personal
character and are described in terms of concrete, tangible, conceivable enemies, for
example “foreign countries”, “the Nazis”, “the immigrants”. They are unambigu-
ous, often dened as elements of external origin and alien nature that endanger the
survival and secure status quo of referent objects (van Munster, 2005, p. 3).
Consequently, the referent objects are also clearly and unambiguously dened.
They are construed as passive and vulnerable objects of security, often having state-
like features described in terms of community or communitarian values or struc-
tures necessary to sustain their survival (Corry, 2012, p. 239). As indicated by
Niemann and Schmidthäussler (2014, p.15), this particular logic is most commonly
invoked in relation to state security, framing referent objects in terms of protection
of borders, territorial coherence of the community, its sovereignty, its nancial and
political stability, or continuity of government.
Brzeziński (2009, p.23) points out that framing security problems in terms of
existential threats also produces a rigid and reactive way of thinking about chal-
lenges to security. In this approach, policies are rather reactive and are oriented
toward dealing with a threat upon its full manifestation or materialisation
(Rasmussen, 2001, p. 293). This marginalises the element of long-term security
planning, focusing predominantly on well-recognised and established aspects of
security reected in its military and political dimension. Security measures
employed under the “exceptionalist” logic have an extraordinary, often militaristic,
character and require mobilisation of procedures well beyond so-called normal poli-
tics (C.A.S.E., 2006, p.463). This again refers to the notion of exceptionality that
implies breaking from everyday practices and rules of existence and introduction of
a state of emergency and mobilisation of sufcient power and resources to
3.3 Securitisation Beyond Exceptionalism
42
Table 3.1 Security logics
Logic/indicator
“Exceptionalist”
security
Risk
Human securityManagement Resilience
Representation
of security
problems
Unambiguous
Personal dimension
External origin
Alien nature
Construed in terms
of existential and
“brutal threats”
Risk based on a friend/enemy
continuum
Impersonal correlation of factors
liable to produce uncertainty
Varying degree of concreteness and
gravity
Ambiguous origin (emphasis on
internal)
Interconnected
Varying degree
of concreteness
and severity
In narrow terms
construed as
critical, physical
and structural
violence against
human beings
In broader terms
refers to social,
psychological,
economic aspects
of human
vulnerabilities
Broad spectrum
of interlinked
issues and
security sectors
Correlation of
factors liable to
produce extreme
insecurity
Pervasive,
recurrent, direct
and indirect
nature
Internal, external
origin
Construed in
terms of
manageable risks
Uncertain
materialisation
of negative
consequences
Construed in
terms of shocks
and disturbances
Certain
materialisation,–
inevitable nature
Referent object State-related,
unambiguous
Passive nature,
managed by other
actors
Often construed in
relation to
territoriality and
sovereignty of
referent objects
Different degrees of concreteness;
Networked and interdependent
Individuals and
their
communities
Human life,
rights, freedoms
and dignity
Passive nature
Passive nature,
managed by
other actors (e.g.,
security
agencies)
Construed as
active
contributors to
security
Devolved
(continued)
3 Securitisation astheWork ofFraming
43
counteract existential threats (van Munster, 2009). In this rationale, security policies
and measures are reactive and initiated only in response to the persisting and exis-
tential threats (Niemann & Schmidthäussler, 2014, pp. 25–26). The security
responses are characterised with extreme intensity in terms of scope and resources,
but are also temporary and designed to reinstate the status quo from before the
emergence of the existential threat. Balzacq (2015a, p.2) points out, that this type
Table 3.1 (continued)
Logic/indicator
“Exceptionalist”
security
Risk
Human securityManagement Resilience
Security
measure
(nature,
temporality)
Exceptional,
militaristic
Reactive nature
Short-term
Bypass normal
political
procedures
Mobilise
signicant amounts
of force and
resources
Normal, institutionalised forms of
governance based on broad
cooperation within the security
realm
Conventional, long term security
actions
Orientation to the future
Orientation to the internal dimension
Broadly
understood as
protection of
human rights, life
and dignity
Humanitarian
intervention
oriented to
saving threatened
lives
Kinetic and
non-kinetic
interventions
directed at
mitigation of
threats
Interventions
may (but do not
have to) assume
extraordinary
character, often
of temporary
nature
Measures of have
external
orientation
(deployed
outside borders
of security
providers)
Preventive
measures,
Practices of
control and
surveillance
Management of
risks
Decentralised and
devolved
measures,
Maintenance,
adaptation and
transformation of
the system
Objective Eradication of
existential threats
in order secure the
collective survival
of a socio- political
order
Status quo
orientation
Equilibrium and
continuation of
normal activities
within
acceptable risks
Risk avoidance,
mitigation of
negative
consequences
Building up
ability to
withstand shocks
and disturbances
Elimination of
extreme
vulnerabilities
within the system
Survival and
wellbeing of
humans
Elevation of
human suffering
Own elaboration based on Alkire (2003), Bourbeau (2015), Chandler (2014), Lund Petersen
(2012), van Munster (2009), and Niemann and Schmidthäussler (2014)
3.3 Securitisation Beyond Exceptionalism
44
of thinking sets security actors on the path that entails the orientation of security
policies on elimination or eradication of threatening objects, securing the collective
survival of a socio-political order.
Risk (Management andResilience)
The concept of risk has deeply saturated contemporary security thinking, becoming,
in its various forms, the guiding principle of security politics on the national and
international level (C.A.S.E., 2006). The literature indicates two dominant perspec-
tives on risk as based on management and resilience (Balzacq, 2015). These two
notions are built on similar foundations emphasising the complexity, uncertainty
and continuum of the contemporary security realm. Both risk management and
resilience follow the idea of security as future oriented dynamics, entailing security
actions that are supposed to manage, mitigate, avert and/or resist the upcoming
shocks and disturbances to the socio-political system (Dijkstra etal., 2018). In this
book, I treat these two perspectives as derivative of broadly understood risk logic,
while maintaining their own identities within this specic way of security thinking.
That is why I incorporate the managerial and resilience perspectives under the
“umbrella term of risk”, at the same time accounting for their corresponding and
differing features.
Framing of security problems is rather ambiguous in risk logic. Firstly, in con-
trast to “exceptionalist” logic, the term “threat” is considered unt to describe the
complex, multifaceted security problems (Renn, 2008, p.290). Instead, it is substi-
tuted with “risk”, as the phrase more suitable to reect future dangers, uncertainties
and potentially threatening events, dynamics and occurrences. In this vein, risk
logic builds on a “friend/enemy continuum” rather than strict “friend/enemy dif-
ferentiation”, primarily focusing on a correlation between factors liable to produce
uncertainty and levels of security (van Munster, 2005, p.4). Here, the rationale of
risk imbues “potential threats” with an impersonal character and centres on the spe-
cic interconnected features of selected phenomena, describing them as potentially
dangerous with varying degrees of concreteness and gravity (Adams, 2000,
pp.199–200). In this logic, the representation of potential risks is focused on the
internal and/or external dimension of security, often described as a consequence of
unfortunate political decisions or omissions that can be made up for, if suitable
future-oriented thinking is applied (Niemann & Schmidthäussler, 2014, p.15).
In the managerial perspective, this translates into a specic framing of risks, as
mostly internal to the system, manageable and falling under the purview of neolib-
eral practices of control and surveillance (Luhmann, 1996, pp.5–6). Niemann and
Schmidthäussler (2014, p. 16) point out that in risk management, “problems are
dened and addressed according to their anticipated future consequences, regard-
less of whether they will ever materialise”. In this sense, the management of risks is
essentially management of the future, which may or may not bring tragic events.
Resilience, even though it uses the same grammar of risk, more often refers to the
future threatening events as shocks and disturbances (Zebrowski, 2013). Here, the
3 Securitisation astheWork ofFraming
45
key element is the inevitability of the upcoming events and departure from the belief
that future can be managed and threatening situations can be fully averted (Dunn
Cavelty etal., 2015). Consequently, the resilience rationale frames the future as
uncertain, but lled with potential shocks and disturbances that will eventually
materialise, though the timing, scope and magnitude of their negative consequences
is uncertain (Corry, 2014, pp.256–257).
Referent objects in risk logics are construed mostly as ambiguous, networked
and interdependent. Risk logic takes into account a variety of possible scenarios that
reect how different components and aspects of security within a given system are
connected and even interdependent. For instance, a possible terrorist attack may
affect the physical security of human beings, as well as industry, stability of cur-
rency and continuity of government (Kessler & Daase, 2008). That is why the risk
rationale rarely narrows its focus to one specic type of objects that should be taken
into account, instead relaying on generalisations and different degrees of concrete-
ness. In regard to specic approach to referent objects, the managerial approach to
risk construes them in terms of passive entities (e.g. population of a state) that need
to be controlled and surveilled for their own good (Krahmann, 2011). As observed
by van Munster (2009, pp.10–15), this type of logic expands its managerial compe-
tencies over referent objects, steering them into more risk aversive situations, creat-
ing order through technologies of security and risk interventions. In contrast,
resilience proposes a different perspective on referent objects, describing them as
more active agents, who should also contribute to security by investing in prepared-
ness and increasing their own robustness and ability to cope with difcult situations
(Diprose et al., 2008). In the resilience-centred logic, referent objects cannot be
fully protected from unwanted occurrences. Resilient referent objects are those,
which can remain stable and maintain their base functionality, to a degree that
allows them to withstand shocks and bounce back to their original state (Bourbeau,
2013). In this regard, resilient referent objects are often framed as decentralised and
even less reliant on external interventions (e.g. from the state).
Security measures employed within the logic of risk focus on normal, institution-
alised forms of governance based on broad cooperation within a security realm.
This entails the exchange of data and utilisation of informational technologies,
which allow informed and future oriented security action (Ceyhan, 2008; Rusu,
2001). Within risk logic, expert communities, security agencies, analytical tools and
knowledge practices receive special attention as instruments that allow glimpsing
into the uncertain future and calculating at least some of its risks (de Goede, 2008;
Renn, 2012). Consequently, the logic revolves around long term strategies and con-
ventionalised security actions and practices focused on monitoring changes within
the security realm, attempting to adjust to its dynamics and abrupt shifts (van
Munster, 2005, p.8).
In this vein, the managerial approach looks at risks as something that can be
managed by employing preventive and precautionary measures, and in a long run
averting future catastrophe. This perspective promotes the idea that with sufcient
data and instruments of control it is possible to change the odds, intervene and
eliminate risky situations. Here, the nal objective is to maintain the socio-political
3.3 Securitisation Beyond Exceptionalism
46
equilibrium and continuation of normal activities within acceptable risks (Krahmann,
2011). A different approach is presented by resilience-centred logic, which does not
focus predominantly on governmental forms of management and control, but on
devolved security practices that decrease extreme vulnerabilities of the system and
build up the robustness of a protected system and its ability to withstand shocks
(Coaffee & Fussey, 2015, p.87). In this regard, the literature indicates three basic
forms of resilience: maintenance of the status quo; marginal adaptation to shocks
and disturbances; and renewal based on transformation of the system in response to
a catastrophe (Bourbeau, 2013, p. 10). All these elements account for the main
objective of the logic, which is building up the system’s ability to withstand shocks
and disturbances, so that it can continue its existence in the face of an uncertain
future and inevitable dangers.
Human Security
The logic of human security has been commonly introduced with the United Nations
Development Programme Report in 1994, which promoted the idea of human
beings as the ultimate referent object (Hampson, 2008; Kaldor etal., 2007; Paris,
2001). Human security logic puts individuals and their communities at the centre of
security. It focuses predominantly on the survival and wellbeing of humans, empha-
sising such issues as respect for human rights, freedoms and human dignity, to name
a few (Burgess & Tadjbakhsh, 2010, p.450). In this regard, the representation of
security problems is often broad and interlinked throughout multiple sectors of
human life and activity (Alkire, 2003, p. 3). In its narrower conceptualisation,
human security is described predominantly as “freedom from fear”, threats and
direct violence. This interpretation proposes focusing on protection of human life
from critical physical and structural violence that passes the threshold of severity
(Hampson, 2008, p. 239). In this respect, according to Paris (2001, p. 89) human
security can be narrowed down to two fundamental elements: rst, human “safety
from such chronic threats as hunger, disease and repression”; and second, “protec-
tion of humans from sudden and hurtful disruptions in the patterns of daily life–
whether in homes, in jobs or in communities”. In most cases, the narrow interpretation
of human security is deployed in the situation where this type of violence has
already reduced the security of individuals making them ee their native communi-
ties (including states) and seek protection “outside” (den Boer & de Wilde, 2008,
p.129).
The broader understanding expands the denition and includes the so-called
“freedom from want”, describing human security as a “condition of existence in
which basic material needs are met and in which human dignity, including meaning-
ful participation in the life of the community, can be realised” (Thomas & Wilkin,
1999, p.3). In this vein, Alkire (2002, p.182) suggests that the concept “should
include the social, psychological, economic aspects of human vulnerabilities,
including all critical and pervasive threats to the vital core and long-term ourish-
ing”. The broader conceptualisation builds on a more nuanced understanding of
3 Securitisation astheWork ofFraming
47
well-being, often focusing on the quality of life, structural limitations and contexts
that foster systemic patterns of discrimination and vulnerability (Gasper & Sinnati,
2016, p.15). It should be noted that human security in its broader and narrow con-
ceptualisations connects to the notion of protection of human rights and human
dignity, which provide a conceptual and normative foundation for human security
by rmly rooting it in international law (Benedek, 2008). Failures to ensure full-
ment of international human rights obligations, be it in the domain of humanitarian
law or economic, cultural and social rights, can directly lead to rapid deterioration
of human security. According to Benedek (2008, p.13), “the best way to achieve
human security is through the full and holistic realisation of all human rights” and
protection of those who are dened as vulnerable and in need.
Regardless the exact denition, the human referent object is conceptualised as
passive, in a vulnerable position and requiring assistance from other actors that hold
resources and power to provide protection and security (den Boer & de Wilde, 2008,
p.137).
Human security measures are focused on broadly understood humanitarian pro-
tection and, in extraordinary situations, intervention. They revolve around either
direct or indirect instruments that are supposed to reduce threats, constraints or even
disturbances to human life. Here, the human security approach centres predomi-
nantly on governmental tools for protection of those who are unable to protect
themselves or seek shelter from physical, political and structural violence (Axworthy,
1997, p.9). This naturally links this notion to external, often humanitarian, interven-
tions as well as asylum and refugee policies, laws, practices and discourses that
construct and enact the common understanding of protection of human beings
(Huysmans, 2006, pp. 35–38). Consequently, human security measures often rely
on the “coalition of good states” and security actors that are willing to take respon-
sibility for temporary humanitarian action, restore human security and protect indi-
viduals and communities that are under severe threats (Kerr, 2013, pp.107–108). In
practice, human security-oriented security measures may substantially vary in terms
of form and intensity. On one hand, they can be aligned with more mundane forms
of care and protection reected in e.g. fullment of international obligations in
regard to refugees, provision of care to victims of violence, or transfer of develop-
ment aid; on the other hand, they can link to deployment of peacekeeping opera-
tions. This latter element is commonly associated with the invocation of extraordinary
security language coupled with militarised measures deployed to address the most
severe instances of violence and violations of human security.
Indeed, humanitarian interventions open human security to close intertwinement
with exceptional logic, but it does not have to be automatic or straightforward.
Human security logic still has a distinctive identity, which focuses on many forms
of protection and care, centred on preservation of human lives, rights and dignity. In
this way it departs from state-like features of “exceptionalist” security, concentrated
on territoriality, sovereignty and default mobilisation of extreme security measures.
Finally, following Gasper’s and Sinnati’s (2016, p. 25) argumentation, while the
language of emergency and exceptionality aims to “end the discussion”, human
security does quite opposite. It often turns the attention on vulnerable groups and
3.3 Securitisation Beyond Exceptionalism
48
continues democratic contestation of the situation in which human security is being
violated. That is why the analysis of human security logic has to be tuned into a
possible merger with other types of security and sensitive to nuances of mobilisa-
tion of this specic logic.
3.4 Securitisation Beyond theActor-Audience Dichotomy
According to the Copenhagen School, securitisation is an inter-subjective process
driven by an interplay between powerful actors (who produce securitising moves)
and empowering audiences (who accept or reject these moves) (Buzan etal., 1998,
p.32). This relationship between actors and audiences is supposed to reect the
inherently constructivist nature of the theory (McDonald, 2008). Instead, it has
ignited substantial criticism from securitisation scholars, who point out that the pro-
posed model of actor-audience interaction is rather limiting and does not allow to
fully explore the depth of intersubjective construction of security (Balzacq, 2005;
Jarvis & Legrand, 2017; Roe, 2008). The criticism revolves around two key issues:
rstly, the role and nature of audience is seriously under-conceptualised, leaving the
theory without a clear idea of who or what may constitute an empowering agent.
Secondly, the proposed mode of interaction between actors and audiences is not
exhaustive, especially in reference to the interactions that go beyond mere produc-
tion, acceptance and non-acceptance of securitising moves. Building on framing
literature, this section offers a conceptualisation of a more active and engaged audi-
ence, which under certain conditions (e.g. within the context of policymaking) and
with enough agency may break from the traditional actor-audience dichotomy.
Here, the interaction is not framed around authoritative actors and audiences, but
rather revolves around parties involved in the securitisation process as locked in a
dialogical relationship driven by contestation.
As in securitisation, framing also envisages actors and audiences interacting in
the collective construction of meanings. Here, “entrepreneurs” or “sponsors” offer
generative frames and stories, which are supposed to appeal to and convince the
targeted audience to acknowledge and internalise the proposed interpretation of an
issue (van Gorp, 2007, pp.123–138). Nonetheless, in the framing theory, the rich-
ness of reactions of an audience may quickly blur the dichotomy and create more of
a “deliberative space of enactment of meaning”, rather than a one-way actor-
audience relationship (Keren, 2010, p.276). The function of an audience is often
explained as an active processor that decodes meaning, an agent who, through com-
plex and varying interactions with framing actors, shapes and authorises the domi-
nant interpretation of an issue (e.g. a threat) (Aukes etal., 2018). In this perspective,
an audience not only listens and reacts, but also carries interpretations and spreads
them in a given context (Gamson & Madigliani, 1989; Scheufele, 1999; Vliegenthart,
2012). This can be observed in more recent studies on framing of the war in Iraq and
terrorism, which analyse audience-actor interaction cycles and interpretative feed-
back loops in media framings (Glazier & Boydstun, 2013). Here, the researchers
focus on how the media (re)produce security framings, readers and listeners share
3 Securitisation astheWork ofFraming
49
those framings among each other, react and comment (e.g. through social media),
participate in opinion polls, which are then contested by the politicians and the
media, etc. (Norris etal., 2003; Reese, 2007). In framing, an audience often not only
legitimises but also can actively challenge particular interpretations, forcing actors
to either abandon the attempt to impose their interpretation or reframe and re-engage
with a new narrative (Schlichting, 2013). This leads to a very important and poten-
tially fruitful notion in securitisation and framing literature, which is blurring the
dichotomy and strict division between powerful speakers and restrained listeners.
This departure from the traditional dichotomy already has been implied in secu-
ritisation scholarship, especially in regard to contexts where clear interactional rules
and differentiation between actors and audiences are not that evident (Sperling &
Webber, 2019). As observed by Côté (2016, p.550), some powerful agents associ-
ated with or assigned to the role of audience do not necessarily have to adhere to
strict contextual rules that determine the audience’s traditional role. In other words,
they may either already hold an inuence similar to actors or strive for it, and exert
greater impact over the securitisation process. This phenomenon already has been
recognised in the policy framing literature, where a strict division between actors
and audiences disappears as policy problematisation emerges (Chong & Druckman,
2007). As Rhinard (2010, p.42) points out, in policy framing, actors or institutional
agents involved in policymaking are supposed to communicate and interact more in
a form of a dialogue than a top-down directive. In his study of European
Commission’s framing practices, he describes how different Directorate Generals
interact and struggle over dominant policy framings, without committing to the spe-
cic role of framing actors or enabling audiences. Here, all involved parties are
locked in a feedback loop, where they speak, listen and problematise policy issues
as a part of the same institutional setting (Sperling & Webber, 2019, pp.244–245).
Through these interactions, they shape the content of securitisatising moves through-
out different stages of policymaking, often commiting to discoursive coalitions
comprised of different policy “actors from different subject positions brought
together by their common orientation towards a common problem perspective on a
certain political issue” (Rothe, 2016, p.62).
In order to better grasp the intersubjective nature of interactions between parties
involved in the securitisation on the EU policymaking level, I propose distancing
the framework from the traditional actor-audience dichotomy. Instead, I suggest
looking at securitisation as subjected to dynamic negotiations between and within
groups of relevant agents (e.g. EU institutions) involved in the process of policy
framing.1 Here, relevant agents are locked in a dialogical relationship, an iterative
1 The emergence of different agents (dichotomous or not) and the type of their interaction is highly
context sensitive and may assume different modes. It can be based on a dialogue and form a space
for deliberation and democratic contestation of a security problem, turn into a struggle over power
and dominance over the framing process, or be a mixture of the two. Regardless, the concept of
“securitising agent” remains a highly context-sensitive but also attractive option for an analytical
framework, in a situation where groups of agents do not necessary t strictly into the roles of an
audience or an actor.
3.4 Securitisation Beyond theActor-Audience Dichotomy
50
feedback loop, where they “talk and respond to each other” in the intersubjective
construction of security. They engage in the policymaking process, contributing to
its various stages, producing and promoting their own security-driven interpreta-
tions of a problem. Sometimes, their framing gains resonance and dominates a spe-
cic stage of policymaking, sometimes it loses its prominence and becomes
marginalised. Regardless of their impact, they co-shape the policy discourse, con-
test alternative interpretations and contribute to the intersubjective construction of
security.
3.5 Dening theProcess ofAcceptance
As McDonald (2008, p. 572) points out, even though there is much commotion
about actor-audience interaction, inter-subjectivity and performativity of securitisa-
tion process, it is still unclear when it all happens. Thus, the debate on securitisation
propells an important question: when does an issue turn into a socially constructed
security problem? The Copenhagen School has been widely criticised for mistreat-
ing the discussion on the so-called moments, processes or politics of acceptance
(Balzacq, 2005, p.179). Indeed, the criteria put forward by Buzan etal. are rather
ambiguous, suggesting that securitisation takes place when a securitising move
“gains enough resonance to a point when it is possible to legitimize emergency
measures” (Buzan etal., 1998, p.25). However, it is not clear how this resonance,
or any other sign of acceptance for that matter, can be isolated and academically
veried within an audience-actor interaction.
There have been several notable attempts to operationalise and dene “accep-
tance” in securitisation research. In relation to the policymaking domain, Williams
(2007, p.67) proposes to treat it as a moment of translation of securitising moves
into suitable policies and security actions. Similarly, for Floyd (2016, p. 679),
acceptance can be traced in a change of the policy action, which is then “justied by
the securitising actor with reference to the threat [that is] identied and declared in
the securitising move”. In this section, I propose to look at acceptance not only as
single moments marking changes in policy actions, but as a process, which is
reected in the way specic security interpretations and logics, to various degrees,
saturate relevant socio-political and socio-linguistic contexts (e.g. the EU) and
inform problem denitions, evaluations and recommendations for treatment
(Entman, 2003; Hajer, 2002b, 2006). Building on Hajer’s (1995) discourse theory
and Rothe’s (2016) discussion on “politics of acceptance”, I apply the concepts of
“structuration” and “institutionalisation” as indicators of prominence and “accep-
tance” of specic security logics operating into policy discourse and practice.
The concept of structuration helps to comprehend to what extent a security inter-
pretation or security logic is inscribed into the socio-linguistic and governmental
landscapes (Rothe, 2016, p.38). Hajer (1995, p.60) explores this approach referring
the way different policy actors use or draw upon existing and proposed interpreta-
tions of a problem (or storylines) in order to make a relevant contribution to the
3 Securitisation astheWork ofFraming
51
policymaking process. For example, if a specic type of framing (e.g. migration as
a terrorist risk) becomes increasingly and recursively present in the core policy
texts, analyses, reports, speeches, and such, it means that it has saturated the policy
discourse to a degree that it turned into a “natural” and acceptable way of describing
the phenomenon of migration. Additionally, an interpretation, in order to become
powerful and dominant, has to be acknowledged and used as a “common sense”,
without which the document or speech would be considered irrelevant or less appli-
cable in describing the challenges related to, in this case, migration. In this interpre-
tation, such a situation is an indicator of high structuration and general acceptance
of a given interpretation of a problem among involved agents (Hajer, 2002a).
The second element of “acceptance” is centred on institutionalisation of pro-
posed security interpretations into “societal and political practices, routines and
organisations and their materialisation in the form of concrete tools and policy
responses employed by governmental and other relevant institutions” (Hajer, 1995,
p.61). This approach corresponds with Bigo’s and Balzacq’s arguments that policy
instruments and tools constitute an important element in shaping the nal product
of securitisation (Balzacq, 2007; Bigo, 2002). As Balzacq (2011, p. 15) notes,
“given the thickness of security programs, in which discourses and ideologies are
increasingly hard to disentangle, and differences between securitising actors and
audiences are blurred, there is growing evidence that some manifestations of secu-
ritisation might best be understood by focusing on the nature and functions of policy
tools used by agents/agencies to cope with public problems, dened as threats”. In
this regard, if a specic policy tool (e.g. military operation) is designed, announced
and incorporated as a part of a policy response to a given problem, it is an indicator
that the corresponding security interpretation is becoming institutionalised. Using
the previously mentioned example of “migration as a terrorist risk” frame, the indi-
cator of its institutionalisation would come down to a situation when a securitising
agent recommends and executes policy tools related to on-going surveillance,
detailed security screening or preventive detention of migrants.
3.6 Including Context intheSecuritisation Process
The Copenhagen School views context as a set of “facilitating conditions” that
increase or decrease the probability for success of the process of securitisation
(Buzan et al., 1998, pp. 31–32). Buzan and his colleagues (1998, p. 32) point
towards internal linguistic rules of speech acts and external social aspects of con-
text, where the power of speech and authority of the speaker intertwine in the con-
struction of security. The more resources and linguistic skills the speaker has, the
higher the chances for the success of securitising act (Wæver, 1995, p.68). I propose
departing from looking at securitisation as facilitated by contextual conditions, but
rather treating it as situated within broader socio-political, socio-linguistic and
therefore, interpretative settings. Building on the framing literature, I argue that the
interpretative context to various degrees envelopes and informs socio-political and
3.6 Including Context intheSecuritisation Process
52
socio-linguistic settings, reecting the already existing ways of thinking about, and
consequently responding to, proposed denitions of security problems. In this
sense, securitisation should not be treated as a singled-out event but as part of an
interpretative continuum, where pre-existing security frames structure and inform
collective construction of security.
The framing literature allows one to view the context of securitisation as informed
by pre-existing security frames, which deeply impact the eld of possibility of what
can be thought, said and done about a securitised issue in a given context (Rothe,
2016, p.42). Pre-existing security frames correspond with already existing types of
securitising framings reected in e.g. historically and culturally embedded deni-
tions of enemies and threats, resentments towards specic groups, negative stereo-
types, security narratives, to name a few (Stritzel, 2007). In this respect, the
interpretative context could be treated as a type of continuum, where the content and
type of prior securitisations inform, but do not automatically dominate, subsequent
securitising processes, and so on. For example, prior securitisations of environmen-
tal protection in the EU have deeply impacted the interpretative scheme for collec-
tive problematisation of climate change, its perceived consequences and, most
importantly, policy responses (Methmann et al., 2013). In this case, securitising
actors have been naturally referring to the “old” frames of interpretation, bringing
out and often expanding on prior securitising moves and security responses that
appeared acceptable and reasonable (Schlichting, 2013, p.501). Actors may decide
to keep the interpretation of an already securitised problem, or an issue proximate
to this problem, or take it to a different level by initiating even more extreme mea-
sures. Such an escalation of securitisation is not unprecedented and can be observed
in securitisation practices employed in reference to mass protests (Carvalho Pinto,
2014), nuclear energy (Peoples, 2014), or irregular migration (Provera, 2015), to
name a few.
The interpretative context and pre-existing security frames inform the socio-
linguistic dimension of securitisation, reected in the “local rules of language” and
“the network of constitutive norms and narratives that surround a single linguistic
securitising act” (Stritzel, 2011b). This perspective expands the Copenhagen School
approach, by focusing not only on the rules of speech act, but also linguistic features
embedded in the context such as “the distinct linguistic reservoir that is available at
a particular locality and point in time” (Stritzel, 2007, p.370). Within the scope of
the socio-linguistic context, it is possible to observe how securitising actors attempt
to exploit and adapt to local linguistic rules and norms using analogies, similes and
contrasts in order to increase their chances for successful securitisation (Stritzel,
2007, pp.368–372).
As the pre-existing security frames reect patterned ways of responding to secu-
rity threats, they also inuence the socio-political dimension of securitisation pro-
cess, including the institutional setup governing security policies.2 Stritzel (2007,
2 For instance, if the interpretative context is heavily saturated with risk-centred framings, empha-
sising the importance of data gathering, surveillance and intelligence, this will translate into a
strengthened position of actors capable of delivering these services.
3 Securitisation astheWork ofFraming
53
p.370) denes the socio-political context as “sedimented social and political struc-
tures that may put actors in positions of power to inuence the process of construct-
ing meaning”. That is why the features of socio-political context often indicate
“who can speak” and “to whom” (Salter, 2008, p.329). They reect the power
structure, positioning and modes of interaction between the involved parties (Côté,
2016; Roe, 2008). Salter (2008, p.329) recognises this marriage of the interpreta-
tive and socio-political dimensions in securitisation research, arguing that every
setting can be characterised by a “different set of grand narratives by which truth is
authorised, the characters who are empowered to speak, and the relationships
between characters and audience”. Thus, it can be expected that different loci of
securitisation will be composed of different types of actors, audiences, and linguis-
tic rules, all of which impact the securitising narrative and success of the process
differently.
The framing and securitisation literature supplement the discussion on the role of
context with incorporation of so called “distal events” that originate outside the
socio-linguistic and socio-political settings of securitisation3 (Eder et al., 1995;
Glazier & Boydstun, 2013). As pointed out by Watson, problematisation of socially
relevant issues cannot be treated independently from external developments
(Watson, 2012, p.287). Framing and securitisation are not a self-contained process,
which can be exclusively associated with powers of speech and text or an interpreta-
tive repertoire embedded in local culture and politics (Balzacq, 2005, p. 193).
Collective problematisation is most commonly inuenced by complex events and
developments of internal (e.g. domestic) and external (e.g. foreign) origin, which
carry reinforcing or aversive consequences on the specic interpretations of socially
relevant issues. For example, terrorist activity in Syria and North Africa can be a
powerful external factor, facilitating and inuencing he securitisation of refugees
and migrants in the EU Member States, or bushres in Australia might contribute to
securitisation of climate change in the US (Diez etal., 2016; Léonard & Kaunert,
2020; Rothe, 2016). In this vein, Lupia and McCubbins (1998, p.55) suggest there
is an interaction between internal and external socio-political contexts– the more
the external environment is indicative of threats, the less inuence could be ascribed
to local powerful actors, internal conditions and local frames of reference. As this
claim provides an interesting insight into dynamics and inter-relation of different
contexts, it certainly requires further discussion and empirical verication.
3 Distant external developments are understood as meaningful events and occurrences external to
the immediate socio-linguistic and socio-political context of a securitising move (Watson, 2012,
pp.287–88).
3.6 Including Context intheSecuritisation Process
54
3.7 Conclusion: Key Points of“Securitisation astheWork
ofFraming” Approach
The aim of this chapter was to discuss the building blocks of securitisation theory as
presented by the Copenhagen School and propose a more interpretative and framing-
oriented reading of the theory. Let me now summarise the main components of
“securitisation as the work of framing” approach and discuss the main changes it
proposes to the original framework and the direction in which it moves the securiti-
sation analysis. For this purpose, I have reduced this chapter to ve essential
assumptions, which will serve as a basis for further discussion.
1. Framing, instead of speech acts – the traditional conceptualisation of securitisa-
tion relies on speech acts and a decisionist, static and illocutionary construction
of security through authoritative utterances produced by powerful actors (Wæver,
2015). In this book I conceptualise securitisation as the work of policy framing,
which views construction of security as a messy and internally complex iterative
process comprised of a variety of actors, security logics, interpretations and
interests that are inherently entangled in the way security issues are constructed.
Here securitisation is reected in mobilisation of security-related perceptions in
the minds of targeted empowering agents and audiences, enabling incorporation
of these perceptions into the common schemata of interpretation.
2. Tangled security logics, instead of exceptionalism– instead of xating on a sin-
gle understanding of security based on existential threats and exceptional secu-
rity measures, I argue that multiple logics and interpretations of security should
be considered as an intrinsic part of securitisation. Security logics are under-
stood as pronouncements that produce a specic social order, the essence of a
security notion, reduced to the rules of grammar applied to make sense of secu-
rity objects. In this vein, securitisation is a complex and, more importantly,
messy process, in which logics and interpretations of security collide and inter-
twine. This results in an emergence of different blends of security which recon-
gure the relationship between referent object, referent subject and threat.
3. Dialogical audience-actor interaction, instead of authoritative instances of secu-
ritisation – in this policy-oriented framework, securitisation does not revolve
around a single authoritative actor, but is subjected to dynamic negotiations
between and within groups of relevant agents involved in the process. Therefore,
the traditional differentiation into actors and audience is substituted with a rela-
tionship in which actors play both roles. They are locked in an iterative feedback
loop, where they “talk and respond to each other” in the intersubjective construc-
tion of security.
4. Politics of acceptance, instead of one-dimensional interaction – the widely-
criticised ambiguous denition of acceptance of securitising moves as “resonat-
ing” with the audience is hereby supplemented with discourse structuration and
institutionalisation. Structuration corresponds to the idea that certain interpreta-
tions become dominant when they turn into obligatory and “commonsensical”
3 Securitisation astheWork ofFraming
55
points of reference in the problematisation of an issue at hand. Institutionalisation
takes place when interpretations solidify, becoming incorporated into societal
and political practices, routines and organisations.
5. Embedded security, instead of facilitating conditions – securitisation should be
understood as a highly context-sensitive process, deeply embedded in socio-
linguistic and socio-political settings and local power structures (Stritzel, 2011a).
In this respect, I propose a departure from treating the context of securitisation
as a mere facilitating condition. Securitisation is contextualised within an
interpretative continuum, rendering context an important factor that structures
and even interpretatively pre-sets the process of constructing security.
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References
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M. Stępka, Identifying Security Logics in the EU Policy Discourse, IMISCOE
Research Series, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-93035-6_4
Chapter 4
EU Migration-Security Continuum.
Investigating Security Frames Before
the“Migration Crisis”
4.1 Introduction
Securitisation of migration is not new to the European Union. In fact, there is a
substantial history of institutionalised practices and discourses that to varying
degrees and intensity have been linking migration with different aspects of EU
internal and external security (Bigo, 2001a; Huysmans, 2000; van Munster, 2009).
Evidently, the “migration crisis” represents a critical case for studying migration-
security in Europe, its development and specic framings. Nonetheless, before
committing to its analysis it is necessary to discuss the so-called pre-existing secu-
ritising moves and security frames which deeply shaped the context of securitisation
prior to 2015 and the beginnings of the “migration crisis”.
Neither securitisation nor framing take place in a vacuum, they have an impor-
tant temporal dimension, negotiating between the past and the future, while making
sense of the present security issues (Schön & Rein, 1991; Stritzel, 2007; van Hulst
& Yanow, 2016). This statement is prominent throughout migration-security litera-
ture, which often underlines the importance of pre-existing security-centred institu-
tional, discursive, practical and interpretative arrangements reected in the so-called
“security continuum” (Anderson & Bort, 2001, p. 155). The “migration-security
continuum” can be characterised as a consecutive series of security discourses and
practices, which contribute to the establishment of a coherent internal security envi-
ronment that unambiguously connects the questions of immigration, asylum and
visas to questions of security and border control (van Munster, 2009). Indeed, the
EU has become a distinctive locus of this type of continuum, generating and accom-
modating both frameworks and discourses on migration and security (Baele &
Sterck, 2015; Karamanidou, 2015; Leonard, 2010a; Sperling & Webber, 2019).
The EU has created a complex and internally diverse framework of securitisa-
tion, with a prolic variety of actors, practices, policies, discourses and interests
having profound impact on the way migration has been framed as a security prob-
lem. Securitisation scholarship has identied several distinctive features that have
64
been characteristic of the EU migration-security nexus to date. Firstly, the EU
migration and asylum policy discourse has been contentious towards third country
nationals, consequently placing immigration from outside Europe at the centre of
securitising moves at the EU level (van Munster, 2009). Consequently, the European
migration-security discourses have been commonly founded on the idea of “Fortress
Europe” as based on restrictive security policies and practices designed to keep out
unwanted migrants and protect material and symbolic “Europeanness” (Bermejo,
2009; Geddes & Taylor, 2016). Secondly, the EU institutional arrangement of secu-
ritisation has been evolving, starting with intergovernmental cooperation in the
areas of internal security and border control, and steadily spilling over to transna-
tional EU institutions and agencies (Leonard & Kaunert, 2019, pp.41–73). From
the analytical point of view, the EU has proven to be a rather unorthodox and prob-
lematic locus of securitisation. Securitising practices on the EU level have been
traditionally centred on common security policies, dominated by technocratic prac-
tices and discourses. Also, there is no distinctive or coherently dened audience, but
rather multiple actors, involved in producing securitising moves as a part of the
political contestation and collective policymaking process (Floyd, 2016).
Consequently, securitising moves and security frames produced by the EU are not
localised in one specic institution or even policy but can be attributed to various
migration-related policy discourses and security frameworks that have been dynam-
ically changing throughout the development of the European project.
In this chapter, I discuss the EU migration-security continuum, focusing on secu-
rity frames and logics that have existed in the EU since before 2015 and the “migra-
tion crisis”. The discussion follows three key and overlapping dimensions of
securitisation. The rst one refers to so-called “constitutional securitising moves”
(embedded predominantly within the EU Treaties) that have been guiding the devel-
opment of the EU internal security dimension and consequently informing and
stimulating further securitising practices deployed on the EU level. The second
dimension refers to the development of the “Fortress Europe” and security frames
centred on border control and management migratory ows. This includes EU dis-
course and practices on detention and deportation of “undesirable” immigrants, dis-
cussing their inuence on security framing of migration in the EU. The third
dimension reects securitising moves embedded in the existing EU security, migra-
tion and asylum policies, exploring different securitising frames that have been link-
ing immigration with clandestine, illicit and even terrorism-related activities. The
last part of the discussion focuses on the internal-external locus of securitisation of
migration examining the EU’s application of internal and external security mea-
sures and migration control technologies as a form of pushing undesirable migrants
away from the EU.
4 EU Migration-Secur ity Continuum. Investigating Security Frames…
65
4.2 From Maastricht toLisbon. Tracing “Constitutional”
Securitising Moves andSecurity Frames
The development of the EU migration-security continuum has taken more than four
decades. It has been driven by incremental and institutionalised processes, such as
development of the Schengen area, which have been enveloping human mobility
with the EU internal and external security policy discourses and actions
(Karamanidou, 2015, p.42). As underlined by van Munster (2009, p.9), the EU’s
mode of securitisation of migration is rarely based on the traditional framework of
“panic politics” or “dramatic speech act”, mobilising discourses of fear and resent-
ment towards migrants. It most commonly, but not exclusively, relies on mundane
political, technocratic discourses and practices, guided by the logic of risk manage-
ment and control, consequently linking human mobility with clandestine, illegal
and threatening activities, including organised crime and terrorism (Bigo, 2002;
Cohen & Sirkeci, 2016; Ibrahim & Howarth, 2017; van Munster, 2009). Many
scholars also indicate that securitisation of migration at the EU level has been stim-
ulated by the development of European integration mainly associated with institu-
tionalisation of the EU internal security domain, and liberalisation of movement of
goods, persons, services and capital (Dover, 2008; Huysmans & Squire, 2010).
