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West European Politics
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Who wants wage moderation? Trade exposure,
export-led growth, and the irrelevance of
bargaining structure
Lucio Baccaro & Erik Neimanns
To cite this article: Lucio Baccaro & Erik Neimanns (2022) Who wants wage moderation? Trade
exposure, export-led growth, and the irrelevance of bargaining structure, West European Politics,
45:6, 1257-1282, DOI: 10.1080/01402382.2021.2024010
To link to this article: https://doi.org/10.1080/01402382.2021.2024010
© 2022 The Author(s). Published by Informa
UK Limited, trading as Taylor & Francis
Group
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WEST EUROPEAN POLITICS
2022, VOL. 45, NO. 6, 1257–1282
Who wants wage moderation? Trade exposure,
export-led growth, and the irrelevance of
bargaining structure
Lucio Baccaro and Erik Neimanns
Max Planck Institute for the Study of Societies, Cologne, Germany
ABSTRACT
An extensive literature in comparative political economy has examined the
determinants of wage militancy and moderation at the country level. So far,
however, there has been no attempt to analyse the determinants of wage
satisfaction and dissatisfaction at the individual level. Based on two waves of
the International Social Survey Programme, this article seeks to fill this void.
It examines to what extent trade exposure affects individual attitudes towards
wages, and whether bargaining institutions facilitate the internalisation of
competitiveness requirements, as suggested by the vast literature on neocor-
poratism. Surprisingly, no relationship is found between the structure of wage
bargaining (more or less coordinated or centralised) and wage dissatisfaction
at the individual level. Instead, wage dissatisfaction decreases strongly when
workers are individually exposed to trade and countries rely heavily on
export-led growth. The findings point to the need to rethink the determinants
of wage moderation.
KEYWORDS Wage moderation; wage preferences; collective bargaining; trade exposure;
export-led growth
The determinants of ‘wage moderation’, or its opposite, ‘wage militancy’
have been extensively researched by comparative political economists. A
large literature has examined cross-country differences in wage bargaining
structures, trying to discern those that are most (or least) conducive to
wage restraint. Surprisingly, individual-level attitudes towards wages have
been neglected so far. Yet, it seems plausible that wage moderation as
an aggregate outcome is more likely to emerge when workers are indi-
vidually satisfied with their wages and thus less likely to mobilise to
increase them.1
https://doi.org/10.1080/01402382.2021.2024010
© 2022 The Author(s). Published by Informa UK Limited, trading as Taylor & Francis Group
CONTACT Erik Neimanns Neimanns@mpifg.de
Supplemental data for this article can be accessed online at: https://doi.org/10.1080/01402382.
2021.2024010.
This is an Open Access article distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution License (http://
creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/), which permits unrestricted use, distribution, and reproduction in any
medium, provided the original work is properly cited.
1258 L. BACCARO AND E. NEIMANNS
In this article, we study the determinants of wage satisfaction and
dissatisfaction at the individual level by analysing two waves of the
International Social Survey Programme (ISSP 1999, 2009), supplemented
by macro-level data from various sources. Our goal is to understand to
what extent workers internalise two kinds of economic constraints: the
microeconomic risk of job loss for workers exposed to international
trade, and the macroeconomic requirement to keep wage growth in check
if a country relies heavily on export-led growth. Furthermore, we aim
to ascertain whether the internalisation of constraints is facilitated by
more coordinated or centralised wage bargaining structures, as suggested
by the vast literature on (neo-)corporatism.
We find that the workers’ attitudes to wages are significantly and
substantially shaped by the above-mentioned constraints. Wage dissatis-
faction decreases with individual-level exposure to trade and with
country-level reliance on export-led growth. Furthermore, and interest-
ingly, the wage-moderating effect of export-led growth applies not just
to workers who directly benefit from increased cost competitiveness but
also to other workers as well. Surprisingly, we do not find any direct or
moderating effect of wage bargaining structure. This implies either that
corporatist institutions affect aggregate wages without modifying the wage
preferences of workers, as suggested by a portion of the literature, or
that the corporatist literature has exaggerated the importance of bargain-
ing structure in producing wage moderation because it has failed to
control for the type of growth model in its regressions.
The article is organised as follows. We first review the existing research
on wage moderation and workers’ preferences, and formulate hypotheses
about how trade exposure, growth models, and wage bargaining institu-
tions affect individual attitudes to wages. Then we present our setup and
empirical tests. In the conclusion, we highlight the implications of our
findings for the literature on wage bargaining and growth models.
Determinants of wage moderation
A rich literature in comparative political economy has examined the
determinants of ‘wage restraint’ by focussing on wage bargaining insti-
tutions, sometimes in interaction with the central bank’s behaviour. In
this literature, wage moderation improves the trade-off between inflation
and unemployment (see Flanagan et al. 1983; Tarantelli 1986). If nominal
wages are set by multiple wage setters, and if none of them is sufficiently
large to internalise the costs of wage militancy (Olson 1965), each will
have incentives to push for higher wages. Yet, because the same reasoning
applies to all actors, the ultimate outcome will be a tendency for nominal
wages to increase everywhere. Whether this tendency translates into
WEST EUROPEAN POLITICS 1259
higher inflation or higher unemployment will depend on the response
of the central bank. If the central bank accommodates, there will be
higher inflation. If the central bank does not accommodate, there will
be higher unemployment (Hall and Franzese 1998; Iversen 1999). If
instead wage bargaining is centralised or coordinated, unions will exercise
self-restraint. Empirical research based on these theoretical premises has
found that centralised or coordinated wage bargaining is associated with
lower inflation and/or unemployment.2 Research has also shown that real
wage growth is lower under centralised or coordinated bargaining, con-
trolling for productivity (e.g. Baccaro and Simoni 2010).
