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Heidegger's Ontology of Events
... Heidegger argued that -no ontology can be sufficient without assigning being an eventual nature itself […] The ruptural form of an event comes to play a central part in the ontological structures of time, ground, truth, language, history, community, the psyche, and so on‖ [21]. Being is described as evental in nature [21]. ...
... Heidegger argued that -no ontology can be sufficient without assigning being an eventual nature itself […] The ruptural form of an event comes to play a central part in the ontological structures of time, ground, truth, language, history, community, the psyche, and so on‖ [21]. Being is described as evental in nature [21]. The event can be defined as -a fundamental, nonperceptual happening that form the basic building block of the Real as such. ...
This paper is a sequel to an evolving research project on a diagrammatic methodology called thinging machine (TM). Initially, it was proposed as a base for conceptual modelling (e.g., conceptual UML) in areas such as requirement engineering. Conceptual modelling involves a high-level representation of a real-world system that integrates various components to refine it into a more concrete (computer) executable form. The TM project has progressed into a more comprehensive approach by applying it in several research areas and expanding its theoretical and ontological foundation. Accordingly, the first part of the paper involves enhancing some TM aspects related to structuring events in existence, such as absent events. The second part of the paper focuses on how to classify events and the kinds of relationships that can be recognized among events. The notion of events has occupied a central role in modelling. It influences computer science and such diverse disciplines as linguistics, probability theory, artificial intelligence, physics, philosophy and history. In TM, an event is defined as the so-called thimac (thing/machine) with a time breath that infuses dynamism into the static description of the thimac called a region. A region is a diagrammatic specification based on five generic actions: create, process, release, transfer and receive. The results of this research provide (a) an enrichment of conceptual modelling, especially concerning varieties of existence, e.g., absent events of negative propositions, and (b) a proposal that instead of semantic categorizations of events, it is possible to develop a new type of classification based on graphs grounded on the TM model diagrams.
... It is interesting to ask what is it that prompts Heidegger to examine the erection of the bridge as some sort of an event generating the place of the bridge in a way that is radically ungrounded, i.e. in no way predicted or anticipated, allowing us only to attune ourselves to it. Things may be thought of as events (Ereignis that reveal their fourfold constitution between earth, sky, mortals Contributions to Philosophy (Of the Event) (Heidegger, 2012) (Bahoh, 2021) (Grollo, 2021, pp. 89-104) (Nelson, 2007, pp. ...
Both Christian Norberg-Schulz and Kenneth Frampton have written on Martin Heidegger’s views on building and dwelling from which they seem to have been influenced. However, upon close scrutiny, their views seem to differ from Heidegger’s when it comes to place and the way place comes to be. For as Heidegger indicates through his famous example of the bridge in “Building, Dwelling, Thinking” the location, the place “comes into existence only by virtue of the bridge” (So kommt den die Brückenichterst an einen Ort hinzustehen, sondern von der Brückeselbst her entstehterstein Ort, Martin Heidegger, Κτίζειν, κατοικείν, σκέπτεσθαι, μτφ. Γιώργος Ξηροπαϊδης, bilingual edition, Αθηνα, Πλέθρον, 2008, p. 50). It seems that human made things emerge as events n Heidegger’s view and influence the world on their own rightand in a constructivist way. Human made things, works, seem to stand outside all relations (Martin Heidegger, “The Origin of the Work of Art” in Poetry, Language, Thought, transl. Albert Hofstadter, New York, Harper& Row, 1975, p. 41) as claimed in “The Origin of the Work of Art” setting up a world, setting forth the earth and letting the truth take place as a happening and becoming, a founding that ultimately comes from Nothing, in the sense that it never comes from the ordinary and the traditional (Ibid., p. 76). Schulz, on the contrary, seems to claim that it is not the building that brings the place into existence. The place is already there when the building starts to be erected and “its detail explains the environment and makes its character manifest.”(Christian Norberg-Schulz, “The Phenomenon of Place” in Theorizing a New Agenda for Architecture. An Anthology of Architectural Theory,ed. Kate Nesbitt, New York, Princeton Architectural Press, 1996, p. 413) By place Schulz means “a totality made up of concrete things having material substance, shape, texture and color” (ibid. p. 414). A place is given as a character and an atmosphere. Things like buildings make this character and atmosphere manifest to the extent they express it. Likewise, Kenneth Frampton, introduces the distinctions between architecture and building, industrialized construction and demanding craftsmanship, autonomous architectural practice and place-making and loss of rapport with nature and an architecture that is life fulfilling (Kenneth Frampton, “On Reading Heidegger” in Theorizing a New Agenda for Architecture. An Anthology of Architectural Theory, ed. Kate Nesbitt, New York, Princeton Architectural Press, 1996, p. 442-446). The purpose of these distinctions is to qualify Heidegger’s constructivism and unquestioned espousal of building as place generator. Although not stated clearly, Schulz’s and Frampton’s views on place are more intricate but less challenging than Heidegger’s radical constructivist visions.