The securitisation scholarship most often denes the introduction of the Schengen
area in 1985 and its operationalisation in 19901 as the stepping-stone for developing
security measures and control over human mobility at the EU level (Boswell, 2007;
Squire, 2015). Here, the abolishment of internal borders between the member states
has facilitated the transformation of the European Union (then European
Communities) into a territorial entity in need of protection and management of its
internal order and external borders. Nonetheless, it is the gradual institutionalisation
and Europeanisation of the internal security domain that has become the main vehi-
cle for securitisation of migration in the EU (Neal, 2009; Zaiotti, 2007). In this
regard, the Treaties and the Schengen acquis have become so-called “constitutional
securitising moves”, embedding migration-security continuum within the EU pri-
mary law, generating the key institutional and political frameworks for development
of further securitising moves (Huysmans, 2006, pp.3–4). Below, I focus on an over-
view of three EU treaties, which are most commonly indicated as signicant con-
tributors to the development of the EU migration-security continuum, namely the
1 Initially France, Germany, Belgium, the Netherlands and Luxemburg decided to abolish controls
at their internal borders by signing the Schengen Agreement in 1985, which was followed by the
adoption of the Schengen Convention in 1990 and led to the creation of the ‘Schengen area’.
Schengen provisions were later brought into the EU framework with the adoption of the 1997
Amsterdam Treaty (Leonard, 2010b, p.33). As of 2020, the Schengen area includes 26 states– all
the EU Member States apart from the Republic of Ireland, Cyprus, Romania, Bulgaria, Croatia, as
well as three states that are not members of the EU (Norway, Iceland, Lichtenstein, Switzerland)
(European Commission Website, 2021)
4.2 From Maastricht to Lisbon. Tracing “Constitutional” Securitising Moves…
66
Maastricht Treaty, the Amsterdam Treaty and the Lisbon Treaty.2 Even though the
Schengen acquis can be considered as one of the EU constitutional securitising
moves, for the clarity of the analysis it will be discussed in the next sub-chapter,
related to the frame of border control in the EU.
Huysmans argues that the Maastricht Treaty represents the rst EU-wide and
constitutional securitising move towards migration, introducing provisions for
intergovernmental cooperation in the elds of justice and home affairs (then known
as the third pillar), putting such issues as asylum, irregular immigration, organised
crime, and terrorism on the EU security agenda (Huysmans, 2006, pp. 66–69).
Building on the legacy of intergovernmental security forums such as the Trevi group
(Terrorisme, Radicalisme, Extrémisme et Violence Internationale)3 and the Ad Hoc
Working Group on Immigration (AHWGI),4 the Treaty embraced policy and secu-
rity frames centred on illegal aspects of migration into the EU territories (van
Munster, 2009, pp.27–28). As emphasised in the document, one of the priorities of
the EU is “safeguarding the free movement of people and internal market” while at
the same time “combatting unauthorised immigration, residence and work by
nationals of third countries on the territory of Member States” (European Union,
1992, p.62). In this way, the Treaty has begun refocusing the EU institutional optics
on migration onto the dangers of human mobility, introducing a signicant and
prevailing distinction between the “good internal mobility of the EU citizens” and
“risky migration into the EU territories from the third countries” (Ibrahim &
Howarth, 2017, p.5).
The Maastricht Treaty has signicantly institutionalised the securitisation pro-
cess by embedding prior intergovernmental European migration-security discourses
within the EU institutional framework, thus shaping the migration-security contin-
uum in three important aspects (van Munster, 2009, pp.36–37). Firstly, it repro-
duced the existing security frames and discourses, signicantly strengthening the
security frame of irregular immigration as a risk to the security and stability of the
European Union. Secondly, it framed the European freedoms and internal market as
referent objects, requiring protection from the destabilising effect of irregular immi-
gration. Thirdly, it normalised securitisation of migration by moving it away from
international security expert forums such as the Trevi group and the AHWGI to the
transnational and technocratic setting of the EU.Consequently, it made room for
EU institutions as new securitising actors.
Though the Maastricht Treaty moved securitisation of migration to the EU-wide
institutional setting, it was the Amsterdam Treaty and the introduction of the Area
2 The impact of the Nice Treaty on framing of immigration in terms of risks to security was mini-
mal (van Munster, 2009, p.147).
3 The Trevi group, established in 1975, was a ministerial forum with an objective of fostering
European cooperation and coordination in the ght against radicalism and terrorism through on-
going exchange of intelligence (Teasdale and Bainbridge, 2012).
4 The AHWGI was developed out of the Trevi in 1986 as an intergovernmental body concerned
with dealing with issues related to visas/false documents, admission/expulsion, asylum, external
borders, and refugees (van Munster, 2009).
4 EU Migration-Secur ity Continuum. Investigating Security Frames…
67
of Freedom, Security and Justice (AFSJ) that have signicantly expanded the scope
of migration-security continuum (European Union, 1997). The introduction of a
refreshed internal security policy has created room for a series of additional securi-
tising moves, reected in the EU multiannual action plans,5 but the Treaty provi-
sions themselves could also be considered as securitising moves (van Munster,
2009, p.9). One of them was the “communitarisation” of border control (Schengen
acquis), migration and asylum and moving them even closer to the institutional
domains of the EU institutions (Huysmans, 2000, p.765). As argued by Balzacq and
Carrera (2006, p.3), by linking these three elements within the EU transnational
framework, the Union strongly emphasised the existing frame of control over immi-
gration from non-EU countries as a way of “providing citizens with a high level of
safety within an area of freedom, security and justice” (European Union, 1992, art.
29). As stated in the Amsterdam Treaty, “free movement of persons can be only
assured in conjunction with appropriate security measures with respect to external
border controls, asylum, immigration and the prevention and combating of crime”
(European Union, 1997, p.8).
The Amsterdam Treaty has specied the referent object in more detail, putting
the protection of European citizens’ and their rights and ability to enjoy those free-
doms at the heart of its security discourse (Monar, 2006, pp.497–498). The intro-
duction of the AFSJ emphasised the “security of everyday life” of European citizens,
discursively linking security of the European Union to security of individuals living
and traveling within the EU (Arcarazo & Murphy, 2014, p.87). As elaborated in the
1998 Vienna Action Plan:6
(…) freedom loses much of its meaning if it cannot be enjoyed in a secure environment and
with the full backing of a system of justice in which all Union citizens and residents can
have condence. These three inseparable concepts have one common denominator– peo-
ple– and one cannot be achieved in full without the other two (European Council, 1998,
para. 5).
In this respect, the AFSJ set out to become the EU area of risk management,
assuring common security through control and surveillance (Fletcher etal., 2017;
Kaunert etal., 2013; Trauner & Ripoll Servent, 2016). The Amsterdam Treaty has
strengthened the symbolic authority of security professionals to speak and dene
immigration, preparing the grounds for the emergence of the EU internal security
agencies (e.g. European Union Agency for Law Enforcement Cooperation
(Europol)) as securitising actors. In this vein, the Treaty provisions and its subse-
quent action plans strongly underlined the need for a closer, more institutionalised
and coordinated cooperation in the area of internal security, calling for “collection,
storage, processing, analysis and exchange of relevant information, including infor-
mation held by law enforcement services (…), in particular through Europol
5 The Tampere Programme of 1999, The Hauge Programme of 2005, The Stockholm Programme
of 2009, Internal Security Strategy of 2010– further discussed in this chapter.
6 The aim of the document was to create a concrete action plan for introduction of the area of free-
dom, security and justice as provided for in the Treaty of Amsterdam (European Council, 1998).
4.2 From Maastricht to Lisbon. Tracing “Constitutional” Securitising Moves…
68
(European Union, 1997, p.17). The development of the AFSJ has given a boost to
risk driven and managerial logic in the EU migration-security continuum, incorpo-
rating border management and risk proling technologies and focusing on “target-
ing risky spaces (airports, third countries), populations (asylum-seekers,
undocumented immigrants) and activities (travel, human trafcking)” (van Munster,
2009, p.15).
The 2007 Lisbon Treaty introduced several crucial changes into the EU migration-
security continuum, strengthening the already mentioned risk-oriented approach
and opening new avenues for securitisation. Salminen (2011, p.276) argues that the
most signicant adjustment to securitisation has been brought with “depillarisaton”
of the EU and the subsequent removal of rigid differentiation between intergovern-
mental and communitarised modes of governance of the AFSJ.This move has sig-
nicantly strengthened the role of the European Commission, European Parliament
or the Court of Justice of the EU in the EU internal security domain, expanding the
scope of securitising moves from Treaties and multiannual security strategies to the
Community instruments such as regulations, directives and decisions
(Kostakopoulou, 2010, p.154). This has pushed the EU even deeper into the tech-
nocratic realm, changing the dynamics of securitisation of migration into more
every-day mundane discourses and practices of security (Karamanidou &
Kasparek, 2020).
In this regard, the Lisbon Treaty has emphasised the importance of Europol and
the European Union's Judicial Cooperation Unit (Eurojust) for coordinating and
managing the AFSJ.Eurojust, being one of the newest additions to the EU migration-
security apparatus, has been tasked with operational assistance in combating and
prosecuting cross-border illicit activities, including those migration-related, and the
production of advice and security expertise for the EU institutions (European Union,
2007a, art 85 and 88). As pointed out by Trauner (2011, p.180), this expansion of
internal security agencies has further opened the migration-security continuum to
technocratic and managerial security logic and pushing forward the agenda for con-
trol and close surveillance of migratory movements. Having this in mind, it should
be noted that the Treaty has also expanded the mandate of the European Parliament,
enabling democratic oversight over European internal security agencies (European
Union, 2007a, art. 15, 85 and 88). Kostakopoulou argues that in reference to securi-
tisation of migration, this increase of democratic control and transparency cannot be
underestimated, as it puts EU migration policies in the spotlight, potentially dimin-
ishing the impact of exceptional security measures and frames in favour of preven-
tion and protection of migrants and asylum seekers (Kostakopoulou, 2010, p.155).
The Lisbon Treaty has been promoting an idea of migration management centred
on increasing outows and curbing inows of “risky migrants” (Hampshire, 2015;
Lefebvre, 2017). It has been underlining the need for the adoption of security mea-
sures against “illegal immigration and unauthorised residence, including removal
and repatriation of persons residing without authorisation” (European Union, 2007a,
art 79c). This also points towards an increased role of Frontex, especially in regard
to its deportation capabilities (so called return operations). Within this managerial
approach to security, the Lisbon Treaty has introduced an innovation, which has
4 EU Migration-Secur ity Continuum. Investigating Security Frames…
69
opened securitisation of migration to the domain of the internal-external security
nexus. The Treaty has pointed towards the possibility of exterritorial application of
migration control through EU external actions and instruments to prevent uncon-
trolled inows of third country nationals into the EU territories. This includes the
incorporation of a readmission agreement, as well as “partnership and cooperation
with third countries for the purpose of managing inows of people applying for
asylum or subsidiary or temporary protection” (European Union, 2007a, art. 78.g).
This framing of potentially dangerous migratory inows is also visible in the soli-
darity provisions, where the Treaty envisages migration-related emergency situa-
tions, necessitating introduction of special measures (European Union, 2007a). As
stated in the Treaty:
(…) in the event of one or more Member States being confronted by an emergency situation
characterised by a sudden inow of nationals of third countries, the Council, on a proposal
from the Commission, may adopt provisional measures for the benet of the Member
State(s) concerned (European Union, 2007a, art. 73.3).
Ibrahim and Howarth (2017) observe that this particular provision may have a sub-
stantial securitising effect, directly framing movement of people as threating and
uncontrollable ows that require extraordinary measures.
4.3 Schengen andBorder Control– Building
“Fortress Europe”
Huysmans (2000, p.751) argues that the 1985 Schengen Agreement and the subse-
quent 1990 Schengen Convention can be viewed as one of the most important
impulses for “development of a restrictive EU migration policy and the social con-
struction of migration into a security question”. Indeed, the Schengen accords are
commonly considered to be the rst ofcial EU policy text “in which the abolish-
ment of internal frontiers is discursively linked to the need for compensatory mea-
sures in the area of internal security and immigration” (van Munster, 2009,
pp. 19–20). These “compensatory security measures”, often assuming a strictly
securitising character, have been put into the Schengen system as a way of mitigat-
ing the so-called “security decit” which emerged after the disappearance of inter-
nal border checks (Kaunert & Léonard, 2012, p.81). After all, the introduction of
the Schengen area has turned the EU into a new and truly complex territorial entity,
which is in need of protection from internal and external threats, similar to any other
state-like territories. Nonetheless, as pointed out by Bigo (2000), the Schengen sys-
tem has also brought into being a specic security eld, introducing new policies
and modes of governance effectively incorporating human mobility into the realm
of EU security and risk management.
The call for the introduction of compensatory security measures, originally elab-
orated in Articles 7 and 17 of the Schengen Agreement, has been used strategically
in the further development of “Schengenland” as a way of increasing control over
4.3 Schengen andBorder Control– Building “Fortress Europe”
70
migration ows in the name of EU internal security (William Walters, 2002, p.52).
As observed by van Munster, the subsequent 1990 Schengen Convention was proof
that member states’ security professionals swiftly “hijacked” the control over
Schengen, shifting the focus of the project from abolishing internal borders to man-
aging internal security and building up walls against “the uncertain and potentially
threatening non-EU nationals” (van Munster, 2009, pp.23–24). In this regard, the
Schengen acquis has produced and reproduced an important frame of differentiation
between good citizens of member states and bad third country nationals, or “aliens”,
who pose risks to the EU freedoms and internal market (Slominski & Trauner, 2018,
p.102). As a result, the Schengen system has initiated the development of an impor-
tant system of control and management, often described in terms of “Fortress
Europe” or “gated community”– an elitist enclave offering security through the
strong input of technologies and logistical arrangements that insulate communities
from dangerous outsiders (Gruszczak, 2010).
Casas-Cortes etal. (2015, p.79) observe that Schengen-based securitisation and
development of a European gated community has been introduced through explic-
itly connecting undocumented and irregular immigration to the issue of crime, pub-
lic order and security. As stated in Article 96 of the Schengen Convention:
(…) refuse entry to aliens may be based upon ‘a threat to public order or national security
and safety which the presence of an alien in national territory may pose’, where security is
considered to be at stake in the case of (i) ‘aliens’ that have been previously convicted for a
criminal offence, (ii) ‘aliens’ that have committed a serious offence such a selling of drugs
or who have the intention to commit such a crime, and (iii) when the ‘alien’ has been pro-
hibited entry and who is illegally residing on the territory of one of the member states
(European Union, 1990, art. 96).
After the 1997 Amsterdam Treaty and the incorporation of the Schengen zone
into the EU legal and institutional framework, the securitisation of migration has
become much more interconnected within the newly established Area of Freedom,
Security and Justice (Salminen, 2011, p.278). As pointed out by Leonard (Leonard,
2010a, p.35), the EU migration control has become a matter of managers of risk
such as police, counterterrorism, and border cooperation, increasingly focusing on
surveillance and data collection on immigrants as a way of identifying and mitigat-
ing risky mobility. With the introduction of sophisticated systems for data collection
such as the Schengen Information System (SIS),7 Visa Information System (VIS),8
7 The Schengen Information System (SIS) is a “large-scale information system that supports exter-
nal border control and law enforcement cooperation in the Schengen States. The SIS enables com-
petent authorities, such as police and border guards, to enter and consult alerts on certain categories
of wanted or missing persons and objects” (European Commission Website, 2018a).
8 The Visa Information System (VIS) “allows Schengen States to exchange visa data. It consists of
a central IT system and of a communication infrastructure that links this central system to national
systems. VIS connects consulates in non-EU countries and all external border crossing points of
Schengen States. It processes data and decisions relating to applications for short-stay visas to
visit, or to transit through, the Schengen Area. The system can perform biometric matching, pri-
marily of ngerprints, for identication and verication purposes” (European Commission
Website, 2018b).
4 EU Migration-Secur ity Continuum. Investigating Security Frames…
71
European Asylum Dactyloscopy (Eurodac),9 or Eurosur,10 the Schengen area has
turned into a “dense network of surveillance and control taking advantage of new
forms of personal identity management, early warning and threat prevention regard-
ing cross- border human and material ows” (Gruszczak, 2010, p.6). As a result of
this “technologisation” of migration control, the movement of population has
become a signicant factor in the EU security paradigm.
4.3.1 Frontex andProtection oftheEU Borders
The EU external borders have become one of the key sites of securitisation of migra-
tion (Bigo, 2014; Ibrahim & Howarth, 2017; Jeandesboz & Pallister-Wilkins, 2014).
In 2004, for the purpose of increasing efciency of the external border control, the
EU created a decentralised agency, specically designed to facilitate operational
strengthening of security at the external borders and assist in management of migra-
tory ows into the EU– the European Agency for the Management of Operational
Cooperation at the External Borders of the Member States of the European Union
(Frontex)11 (Neal, 2009, p.333).
Frontex occupies a prominent place in the securitisation literature, as it is com-
monly described as one of the key actors securitising migration at the EU level
(Horii, 2016; Kasparek, 2010; Leonard, 2010a). The signicance of Frontex lies in
its “double-logic securitisation”, reected in both “exceptionalist” security- and
risk-driven practices and discourses (Neal, 2009, p.337). Its peculiar securitising
position can be attributed to a wide scope of activities pertaining to its managerial,
intelligence and surveillance prerogatives as well as operational involvement on the
external borders of the EU (Kalkman, 2020; Leonard, 2010a, p.232).
Frontex has been put in the centre of what is called Integrated Border Management
(IBM). The IBM is a system underpinning EU cooperation on border controls, join-
ing up all activities of the EU and member states’ public authorities tasked with
9 Eurodac is an EU asylum ngerprint database which assists with determining the Member State
responsible for examining an asylum application made in the EU.It was originally established to
facilitate the application of the Dublin Convention and its application was later broadened to facili-
tate preventing, detecting or investigating terrorist offences or other serious criminal offences
(European Union, 2013b).
10 The European Border Surveillance system (Eurosur) is “a multipurpose system for cooperation
between the EU Member States and Frontex in order to improve situational awareness and increase
reaction capability at external borders. The aim is to prevent cross-border crime and irregular
migration and contribute to protecting migrants’ lives. It comprises all Schengen area countries
and Bulgaria, Romania and Croatia” (European Commission Website, 2020).
11 During the peak of the “migration crisis” in 2016, the mandate of the agency was revised, and the
name of the agency has been ofcially changed into European Border and Coast Guard Agency
(Frontex) (Council of the European Union, 2016). As this development can be considered as a part
of securitisation of the “migration crisis”, I will discuss it in a later part of this book.
4.3 Schengen andBorder Control– Building “Fortress Europe”
72
border security including surveillance and control (Jorry, 2007). In this regard,
according to its original founding regulation, Frontex has six main tasks:
(1) coordinating operational cooperation between Member States regarding the manage-
ment of external borders; (2) assisting Member States in the training of national border
guards, including establishing common training standards; (3) conducting risk analyses; (4)
following up on developments in research relevant for the control and surveillance of exter-
nal borders; (5) assisting Member States when increased technical and operational assis-
tance at external borders is required; and (6) assisting Member States in organising joint
return operations (European Union, 2011b, art. 1.5).
Leonard (2010a) observes that all these activities hold securitising potential,
encompassing operational, discursive and bureaucratic practices, which generate a
specic “technocratic security framework” around migration. In this respect, two
types of Frontex’s activities are commonly attributed with substantial securitising
effect and aptly reect the double logics of securitising nature of Frontex, namely
coordination of border operations and risk analysis.
Border operations align with a more “exceptionalist” security logic as they rep-
resent mobilisation of extraordinary resources in the crisis situations. The opera-
tions constitute a signicant portion of Frontex’s activities (Carrera etal., 2017).
The agency, being tasked with coordination of joint operations along the air, land
and sea external borders, assists the EU member states and Schengen associated
countries in conducting joint reinforced border control in the event of unprecedented
migratory inows (Leonard, 2010a, p.239). The agency also coordinates Rapid
Border Intervention Teams (RABIT) comprising of “specially trained experts from
EU member states’ that can be deployed on the territory of another member state
requiring assistance for a limited period of time (…) in exceptional and urgent situ-
ations” (European Union, 2007b rec. 6, 7). Frontex’s operations have been designed
to intervene in border crises including substantial increase of transnational border
crime and uncontrolled inux of migrants into the Schengen area (Léonard &
Kaunert, 2020). As pointed out by Lutterbeck (2006, p.65), given the participation
of semi-military units (e.g. Guardia Civil in Spain or the Guardia di Finanza in Italy)
in these emergency operations, Frontex’s involvement is often framed as militarisa-
tion of migration management based on deployment of excessive security measures
against irregular immigrants and asylum seekers.12
Frontex’s operations and rapid interventions can be deployed under specic cir-
cumstances specically relating to a sudden increase of migratory pressures gener-
ated by large numbers of third-country nationals trying to enter the territory of a
member state illegally (Frontex Website, 2018b). In this regard, Frontex, relying on
sophisticated intelligence analysis structures,13 is responsible for production of
12 Several human rights groups and pro-migrant NGOs tagged Frontex as “migrant hunters” or as
“waging war on asylum seekers” (Monforte, 2016). The German non-governmental organisation
(NGO) PRO ASYL submitted a petition to the European Parliament in December 2008 entitled
“Stop the death-trap at the EU borders!” (PRO ASYL, 2008).
13 Risk analysis is produced by the Risk Analysis Unit on the basis the Common Integrated Risk
Management Model and then distributed within Frontex Risk Analysis Network (Leonard, 2010a,
4 EU Migration-Secur ity Continuum. Investigating Security Frames…
73
consistent security discourses, such as reports and analyses14 assessing and predict-
ing irregular migratory ows and risks they pose to the security of the EU external
borders (Paul, 2017). In this vein, the agency depicts itself as an intelligence-driven
discursive and epistemic actor involved in “assessing changes, risks and threats with
possible impact on the security of the EU’s external borders” (Frontex Website,
2008, p.9). Leonard (2010a, p.240) notes that this particular self-framing seems to
have an interesting securitising effect. As she argues, “given that ‘intelligence’ has
traditionally referred to information concerning threats to (national security), the
use of this concept, rather than more neutral concepts such as ‘data’ or ‘informa-
tion’, already contributes to securitising asylum and migration in the EU” (Leonard,
2010a, p.242). Bigo and Guild (2005, p.86) notes that this type of risk analysis
places migrants in a specic security dimension, securitising migration “proac-
tively, anticipating the risks and the threats, locating the potential adversaries even
before they have any consciousness of being a threat to others”.
It should be stressed that even though the logic of management of “risky”
migrants and irregular border crossings seems to be quite prominent, traces of
“exceptionality” are becoming increasingly important in the way EU frames protec-
tion of borders and the Schengen zone. As discussed above, there are visible trends
leading to militarisation of EU border regime, which most notably include employ-
ment of decisive and often extraordinary security measures towards irregular
migrants. This, coupled with a language of emergency that is often used in the situ-
ation of increased migratory pressures opens the continuum to more robust utilisa-
tion of logic of “exceptionality” in the future.
4.4 Detention andDeportation– Reception andReturn
The element of detention and deportation of irregular migrants has become a promi-
nent frame of securitisation in the EU, constructing migrants as objects that need to
be separated from the host society and expelled from its territories (Karamanidou,
2015, p. 52). As observed by Mountz et al., “detention is best understood as a
sequential process that should be viewed in connection to detection, deportation,
and exclusion” of migrants who are construed as a risk to public safety (Mountz
etal., 2013, p.534). In this vein, detention is a specic instrument for securitisation,
controlling and moving “migrant undesirables” into a semi-prison setting and auto-
matically designating them as threatening (Walters, 2010, pp.80–81). Securitisation
scholarship often depicts detention as a form of criminalisation of refugees, asylum
seekers, and irregular immigrants, with deportation used as a deterrent and punish-
ment for illegal, fraudulent or simply undesirable behaviour (Khosravi, 2009, p.41).
p.242).
14 This specically relates to Frontex’s Annual Risk Assessment, which covers the EU external
borders in general and provides long-term strategic analysis contributing to the Agency’s annual
work plan (Leonard, 2010a, p.242).
4.4 Detention andDeportation– Reception andReturn
74
Traditionally, the issue of detention and deportation has not been high on the EU
agenda, falling under the purview of the national immigration and security policies
of the member states (Mountz etal., 2013, p. 525). This trend changed with the
2000s and the introduction of Reception (European Union, 2003) and Return
(European Union, 2008) Directives which have established common standards and
procedures for the detention and removal of “third country nationals residing ille-
gally on territory of a member state” (European Union, 2008, p.1). The EU denes
detention as “connement of an applicant by a Member State within a particular
place, where the applicant is deprived of his or her freedom of movement” (European
Union, 2013b, art. 2.h). The Reception Directive allows for application of this type
of detention in reference to undocumented migrants as well as refugees and asylum
seekers “when protection of national security or public order so requires” (European
Union, 2013b, art. 8.3.e). The argument of public and national security has been
invoked quite commonly in the EU detention provisions as a way of limiting access
to information or restricting the activities of threating immigrants, including remov-
ing the possibility of voluntary returns, imposing entry bans, and denying informa-
tion on the reasons for deportation decision or entry bans (Karamanidou, 2015, p.54).
As pointed out by Mainwaring (2012, p.697), the EU framing of detention as a
matter of public order and safety opens the possibility of “incarceration of people
who have committed no crime from six to eighteen months in highly criminalising
and traumatising conditions, which eventually lead to deep securitisation of immi-
grant and refugee populations”. Detention scholarship points out that detention has
been increasingly used by the EU member states as a deterrent for curbing the inux
of irregular immigrants and asylum seekers as well as means for more robust execu-
tion of returns (Amit & Lindberg, 2020; Ceccorulli & Labanca, 2016; Prem Kumar
& Grundy-Warr, 2004; Niedźwiedzki & Schmidt, 2021).
Deportations or rather “returns”,15 as euphemistically referred to in the EU pol-
icy discourse, are closely connected to the detention regime. As explained by
Leonard (2010a, p.245), the EU return policy “aims to send back to their country of
origin (or a country through which they have transited) those whose asylum applica-
tion has been rejected or who have otherwise been found in an illegal situation on
the territory of one of the EU Member States”. Return operations have become a
prominent part of the UE migration control mechanism, specically designed to
address the removal of risky and unwanted immigrants in regard to “special con-
cerns of safeguarding public order and security” (European Commission, 2005,
p.5). The EU promotes an effective returns policy as key in ensuring public support
for legal migration and asylum, as it projects an ability to control and remove prob-
lematic “overstayers”, irregular third country nationals and failed asylum seekers
from the EU host societies (Triandafyllidou & Dimitriadi, 2014).
15 As pointed out by Borraccetti (2014, p.46), “although the term ‘return’ normally involves citi-
zens going back to their country of origin, either voluntarily or forcibly, according to Article 3.3 of
the Directive ‘return’ also covers situations where the individual goes back to a country of transit
(before arrival in Europe) or, to a third country; in this last case only with the immigrant’s consent”.
4 EU Migration-Secur ity Continuum. Investigating Security Frames…
75
In this vein, the EU return policy is framed as a tool for combating irregular
immigration, but also an important element of the internal security system, centred
on detecting, removing and banning individuals identied as posing risks to the
public policy, public security or national security of the member states (European
Union, 2008). As observed by Baldaccini (2009, p.114), the EU Return Directive,
also called the “shameful Directive”, introduces a restrictive scheme designed not
so much to protect the EU citizens from threats, but to remove and keep out irregu-
lar migrants with security measures such as “prolonged pre-removal detention and
a ban on re-entering the EU”. The Directive visibly downplays the humanitarian
overtones and protection safeguards, allowing for a wide application “criminalising
practices” and “forceful returns” as an attempt of managing irregular immigration
and decreasing the general intake of asylum seekers (Cherubini, 2015, p.228). As
stated by the European Commission,
Member States must be supported in designing and implementing voluntary return pro-
grammes and plans for enforced return, (…). Supporting Member States in obtaining the
necessary documentation for an immediate return and readmission of illegal migrants
remains a priority (European Commission, 2006, p.9).
The return decisions are taken and executed by the EU member states, but they
are often nancially and logistically supported by Frontex (Slominski & Trauner,
2021). The agency is tasked with facilitation and coordination of return operations,
where the EU member states may jointly remove whole groups of irregular immi-
grants and rejected asylum seekers to their countries of origin or countries of trans-
fer (Geiger & Pécoud, 2010, p. 144). Frontex most commonly provides or
co-provides means and expertise in forced and voluntary expulsion of immigrants,
including specialised training, escort ofcers, transportation or medical support
necessary to conduct effective return operations (Frontex Website, 2018a). Frontex
return operations constitute an important example of EU-level and practice-based
securitisation, deploying joint extraordinary security measures to effectively remove
large numbers of immigrants from the EU territory (Léonard & Kaunert, 2020). As
observed by Leonard (2010a, p.246), “nowhere else in the world, and never before,
has there been such a high level of sophistication in the coordination of operations
aiming to expel certain groups of migrants amongst such a large group of states”.
At this point, it should be noted that even though the EU’s reception-return pol-
icy scheme has strong securitising features, it is also a space where the notions of
protection, care and security become closely entwined. In many aspects, the EU
practice and discourse on detention and return policy seems to be internally con-
icted. It presents securitised policies as “caring for” or “saving” refugees and asy-
lum seekers by giving them shelter and addressing their needs during their detention
and expulsion, at the same time categorising them as common security threats and
risks to public safety (Mountz etal., 2013, p.529). This type of approach is also
visible in relation to voluntary or assisted returns which are framed as the “humani-
tarian solution” (Bendixsen, 2020, p.113). Here, migrants are often framed as saved
from precarious and undocumented existence in an EU member state and helped to
return “home” (Bendixsen, 2020, p.114). This type of narrative is often refered to
4.4 Detention andDeportation– Reception andReturn
76
as “hostile hospitality” or the safety/security and risk nexus, which reects the ways
“migrant safety and border security discourse are seemingly reconciled in both of-
cial state discourse and policy. Within the discursive space of the safety/security
nexus, migrant safety and border security are framed as mutually attainable goals;
greater border security is posited as the means to increase migrant safety” (Williams,
2016, p.27).
4.5 Migration andAsylum Policies– Between “Bogus
Asylum Seekers” andIrregular Migrants
The so-called “bogus asylum seeking” as a form of illegal activity has been one of
the most prevalent security frames in the migration discourse in the EU and its
member states (Karamanidou, 2015, p.41). The general confusion around asylum
seekers, refugees and immigrants in the EU arose from discursive presentation of
asylum seeking as a form of alternative, potentially illegal economic immigration to
the European Union (Huysmans, 2006, p. 66; Klaus et al., 2018). Leonard &
Kaunert, (2019) point out that the EU has been gradually and successfully imposing
restrictive control over refugees and asylum seekers. For instance, the Dublin
Convention of 1990,16 by addressing the problem of states’ refusal to review asylum
claims, introduced important restrictions in reference to the mobility of refugees
and their ability to lodge sequential asylum applications in different EU member
states (i.e. asylum venue-shopping) (Kaunert & Léonard, 2012, pp.1400–1401). As
van Munster notes (2009, p.32), “on closer inspection the Dublin Convention, and
its later incarnations, seems to be designed to keep refugees away rather than to
regulate their protection, facilitating readmission agreements and sequential expul-
sion of refugees from the EU”. Consequently, next to narratives driven by human
security and the need for protection of those eeing persecution and extreme vio-
lence, asylum seekers and refugees have been labelled as potential frauds, seeking
16 The Dublin Convention initiated a series of EU-level asylum regulations (a.k.a. the Dublin
Regulations or the Dublin System). The Dublin System establishes a set of criteria assigning
responsibility among the EU Member States (excluding Denmark) and non-EU states (Lichtenstein,
Norway, Iceland and Switzerland) for examination of asylum applications (European Parliament
Website, 2020). The criteria are set in a hierarchical order and include a variety of factors ranging
from family considerations, through recent possession of visa or residence permit in a Member
State, to whether the applicant has entered EU irregularly, or regularly (Adamczyk, 2017, p.304).
The last criterion, meaning point of irregular or regular entry, is often invoked as the most signi-
cant factor in assigning responsibility for processing of asylum seeker (Cesarz, 2017, p.106).
Currently the Dublin Regulation is in its third instalment (so-called Dublin III) and envisages a
number of additional provisions, exceeding mere assignment of responsibility. These clauses
include asylum early warning and preparedness system as well as applicant protection clauses that
allow for appeals to suspend execution of return orders, compulsory interviews with applicants,
special procedures for minors, assurance of legal assistance free of charge, or limitations on the
duration of detention (Hruschka, 2014).
4 EU Migration-Secur ity Continuum. Investigating Security Frames…
77
economic gains and exploiting the international system of protection (Guild &
Minderhoud, 2012). The 1992 Edinburgh European Council conclusions directly
refer to this rationale, calling on the member states for “common endeavours to
combat illegal immigration and preventing the misuse of the right to asylum in order
to safeguard the principle itself” (European Council, 1992, p.47).
This frame has been carried on with the institutionalisation of the EU internal
security dimension by the Maastricht Treaty (introduction of the third pillar– Justice
and Home Affairs) and the Amsterdam Treaty (introduction of Area of Freedom,
Justice and Security). De Lobkowicz (1994, p.100) observes that the institutionali-
sation of the EU Justice and Home Affairs has eased the prior semi- clandestine and
“exceptionalist” approach to migration and asylum, moving it away from security
forums into the more technocratic EU institutional structure. It has not, however,
stopped the EU from expanding its security frame over refugees and asylum seek-
ers. Instead, it has emphasised its more mundane and risk-oriented nature through
technologies of control such Eurodac (ngerprints database) and compulsory col-
lection of biometric data from irregular immigrants, as well as all asylum applicants
in the EU (Skleparis, 2016). As noted in the 2004 Hague Programme:
the on-going development of European asylum and migration policy should be based on a
common analysis of migratory phenomena in all their aspects. Reinforcing the collection,
provision, exchange and efcient use of up-to-date information and data on all relevant
migratory developments is of key importance (European Council, 2004, p.1).
In this regard, utilisation of technologies of control, surveillance and risk man-
agement has become an important logic behind securitisation of asylum and migra-
tion in the EU.
This is not to say that the human security, human rights and protection frame has
been ultimately neglected in the EU asylum policy discourse. The EU regularly
acknowledges its international obligations towards refugees and asylum seekers,
often underlining the need and responsibility for providing shelter, care and protec-
tion. In this regard, the European Parliament has become an important venue for
humanitarian framing of asylum and migation, pushing the EU policy discourse
towards a more liberal approach to asylum and migration (Leonard & Kaunert,
2019, p.87). In the context of the deep securitisation of migration, the EU has been
attempting to create a discursive space for humanitarian framing of asylum, pro-
claiming itself as an “area of protection” and emphasising its commitment to the
“European values and humanitarian tradition” (Comte, 2010, p.173). Securitised
migration and asylum policies have been running in parallel with gradual develop-
ment of the human rights framework and instruments supporting more efcient pro-
tection of asylum seekers and refugees (e.g. European Refugee Fund) (Scipioni,
2017, p. 17). For instance, the right to asylum is included in the Charter for
Fundamental Rights (European Union, 2000) and further developed within the
CEAS, including harmonisation directives on asylum procedures and minimum
standards (European Union, 2005; European Union, 2013a), refugee status quali-
cation (European Union, 2004; European Union, 2011a), reception directives
(European Union, 2003; European Union, 2013b), and the Eurodac directive
4.5 Migration and Asylum Policies – Between “Bogus Asylum Seekers” and Irregular…
78
(Council of the European Union, 2000). The existence of the humanitarian frame is
also reected in the establishment of the European Asylum Support Ofce (EASO)17
and Fundamental Rights Agency (FRA),18 which produce expertise and provide
support to human rights and the protection-oriented dimension of asylum in the EU
(Carrera etal., 2013).
4.5.1 Irregular Migration, Organised Crime andTerrorism
The “security rst” principle has been dominating migration and asylum policies at
the EU level, emphasising the illicit and clandestine dimension of human mobility
and stimulating the deployment of security- and policing-oriented practices (Jorg
Monar, 2016, pp.37–38). In the EU, the notion of illegal conduct of migrants quite
visibly remains the prevailing category, deeply connecting to discourse on legal
migration and exercise of freedom of movement (Huysmans, 2006, p.97). As stated,
un the 1999 Tampere Programme,
…it would be in contradiction with Europe’s traditions to deny freedom to those whose
circumstances lead them justiably to seek access to our territory. This in turn requires the
Union to develop common policies on asylum and immigration, while taking into account
the need for a consistent control of external borders to stop illegal immigration and to com-
bat those who organise it and commit related international crimes (European Council, 1999,
art. 3).
In point of fact, over the years the EU migration-security continuum has become
an institutionalised mode of policymaking, allowing the creation of close associa-
tions between drug trafcking, money laundering and even terrorism and migration
(Huysmans, 2000, p.760). As observed by Bigo (1994, p.164), after the introduc-
tion of the Schengen
17 The European Asylum Support Ofce is an EU agency established in 2010 with an aim to sup-
port and advise the EU member states on matters related to the asylum and reception systems. It
provides specialised assistance that is tailored to the needs of individual member states, but also
coordinates cooperation between member states and supports the external dimension of the
Common European Asylum System. In this sense, EASO’s tasks include provision of data and
expertise on asylum trends and key countries relevant for asylum decision makers, development
and provision of training, operational support and operational tools, as well as contribution to the
EU’s “Hotspot” approach and coordination of relocation measures (EASO, 2017). Since 2012,
EASO has supported a number of EU member states with regard to the “migration crisis”, includ-
ing Italy, Bulgaria and Cyprus (EASO Website, 2018).
18 The Fundamental Rights Agency is a decentralised EU agency established in 2007, which pro-
vides the EU institutions and member states with assistance and expertise on fundamental rights.
It deals with a broad array of thematic areas, including access to justice, discrimination, Roma
integration, child rights, as well as immigration and integration of migrants, visa and border con-
trol, and asylum (FRA, 2016). FRA conducts large-scale surveys and comparative legal and social
research, and prepares handbooks for legal practitioners, for the benet of the EU institutions,
national governments and international organisations. It also engages in dialogue with civil soci-
ety, cooperating with almost 400 organisations across the EU (FRA, 2016).
4 EU Migration-Secur ity Continuum. Investigating Security Frames…
79
the issue of security and human mobility was no longer, on the one hand, terrorism, drugs,
crime, and on the other, rights of asylum and clandestine immigration, but it came to be
treated together in the attempt to gain an overall view of the interrelation between these
problems and the free movement of persons within Europe.
The terrorist attacks in NewYork (2001), Madrid (2004) and London (2005)
signicantly stimulated the perception of migration as a security matter, dening a
common terrorist threat as alien, radicalised and connected to “undesired mobility
of threatening humans” (Jorg Monar, 2016, p.34). Baker-Beall (2009, pp.198–199)
observes that as a result of increased terrorist threat, the EU counter-terrorism dis-
course has decisively centred on the idea of threatening “others”, potentially engag-
ing illegal activities, facilitating terrorism and exploiting the vulnerabilities of
“Europe of open borders and open societies”.