A general feature of the existing literature is its exclusive focus on
macro characteristics. Such focus makes it difficult to understand the
mechanisms through which wage moderation emerges (or fails to emerge)
as an aggregate outcome. If bargaining coordination leads to wage mod-
eration, does this happen because bargaining coordination leads individual
workers to develop more moderate wage preferences, or because union
leaders are able to suppress ‘deviant’ preferences? Alternatively, are the
workers’ wage preferences simply irrelevant for aggregate wage outcomes?
In response to these questions, the literature on neocorporatism has
offered interesting, but largely untested conjectures. A portion of the
literature has argued that corporatist institutions enable organisational
leaders to effectively suppress or sideline ‘militant’ worker preferences
(Pemberton 1988; Schmitter 1974; Streeck 1988, 1994). According to this
literature, wage moderation does not emerge because the wage preferences
of workers become more moderate under centralised bargaining struc-
tures, but because the preferences of interest group leaders prevail,
enabling them to pursue policies that conflict with the preferences of a
large portion or even the majority of the membership (Pizzorno 1978).
Another stream of literature has argued instead that union leaders in
centralised structures moderate workers’ preferences through the circu-
lation of information and persuasive argument (Baccaro 2003;
Culpepper 2008).
In this article, our focus is on workers’ individual attitudes towards
wages. We start from the assumption that wage attitudes depend on the
perceived costs of wage militancy, and that workers who are exposed to
international trade are less likely to express wage dissatisfaction. In formu-
lating this hypothesis, we build on a portion of the neocorporatist literature,
which we combine with literature about the impact of exposure to trade.
The neocorporatist literature distinguishes between wage-formation in
exposed and non-exposed sectors (Crouch 1988; Franzese 2001; Garrett
and Way 1999). Unions in sectors exposed to international competition
are directly affected by the consequences of wage militancy, since the
resulting cost increase is likely to lead to reduced product and labour
1260 L. BACCARO AND E. NEIMANNS
demand and lower employment. Firms in exposed sectors are for the
same reason more likely to resist unions’ wage militancy. Instead, unions
in non-exposed sectors face less stringent competitiveness constraints,
and firms are more likely to accommodate higher costs by increasing
prices. For public sector unions in particular, employment may be entirely
disconnected from market conditions.3 For all these reasons, wage mod-
eration is more likely to emerge in exposed sectors than in non-exposed
ones (Crouch 1988; Franzese 2001; Garrett and Way 1999; Hancké 2013;
Johnston and Regan 2016; see however Di Carlo 2020). The wage mod-
erating effect of trade exposure is likely to apply to the individual level
as well, as suggested by the literature on the effects of trade openness
(e.g. Busemeyer and Garritzmann 2019; Mayda and Rodrik 2005; Walter
2017). According to this literature, individuals have a preference for
policies that reduce labour market risks and the potential adverse eco-
nomic consequences of trade.4 For workers exposed to international
competition, excessive wage growth erodes firm competitiveness and
increases labour market risk. We thus hypothesise that exposed workers
are more likely to suppress attitudes of wage dissatisfaction.
Hypothesis 1: The more workers are exposed to international competition,
the lower their wage dissatisfaction.
The egocentric effect of trade exposure does not exclude sociotropic
considerations. Here we build on the recent literature on growth models
(Baccaro and Pontusson 2016; Lavoie and Stockhammer 2013;
Stockhammer 2015). This literature casts doubt on the notion that wage
moderation is unconditionally conducive to higher growth. Especially for
large economies, wages are an important determinant of aggregate
demand, and wage moderation may lead to excessive savings and stag-
nation. However, in export-led economies wage moderation leads to real
exchange rate depreciation (provided the exchange rate is not fully flex-
ible). If the economy is sufficiently open and the sensitivity of exports
to wage and price differences sufficiently large, any negative effect of
wage moderation on domestic demand is more than compensated by the
stimulation of exports (Bhaduri and Marglin 1990). In a recent analysis,
Johnston (2021) finds that wage moderation is associated with higher
growth and lower unemployment only for countries pursuing export-led
growth, but not for countries relying on domestic demand.
In brief, the growth model literature suggests that wage moderation
is a prerequisite for export-led growth (Baccaro and Pontusson 2016).
Again, we transpose this insight to the individual level, hypothesising
that in countries relying on export-led growth, workers internalise the
need for wage moderation and that a generalised ‘wage moderation
consciousness’ emerges.
WEST EUROPEAN POLITICS 1261
Although in this article we are unable to test the precise mechanisms
leading to such wage moderation consciousness, we postulate that national
discourse shapes the process of internalisation. We draw on a recent con-
tribution by Ferrara et al. (2021), which has shown that media reports
about current account imbalances vary dramatically and systematically
between countries with current account surpluses and deficits. In particular,
these authors find that in Germany the media tend to highlight superior
domestic competitiveness vis-à-vis trade partners when reporting on current
account surpluses. Importantly, they also show that media frames on current
account imbalances have a significant impact on individual economic policy
preferences in an experimental setting. These findings suggest that in
countries relying on export-led growth, public discourse is likely to high-
light the need for international competitiveness (Ferrara et al. 2021; Meteling
2016). Political parties may also adopt this discourse in the expectation
that a strong export sector contributes to economic growth, which should
strengthen their electoral appeal (Lewis-Beck and Stegmaier 2019).
In turn, the elite-driven discourse about international competitiveness
is likely to leave its imprint on individual level-attitudes (Ferrara et al.