This paper attempts to reconceptualize memory as an event from a theological perspective, drawing on the recent dialog between memory studies and Critical Event Studies. To this end, it analyzes the narrative and themes of the 2007 novel Brodeck’s Report by Philippe Claudel, classified as a third-generation Holocaust (narrative) writer in France, within the framework of event studies. The novel has been praised for successfully depicting the tragedy as a universal event transcending spatial–temporal specificity by utilizing the genre of allegory while minimizing references to the historical and geographical specificity of the Holocaust. Extending this evaluation, this paper particularly focuses from a theological perspective on how the protagonist and narrator, Brodeck, simply names the subject of his report—a past event that happened to an unidentified other (Autre) called the ‘Anderer’—as ‘Ereignis’ (event). This is noteworthy because Ereignis is not only the most famous concept representing late Heideggerian philosophy but also holds significant importance in post-Heideggerian modern philosophy as the speculative source of the ‘evental turn’, which, along with the ‘material turn’, constitutes one axis of the ‘ontological turn’ in contemporary humanities and social sciences. In this regard, this work, which narrativizes the universality of the Holocaust, provides interesting implications for the possibility of a disjunctive synthesis between memory studies in the humanities and social sciences and theological event studies. Above all, it stimulates a reconsideration of the conventional dichotomy between memory and event—namely, the commonplace premise of “events that occurred in the past” and “present memories of past events”—as revealed in the definition of memory studies as “naming pasts, transforming futures”. Thus, this paper explores the possibility of reconceptualizing the moment of memory as part of the ongoing event itself from past to present, and the event as a process of symbolic construction of meaning through memory.
The following research is devoted to the reasoning of the body as a legal phenomenon. After all, despite the fact that the body is ontologically the closest thing to us, from the legal point of view it is one of the most mysterious legal phenomena. In other words traditional jurisprudence usually divides all legal beings into subjects of law (the state, individuals and legal entities, the nation etc.) and objects of legal relations (estate, material evidence, objects of dispute, etc.). However the body cannot be identified within these criteria. On the one hand the body itself is not a subject of law. After all, purely disembodied, abstract entities, such as legal entities or the state, are subjects of law, sometimes without any material "embodiment". On the other hand purely corporeal existence does not guarantee legal personality, since, for example, the presence of a dead body as such indicates its absence. The similar conditions are fully reflected in the national legislation of Ukraine. Its analysis shows that the human body is not defined as an independent object of legal regulation and there is no corresponding legal regime. The most symptomatic manifestation of the total disregard for the legal issues of the body is the absence of a corresponding term even in special medical legislation regulating organ transplantation, health care and medical assistance. Therefore the phenomenon of the body currently remains outside the attention of lawyers. This leads to the lack of a conceptual reasoning of the body as a legal phenomenon and uncertainty of legal regulation of the human body as such. So it is worth to conclude that the phenomenon of the body needs to be comprehended from a philosophical and legal point of view. The result of such comprehension is the identification of the following ontological features of the body as a legal phenomenon: syncretism, liminality and intentionality of the body. This, in turn, creates certain grounds to assert that normativity is immanently present in the body, when the body itself is a hypothesis and disposition for others, and the impossibility of communication with it is a sanction. As a result the author concludes that the inviolability of the body should be enshrined in law and the relevant amendments should be made to the Civil and Criminal Codes of Ukraine.
In Heideggerian ontology, the way Dasein is grounded in beyng (Seyn) as event (Ereignis) is a matter of debate. In this article, I address this within a specific scope: I develop an interpretation of the logic of authenticity and inauthenticity in Dasein’s ‘selfhood’ and the relation of this logic to that of the domain of propriety (das Eigentum) that forms part of the structure of beyng as event. I argue authenticity and inauthenticity are logically inextricable from one another: authenticity is structurally problematized by inauthenticity such that the latter co-constitutes the former. This entails that becoming more authentically oneself means reducing alienation not from an idealized authentic state of ‘self,’ but from the logic of co-constitutive irreconcilability between authenticity and inauthenticity. This logic is more originarily described by domains of propriety and alienation in the event. The logic of the event forms the pre-personal ground of Dasein’s intrinsically problematic selfhood.
Does adherence to the principles of logic commit us to a particular way of viewing the world? Or are there ways of being – ways of behaving in the world, including ways of thinking, feeling, and speaking – that ground the normative constraints that logic imposes? Does the fact that assertions, the traditional elements of logic, are typically made about beings present a problem for metaphysical (or post-metaphysical) prospects of making assertions meaningfully about being? Does thinking about being (as opposed to beings) accordingly require revising or restricting logic's reach – and, if so, how is this possible? Or is there something precious about the very idea of thinking the limits of thinking? Contemporary scholars have become increasing sensitive to how Heidegger, much like Wittgenstein, instructively poses such questions. Heidegger on Logic is a collection of new essays by leading scholars who critically ponder the efficacy of his responses to them.
Meine Dissertation analysiert die metaphysischen Konzepte von Alfred North Whitehead und Gilles Deleuze hinsichtlich ihrer Kompatibilität. Die metaphysischen Grundannahmen von Whitehead und Deleuze werden zunächst vor der Folie der leibnizschen Metaphysik herausgearbeitet und im nächsten Schritt mit metaphysischen Strömungen in der analytischen Philosophie und der Wissenschaftsphilosophie, speziell der Quantenphysik, kontrastiert. Ein weiterer selektiver Vergleich wird mit dem ostasiatischen Prozessdenken gewagt, wie es im Buch der Wandlungen des antiken China Yijing und im daoistischen und neokonfuzianischen Denken praktiziert wird. Ich argumentiere, dass Whitehead und Deleuze eine je besondere, spinozistisch orientierte Umdeutung der leibnizschen Metaphysik vornehmen, die sowohl Modalität als auch Subjektivität prozessual auslegt
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