In this regard, both the Hague (2004) and Stockholm (2010) programmes, con-
cerned with the development of the European internal security dimension, have
underlined the connection between terrorism and cross border mobility-related
security problems such as irregular migration, trafcking and smuggling of human
beings, and organised crime (European Council, 2004, pp. 2–3, 2010). In both
cases, the EU policy discourse underlines the internal-external dimension of the
issue, calling for decisive joint actions and advanced cooperation with the third
countries, addressing the root causes of the problem (Kaunert & Leonard, 2010,
pp.146–147). As often indicated by security scholars, the 9/11 and subsequent ter-
rorist attacks shocked the EU internal security dimension, repositioning migration
policies as a vital part of the counter-terrorist realm (Maguire, 2015; Nail, 2016; W
Walters, 2008). With the help of the Schengen-based systems of migration control
and surveillance,19 human mobility, especially from third countries, has become a
category of risk that needs to be deeply regulated (Leonard, 2010b, p.35). As stated
in the EU Counter-Terrorism Strategy:
we need to enhance protection of our external borders to make it harder for known or sus-
pected terrorists to enter or operate within the EU.Improvements in technology for both the
capture and exchange of passenger data, and the inclusion of biometric information in iden-
tity and travel documents, will increase the effectiveness of our border controls and provide
greater assurance to our citizens (Council of the European Union, 2005, p.10).
By entwining immigration with criminal and terrorist activities, the EU has been
gradually applying the same modes of governance in relations to both migration as
well as combating transnational organised crime, terrorism and drug trafcking
(van Munster, 2009). In this regard, it has framed migration not as much as a direct
threat to European security, but a risk potentially facilitating proliferation of exis-
tential security problems (Argomaniz etal., 2015, p.201). As emphasised in the
Hague programme,
the management of migration ows, including the ght against illegal immigration should
be strengthened by establishing a continuum of security measures that effectively links visa
19 In particular, the Schengen Information System, Visa Information System, Passenger Name
Record (PNR) (Leonard, 2010b).
4.5 Migration and Asylum Policies – Between “Bogus Asylum Seekers” and Irregular…
80
application procedures and entry and exit procedures at external border crossings. Such
measures are also of importance for the prevention and control of crime, in particular ter-
rorism (European Council, 2004, p.16).
This position was later reiterated in the EU Internal Security Strategy, which
explicitly linked migration and organised crime, arguing that “in relation to the
movement of persons, the EU can treat migration management and the ght against
crime as twin objectives of the integrated border management strategy” (European
Commission, 2010, p.11).
4.6 Externalisation ofMigration Control. Securitisation
Within theInternal-External Security Nexus
The externalisation of migration control has notably inuenced the EU securitisa-
tion practices and policy frames, moving migration into the realm of the internal-
external security nexus or the so-called externalised dimension of the Area of
Freedom, Security and Justice (Balzacq, 2009; Trauner & Carrapiço, 2012; Wolff
etal., 2009). Trauner (2011, p.7) observes that the internal-external security nexus
has steadily become one of the key concepts guiding the EU migration-security
discourse, intertwining and connecting the realms of internal/domestic security (i.e.
crime, public order, political stability, population control) and external/foreign
security (i.e. diplomacy, military engagement and development). In this regard,
Bigo (2001b, p.112) notes that
internal -external security is often embedded in the gure of the ‘enemy within’, of the
outsider inside, which is increasingly labelled with the catchword ‘immigrant,’ who is,
depending on the context and the political interests, a foreigner or a national citizen repre-
senting a threatening minority. The outsiders are insiders. The lines of who needs to be
controlled are blurred.
Over recent decades, the EU has been constructing migration as a security prob-
lem that should be addressed at its roots, namely outside the EU territories and its
formal jurisdiction (Menz, 2015). Since the 1990s the internal security agenda has
been “leaking” into EU foreign security policies, making more room for irregular
immigration and terrorism and providing for expansion of migration control to
external EU action (Menz, 2015, p.310). Consequently, EU foreign, development
and neighbourhood policies have been taking on internal security features by includ-
ing immigration, border control and dangers of uncontrolled inux of problematic
populations into its own policy frames and actions (Fletcher etal., 2017).
For instance, the 1992 Edinburgh Declaration calls for addressing the causes of
migration and refugee ows through the European Communities’ external policy
while referring to the Balkan wars and observing that “the danger that uncontrolled
immigration could be destabilising” to the member states (European Council, 1992,
annex 5). This frame was later reiterated in the Tampere conclusions (European
Council, 1999), the Hague (European Council, 2004) and Stockholm (European
4 EU Migration-Secur ity Continuum. Investigating Security Frames…
81
Council, 2010) programmes, as well as the EU Internal Security Strategy (European
Commission, 2010) where the EU once again called for the use of external policy
tools to increase the Union’s dialogue and cooperation with countries of origin and
of transit in order to improve their capacity to carry out border control, to ght
against irregular immigration and better manage migration ows (Boswell, 2003;
Chou, 2009). Karamanidou (2015, p.49) argues that this prevailing expansion of
externalised forms of migration management has been motivated by “the perception
that domestic and EU-level policies were insufcient in dealing with migration
pressures and co-operation with other states would enhance the protection- providing
and controlling capacities of the EU”.
One of the most signicant features of the externalised securitisation of migra-
tion at the EU level is reected in the attempts to project its internal security mea-
sures onto surrounding states and regions (Paoletti, 2010, p.29). As indicated by
Eriksson and Rhinard (2009, p.253), the internal-external security realm marries
the instruments of manageable internal security with unmanageable external secu-
rity environment, introducing a sense of control over elusive transversal threats such
as terrorism or organised crime. In this vein, the EU commonly engages in political
activities and so-called “policing at distance”, incrementally incorporating migra-
tion into the security realm through a variety of security measures and legal frame-
works, ranging from carrier sanctions and visa regimes to Frontex-run policing
measures patrolling international waters so as to prevent migrants reaching EU ter-
ritories, to policies on readmission (Karamanidou, 2015, p.49).
In this regard, the EU has been applying a wide plethora of political and external
action measures attempting to expand its control and inuence over the external
migration-security domain. Within the framework of the Global Approach to
Migration and Mobility (GAMM), the European Commission has established a
political dialogue and security cooperation with third countries, which have been
considered strategic for curbing and managing migratory ows, with so-called
Mobility Partnerships (Strik, 2017). As observed by Collyer (2012, p. 507), the
GAMM carries a signicant securitising effect, broadly incorporating security mea-
sures into international frameworks concerning human mobility. For instance, the
GAMM links the negotiation of visa-facilitation provisions with the establishment
of readmission agreements as a means for forceful return of irregular immigrants
and unsuccessful asylum applicants to partnership countries, given they are the
country of origin or transfer (European Commission, 2011, p.16). At the same time,
the GAMM emphasises the resilience of the security structure of partner countries
as a way of safeguarding legal migration, reducing the risks of irregular migration,
and managing rapid inows of refugees (Hampshire, 2016, p.578). As stated in the
Framework, the internal security of the EU neighbourhood must be built up along
with the “external dimension of asylum in order to contribute more effectively to
solving protracted refugee situations” (European Commission, 2011, p.17).
This resilience-oriented approach to securitisation of migration is also visible in
linking the deciencies of third countries with migration-security issues, empha-
sising that
4.6 Externalisation of Migration Control. Securitisation Within the Internal-External…
82
migration and mobility are embedded in the broader political, economic, social and security
context. A broad understanding of security means that irregular migration also needs to be
considered in connection with organised crime and lack of rule of law and justice, feeding
on corruption and inadequate regulation” (European Commission, 2011, p.15).
In this vein, the GAMM envisages a possibility of launching security capacity-
building initiatives in third countries, transferring skills and resources in order to
prevent and reduce migration-related illicit activities, including trafcking, smug-
gling and irregular migration (European Commission, 2011, p.15). The framework
allows for mobilisation of the EU Internal Security Fund and EU Asylum and
Migration Fund, along with development of cooperation, and border assistance
under the auspices of the Common Security and Defence Policy (e.g. EUBAM
Libya) (European Commission, 2014, p.6).
In regard to external dimension of migration management, the EU has been
stressing the importance of pre-frontier controls such as pre-arrival visa and back-
ground checks, which are supposed to detect threatening individuals attempting to
enter the EU territories (Karamanidou, 2015, p.49). In this vein, the EU Internal
Security Strategy calls for a closer cooperation with third countries in sharing intel-
ligence and coordinating common efforts, by “deploying security expertise to EU
Delegations, particularly in priority countries, including Europol liaison ofcers
and liaison magistrates” (European Commission, 2010, p.3). A similar provision is
included the GAMM framework, which calls for a closer exchange of information
between Immigration Liaison Ofcers and partner countries, as well as EU agencies
specialising in migration and organised crime intelligence (European Commission,
2011, p.16). McNamara (2013, p.322) observes that this devotion to management
through intelligence and risk proling may be a double-edged sword, on the one
hand generating a sense of control and security, while on the other preventing whole
groups of forced migrants from accessing the EU territories and seeking protection
in a safe manner, on the grounds of suspicion. In this regard, EU practices of “polic-
ing at distance” has made its mark on the EU migration-security continuum, carry-
ing a strong securitising effect.
4.7 Conclusion
As discussed above, the EU is responsible for the creation of a very specic
migration- security continuum, interwoven with a variety of policies, discourses,
and security practices. The EU migration-security continuum was set up with the
introduction of the Schengen zone, partly as a response to the internal security de-
cit but also as an opportunity for increasing control over inows of migrants from
outside the EU.In this sense, the securitisation of migration at the EU level can be
considered as an incremental and institutionalised process locked within three
closely related dimensions: “constitutional securitisation”, “Fortress Europe”, and
the “migration-crime nexus”.
4 EU Migration-Secur ity Continuum. Investigating Security Frames…
83
Even though these dimensions have been discussed separately in this chapter,
they are closely entwined in the continuum, often reinforcing one another. The
“constitutional” securitising moves have been gradually moving the continuum
from intergovernmental into more supranational and decentralised modes of gover-
nance. Due to changes introduced by the EU treaties, the continuum has gained a
framework, which enabled a much closer interplay between different aspects of
migration management at the EU level. For instance, the notion of “Fortress Europe”
and the development of a more restrictive border regime has discursively and practi-
cally merged with the EU’s asylum scheme and the migration-crime nexus. Irregular
migrants and asylum seekers who are captured in the EU and categorised as uniden-
tiable, risky, or threatening are often detained and isolated for purposes of deporta-
tion. This is part of broader capture-identication-containment-return cycle that has
been present in all three dimensions of the continuum, steadily gaining prominence
in the EU’s approach to migration management.
As indicated in this chapter, the EU’s migration-security continuum is a complex
construct, suggestive of three logics that have been intertwining and to different
degrees inuencing the way the EU has been framing the relationship between
migration and security. This concerns most notably risk management, but also ele-
ments of “exceptionality” and human security. Traces of the logic of “exceptional-
ity” can be found in the conceptualisation of “Fortress Europe”, especially in regard
to the militarisation of border management and discourse on border operations and
emergency interventions in the situation of unprecedented migratory inows.
Similarly, elements of human security are embedded within the EU’s discourse on
asylum policy and “worthy” asylum claims as well as its reception and return poli-
cies. Nonetheless, it is hard to ignore that the risk seems to be most fundamental,
overarching and expansive out of the logics existing in the continuum. It has a ten-
dency to expand together with the need for precise control of migratory movements
and rapid technologisation of migration management policy in the EU.References
to risk can be found in a plethora of the EU migration policies, ranging from protec-
tion of refugees and management of the asylum system to border security, robust
Frontex operations, detention and returns, as well as the externalisation of migration
control. As a security logic, risk has been consistently introduced into the contin-
uum, setting the tone for further securitisation of migration in the EU.In the next
chapter, I analyse how risk and other pre-existing frames and security logics con-
strued as a part of the EU migration-security continuum translate into security fram-
ing of migration-related emergency situations such as the “migration crisis”.
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M. Stępka, Identifying Security Logics in the EU Policy Discourse, IMISCOE
Research Series, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-93035-6_5
Chapter 5
Analysing Diagnosis andEvaluation
ofthe“Migration Crisis” attheEU Level
5.1 Introduction
As outlined in the previous chapter, prior to the “migration crisis” the EU has
become a site of a specic migration-security continuum. It consists of securitising
frames and narratives, depicting non-EU immigrants in terms of security nuances
and risks, associating them with unauthorised residence, irregular immigration, and
bogus asylum-seeking, to name a few. The continuum brought forth three pre-
existing and intertwined security logics that have been commonly used to describe
the relationship between migration and security in the EU i.e. human security,
“exceptionality” and most prominently, risk management. As indicated in the previ-
ous chapter, the logic of management of “risky” migrants has notably dominated the
EU’s migration-security continuum. This is not surprising, as most EU securitising
moves prior to the crisis were developed under the circumstances of normalised
modes of politics and incremental policy cycles. This made securitisation at the EU
level more mundane and driven by technologisation of security and technocratic
routine.
The outbreak of the “migration crisis” has put this risk-centred mode of securiti-
sation into a new perspective, moving the security of migrants and humanitarianism
closer to the centre of political contestation, and at the same time signicantly ele-
vating the position of “threatening features” of mass migration on the EU security
agenda (Eurobarometer, 2015). This has led to a more visible intertwining of human
security with “exceptionality” and to a lesser extent with risk management. For
instance, even though risk management-centred framing of the crisis distinctly
diverts from the idea of the human being as the ultimate referent object, it still on
occasion refers to pervasive threats to migrants such as transborder organised crime
or recognises the need to protect the “legitimate” refugees and asylum seekers. On
the other hand, in the diagnosis and evaluation of the crisis, “exceptionality” has
become more closely entwined with both human security and risk, building on the
language of emergency and the need for a rapid and decisive response to the
94
deteriorating situation on the EU borders. In this regard, the “migration crisis” has
visibly opened the EU migration-security debate to change and possible shifts
towards new perspectives on the relationship between security and human mobility.
This chapter is concerned with this dynamic, focusing on the analysis of the rst
two segments of the EU frame-narrative produced in response to the “migration
crisis”, namely diagnosis and evaluation.
In the “securitisation as the work of framing” approach, the diagnosis and evalu-
ation processes wield signicant inuence over the ways the issue is understood and
acted upon. Diagnosis most commonly entails recognising and often taking owner-
ship of the problem in terms of naming and selecting its security features. This
imbues the problem with its own identity and meaning. In this sense, diagnosis
revolves around conceptualisation of the threatening nature of the problem, its ori-
gins, and/or powers behind its escalation, while ascribing it within a specic policy
realm. Thus, construed diagnosis is often merged with evaluation of causal effects
and the moral dimension. Evaluation focuses on the question of how specic cate-
gories of threats affect security referent objects and who/what should be blamed. In
this respect, evaluation is focused on the nature of the relationship and interactions
between threats and referent objects. It should be noted that these specic elements
of diagnosis and evaluation are not necessarily sequential or even occurring in a
specic order. As in the EU policy discourse, these two segments are inherently
connected, for analytical clarity, in this chapter they are discussed in unison.
This chapter is organised as follows. Every subchapter corresponds with security
logics which have achieved the most signicant levels of structuration in the diag-
nosis and evaluation segments (i.e. human security-centred, risk as well as “excep-
tionalist” security, which has seeped into the aforementioned logics). Each
sub-chapter explains how different logics have been incorporated and used in the
framing process, thus eshing out different interpretations of the crisis embedded in
the EU policy discourse as well as their key framing sponsors. Each sub-chapter
discusses how the EU policy actors have been promoting various framings of the
crisis, by proposing different denitions of its nature (introducing specic names
and categories), root causes, threats and referent objects. The nal part of the chap-
ter is devoted to the analysis of the three logics, discussing how they intertwine,
correspond and t into general diagnostic and evaluation segments of the EU frame
narrative.
5.2 Human Security
In terms of diagnosis and evaluation of the “migration crisis”, human-centred logic
has reached signicant levels of structuration at the EU level, turning into a mean-
ingful and essential part of the collective framing of the crisis. It has been focused
predominantly on humanitarian features, emphasising the need of protecting
migrants who face pervasive, recurrent, direct and indirect threats to their lives,
dignity, and freedoms. Such a broad application of human security logic in
5 Analysing Diagnosis andEvaluation ofthe“Migration Crisis” attheEU Level
95
diagnosing and evaluating migratory inows to the EU is a novelty. Even though the
concept of human security has been a part of EU security culture since the begin-
nings of the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP), it had limited impact on
the EU migration security-continuum and especially with regard to events that
directly affect the EU internal security domain (Huysmans, 2006; Parkes, 2014;
Pinyol-Jiménez, 2011; Roos, 2013).
There is, however, a consequnec to this type of framing. The EU has indeed rec-
ognised the human tragedy of the crisis and the need to protect migrants’ lives,
reproducing this type of narrative on numerous occasions. However, at the same
time it has been avoding taking full owenership of this interpretation, introducing
ambiguity into naming and categorising practicies and situating key threats and
causal effects of mass migration outside the territories of the European Union. As a
result, from the framing point of view, the humanitarian features of the “migration
crisis” have never trully crossed EU borders, becoming yet another part of a larger
equation of “distant” refugee crises caused by extreme violence, poverty, undemo-
cratic regimes and political turmoil, to name a few.
5.2.1 Naming andCategorising theHumanitarian Features
ofthe“Migration Crisis”
Even though all the actors analysed have been active in the application of human
security in the diagnosis and evaluation of the crisis, it is the European Parliament
that can be considered as the key “speaker” of this logic in the EU, setting the initial
tones and interpretative cues.1 The Parliament was the rst EU institution which
fully and explicitly recognised the humanitarian features of the events on the EU
borders, focusing the framing on the tragedy of refugees and the loss of human life
in the Mediterranean. The 2013 tragic events off a small Italian island of Lampedusa2
1 The European Parliament proved to be most receptive to external framing cues (i.e. originating
outside the EU) primarily from the Council of Europe (CoE) (European Parliament, 2015b, 2016b,
f), United Nations (European Parliament, 2015e, 2016a, f), International Organization for
Migration (European Parliament, 2015f, 2017a) and the United Nations High Commissioner for
Refugees (European Parliament, 2015a, f, 2017a), embracing their distinctive human security-
centred framing and incorporating it into its own discourse. Indeed, the international community
has been pushing the EU to embrace and acknowledge the humanitarian nature the “migration
crisis”. For instance, Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe has been producing human
security-centred discourse on “migration crisis” since 2011, calling the EU to drastically increase
its efforts in saving migrants, refugees, asylum seekers and others who risk their lives to reach
Europe’s borders (Council of Europe, 2011b, 2012).
2 The island of Lampedusa is Italy’s most southern point, situated ca. 100km off the coast of
Africa, midway between Tunisia and Malta. The small island of ca. 6,000 residents (UrbiStat.com,
2016) has become one of the symbols of the wider “migration crisis” in Europe. Due to its location,
since the early 2000s, Lampedusa has been a signicant transit spot for irregular migrants, with
large numbers of illegal landings and a high death toll off the coast of the island (see Cuttitta,
2014). However, in 2011, following the so-called Arab Spring, the number of migrants arriving
5.2 Human Security
96
represent one such focusing event, putting pressure on the EU to employ a more
humanitarian narrative. Here, the European Parliament’s “resolution on migratory
ows in the Mediterranean, with particular attention to the tragic events off
Lampedusa” has unequivocally put the inows of migrants into a humanitarian cat-
egory, indicating that there is a need to do “everything possible to save the lives of
people in danger” (European Parliament, 2013, rec. B). This humanitarian logic was
later reproduced in the EP’s resolutions on the situation in Libya (European
Parliament, 2014a, 2015e) and Syria (European Parliament, 2017b) as well as “on
the situation in the Mediterranean and the need for a holistic EU approach to migra-
tion” (European Parliament, 2014b), where the EP strongly emphasised the human
tragedy, exploitation of migrants and the loss life at sea. This framing was later
reproduced by the European Commission in the 2015 State of the Union, which
substantially increased the exposure of the human security logic.
The 2015 State of the Union was unique in terms of framing the crisis, as it was
a rare instance when an EU institution, in this case the European Commission, so
bluntly gave a name to the problem. While diagnosing the crisis, Jean Claude
Juncker, the President of the European Commission, repeatedly used the name “ref-
ugee crisis”, describing the increased migratory ows as “rst of all a matter of
humanity and of human dignity” (European Commission, 2015g). In this vein, the
President’s statement, directly dened the crisis as a humanitarian issue, emphasis-
ing its refugee nature. As stated in the speech:
There is no price you would not pay, there is no wall you would not climb, no sea you would
not sail, no border you would not cross if it is war or the barbarism of the so-called Islamic
State that you are eeing (European Commission, 2015g, p.3).
The State of the Union visibly placed migrant’s life at the centre of the problem,
describing it as a value that has become threatened in the course of undesirable
events outside the EU and on its borders (European Commission, 2015g). In doing
so, for a moment it stepped out from its risk-centred and managerial role, openly
categorising the crisis as a humanitarian issue (European Commission, 2015g, c).
As will be discussed in the next part of this chapter, this type of human security-
centred naming and categorising is visible throughout the diagnostic part of the EU
frame-narrative. However, there is a visible uctuation in the intensity and mode of
its application. The “uniqueness” of the 2015 State of the Union lies in the fact that
it introduces the term “refugee crisis” in order to name and acknowledge the human-
itarian nature of the problem. Nonetheless, this explicit naming has never gained
signicant resonance in the EU policy discourse. EU institutional actors, including
from Tunisia and Libya rose exponentially, reaching over 55,000 (Council of Europe, 2011a, art.
13). Together with a critical increase of deaths of migrants in transit and drastic deterioration of the
conditions of reception, Lampedusa is seen as the harbinger of the “migration crisis” (Dolidze
2011, pp.123–124). In October 2013, a boat with ca. 500 migrants caught re and capsized, killing
364, including children (Davies, 2013). However, Lampedusa has also become the symbol of
humanitarian approach to the crisis with the island’s former mayor, Giusi Nicolini, providing safe
haven to migrants and emphasising “the humanistic imperative that it is more important to protect
people than borders” (Olof Palme Minnesfond, 2017).
5 Analysing Diagnosis andEvaluation ofthe“Migration Crisis” attheEU Level
97
the European Parliament, have been avoiding committing to any specic name, or
even a set of names, that could symbolise the EU’s categorical ownership of the
humanitarian interpretation of the crisis. Instead, the Union has applied the human
security logic using descriptive accounts of various occurrences accompanying the
crisis, most commonly referring to “tragic loss” (European Parliament, 2015f),
“tragic events” (European Council, 2015f; European Parliament, 2015f, c), “tragic
situation” (European Council, 2015d) or simply “tragedies in the Mediterranean”
(European Parliament, 2015f).
This rather implicit mode of naming signies an interesting trend. Even though
the EU has recognised and emphasised the elements of human security and the need
to protect those migrants who are at risk, it has also distanced itself from taking full
ownership of the humanitarian interpretation of the crisis. Without committing to a
specic and distinctive type of naming, the EU has kept the humanitarian features
of the crisis at the discursive equivalent of “arm’s length”. This type of “framing
without explicit naming” suggests that policy actors may acknowledge specic fea-
tures of the problem and put them on the political agenda, but at the same time they
do not fully internalise its ramications. This strategised use of naming and cate-
gorising, has allowed the EU to manage expectations and balance imperative for
specic types of humanitarian response to increased migratory ows. Here, the
introduction and subsequent discursive marginalisation of the name “refugee crisis”
can be treated as symptomatic. The EU policy actors have consistently avoided
using this name in ofcial discourse, substituting it with sympathetic language
towards the migrants and refugees and their hardship, at the same time avoiding the
term “refugee crisis” in describing the events within the EU territories and on its
borders.
5.2.2 Conceptualising thePush Factors andDening Threats
The EU policy actors seem to be more explicit in applying human security logic
when diagnosing the root causes and dening forces behind the crisis, here repre-
sented by the push factors driving people to leave their communities of origin, such
as economic, social, or political insecurities (Fiddian-Qasmiyeh etal., 2014, p.270).
The EU discourse strongly emphasises the role of the unstable and dangerous “out-
side”, construed as territorial and socio-political space external to the EU.Here, the
policy framing of the root causes focuses on “countries and regions of origin”,
described as the main locus of insecurity and pervasive threats to prospective
migrants and their native communities (see Council of the European Union, 2015i;
European Parliament, 2015b; European Commission, 2016c). As stated in the
Agenda on Security:
contemporary security concerns originate from instability in the EU’s immediate neigh-
bourhood and changing forms of radicalisation, violence and terrorism. Threats are becom-
ing more varied and more international, as well as increasingly cross-border and
cross-sectorial in nature (European Commission, 2015d, p.2).
5.2 Human Security
98
The EU policy discourse closely links this type of security framing of the EU
neighbourhood to human security-driven migratory movements, connecting them to
the turmoil in the Middle East and parts of sub-Saharan Africa (European
Commission, 2015e; European Parliament, 2015a, c; European Council, 2015d). In
this vein, the EU global security strategy clearly links the deteriorating security situ-
ation in the underdeveloped regions to the root causes of the “migration crisis”,
indicating that, “solving conicts and promoting development and human rights in
the south is essential to addressing the threat of terrorism, the challenges of demog-
raphy and migratory pressures” (European Commission, 2016d, p.34).
There is a coherent application of human security logic across the EU policy
discourse, in the framing of the root causes of the “migration crisis”, associating
them with a broad spectrum of interlinked issues that affect the wellbeing of indi-
viduals and push them into mobility, or more precisely to seek refuge from perva-
sive threats and structural violence. The EU discourse most commonly correlates
the forces pushing individuals out of their native communities with degradation of
the security environment (e.g. war, regional conict, terrorism) on the one hand, and
economic decline (e.g. poverty, underdevelopment) on the other (European
Commission, 2015d, 2016f; European Parliament, 2016f; European Council,
2017c). As indicated in the European Commission’s Agenda on Migration, “civil
war, persecution, poverty, and climate change all feed directly and immediately into
migration, so the prevention and mitigation of these threats is of primary importance
for the migration debate” (European Commission, 2015c, p.7). On a similar note,
the European Parliament argues that “the root causes of violence and underdevelop-
ment need to be addressed in the countries of origin in order to stem the ow of refu-
gees and economic migrants” (European Parliament, 2015f, rec. 16).
And so, the EU policy discourse attributes the blame for degradation of the secu-
rity environment, the decrease of human security, and human rights infringement to
three culprits, namely Syria, Libya and the so-called Islamic State (IS)/Da’esh.3 The
EU discourse has been gradually increasing the prole of Syria and Libya in the
diagnosis of the root causes, linking these countries to regional instability, the rise
of terrorism, and structural facilitation of the “migration crisis” (European
Commission, 2015c; European Council, 2015f; European Parliament, 2015a). In
the EU policy discourse, the war in Syria is framed as the original push factor, set-
ting a refugee-driven chain reaction in the whole region,4 leading up to the emergence
3 Iraq is also included in the diagnosis, but mostly in connection to Syria (see: European Parliament,
2015a, 2017b; Council of the European Union, 2015a; European Council, 2015e).
4 United Nations Ofce for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs estimated the prolonged con-
ict in Syria resulted in 5,5 million refugees and over 6 million internally displaced persons (as of
December 2017; UNOCHA Website, 2018). The majority of Syrian refugees escaped to neigh-
bouring countries, predominantly to Turkey (3,485,000 refugees), Lebanon (997,000 refugees) and
Jordan (657,000 refugees), as well as Egypt (over 126,000) and Iraq (over 247,000) (as of
December 2017; UNHCR Information Sharing Portal, 2018). The real number of refugees is likely
to be higher than the estimates provided by the UNHCR, as not all Syrians decide to ofcially
register. This massive movement of people has led to a serious humanitarian crisis, with millions
left in need of protection, food, shelter and health care. What is more, it also had a serious negative
5 Analysing Diagnosis andEvaluation ofthe“Migration Crisis” attheEU Level
99
of the “migration crisis” in the EU territories (European Parliament, 2017b, p.6).
The framing of the Syrian crisis is visibly permeated with human security logic,
emphasising the hardship, suffering, and the consequent refuge of the Syrian peo-
ple. The European Parliament’s resolutions on the situation in Syria often strengthen
this framing, reiterating that “almost 50 % of all Syrians have lost their homes and
40 % of the refugees are forced to endure sub-standard living conditions” (European
Parliament, 2015a, rec. M).
On a similar note, Donald Tusk, then the President of the European Council,
stated that, “(…) the biggest humanitarian challenge of our time is the Syrian refu-
gee crisis. Refugees have had little choice but to ee their country. Many of them
have lost everything” (European Council, 2016b, p.1). Continuing this line of fram-
ing, the European Parliament has become the most explicit promoter of “human
security” logic, attributing blame specically to the Syrian government as respon-
sible for the atrocities and violence spilling over the Middle East. As stated in the
European Parliament’s resolution, the:
on-going violent crisis in Syria as a result of the Assad regime and terrorist violence has
resulted in a humanitarian catastrophe of an unprecedented scale in history, with more than
200 000 people killed, most of them civilians, more than 7.6 million people internally dis-
placed, and more than 12.2 million Syrians in desperate need of assistance inside Syria
(European Parliament, 2015a, rec. A).
The situation in Libya has been connected to the root causes of the “migration
crisis” in a slightly different manner. It is not only framed as a source of severe
instability having a devastating impact on human security, but is also described as a
structural security problem creating an ideal environment for criminal activities,
including human smuggling and trafcking, consequently facilitating the “migra-
tion crisis” (European Council, 2015d, p.9). This type of diagnosis and evaluation
has been also emphasised by the European Parliament. As stated in the EP resolu-
tion on Libya:
Libya is a primary departure point for migrants attempting to reach Europe; hundreds of
migrants and refugees eeing the violence in Libya have reportedly died while attempting
to cross the Mediterranean to Europe, leading to a major refugee crisis in Italy and Malta
(European Parliament, 2015e, rec. P).
In the case of Libya, the attribution of blame is more ambiguous than in the case of
Syria. It does not refer to a specic person, regime, or group, but “the unstable situ-
ation” that is obstructing the cooperation and management of the crisis. In this vein,
the Libyan government, despite contributing to the crisis, is not blamed or shamed,
but rather treated as a potential partner for the future actions addressing the root
causes of the crisis (European Council, 2015d).
Regardless the differences in the framing of the Syrian and Libyan “contribu-
tion” to the “migration crisis”, the EU discourse explicitly correlates the deteriorat-
ing security situation in those countries with the proliferation of terrorist activities
impact on the host countries’ economies, with widening scal decits, raising prices, unemploy-
ment and poverty rates, as well as tensions at the social level (Berti, 2015).
5.2 Human Security
100
of IS/Da’esh and other jihadist groups in the region (cf. European Parliament,
2015a, e; European Commission, 2015d; Council of the European Union, 2015l).
The analysed EU institutions uniformly treat terrorism as having devastating impact
on the human security environment, explicitly promoting it as one of the most per-
vasive and prevailing causes of the “migration crisis” (see: European Parliament,
2015a; Council of the European Union, 2015k, d; European Council, 2017a). As
stated in the EP resolution on migration and refugees, “the rise of IS/Da’esh in
neighbouring conict areas are having an impact on the mass inux of migrants and
ows of displaced people and, therefore, on the number of individuals attempting to
reach the EU” (European Parliament, 2015b, rec. E). Again, the European Parliament
is responsible for the most explicit and frequent diagnosis of terrorism in terms of
human security related push factors, connecting it directly to the degradation of the
security environment and forced migration. In the resolution on EU strategy regard-
ing Syria, the EP indicates that:
ISIS/Da’esh and other jihadist groups have committed cruel atrocities, including the use of
brutal executions and unspoken sexual violence, abductions, torture, forced conversions
and slavery of women and girls; whereas children have been recruited and used in terrorist
attacks; (…) these crimes may amount to war crimes, crimes against humanity and geno-
cide (European Parliament, 2017b, rec. D).
Whereas degradation of physical security is framed as the key determinant of the
increased mobility of refugees, the EU actors also refer to poverty and structural
underdevelopment as one of the key forces behind the rapid increase of irregular
migration into the EU.Also in this case, the diagnosis of the root causes clearly
employs human security logic, showing how mixed migratory ows come into
being when individuals and their communities experience persistent physical and
structural violence. In this respect, there are visible links in the EU policy discourse
between the degradation of security with economic decline, showing how poverty
and the lack of opportunities may turn into a powerful and long-term push factor. As
stated by the European Parliament:
devastating civil conict has set countries back decades in terms of social and economic
development, forcing millions of people into unemployment and poverty and entailing con-
siderable destruction of health and education services, and large-scale displacement of
Syrians and brain drain (European Parliament, 2017b, art. 15).
This emphasis on the economic root causes of the crisis is also visible in regard
to framing economic migration as a type of forced migration. EU actors emphasise
economic hardship in the countries of origin as one of the key issues to be addressed
in curbing migratory ows into Europe (Council of the European Union, 2015j;
European Commission, 2016d; European Parliament, 2017a). As indicated by the
European Commission, “poverty, insecurity, inequality and unemployment are
among the main root causes of irregular and forced migration. This includes regions
of Africa, Asia and Eastern Europe where most of the migrants reaching Europe
originate from” (European Commission, 2015c, p.8). The Council of the European
Union often uses a similar type of framing, reiterating the need to look at the crisis
not only in terms of security but also developmental issues and regional dynamics
5 Analysing Diagnosis andEvaluation ofthe“Migration Crisis” attheEU Level
101
that will impact the migratory ows in the near future (Council of the European
Union, 2015h). The Council conclusions on migration and development observe
that “by addressing political, economic and social instability, development coopera-
tion can contribute to ensuring that migration is a choice rather than a necessity”
(Council of the European Union, 2015h, p.2).
Even though war, terrorism and poverty in the countries of origin are depicted as
severe and persistent threats to human life, they are not the most persistent part of
the EU humanitarian framing of the crisis. With respect to “human security” logic,
the EU policy actors clearly frame human trafckers and smugglers as agents pro-
pelling the “migration crisis”, making a considerable effort to elevate their “threat-
ening status” within the EU policy discourse (Council of the European Union,
2016b; European Commission, 2015b; European Parliament, 2016c). The trans-
border criminal networks are described as the main perpetrators and facilitators of
violence against migrants, exploiting human desperation and feeding on degrada-
tion of human security environment in the EU neighbourhood (European Parliament,
2016c, p.2). As stated in the EU Strategy towards the Eradication of Trafcking in
Human Beings:
(…) human trafcking and smuggling are complex transnational phenomena rooted in vul-
nerability to poverty, lack of democratic cultures, gender inequality and violence against
women, conict and post-conict situations, lack of social integration, lack of opportunities
and employment, lack of access to education, child labour and discrimination (European
Commission, 2012, p.3).
In this respect, the EU policy actors attribute blame for the humanitarian crisis on
the EU borders directly to trans-border crime networks, which “put at risk the lives
of immigrants for their own business prots, and are responsible for thousands of
deaths in the Mediterranean” (European Parliament, 2015b). Consequently, the EU
framing of human smugglers puts much emphasis on the inhuman and degrading
mode of their operations, often iterating that “scores of migrants drown at sea, suf-
focate in containers or perish in deserts,” while being squeezed onto “unseaworthy
boats– including small inatable boats or end-of-life cargo ships– or into trucks”
(European Commission, 2015b, p.1).
In this respect, the EU actors have started producing discourse entailing a stricter
understanding of human smuggling, linking it to physical exploitation and trafck-
ing, especially of vulnerable groups such as women and children (Council of the
European Union,2016f, 2017a; European Commission, 2017b, 2017d; European
Parliament, 2016b, g). They have been emphasising the fact that “migrant smug-
gling has become an increasingly violent form of crime, which may involve serious
physical or psychological violence and human rights abuse, exposing women and
children to particular risk” (Council of the European Union, 2016b, p.1). This type
of framing is recurrent in the EU policy texts devoted to the criminal aspects of the
crisis, where smuggling and trafcking are often treated as part of the same “indus-
try” feeding on structural deciencies of the European and national security and
tragic situation of migrants, who often seek “services” of trans-border criminal
5.2 Human Security
102
groups out of desperation (Council of the European Union, 2016b; European
Commission, 2015b).
5.2.3 Dening theHuman Referent Object
When framing the humanitarian features of the crisis, the EU policy actors do not
explicitly differentiate between refugees and economic migrants, or legal and illegal
modes of migration, but rather diagnose threats to all individuals who engage in
mobility out of fear of physical or structural violence. This inclusive denition of
the human referent object is intensied in the denition of the root causes of the
crisis, where the EU policy actors correlate push factors linked to the physical
abuses of war and terrorism with poverty and underdevelopment (European
Commission, 2015c; Council of the European Union, 2016a; European Parliament,
2017b). In this respect, the EU discourse makes attempts to embrace and acknowl-
edge the mixed and internally diverse nature of migratory ows into Europe, empha-
sising the fact that hazardous journeys affect to an equal degree refugees and
economic migrants (see European Council, 2017a, art. 21; European Commission,
2015c, p.7). As stated in the European Council conclusions:
We are deeply concerned by the sharp increase in ows of refugees, asylum seekers and
irregular migrants which entails suffering, abuse and exploitation, particularly for children
and women, and unacceptable loss of life in the desert or at sea (…). We agree that the rst
priority in this context is to save lives and do everything necessary to rescue and protect the
migrants whose lives are at risk (European Council, 2015f, p.1).
Nonetheless this type of inclusive denition of referent objects is noticeably limited
to the external dimension of the “migration crisis”, emphasising the humanitarian
responsibility to save migrants’ lives outside the EU territories, in the countries of
origin or transit (Council of the European Union, 2016a; European Parliament,
2015f). This does not encompass the acceptance of economic migrants to the
European Union on similar rights to so-called “legitimate asylum seekers”.
With the progression of the crisis, the EU policy discourse has visibly shifted its
attention to vulnerable groups such as children, especially unaccompanied minors,
and women, underlying the specic risks that affect their security and wellbeing
(Council of the European Union, 2017a; European Parliament, 2016g). Such an
adjustment in framing of referent objects is not without reason, as the numbers of
women and children seeking refuge in the EU amounted up to 60% of overall arriv-
als in 2016 (Karas, 2016) Here, the European Parliament and European Commission
have proved to be vocal promoters of vulnerable groups, devoting much attention to
conceptualisation and institutionalisation of their protection within the EU policy
framework (European Commission, 2017c). Nonetheless, only as late as mid-2016
did the European Parliament produce a resolution devoted specically to “the situ-
ation of women refugees and asylum seekers in the EU”, introducing an explicit
policy frame for discussion on the scale and nature of vulnerabilities of female
5 Analysing Diagnosis andEvaluation ofthe“Migration Crisis” attheEU Level
103
migrants and refugees affected by the crisis (European Parliament, 2016g). As
stated in the document:
(…) women refugees and asylum seekers are often subjected to multiple forms of discrimi-
nation and are more vulnerable to sexual and gender-based violence in their countries of
origin, transit and destination; whereas unaccompanied women and girls, women heads of
household, pregnant women, people with disabilities and the elderly are particularly vulner-
able; (…) women refugees not only face threats to their personal safety (long and dangerous
journeys into exile, harassment, ofcial indifference and, frequently, sexual abuse and vio-
lence, even once they have reached a place that seems safe and the resulting social stigma-
tisation), but are also responsible for the physical safety, welfare and survival of their
families (European Parliament, 2016g, rec. K, L).
A similar type of framing has been applied to the situation of children and unac-
companied minors in migration, who have been dened as one of the most rapidly
growing vulnerable groups among asylum seekers in the EU.The security of chil-
dren was more decisively embraced as issue in later stages of the crisis, when the
European Commission issued a communication on “protection of children in migra-
tion”. In this seminal policy document, the European Commission, building on the
previous narrative of gender-related vulnerabilities acknowledged that:
(…) both girls and boys in migration are exposed to risks and have often suffered from
extreme forms of violence, exploitation, trafcking in human beings, physical, psychologi-
cal and sexual abuse and before and/or after their arrival on EU territory. They may risk
being marginalised and drawn into criminal activity or radicalisation. Children may go
missing or become separated from their families. Girls are particularly at risk of forced
marriages as families struggle in straitened circumstances or wish to protect them from
further sexual violence (European Commission, 2017c, p.2).