2021; Howarth and Rommerskirchen 2013, 2017; Meteling 2016). Most
workers are unlikely to have a full understanding of how changes in
wages translate into macroeconomic outcomes such as inflation, levels
of unemployment, or growth. In the absence of a full understanding of
such complex economic interrelationships, workers may follow cues pro-
vided by political elites, transmitted via the media (e.g. Barnes and Hicks
2018; Ferrara et al. 2021; Kneafsey and Regan 2020; Lenz 2009; Zaller
1992). As a sizable literature on framing effects has documented, media
reports about (economic) issues can shape individuals´ understanding of
and attitudes towards issues (Lecheler and De Vreese 2019). As a result,
workers in countries strongly dependent on export-led growth may come
to internalise the importance of wage moderation even when they are
employed in sectors in which wage moderation is not crucial for firm
competitiveness. This implies that a favourable attitude towards wage
moderation should also be manifest among workers who are not directly
affected by the beneficial consequences of wage moderation, such as
non-exposed workers.
Hypothesis 2: Individual wage dissatisfaction declines with greater country
dependence on export-led growth.
Hypothesis 3: Specifically, for workers not exposed to international compe-
tition, wage dissatisfaction declines with greater country dependence on
export-led growth.
Finally, we explore the impact of bargaining structure. The corporatist
literature reviewed above suggests that unions in more coordinated or
1262 L. BACCARO AND E. NEIMANNS
centralised bargaining structures (Golden et al. 1999; Soskice 1990) are
more likely to internalise the negative externalities of wage militancy. If
unions’ preferences are reflective of the preferences of workers, these
corporatist institutions should be associated with lower levels of individual
wage dissatisfaction. Furthermore, if bargaining has spill-over effects for
non-union workers as well, wage dissatisfaction may be lower not just
for union members but for non-members as well. Additionally, a more
coordinated or centralised bargaining structure may facilitate the inter-
nalisation of competitiveness concerns for workers exposed to trade
(Crouch 1988; Franzese 2001; Frieden and Rogowski 1996; Garrett and
Way 1999). Moreover, it may be hypothesised that workers may be less
dissatisfied with low wage growth when wage bargaining is more coor-
dinated or centralised. This leads us to formulate the following additional
hypotheses:
Hypothesis 4: Wage dissatisfaction is lower in coordinated/centralizated bar-
gaining structures.
Hypothesis 4a: The wage dissatisfaction of union members is lower in coor-
dinated/centralizated bargaining structures.
Hypothesis 4b: The wage dissatisfaction of workers exposed to trade is lower
in coordinated/centralizated bargaining structures.
Hypothesis 4c: The wage dissatisfaction caused by low wage growth is lower
in coordinated/centralizated bargaining structures.
Data and models
Our data come from two waves of the ISSP Social Inequality module
conducted in 1999 and 2009, which we complement with various
country-level data. We focus on advanced OECD countries included in
at least one ISSP wave. In total, our sample includes 19 countries with
31 country-year observations and 14,945 individuals.5
Dependent variable
In order to operationalise our dependent variable we use the following
survey question from the ISSP:
Would you say that you earn: 1: Much less than [you] deserve; 2: Less
than [you] deserve; 3: What [you] deserve; 4: More than [you] deserve;
5: Much more than [you] deserve?
We dichotomise responses to this item distinguishing between respon-
dents who are dissatisfied with their wage (categories 1 and 2) from those
who are satisfied with their wage (categories 3 to 5). Dichotomisation of
WEST EUROPEAN POLITICS 1263
the dependent variable eases the presentation of the results. However,
running multilevel ordered logistic regression models with the original
coding of the dependent variable does not alter the findings (Table A.8
in the online appendices). We include only employed individuals in
the sample.
We consider our measure an acceptable proxy of attitudes towards
wage satisfaction and dissatisfaction. Research in economics has found
that wage attitudes are largely shaped by whether individuals consider
their wages as being fair (for a review: see Fehr et al. 2009). A perception
of earning less than one deserves should thus be associated with pref-
erences for higher wages to redress the perceived unfairness. Summary
statistics show that 57 percent of respondents in our sample state that
they earn less or much less than they deserve, which we interpret as
wage dissatisfaction (see Table A.1 in the online appendices). Below, we
explain how we operationalise our independent variables to take into
account the fact that our dependent variable may be interpreted as rel-
ative to a reference group. In the online appendix A.1 we also explain
how we cross-validated our measure against other measures of wage
(dis-)satisfaction using the WageIndicator Survey (Tijdens et al. 2010).
Main independent variables
Constructing a measure of occupational trade exposure
One of our key independent variables is individual-level exposure to trade.
The ISSP does not include information on the sector in which the worker
is employed. Thus, we combine the individual-level data on occupations
in the ISSP with individual-level data on occupation by sector of employ-
ment from the European Social Survey (ESS 2008), and with sector-by-coun-
try data on trade exposure from the OECD STAN database (OECD 2019).6
Using ESS data, we calculate the probability for each occupation (ISCO88,
at the 4-digit level) of being located in a specific sector (NACE rev.1.1
at the highest level of aggregation: 15 sectors). Then we calculate the
trade exposure of each sector defined as: (Exports + Imports)/Output. We
use 5-year averages of sectoral trade exposure for the years preceding the
fielding of the ISSP (1994–1998 and 2004–2008). In this way, we create
a measure which attributes to each individual a probability distribution
of being employed in certain sectors based on the person’s occupation,
and then weighs this probability distribution by the sectoral trade expo-
sure.7 The formula we use is the following:
Occupational tradeexposure(i, o) =(o, s)
s=1
n
*(sectoral tradee
xxposure(s))
1264 L. BACCARO AND E. NEIMANNS
where i indexes individuals, o occupations, s the n sectors, and π is the
probability of being employed in a particular occupation and sector. The
measure captures the trade risk of a particular occupation as opposed
to the trade risk of the sector in which the individual is currently
employed. We think it is preferable to the latter because it takes into
account that individuals are able to move across different sectors while
maintaining the same occupation.
Online appendices Table A.2 shows that our measure of occupational
trade exposure produces systematic variation in trade exposure across
occupational categories (Table A.2 displays summary statistics at the
ISCO88 1-digit level). Exposure varies between zero for service workers
and an average value of 0.33 for ‘plant and machine operators and assem-
blers’. As a robustness check, we replicated the analysis using the ‘off-
shorability index’ developed by Blinder (2009). This index measures the
potential for an occupation to be moved abroad based on its technological
characteristics and was used, among others, by Walter (2017) to assess
the impact of globalisation on individual preferences. Using the offshora-
bility index as an alternative measure produces similar findings to the
main analysis (see Table A.4 in the online appendices). However, the risk
associated with trade exposure seems more general than the risk of off-
shoring. A worker may be affected by foreign trade competition whether
or not the job is offshorable. Therefore, we consider our measure of
occupational trade exposure as more suitable for the context of this study.
We use two different versions of our measure of occupational trade
exposure: one continuous, the other discrete. As our first measure, we
use a logarithmic transformation (to reduce the influence of outlying
values) of the continuous occupational trade exposure measure illustrated
above, and control for the worker being employed in the public sector
using self-reported information from the ISSP survey. Our second measure
combines trade exposure and public sector employment into a categorical
variable, which distinguishes among sheltered public, sheltered private,
and exposed workers. Due to the probabilistic construction of our measure
of occupational trade exposure only 13 percent of respondents have zero
trade exposure, but many occupations have values of exposure close to
zero. For this reason, we code occupations with below-median exposure
as sheltered and with above-median exposure as exposed (this median
value of exposure is 0.0063). The large majority of public sector workers
fall below this threshold. We code the remaining public sector workers
with above-median occupational trade exposure as exposed workers. These
workers are likely to be employed in state-owned enterprises, which are
often organised similarly to private sector companies, or to work in public
sector occupations which are in common with exposed sectors, and thus
in principle subject to similar labour market risks.
WEST EUROPEAN POLITICS 1265
Constructing a measure of export-led growth
Another key predictor in our analysis is the country-level reliance on
export-led growth. A common approach to operationalising export-led
growth is to calculate the contribution of net exports (i.e. the difference
between exports and imports) to GDP growth (e.g. Baccaro and
Pontusson 2016). However, this approach underestimates the actual
growth contribution of exports because it subtracts the whole volume
of imports from exports. In reality, imports are mostly for consumption
and investment purposes, and only a portion of imports is absorbed
by exports. To obviate this shortcoming we proceed as follows: In a
first step, we calculate the import-adjusted volume of exports. This is
the volume of exports minus the volume of imports used in the pro-
duction of exports. Data on exports comes from the AMECO database
(AMECO 2019); data on the import-content of exports comes from
the OECD Input-Output Tables (OECD 2019). The import-adjusted
contribution of exports to growth is then calculated as the annual
change of import-adjusted exports weighted by the share of
import-adjusted exports in GDP at t–1 (data on GDP from AMECO
2019). We then calculate the share of import-adjusted growth contri-
bution of exports in total growth.8 See the online appendix A.2 for a
detailed exposition of the way this measure is calculated.9 The final
formula is the following:
import -adjustedexport-ledgrowth=PIE-PIE
PY -P
t
e
tt-1
e
t-1
tt t-1
YY
t-1
Where Pe is the price of exports, P is the price of GDP, IE is
import-adjusted exports, and Y is GDP. To avoid an excessive influence
of year-to-year fluctuations, we calculate 5-year averages for the periods
preceding data collection in the ISSP (i.e. 1994–1998 and 2004–2008).
Table A.1 in the online appendices lists the shares of (import-adjusted)
export-led growth by country. This is lowest in the US (with a value of
0.17) and below average in the Anglo-Saxon and Southern European
countries. Switzerland has the highest contribution of exports to GDP
growth (0.87), and export-led growth is above-average in the Continental
European and Scandinavian countries (see Figure 1 below).
Wage bargaining structure and controls
We operationalise bargaining structure by including several measures of
wage bargaining structure from the Visser (2019) database: coordination
and centralisation of wage setting (coord and level), and centralisation
of union organisation (cent).
1266 L. BACCARO AND E. NEIMANNS
Figure 1. Export-led growth and country-average levels of wage dissatisfaction.
Note: Survey weights used.
We also control for union membership status using individual data
from the ISSP since some literature suggests that union members are
more dissatisfied than non-members (Bryson et al. 2004; Hadziabdic 2020).
Additionally, we control for a range of confounding factors at the
individual and at the country level. The coding of these variables is
described in detail in online appendices Table A.3. At the individual
level, we include variables related to the demographic and socio-economic
situation of an individual to control for their potential association with
both trade exposure and wage preferences: age, age-squared (to test for
a non-linear impact of age), gender, part-time versus full-time work,
individual income, and educational attainment.10 In robustness models,
we include alternative versions of some individual-level control variables:
Since the question about attitudes towards wages may be interpreted by
the respondent as relative to a reference group, we calculated a relative
education measure (indicating the respondent’s over- or undereducation
relative to other respondents in the same occupation, at the ISCO 1-digit
level), and a measure of income difference relative to respondents with
a) the same educational attainment, and b) the same occupation (at the
ISCO 1-digit level). These additional models lead to the same findings
as the main analysis, which makes us more confident about our depen-
dent variable being a valid proxy of wage (dis-)satisfaction.