This broad spectrum of vulnerabilities has been gradually introduced into the EU
diagnosis of “migration crisis”-related threats to human security. Here, the most
emphasis has been put on sexual exploitation and forced labour that have been
“thriving” under the circumstances of the degraded security environment in the EU
neighbourhood (Council of the European Union, 2016e; European Commission,
2016c; European Parliament, 2015d, 2016c, e).). In this respect, the narrative on
women and children as vulnerable groups has been explicitly connected to migrant
smugglers and trafckers, who are commonly dened as one of the main perpetra-
tors of gender-related violence (European Commission, 2015b; European
Parliament, 2015d, 2016g).
5.2.4 Comments
The human security logic has become the most signicant part of the evaluation and
diagnosis of the crisis at the EU level. The Parliament has proved to be most dedi-
cated promotor of this particular framing, producing a qualitatively and quantitively
rich discourse on humanitarian features of the crisis. Here, the EP’s resolutions
played a signicant role, case by case putting human lives and wellbeing at the
5.2 Human Security
104
centre of the framing of the crisis. The Commission as well as both Councils did
follow up on this type of framing. Even though the migration security continuum
places the Commission and the Councils on the risk management and exceptional
security side of the framing process, respectively, these two institutions could not
ignore the humanitarian features of the crisis, while proposing its diagnosis its
nature and dening its root causes. This is also a testament of the signicance and
structuration of the human security-centred logic in the rst stages of policy framing
in the EU.
The EU’s application of human security logic in the diagnosis and evaluation of
the crisis clearly denes migrants as the referent objects together with a plethora of
interlinked physical and structural threats that affect their lives and wellbeing. In
this vein, the EU actors visibly build on the notion of humanitarian crisis as an
urgent situation that is caused by security factors external to the EU such as war,
terrorism and poverty, but is also facilitated and escalated by trans-border criminal
networks. In this type of humanitarian framing, the main source of insecurity is
dened as the degraded security environment in the EU neighbourhood and the
hazardous journey, often facilitated by exploitative criminal organisations that use
violence as a part of their business model (Achilli, 2016, p.99). This is the general
outlook on the human security-based securitisation of the “migration crisis”.
However, as indicated above, there are several interesting points that this type of
framing brings into the discussion on securitisation of migration at the EU level.
Firstly, the EU has visibly attempted to distance itself from explicit ownership of
the humanitarian framing of the crisis, introducing a sense of ambiguity in its nam-
ing. Even though the EU has acknowledged the “migration crisis” as a human trag-
edy, it has spent substantial discursive resources to frame its humanitarian elements
as external to the Union. As noted by the European Parliament’s LIBE
Committee member:
I was a co-rapporteur, or a shadow rapporteur, on two migration crisis-related resolutions. I
must admit that even in the EP we had this aversion to the term refugee crisis. Why?
Because Europe does not have humanitarian crises, not anymore. We have challenges; we
have concerns and deciencies– this is it. The moment you recognise that something hor-
rible and humanitarian-related is happening within the borders you change the political
game. You admit that you have lost control and this is something that we did not want to
admit. We still don’t (European Parliament-1).
Consequently, the application of human security logic is most prominently visi-
ble in the framing of the events and aspects of the crisis that are situated outside the
EU.This is particularly noticeable in the framing of the root causes of the crisis,
which here represent the security-related push factors for those who ee from their
communities of origin fearing for their lives and livelihoods. In this vein, the EU
policy actors align with the EU migration-security continuum, building on the nar-
rative of an unstable, underdeveloped and threatening external environment, in
which humanitarian crises often proliferate, varying in scale and nature, but always
distant from the EU.In this respect, one of the interviewees argued that:
The refugee crises have always been in the EU neighbourhood, but have never reached the
EU shores. It was never an internal problem, for European police or border guard. What has
5 Analysing Diagnosis andEvaluation ofthe“Migration Crisis” attheEU Level
105
changed? The scale and efciency of facilitated illegal migration has changed. This is what
made it all different (European Commission-1).
Indeed, as indicated above, the EU policy framing has been placing migrant
smuggling and trafcking at the centre of the securitisation process, explicitly build-
ing a narrative of violence and exploitation around their activities and modes of
operations. Here, the trans-border criminal groups have been framed as the most
severe and persistent threat to migrants’ lives and wellbeing, often getting more
attention than the human security-related root causes of the “migration crisis”.
Consequently, even though they are construed as facilitating factors, smugglers and
trafckers have been deeply securitised within the human security logic and dened
in terms of urgent security problems that affect the whole spectrum of migrants,
especially those most vulnerable. This is also reected in the material gathered from
the interviews:
If I had to dene one specic threat, security challenge to the EU it is the scale of trans-
border organised crime and terrorism– both connected with exploiting migrants. I think
that the humanitarian factor is a little bit responsible for that. The humanitarian imperative
as they call it. We need to ght human smugglers to save lives. And we do it, but more in
the shadows as intelligence providers and experts (Europol-1).
Legally yes, but practically there is often no difference between trafckers or smugglers.
They both feed on human misery and desperation of migrants. Even though data on unac-
companied minors have been exaggerated by Timmermans and the issue of children at risk
is much smaller than described, we still have a lot of groups, vulnerable groups that have
been severely exploited by all kinds of people, not only smugglers but also corrupt law
enforcement in Libya, Egypt, Turkey and so on. It is all a part of the same migration crisis
business model (Council of the European Union-1).
As a result of this securitising move, the EU policy discourse has visibly moved
towards a more humanitarian framing of vulnerable groups, specically women and
children, that have become dened as one of the main objects of violence and
exploitation in migration-related situations. As discussed above, the growing num-
bers of arrivals of women and children into Europe have propelled the EU to refocus
its attention on the vulnerable groups and adjust its policy responses according to
their needs and the specicity of their situation.
Secondly, the EU application of the human security logic in the framing of the
“migration crisis” is reected in an acknowledgement of economic push factors,
such as poverty and underdevelopment, that have largely contributed to increased
and mixed migratory ows. In this vein, the framing of the referent objects broadens
the spectrum of migrants at risk and includes economic migrants (next to refugees)
among those who are threatened. This type of framing, however, does not necessar-
ily refer to asylum procedures or secondary protection as in the case of refugees, but
rather to measures related to saving lives outside the EU or from the hands of human
smugglers and trafckers. As pointed out by one of the interviewees:
It is true that when we talk about saving lives of migrants we usually talk about saving them
at sea, from exploitation by organised crime groups, or from terrible things that happen to
them at their home countries. We tend to forget what is happening to them in Europe. They
5.2 Human Security
106
are still exploited, they still experience hardship, and often their lives are still in danger
(EASO-2).
In other words, the economic migrants’ lives are construed as referent objects, if
they are directly threatened in their country of origin or during the journey. This is
symptomatic for the EU policy actors and their application of human security logic.
The EU tends to emphasise the misery and hardship of migrants, but only up to the
point of the external EU borders. However, when they cross the EU borders the
diagnosis of the nature of crisis and evaluation of its causal effects visibly shift
towards the logic of risk.
Nonetheless, as often indicated in the securitisation literature, the application of
human security logic carries certain risks of manipulation and opens the narrative to
more security-oriented interpretations driven by “exceptionality” (Davitti, 2018;
Squire et al., 2021; Watson, 2011). Indeed, the humanitarian framing applied in
relation to increased migratory inows does invoke a very specic language of
emergency and crisis. It creates a powerful frame that produces a moment of excep-
tion, consequently dismantling certainties and normal narratives of mobility, sover-
eignty, social bonds and belonging (Carastathis etal., 2018, p.31). The humanitarian
emergency language makes the situation more difcult to govern. It limits the
response options to spectacular and extraordinary interventions such as military
missions, border operations and high-level politics which are supposed to bring
order into situation which is “out of control” (Jeandesboz & Pallister-Wilkins, 2016,
p.317). In this sense, the language of humanitarian emergency can be misleading.
It often discursively marginalises the normalised modes of governance and routines
of control and care, which even in crisis situations tend to be intertwined with one
another rather than exclusive (Jeandesboz & Pallister-Wilkins, 2016)
Another consequence of the language of humanitarian emergency, so promi-
nently deployed by the EU and its member states, is the recategorisation of forced
migration, refugeeism and asylum-seeking in the lines of exclusionary and securi-
tised narratives. Holzberg etal.’s (2018, p. 547) research indicates that even in
Germany during the rise of “welcome culture”, humanitarian responses were “con-
tingent upon the rejection of those considered to be undeserving and threatening”.
This type of framing leads to interpretation of broadly international protection and
implementation of asylum policy as a “bitter pill” that has to be swallowed so that
the “normal times” can return (Carastathis etal., 2018, p.31).
5.3 Risk Management
Even though human security-centred security logic has attracted substantial atten-
tion from the EU policy actors, the concept of risk does not stand far behind. The
logic of risk has gained visible levels of structuration, introducing a distinctive way
of looking at different dimensions of the crisis, especially in regard to the EU inter-
nal security domain. As already discussed, risk-oriented logic has been guiding the
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107
EU migration-security continuum since the beginnings of the securitisation of
migration at the EU level. It has been reected in the managerial approach to secu-
rity, interpreting migratory ows as a disturbance that needs to be monitored, con-
trolled and curbed. With respect to this type of logic, the EU has been focusing on
protection of non-human referent objects, such as the Schengen zone, freedom of
movement or effectiveness of the European asylum system. In this regard, there is a
noticeable shift in the denition of risks and potential dangers. Increased proximity
to the EU external borders propels managerial and border security framing of the
crisis, turning “migrants at risk” into “risky migrants”, who put the internal security
of the EU and its citizens in jeopardy.
5.3.1 Naming andCategorising theRisk-Oriented Features
ofthe“Migration Crisis”
The European Commission, as a traditional leading sponsor of risk management in
the EU, has been setting the pace and tone for the rest of the EU actors, mainly the
Council and the European Council, for the risk-centred framing of the crisis. As
already discussed in this book, the Commission has already been at the centre of the
managerial approach towards migration in the EU, driven by technocratic and
surveillance- oriented security policies (Kaunert et al., 2014; van Munster, 2009).
Such an approach has allowed the Commission to increase its relevance within the
EU internal security domain, often building on the ambiguity and exibility of risk
logic in its diagnosis and evaluation of migration and security-related issues. To this
end, the Commission, with the support of other EU institutions, has been introduc-
ing a specic type of naming and categorising in regard to the crisis, framing
increased migratory ows as a technical problem, solvable predominantly at the EU
level and with the EU’s policies and resources.
The risk-oriented naming of the “migration crisis” is rather descriptive and
frames the crisis in terms of high-intensity and large-scale occurrences, disruptions
or challenges to the EU. In this respect, the crisis is commonly referred to as
“unprecedented migratory ows into Europe” (European Council, 2015b) “growing
ows of illegal migration” (European Council, 2015a), “alleviated migratory pres-
sures” (European Commission, 2015c), “unprecedented irregular border trafc”
(European Commission, 2016a), or a “migratory challenge for Europe” (European
Commission, 2017e), to name a few. This type of naming is visibly detached from
the humanitarian and human-centred aspects of the crisis, explicitly centring on
irregular migration and insufcient control over EU external borders and population
movements. In this fashion, the humanitarian “refugee crisis” becomes a technical
“irregular immigration crisis”.
The naming is often followed by an action verb placing the migratory ows in
the category of a “manageable problem”. Here, the European Commission, often
followed by the European Council and the Council of the European Union,
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108
specically focuses on the management of ows on the EU borders, calling for
increased technological resources, funds and security prerogatives that would help:
“stemming” (European Commission, 2016c, d, 2017h, g), “managing” (European
Commission, 2016e, 2017c, e), “containing” (European Council, 2015a), “decreas-
ing” (Council of the European Union, 2016a; European Commission, 2016a, 2017i),
“mitigating” (European Commission, 2015c, f), or “controlling” (Council of the
European Union, 2015e; European Commission, 2016b, 2017g) migration-related
structural pressures (European Parliament, 2015c; Council of the European Union,
2015b). This type of framing assigns agency to the EU, which visibly attempts to
take the initiative and quickly mitigate the negative consequences of the crisis.
The risk-driven framing reveals a different diagnosis of the crisis, not so much
oriented to the external security environment, human tragedy and saving lives, but
to diverting and pushing back its negative consequences from the EU internal secu-
rity environment. In this regard, the EU policy discourse visibly emphasises two
specic features. Firstly, the nature of the crisis is construed as a problem internal to
the EU, managerial and revolving around “signicant structural weaknesses and
shortcomings in the design and implementation of European asylum and migration
policy, which the crisis has exposed” (European Commission, 2016c, p.2). In this
sense, at the core of the crisis lies the EU’s (in-)ability to control its borders and
manage migration, or rather its ability to regain this control for the benet of the
security and free movement of all migrants working and living in the EU (European
Commission, 2015g, p. 4). Secondly, this nature of the crisis is specically con-
nected to the irregular migratory ows, terrorism and organised crime, which in this
case are considered as a matter of both the internal and the external security of the
EU.As indicated in the European Council conclusions, “a key element of a sustain-
able migration policy is to ensure effective control of our external border and stem
illegal ows into the EU” (European Council, 2017d, p. 1). The European
Commission has been reiterating this interpretation, additionally noting that “[t]he
European Agendas on Security and on Migration have set the direction for the
development and implementation of EU policy to address the parallel challenges of
migration management and the ght against terrorism and organised crime”
(European Commission, 2016b, p.2).
5.3.2 Dening Non-human Referent Objects
The risk-centred EU policy discourse explicitly denes the Schengen zone and
mobility in the EU as the main referent objects (Council of the European Union,
2016c; European Commission, 2016a, b). Here, freedom of movement (Council of
the European Union, 2015g; European Commission, 2018a; European Parliament,
2016d, 2017a) and “Europe without borders” (European Commission, 2015a, c, d)
are viewed as the pillars of European integration and some of the most important
accomplishments of the EU member states. As indicated in the 2015 State of the
Union and European Commission’s Communication on “Back to Schengen”:
5 Analysing Diagnosis andEvaluation ofthe“Migration Crisis” attheEU Level
109
(…) we have given up border controls between the Member States of the Schengen area, to
guarantee free movement of people, a unique symbol of European integration. But the other
side of the coin to free movement is that we must work together more closely to manage and
protect our external borders. This is what our citizens expect (European Commission,
2015g, p.5).
Schengen is one of the major achievements of European integration. The creation of an
internal area without borders where persons and goods can circulate freely has brought
important benets to European citizens and business alike. Schengen is one of the key
means through which European citizens can exercise their freedoms, and the internal mar-
ket can prosper and develop (European Commission, 2016a, p.2).
This type of framing has been reiterated on numerous occasions, with emphasis on
the role and value of the Schengen zone and internal mobility within the EU as
deeply linked to European integration and the wellbeing of the EU citizens. In this
respect, the European Commission has been especially active in connecting border
control and migration with the future of Europe, placing security and mobility at the
centre of the framing process, clearly indicating that Europe is a mobile society and
secure mobility is inherent to the European Union (European Commission, 2016a,
p.1, see also: 2018b).
The prominence or risk and the managerial approach has increased along with
the progression of the “migration crisis”. In late 2016 and 2017, when the presence
of migrants was more visible on continental Europe, the human referent object was
marginalised and gradually substituted with the call for protection of the Schengen
zone and EU freedoms (Council of the European Union, 2016a, 2017c; European
Council, 2017c; European Commission, 2017a; European Parliament, 2017a). As
stated in the European Council conclusions on the management of migration, “the
objective must be to rapidly stem the ows, manage our external borders, reduce
illegal migration in order to safeguard the integrity of the Schengen area” (European
Council, 2016a, p.1). By putting the Schengen zone, borders and European territo-
ries at the centre of the framing process, the EU policy actors indicate that that the
real stake of the crisis is the efciency of the European project and the basic func-
tionality of the EU’s internal security systems (Niemann & Zaun, 2018, pp.5–6).
This type of framing opens the securitisation process to a more “exceptionalist”
logic, touching upon basic, or even existential elements of the EU, such as stability
and continuation of the European project. I will discuss this framing thread later on
in this chapter.
5.3.3 Conceptualising Risks
While human security-centred logic places the root causes and threats predomi-
nantly outside of EU borders, connecting them to push factors such as the degraded
security environment and poverty, the risk management logic situates the causes of
the crisis much closer to its territories, focusing primarily on the pull factors. Pull
factors are framed as structural deciencies of the EU external borders and criminal
5.3 Risk Management
110
activities that facilitate increased irregular migratory ows. As indicated by the
European Commission:
Beyond regular travel ows, in 2015 alone, conict in Syria and crises elsewhere triggered
1.8 million irregular border crossings at Europe’s external borders. This is the central prob-
lem. EU citizens expect external border controls on persons to be effective, to allow effec-
tive management of migration and to contribute to our internal security (European
Commission, 2016b, p.2).
In the EU policy discourse, the application of risk logic visibly shifts the centre
of gravity for interpretation of the “migration crisis” and puts it within the EU ter-
ritorial and socio-political structures. It moves security thinking away from distant
turmoil and humanitarian crises and focuses it on the EU external borders and the
internal security environment, which are put at risk as a consequence of increased
and uncontrolled migratory pressures. In this respect, the application of risk logic
begins on the EU borders, the moment when migratory ows reach the EU territo-
ries and become a different type of security problem– predisposed to generating
high levels of risks and uncertainties. As in the case of human security logic, the
framing of the causes of the crisis is closely interlinked with framing of threats, or
rather risks, to referent objects. In this regard, the EU policy actors have been focus-
ing on three distinctive risk-generating issues: (1) criminal groups facilitating the
crisis and “pulling” migrants to the EU; (2) irregular migrants decreasing the ef-
ciency of the asylum system (3) and terrorism-related mobility generating risks to
internal security of the EU.
As risk management logic frames the “migration crisis” as a problem of irregular
migration, it naturally denes trans-border criminal organisations facilitating irreg-
ular migration as one of the key causal effects. In this respect, the EU Agenda on
Security describes trans-border organised crime as one the most challenging and
severe threats to EU internal security, linking it with facilitation of “migration cri-
sis”, terrorism and cybercrime:
(…) serious and organised cross-border crime is nding new avenues to operate, and new
ways to escape detection. There are huge human, social and economic costs– from crimes
such as trafcking in human beings, trade in rearms, drug smuggling, and nancial, eco-
nomic and environmental crime. Organised crime groups involved in the smuggling of
migrants exploit the vulnerabilities of people seeking protection or better economic oppor-
tunities and are responsible for the loss of lives in the name of prot. Organised crime also
feeds terrorism and cybercrime through channels like the supply of weapons, nancing
through drug smuggling, and the inltration of nancial markets (European Commission,
2015d, p.12).
In the case of the “migration crisis”, trans-border organised crime is not only
responsible for putting the refugees and economic migrants at risk, but also fuelling
the crisis by exploiting the structural deciencies of the EU borders and making
irregular crossings an attractive form of migration. It simultaneously feeds on and
drives the “migration crisis”. As repeatedly indicated by the European Commission:
Irregular crossing of borders threatens security and fuels the crisis. Effective management
of borders and ght against organised crime responsible for migrant smuggling and traf-
cking in human beings are essential. It is therefore of utmost importance to step up our
5 Analysing Diagnosis andEvaluation ofthe“Migration Crisis” attheEU Level
111
joint efforts aimed at establishing comprehensive border management (Council of the
European Union, 2015f, art. 3).
Action to ght criminal networks of smugglers and trafckers is rst and foremost a way to
prevent the exploitation of migrants by criminal networks and to stem uncontrolled irregu-
lar migratory ows into Europe. (…) The goal must be to transform smuggling networks
from ‘low risk, high return’ operations for criminals into ‘high risk, low return’ one
(European Commission, 2015c, p.8).
The second group of risks (i.e. irregular migrants) has been systematically
framed in EU policy discourse as an obstructive security nuisance that reduces the
effectiveness and integrity of the EU asylum and border protection systems (Council
of the European Union, 2016b; European Commission, 2015b). Here, the irregular-
ity of migration is commonly linked to economic migrants, who upon their arrival
in the EU undergo reframing– from referent objects eeing extreme poverty and
underdevelopment, to a security problem that needs to be managed, processed, and
returned to their place of origin as soon as possible (European Commission, 2016c;
European Parliament, 2015f). In the course of the “migration crisis”, the EU has
visibly strengthened its position on irregular migration, emphasising its “disor-
derly” (European Commission, 2016c) or “uncontrollable” (European Commission,
2017g) aspects and even framing it as an issue that European citizens need to be
protected from. As stated by Donald Tusk after the European Council meeting in
June 2017, “Last year we agreed that the EU will protect our people against security
threats, illegal migration, and uncontrolled globalisation, and we must continue to
deliver” (European Council, 2017b, p.1). This stance reiterates the position of the
European Commission, according to which:
Migration has been and will continue to be one of the dening issues for Europe for the
coming decades. (…) We need to stem disorderly irregular migration ows, protect our
external borders and safeguard the integrity of the Schengen area (European Commission,
2016c, p.1).
Building on this type of narrative, the EU policy discourse has been employing a
well-known frame of irregular migrants, posing risks to refugees and legal migrants
and obstructing legal pathways of migration and efcient implementation of the EU
asylum system. The European Commission has been actively strengthening this
framing, underlining that:
the EU must continue to offer protection to those in need (…), but by the same token, the
EU needs to draw the consequences when migrants do not meet the criteria to stay.
Unsuccessful asylum claimants who try to avoid return, visa overstayers, and migrants liv-
ing in a permanent state of irregularity constitute a serious problem. This corrodes con-
dence in the system. It offers strong arguments for those looking to criticise or stigmatise
migration. It makes it harder to integrate those migrants staying in the EU as of right
(European Commission, 2015c, p.7).
In this regard, the EU policy actors have been increasingly framing ineffective
policies on irregular migration as a major security deciency and a pull factor
increasing facilitated irregular migratory ows (Council of the European Union,
2014, 2015a; European Commission, 2016c). The EU policy discourse noticeably
5.3 Risk Management
112
reects a stricter and more security-driven approach to migration in the EU, aimed
at deterring potential irregular migrants
(…) from trying to reach the EU by using smugglers’ services, it has to be made clear to
them that they will be returned swiftly to their home countries if they have no right to stay
in the EU legally. For the moment, smuggling networks exploit the fact that relatively few
return decisions are enforced to attract migrants (39.2% of return decisions were carried out
in 2013) (European Commission, 2015b, p.7).
The third group of risks pertains to terrorism and its effect on increased migra-
tory ows. Here, the EU policy discourse centres predominantly on jihadist and
religion- driven terrorism,5 making rather marginal note of domestic right-wing radi-
cals who have been gaining support and inuence on the wave of anti-refugee and
anti- migrant resentments in Europe (Ragazzi, 2016, p.14). It should be highlighted
that the EU policy actors, most notably the Commission, the Council and the
European Council, do not directly frame terrorism as a causal effect of the crisis and
explicitly avoid making any associations between refugees and jihadist terrorism.
They do, however, extensively apply a risk-oriented approach pointing towards
terrorism- related concerns, risks and possibilities, while connecting them with
uncontrolled migratory ows into the EU (European Commission, 2015d, p. 2,
2016b, p.3). In regard to this risk-centred evaluation of the crisis, two major secu-
rity concerns, or security causal effects, stand out and link the “migration crisis” to
the problem of terrorism, namely uncontrolled irregular migration and
radicalisation.
The 2015 Paris attacks have proved to be a turning point for more decisive fram-
ing of terrorism in relation to the “migration crisis” (Council of the European Union,
2015a, 2016d; European Commission, 2016b; European Council, 2015c). Here, the
EU policy discourse reects a concern that the uncontrolled migratory inows have
been used and may be used in the future by terrorist groups to penetrate EU borders
for the purposes of radicalisation, recruitment and perpetration of violent acts on the
EU territories (Council of the European Union, 2017b; European Commission,
2017f; European Parliament, 2017a; European Union, 2017). As indicated by a
Europol’s ofcial during hearings in the LIBE Committee of the European
Parliament:
The inux of refugees and migrants to Europe from existing and new conict zones is
expected to continue. Islamic State has already exploited the ow of refugees and migrants
to send individuals to Europe to commit acts of terrorism, which became evident in the
2015 Paris attacks. Islamic State and possibly other jihadist terrorist organisations may
continue to do so (LIBE, 2016; see also: Europol, 2017, p.6).
Europe faces many complex security challenges at the moment, including at the external
border of the EU where high migratory pressures are exploited by criminal organisations.
5 Jihadist terrorist attacks have increased over the course of the crisis, from 4in 2014, 17in 2015,
and 13 in 2016 (Europol, 2017). EU member states’ law enforcement agencies also increased
arrests of suspects related to jihadist terrorism from 395in 2014, 687 in 2015 and 718 in 2016
(Europol, 2017).
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113
Although seen on a much less frequent scale suspected terrorists also use these channels to
move in and out of Europe. Combating these movements is already a top priority for the EU
and the Member States (LIBE, 2015).
In this respect, the possibility of terrorist entry into Europe is framed as a prob-
lem of uncontrolled mobility and insufcient border management, which makes it
impossible to stop and/or track risky movements out and into the EU territories
(European Commission, 2016b). One of the more prominent aspects of this type of
framing is the explicit inclusion of radicalised EU citizens into the pool of “mobile
jihadist terrorists”, distinctively placing the problem of terrorist mobility on the
internal-external security axis. In this regard, the European Commission has been
quite explicitly pointing towards the issue of foreign ghters and the need for
strengthening the ltering function of the EU external borders:
EU citizens are known to have crossed the external border to travel to conict zones for
terrorist purposes and pose a risk upon their return. There is also evidence that terrorists
have used routes of irregular migration to enter the EU and then moved within the Schengen
area undetected. These elements brought into sharper focus the need to join up and
strengthen the EU’s border management, migration and security cooperation frameworks
and information tools in a comprehensive manner (European Commission, 2016b, p.2).
Extremist propaganda has been shown to lead foreign terrorist ghters from Europe to
travel abroad to train, ght and commit atrocities in combat zones, and to threaten the inter-
nal security of the EU on their return (European Commission, 2015d, p.14).
The EU policy discourse also reects risks related to radicalisation (Council of
the European Union, 2017b; European Union, 2017). In this type of framing, irregu-
lar and mostly economic migrants are dened as prone to indoctrination and exploi-
tation by jihadist recruiters who feed on their poor socio-economic and precarious
status in the EU (Council of the European Union, 2017b; European Parliament,
2017b). As indicated by Europol and also repeated during LIBE Committee hearing
on terrorism and organised crime:
Terrorist groups continue to exploit the socio-economic grievances of Muslim immigrants
to the EU, in order to recruit and incite them to engage in terrorist activities. Islamic State’s
ideology has a certain appeal amongst segments of the Muslim population in the EU, some-
times expressing admiration for “martyrdom”. Motivations may generally include a belief
that Islam is under attack from the West (LIBE, 2017; see also: Europol, 2017, p.7).
Similar concerns have been voiced in relation to European reception facilities
and conditions, which have been often descried in the EU discourse as “unsatisfac-
tory” (European Parliament, 2017a) “inadequate” (European Parliament, 2016e)
and failing to meet the EU security and humanitarian standards (European
Commission, 2016e, 2017h).
5.3 Risk Management
114
5.3.4 Comments
The analysis of EU policy discourse, as presented above, indicates that risk manage-
ment logic has deeply saturated the framing of the “migration crisis”. Here, the
framing of the crisis is centred on the disruptive impact of increased migratory ows
on the Schengen zone, EU borders and the European system of migration control
and asylum. Such an application of risk management logic visibly shifts the point of
reference for the framing process, placing it within the EU and on its border. In
regard to risk-oriented logic, the “migration crisis” is described as a manageable
problem, a migratory ow, inux, or pressure that can be dealt with properly
adjusted policy tools and technologies of control. At the same, the crisis generates
risks to the EU internal security domain, revealing and feeding on its deciencies,
creating opportunities for its further degradation. As already noted, this type of
framing is not new to the EU and is well-placed within the EU migration-security
continuum. However, in the case of the “migration crisis” there are several impor-
tant points that should be discussed in more detail.
Firstly, the application of risk-oriented logic visibly de-escalates the urgency
levels of the crisis, moving it to a more mundane realm of management, surveillance
and control. This is typical for this type of framing, as application of management
is problematic in a situation of “panic politics”. Managing risks requires a certain
sense of stability that allows to continue and adjust “normal security politics and
practices” that are necessary to normalise the situation, in this case the “migration
crisis”. The interviewees, specically those representing the AFSJ agencies,
agreed that:
Nothing that has been happening around the crisis is completely new. The new mandate of
Frontex has been on the agenda for some time now, the EU wanted to strengthen Europol’s
anti-smuggling intelligence units and EASO has to change its mandate, because right now
it is not even a fully-edged agency. This is all, to some extent, a part of a normal institu-
tional process (Frontex-3).
This crisis is really about a multisystem failure of the migration, asylum and border control.
Look how many different policies, regulations and legal orders we have here. We do not
have one specic problem or a security issue, it is a networked problem with different facets
and dimensions. I hate when someone asks me what this crisis is about. Is it humanitarian
or security? It is neither, it is both. We have a lot of holes in this European ship of ours and
we should stop deliberating over the nature of those holes and start xing them, all of them,
otherwise we sink (Europol-2).
Indeed, the EU policy discourse does not dene one ultimate referent object, as
in the case of human security-centred logic, but instead points to a set of dispersed
yet interconnected objects, such as the Schengen zone, the EU borders or asylum
and migration policies. The common denominator for all these referent objects is
control, which here can be dened as an overarching referent object that the EU
strives to protect, maintain and exercise. As observed by one of the interviewees:
This crisis is not about refugees, Syrians, Iraqis, or what have you– we can deal with them.
It is about irregular migrants who day in day out test our ability, as a Union, to withhold
5 Analysing Diagnosis andEvaluation ofthe“Migration Crisis” attheEU Level
115
constant migratory pressures in the situation of extreme structural deciencies. Look at the
Greek sea borders, it is impossible control them in such a situation. There is no border right
now, we are playing hide and seek on the high seas, with ngers crossed that we do not die
and they [irregular migrants] do not die in this very risky and tragic game (Frontex-2).
Indeed, in the risk-oriented framing, the element of “losing control” over parts of
the EU external borders and consequently human mobility is construed as one of the
most signicant causal effects of the crisis. As a result, every element that contrib-
utes to this effect is dened as a risk, or a security concern potentially affecting the
EU internal security order. Here, the issue of facilitated irregular migration, along
with the clients and the perpetrators of this crime, seems to play a central role in the
EU framing of the crisis. As already noted, the risk-oriented framing of irregular
migrants is not specically out of character for the EU and is in line with the EU
migration-security continuum. Consequently, the massive inux of migrants into
the EU is described as a serious structural problem that decreases the efciency of
the EU asylum system and obstructs the processing of those who are in “real” need
of protection, namely refugees.
Even though irregular migrants play an important role in risk-oriented framing of
the “migration crisis”, it is trans-border organised crime, primarily human smug-
glers and trafckers, that is dened as a key pull factor. In this respect, the EU policy
discourse prominently reects the destructive and obstructive role of organised
crime, attributing to it the majority of the blame for creating conditions for the pro-
gression and further escalation of the “migration crisis”. As noted by one of the
interviewees:
It might not be popular what I am going to say right now, but refugee crises have always
been present in the EU neighbourhood. It is nothing new really. I would not say that Assad
or ISIS caused this refugee crisis in Europe. It is the smugglers that have created this bridge
to Europe and brought the crisis to our doorsteps (Europol-3).
Thus, in the EU policy discourse, this “bridge” between the uncertain and threat-
ridden external security environment and EU internal security has become one of
the most important security concerns. It is linked with increased risks of terrorist
mobility and activity in the EU and consequent radicalisation of the refugee and
migrant groups arriving to and living in the EU territories.
5.4 “Exceptionalist” Security
In the EU, the “exceptionalist” logic of security has not reached signicant levels of
structuration in the diagnosis and evaluation segments of the framing process. Thus,
it cannot be treated as separate strand within the frame-narrative, setting a distinc-
tive and coherent tone for diagnosis and evaluation of the crisis. In contrast to cer-
tain member states’ political and media discourse, the EU policy actors have been
refraining from the traditional path of securitisation of migration and explicit diag-
nosis of the crisis in terms existential dangers to the European Union. Nonetheless,
5.4 “Exceptionalist” Secur ity
116
this does not mean that the EU policy discourse on the “migration crisis” is com-
pletely free from the “exceptionalist” security logic.
The elements of militaristic language, the sense of extreme urgency and state-
related denition of the referent object is still present in the EU’s framing of the
crisis. It manifests not as a separate logic, but rather intertwines with human secu-
rity- and risk-centred interpretations in different aspects of diagnosis and evalua-
tion. As in the case of the previous logics, “exceptionalist” security has its key
sponsors within the EU policy discourse, namely the Council of the European Union
and the European Council. This is not surprising, as the Council is often described
as a “guardian of national security”, exercising often strong militaristic and
Realpolitik-driven approach to framing and conceptualisation of threats within and
outside the EU borders (Maricut, 2017, p.166). After all, both Councils are com-
prised of government ofcials who traditionally promote an intergovernmental and
state-centred approach to security (Hampshire, 2016). In this regard, the Councils
traditionally have sponsored a strong security-centred approach to migration and
border policies, correlating it with public safety, the need of control over borders
and EU territory, as well as stability of the Union as a whole (van Munster, 2009,
pp.59–63). In this sub-chapter, I will discuss how “exceptionalist” security logic
has seeped into the human security-centred and risk-oriented framing of the nature
and causal effects of the “migration crisis”.
5.4.1 Human Security– “Exceptionalist” Security
As already noted, the human security-oriented framing of the crisis puts the
migrant’s life at the centre of the problem, dening it as the value that requires pro-
tection from a long list of pervasive threats such as war, terrorism, criminal exploita-
tion, extreme poverty or underdevelopment, to name a few. In the EU’s diagnosis
and evaluation of the crisis, this specic type framing intertwines with a more
“exceptionalist” outlook on security, building on common elements of exceptional-
ity and externality of existential and brutal threats to referent objects.
Firstly, as in the case of “exceptionalist” security logic, the human security fram-
ing imbues the “migration crisis” with a sense of urgency, centring it on the “human-
itarian imperative” and “human tragedy” or “humanitarian disaster” that is
happening in the EU neighbourhood and on the EU borders. It proposes an unam-
biguous denition of the human referent objects (i.e. “friends”) and existential
threats (i.e. “enemies”) that have to be addressed decisively in order to protect the
migrant’s life. In this vein, the brutality and severity of threats, dened as war, ter-
rorism, and crime networks, create an imperative for application of extraordinary
security measures that in such a situation are capable of protecting migrants. It
could be argued that even though human security logic does not directly securitise
migrants, it creates a very specic security framework around them, implicitly plac-
ing them within the realm of “exceptionalist” security permeated with urgency,
5 Analysing Diagnosis andEvaluation ofthe“Migration Crisis” attheEU Level
117
unambiguity, existential threats and an imperative for the application of extraordi-
nary, often militarised, measures.
Secondly, the humanitarian framing of the “migration crisis” has coincided with
“exceptionalist” security logic in the diagnosis of the root causes, specically in
regard to identication and location of existential threats to migrants. Here, the EU
constructs its humanitarian perspective by focusing explicitly on threats that origi-
nate outside its socio-political and territorial domains. In this respect, the blame is
commonly attributed to external actors and phenomena, which according to the EU
policy discourse hold the sole responsibility for the outburst of the “migration cri-
sis”. In this vein, the EU neighbourhood is most often dened as the source of the
migratory problems, and described as in extreme turmoil, overridden with conict,
terrorism, and crime, all of which pose existential threats to migrants during their
hazardous journey to Europe.
5.4.2 Risk Management– “Exceptionalist” Security
As discussed above, risk-driven diagnosis and evaluation of the crisis proposes a
distinctive framing of increased migratory ows, describing them as having signi-
cant potential for decreasing the structural efciency of the EU internal security
system, consequently jeopardising the stability and controllability of the Schengen
zone, freedom of movement, and external borders of the EU.In this respect, the
application of risk logic locates the security problem within the internal security
domain and denes it in terms of risks and security concerns, rather than direct
threats. On the face of it, such a framing seems very distant from “exceptionalist”
security thinking; nonetheless, there are traces of traditional securitisation logic in
the risk-oriented framing of the crisis. This mesh of logics is most pronounced in the
denition of the referent objects (e.g. the EU external borders and the Schengen
zone) and the framing of the organised crime, which in the course of the crisis has
arisen as an exceptional security problem for the EU.
The risk-driven denition of referent objects tends to include indications to state-
like features of the EU such as territory and external borders, which require “safe-
guarding” (European Commission, 2016a, p.12; European Council, 2015b, p.4;
European Parliament, 2016f, p.2), “protecting” (Council of the European Union,
2016c, p.22; European Commission, 2016a, p.2; European Parliament, 2016f, p.9)
or “defending” from disturbing effects of the “migration crisis” (Council of the
European Union, 2015l, p. 1–2; European Commission, 2016e, p. 17). In this
respect, the European Council, has proved to be the most vocal promoter of “excep-
tionalist” logic in the EU policy discourse. In ofcial remarks, customarily deliv-
ered after the European Council meetings, the President of the European Council
has been applying the militaristic and urgent language connecting the need of
regaining control over external borders with the survival of the Schengen zone and
even the EU as a whole:
5.4 “Exceptionalist” Secur ity
118
I will repeat this again: without control on our external borders, Schengen will become his-
tory (Council of the European Union, 2015c, p.1).
Let there be no doubt: the future of Schengen is at stake and time is running out (European
Council, 2015e, p.1).
Yesterday’s discussion on migration conrmed the hierarchy of our aims, where protecting
our territory, protecting our external borders as well as stemming illegal migration come
rst (Council of the European Union, 2017d, p.1).
Another issue where the logic of exceptionality intertwines with risk manage-
ment is organised crime. The problem of organised crime has been placed very high
on the EU security agenda, playing an important role in both the human security and
risk-oriented framings of the crisis. In this respect, organised crime has been con-
strued as one of the main “enemies” of European integration, a direct threat to EU
citizens and their freedoms as well as to migrants. Building on this narrative, the EU
has been applying militaristic language, expressing the need for “combating”
(Council of the European Union, 2016b), “eradicating” (European Union, 2017), or
“ghting against” organised crime, most notably human smugglers and trafckers
(European Commission, 2015b, f). As indicated in the Valetta Political Declaration:
We undertake to scale up our joint efforts in preventing and ghting migrant smuggling,
eradicating trafcking in human beings and combatting those who exploit vulnerable peo-
ple, both in Europe and in Africa. Trafcking in human beings, including for the purpose of
sexual exploitation and forced labour is a serious crime and an unacceptable infringement
of fundamental human rights. We will strengthen the ght against organised criminal net-
works, including their links to terrorism, through effective border management, enhanced
cooperation and the implementation of the relevant legal and institutional frameworks
(European Council, 2015f, p.3).
The European Council reiterated this position, clearly stating that “we [the EU]
must prove that we can defend Europe against organised crime and those who want
to abuse our openness” (European Council, 2017b, p.1). This type of language and
militaristic narrative towards organised crime has been present in the EU migration-
security continuum but has reached signicantly higher levels of structuration with
the framing of the “migration crisis”.
5.4.3 Comments
“Exceptionalist” security logic, though residual, exists in the EU policy discourse
on the “migration crisis”, manifesting itself in different parts of diagnosis and evalu-
ation. It does not necessarily disrupt the dominant logics of human security and risk
management, but rather increases a sense of urgency and emphasises the imperative
for action– often of an extraordinary nature. As noted by one of the interviewees:
We have become even more territorial with this crisis. Every time we talk about protecting
our borders, putting more armed men on the checkpoints, erecting walls, I think that this
migration crisis is getting more and more militarised. I have been on Parliamentary delega-
tion on Evros and in Bulgaria very recently and there is a lot of military or military-like
5 Analysing Diagnosis andEvaluation ofthe“Migration Crisis” attheEU Level
119
activity going on there. I am not sure if it is the right direction, but this is how we face this
purportedly humanitarian problem– with men in uniforms and guns (EP-1).