In order to be able to identify the effect of export-led growth on wage
preferences, we need to hold constant a range of confounding factors at
the country level. Bivariate correlations reveal a tight negative association
between average real wages at the country level and wage dissatisfaction
WEST EUROPEAN POLITICS 1267
(r = −0.63; p = 0.004) meaning that wage dissatisfaction is lower where
the average real wage is higher. We thus include average real wage levels,
as well as their change in the years preceding the surveys, as control
variables. Wage dissatisfaction might also be stronger if incomes are
distributed more unequally, since income inequality violates fairness
norms (Fehr et al. 2009). Thus, we control for inequality in market and
disposable incomes. Furthermore, wage expectations can be associated
with the country’s economic situation. Wage dissatisfaction should be
more widespread if the country experiences strong economic growth, if
high inflation threatens the purchasing power of wages, and if national
or education-specific unemployment is low, implying a more favourable
labour market situation for workers. Eurozone membership could be
expected to reduce wage demands because it eliminates the option of
currency devaluation to compensate for adverse consequences of high
wage settlements on competitiveness. The euro was in the process of
introduction during the first ISSP wave in 1999 but the exchange rate
parities had been fixed the year before.
Generous welfare state benefits loosen the link between workers’
income and market conditions, and as such, they could lead to lower
wage dissatisfaction. Furthermore, generous welfare states are correlated
with trade exposure (Katzenstein 1985; Rodrik 1998) and thus their
non-inclusion in the analysis could lead to omitted variable bias. We
control for welfare state and unemployment benefit generosity by using
the measures elaborated by Scruggs et al. (2017). Finally, the association
between wage satisfaction and trade exposure may be confounded by
the wage differential between exposed and sheltered occupations.
Specifically, workers in exposed occupations may be more dissatisfied
if the wage gap with workers in non-exposed occupations is large. We
thus additionally control for wage differentials between manufacturing
and services (AMECO 2019) and interact the wage differential variable
with occupational trade exposure. We control for all these potential
confounding variables in separate models.
Estimating equation and estimators used
We run multilevel logistic regression models to account for the nested
structure of our data. Because individuals are nested in country-years,
which are nested in countries, we include country and country-year
random intercepts.11 We include macro-level variables as country-average
values over the two periods and as deviation from these values in the
specific period of observation (Bell and Jones 2015; Fairbrother 2014).
This specification has several advantages. Compared to standard random
effects models it avoids the assumption that cross-sectional and
1268 L. BACCARO AND E. NEIMANNS
longitudinal relationships are the same. Including country-averages of
the macro-level variables controls for possible correlation between
time-invariant covariates and country random intercepts. At the same
time, this specification is more flexible than the country fixed effects
model specifications because it is not limited to longitudinal relationships
only. By distinguishing country averages and period-specific deviations,
we can thus distinguish between long-term effects of macro variables
(captured by the variables in levels) and short-term effects (captured by
changes). Finally, we include a year dummy to control for time effects
that are common across countries.
Results
We begin by examining the individual predictors of wage dissatisfaction.
We then move to the impact of export-led growth at the country level,
including the cross-level interaction between export-led growth and occu-
pational trade exposure. Finally, we analyse the effects of various dimen-
sions of bargaining structure, including cross-level interactions with union
membership and occupational trade vulnerability, respectively.
The multilevel logistic regression results in Table 1 provide robust
support for the hypothesis that working in an occupation exposed to
international trade is associated with lower wage dissatisfaction (hypoth-
esis 1). This finding applies to both the continuous and the categorical
operationalizations of occupational trade exposure (see Models 1 and 2).
Average marginal effect estimates based on Model 1 suggest that com-
pared to workers without any trade exposure, the probability of wage
dissatisfaction for individuals at the 90th percentile of exposure is 7.47
percentage points lower.12 The magnitude of this effect is comparable to
an upward shift of individual income of approximately 1.5 income deciles.
Average marginal effect estimates based on Model 2 suggest that com-
pared to individuals in sheltered private sector occupations, the likelihood
of individuals working in exposed occupations to express dissatisfaction
with their wage decreases by 2.25 percentage points. Compared to shel-
tered public sector workers, the difference is 6.37 percentage points.
Thus, it seems that working in the sheltered public sector is associated
with a higher likelihood of experiencing wage dissatisfaction.
Several of the individual-level control variables in Table 1 are also
significantly related to wage preferences. Being a trade union member
is associated with a higher likelihood of being dissatisfied with one’s
wage. Age has a curvilinear relationship: Both labour market entrants
and workers close to retirement age are more likely to be satisfied with
their wages compared to middle-aged workers. Women are more
WEST EUROPEAN POLITICS 1269
Table 1. Multilevel logistic random intercept regressions: determinants of wage
dissatisfaction; maximum likelihood estimates.
M1 M2 M3 M4
Dependent variable: wage dissatisfaction
Occupational trade exposure (log) –0.034***
(0.006)
Public sector 0.050
(0.043)
Occupational exposure: public sheltered 0.292*** 0.292*** 0.445***
(Reference group: exposed) (0.047) (0.047) (0.124)
Private sheltered 0.102*0.100*–0.078
(0.045) (0.045) (0.110)
Union member 0.200*** 0.196*** 0.196*** 0.194***
(0.043) (0.043) (0.042) (0.043)
Age 0.064*** 0.064*** 0.064*** 0.064***
(0.010) (0.010) (0.010) (0.010)
Age squared –0.001*** –0.001*** –0.001*** –0.001***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Female 0.083*0.101** 0.102** 0.100*
(0.039) (0.039) (0.039) (0.039)
Individual income –0.250*** –0.250*** –0.249*** –0.248***
(0.010) (0.010) (0.010) (0.010)
Employed part-time –0.624*** –0.619*** –0.617*** –0.613***
(0.053) (0.053) (0.053) (0.053)
Education: upper secondary –0.192*** –0.182*** –0.191*** –0.188***
(Reference group: below upper sec.) (0.053) (0.053) (0.053) (0.053)
Above upper secondary –0.078 –0.059 –0.070 –0.068
(0.057) (0.057) (0.057) (0.057)
Tertiary –0.103 –0.082 –0.093 –0.092
(0.055) (0.054) (0.054) (0.054)
Year = 2009 0.223 0.223 0.297*0.292*
(Reference: 1999) (0.146) (0.147) (0.132) (0.132)
Export-led growth (mean) –1.348*** –1.390***
(0.359) (0.369)
Export-led growth (delta) –0.174 –0.174
(0.646) (0.649)
Public sheltered* Export-led growth (mean) –0.349
(0.259)
Private sheltered* Export-led growth (mean) 0.412
(0.232)
Constant 0.507*0.212 0.772** 0.790**
(0.236) (0.234) (0.267) (0.270)
Random intercept variance (country) 0.033 0.032 0.007 0.006
(0.058) (0.060) (0.032) (0.032)
Random intercept variance (country-year) 0.136*0.139*0.106*0.107*
(0.062) (0.063) (0.042) (0.043)
N14,945 14,945 14,945 14,945
N countries 19 19 19 19
N country-years 31 31 31 31
Standard errors in parentheses.
***p < 0.001.
**p < 0.01.
*p < 0.05.
1270 L. BACCARO AND E. NEIMANNS
dissatisfied with their wages than men. This finding is surprising because
women have been found to be willing to accept lower wage offers than
men (Säve-Söderbergh 2007; Bowles and Babcock 2013). Their wage
dissatisfaction may be a reaction to discriminatory wage practices. In
contrast, part-time work, which is more common among women, is
associated with lower dissatisfaction. If working part-time is dropped
from the model, being female becomes insignificant.13 Furthermore, wage
dissatisfaction is lower for individuals with higher income. The effect of
educational attainment is non-linear, with individuals below upper sec-
ondary education having the highest level of dissatisfaction and individ-
uals with upper secondary education being most satisfied.
In the next step, we evaluate the impact of export-led growth (hypoth-
esis 2), starting with a graphic representation of the bivariate relationship
at the country level. Figure 1 displays a clear negative association between
export-led growth and wage dissatisfaction. The bivariate correlation
coefficient is −0.71 (p = 0.001). Dissatisfaction is highest in Portugal, a
country with below-average export-led growth with more than 70 percent
of workers being dissatisfied with their wages, and is lowest in Switzerland,
a country with a strong export contribution to growth and less than 40
percent of workers being dissatisfied.
Models 3 and 4 in Table 1 add our macro-level measure of export-led
growth to the logistic regression models. The core finding is that a higher
reliance on export-led growth is associated with more moderate wage
preferences (Model 3). What matters is cross-national variation in
export-led growth, which is highly statistically significant, while variation
in export-led growth over time is also negatively signed but does not
reach conventional levels of statistical significance. With observations
from only two points in time, we are unable to judge whether the insig-
nificance of changes in export-led growth represents a substantive finding
or merely reflects the low number of time-varying observations.14 The
effects of average levels of export-led growth are substantial in size. The
simulated difference in the predicted probability of wage dissatisfaction
between countries with a very low (the US) and a very high level of
export-led growth (Switzerland) amounts up to 20.83 percentage points.
It seems that the more exports contribute to GDP growth, the more
satisfied individuals are with their wages, controlling for other individual
determinants of wage (dis-)satisfaction.
In additional models, we tested for the influence of country outliers.
We replicated Model 3 dropping one country at a time. The effect of
export-led growth remains robust at least at the 99 percent level of
significance and the simulated difference in the predicted probability of
wage dissatisfaction between the countries with the lowest and the highest
levels of export-led growth varies between 17.73 and 24.23. These results
WEST EUROPEAN POLITICS 1271
suggest that the negative effect of export-led growth on wage dissatis-
faction is not driven by any particular country outlier.15
In order to evaluate the claim that competitiveness concerns are inter-
nalised also by individuals in sheltered sector occupations (hypothesis
3), we introduce a cross-level interaction between occupational trade
exposure and export-led growth (Model 4). Wage dissatisfaction declines
with greater export-led growth orientation not only for exposed workers
but also for public sector and private non-exposed workers. In fact, the
insignificance of the interaction terms suggests there is no difference in
the impact of export-led growth for these three types of workers. Figure 2
plots predicted probabilities of wage dissatisfaction by export orientation
and occupational exposure (based on Model 4 in Table 1). It shows that
our hypothesis 3 is corroborated: wage preferences are more moderate
in countries that rely more extensively on export-led growth also for
workers not exposed to international competition.
Models 1 to 11 in Table 2 test whether the negative effect of export-led
growth holds when controlling for various macro variables: real average
wage levels, changes in real average wages, GDP growth, (education-specific)
unemployment, inflation, eurozone membership, disposable and market
income inequality, and welfare state and unemployment benefit generosity
(the full results are reported in Table A.5 in the online appendices).
Across model specifications, the effect of export-led growth is robust
Figure 2. Predicted probabilities of wage dissatisfaction, by export-led growth and
occupational trade exposure.