The elements of “exceptionalist” security logic can be observed in the example
of the framing of organised crime and evaluation of its role in the “migration crisis”.
Trans-border organised crime has been widely framed in the EU policy discourse as
one of the most severe and urgent security issues that affect a plethora of referent
objects ranging from migrants, European citizens to security of EU external bor-
ders. At same time it feeds on and fuels EU security deciencies, becoming the key
facilitator of the crisis. As noticed by one Europol ofcial and the EP-2:
Organised crime can be linked to everything from illegal immigration to terrorist attacks. It
is a security nightmare, really, and you cannot just get rid of it. Today, the problem is not as
much about existence of organised crime, because they are here to stay, but their business
model that feeds on our security deciencies and fuels our security problems. For example,
organised crime makes money on the migration crisis and uses this money to nance terror-
ism. Our rst and foremost security concern should be about breaking this model
(Europol-3).
There has never been so much attention paid to trans-border organised crime as there is
today. I sit on the special committee on terrorism and even there we talk about a lot about
organised crime, human smuggling, trafcking and radicalisation in the refugee camps. It
all revolves around organised crime. It connects many dots and is a big problem in Europe
and outside Europe. A good example is corruption among law enforcement ofcers. It is
organised crime that corrupts them and pays them. We need to eradicate it, but for that we
need to work together, as a Union and as global security actor (European Parliament-2).
5.5 Conclusion
Framing of a policy-relevant problem is a complex and messy process, imbued with
many different logics and approaches reected in a plethora of potential interpreta-
tions that struggle, correspond, and intertwine in the inter-subjective contestation of
the problem’s specic nature, causal effects and remedial actions (Schön & Rein,
1991, p.23). The aim of the “securitisation as the work of framing” approach is to
esh out these different logics and types of security thinking applied in the collec-
tive framing of issues and phenomena that potentially yield security implications for
the socially valued objects. In this sub-chapter, I presented an overview of the rst
two components of the securitising frame-narrative produced in response to the
“migration crisis”, namely diagnosis and evaluation. These two elements, though
conceptually separate, constitute a very closely interlinked interpretative space,
which prepares the background for remedial action by providing the denition of
the nature of the problem, root causes and security implications, threats, and attribu-
tion of blame.
The analysis of the EU’s diagnostic and evaluation scheme indicates that securi-
tisation of the “migration crisis” is interwoven with different strands of security
logics that “emplot” or wrap the EU frame-narrative, unravelling the existence of a
5.5 Conclusion
120
complex and dynamic interpretation. In this respect, the analysis unveils dominant
security logics that have been applied in the diagnosis and evaluation of the “migra-
tion crisis”, namely human security and risk management– both containing traces
of “exceptionalist” security thinking. Even though these logics drive two distinctive
types of framings and build on different features and causal effects, they still co-
exist in the EU frame-narrative, overlapping and intertwining in the policy framing
process.
Human security and risk management logics, being part of the same frame-
narrative, place the “migration crisis” on the internal-external security axis, reveal-
ing the dynamic nature of both the crisis as well as the framing process. The human
security logic is centred on the security of all migrants who embark on the journey
to the EU, eeing from pervasive threats and structural violence This type of logic
has a very strong externalising effect, placing the “migration crisis” and its main
security features outside the EU and its socio-political and territorial domain. Here,
the core security issues do not stem from the migrants, but hazardous migration,
affected by external security environment proliferated with dangers, such as organ-
ised crime of terrorism. The human security framing, though reaching highest levels
of structuration, has proved to be limited in two signicant aspects. The rst limita-
tion refers to the factor of time and normalisation of the humanitarian interpretation
in the EU policy discourse regime. With the progression of the crisis, the EU policy
actors, except for the Parliament, have been gradually deemphasising the humani-
tarian features of the crisis, acknowledging their importance, but rather as a matter
of courteous reference than strong support. The second limitation refers to the spa-
tial dimension of the human security-oriented interpretation of the crisis. The
humanitarian framing ends at the EU external borders and gives a way to a risk-
oriented and managerial approach to security.
The EU external borders represent an important symbolic and physical space,
where the two logics most extensively interact and intertwine in their framing of the
central security concerns and referent objects. Upon contact with the EU borders,
migrants are effectively stripped of their protective status and reframed as risks to
security. Consequently, the salience of the humanitarian narrative is downplayed
when confronted with the EU borders and replaced with the referent object dened
as control over migration and the Schengen zone. This shift in framing of the refer-
ent object introduces tension into the EU frame-narrative, particularly in relation to
the denition of the root causes and framing of migrants. While human security
logic promotes an inclusive approach to migrants requiring protection, the risk-
oriented interpretation clearly recognises the mixed character of inows, differenti-
ating irregular migrants into “desirable asylum seekers” who deserve protection and
“undesirable economic migrants” who are a security nuisance. This tension has vis-
ible effect on conceptualisation of remedial actions segment of the EU frame narra-
tive. The EU borders also reect some important points of convergence for both
logics. In the diagnostic and evaluation segments of the EU frame-narrative, trans-
border organised crime constitutes a signicant element for both logics. In both
types of framing, organised crime is recognised as a severe security problem in
relation to both referent objects, be it migrants (human security) or control over
5 Analysing Diagnosis andEvaluation ofthe“Migration Crisis” attheEU Level
121
border and migration (risk management). Organised crime also represents the point,
where “exceptionalist” security thinking seeps into the EU frame-narrative, being
imbued with a sense of severity and urgency and linked with other major security
concerns such as terrorism.
What has been omitted in the diagnostic and evaluation segments of the EU
frame-narrative is the logic of resilience. The lack of this logic in the initial stages
of the framing process comes as a surprise, as it has been commonly dened in the
EU studies literature as one of the newest leitmotifs in EU security policymaking
(Wagner & Anholt, 2016). Being the cornerstone of the new EU global strategy, it
explicitly tackles the problem of recurring migration-related risks and threats such
as an unstable neighbourhood, refugee crises, terrorism and poverty, all of which
have been agged by the EU in the framing of the crisis (European Commission,
2016d, pp.27–30). In this vein, resilience would seem like a natural t for the diag-
nosis and evaluation of the “migration crisis”. Its omission could be inuenced by
three factors. Firstly, the prominence and framing power of risk management logic
in the EU migration-security continuum has deeply impacted the interpretation of
the crisis, leaving little space for other risk-oriented logics. Secondly, the framing of
the crisis has been more reactive, focusing on regaining control over migration and
the EU external borders and managing the situation, rather than preparing for the
inevitable cycles of migratory pressures. Thirdly, when the EU Global Strategy was
introduced in 2016, resilience became much more inuential in the EU in the later
stages of the crisis, having more impact on the conceptualisation of remedial actions.
The diagnostic and evaluation segments of the frame-narrative address the ques-
tions of “what are we dealing with?” and constitute the interpretative grounds for
conceptualisation of policy responses that are most suitable for a specic category
of problems at hand. In reference to the “migration crisis”, the policy actors have
introduced two dominant diagnostic and evaluation framings, namely human secu-
rity and risk management oriented. They represent two distinctive strands of secu-
rity framing that have reached discourse structuration and have signicant chances
for institutionalisation within the last segment of the frame-narrative, namely con-
ceptualisation of remedial action. In the next chapter, I discuss how these logics,
along with their specic interpretations of referent objects, categorisation of threats
and evaluation of causal effects translated into specic EU policies mobilised in
response to the “migration crisis”.
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M. Stępka, Identifying Security Logics in the EU Policy Discourse, IMISCOE
Research Series, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-93035-6_6
Chapter 6
Analysing theConceptualisation
ofRemedial Actions Towards
the“Migration Crisis” at theEU Level
6.1 Introduction
The collective conceptualisation of remedial action constitutes the concluding part
of the frame-narrative. It represents the institutionalisation of specic interpreta-
tions, making them a part of the security practice framework. In this respect, reme-
dial action is supposed to be the culmination of the interpretative process and a
natural and logical extension of specic security logics that informed the tasks and
objectives set out in the diagnostic and evaluation segments. This, however, is not
always the case. Conceptualisation of remedial action often proves to be most com-
plex, ambiguous, and confusing part of frame-narrative (Schön & Rein, 1991; van
Hulst & Yanow, 2016). It commonly becomes a forum for tensions between security
logics, be it those which have already reached structuration in the diagnosis and
evaluation or new interpretations that have entered the stage in the last moment
(Boas & Rothe, 2016). In this sense, the remedial action phase may follow the inter-
pretative path that has already been set up, but also include a change of internal
dynamics of the frame-narrative, downgrading, emphasising specic logics, or even
completely diverting from the diagnosis and evaluation, introducing ambiguities
and incoherencies into the framing process (Dekker, 2017, p.130).
As outlined in the previous chapter, the EU policy actors have diagnosed and
evaluated the “migration crisis” following predominantly human security and risk
management logics, both containing traces of “exceptionalist” security. The reme-
dial action segment has proved to be a game changer in terms of application of these
security logics, reshufing their prominence and revealing their tangled nature.
While risk management has sustained its prominence in the conceptualisation of
remedial actions, the human security-centred interpretations of the crisis have
become deemphasised into a secondary or supporting logic. Instead of focusing
predominantly on humanitarian aspects of the crisis, the EU policy actors have been
explicitly promoting the risk-oriented measures, emphasising the risk management
approach and introducing the concept of resilience into the EU frame-narrative.
132
This is not to say that human security-centred logic has been lost in the EU’s con-
ceptualisation of remedial actions, but it has been rather dispersed between resil-
ience- and “exceptionalist” security-centred measures, acting as a legitimising
element rather than a guiding rationale. In this respect, the EU measures such as
naval and border operations (“exceptionalist” security), as well as capacity-building
operations and trust funds (resilience) have been framed as instruments of humani-
tarian relief and development aid designed specically to target the root causes and
alleviate human suffering. In this respect, resilience as a new addition to the frame-
narrative proves to be an interesting case of intersection between the security of
migrants and the notion of borders and migration management systems capable of
withstanding shocks and disturbances caused by increased migratory ows. The EU
policy discourse connects the effectiveness and functionality of border and asylum
systems with its ability to provide necessary protection for refugees and asylum
seekers. As often indicated in policy documents, without well-functioning security
and asylum systems, the EU will not be able to protect migrants from organised
crime or process their asylum applications in timely manner and with due diligence.
It should be also noted that “exceptionality”, even though there are more singular
examples of its application in the conceptualisation of remedial actions (such as
military mission EUNAVFOR MED “Sophia”), it also has a tendency to overlap
with other logics. It can be identied in the framing of risk and resilience-centred
policy actions such as relocation mechanism and EU capacity building missions,
respectively. In this respect it can also be dened as a security logic of dispersed
nature, saturating specic remedial actions with more robustness and extraordinary
character.
This chapter is structured in accordance with the dominance of specic logics
that manifest in the EU’s conceptualisation of remedial action towards the “migra-
tion crisis”. In this respect, the rst sub-chapter is devoted to the logic of risk man-
agement that has been identied as the most dominant and the most signicantly
institutionalised within the EU policy responses to the crisis. It focuses on a plethora
of measures, such as “hotspots” or the European Border Surveillance System that
have been framed as means of surveillance and control of migrants and their move-
ment. Further, the chapter proceeds to the analysis of resilience-centred conceptu-
alisation of remedial actions. Resilience, being a part of a broader family of
risk-driven logics, has been identied as a new development in the EU frame-
narrative, reecting a distinctive set of measures designed to increase the robustness
of the EU asylum system within the EU and to address the root causes of the crisis
outside of EU borders. Here, resilience coincides with human security-oriented
logic, being framed as an instrument for containing migration and mitigating factors
which are threatening migrants’ lives and are pushing them out of their own com-
munities. The third sub-chapter is devoted to “exceptionalist” security logic, analys-
ing the way militarised and border security measures have been framed as life- and
migrant-saving instruments and how they have been building on the humanitarian
imperative and narrative.
6 Analysing the Conceptualisation of Remedial Actions Towards the “Migration…
133
6.2 Risk Management
Risk management logic has retained its prominence in the remedial action segment
of the EU frame-narrative, effectively becoming both discursively structured and
institutionalised within the EU policy discourse on the “migration crisis”. As already
noted in the previous chapter, the risk management-oriented framing has been pre-
dominantly (but not exclusively) sponsored by the European Commission, promot-
ing the notion of stability of the EU internal security realm, as well as dening the
Schengen zone, freedom of movement, and EU external borders as the key referent
objects. Such framing naturally leads to conceptualisation of remedial actions, cen-
tred on helping to regain the control over the movement of population within the EU
and restoring the functionality of Schengen and the external borders of the EU.In
this respect, the risk-oriented security measures traditionally refer to normalised,
institutionalised forms of security governance and are based on broad cooperation
between security agencies and systems, often operating within the internal-external
security nexus (Lund Petersen, 2012, p.702). As such, risk management and resil-
ience have much in common, attempting to strengthen the effectives of the system,
making it more robust and capable of withstanding crisis situations. That is why it
is only natural to see resilience in some elements of risk management policies.
Nonetheless, what is typical of the managerial approach is a belief that crises, future
shocks and disturbances are fully governable. Resilience does not subscribe to this
conviction. That is why risk management-driven policy actions usually assume a
conventionalised and long-term character, focusing on the future foreseeable events
and ways they can be managed and mitigated. In this respect, risk management
measures are based on technologies of control and surveillance of “risky objects”.
They are designed to navigate and govern possible “risky futures” and achieve an
equilibrium between what is considered as satisfactory security and acceptable
uncertainty (C.A.S.E., 2006, p.468).
In this regard, the conceptualisation of responses towards the “migration crisis”
has been driven by the development and improvement of already existing technolo-
gies of surveillance and control, oriented on administration of migratory ows and
ltering capabilities of the EU border management systems (see European
Commission, 2015a, b, c, f). The overarching aim of these remedial measures is to
normalise the situation, regain control and restore the desired order within the bor-
ders of the EU.In this regard, much of the risk-oriented remedial actions are heavily
embedded within internal-external security dimension and the borders, which dur-
ing the crisis, have proved to become a problematic space for interpretative and
practical reasons. As already discussed, the borders constitute the point where the
framing process shifts from human security to risk management, reshufing secu-
rity priorities and changing the denition of the referent objects. This has led to
interpretative tensions within the EU policy discourse and between EU policy actors
(most notably the European Commission, the Council and the European Parliament)
in regard to conceptualisations of remedial actions and their securitising conse-
quences on migration and migrants.
6.2 Risk Management
134
In the next part of this chapter, I will focus on the internal and external dimension
of the risk-oriented security measures, specically by analysing activities employed
to responding to the arrival of asylum-seekers at the EU’s external borders (e.g.
through the introduction of “hotspots”), measures oriented to surveillance and con-
trol of population movement (e.g. return operations, European Border Surveillance
System) and the prevention of irregular migration (through border control and mea-
sures against trafcking and smuggling, and the EU-Turkey deal). I also identify the
policy responses that have become the most explicit examples of the tensions
between human security and risk management logic within and outside the EU,
namely the “hotspot approach”, “detention, returns and readmission” and the
“EU-Turkey Statement”.
6.2.1 The “Hotspot Approach”
The so-called “hotspot approach” represents one of the most prominent examples of
risk-based policy responses employed by the EU and framed as an instrument for
regaining control over inows of irregular migrants into the EU. The “hotspot
approach” was introduced and elaborated by the European Commission and has
quickly become the symbol of the EU’s response to the “migration crisis” (European
Commission, 2015b, p.6). It has been developed and implemented as a frontline
mechanism for border and migration management, specically designed to assist
the EU border states, such as Greece and Italy, in coping with sudden and increased
inuxes of irregular migrants (Council of the European Union, 2015d, p.2; European
Commission, 2015b, p.5). The main idea behind this approach is to increase the
efciency of EU reception capabilities by deploying specialised EU Regional Task
Forces1 (EURTF) and Migration Management Teams,2 entrusted with providing
“operational support to Member States to ensure arriving migrants were identied,
registered and ngerprinted, and channelled into the relevant follow-up procedures”
(European Court of Auditors, 2017, p.5). As stated in the “Agenda on Migration”:
(…) a new “Hotspot” approach is based on the European Asylum Support Ofce, Frontex
and Europol working together on the ground with frontline Member States to swiftly iden-
tify, register and ngerprint incoming migrants. The work of the agencies will be comple-
mentary to one another. Those claiming asylum will be immediately channelled into an
1 EURTF is a specialised administrative unit responsible for coordination of the activities and infor-
mation exchange between different teams of experts involved in the “hotspot approach”. This
includes EU agencies (such as Frontex, EASO and Europol) as well as authorities of the host
country. EURTF and operational expert teams support the work of the host Member State on the
ground (e.g. registration and screening of irregular migrants at the ports of disembarkation, pre-
return assistance in pre-removal centres) (Statewatch, 2015).
2 The European Commission denes a Migration Management Support Team as a team of experts
deployed within the framework Frontex, EASO, or another relevant EU agency. The teams are
entrusted with technical and operational support to Member States at hotspot areas (European
Commission Website, 2018g).
6 Analysing the Conceptualisation of Remedial Actions Towards the “Migration…
135
asylum procedure where EASO support teams will help to process asylum cases as quickly
as possible (European Commission, 2015b, p.6).
“Hotspots” are commonly depicted in the policy discourse as strategically
located centres for migration and risk management (Council of the European Union,
2015b, g, h, c; European Commission, 2015b, c, 2016a, e; European Parliament,
2015b, c, d). They are the frontline hubs for the EU inter-agency data gathering and
cooperation, employing complementary security measures and practices aimed at
“improving border management, combating irregular migration, and creating suf-
cient and adequate reception conditions” (Papadopoulou etal., 2016, p.19). In this
respect, “hotspots” represent a physical space, where irregular migrants arriving at
the EU borders become reframed, from human security-based referent objects to
objects of risk that need to be managed with security technologies such as screen-
ing, security debrieng or biometric proling (Amicelle etal., 2015). With these
practices and technologies, the personal data of irregular migrants are put into the
EU’s data gathering and surveillance systems such as migrant ngerprinting system
(Eurodac), Schengen Information System, and Visa Information System, effectively
becoming a factor in an equation calculating risk for the security of the EU and its
citizens.
This fact and the process of reframing migrants from objects of protection to
objects of risk has not gone unnoticed and has been reected in the EU policy dis-
course as well as the general public debate concerning the “hotspot” approach.
Deployment of “heavy intelligence machinery” on the frontlines of the “migration
crisis has caused signicant tensions between the human security and risk manage-
ment logics in the EU (Jeandesboz, 2017, p. 367). In this vein, the European
Parliament has yet again engaged in the debate emphasising that “great care needs
to be taken to ensure that the categorising of migrants at ‘hotspots’ is “carried out in
full respect for the rights of all migrants” (European Parliament, 2016f, rec. 85)
focusing not so much on security but protection and humanitarian assistance
(European Parliament, 2016d, rec. 13). However, the biggest criticism has origi-
nated outside the EU, mostly in the NGO sector, which has been condemning the
EU for the introduction of so-called “anti-migrant security measures”, employing
“inadequate, unfair and/or repressive measures towards asylum-seekers, who have
been often kept in prolonged detention without access to asylum procedures and
have received inaccurate or incomplete information on the latter, or have been
swiftly returned” (Niemann & Zaun, 2018, p.6). In this respect, the EU has been
specically blamed for the lack of any specic legal framework that would protect
the fundamental rights of refugees and economic migrants (Amnesty International,
2016; LIBE, 2015). The discourse of NGOs and humanitarian organisations on the
situation in the “hotspots” clearly frames the approach as inhuman and in violation
of human rights and dignity, while Human Rights Watch indicated that “hotspots”
constitute an outstanding breach of human security pointing towards poor medical
services, inadequate food supply and accommodation (Human Rights Watch
Website, 2016c).
6.2 Risk Management
136
6.2.2 Returns, Readmission andDetention
Detention (or using the EU nomenclature “reception”) and returns operations of
irregular migrants have been a vital part of the EU migration- security continuum
and have naturally become one of the key instruments for managing increased
migratory ows in the EU (Ceccorulli & Labanca, 2016; Slominski & Trauner,
2018, 2021; Tazzioli, 2017). Even though detention and returns operations function
under different legal and institutional frameworks, they both share similar goal,
namely separation and/or removal of problematic, risky, or threatening migrants
from EU public space (Mountz etal., 2013, p. 523). As already elaborated in the
previous chapter, the EU regulates detention with the Reception Directive, allowing
the temporary detention of migrants in order to (1) verify their identity during pro-
cessing their asylum claims, (2) secure evidence when there is a risk of an applicant
absconding, (3) in order to decide upon migrant’s right to enter the EU territory, (4)
when protection of national security and public safety is involved, (5) and nally
when a migrant has been subjected to a return procedure (European Union, 2013a,
art. 8).
Even though the EU policy discourse on the “migration crisis” promotes the idea
of detention as the last resort, most commonly emphasising the need for looking for
alternative forms of reception, especially in reference to vulnerable groups (e.g.
children), it also emphasises the need for rigorous identication (European
Commission, 2017b, p. 9; European Parliament, 2016c, rec. 8), separation and
return of those migrants who do not qualify for protection in the EU (Council of the
European Union, 2015a, p.3, 2016c, p.7; European Commission, 2015b, pp.9–10).
In this regard, particularly the Council of the European Union and the European
Council highlight the importance of detention measures in curbing and managing
irregular ows of migrants into and within the EU territories (see for example
Council of the European Union, 2016i, j, 2017d; European Council, 2015e, 2017b).
As often reiterated in the outcomes of the Justice and Home Affairs Council (Council
of the European Union), “to prevent secondary movements, detention measures in
line with article 15 of the Return Directive should be applied urgently and effec-
tively” (Council of the European Union, 2015j, rec. 8; see also: 2015f; 2016c, h). In
this respect, detention has also been framed as an important migration management
mechanism that facilitates the returns operations and deters further inows of
unwanted irregular migrants. In this respect, the Council has been underscoring that
All measures must be taken to ensure irregular migrants’ effective return, including use of
detention as a legitimate measure of last resort. In particular, Member States should rein-
force their pre-removal detention capacity to ensure the physical availability of irregular
migrants for return and take steps to prevent the abuse of rights and procedures (Council of
the European Union, 2015c, rec. 6).
In this respect, as a complementary response to the “migration crisis”, there is a
visible increase in the EU policy discourse of references to returns operations as a
form of migration management though voluntary or assisted (i.e. forced) removal of
“aliens” from the physical, juridical, and social space of an EU member state
6 Analysing the Conceptualisation of Remedial Actions Towards the “Migration…
137
(Slominski & Trauner, 2018, p.102). As already indicated in the previous chapter,
the return of “undesirable migrants” has been present in the EU migration-security
discourse since the late 1990s and the full operationalisation of the Schengen zone
(Huysmans, 2000; van Munster, 2009). However, it is the “migration crisis” that has
raised its prole and framed it as an essential part of the EU’s risk and migration
management toolbox (see for example Council of the European Union, 2015c, d,
European Commission, 2015b, 2017a; European Council, 2015f; European
Parliament, 2014, 2015a). The EU policy discourse on returns operations focuses
predominantly on the idea of swift and effective return, readmission and reintegra-
tion of irregular migrants who have not qualied for protection, legal residence in
the EU and/or have been agged as a security risk to public safety (Baldaccini,
2009). In this respect, particularly the European Commission has been promoting
the image of returns operations as an effective and inevitable scenario for all “unsuc-
cessful asylum claimants who try to avoid return, visa overstayers, and migrants
living in a permanent state of irregularity” (European Commission, 2015b, p.7).
Trauner and Ripoll Servent (2016, p.1420) observe that in the EU policy dis-
course, return operations have gained strong security features, being employed to
deal not only with problematic migratory ows and expulsion of irregular migrants,
but to also as a deterrent to human smuggling operations. As noted in the European
Council conclusions:
Effective return, readmission and reintegration policies for those not qualifying for protec-
tion are an essential part of combating illegal migration and will help discourage people
from risking their lives. All tools shall be mobilised to promote readmission of irregular
migrants to countries of origin and transit (European Council, 2015a, p.3).
In this respect, the EU policy discourse on returns is based on the notion that
mobilisation and effectiveness of these operations relies as much on the internal as
external factors, promoting the need for increased cooperation with third countries
under the Migration Partnership Framework.3 Here, the European Commission
along with other policy actors has been employing a rather direct or even assertive
approach towards partner countries that have been reluctant to comply with read-
mission and/or partnership agreements, explicitly stating that while some countries
comply with their international and legal obligation towards the EU, many others do
not cooperate in a satisfactory manner (European Commission, 2017c, p.12). In this
respect, the European Commission and Council have visibly emphasised the ele-
ment of effectiveness, promoting political and administrative actions that could
speed of the returns of irregular, unwanted migrants (Council of the European
Union, 2015c, f; European Commission, 2015a, b, 2016k). In this respect, the EU
has called for cooperation with third countries based on leverages and incentives
that could facilitate (re)negotiations of readmission agreements increasing their
3 The Migration Partnership Framework regulates returns to third countries as well as passing back
irregular migrants from a member state to another on the basis of bilateral readmission agreements
(see European Commission, 2017l).
6.2 Risk Management
138
scope and the effectiveness of return operations. As stated by the European
Commission,
Overall, tailor-made approaches should be used to identify all the interest, incentives and
leverages at stake with a partner country in order to achieve targets and commitments and
to offer specic support measures by the EU and interested Member States to the partner
country concerned– such as effective reintegration of returnees– so as to ensure a better
management of migration, and in that context to further improve cooperation on return and
readmission. The EU and Member States will need to employ their collective leverage in a
coordinated and effective manner to achieve this result (European Commission,
2017a, p.13).
In a similar spirit, the EU policy actors have consistently sought to make the
return policy more effective by closing loopholes and interpreting the existing EU
regulations more rigorously (Slominski & Trauner, 2018, pp. 106–107). This
approach has quickly translated into further tensions between human security and
risk management logics within the conceptualisation of remedial actions towards
the “migration crisis”. The development of the “safe country of origin”4 list repre-
sents a good example of such tensions, introducing a fast-track procedure for evalu-
ation of asylum claims that was supposed to facilitate and increase the rate of returns
decisions. As noted by the President of the European Commission in the 2016 “State
of the Union”:
We are making our return policy more effective. The proposed new EU list of ‘safe coun-
tries of origin’ will allow for faster returns where an individual has no right to asylum, and
we are putting in place incentives, for specic countries (starting with Algeria, Bangladesh,
Morocco and Pakistan) to ensure effective returns and readmission (European Commission,
2016k, p.42).
In this respect, the EU, and most vocally the European Commission, has been
promoting the idea that increasing the effectiveness and swiftness of detention/
reception and return operations “is the only way Europe will be able to show soli-
darity with refugees in real need of protection” (European Commission, 2017e,
p.4). This type of framing has been contested by the European Parliament, which
consistently pointed towards the dangers of detaining vulnerable groups, especially
minors, indicating that “the fear of being detained, sent back or transferred, is result-
ing in children absconding, leaving them exposed to trafcking, violence and
exploitation” (European Parliament, 2018). In a similar manner, NGOs and interna-
tional organisations have been pointing out ill treatment of migrants during the
administrative processing of their asylum claims (Perkowski, 2016). Papadopoulou
etal. (2016) observe that, especially in the frontline member states, migrants have
been kept in prolonged detention, often in undignied conditions. They have been
frequently provided with inaccurate or incomplete information on asylum proce-
dures, which commonly led to administrative mistreatment and premature return
decisions (Vanderbruggen etal., 2014). Similar criticism has been raised against the
4 The concept of a “safe country of origin” denes countries which, based on the stability of their
democratic system and compliance with human rights standards, are considered safe to live in
(Niemann & Zaun, 2018, p.9).
6 Analysing the Conceptualisation of Remedial Actions Towards the “Migration…
139
Returns Directive and reliance on the “safe countries of origin” list (Slominski &
Trauner, 2018; Uçarer, 2014). In this regard, NGOs have been pointing towards the
danger of “blanket return decisions”, leading to disregard of individual cases and
proper administrative asylum due process (ECRE, 2015).
6.2.3 Intelligence Cooperation, Surveillance andControl
In security studies literature, intelligence cooperation, surveillance and migration
control are considered as the cornerstones of the risk management logic (C.A.S.E.,
2006; Kessler & Daase, 2008; Skleparis, 2016). Amoore and Raley (2017, p.12)
argue that intelligence is a multipurpose tool in crisis situations, allowing policy
makers and practitioners to make sense of the crisis and take informed decisions
that would account not only for the current but also future shocks and disturbances.
In this regard, the EU’s approach to the “migration crisis” is often described as data-
driven, heavily relying on high quality operational information (i.e. intelligence)
and technologies of control and management (Bellanova & Duez, 2016; Jeandesboz,
2016; Marin, 2017). Jeandesboz (2016, p.293) notes that since 2001, systematic
and large-scale gathering, analysis and use of electronic information on persons has
become a preferred policy option for border control in the EU.The EU has been
feeding on an elaborate network of data gathering and monitoring systems, inte-
grated into border control, including the Schengen Information System (SIS),
Eurdac, Visa Information System (VIS), Passenger Name Record (PNR), Entry/
Exist System (EES), to name a few (see European Commission, 2016b, i, 2017k).
This broad spectrum of risk management tools and technologies has entangled the
AFSJ agencies, border and internal security authorities in a dense socio- technological
web, designed for governance of regular and irregular inows and outows of
migrants in the EU (Bellanova & Duez, 2012, p.110). In this regard, the EU policy
discourse builds on two important strands of narrative, namely “technologies of
border control” and “intelligence-gathering systems”.
Let us see how these instruments for risk management intertwine in the framing
of the EU external borders. As already mentioned in the previous chapter, referent
objects in the risk management-driven diagnosis and evaluation of the crisis have
been centred on the issue of control of migratory ows and external borders. Here,
EU policy actors directly refer to smart, advanced and preventive border technolo-
gies as instrumental in regaining and sustaining control by strengthening data shar-
ing on border trafc and migratory movements within the EU borders (see Council
of the European Union, 2016h, j; European Commission, 2016b, i; European
Commission Website, 2018h; European Parliament, 2016a). The framing of the
data-driven policy response towards the crisis has been built on the idea of the
“incomplete picture” of the “migration crisis” (European Commission, 2015e,
2017k, m; European Commission Website, 2018d), explicitly indicating that pool-
ing and sharing information on migrants and border trafc is one of the most impor-
tant pillars of the EU’s response to the crisis (European Commission, 2017h, j). The
6.2 Risk Management
140
Commission’s “Agenda on Migration” refers to the need for the technologisation of
migration and border management in the EU, stating that
managing our borders more efciently also implies making better use of the opportunities
offered by IT systems and technologies. The EU today has three large-scale IT systems,
dealing with the administration of asylum (Eurodac), visa applications (the Visa Information
System), and the sharing of information about persons or objects for which an alert has been
created by the competent authorities (Schengen Information System). The full use of these
systems can bring benets to border management, as well as to enhance Europe’s capacity
to reduce irregular migration and return irregular migrants. A new phase would come with
the “Smart Borders” initiative to increase the efciency of border crossings, facilitating
crossings for the large majority of ‘bona de’ third country travellers, whilst at the same
time strengthening the ght against irregular migration by creating a record of all cross-
border movements by third country nationals, fully respecting proportionality (European
Commission, 2015, p.5).
As pointed out by Lehtonen and Aalto (2017, p.219), even though the “Smart
Borders” initiative is not treated by the European Commission as a policy response
specic to the “migration crisis”,5 the so-called “smartening of borders” certainly is,
and has been serving as an umbrella concept for curbing migratory ows with bor-
der and data surveillance systems. In this vein, the European Commission has been
stressing the role of “computerized systems for the collection, exchange and analy-
sis of data related to persons crossing its external borders” (Jeandesboz, 2016,
p. 292). Along with the “Smart Borders” package (i.e. Registered Traveller
Programme- RTP6 and Entry/Exit System-EES7) and the previously-mentioned
large-scale IT systems, the European Commission has been calling for the full
application of the Stolen and Lost Travel Documents (SLTD), Anti-Fraud
Information System (AFIS), the Prüm framework,8 Passenger Name Record (PNR),
European Criminal Records Information System (ECRIS), European Police Record
Index System (EPRIS), and Maritime Common Information Sharing Environment
(CISE) (European Commission Website, 2018h). All these technologies, to different
degrees, have not been maintaining electronic records on different aspects of
5 In this regard, the European Commission frames the “Smart Borders” as an instrument dealing
with recording short-term legal stays of third country nationals (European Commission,
2016i, p.1).
6 RTP is a border control system which facilitates crossing of EU external borders for visitors from
third countries traveling frequently to the EU.It is based on pre-vetting of specic groups of travel-
lers before their arrival at the border (European Parliament Website, 2018c).
7 EES gathers data on non-EU nationals (both visa-required and visa-exempt travellers). It gathers
travel information and records entry and exit information with a view to facilitate the border cross-
ing and identify overstayers (European Commission Website, 2018d). The system has an important
security feature as it is designed to “support the identication of terrorists, criminals as well as of
suspects and victims of crime. It also provides a record of travel histories of non-EU nationals
including crime suspects, perpetrators or victims of crime. It would thus complement the informa-
tion in the SIS” (European Commission Website, 2018d).
8 The Prüm framework is an information exchange tool, which grants EU member states mutual
access to DNA analysis les, ngerprint identication systems and vehicle registration data
(European Commission Website, 2018c).
6 Analysing the Conceptualisation of Remedial Actions Towards the “Migration…
141
migration, border crossing and criminal activity and have been a part of what
Jeandesboz calls the “European mass ‘dataveillance’ system”, which has been con-
sistently framed and reframed by the Commission as the only way to ensure “con-
trol over border control” and migratory ows into Europe (Jeandesboz, 2016,
p.293).
In this vein, the EU policy discourse on the “migration crisis”, particularly pro-
duced by the European Commission and the Council of the European Union, has
been extensively promoting the idea of the “interoperability” of the EU information
systems (Council of the European Union, 2016g, m, n; European Commission,
2015b, c, 2017k, m). As often reiterated by the Commission, one of the conse-
quences of the “migration crisis” was the realisation that proliferation and fragmen-
tation of different EU dataveillance systems makes it impossible to reach effective
exchange of data (European Commission, 2017k). In this vein, the Commission
explicitly argued that
currently, EU information systems do not talk to each other– information is stored sepa-
rately in unconnected systems, making them fragmented, complex and difcult to operate.
This risks pieces of information slipping through the net and terrorists and criminals escap-
ing detection by using multiple or fraudulent identities, endangering the EU’s internal secu-
rity and making border and migration management more challenging (European
Commission, 2017h, p.2).
In response to this problem, the European Commission has proposed the creation of
a massive information-sharing platform9 for migration ofcials, police ofcers and
border guard, that would enable EU security ofcials faster and seamless access to
all centrally operated EU databases,10 which hold information on migrants, and
migration- and border-related illicit activities (European Commission, 2017i). The
platform was to be based on a common search engine giving access to shared bio-
metric matching service, identity repository and multiple identity detector, designed
specically for comprehensive and fast security screenings of migrants (European
Commission, 2017k, h).
This “technologisation” of the EU’s approach to the “migration crisis” is simi-
larly visible in reference to Eurosur, which has become a prominent part of the EU
risk management-oriented framing of remedial actions. As stated by the European
Council, the EU needs to “increase its reactivity towards rapid evolutions in
9 In order to reach satisfactory levels of interoperability, the European Commission has also pro-
posed strengthening the mandate of eu-Lisa– an AFSJ agency responsible for maintenance and
management of the EU IT-large scale dataveillance systems, specically the Schengen Information
System and the Visa Information System. The proposition of the Commission envisages that eu-
Lisa would be responsible not only for management but also development of the new systems and
would contribute to increased interoperability of the EU data gathering and surveillance (European
Commission, 2017i).
10 The interoperability platform initially encompasses the following databases: Schengen
Information System, Eurodac, Visa Information System, Entry/Exit System (EES), European
Travel Information and Authorisation System, European Criminal Records Information System for
third-country nationals, Interpol’s Stolen and Lost Travel Documents (European
Commission, 2017i).
6.2 Risk Management
142
migration ows, making full use of the new European Border Surveillance System
(Eurosur)” (Council of the European Union, 2014, rec. 9). According to Bellanova
and Duez (2016, p.28), the EU policy discourse has been visibly shifting the per-
ception of Eurosur, framing it not only as a platform allowing to enhance internal
security by exchange of border surveillance data, but also as a tool facilitating on the
one hand law enforcement operations and on the other search and rescue missions.
In this vein, Eurosur as a “system of border surveillance systems” has been com-
monly identied as a larger part of the EU border, irregular migration, cross-border
crime, and terrorism monitoring technology that in conjunction with “dataveil-
lance” is supposed to contribute to better risk management and “joint pre-emptive
actions” on the frontlines of the crisis (Jeandesboz, 2016; Jeandesboz & Pallister-
Wilkins, 2014, 2016). As stated by the European Commission:
The EU should further develop monitoring of pre-frontier area for early identication of
smugglers and prevention of irregular departures of migrants, including through the use of
Frontex tools, such as Eurosur. The potential of using satellite imagery following the agree-
ment signed by Frontex and the EU Satellite Centre Sat Cen should be fully exploited. EU
IT systems (e.g. SIS II, VIS) and the European Document Fraud Network should be used to
improve risk analysis and enable identication of irregular entry and stay through ‘look-
alike’, falsied or forged documents, or nationality swapping (European Commission,
2015a, p.5).
These different technologies of surveillance and data gathering operate for the
benet of the EU member states’ justice and home affairs authorities, which feed
the systems information and utilise it for intelligence and operational activities
(Friedewald etal., 2017). In this regard, the EU AFSJ agencies, specically Frontex
and Europol, play a crucial role as facilitators of the intelligence cooperation within
the EU internal security realm gathering, compiling, processing and disseminating
data and analysis on broadly understood border security, irregular migration trends,
irregular migrants, trans-border crime and terrorism (Carrapiço & Trauner, 2013;
Pollak & Slominski, 2021). In the course of the “migration crisis”, Frontex has
gained a special position in the EU policy discourse, being framed as a key opera-
tional and intelligence-oriented agency involved on the frontlines of the crisis (i.e.
“hotspots” and joint border operations) and in its background (e.g. Frontex Risk
Analysis) (see Council of the European Union, 2016a, f; European Commission,
2015b, 2016e, 2017m; European Parliament, 2016a).
As a part of response package to the “migration crisis”, the EU has re-negotiated
the mandate of Frontex bringing into existence the European Border and Coast
Guard Agency (Frontex) (also referred in the academic literature as “Frontex+”)
(Gruszczak, 2017; Léonard & Kaunert, 2020). As a result, the agency has signi-
cantly increased in terms of scope and size, becoming one of the biggest and best-
funded AFSJ agencies in the EU.11 One of the most controversial aspects of the
renewed mandate include what is called “preventive vulnerability assessment”,
11 In 2016 Frontex was given a 54% budget increase, amounting to 176million EUR.In 2017, the
budget reached 302million EUR with another increase of funds negotiated for the budgetary term
2020–2027. The staff size has increased from 304in 2016 to 488 in 2017. For comparison the
6 Analysing the Conceptualisation of Remedial Actions Towards the “Migration…
143
based on a border stress simulation and technical evaluation of “the capacity and
readiness of the Member States to face challenges at their external borders, (…) as
well as their contingency plans to address possible crisis at the external borders”
(European Union, 2016a, p.3). Following a negative outcome of the assessment,
Frontex has been given the right to intervene in the cases where an EU member state
facing structural deciencies is unable to properly address increasing “migration
pressures” (Carrera et al., 2017, p. 45). In this situation, Frontex is obligated to
deploy technical and operation assistance supporting border controls so as to safe-
guard the functioning of the Schengen area (Carrera & Hertog, 2016). This specic
prerogative of Frontex has distinctive features of risk management and resilience
logics. On the one hand, the assessment allows for management of specic sections
of external border in order to divert from possible scenarios of border and migration
crises. On the other, it makes the agency responsible for identication of the “weak-
est link” in the EU border security system and provision of support and recommen-
dations for the purposes increasing the state’s robustness in the case of the future
migration-related shocks and disturbances on the European borders. The logic of
resilience will be discussed further in the next part of this chapter.