Note: Predicted probabilities and 95 percent confidence intervals based on Model 4
in Table 1. Predicted probabilities are shown for export-led growth at the following
levels: minimum value, 10th, 25th, 50th, 75th, 90th percentile, and maximum value.
1272 L. BACCARO AND E. NEIMANNS
Table 2. Multilevel logistic random intercept regressions: determinants of wage dissatisfaction; effects of macro-level covariates; maximum
likelihood estimates.
Export-led growth
(mean)
Export-led growth
(delta)
Macro-level control
(mean)
Macro-level control
(delta)
N
countries
N
country-years
M1 Real average wage levels –1.073*** (0.309) 0.123 (0.685) –0.000** (0.000) –0.000 (0.000) 19 31
M2 Changes in real average wages –1.334*** (0.362) –0.155 (0.628) 0.312 (1.960) 2.588 (2.592) 19 31
M3 GDP growth –1.589*** (0.384) 0.069 (0.588) –0.068 (0.074) 0.243 (0.139) 19 31
M4 Unemployment rate –1.228*** (0.337) 0.033 (0.617) 0.027 (0.022) –0.071 (0.045) 19 31
M5 Inflation –1.441*** (0.370) –0.488 (0.649) –0.041 (0.078) 0.158 (0.131) 19 31
M6 EMU membership –1.470*** (0.359) –0.219 (0.640) 0.170 (0.132) 19 31
M7 Education-specific unemployment rate –1.201** (0.400) –0.034 (0.694) 0.026 (0.016) –0.032 (0.029) 16 26
M8 Disposable income inequality –1.341*** (0.407) –0.295 (0.673) 0.058 (0.094) 0.003 (0.018) 19 31
M9 Market income inequality –1.187*** (0.353) –0.426 (0.675) 0.077 (0.079) 0.025 (0.016) 19 31
M10 Welfare state generosity –1.484*** (0.438) –0.340 (0.668) 0.008 (0.012) –0.062 (0.048) 17 29
M11 Unemployment benefit generosity –1.283*** (0.386) –0.335 (0.698) –0.011 (0.028) –0.079 (0.105) 18 30
Note: Regression models include the same individual-level variables as Table 1, Model 2. For full regression results, see Table A.5 in the online appendices.
Standard errors in parentheses.
***p < 0.001.
**p < 0.01.
*p < 0.05.
WEST EUROPEAN POLITICS 1273
Table 3. Multilevel logistic random intercept regressions: determinants of wage
dissatisfaction; effects of wage bargaining coordination; maximum likelihood
estimates.
M1 M2 M3 M4
Dependent variable: wage dissatisfaction
Occupational exposure: public sheltered 0.292*** 0.295*** 0.069 0.291***
(Reference group: exposed) (0.047) (0.047) (0.088) (0.047)
Private sheltered 0.102*0.102*0.045 0.104*
(0.045) (0.045) (0.080) (0.045)
Union member 0.198*** 0.078 0.204*** 0.197***
(0.043) (0.079) (0.043) (0.043)
Age 0.064*** 0.064*** 0.064*** 0.064***
(0.010) (0.010) (0.010) (0.010)
Age squared –0.001*** –0.001*** –0.001*** –0.001***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Female 0.101** 0.100*0.099*0.101**
(0.039) (0.039) (0.039) (0.039)
Individual income –0.250*** –0.249*** –0.249*** –0.250***
(0.010) (0.010) (0.010) (0.010)
Employed part-time –0.620*** –0.618*** –0.618*** –0.619***
(0.053) (0.053) (0.053) (0.053)
Education: upper secondary –0.182*** –0.180*** –0.182*** –0.181***
(Reference group: below upper sec.) (0.053) (0.053) (0.053) (0.053)
Above upper secondary –0.059 –0.056 –0.061 –0.058
(0.057) (0.057) (0.057) (0.057)
Tertiary –0.082 –0.080 –0.080 –0.082
(0.054) (0.054) (0.054) (0.054)
Year = 2009 0.213 0.213 0.218 0.275
(Reference: 1999) (0.143) (0.143) (0.141) (0.158)
Wage bargaining coordination (mean) –0.261 –0.357 –0.400 –1.174
(0.277) (0.282) (0.283) (0.838)
Wage bargaining coordination (delta) 1.020 0.996 1.008 0.698
(0.884) (0.887) (0.878) (0.951)
Union member* Bargaining coordination
(mean)
0.253
(0.139)
Public sheltered* Bargaining coordination
(mean)
0.454**
(0.152)
Private sheltered* Bargaining coordination
(mean)
0.117
(0.146)
Changes in real average wages (mean) –10.793
(11.213)
Changes in real average wages (delta) 2.538
(3.105)
Wage bargaining coordination (mean)*
Changes in real average wages (mean)
18.197
(16.044)
Constant 0.355 0.385 0.410 0.851
(0.261) (0.262) (0.262) (0.603)
Random intercept variance (country) 0.041 0.040 0.042 0.025
(0.062) (0.062) (0.061) (0.063)
Random intercept variance (country-year) 0.119*0.119*0.117*0.122
(0.059) (0.059) (0.058) (0.064)
N14,945 14,945 14,945 14,945
N countries 19 19 19 19
N country-years 31 31 31 31
Standard errors in parentheses.
***p < 0.001.
**p < 0.01.
*p < 0.05.
1274 L. BACCARO AND E. NEIMANNS
and strongly statistically significant. Compared to the strong and per-
sistent effects of export-led growth, the remaining macro-level variables
matter little in influencing wage preferences and the effect estimates are
insignificant for most variables. The only significant effect appears for
long-term wage levels, with higher average wage levels being associated
with lower wage dissatisfaction. The results are furthermore robust when
we include a measure of sectoral wage differentials and interact it with
occupational trade exposure (Table A.10 and Figures A.2 and A.3 in the
online appendices). Irrespective of wage differentials between the exposed
and sheltered sectors, occupational trade exposure continues to be neg-
atively associated with wage dissatisfaction.