In respect to risk management logic, the new mandate expands Frontex’s intel-
ligence gathering and sharing capabilities by reinforcing its “points of entry into
maritime border surveillance cooperation and information exchange, based on net-
works of authorities with coast guards’ functions”, specically Eurosur (Carrera &
Hertog, 2016, p. 3). However, most importantly, the new mandate increases the
scope of collecting, processing and exchanging the personal data of migrants gath-
ered during Frontex-led operational activities (i.e. at “hotspots”, joint border opera-
tions, pilot border surveillance programmes, rapid border interventions, etc.)
(Esteve, 2017, p.14). In this regard, the mandate allows Frontex to share personal
data not only on “persons who are suspected of involvement in cross-border crime,
such as migrant smuggling, trafcking in human beings or terrorism” (European
Union, 2016a, p. 12) but also “persons who cross the external borders without
authorisation” (European Union, 2016a, p.19). This has only increased the risk-
driven securitisation of irregular migration, which has begun to operate within the
same security frameworks and categories as criminals and terrorists.
In the EU discourse on remedial actions, Frontex is intertwined with Europol.
The agency is tasked with supporting law enforcement authorities throughout the
EU in regard to crime ghting activities, including areas specically relevant to the
“migration crisis”, namely human trafcking, facilitated irregular immigration,
organised crime and terrorism, to name a few (Den Boer, 2015). Europol is often
described as an intelligence hub, feeding on information provided by the Member
States and other EU AFSJ agencies (Carrapiço & Trauner, 2013, p.365). To this
end, it collects, stores, processes, and analyses data for operational (e.g. supporting
joint investigations) and strategic purposes (e.g. informing the European Commission
budget of European Asylum Support Ofce is approx. 75million EUR with staff of 200 people
(ECRE, 2017).
6.2 Risk Management
144
and the Council of the European Union) related to EU internal security (European
Union, 2016b). As a part of the EU’s response to the “migration crisis” Europol and
Frontex cooperate in “hotspots”, facilitating:
(…) the process of a systematic registration, including ngerprinting of illegally entering
third-country nationals according to the Eurodac Regulation and to perform systematic
security checks by using relevant databases, in particular SIS II, Interpol, VIS and national
police databases (Council of the European Union, 2016c, p.5).
In this vein, Europol has re-framed from a purely intelligence-driven to a “quasi-
operational” agency, capable of sending ofcers into the frontline of the crisis and
becoming the EU’s “boots on the ground” (Scipioni, 2017, p.6). As part of the EU
remedial action towards the crisis, Europol has also gained a new mandate, which
not only cosmetically renamed the agency into the European Union Agency for Law
Enforcement Cooperation (Europol), but also strengthened its intelligence-sharing
capabilities and reinforced its transnational role in ghting terrorism, cyber-crime,
and trans-border organised crime (European Union, 2016b). Consequently, Europol
has opened an intelligence centre, the European Migrants Smuggling Centre, tasked
specically to cooperate with the AFSJ agencies (i.e. Frontex and Eurojust) and
“support EU member states’ police and border authorities in coordination of highly
complex cross-border anti-smuggling operations” (Europol Website, 2021).
6.2.4 EU-Turkey Statement
Confronted with increased and continuous migratory pressures and prolonged
deployment of internal policy responses (e.g. reforming of the Common European
Asylum System, re-negotiations of AFSJ agencies mandates, re-negotiations of
readmission agreements, to name a few), the EU has opened up to externalisation of
the migration management, attempting to curb irregular migratory ows in the pre-
frontier area of the EU, preferably in cooperation with third countries. The
EU-Turkey Statement of 18 March 201612 lies at the heart of this type of migration-
related risk management strategy, building on the idea of control, containment and
deterrence of irregular ows into the EU, specically through Greece and the
Eastern Mediterranean route (Niemann & Zaun, 2018, p.8). It should be noted that
the EU-Turkey statement can be dened as a political declaration and not an ofcial
part of the EU policy response to the “migration crisis”. In this sense, it is not insti-
tutionalised within any specic policy nor it is an international agreement and con-
sequently legally binding for the EU or Turkey (Zaragoza-Cristiani, 2017,
pp.59–60). This means that the statement is not formally subjected to the European
Parliament’s scrutiny or judicial review by the Court of Justice of the European
Union (Carrera etal., 2017).
12 The content of the Statement has become a “blueprint” for similar partnership frameworks with
Afghanistan, Mali, Niger, Nigeria, Senegal, Ethiopia (European Commission, 2017l).
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The content of the EU-Turkey statement focuses on pre-frontier management of
migratory ows, specically of Syrian nationals, from Turkey into Greece and is
based on the following provisions: (1) as of 20 March 2016 new irregular migrants
entering Greece through Turkey have been returned to Turkey. This applies to all
migrants who have either not applied for asylum or whose applications have been
declared “un-founded” or “inadmissible”; (2) for every Syrian being returned to
Turkey from the Greek islands, another Syrian will be resettled from Turkey to the
EU taking into account the UN Vulnerability Criteria (Council of the European
Union, 2016f, art. 1 and 2). The statement does not allow for more than 72 thousand
people being retuned through this mechanism (Niemann & Zaun, 2018, p.8). At the
same time, Turkish authorities are obligated to “take any necessary measures to
prevent new sea or land routes for illegal migration opening from Turkey to the EU,
and will cooperate with neighbouring states as well as the EU to this effect” (Council
of the European Union, 2016f, art. 3). In return, the EU has promised to accelerate
visa liberalisation negotiations and disburse three billion EUR as a part of the
“Facility for Refugees in Turkey” fund and additional three billion EUR for any
projects aiming to help refugees in Turkey (European Commission, 2015d). The EU
has also advanced the talks on Customs Union and resumption and extension of the
accession negotiations with Turkey (European Commission, 2015d).
Bauböck (2018, pp.152–153) notes that this design of the EU-Turkey Statement
makes it inherently burden-sharing and risk management-oriented, being equipped
with specic return and resettlement mechanisms, migratory quotas and nancial
features. Nonetheless, its framing and position in the EU policy discourse is not that
evident. The EU policy actors quite commonly agree that the Statement has been
put into action as a way of curbing irregular migratory ows, but at the same time
built an explicitly humanitarian narrative around it, describing the Statement as a
life-saving instrument (see Council of the European Union, 2016f; European
Commission, 2017g; European Council, 2016c). An apt example of such framing is
the 2016 “State of the Union”, where the President of the European Commission
noted that “we adopted on 18 March 2016 an EU–Turkey Statement to end the
irregular migration from Turkey to the EU to replace dangerous journeys across the
Aegean with safe and legal paths to the EU for Syrian refugees” (European
Commission, 2016k, p. 42). It was also reiterated in the following year, when the
President of the Commission stated that:
We have managed to stem irregular ows of migrants, which were a cause of great anxiety
for many. We have reduced irregular arrivals in the Eastern Mediterranean by 97% thanks
our agreement with Turkey. And this summer, we managed to get more control over the
Central Mediterranean route with arrivals in August down by 81% compared to the same
month last year. In doing so, we have drastically reduced the loss of life in the Mediterranean
(European Commission, 2017e, p.114).
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Indeed, the rapid drop of irregular border trafc to the EU from Turkey through
Greek islands13 has generated a momentum for optimism towards the EU-Turkey
deal, gradually making it into one of the most important pillars of the EU’s remedial
actions towards the “migration crisis”. The EU policy actors have been reiterating
in their respective discourses the need for sustaining and deepening migration-
related cooperation with Turkey as one of the most effective and key measures in
stabilising border trafc and curbing irregular migratory ows in the Eastern
Mediterranean (Council of the European Union, 2016b, j; European Commission,
2017g; European Council, 2015d, 2016b; European Parliament, 2016f, 2017b). In
this vein, in the progress report on “Agenda on Migration”, the European Commission
directly argues that:
The implementation of the EU-Turkey Statement has continued to play a key role in ensur-
ing that the migration challenge in the Eastern Mediterranean is addressed effectively and
jointly by the EU and Turkey. It continues to deliver concrete results in reducing irregular
and dangerous crossings and in saving lives in the Aegean Sea. The full and sustained
implementation of the Statement requires continuous efforts and political determination
from all sides (European Commission, 2017f, p.5).
Even though the EU policy discourse reects praise of the EU-Turkey Statement
for its effectiveness and rapid decrease of the migratory pressures in the Eastern
Mediterranean, it has not been so vocal about its human rights and human security
dimension, or rather the lack thereof.14 The EU’s framing of the Statement conve-
niently marginalises certain practical, legal or moral aspects of the document,
including the conditions in Turkish refugee camps, discrimination of specic groups
of migrants by Turkish ofcials, or the varying degree of protection of Syrian and
non-Syrian refugees under the Turkish asylum law,15 to name a few (Batalla Adam,
2017). Furthermore, the EU-Turkey Statement has been brought into question in
terms of its compliance with the EU and international asylum law (Barbulescu,
2017; Okyay & Zaragoza-Cristiani, 2016). As has been observed, instead of safe-
guarding the rights of refugees, the Statement often directly breaks them by neglect-
ing due process of asylum law (through so-called fast track border procedures)
frequently returning to Turkey those migrants who declared their intent to apply for
asylum in Greece (Batalla Adam, 2017, p.47).
13 Many have credited the EU-Turkey Statement for the lower numbers of refugees attempting to
cross the Mediterranean to Greece via Turkey. Overall, arrivals in Greece decreased by 98%
between 2015 and 2016 and recorded deaths and missing persons in the Aegean Sea went down by
94% (Niemann & Zaun, 2018, p.8).
14 This changed after 2019, when President Erdogan has started to use the Statement as a leverage
against the EU.The European Commission and the High Representative has begun to recognise
the humanitarian consequences of Turkey’s actions on the borders and in Syria (Stanicek, 2020).
15 The Turkish authorities apply the 1951 Geneva Convention and not the 1967 Protocol, thus only
recognising refugees coming from Europe (Niemann and Zaun, 2018, p.8). Even though Turkey
reformed its asylum laws in 2013 allowing Syrians to be considered for temporary international
protection and therefore more rights, other refugees are still not eligible for protection and their
rights are in danger (Batalla Adam, 2017, p.47).
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Human Rights Watch directly points towards harsh and abusive practices
employed by the Turkish military and border ofcials who while handling returns
under the EU-Turkey Statement contribute to the general (in)securitisation of the
situation of refugees in Turkey (see more Human Rights Watch Website, 2016a). In
this respect, in several asylum cases, “the Greek appeals committee has blocked the
implementation of the Statement by rejecting the fact that Syrian asylum seekers
can nd safe haven effective international protection in Turkey” (Human Rights
Watch Website, 2016b). As observed by Cohen and Sirkeci (2016), the EU-Turkey
Statement has generated a substantial amount of insecurity among Syrian refugees,
introducing not only a high degree of uncertainty in terms of their journey into the
EU but also a threat of their possible mistreatment by the Turkish law enforcement
and border authorities.16 While the EU-Turkey Statement has introduced high levels
of insecurity at migrant level, it has certainly increased the sense of security and
stability for the EU.
6.2.5 Relocation andResettlement
Relocation and resettlement constitute yet another example of conceptualisation
and further institutionalisation of risk management-centred remedial actions
towards the “migration crisis”. As noted by Bauböck (2018, p.145), relocation and
resettlement, though technically separate policy responses, are commonly construed
in the academic discourse as a governmental technique of migration management
relating to specic group of migrants, namely refugees. Both policy instruments
refer to “transfers of persons in need of international protection either from other
EU Member State (relocation) or third country (resettlement)” (Barbulescu, 2017,
p.304). In this way, they concentrate on institutionalised forms of migration gover-
nance and broad cooperation between member states and the EU agencies in han-
dling increased inows of migrants seeking international protection and the
consequent asylum applications. In this regard, resettlement and relocation mecha-
nisms represent an attempt to nd an equilibrium and a continuation of normal
activities within acceptable risks and to sustain the functionality of the EU migra-
tion and asylum management system.
Let us start with resettlement, which has been well institutionalised in the EU as
a form of management of migrants seeking asylum status in one of the EU member
states but while still outside the EU territories (Barbulescu, 2017, p. 306). As
explained in the Commission’s “Agenda on Migration”:
Resettlement means the transfer of individual displaced persons in clear need of interna-
tional protection, on submission of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees
16 As stated in the Human Rights Watch report, Turkish border guards have shot at refugees trying
to cross the border (Human Rights Watch Website, 2016a). Amnesty International also reported
that large numbers of Syrians have been transported from Turkey back to Syria (Amnesty
International Website, 2016).
6.2 Risk Management
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and in agreement with the country of resettlement, from a third country to a Member State,
where they will be admitted and granted the right to stay and any other rights comparable
to those granted to a beneciary of international protection (European Commission,
2015b, p.19).
In the EU policy discourse, resettlement is framed as an instrument, which is
supposed to help “avoid displaced persons in need of protection having to resort to
the criminal networks of smugglers and trafckers, consequently providing legal
and safe pathways to enter the EU” (European Commission Website, 2017). The
concept of resettlement shows yet another example of how the EU has been distanc-
ing itself from the inclusive migrant-centred referent object present in the diagnostic
and evaluation parts of the framing process and moving towards a more restrictive
and exclusive refugee-oriented perspective. Since 2015, the EU has launched two
resettlement schemes, which were commonly publicised as “safe passage” for
migrants escaping war and brutalities of terrorism, visibly marginalising the inclu-
sive understanding of migrants and leaving out of the resettlement scheme those
seeking refuge from economic hardship (see European Commission, 2015b, 2017e;
European Commission Website, 2017; European Parliament, 2016a). In May 2015,
the European Commission proposed an ad hoc European Resettlement scheme, a
voluntary framework for EU-wide resettlement of over 22,000 people in need of
international protection (Radjenovic, 2017, p.12). The scheme also included execu-
tion of the EU-Turkey Statement, which envisages that “for every Syrian national
returned from the Greek islands another will be resettled to the EU directly from
Turkey” (European Commission Website, 2017). In July 2017, after proclaiming the
success of the ad hoc scheme, which resulted in over seventeen thousand transfers
mainly from Turkey, Jordan and Lebanon, the Commission initiated a new round of
pledges for the new resettlement scheme aiming for 50,000 transfers, this time from
the regions of North Africa and Horn of Africa (European Commission, 2017m).
Even though the European Resettlement scheme has raised certain controversies,
especially in relation to the member states’ quotas, selection criteria, or length of
procedures, it is the so-called “relocation mechanism” that has proved to be the
most contentious among all the EU responses to the “migration crisis” (Thielemann,
2018, p.71). It should be noted that the relocation mechanism, also known as the
“temporary emergency relocation scheme” was not part of the EU migration-
security continuum before the “migration crisis”. It was adopted by the Council of
the European Union in September 2015, for the duration of 2years, as a new burden-
sharing mechanism and an emergency response system envisaged under Article
78(3) of the Treaty on Functioning of the European Union (TFEU) (Council of the
European Union, 2015d). Under the relocation scheme:
asylum seekers with a high chance of having their applications successfully processed are
relocated from Greece and Italy, where they have arrived, to other Member States where
they will have their asylum applications processed. If these applications are successful, the
applicants will be granted refugee status with the right to reside in the Member State to
which they are relocated (European Commission, 2015b, p.4).
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According to the scheme, the receiving member state was responsible for the exami-
nation of the asylum application in accordance with international, European and
national standards (Thielemann & Hobolth, 2016, p.645). The redistribution key
was based on criteria such as Gross Domestic Product (GDP) (40 per cent), size of
population (40%), unemployment (10%), and the number of already hosted asylum
seekers (10%) (European Commission, 2015b, p.4).
The relocation scheme was framed as a matter of European solidarity and a rem-
edy for the disproportionate responsibility put on the EU “frontline countries”
(Niemann & Zaun, 2018, p.6). As a result of intergovernmental negotiations, the
EU member states committed themselves to relocate altogether 160,000 refugees
from the “frontlines” by the end of September 2017 (European Commission
Website, 2017). The negotiations and later implementation of the scheme have been
highly confrontational, bringing several member states (especially Poland, Czech
Republic, Hungary, Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia, and Bulgaria) into conict with
the European Commission17 (Nič, 2016; Niemann & Zaun, 2018, p.7). The bone of
contention was the mandatory character of the scheme, which obligated all the
member states to accommodate the designated quotas of asylum seekers within the
given timeframe. It should be noted that the mandatory relocation mechanism
allowed for refusal of transfer of any asylum seeker on the basis of national security
or public safety (Council of the European Union, 2015d, art. 32). This security pro-
vision was later used, or misused, by the reluctant member states to postpone trans-
fers of asylum seekers indenitely, thus further securitising asylum seekers and
rendering the whole scheme highly ineffective (Thielemann, 2018, p.73).
The relocation mechanism and further asylum system reform (i.e. the Dublin
plus proposal) have quickly become the most problematic and dividing issues dur-
ing the conceptualisation of remedial of actions in the EU.Firstly, one of the prob-
lems raised by several member states was that the mechanism diverted from the
original Dublin system that has established specic set of criteria indicating which
member states are responsible for examining asylum claims in the EU (Niemann &
Zaun, 2018, p.7). According to the Regulation, the establishment of responsibility
should be based on a set of hierarchical criteria, one of which is the place of entry,
indicating that the applicants who entered into the EU in an irregular manner shall
be examined by the member state where they rst arrived, limiting the possibility of
secondary relocations and “venue shopping” within the EU (European Union,
2013b, art. 13). Secondly, due to the coercive character of the scheme and later
proposals of “corrective fairness mechanism”,18 the relocation has never been
17 On 15 June 2017, the Commission launched an infringement procedure against several Central
and Eastern European Member States, referring specically the Czech Republic, Hungary and
Poland to the Court of Justice of the EU for non-compliance with their legal obligations on reloca-
tion (European Commission, 2017o).
18 Under the so-called “Dublin plus” proposal, the Commission offered a new mechanism, which
stated that whenever an EU country receives dipropionate numbers of asylum seekers (exceeding
a pre-set reference number by 150 per cent), it will be automatically unburdened and the surplus of
asylum seekers will be relocated to other EU countries. If an EU country declines participation in
6.2 Risk Management
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considered as a fully “politically legitimate solution” among the member states,
generating substantial political opposition to any new ideas regarding this type of
solution in the future.19 This resulted in the ofcial withdrawal by the European
Commission from the relocation scheme in September 2017 and the subsequent
failure to establish an EU permanent relocation mechanism (originally incorporated
into the revision of the Dublin system), which was eventually vetoed by the Council
of the European Union (European Parliament Website, 2018a). Consequently, the
European Commission has sustained its position that the original relocation obliga-
tions should be honoured by the member states, but no new mandatory schemes will
be introduced in the near future (European Commission Website, 2017).
The EU policy discourse on resettlement and relocation reveals a dynamic and
conict-driven framing of these specic remedial actions. The relocation scheme
has certainly gained more substantial prominence in the discourse, especially in the
rst years of the “migration crisis”, where it was framed as the “European solution”
(Council of the European Union, 2015k; European Commission Website, 2017;
European Parliament Website, 2018a). At rst, the EU policy actors supported the
principle of the scheme, following the framing of the Commission, which promoted
the relocation as driven by solidarity among the member states and as effective
management and diffusion of unprecedented migratory pressures from the EU
“frontlines” (Council of the European Union, 2015d; European Commission,
2015b, 2016a; European Parliament, 2015b). As explained by the Commission,
the volumes of arrivals mean that the capacity of local reception and processing facilities is
already stretched thin. To deal with the situation in the Mediterranean, the Commission
will, by the end of May, propose triggering the emergency response system envisaged under
Article 78(3) TFEU.The proposal will include a temporary distribution scheme for persons
in clear need of international protection to ensure a fair and balanced participation of all
Member States to this common effort (European Commission, 2015b, p.4).
However, this initial agreement between the actors has quickly turned into a
framing conict, a dissonance of interpretations between the Commission, the
Parliament and the Council regarding the conceptualisation of nature of this mea-
sure. On the one hand, the European Commission, with the support of the European
Parliament, has been producing a narrative on relocation putting emphasis on its
technical and political character, embodied in the values of European responsibility
and solidarity. Here, both institutions have been promoting the obligatory character
of the scheme, at the same time repeatedly calling for its full implementation and
even intensication within a long-term EU policy scheme (European Commission,
2015g, p.4, 2016k, p.25; European Parliament, 2015b, p. 7). In this respect, the
the scheme, then it will be expected to make a “solidarity contribution” (250,000 EUR for each
refused applicant) (Thielemann, 2018, p.77).
19 There have been alternative visions of the relocation. For instance, “exible solidarity”, speci-
cally promoted by the countries of the Visegrad Group. According to this proposal, the distribution
of refugees would be voluntary. The idea behind this specic principle is that some member states
could take in refugees, others could instead offer some nancial support or expertise (for more
detailed overview see Nič, 2016).
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Commission has been framing relocation as normalised and institutionalised per-
manent part of the EU migration policies. As stated by the President of the European
Commission in the 2015 State of the Union:
A true European refugee and asylum policy requires solidarity to be permanently anchored
in our policy approach and our rules. This is why, today, the Commission is also proposing
a permanent relocation mechanism, which will allow us to deal with crisis situations more
swiftly in the future (European Commission, 2015g, p.5).
On the other hand, the Council of the European Union has been promoting a
rather different image of the relocation scheme, distancing itself from its institution-
alisation within the EU policy framework and explicitly framing it as a temporary
and extraordinary measure (Council of the European Union, 2015k, l, 2016e). In
this vein, the Council has been using the language of urgency showing that this is
indeed an exceptional moment requiring exceptional measures, but it is only tempo-
rary and should not be considered as a long-term solution. As stated by the Council:
(…) in the light of the current emergency situation and of the EU commitment to reinforce
solidarity and responsibility, agreed on the temporary and exceptional relocation over two
years from the frontline Member States Italy and Greece to other Member States (Council
of the European Union, 2015k, p.1).
This dissonance in framing of the relocation mechanism has revealed tensions
within the policy environment, specically between the Council and the Commission.
In the course of the “migration crisis”, the European Commission has proven its
devotion to institutionalisation of all forms of migration and border management,
attempting to push forward the reform of the European asylum and migration frame-
work and expand its control over the realm EU internal and border security (see
European Commission, 2015b, 2016a). Along with the reforms of the AFSJ agen-
cies and the development of border-migration intelligence framework, the perma-
nent relocation scheme was supposed to be another step towards centralisation and
Europeanisation of migration control. Yet, as opposed to the rest of the proposed
remedial actions, the relocation scheme has had the biggest political consequences
for the member states, transferring the “migration crisis” from one state to another,
making member states’ governments prone to internal criticism and loss of popular
support (Bauböck, 2018, p.153). Consequently, the relocation scheme has gained a
lot of opposition from some of the member states but also reignited a conict over
the institutional locus of migration control in the EU (Barbulescu, 2017;
Willermain, 2016).
6.2.6 Comments
Risk management has clearly saturated the EU’s conceptualisation of remedial
actions towards the “migration crisis”, becoming deeply institutionalised within the
EU’s contemporary approach to migration and border policies. In this way, it has
secured its dominance in the EU migration-security continuum pushing framing of
6.2 Risk Management
152
migration even deeper into the realm of normalised, institutionalised and often
technology- driven modes of securitisation. The risk management-centred conceptu-
alisation has visibly distanced the EU framing of the “migration crisis” from an
inclusive humanitarian and migrant-centred referent object, promoting the idea of
regaining control over mobility and external borders as the highest security priority.
In doing so, the EU has introduced a plethora of instruments and policies that were
supposed to lead the way back to normalcy and stability on the borders, regulating
migratory ows into Europe, and ushing out “risky migrants” within the migratory
ows. This type of framing has generated visible tensions with the human security-
centred logic.
In this regard, the so-called “hotspot approach” has become one of the sites of
such tensions, quickly becoming a symbol of the EU’s frontline and operational
involvement in the “migration crisis”. In the EU policy discourse, “hotspots” have
been dened as sites for the swift identication, registration and ngerprinting of
incoming migrants. They were supposed to assist national authorities in managing
migratory ows by selecting and channelling migrants into proper administrative
procedures. According to observers and practitioners, thus construed “hotspots”
represent some of the most explicit sites of securitisation of irregular immigrants
and asylum seekers, subjecting them to security practices and restrictive border and
migration policies. They have been reframing migrants and turning them into
objects of risk, collecting biometric information and generating security dossiers in
the name of the security imperative. As noted by an interviewed Frontex ofcer:
In their essence “hotspots” are not about humanitarian assistance but assigning illegal
migrants into a category, making them visible in the system for now and future reference. It
is about turning them from “unknown” into “known”, or better from “unmanageable” into
“manageable”. Identication and processing of those illegal migrants, refugee status or not,
is our security imperative and cannot be ignored whatever the crisis (Frontex-2).
Evidently the need for management, control and monitoring of increased migra-
tory ows has translated into actions of identication, registration, screening and
surveillance at the EU level. This is not to say that migration-oriented technologies
of data surveillance and control were not present before the “migration crisis” but
they have certainly become more prominent in the EU’s conceptualisation of
responses to the “migration crisis”. The increased technologisation of the EU migra-
tion and border policies has further normalised and institutionalised risk manage-
ment in the EU policy discourse, moving conceptualisation of remedial actions to
what Bigo (2002) calls “managers of unease”– technocrats, experts and profession-
als responsible for calculating uncertain futures. This has resulted in the more prom-
inent mobilisation of EU agencies and proliferation of dataveillance systems tasked
with targeting asylum seekers, irregular, but also regular migrants in search for
threats to security. This incorporation of broad categories of migrants into the risk
equation has a signicant securitising effect, going beyond the “migration crisis”. In
this vein, an interviewed Europol ofcer observed that:
Because of this crisis, migration has become one of the sites of security and risk manage-
ment. For instance, when I train Europol ofcers for the “hotspot” duty, I keep telling them
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that they do not interview migrants but debrief them. The task is to collect sensitive, opera-
tional data that can be used in on-going criminal investigations, counter-terrorist operations
etc. These intercepted migrants are the source of this information, they can be valuable, but
they also can be dangerous because of their willing involvement in certain illicit activities.
The operative word is that they “can be” a problem and it is our job to know which ones
already are a threat or can turn into one in the future. One way or another, they have become
a serious part of a security problem that has emerged in the course of the crisis and there is
nothing we can do about it. I think that this crisis has permanently changed the relationship
between security and migration (Europol-2).
As observed by Niemann and Zaun (2018, p.16), the “hotspots” and other instru-
ments of intelligence gathering and sharing are now cogwheels in a more complex
European administrative machinery that allow border and migration authorities to
categorise, select and process irregular migrants in accordance with their protection
or security status but also desirability. In this respect, the managerial approach to the
crisis is strongly reected in the promotion of policy instruments that enable manag-
ing and moving different categories of migrants within and out of the EU.Here, the
elements of the detention and return of migrants have proved to have a signicant
securitising effect, labelling whole groups of migrants as risky or undesirable (often
in the name of public safety), subjecting them to security practices eventually result-
ing in expulsion from the EU territories. In the EU policy discourse, returns repre-
sents a peculiar way of claiming control over the uncontrollable force of human
mobility. In this sense, return operations are supposed to secure the outows of
migrants; they are a safety valve which can and will be used whenever there is a too
much pressure in the migration and border system.
While the returns and detention are aimed at the broadly understood removal of
risky and unwanted migrants, resettlement and relocation are directed at those who
deserve protection and have passed administrative pre-screening and pre- processing,
at the latest. In this vein, the EU has been framing relocation and resettlement as
legal pathways or safe passages for refugees into their destination countries, at the
same time indicating the need for solidarity among the member states in sharing the
burden of international protection. As application of these measures (specically
the relocation mechanism) has proved to contentious, the idea behind resettlement
and relocation has revealed strong managerial and externalising tendencies in the
conceptualisation of remedial actions in the EU. An interviewed Member of the
European Parliament observed that:
The whole idea of returns and resettlement is based on a ltering process. It is about letting
in “good migrants” and pushing out “bad migrants” and the security, border and migration
apparatus is the “lter” here. The thing is that the EU’s approach to this ltering process is
to do it at a distance, preferably in Libya, Turkey, everywhere but not here. That is why
resettlement was much less controversial than relocation. Resettlement places migrants out-
side the borders and they come in only when we choose to let them, while relocation is
about migrants-refugees who are here and now, and they have to be dealt with whatever
EU’s or Member States’ preferences. That is why EU likes the deal with Turkey so much.
It gives you a chance to manage the “migration crisis” outside the EU and keeping, at least
some of the migrants, at bay (European Parliament-3).
6.2 Risk Management
154
Indeed, the EU-Turkey deal has become the symbol of the externalisation of
management of migratory ows into the EU.Thanks to the mixture of border secu-
rity measures and resettlement schemes, it has allowed the EU to deter some
migrants from crossing the Mediterranean and the EU to regain some control over
the migratory ows. In doing so, it has also introduced a more restrictive border
regime with serious consequences for the security of migrants attempting to cross
the Eastern Mediterranean into Greece. In this respect, there is a tension between
logics inscribed into the EU-Turkey Statement, reected in sacricing the human
security of migrants in the name of regaining of control over migratory ows. As
noted by an interviewed European Asylum Support Ofce ofcer:
The deal gave the EU a sense of control and space to breathe and think about the next steps.
It pushed the ows back and externalised the problem, dropping it in Turkey’s lap. We keep
forgetting that tightening border security and distancing the problem does not make the
ows stop. Push and pull factors remain as they were. The change is that migrants have to
nd new, often more dangerous, ways of travel from there to here. They choose other routes
or stay in Turkey, hiding from the Turkish authorities and paying additional fees to smug-
glers, who only benet from attempts to contain the problem instead of solving its underly-
ing causes (EASO-2).
The analysed policy discourse and accounts of interviewees indicate that the ele-
ments of management of borders, migration, and migration-related risks have
indeed made a deep mark on the conceptualisation of the remedial actions towards
the crisis. The Union’s discourse on the “migration crisis” is characterised by a
distinctive risk-centred framing, oriented on regaining of control over EU external
borders and migratory ows. To this end, the EU has promoted mobilisation of
security measures and IT systems that allow identifying incoming irregular migrants,
categorising them and managing them according to their status and the level of risks
they generate. Thus, in response to the “migration crisis”, the EU has sponsored and
enhanced a specic blend of border security and risk management measures built on
tailor-made modes of migration governance (e.g. “hotspots”) or technology and
intelligence-driven policy instruments (e.g. data surveillance or interoperability of
information systems) in order to create and maintain a sense of order and manage-
ability of future migration-related risks.
6.3 Resilience
The inclusion of resilience in the conceptualisation of remedial actions towards the
crisis has emerged on the wave of its increasing popularity among international
security actors such as NATO (Hady, 2017; Prior, 2017), the UN (Marulanda Fraume
et al., 2020), and of course the EU (Juncos, 2017; Wagner & Anholt, 2016).
According to the logic of resilience, the notion of security revolves around struc-
tural and institutional robustness to negative scenarios that will certainly materialise
at some point in the future (Brassett etal., 2013; Coaffee & Fussey, 2015; Manyena,
2006). With this assumption in mind, resilience is centred on the conceptualisation
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of long-term remedial actions that allow development of an interconnected, exible
and adaptable system, capable of withstanding any possible shocks and disturbances
that may affect the stability or even existence of referent objects (e.g. the EU asylum
system or the EU as whole) (Bourbeau, 2013). In this respect, resilience-oriented
policy actions are focused on elimination of extreme vulnerabilities within the tar-
geted system by building up its structural and institutional strength (Bourbeau,
2015, p.1963).
During the “migration crisis”, resilience has become the new leitmotif of the
EU’s approach to security. This specic logic is sponsored most visibly by the
European Commission, the Council of the European Union, with contributions from
the European External Actions Service (which was the result of the framings of the
Commission and the Council). These framing actors have expressed a common
interest in the external security realm of the EU and were already invested in the
external dimension of resilience, promoting development, a comprehensive
approach to security, disaster early warning and preparedness programmes, or the
idea of community resilience in the EU neighbourhood (Wagner & Anholt, 2016).
Broader internalisation of resilience came with the 2016 EU’s Global Strategy,
which explicitly indicates the role of this particular logic within the EU’s external
policy framework:
It is in the interests of our citizens to invest in the resilience of states and societies to the east
stretching into Central Asia, and south down to Central Africa. Fragility beyond our borders
threatens all our vital interests. By contrast, resilience– the ability of states and societies to
reform, thus withstanding and recovering from internal and external crises– benets us and
countries in our surrounding regions, sowing the seeds for sustainable growth and vibrant
societies. Together with its partners, the EU will therefore promote resilience in its sur-
rounding regions. A resilient state is a secure state, and security is key for prosperity and
democracy (European Commission, 2016h, p.23).
This is not to say that resilience is limited to the external dimension of EU policy. It
strongly intertwines with the internal security domain, gaining signicance, also in
relation to border control and migration management. Here, the EU policy discourse
concerning the crisis strongly communicates the need for building up resilience
within the internal-external security nexus, identifying structural vulnerabilities
(e.g. by external border vulnerability assessment) and strengthening the capacity for
crisis management (Council of the European Union, 2016d; European Commission,
2015b, 2016g, h; European Parliament, 2014, 2016f). As stressed by the Council of
the European Union in its Conclusions on the EU’s Internal Security Strategy, there
is a “necessity to strengthen protection of critical infrastructures and the need to
ensure resilience, operational preparedness and political coordination to react, deal
with and mitigate crises and natural/man-made disasters” (Council of the European
Union, 2015e, p.2).
As a result, the logic of resilience is prominently visible in the conceptualisation
of remedial actions towards the “migration crisis”, specically while addressing its
root causes (external dimension) and the EU’s capacity for processing asylum seek-
ers (internal dimension). It should be stressed that in relation to the root causes of
the crisis, the logic of resilience seems to be intertwining and corresponding with
6.3 Resilience
156
the human security-centred diagnosis and evaluation of the crisis. Here, human suf-
fering and poverty, dened as the key push factors for the 2015 increased migratory
ows to the EU, are addressed with external interventions of a capacity-building
nature, aimed at enhancing the societal, economic and political resilience of coun-
tries of origin and transit (Council of the European Union, 2016b, f; European
Commission, 2015h; European Parliament, 2016f, 2017a). In this respect, the
European Commission has been communicating that:
a special focus in our work on resilience will be on origin and transit countries of migrants
and refugees. We will signicantly step up our humanitarian efforts in these countries,
focusing on education, women and children. Together with countries of origin and transit,
we will develop common and tailor-made approaches to migration featuring development,
diplomacy, mobility, legal migration, border management, readmission and return. Through
development, trust funds, preventive diplomacy and mediation we will work with countries
of origin to address and prevent the root causes of displacement, manage migration, and
ght trans-border crime (European Commission, 2016h, p.27).
Similarly, the idea of building up the resilience of the EU migration and border
control capacity is framed as a matter of protection of human life, alleviation of the
suffering and exploitation of migrants at the hands of human smugglers and trafck-
ers. In this respect, the EU policy actors produce a coherent message that only by
improving the capacity and resilience of the EU’s asylum system, Europe is able to
full its international obligations and provide international protection to those who
are entitled to it (European Commission, 2015h; European Parliament, 2016f).
Here, the resilience-driven framing points towards the need for strengthening the
Common European Asylum System directly referring to centralisation and harmon-
isation of the EU-wide capacity for dealing with the current and future increased
migratory ows (European Commission, 2016c, p.4).
In the next part of this chapter, I will discuss some of the most prominent exam-
ples of application of the logic of resilience in conceptualisation of remedial actions
towards the crisis. In doing so, I will focus specically on three types of actions
framed in the EU policy discourse, covering the internal (i.e. Common European
Asylum System) and external (i.e. EU Trust Funds, and CSDP capacity building
and assistance missions) dimensions of the resilience-building activities.
6.3.1 Reforming Common European Asylum System
As aptly noted by Costello and Mouzourakis (2017, p.263), the Common European
Asylum System (CEAS) is “neither truly common nor a system”. It is rather a leg-
islative framework, consisting of a package of EU directives and regulations “den-
ing common minimum standards to which Member States are to adhere in connection
with the reception of asylum-seekers; qualication for international protection and
the content of the protection granted; and procedures for granting and withdrawing
6 Analysing the Conceptualisation of Remedial Actions Towards the “Migration…
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refugee status”20 (International Association of Refugee Law Judges, 2016, p.15).
The idea behind development of the CEAS is harmonisation and centralisation of
the main features of the EU’s migration management and asylum policy. This
includes establishment of EU-wide mechanisms that would discourage secondary
movements and “venue shopping”, as well as ensure uniform treatment of asylum
seekers and balanced recognition rates across the EU (European Commission,
2016c, p.2).
Some of the most prominent features of the CEAS have already been covered in
this chapter, specically referring to the issues of reception-detention, relocation,
resettlement and dataveillance. That is why in this section I will focus on the CEAS
as a whole, taking into account its specic framing in the EU policy discourse on the
“migration crisis” and its underlying security logic. Within the timeframe of the
writing of this book, the CEAS is still considered to be “under construction”, being
a prominent part of the EU policy discourse rather than an effective component of
the EU policy action framework (Bauböck, 2018; Niemann & Zaun, 2018). This
does not mean, however, that its importance and prominence in the conceptualisa-
tion of remedial actions towards the crisis is any less signicant. Quite the contrary,
the framing of CEAS in the EU policy discourse reveals a very important, resilience-
driven aspect of this process.
As already noted earlier in this chapter, within the EU policy discourse on the
“migration crisis” the CEAS is often framed with a distinctive blend of human secu-
rity- and resilience-centred logics. The EU policy actors, and the Commission in
particular, have been promoting the idea of CEAS as a tool for ensuring protection
and strengthening human security, noting that a well-functioning and uniform asy-
lum system is “supposed to ensure the legal avenues to Europe for migrants seeking
protection” (European Parliament, 2016f, rec. 15), at the same time “guaranteeing
humane and efcient asylum policy reinforcing protection of the fundamental rights
of asylum-seekers, paying particular attention to the needs of vulnerable groups,
such as children” (European Commission, 2015b, p.12). In this regard, the CEAS
is unequivocally depicted as an instrument for providing protection, or as the
European Commission puts it– “an area of protection and solidarity for the most
vulnerable, (…) setting out common high standards and stronger co-operation to
ensure that asylum seekers are treated equally in an open and fair system– wherever
20 The legislation dening CEAS includes the Eurodac Regulation (regulating collection and
exchange of biometric information on asylum seekers), the Temporary Protection Directive (regu-
lating subsidiary international protection), the Dublin III Regulation (setting out criteria for assign-
ing responsibility for processing asylum applications), the Reception Conditions Directive (setting
out condition for detention of migrants), the Qualication Directive (setting out grounds for grant-
ing international protection), and the Asylum Procedures Directive (setting out quality standards
for asylum procedures) (for more detailed overview see Costello and Mouzourakis, 2017). Even
though not considered as part of legislative instruments of CEAS, the Returns Directive, the Family
Reunication Directive and the Long-Term Residents Directive, and the European Asylum Support
Ofce Regulation are also commonly connected to the CEAS framework as part of a wider EU
migration and asylum policy package (International Association of Refugee Law Judges, 2016,
pp.17–19).
6.3 Resilience
158
they apply” (European Commission, 2018, p.1). Here, the European asylum system
is connected to the notions of fairness, responsibility for asylum seekers and soli-
darity among the EU Member States in treating all the asylum applications in accor-
dance with the highest EU standards and international obligations (European
Parliament, 2016e).
In the course of the “migration crisis”, the EU’s framing of the CEAS displayed
a distinctive note of “wishful thinking”, indicating that the current state of this par-
ticular system is rather a liability than opportunity in dealing with the crisis (Costello
& Mouzourakis, 2017, p.272). In this respect, the state of CEAS becomes dened
as dangerous, affecting the EU security with its dysfunctionality and vulnerability.
As reiterated throughout the EU policy discourse, the increased migratory ows
have revealed an inherent weakness in the EU asylum system, rendering the CEAS
fragmented (European Commission, 2016c, p. 3), defective (Council of the
European Union, 2017d, p.8; European Parliament, 2016g, rec. 12), and enabling
unwanted practices such as “venue shopping” and secondary movement of asylum
seekers (European Commission, 2018). This has translated into concerning lack of
resilience, and a collapse under the strain of increased arrivals of migrants. When
the European Commission proposed reform of the CEAS it established that state
CEAS dees its purpose, as it is
characterised by differing treatment of asylum seekers, including in terms of the length of
asylum procedures or reception conditions across Member States, a situation which in turn
encourages secondary movements. Even though CEAS sets out the standards for the recog-
nition and protection to be offered at EU level, in practice recognition rates vary, sometimes
widely, between Member States. There is also a lack of adequate convergence as regards the
decision to grant either refugee status (to be accorded to persons eeing persecution) or
subsidiary protection status (to be accorded to persons eeing the risk of serious harm,
including armed conict) for applicants from a given country of origin (European
Commission, 2016c, pp.4–5).
Under more critical investigation, the “migration crisis” reveals itself not as a crisis
of migration but of migration and policies employed at the member states and the
EU levels (Niemann & Zaun, 2018, p.3). It is a crisis of resilience and functionality
that feeds on the vulnerabilities of the EU asylum system, which has failed the test
of the increased migratory pressures.
As a result, the EU policy discourse indicates that it is not the CEAS that should
be considered as a remedial action towards the crisis, but its reform, which is sup-
posed to build up the EU’s resilience to the future shocks and disturbances related
to increased migratory ows (Council of the European Union, 2017d; European
Commission, 2016c, d; European Parliament, 2015d). As noted in the European
Council conclusions,
there is a common understanding that the reformed CEAS needs to strike the right balance
between responsibility and solidarity and that it needs to ensure resilience to future crises.
The system has to be efcient, be able to withstand migratory pressure, eliminate pull fac-
tors as well as secondary movements, in compliance with international law, ght abuse and
provide adequate support to the most affected Member States (European Council,
2017a, p.11).
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In this respect, the European Commission has proposed further harmonisation and
centralisation of the EU asylum instruments, framing the European Asylum Support
Ofce as instrumental for implementation of the Common European Asylum
System “by collecting and exchanging information on best practices, drawing up an
annual report on the asylum situation in the EU and adopting technical documents,
such as guidelines and operating manuals, on the implementation of the Union’s
asylum instruments”21 (EASO, 2017, p.2). The majority of provisions included in
the reform did not arouse many objections in the EU, except for the Revision of
Dublin Regulation (Pastore & Henry, 2016).
The so-called Dublin system (currently in its third instalment under the Dublin
III Regulation) has been present in the EU migration-security continuum since the
1990s. In the course of the crisis, it has become one of the most controversial and
problematic aspects of the CEAS and the EU’s approach to migration and asylum
management (Bauböck, 2018; Huysmans, 2000). The Dublin system has estab-
lished clear indicators for assigning responsibility for handling asylum applications
to one specic EU member state, thus limiting the secondary movements and so-
called “venue shopping” (Kaunert & Léonard, 2012). In this regard, the regulation
introduces a hierarchy of criteria such as “family unity, possession of residence
documents or visas, irregular entry or stay and visa-waived entry” (European
Parliament Website, 2018b). There is, however, one element of this set of criteria
that has quickly become the symbol and the main issue of the system, namely the
criterion of irregular entry, which means that “the Member State through which the
asylum-seeker rst entered in the EU is responsible to examine his/her asylum
claim” (European Parliament Website, 2018b). During the crisis, this criterion,
along with the Dublin system, has proved not only impractical but also potentially
devastating for the asylum systems of EU frontline countries such as Greece or
Italy, making them solely responsible for handling the migratory pressures on the
EU Mediterranean border (Thielemann, 2018, p.78). This vulnerability and inap-
plicability of the Dublin system has not gone unnoticed in the EU policy discourse,
focusing attention around the relocation mechanism (already discussed in this chap-
ter) and its institutionalisation within the reformed CEAS (Council of the European
Union, 2017a; European Commission, 2016c, 2017i; European Parliament, 2015d).
In this respect, the framing of the CEAS reform, intertwines with the framing of
the relocation mechanism revealing elements of resilience-centred thinking. Here,
the reform of the EU asylum and the Dublin system is specically promoted in the
21 The reform consists of seven individual legislative proposals including Revision of the Dublin
Regulation, Recast Eurodac Regulation, Renegotiation of European Asylum Support Ofce
Regulation, Reform of the Asylum Procedures Directive, Reform of the Qualication Directive,
Reform of the Reception Conditions Directive, Development of the EU Resettlement Framework
(Bauböck, 2018, p.147). The main points of the reform included “(1) relocation of applicants from
countries overburdened with asylum claims; (2) shorter time limits for transfers of applications
between Member States, thus removing shifts of responsibility; (3) discouraging venue shopping
and secondary movements with aim of claiming asylum in different EU Member States; (4) stron-
ger guarantees for unaccompanied minors and reworking of the denition of ‘family
members’”(European Parliament Website, 2018a; European Union, 2016c).
6.3 Resilience
160
EU policy discourse as a response to the exposed shortcomings in the design and
implementation of the EU asylum policies. As stated by Dimitris Avramopoulos, the
Commissioner for Migration, Home Affairs and Citizenship, “the CEAS and the
whole Schengen zone is as strong as its weakest link, and now this weakest link is
the Dublin system” (Ripoll Servent, 2018, p.89). In this sense, the policy discourse
concentrates not only on the issue of processing asylum seekers, but also on the
matters of resilience of the Dublin system and its ability to provide clear and bind-
ing rules regarding redirecting of increased migratory pressures into less strained
components of the system (European Commission, 2016c, p.7). For this reason,
building on the idea of solidarity, fairness and trust between the member states, the
European Commission has been framing the reformed Dublin system as a resilient
and reliable mechanism that provides clear rules governing relations between the
member states in regard to examination of asylum applications, at the same time
creating “means of detecting early problems in national asylum or reception sys-
tems, and address their root causes before they develop into fully edged crises”
(European Commission, 2018, p.1). With this outspoken outlook on the future cri-
ses, the reform of the CEAS and the Dublin system is framed as an instrument for
increasing resilience, making the asylum system more balanced, exible, and robust
in the face of not so much the “migration crisis” of 2015 but rather future migration-
related challenges which will, sooner or later, materialise at the EU’s doorsteps.
6.3.2 European Union Trust Funds
The EU policy discourse on the “migration crisis” frames nancial aid and develop-
ment programmes as some of the key instruments for addressing the external causes
of the crisis, enabling direct humanitarian-, reconstruction- and development-
oriented interventions in the communities and countries of origin of irregular
migrants (see Council of the European Union, 2016b, d; European Commission,
2016a; European Council 2017c; European Parliament, 2017a). It is continuously
reiterated, specically by the Commission, that “EU external cooperation assis-
tance, and in particular development cooperation, plays an important role in tack-
ling issues like poverty, insecurity, inequality and unemployment which are among
the main root causes of irregular and forced migration” (European Commission,
2015b, p.8, 2016a, f). The Parliament has supported this type of framing, especially
in reference to its human security-centred features, often underlining that “the root
causes of violence and underdevelopment need to be addressed in the countries of
origin in order to stem the ow of refugees and economic migrants” (European
Parliament, 2015d, rec. 16; see also 2016f, 2017a).
Here, the EU’s framing revolves around developing resilience in its neighbour-
hood and beyond. This idea is based on the notion that by increasing nancial trans-
fers and tailored development aid it is possible to strengthen the capacity of countries
of origin to alleviate human suffering, ght structural problems and, in the long
term, withstand economic, social and political shocks that produce and/or facilitate
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irregular migratory ows (Ceccorulli & Lucarelli, 2017). This again pinpoints the
intertwining of resilience with human security in the EU discourse. The EU policy
actors have been coherently promoting the idea of adjusting or reorienting develop-
ment funds for the purpose of increasing resilience in the countries of transit and
origin, creating a stronger EU neighbourhood that could contain the migratory
ows, even before they reach the EU’s borders (European Commission, 2015h;
European Parliament, 2017a). Here, the Council of the European Union offers an
apt example of such framing, noting already in the early stages of the “migration
crisis” that
A sustainable solution can only be found by intensifying cooperation with countries of
origin and transit, including through assistance to strengthen their migration and border
management capacity. Migration policies must become a much stronger integral part of the
Union’s external and development policies (European Council, 2014, p.3).
In this respect, the EU policy discourse is lled with calls for increased synergy
between migration, trade and development policies, underlining the need for more
comprehensive and coordinated actions that could address the internal and external
dynamics of the crisis (for example: Council of the European Union, 2015c, e, f;
European Commission, 2015b, h; European Parliament, 2017a). Along with a whole
plethora of already existing nancial programmes that have been earmarked to
address the external root causes of increased migratory ows,22 the EU has been
specically focusing attention on one type of nancial instrument that is depicted in
the EU policy discourse as the best stimulant of resilience, namely EU Trust Funds
(EUTFs).
Trust Funds are commonly described as ad hoc and temporary instruments that
allow pooling and sharing of signicant volumes of nancial assets from different
sources in order to fund a specic goal (Hauck etal., 2015, p. 2). The funds may
vary in scope, covering a specic country, region or even the whole globe while
responding to identied policy priorities. They are governed by legal arrangements
between donors and beneciaries and are subjected to extraordinary nancial
reporting requirements for the purposes of monitoring spending priorities (Guder,
2009, p.36). The trust funds have quickly become a preferred mode of nancial
intervention, proliferating in international development politics and turning into a
“standard nancing modality for delivering aid in coordinated international
responses in fragile and post-conict environments and complex emergencies”
(Hauck etal., 2015, p.2).
The EU started to develop its own trust fund scheme in 2013 as a way of increas-
ing its political visibility on the international stage by creating a nancial instru-
ment for rapid and high impact interventions in external crisis situations (Hauck
etal., 2015, p.3). The main idea behind the EUTFs was to introduce a dose of ex-
ibility into the existing development schemes, allowing the Commission to create
22 Migration and Integration Fund, Internal Security Fund, Humanitarian Aid from the Emergency
Aid Reserve, External Borders Fund, to name a few (for more detailed overview see European
Parliament Website, 2018d).
6.3 Resilience
162
and manage its own EUTFs that would not only leverage additional contributions
from the EU member states but also remain open to nancial transfers from non-EU
donors and private entities (Hauck etal., 2015, p.3). In this way, as an added value
to already existing development programmes, the EUTFs are “supposed to bring a
more coherent and integrated EU response to crises by merging various EU nan-
cial instruments and contributions from within and outside the EU into one single
exible mechanism for quick disbursement” (European Commission, 2017n).
Since the early days of the “migration crisis” the EU policy actors, especially the
Commission and the Councils, have been framing the EUTFs as rapid and custom-
tailored nancial instruments for increasing resilience. This commitment to the
EUTF concept is clearly visible in the Valletta Summit Action Plan, where the EU
has conrmed the importance of trust funds in responding to the “migration crisis”,
indicating that they will provide countries of origin and transit with:
additional funding and will contribute to a exible, speedy and efcient delivery of support
to foster stability and to contribute to better migration management. More specically, the
Trust Funds will help address the root causes of destabilisation, forced displacement and
irregular migration, by promoting economic and equal opportunities, strengthening resil-
ience of vulnerable people, security and development (European Council, 2015f, pp.1–2).
In this respect, the EU quite directly indicates that the strength of EUTFs lies in
their exibility that allows mobilising additional nancial resources and the possi-
bility to nally factor-in the ties between migration control, labour mobility and
trade, thus enhancing incentives for cooperation in the areas of border management
and readmission (European Commission, 2015g, p.27).
By the end of 2017 the EU had created and promoted three major EUTFs that
were supposed to directly contribute to addressing the root causes of the crisis by
building up societal, political and economic resilience in the relevant countries and
regions. The rst EUTF, framed as a policy response to increased migratory ows
was launched in mid-2014 under the name “Bêkou Trust Fund” (or EUTF CAR)
and concentrated predominantly on the Central African Republic (CAR) (European
Commission, 2018). The Fund has been tasked with streamlining donor operations
into CAR and funding post-conict and transition-related activities, reducing human
suffering and displacement by alleviating structural fragility of the state (European
Commission Website, 2018b). With a broad scope of projects concentrated on
employment generation, access to health services, development of water and sanita-
tion infrastructure, and refugee support, the EUTF CAR has become a new type of
Trust Fund linking relief, rehabilitation and development (LRRD) in one EU nan-
cial intervention (Niemann & Zaun, 2018, p.12). In this way, even though limited
in terms of budget (64million EUR), the EUTF CAR has set out an overarching
principle for the development and implementation of the other Trust Funds that
were supposed to tackle the root causes of the “migration crisis”.
The “EU Regional Trust Fund in response to the Syrian Crisis” (also referred to
as “the Madad Fund” or EUTF Madad) was established in 2014 to address the chal-
lenges of the Syrian refugee crisis in Syria and neighbouring countries (i.e. Iraq,
Jordan, Lebanon Turkey), and affected regions (i.e. Western Balkans) (Den Hertog,
6 Analysing the Conceptualisation of Remedial Actions Towards the “Migration…
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2016, p.3). The EUTF Madad focused on providing help to up to 1.5million Syrian
refugees, supporting basic public services and necessities, covering access to basic
and higher education, health services, socio-economic support, and development of
water and wastewater infrastructure (European Commission Website, 2018a). Since
its inception, the Fund has been framed as an instrument for development and resil-
ience, covering programmes aimed at decreasing “the pressure on countries hosting
refugees by investing in livelihoods and social cohesion and supporting them in
providing access to jobs and education that will benet both refugees and host com-
munities” (European Commission Website, 2018a). With the escalation of the
“migration crisis” in late 2015 and early 2016, the Madad Fund rapidly gained in
signicance in the EU’s development aid scheme, relatively easily exceeding the
target contribution of one billion EUR and amounting to total volume of 1.5billion
EUR in 2018 (Den Hertog, 2016, p.3).
Encouraged by the initial success and overall support for the Trust Fund for
Syria, in 2015 the EU initiated another fund, this time focused specically on Africa
and programmes oriented to stemming irregular migration (Niemann & Zaun, 2018,
p.12). The “EU Emergency Trust Fund for Africa” (EUTF for Africa) focused spe-
cically on three regions, which produce the highest numbers of irregular migrants
in the EU, namely Sahel and Lake Chad, the Horn of Africa and North Africa
(European Commission, 2015b, p. 5; European Commission Website, 2018e).
EUTF for Africa is a great example of how the EU policy actors have started to
reorient the focus of development aid specically for the purpose of migration man-
agement and resilience. The Fund is described as an instrument for removing push
factors for migration by building up economic security (e.g. addressing skills gaps,
improving employability through vocational training, supporting job creation and
self-employment) and broadly understood resilience covering food and nutrition
security, as well as good governance, rule of law and human rights protections, to
name a few (European Commission Website, 2018f; European Parliament, 2016b).
In this sense, the discourse on the Fund has very distinctive migration-resilience
features, oriented on improving migration governance by addressing the drivers of
irregular migration, encouraging legal mobility and fostering effective returns and
reintegration.
6.3.3 EU Border, Capacity Building andAssistance Missions
The CSDP non-kinetic (e.g. capacity building- and assistance-centred) responses to
the root causes of the “migration crisis” have become a prominent part of the
resilience- centred framing in the EU. In this respect, with the Council of the
European Union as the main sponsor, the EU policy actors have been expanding the
understanding of the CSDP operations within the EU migration and border manage-
ment scheme discussions (Council of the European Union, 2016b, c, g, 2017a;
European Commission, 2015b, 2016g; European Parliament, 2017a). They have
been consistently framing the EU’s military and civilian missions as one of the
6.3 Resilience
164
instruments that “will support different paths to resilience, targeting the most acute
cases of governmental, economic, societal and climate/energy fragility, as well as
develop more effective migration policies for Europe and its partners” (European
Security and Defence College, 2017, p.22). The mandates of the missions are pre-
dominantly centred on elimination of the weakest links in the border and security
system of host countries, focusing on security sector reform, capacity building, bor-
der assistance, and advisory and training activities. These are supposed to supple-
ment and complement other EU efforts in strengthening political, economic and
societal resilience in the regions producing highest numbers of irregular migrants
(Haesebrouck & Meirvenne, 2016, pp.269–270). In this regard, the EU policy dis-
course on the “migration crisis” highlights three CSDP missions in particular– EU
Border Advisory Mission Libya (EUBAM Libya), EU Capacity Building Mission
Sahel Niger (EUCAP Niger), and EU Capacity Building Mission Sahel Mali
(EUCAP Mali).
EUBAM Libya23 is an explicit example of the resilience-centred framing of
CSDP instruments. In the EU policy discourse, the mission is framed as a support
and capacity building capability, which is supposed to assist the Libyan (legitimate)
border, migration and justice authorities in regaining control over its borders and the
internal security realm (Council of the European Union, 2016k; EEAS Website,
2017). To this end, its mandate “is carried out through advising, training and men-
toring Libyan counterparts in strengthening the border services in accordance with
international standards and best practices, and by advising the Libyan authorities on
the development of a national Integrated Border Management” (EEAS Website,
2018). However, EUBAM Libya is more than a border assistance mission. Indeed,
it has very prominent migration and border control features, but it also includes
strong criminal justice and counter-terrorism components, which strategically con-
nect security and defence planning, migration and policing within one broad CSDP
assistance-expertise package (EEAS Website, 2018). The EUBAM Libya shows an
interesting securitising potential in the conceptualisation of external migration con-
trol, merging capacity building with elements of militarisation of migration (Jones
& Johnson, 2016, p.196). In this respect, the mission is based on the idea that the
strength of the EU borders starts with the strength of the EU neighbourhood and by
extension its ability to control its territories and contain migratory ows (Jones &
Johnson, 2016, p.197). In this respect, the mission’s mandate literally brings migra-
tion and border control in Libya under CSDP crisis management mentorship, gen-
erating a distinctive securitising or even militarising move towards human mobility,
merging elements of resilience and “exceptionalist” security thinking.
23 EUBAM Libya was launched in May 2013, as a civilian mission under the framework of CSDP.It
was extended twice by the Council of the European Union, most recently in 2016 when the EU
framed it as a response to the 2015 “migration crisis” and strengthened its mandate with capacity
building of criminal justice (EEAS, 2017b).
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Another example of the application of CSDP missions for the purposes of curb-
ing migratory ows are the EU Capacity Building Operations Sahel Niger24 and
Sahel Mali,25 both mandated with security sector reforms, counter-terrorism train-
ing, and capacity building of migration control and criminal justice systems. The
intensication of CSDP operations in the Sahel is not a coincidence. In the EU
policy discourse, the region is dened as one of the key points of reference for secu-
rity, migration and resilience building activities (Alberto & Tebas, 2015). As noted
by the EEAS, “Europe has numerous interests in the region, ranging from combat-
ing security threats, terrorism, organised crime and illegal migration to assuring
energy security” (EEAS Website, 2016a). In this respect, the scope of both EUCAP
Sahel operations remains relatively broad and concentrates on assisting and mentor-
ing national security authorities in security sector reform and management of the
internal security system (EEAS, 2017a, p.19). In regard to migration control pre-
rogatives, the EUCAP, frames the national Nigerian and Malian security forces as
the primary “managers” of migration, effectively supporting militarisation of migra-
tion control in Mali. As specied in the mandate of EUCAP Sahel Niger, one of the
key priorities of the mission is to “support the security forces’ capability to better
control migration ows and to combat irregular migration and associated criminal
activity more effectively” (EEAS Website, 2016a). Similarly, EUCAP Sahel Mali
has been emphasising the need for “supporting Mali in managing migrating ows
and border management by strengthening of the Malian internal security forces
capacity in the ght against terrorism and organised crime” (EEAS Website, 2016b).
With this type of framing, it becomes evident that the clue of the EU’s approach to
migration control and resilience building in its neighbourhood lies with the effec-
tiveness of national security authorities in controlling their borders and containing
irregular migration.
6.3.4 Comments
The prominence of the logic of resilience in the conceptualisation of remedial
actions towards the “migration crisis” indicates that broader risk-oriented framing
is strongly favoured. Resilience, even though it belongs to the family of risk logic,
proposes a set of measures and objectives for dealing with migration-related
24 EUCAP Sahel Niger was launched in 2012 as a capacity building mission providing training and
advice to the Nigerian security authorities, specically in reference to counter-terrorist and anti-
organised crime activities. In 2015 the mission was extended and operationally expanded to cover
capacity building of migration control and ght against irregular migration (EEAS, 2017a, p.19).
25 EUCAP Sahel Mali was launched in 2015 as a capacity building mission tasked with providing
assistance and advice to the national police, the national gendarmerie and the national guard in the
implementation of the security reform. EUCAP Sahel Mali closely cooperates with United Nations
Multidimensional Integrated Stabilisation Mission in Mali in execution of its mandate (EEAS,
2017a, p.20).
6.3 Resilience
166
challenges separate from risk management. While risk management-centred policy
responses concentrate on the idea of managing, averting or mitigating potential
threats, resilience focuses on building up the structural robustness of the referent
object to the upcoming shocks and disturbances (Kaufmann, 2016, p.102). In the
EU’s framing of the crisis, this notion of increasing resilience, though not present in
the diagnosis and evaluation, has been institutionalised into the policy responses. In
this respect, in the remedial actions phase of the framing process, resilience- oriented
instruments have become juxtaposed with human security and “exceptionalist”
logic, inducing a specic mixture of humanitarian relief, development, capacity
building and security into the internal (European Common Asylum System) and
external (EU Trust Funds and CSDP missions) dimensions of EU migration and
border management. In both these dimensions the EU’s framing of resilience-
building reforms or interventions carry a signicant potential for securitisation, to
various extents linking asylum and external migration control with the realm of
security.
As discussed above, within the EU’s internal dimension the logic of resilience is
most prominent in the conceptualisation of the Common European Asylum System
reform. Here, the CEAS is framed in the EU policy discourse as one of the key EU’s
vulnerabilities, reected in its ineffectiveness and inability to absorb pressures
caused by increased numbers of applications from asylum seekers. This lack of
resilience of the CEAS has been continuously reiterated in the EU policy discourse,
encouraging calls for deeper and more decisive centralisation and harmonisation of
EU asylum procedures at the EU level. Here, the EU’s strategy towards the identi-
ed vulnerability falls under the category of “adaptation”, which suggests the
adjustment of the system within the existing policies and institutional frameworks
in accordance with the identied vulnerabilities and specic types of future risks
(Methmann & Oels, 2015, p.54). This element of resilience-building adaption quite
visibly pushed asylum seekers deeper into the realm of security, on one hand
attempting to strengthen the effectiveness of the system, but on the other integrating
it more with the EU’s internal security realm. As noted by the interviewed European
Asylum Support Ofce ofcer:
From EASO’s point of view, the whole commotion around CEAS is good. It nally puts us
on the map calling for strengthening of our mandate and centralisation of the whole system.
But if we look closer what the EU is trying to do here, we will see that in fact in the name
of protection of asylum seekers it proposes to bring closer the asylum security systems,
especially in terms of identication of potential threats, terrorists, and irregular migrants
among asylum applicants. For instance, the reform proposes a major increase of Eurodac
competencies and scope, allowing for collecting more detailed and, using security lan-
guage, operational information on asylum seekers. This data will be then, under certain
circumstances, shared among EU security agencies, national security authorities that inves-
tigate asylum seekers. Another example is EASO’s rapprochement with Europol and
Frontex, what is already visible in hotspots. With the new mandate we will be institution-
ally, organisationally and what is more important operationally closer than ever with these
agencies, which are all about security– we are not. EASO is about protection, even though
we do not provide protection as such (EASO-3).
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In this respect, the idea of building up resilience to the future migration-related
crises is linked not only to harmonisation and centralisation of specic aspects of
the EU asylum system, but also its securitisation.
The logic of resilience has assumed a slightly different shape in the conceptuali-
sation of actions addressing the external dimension the crisis. Resilience-building
instruments have been commonly framed in the EU as the most suitable for address-
ing what is believed to be the human insecurity and root causes of the “migration
crisis”; however, under closer scrutiny it becomes evident that they have been
designed to externalise migration management and outsource responsibility for
containment of irregular crossings into the EU.Indeed, the EU’s conceptualisation
of remedial actions outside the EU borders embodies the very idea of externalisa-
tion of migration control by increasing the resilience and effectiveness of the migra-
tion and border authorities in the countries of transit or origin of irregular migrants.
In this sense, the EU has been framing such external action instruments as the EU
Trust Funds and the CSDP civilian missions as interventions that were supposed to
assist national authorities in increasing their capacity for border and migration con-
trol. The neighbouring countries and countries of origin, with the EU’s assistance,
were supposed become stable enough to absorb all kinds of shocks (be it economic,
societal or environmental) and contain migrants (often their own citizens) within
their borders.
Here, the EU Trust Funds represent a nancial intervention that was supposed to
disarm socio-economic factors pushing migrants out of their host communities,
while the CSDP capacity building missions concentrate on assisting security author-
ities (e.g. the military) in addressing migration-related challenges, including irregu-
lar migration and trans-border organised crime, and terrorism. These
resilience-centred instruments to different degrees integrate migration with the
realm of security, sometimes even militarising migration control in the third coun-
tries, fortifying the EU against future migration-related shocks. As noted by the
interviewed Member of the European Parliament:
The EU’s understanding of resilience to migration is about building walls outside already
existing walls. The EU is trying to make different countries, especially neighbouring ones,
responsible for stopping ows of migrants whatever the cost. Let’s not kid ourselves,
Europe needs stable countries with stable borders in its proximity, even if they are difcult
to accept for obvious reasons. Look at the EUCAPs in Sahel, they literally teach military
and security personnel in those countries how to deal with illegal migrants and how to
secure borders. This is not as much about the protection of migrants or citizens of those
countries, but about containing them and stopping anyone who wants to illegally cross their
borders into Europe or wherever. It is about building that wall. EUTF’s on the other hand
allow transferring money to specic sectors that stimulate illegal migration to limit the
ows, but thanks to those funds money is also transferred to civilian security sector, mostly
related to border security under the “Train& Equip” scheme. You have it in the Africa Trust
Fund. It does not look like addressing push factors to me. It looks like resilience according
to the EU comes down to maintenance of security authorities of specic countries rather
than investing in their social and economic robustness and sustainability (European
Parliament-2).
6.3 Resilience
168
Indeed, the EU’s conceptualisation of external remedial actions towards the cri-
sis carry a distinctive blend of relief, development and security. It depicts resilience-
building interventions as a development or even humanitarian assistance to the
regions producing highest numbers of migrants, at the same time prominently
focusing on providing assistance to the security sector that in this case is identied
as the key manager of migration. This type of framing, merging humanitarian and
risk, resilience and “exceptionalist” features has become symptomatic for the
EU.Here, the application of human security seems to have an important legitimis-
ing effect, serving as a justication for the mobilisation of restrictive and securitis-
ing policy instruments, such as the training of the Malian military in migration
management techniques, all in the name of alleviating suffering and increasing the
societal, economic and governmental resilience of vulnerable groups and regions
outside the EU.This framing points towards a specic type of exploitation or appro-
priation of the humanitarian narrative, which when coupled with “exceptionalist”
security measures may lead to what could be described as “humanitarian securitisa-
tion” (Stępka, 2018). This trend is better eshed out in the next part of chapter, dedi-
cated to the application of “exceptionalist” security logic.
6.4 “Exceptionalist” Security
Remedial actions driven by “exceptionalist” security logic are commonly associ-
ated with the state of exception, reected in mobilisation of exceptional and reactive
measures, which are designed to combat and eradicate perceived security problems
in the name of maintaining the status quo and the survival of the referent object
(Buzan, 1991, p. 116). Exceptional security measures are usually, but not exclu-
sively, initiated by extraordinary procedures, bypassing normal politics and mobil-
ising a signicant amount of force and resources for a limited period of time
(C.A.S.E., 2006, pp.465–466). In the case of the “migration crisis”, the Council of
the European Union with the support of the European Commission have proved to
be the most outspoken sponsors of the exceptional security framing of the remedial
actions towards the crisis. The active role of the Council does not come as a sur-
prise, as it has been traditionally employing a more realist approach towards the
framing of international crises, commonly building on the intergovernmental or
militarised approach of the Foreign Affairs Council (Roselle et al., 2014). The
Commission, however, is a more unlikely promotor of “exceptionalism”, as it has
been traditionally invested in policy framing based on risk-oriented logics. Here, the
imperative for decisive action, so present in the diagnosis and evaluation of the
“migration crisis”, has pushed the Commission towards a blend of risk and “excep-
tionalist” thinking, aligning it with the Council in supporting mobilisation of mili-
tary or militarised operations in response to increased migratory ows. In this
respect, the analysis of the EU policy discourse reveals elements of exceptional
security logic applied in conceptualisation of remedial actions in two distinctive
policy responses, namely EUNAVFOR MED – Operation “Sophia” and Joint
6 Analysing the Conceptualisation of Remedial Actions Towards the “Migration…
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Operations coordinated by the Frontex. As discussed later in this chapter, both types
of operations represent a dynamic blend of predominantly “exceptionalist” security
framing with distinctive elements of risk and human security-oriented logics.
6.4.1 EUNAVFOR MED “Sophia”
From the beginning of the crisis, the EU policy discourse has been lled with calls
for the mobilisation of decisive security measures in the EU’s ght against human
smuggling and exploitation of migrants in the Mediterranean routes (Council of the
European Union, 2016a; European Commission, 2015a, b, 2016b; European
Parliament, 2015a, d). As stated in the Commission’s “Agenda on Migration”:
The criminal networks which exploit vulnerable migrants must be targeted. The High
Representative/Vice President (HR/VP) has already presented options for possible Common
Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) operations to systematically identify, capture and
destroy vessels used by smugglers. Such action under international law will be a powerful
demonstration of the EU’s determination to act (European Commission, 2015b, p.3).
In June 2015, the EU member states decided to launch an unprecedented military
naval operation (originally under the codename EUNAVFOR MED, later renamed
EUNAVFOR MED-Operation “Sophia”) and mandated it with border security
activities centred on two main tasks: (1) disrupting trafcking and smuggling of
human beings; and (2) preventing further loss of life on the Mediterranean high
seas26 (Council of the European Union, 2016a, p.1). To achieve this goal the mis-
sion focused specically on disruption of the business model of human smuggling
and trafcking networks in the Southern Central Mediterranean through the identi-
cation, capture, and disposal of vessels and associated assets suspected of being
employed for smuggling or trafcking activities (European Council, 2015b). The
operational area of the mission covered Southern Central Mediterranean, speci-
cally focusing on migratory inows from the coasts of Libya (EEAS Website,
2016c). Since 2017, it has been conducted under the so-called Chapter VII “peace-
enforcement mandate” (UNSC resolution 2357 (2017)), which authorised kinetic
operational activities such as boarding, search, seizure and diversion, on the high
seas, of vessels suspected of being used for human smuggling or trafcking (EEAS
Website, 2016d).
The EU policy framing of Operation “Sophia”, specically produced within the
Council of the European Union, has been based on an explicit humanitarian note
(Council of the European Union 2016a, l, 2017c, e). One of the most distinctive
moves, framing the operation as a predominantly humanitarian endeavour, was the
renaming of the mission from EUNAVFOR MED to Operation “Sophia”. For this
26 The rst incarnation of the mission EUNAVFOR MED was authorised by the UN Security
Council Resolution 2240 (UNSCR 2240) to “inspect vessels on the high seas off the coast of Libya
that they had reasonable grounds to suspect were being used for migrant smuggling or human traf-
cking from that country” (UN Security Council, 2015, art. 4 and 5).
6.4 “Exceptionalist” Security
170
purpose, Federica Mogherini, the High Representative of the Union for Foreign
Affairs and Security Policy, has been inserting into the ofcial EU discourse a nar-
rative about a baby girl named Sophia born on an EU naval vessel:
We all know that we need to work together– the international community, Europe, Libya
and neighbours– to stop the smugglers, dismantle the criminal networks, save lives and
stop this human tragedy. I particularly think of women and children and babies, one of them
born on one of our vessels – this is why Operation “Sophia” is called like this (EEAS
Website, 2017).
This human security-oriented frame has been continuously reproduced by other EU
policy actors. For instance, the European Parliament has been expressing its con-
tinuous support “for the aims of navy operations such as Operation ‘Sophia’, and
stresses the need to protect life, emphasising that all aspects of the operation should
ensure that migrant lives are protected” (European Parliament, 2016f, rec. 9). In a
similar tone, the European Commission has been framing the operation as one of
the key and most effective EU actions and symbols of the European unity in saving
human lives at high seas and from exploitation of human smugglers (European
Commission, 2016k, 2017c, d, f).
The EU policy actors quite uniformly promoted the humanitarian features of the
mission, but also welcomed its decisive and robust character, even going as far as
describing it as the “spearhead” of the EU policy response to the “migration crisis”
(LIBE, 2016, 2017). Following the general trend in the EU policy discourse, the
framing of Operation “Sophia” has been changing over the course of the “migration
crisis”. In this regard, the human security features were most emphasised in its early
days of the mission, specically in the discourse surrounding its development and
deployment, and then gradually turned into a more security-oriented and militarised
tone (see Council of the European Union 2016c, 2017c, e). This is not surprising, as
under more careful scrutiny of the mission’s mandate, the element of prevention of
loss of human life is rather marginal in comparison to its security-related features.
As stated by the Commander of the mission during a hearing at the European
Parliament on search and rescue activities in the Mediterranean:
Operation “Sophia” is not a search and rescue mission, and it should not be treated as such.
We save lives because it is our international obligation, but let us not lose out of sight the
primary objective of the mission and that it is combating human smugglers and trafckers
and disrupting their business model (LIBE, 2017).
Indeed, starting in 2017 the framing of the mission moved towards exceptional
security-oriented, emphasising and celebrating its kinetic features such as the board-
ing, inspection, seizure and disposal of vessels used in human smuggling and traf-
cking activities (Council of the European Union, 2017c, e). This turn in framing
can be best observed in the human security-free description of the mission, offered
in the European External Action Service’s CFSP/CSDP Missions Review:
Operation “Sophia” is a military crisis management operation that contributes to improving
maritime security in the Mediterranean and supports the return of stability and security in
Libya. Its primary goal is to contribute to disrupting the business model of the migrant
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smuggling and human trafcking networks in the Central Mediterranean (EEAS,
2017a, p.28).
In its later stages, the activities of “Sophia” have been framed within a security
package in the Mediterranean, oriented not only to kinetic activities, but also sur-
veillance activities (thus including elements of risk management) (EEAS, 2017a,
pp.28–30; Council of the European, Union 2016a). In this regard, its mandate and
operational capability have been designed to be comprehensive and open to coop-
eration with the EU AFSJ agencies, primarily Frontex and Europol, as well as exter-
nal security actors, namely NATO Operation “Sea Guardian”27 (Council of the
European Union, 2016l). As a consequence, Operation “Sophia” envisaged opera-
tional support in saving lives at sea, but also increased cooperation with the AFSJ
partners and NATO in its decisive offensive against human smugglers, proceeded
with extensive “monitoring, intelligence gathering and adaptation to the evolving
modus operandi of smugglers” (European Commission, 2017d, p.8). This visible
shift towards security and a risk-oriented understanding of “Sophia’s” tasks did not
go completely unnoticed and uncontested. The European Parliament was monitor-
ing developments in the EU’s engagement in the Mediterranean and was contesting
the exceptional security-oriented remedial actions, underlining that “military opera-
tions should not be the predominant aspect of any holistic approach to migration
and reiterates that Operation “Sophia” must not distract assets already deployed in
the Mediterranean from saving lives at sea” (European Parliament, 2016f, rec. 10).
This concern, however, did not resonate in the EU policy discourse and was rather
limited to the Parliament.
6.4.2 Joint Border Operations
According to the European Border and Coast Guard Regulation (Frontex), a joint
border operation is a “package of technical and operational reinforcement as well as
capacity-building activities” (European Union, 2016a, p.19). It is coordinated by
the Agency in cooperation with a member state, which is “faced with a situation of
specic and disproportionate challenges, especially the arrival at points of the exter-
nal borders of large numbers of third-country nationals trying to enter the territory
of that Member State without authorisation” (European Union, 2016a, p. 19). It
represents a blend of risk (managerial and resilience-oriented) and exceptional
security logics, being interpreted as both an instrument for control of migratory
ows, as well as a response to persistent and severe threats to the integrity of the EU
borders (Sagrera, 2013, p.171). In respect to the “migration crisis”, the framing of
27 NATO Operation “Sea Guardian” was announced in July 2016. It is a non-article 5 maritime
operation tasked with support of the EU and other stakeholders operating in the Mediterranean.
The mandate of the mission includes supporting the situation awareness, upholding freedom of
navigation, conducting interdiction tasks, counter-terrorism, countering proliferation of weapons,
and protection of critical infrastructure (NATO Website, 2018).
6.4 “Exceptionalist” Security
172
the missions included one more logic that visibly seeped from the diagnostic and
evaluation segments of the frame-narrative, namely human security.
The framing of joint operations has been built around a sense of exceptionality
and urgency reected in the rhetoric of “human tragedy”, “emergency” and “struc-
tural deciency of border control” at the same time intersecting with discourse on
the existentially threatened Schengen area (Council of the European Union, 2016d,
o; European Commission, 2016a, b, g). This has contributed to increased calls for
urgent deployment of robust measures capable of addressing security and humani-
tarian challenges unfolding on the EU borders (Council of the European Union,
2015i, 2016b; European Commission, 2015b, 2016j; European Parliament, 2015d).
In this respect, in the “Agenda on Migration”, the European Commission explicitly
denes the border operations as the spearhead of the EU humanitarian engagement
on its borders, calling for maintained and intensied involvement of the mem-
ber states:
Europe cannot stand by whilst lives are being lost. Search and rescue efforts will be stepped
up to restore the level of intervention provided under the former Italian ‘Mare Nostrum’
operation. To triple the budget for the Frontex joint-operations Triton and Poseidon, the
Commission has already presented an amending budget for 2015 and will present its pro-
posal for 2016 by the end of May. When implemented, this will expand both the capability
and the geographical scope of these operations, so that Frontex can full its dual role of
coordinating operational border support to Member States under pressure, and helping to
save the lives of migrants at sea. In parallel to this increase in EU funding, assets (ships and
aircrafts) are being deployed by several Member States. This welcome solidarity will need
to be maintained for as long as the migratory pressure persists (European Commission,
2015b, p.3).
The EU promoted mobilisation and operational expansion of border missions on an
unprecedented scale, emphasising their role in search and rescue, patrolling, polic-
ing and guarding the irregular immigration routes, mostly on the Southern ank of
the EU external borders.28 With this broad catalogue of activities in mind, the EU
lunched three large-scale Frontex-led sea border operations – Joint Operations
“Triton” and “Themis” in Italy, and Joint Operation “Poseidon” in Greece.29
The search and rescue-oriented activities played a prominent role in the framing
of the operations. They were also reected in the revision of Frontex’s new mandate,
which in addition to traditional border and internal security tasks, made the agency
responsible for coordination and facilitation of search and rescue activities on the
EU external borders (European Union, 2016a, art. 8). At rst, the prerogative of
saving lives was listed as a primary goal of the EU’s presence of the borders, with
the European Parliament and the Commission underlining the humanitarian impera-
tive of the operations (European Commission, 2015b, 2016j: European Parliament,
28 Major Frontex-led Joint Operation (JO) with a mandate specically related to increased irregular
migratory ows: JO “Minerva”, JO “Indalo”, JO “Hera”– Spain; JO “Triton”, JO “Aeneas”, JO
“Themis”– Italy; JO “Poseidon”, JO “Poseidon Land”– Greece Frontex Website, 2018a).
29 “Themis” is a joint operation launched in 2018, exceeding the timeframe of the study.
Nonetheless, it is mentioned here as a relevant example of militarisation of the EU-led search and
rescue operations.
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2015d). The rst Frontex-led joint operation, “Triton”30 (2014–2018), was a con-
tinuation of a unilateral Italian search and rescue mission “Mare Nostrum”.31
“Triton” was promoted as a support mission to Italian border and coast guard
authorities, focusing on border security and saving migrants’ lives in the Central
Mediterranean (Frontex Website, 2018e). Its operational area covered the territorial
waters of Italy as well as parts of the search and rescue zones of Italy and Malta32
(European Commission, 2016j, p.1). The joint operation “Poseidon”33 at rst repre-
sented a similar type of mission, covering search and rescue in the Greek sea border
with Turkey and the Greek islands (Frontex Website, 2018d). However, it has
quickly embraced more security-driven activities, on the one hand strengthening
search and rescue activities, but on the other focusing on identication and registra-
tion of saved migrants as well as support of returns and readmission (European
Commission, 2016j, p.1).
As it was in the case of EUNAVFOR “Sophia”, the security features of the joint
border operations became more robust with the progression of the crisis. Each
review of the operational mandates of the missions added new security components.
For instance, while reviewing Operation “Triton” in 2017, the European Commission
stated that even though “Triton” was initially launched with a focus on support to
search and rescue, the state of the EU borders required its rapid expansion to
“include cross border crime, such as people smuggling, drug trafcking, illegal sh-
ing and maritime pollution” (European Commission, 2017d, p.5). With time, the
explicit search and rescue prole of the mission was substantially downscaled
within the Operational Plans of both “Triton” and “Poseidon”, putting the emphasis
on the tasks related to enhancement of border security, operational cooperation in
combating transborder crime, terrorism and irregular migration (Frontex, 2015a, b).
Since 2015 and the major revisions of the EU border regime, the joint missions have
gained a signicantly militarised character, employing a “‘rescue-through-
interdiction’/‘rescue-without-protection’ model” of operations (Ghezelbash etal.,
2018). As Moreno-Lax (2018, p.130) argues, the EU border operations have been
using the narrative of search and rescue as an excuse for increased security activity
30 In 2016, Joint Operation “Triton” was comprised of 509 guest border ofcers, 16 vessels, four
surveillance aircraft and two helicopters, all deployed under the auspices and coordination of
Frontex. It is important to note that even though the renewed mandate of Frontex does allow for
purchase of equipment, the joint operations are based predominantly on staff and equipment con-
tributions from EU Member States (European Commission, 2016j, p.1)
31 “Mare Nostrum” was launched in 2013 as a response to the tragic events off Lampedusa. It was
an Italian-led military mission with humanitarian mandate, tasked with search and rescue as well
as disembarkation of irregular migrants attempting to cross the central Mediterranean route to
Europe. The mission covered search and rescue zones near Italy and Malta (Panebianco and
Fontana, 2018, p.7).
32 Often, Frontex-coordinated vessels and aircraft were redirected by the Italian Coast Guard for
search and rescue purposes in maritime zones far away from the original operational area of
“Triton” (European Commission, 2016j, p.2).
33 Joint Operation “Poseidon” consisted of 680 guest border ofcers, 21 vessels, one surveillance
aircraft and one helicopter (European Commission, 2016j, p.1).
6.4 “Exceptionalist” Security
174
in the Mediterranean, mainly focusing on combating cross-border crime and
counter- terrorism activities. This model has been more explicitly reected in
Operation “Themis”, which in 2018 replaced “Triton” in the Central Mediterranean
area of operations. “Themis” focused predominantly on security and law enforce-
ment operational tasks, leaving very little space for any search and rescue activities
(Frontex Website, 2018b, c). The operation has been equipped with extensive secu-
rity components specically tailored for combating and tracing illicit trans-border
activities, including terrorism (Nielsen, 2018). The operational mandate included
“collection of intelligence and other steps aimed at detecting foreign ghters and
other terrorist threats at the external borders” (Nielsen, 2018). As stated by the exec-
utive director of Frontex, “We need to be better equipped to prevent criminal groups
that try to enter the EU undetected. This is crucial for the internal security of the
European Union” (Frontex Website, 2018c). In this respect, the framing of the joint
operations included human security logic only in the initial stages and the opera-
tions, keeping it to the point when the operation was established enough to shed its
humanitarian features and become a more kinetic and security-driven response to
the crisis.
6.4.3 Comments
In regard to the conceptualisation of remedial action, the logic of “exceptionality”
was reected in the mobilisation of multipurpose robust border operations and
deployment of military naval vessels, vehicles and armed border guards under the
special security circumstances. Here, Operation “Sophia” and Frontex-led joint
operations represent such a security response, an EU reactive force symbolising a
security presence on the frontlines of the “migration crisis”. The analysis shows that
the framing of these operations remained dynamic and reected in the intertwining
of surveillance and security features (monitoring and reacting to threats) and
humanitarian orientation (search and rescue).
The initial stages of Operation “Sophia” and Frontex-led joint operations were
driven by the human security-centred framing. In the case of Operation “Sophia”,
the EU has been actively promoting this anti-human smuggling and anti-irregular
migration military operation as a humanitarian mission, regardless its explicit
security- oriented mandate. A similar framing move has been applied in the case of
Frontex-led operations, which have been mandated as both border control and
search and rescue missions. As noted by one of the interviewees:
there is something wrong with mandating one mission with stopping and saving migrants at
the same time. In my experience if you couple security and humanitarianism in one man-
date, security always wins. There is an inherent contradiction in that. We have to remember
that especially “Sophia” is not a search and rescue operation. You have vessels with big
guns, sailors, soldiers hunting human smugglers and if they have a chance, picking up
migrants at sea. They are not really prepared for that. I am not saying that there should not
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be such a mission but let us stop calling it humanitarian. It is a hardcore military operation
mandated by the UNSC resolution to combat organised crime. (European Parliament-2)
It has become increasingly visible that the human security-oriented framing of the
missions has been rather used to explain and justify political decisions on deploy-
ment of military assets in the centre of the “migration crisis” (Cusumano, 2017;
Little & Vaughan-Williams, 2017). In other words, they served as a legitimising
factor, allowing the launch of an explicitly military operation, which then was
swiftly reviewed and transformed from “search and rescue” to “seek and destroy”
mode (Ghezelbash et al., 2018; Stępka, 2018). This reects a rather narrow and
utilitarian understanding of human security and humanitarian obligations, granting
irregular migrants escaping life-threatening situations the right to be rescued at sea,
but very little beyond that.
Even though this securitisation or militarisation of humanitarian action has been
successful, it has proved to have a rather limited effect on EU security (Johansen,
2017). The reviews of the missions, indicate that saving migrants lives turned out to
be the most tangible result of the missions given that there is little evidence that
Operation “Sophia” or joint operations have signicantly disrupted human smug-
gling or terrorist activities in the Mediterranean (Johansen, 2017, p.515). Regardless,
in the later stages of the “migration crisis” the EU policy actors, except for the
European Parliament, have been favouring this surveillance and kinetic refocus of
all the operations, emphasising the need for adaptation, and a stronger and more
decisive involvement in combating human smuggling and terrorism in the
Mediterranean (Council of the European Union, 2016a, l, 2017b; European
Commission, 2015a, b, 2016h; European Council, 2015c, 2016a, b, 2017d).
6.5 Conclusion
The remedial action phase marks a shift in the dynamics of the interpretative pro-
cess as well as between the EU policy actors. Here, the framing of suitable policy
responses has been visibly dominated by the European Commission, the European
Council, the Council of the European Union and, to some extent, the European
External Action Service– the actors that have the most signicant impact on the
shaping and implementation of security policies and in the EU.As a result of this
changed dynamic, the European Parliament has lost its prominence in the remedial
action phase, either aligning with the dominant players or on a rare occasion
attempting to promote the incorporation of human security logic in the EU’s policy
response. With this decline of the role of the Parliament and the rise of the member
states and the Commission, the internal dynamics of the framing process and the
specicity of security logics applied in the frame-narrative has changed in compari-
son to the diagnosis and evaluation.
Firstly, the EU policy discourse on the conceptualisation of remedial actions has
proved to be far more contentious, revealing tensions between logics (e.g. human
6.5 Conclusion
176
security and risk regarding the “hotpots”, detention and returns, the EU-Turkey
Statement) and conicts among the actors (e.g. between some member states and
the Commission regarding the relocation scheme and the Dublin system reform).
Secondly, it revealed the dynamic and complex nature of security logics, which
became increasingly entangled in the conceptualisation of remedial actions. The
logic of human security has been repositioned in the EU policy discourse, leaving
space for more robust introduction of another risk-oriented logic– resilience. This
has conrmed the explicit dominance of risk logic in the EU frame-narrative on the
“migration crisis”, which has saturated both the internal and external dimensions of
the EU interventions. The fate of human security was very different. It has lost its
prominence and has been “dissolved” between different policy responses, most
notably resilience- and “exceptionality”-oriented measures.
The explicit dominance of broadly understood risk logic in the framing of the
“migration crisis” is reected in both risk management and resilience-oriented
remedial actions. The risk management-centred interpretations have been discur-
sively well-structured within the EU migration-security continuum and the diagnos-
tic and evaluation segments of the frame-narrative. Building on the need to regain
control over the EU’s external borders and internal security realm, the Commission
and the Councils strongly promoted security measures oriented to the control, man-
agement and surveillance of human mobility. With the introduction of specic sites
(i.e. “hotspots”) and measures (e.g. Eurodac, PNR system) irregular migrants and
asylum seekers have been successfully reframed from objects of protection (as in
human security) to objects of risk that need to be controlled for security purposes.
The prominence of risk was continued with the promotion of resilience-centred
measures, which have been introduced into the EU’s frame-narrative as means for
addressing the root causes of the crisis and building up the institutional robustness
of the EU’s asylum system. Here, the EU started to create two categories of asylum
seekers, framing them as desirable and legitimate applicants, and irregular migrants
who harm the system by submitting bogus asylum claims. Resilience-centred poli-
cies have been oriented to fortifying the internal and external realm of the EU,
building up the capacity to withstand future migration-related shocks and distur-
bances that are believed to manifest themselves sooner or later. The framing of
resilience-building measures deployed outside the EU borders distinctively feeds on
human security logic, being interpreted as instruments bringing relief, development,
rehabilitation and security to the countries and communities ridden with underde-
velopment and human suffering. In this sense, human security logic is being dis-
solved within resilience-centred framing, as a secondary interpretative thread which
legitimises interventions outside the EU borders.
A similar trend is visible in the application of “exceptionalist” security logic in
the conceptualisation of remedial actions. Here, militarised and robust security
measures such as EUNAVFOR “Sophia” or Frontex-led border operations include
the humanitarian narrative in a more utilitarian fashion. Here, the notion of “saving
lives at sea” and humanitarian actions were successfully used for justication and
legitimisation of the mobilisation of extraordinary security measures in the
Mediterranean; however, they were swiftly marginalised in favour of more
6 Analysing the Conceptualisation of Remedial Actions Towards the “Migration…
177
security-centred modes of operation. In this respect, in the later stages of the crisis
(i.e. late 2016 and 2017) the mandates of the EU missions have been gradually
revised and reframed to assume tasks centred on “seek and destroy” rather than
“search and rescue”. As a result, the protection and wellbeing of migrants has been
deemphasised in the EU’s conceptualisation of remedial actions, making space for
more risk and security-oriented framing, focused on the strengthening of external
borders, control of mobility, identication of foreign ghters and terrorists within
the migratory ows, and the ght against trans-border organised crime.
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Research Series, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-93035-6_7
Chapter 7
Conclusions
7.1 Introduction
The main aim of this book was to investigate the policy framing of the “migration
crisis” and uncover the multiplicity of security meanings and interpretations that
have been underlying the process of securitisation of migration at the EU level. In
order to do so, the book introduced two conceptual elaborations that served as the
basis for a more interpretative analysis, namely logics of security and securitisation
as the work of framing. The conceptual framework applied in this book departs
from the traditional understanding of securitisation theory, claiming that an “excep-
tionalist-” and speech act-driven approach to security is not t to explore a full
range of security logics and interpretations that are involved in the inter-subjective
construction of security. In the analysed case of the “migration crisis”, such alterna-
tive notions as risk, resilience or human security proved to have securitising effects,
pushing or pulling migration into the realm of security by mobilising, for example,
surveillance technologies, border and assistance missions, and militarised means
against migratory ows. In order to address the question of security logics, the book
proposes to embrace policy framing theory within the securitisation paradigm and
attune it to a variety of security interpretations that co-exist, struggle, and/or inter-
twine in the processes of securitisation. In order to reveal how the EU has been
mobilising different security logics, generating a security-oriented mind-set around
migration, the analysis concentrated on the EU frame-narrative produced in response
to the “migration crisis”. In this way, it focused on how specic segments of it (i.e.
diagnosis, evaluation and ascription of solutions) have been imbued with a variety
of security logics.
The EU is certainly a complex and internally diverse securitising actor. For more
than four decades, it has been enveloping migration with its technocratic modes of
security, framing different categories of migrants in terms of manageable risks,
requiring constant control and surveillance. Indeed, as discussed in this book, the
risk-centred framings of the “migration crisis” have proved to be dominant, being
194
most signicantly structured and institutionalised within all segments of the EU
frame-narrative. Nonetheless, the analysis also indicated that the EU does not sub-
scribe exclusively to one mode or logic of construction of security. The nature of
securitisation at the EU level is more complex than that. If looked at more closely
and beyond the dominant modes and contents of securitisation, one can see other
underlying logics which play different roles and securitise human mobility in its
various dimensions. There is an inherent dynamic written into the securitisation
process at the EU level, which reveals uctuations in terms of logics applied, as well
the actors who mobilise them. Even though specic logics such as risk or human
security have sponsors who predominantly promote them in the EU policy dis-
course, these actors rarely build exclusively on just one type of interpretation. They
rather create complex entanglements of security logics, using humanitarianism, risk
and exceptionality while framing and consequently making different categories of
human mobility part of the EU security equation. Let us revisit the EU frame-
narrative and discuss the most important ndings of the book in more detail.
7.2 Revisiting Security Logics intheEU Frame-Narrative
onthe“Migration Crisis”
This book focused on unravelling the EU frame-narrative on the “migration crisis”,
looking into the interpretative processes and logics embedded in the EU policy dis-
course, which makes up a specic securitising frame-narrative on the increased
migratory ows. Here, a frame-narrative creates a sense of logical and sequential
process, which denes and explains a problematic and uncertain situation and trans-
lates it into an interpretative pattern that can be internalised and accepted within a
specic socio-political context. By proposing a particular diagnosis, evaluation and
proposition of remedial actions, a frame-narrative links an issue to a certain inter-
pretation (e.g. security related) by silencing and/or empowering particular features
of it. In this respect, the EU frame-narrative on the “migration crisis” has proved to
be a complex and dynamic construct, permeated with a variety of security logics
and interpretations that have been, to various degrees, underwriting the process of
securitisation. Table7.1 offers a synthesis of the EU frame-narrative on the “migra-
tion crisis” containing an overview of specic logics and their main features. As
shown in Table7.1, the analysis revealed four distinctive logics that co-exist in the
EU frame-narrative on the “migration crisis”, namely risk management, resilience,
human security and “exceptionalist” security. Let us now revisit their prominence,
interactions, and dynamics within the diagnostic, evaluation and remedial segments
of the frame-narrative.
The EU’s diagnosis and evaluation of the crisis has been predominantly saturated
with human security and risk management logics of security, with elements of
exceptionality seeping into the framing of specic aspects of the crisis. Here, the
human security-centred framing of the crisis can be dened the most prominent,
7 Conclusions
195
Table 7.1 EU frame-narrative on the “migration crisis” (own elaboration)
Segments of
frame- narrative /
Security logics
“Exceptionalist” security
(sponsored predominantly
by the Council of the
European Union and
European Council)
Human security (sponsored
predominantly by the European
Parliament)
Risk management (sponsored
predominantly by European
Commission)
Resilience
(sponsored predominantly by
the European Commission and
EEAS)
Diagnosis
(dominant logics:
Human security and
risk management)
Elements of this logic are
visible in the human
security- centred framing in
the conceptualisation of
the root causes (driven by
violence, terrorism, and
crime) and focus on the
external enemy
Places the locus of the EU external
security domain
Root causes of the crisis are placed
outside the EU and linked with the
proliferation of physical and violence
in third countries
Refugees and economic migrants are
dened as referent objects, requiring
EU protection
Places the locus of the crisis in the
EU internal security domain
The sustainability of control over
the EU external borders and
migration is dened as the referent
object
Resilience does not reach
signicant levels of discourse
structuration in this segment of
the frame-narrative
Evaluation
(dominant logics:
Human security and
risk management)
Elements of this logic are
visible in risk
management-centred
framing of organised
crime, which is described
as an existential threat to
migrants and the stability
of the EU (incl. The
Schengen zone and
freedom of movement)
Causal security effects revolve around
the wellbeing of migrants and
degrading human security on the EU
borders
Blame for the “migration crisis” is
attributed to terrorists, unstable and
undemocratic countries of origin, and
trans-border organised crime groups
Strong emphasis on humanitarian
imperative for action
Causal security effects relate to
inefciency of the EU border and
migration policies and instruments
Trans-border organised crime is
dened as the main driving force
behind the crisis
Strong emphasis on the need of
management and normalisation of
the situation on the external and
internal EU borders
Resilience does not reach
signicant levels of discourse
structuration in this segment of
the frame-narrative
Remedial action
(dominant logics:
Risk, comprised of
risk management
and resilience)
Strong discursive intertwining of human and realist security logics
reected in mobilisation of militarised security measures for
humanitarian purposes, including border operations led by Frontex
and CSDP naval mission EUNAVFOR “Sophia”
A plethora of measures oriented to
control, management and
surveillance of migrants, the EU’s
external borders and internal
security realm
Stimulation of development and
capacity building in the
countries of origin and transit
Discursive intertwining with
human security logic in the
EU’s framing of resilience
building measures as a remedy
to the root causes of the crisis
7.2 Revisiting Security Logics intheEU Frame-Nar rative onthe“Migration Crisis”
196
dominating the framing of migratory ows, especially in the early stages of the
crisis. This type of framing is centred on protection of all migrants who have become
part of the increased migratory ows while seeking refuge from pervasive threats in
their native communities. This type of logic has proved to have a strong externalis-
ing effect, placing the “migration crisis” and its root causes outside the EU and its
socio-political and territorial domain. In this type of framing, the main security
concerns do not stem from the migrants themselves, but rather hazardous migration,
which takes place in an environment external to the EU and permeated with severe
threats that are pushing migrants to seeking protection and betterment in Europe. In
this vein, the security related causal effects are conceptualised around hardship and
harm of migrants in their countries of origin, as well as their dangerous journeys to
the EU.In this respect, the human security-driven framing specically emphasises
the role of trans-border organised crime, more prominently human smugglers and
trafckers, who are dened as one of the effects and at the same time the driving
force of the crisis, feeding on human misery and security deciencies of the EU
external borders.
The risk management-centred diagnosis and evaluation of the crisis offers a
digression from human security-related interpretations, feeding on the notions of
irregular migration, border security, control and management of EU internal secu-
rity realm. Indeed, as soon as the “migration crisis” has “entered” the Schengen
zone, the interpretation shifts into risk management-oriented logic, redening the
nature of the crisis, referent objects, security concerns and their causal effects. The
centre of gravity is placed in the internal security domain as most severely affected
by the increased migratory ows (i.e. marking the causal security effect). Here, the
framing of the referent object visibly clashes with the migrant-centred conceptuali-
sation, moving away from human security. Instead, the control over and functional-
ity of the Schengen zone, freedom of movement, and the EU borders become most
commonly dened as the referent objects for security policies. In this respect, the
EU policy discourse has been permeated with calls for normalisation and manage-
ment of the migratory ows as well as stabilisation of the situation on the EU bor-
ders. Even though human security and risk diverted from each other in their
conceptualisations of referent objects, they converged in their denition of causal
security effects and forces escalating the crisis. Similarly, to the human security-
centred framing, risk management focuses much attention on organised crime and
terrorist groups, dening them as the key perpetrators of crimes against the EU
internal security and one of the key facilitators of the crisis.
The analysis suggests that the framing of organised crime and terrorism not only
brings together the two logics, but also visibly infuses them with elements of
“exceptionalist” security thinking. Organised crime and terrorism are both broadly
dened as a threat to the existence and functionality of the dened referent objects,
exploiting and feeding on the tragic situation of migrants and structural deciencies
of the EU border and migration policies. Consequently, organised crime and terror-
ism are dened as the major driving forces behind the “migration crisis”. Similarly,
elements of “exceptionalist” security logic can also be found in the human security-
centred framing of the root causes of the crisis. Here, the EU policy actors have been
7 Conclusions
197
placing the “migration crisis” and its push factors in the EU external security
domain, commonly dening it as ridden with violence, insecurity, as well as eco-
nomic and socio-political instability. This is not to say that “exceptionalist” security
can be described as highly structured within the diagnostic and evaluation segments,
but nonetheless, its elements are visible, and their inclusion strengthens the secu-
rity-oriented tone of the frame-narrative.
As shown in Table7.1, the diagnostic and evaluation segments of the EU frame-
narrative lack any signicant traces of resilience. Marginalisation of resilience in
the diagnosis and evaluation of the “migration crisis” may come as a surprise, as it
is a commonly accepted and internalised logic within the EU security and policy
frameworks. The explanation for the lack of reference to resilience in the initial
phases of the framing process could lie in the fact that both risk management and
human security-driven framings already covered the diagnosis of protracted de-
ciencies in the EU’s internal and external security environment. More precisely, the
risk management-oriented framing was to some extent diagnosing structural defects
in regard to e.g. external borders, while human security was used to frame the crisis-
ridden EU neighbourhood. Both these diagnoses have been used as the basis for
conceptualisation of resilience-building remedial actions.
As the diagnostic and evaluation segments of the frame narrative identied and
explained the main features of the “migration crisis”, its root causes, referent objects
and causal security effects, the remedial action phase dealt with conceptualisation
and translations of those interpretations into policy responses. Ideally, the remedial
action phase should build on the diagnosis and evaluation, representing a natural
and logical continuation of previously established frames and logics. However, the
case of the EU’s policy framing of the “migration crisis” reveals a slightly different
dynamic, reected in dispersed and non-linear interpretative patterns. The logic of
risk management prevailed in the remedial actions phase, conrming its dominance
throughout the frame-narrative with the introduction and further institutionalisation
of EU policy measures oriented to control, management, and surveillance of migra-
tion ows, migrants, and borders. At the same time, the EU frame-narrative has
ultimately diverted from a singular human security- and migrant-centred conceptu-
alisation. Instead, it focused on introducing sites (i.e. “hotspots”) and measures (e.g.
Eurodac, SIS system) that have successfully reframed the incoming migrants from
objects of protection to objects of risk that need to be controlled for security
purposes.
The remedial action segment of the frame-narrative lacks any distinctive traces
of human security that make it into a properly institutionalised and standalone logic.
Instead, elements of human security have been dispersed or redistributed among the
“exceptionalist” security- and resilience-oriented conceptualisation of policy
actions, most often serving as a factor legitimising mobilisation of more robust
security-militarised (e.g. EUNAVFOR “Sophia”) or nancial (e.g. EU Trust Funds)
measures. Here, the resilience-centred policy measures constitute a peculiar case of
framing, linking elements of risk and human security with elements of “exception-
ality” reected in the mobilisation of militarised resources. In this case, the EU has
been promoting two types of resilience, centred on the internal and external security
7.2 Revisiting Security Logics intheEU Frame-Nar rative onthe“Migration Crisis”
198
dimensions. The idea of external resilience focuses on elimination of push factors
for migration by strengthening the economic, security and political sectors of coun-
tries of origin and transit. In this respect, resilience-building measures such capacity
building missions or trust funds distinctively feed on human security logic, being
framed as instruments bringing relief, development, rehabilitation and security to
the countries and communities ridden with underdevelopment and human suffering.
The internal dimension of resilience, on the other hand, focuses on the development
and effectiveness of the EU’s common asylum system (i.e. CEAS, relocation, reset-
tlement), which is commonly framed in the EU policy discourse as an essential
element of the European system of international protection. Here, the effectiveness
of the system is reected not only in its robustness and ability to withstand a sudden
increase in asylum applications, but also in the ability to quickly identify and remove
“bogus asylum seekers” in favour of “true asylum seekers”.
Traces of human security are also visible in the conceptualisation of “exception-
alist” security measures within the EU frame-narrative. Here, militarised policy
responses such as EUNAVFOR “Sophia” or Frontex-led border operations have
often been framed as humanitarian missions with prominent search and rescue-
oriented components. This type of framing, however, has proven to be limited in
scope and time-length. The notion of the humanitarian imperative successfully
launched and legitimised the mobilisation of extraordinary security measures in the
Mediterranean, but in the course of the “migration crisis”, it has been marginalised
in favour of more security-centred concerns. In this respect, in the later stages of the
crisis (i.e. 2017 onwards) the operational plans and mandates of the EU missions
have been gradually revised and reframed to assume tasks centred on “seek and
destroy” rather than search and rescue. As a result, the protection and wellbeing of
migrants has been deemphasised in the EU’s conceptualisation of remedial actions,
focusing on identication of foreign ghters and terrorists within the migratory
ows, and the ght against trans-border organised crime.
7.3 Reecting onSecuritisation astheWork ofFraming
As emphasised in this book, the “securitisation as the work of framing” approach
was developed and applied in order to open the discussion on the construction of
security to a broader and more inclusive conceptualisation, consequently allowing
analysis of securitising moves that occur below the threshold of “political drama”
and extraordinary security circumstances. In this regard, the proposed approach was
supposed to be better suited for analysis of securitisation at the EU policy level, tun-
ing the analytical framework to a multiplicity of meanings, interests and logics that
normally co-exist and struggle in policymaking processes. Let me now recap and
reect on how this approach has worked in the presented analysis of the EU’s policy
framing of the “migration crisis”.
The rst aim of the “framing approach” was to stop xing securitisation analysis
to one meaning of security, traditionally linked with the state of exception, but to
7 Conclusions
199
embrace a variety of security interpretations that commonly result from different
interpretive communities and actors that take part in the policymaking process. In
the presented analysis of securitisation of the “migration crisis” at the EU level, this
conceptual assumption proved to be necessary and enabled incorporation of differ-
ent types of diagnosis, evaluation and conceptualisations of remedial actions that
have been introduced by the EU policy actors at different stages of the framing
process. In this way, the analysis has revealed biases towards specic logics among
the EU policy actors, who have been promoting or sponsoring their own interpreta-
tions of the “migration crisis”. For instance, the European Parliament has been the
most vocal sponsor of the humanitarian and human-centred conceptualisation of the
“migration crisis”, distinctively framing the crisis as a human tragedy and incoming
migrants as referent objects that require the protection of the EU.At the same time,
the European Commission has been promoting rather risk-centred logics, building
on the notions of control of European external borders and management of migra-
tory inows into Europe. The Council of the European Union and the European
Council emphasised yet another interpretation, sponsoring the realist security-
oriented framing of the crisis, often promoting physical protection of the borders
and EU territories and mobilisation of military means to ght human smugglers and
trafckers. This does not mean that these policy actors were the sole “users” of
specic logics. The analysis has shown that each EU institution was weaving its
own set of securitising moves using a variety of security logics. In this respect, the
case of the “migration crisis” has shown that there is a certain degree of messiness
and a distinctive internal dynamism inscribed into the process of securitisation at
the EU level.
This proliferation of actors and their interpretations has conrmed that in com-
plex policymaking environments such as the EU, securitisation cannot be limited to
one authoritative actor who controls the whole process. It is rather subjected to
dynamic negotiations between and within groups of relevant actors, who wield dif-
ferent positional powers that enable them to inuence particular elements of the
collective understanding of a security problem. In this way, though the European
Parliament has proved to be an inuential promoter of human security-centred diag-
nosis and evaluation of the crisis, due to its limited control over EU security policies
it has lost its inuence in the conceptualisation of remedial actions. Similarly, the
European Commission and the Council have proved to be the most powerful in
conceptualising remedial actions and promoting instruments that would allow long-
term management of the crisis and direct military interventions, respectively. It
should be noted that in the analysed case of the “migration crisis”, the policy fram-
ing was rather conciliatory with limited instances of policy controversies. There
have been issues that introduced conict between the EU policy actors, namely the
relocation scheme and consequently the reform of the CEAS and the Dublin system.
Here, the Council and the European Commission clashed over the framing of nature
and scope of the relocation mechanism, proposing different interpretations and con-
ceptualisations of the scheme. The bone of contention was reected in the actual
denition and logics of specic measures. The relocation mechanism represents a
good example, when the Council along with Central and Eastern European Member
7.3 Reecting onSecuritisation astheWork ofFraming
200
States argued whether this measure should be included in the normalised modes of
migration management (in line with risk and resilience) or rather should be dened
as an extraordinary measure, mobilised only in the times of extreme crisis (in line
with “exceptionalism”).
In the “securitisation as the work of framing” approach, specic biases towards
security logics and differences in inuence over various parts of the framing process
are often inuenced by contextual factors that are deeply embedded in socio-
linguistic and socio-political settings as well as local power structures. In this book,
the contextual factors are best seen in the pre-existing security frames, or the
migration- security continuum, produced at the EU level. The presented analysis of
the continuum has revealed several important tendencies in the securitisation of
migration. Firstly, the EU policy actors have been intensifying securitising moves
towards migrants as a way of managing security decits within the EU borders (e.g.
introduction of the Schengen zone or Europeanisation of the asylum system).
Secondly, the EU has been incrementally developing and institutionalising a pleth-
ora of risk management instruments and policies such as migration and border man-
agement systems, Frontex operations, detention and returns, to name a few. The
strong emphasis on risk management has prepared the ground for further prolifera-
tion of resilience-oriented thinking and policies directed at both, external and inter-
nal policy realms. As a result, the logic of risk, already dominant in the
migration-security continuum, has only been strengthened during the “migration
crisis”, placing more control over securitisation in the hands of the European
Commission, along with the AFSJ specialised agencies.
Further, the “securitisation as the work of framing” approach embraces the fact
that the inter-subjective construction of security is not based on a single powerful
discursive act, but is a continuous, inter-subjective and iterative process. Indeed, the
analysis of the framing of the “migration crisis” reveals that securitising moves have
been embedded in a frame-narrative that has been incrementally pushing the
increased migratory ows into the EU security realm. In this respect, every policy
actor has been producing distinctive sets of utterances (reected in specic types of
policy documents), which to various degrees have inuenced and stimulated differ-
ent aspects of the framing of the analysed crisis. For instance, the diagnosis and
evaluation segments were deeply inuenced by the European Parliament’s series of
resolutions on the “situation in the Mediterranean and the need for a holistic EU
approach to migration” and external aspects of the crisis (e.g. on the situation in
Libya, on the situation in Syria, on human rights, etc.). Similarly, the Commission
was using the annual “State of the Union” speeches to initially promote the humani-
tarian framing of the crisis, visibly attempting to build up an imperative for action
for the EU as a whole. In regard to the conceptualisation of remedial actions, the
biggest impact was exerted by the Commission’s “Agenda of Migration”, along
with corresponding action plans (e.g. against human smuggling) and strategies (e.g.
EU Internal Security Strategy), which have been commonly referenced in other
policy texts on the “migration crisis”. The Council of the European Union and
European Council were communicating though conclusions (the Council and
7 Conclusions
201
European Council) and outcomes (the Council), mostly promoting “exceptionalist”
and more robust use of security measures against the increased migratory ows.
Finally, with the “securitisation as the work of framing” approach, the analysis
focused on how different EU policy actors have been “talking to each other” through
policy texts and speeches, communicating specic interpretations, supporting or
contradicting each other in the framing process. In this approach, policy actors play
the role of interlocutors (being audiences and actors) that incrementally and inter-
subjectively imbue the “migration crisis” with security meanings. Here, acceptance
of securitising moves does not stem from straightforward agreement or acknowl-
edgements, but structuration of specic interpretations and institutionalisation of
remedial actions within the EU interpretative framework. In this sense, the human
security-centred and risk-oriented framing have become commonly accepted within
the EU by assuming the role of an obligatory and commonsensical interpretation of
the crisis (i.e. reaching structuration). Similarly, in the conceptualisation of reme-
dial actions, the risk-centred instruments and policies, already institutionalised
within the EU migration-security continuum, have naturally gained prominence
over other logics and corresponding policy responses. In this respect, risk proves to
be the dominant and commonly accepted logic in the securitising frame-narrative,
being both structured and institutionalised within the EU policy discourse.
7.4 Final Reections onRisk andSecuritisation ofMigration
intheEU
The analysis of the EU frame-narrative on the “migration crisis”, outlined in this
book, reveals its distinctive securitising features, predominantly embedded in the
logics of risk. The prominence of risk signies broader tendencies of the European
Commission and the EU agencies in their claiming increasing control over human
mobility within and into the EU.In this respect, the risk-driven securitisation of the
“migration crisis” could have direct consequences on the future of the integration
process and the way the common migration policies are constructed and imple-
mented within the EU internal (AFSJ) and external (CSFSP/CSDP) realms.
It is important to mention the potential dangers of deeper and broader securitisa-
tion of migration to the general direction of the European integration. Regardless of
other types of crises that have been affecting the EU, migration will most likely
remain one of the most challenging issues in contemporary European politics. In
this respect, within a broader European political discourse, migration is explicitly
described as a problem, an issue, a nuance, a risk, or nally, a threat. The key word
here is “migration”, not increased migratory ows or uncontrolled movement of
population associated with the “migration crisis”, but the general idea of human
mobility, which according to the logic of securitisation generates undesirable con-
sequences that need to be controlled in the name of the stability and security of the
EU political, social and economic system. This increased application of broadly
7.4 Final Reections onRisk andSecuritisation ofMigration intheEU
202
understood security and risk rhetoric may translate into deep securitisation of mobil-
ity and freedom of movement within Europe, incorporating one of the cornerstones
of European integration into the security realm. This carries a certain risk for the
future of migration policy in the EU.Securitisation is a double-edged sword that on
the one hand allows gaining control over an issue or domain (here, human mobility)
in order to protect it, but on the other it also limits the discussion to policy areas that
do not go beyond security. Along with the crisis, the debate on migration in the EU
has been dominated by security concerns, rendering such important dimensions of
migration policy as integration, culture, social policy, employment, economy, or
education undermined or even marginalised. As the new EU “Pact on Migration and
Asylum” has shown, migration and security are now even more intertwined in the
EU policy discourse, and this may become a signicant challenge for the develop-
ment of more comprehensive and less restrictive EU policies towards migrants
(European Commission, 2020).
While securitisation through control of risky objects can be considered as one of
the key features of securitisation of migration, the development of broadly under-
stood walls can be dened as the key instrument for gaining and securing this con-
trol. The prominence of risk-driven securitisation indicated that the future of the
EU’s common approach to migration lies in the “fortication of Europe” (Geddes &
Taylor, 2016; Zaragoza-Cristiani, 2017). The concept of “Fortress Europe” had
been well known before 2015 (Bermejo, 2009; Caviedes, 2004), but the framing of
the “migration crisis” has increased its relevance among the EU policy actors,
embedding this idea in the policy discourse and even signicantly moving it beyond
the EU borders. Here, the dominance of resilience and risk management in the fram-
ing of the “migration crisis” show that building “fortications”, be it physical walls
(e.g. Bulgarian-Turkish or Hungarian-Serbian border fences) or biopolitical con-
straints and systems of control (e.g. Passenger Name Record, Entry/Exit System),
arise as a preferred policy option in responding to migration-related challenges.
While responding to the “migration crisis”, the EU has taken prominent steps in
strengthening its border regime, attempting to regain control over irregular migra-
tory ows and increase the resilience of the most affected portion of its external
border as well its external security environment. Nonetheless, as argued by Pallister-
Wilkins (2016), building stronger, and more elaborate forms of “walls” guarantees
little more than more elaborate forms of human smuggling and higher costs for
migrants who engage these services. For instance, deeper securitisation of border
controls between the United States and Mexico1 or Palestine and Israel so far cor-
respond with the rule that “where is a border wall, there is a tunnel”, and prove that
unreective strengthening of border control has a limited impact on curbing irregu-
lar migratory ows (Baele & Sterck, 2015; Castles, 2004). In this respect, deeper
1 In 1994 the Clinton Administration launched a border operation “Gatekeeper”. As a consequence
of this initiative, “the US Immigration and Naturalisation Service introduced double steel fences,
helicopters, searchlights and high-tech equipment along the US-Mexico border. The number of
agents patrolling the border doubled. The INS budget tripled from 1994 to 2000, reaching $5.5bil-
lion. However, there was no decline in illegal border crossings” (Castles, 2004, p.206).
7 Conclusions
203
securitisation and strengthening of the border and migration regime in the EU
should be carefully evaluated and further researched, specically in reference to the
declared and promoted aim of such securitisation, which is better management of
migratory ows. As often pointed out by Castles, the notion that migration can be
managed at all is rather controversial and should be approached critically (Castles,
2004, 2017). Migration is a complex and dynamic phenomenon that is stimulated by
multiple factors such as globalisation, economic incentives, migrant agency, climate
change, immigration policies, and many other stimulants arising from the context of
countries of origin, transit and destination (Niedźwiedzki, 2010, pp. 53–58).
Narrowing management of migratory ows down to smartening of borders (e.g.
EU’s Smart Borders Initiative), restraining of migrants in detention centres, coordi-
nating return operations, and deterrence, may lead to a more or less effective con-
tainment of migrants rather than their management.
Many studies point out that the idea of effective migration management is often
driven by addressing the root causes of irregular migratory ows as soon as possible
(Brettell & Hollield, 2015; Castles, 2017; Triandafyllidou & Spencer, 2020). As
shown in this book, the EU policy actors have committed the policy responses to the
“migration crisis” to the logic of resilience, focusing on building the effectiveness
of the security sector in managing the migration in the countries of origin and transit
of irregular migrants (e.g. EUCAP Mali and EUCAP Niger). This type of resilience-
building reected in externalisation of border controls only contributes to securitisa-
tion of migration outside the EU borders and might be ineffective in addressing the
root causes of increased migratory ows. As a consequence of this type of policy,
the EU has fortied itself even more deeply in the securitised politics of migration
control, often underappreciating complex structural factors stimulating irregular
migration such as inequality, human rights violations, or societal insecurity, to name
a few (Scipioni, 2017). In this regard Castles (2004, p.222) argues that migration
policies might benet from desecuritisation and commitment to long term political
and economic agendas concerned with fair trade, global equality and conict pre-
vention, to name a few. Similarly, Bilgic (2013, p.48) notes that in regard to the
security-migration nexus, emancipatory approach to security could serve as an
interesting policy option in a long run, potentially mitigating push factors by reduc-
ing North-South inequality and fostering fairer and less exploitative economic rela-
tions between countries of origin and the EU and its member states. This is not to
say that a deeper desecuritisation of migration is a viable option in the EU, espe-
cially after the experiences with the “migration crisis”. Securitisation of migration
is well established within the EU policy discourse and practice and it is there to stay.
Nontheless, looking for alternative logics that proliferate the debate on migration
and security allows for nuance in the political and academic discussion but also the
search for alternative migration policies.
7.4 Final Reections onRisk andSecuritisation ofMigration intheEU
204
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7 Conclusions