Finally, we assess the influence of wage bargaining structure (hypoth-
eses 4 to 4c). The models in Table 3 keep the individual-level predictors
from the previous models and add the macro-level measure of wage
bargaining coordination (Model 1), its interaction with union member-
ship (Model 2), with occupational trade exposure (Model 3), and with
country-level wage change (Model 4). Results for the additional indica-
tors of wage bargaining structures, wage bargaining centralisation, and
union centralisation, are included in the online appendices (Table A.6).
We do not find support for hypotheses 4 to 4c. Contrary to hypothesis
4, the effect estimates of wage bargaining coordination are statistically
insignificant. Contrary to hypothesis 4a, there is no evidence that the
wage dissatisfaction of union members is lower in countries with more
coordinated wage bargaining. In fact, the interaction between bargaining
coordination and union membership is positively signed, although insig-
nificant. Contrary to hypothesis 4 b, the wage dissatisfaction of exposed
workers (the reference category) is not significantly lower in countries
with more coordinated wage bargaining. Post-estimation Wald tests show
that differences in wage dissatisfaction of exposed workers are statistically
insignificant across levels of bargaining coordination. Model 3 in Tab l e
3 even suggests that public sector workers are more dissatisfied in coun-
tries with higher bargaining coordination. Contrary to hypothesis 4c,
there is no evidence that the wage dissatisfaction caused by low wage
growth at the country level is lower at higher levels of bargaining coor-
dination. Again, Wald tests show no significant effects. In a similar vein,
we do not find support for hypotheses 4 to 4c by using the alternative
indicators of wage bargaining structures (Table A.6 in the online
appendices).16
In light of our findings for export-led growth and non-findings for
wage bargaining structures, export-led growth seems to be the decisive
country-level factor shaping individual attitudes towards wages. In addi-
tional models, we include both sets of variables simultaneously to further
evaluate their relative importance.17 Table A.7 in the online appendices
WEST EUROPEAN POLITICS 1275
reinforces the above findings. Holding wage bargaining structures con-
stant, the effect estimates of export-led growth remain significant and
hardly change in size. In contrast, bargaining coordination, bargaining
centralisation, and union centralisation are not significantly related to
wage dissatisfaction.
Concluding discussion
This article has focussed on the determinants of individual attitudes of
wage satisfaction and dissatisfaction. In so doing, it has contributed to
two literatures: the literature on the institutional determinants of wage
moderation, by exploring the so far neglected dimension of individual
preferences, and the new literature on growth models, by investigating
their relationship with workers’ wage preferences.
Our main intent was to assess the extent to which workers internalise
the systemic constraint of competitiveness, both at the individual and at
the country level. For this reason, rather than only considering the impact
of bargaining structure as in the previous macro-level literature, we also
examined the impact of occupational exposure to trade and country
reliance on export-led growth.
Our results indicate that workers employed in occupations exposed to
international trade are less likely to express wage dissatisfaction. In other
words, wage satisfaction is enhanced by a heightened risk of job loss.
Wage preferences are also influenced by sociotropic concerns about
the drivers of growth in a country. If a country relies heavily on export-led
growth, workers are less likely to express wage dissatisfaction, even when
they do not benefit directly from the competitiveness-enhancing effects
of wage moderation. We interpret this finding as a generalised ‘wage
moderation consciousness’ being associated with export-led growth.
Workers seem to internalise the systemic importance of wage restraint
for the country’s growth. Thus, export-led growth seems to create its
own supporting attitudes, which boost its political viability and facilitate
its reproduction as a growth regime.
This finding does not exclude the possibility of growth model change.
In fact, the recent literature on growth models has argued that change
is the result of the erosion of industrial relations institutions and of shifts
in the balance of power between labour and capital, not of attitudinal
shifts of workers or voters (Baccaro and Pontusson 2016). Structural
forces, rather than attitudes, are the most important drivers of growth
model change.
Surprisingly, wage bargaining institutions do not affect wage (dis-)
satisfaction according to our analysis. One would expect, based on the
previous literature, that wage preferences would be more moderate when
1276 L. BACCARO AND E. NEIMANNS
wage bargaining is coordinated or union structure centralised. However,
we do not find any evidence either of a direct effect of wage bargaining
structure on wage preferences or of a moderating effect on the attitudes
of union members or workers exposed to trade competition.
There are two possible explanations for this null finding: First, the
effect of bargaining institutions may have been exaggerated by the pre-
vious literature because previous research did not control for export-led
growth, which seems to be the decisive country-level factor and is pos-
itively correlated with wage coordination. Second, bargaining institutions
may affect wage moderation without modifying worker preferences, as
suggested by the early literature on corporatism, which argued that cor-
poratist institutions allow union leaders to ignore or suppress the pref-
erences of workers (Schmitter 1974). Obviously, the absence of a general
cross-country effect of wage bargaining does not exclude possible localised
effects in specific sectors or regions or countries.
Our findings invite further research in several directions: First, we
should explore through which mechanisms reliance on export-led growth
moderates workers’ wage expectations. One hypothesis is that the effect
is linked to the dominant discourse diffused by the media, in line with
recent research (Ferrara et al. 2021). This would explain why export-led
growth has broad support even though only a minority of individuals
directly benefit from it. Second, future research should return to the
macro analyses of the determinants of wage moderation, and test whether
the effect of bargaining institutions on wage moderation at the country
level holds when the average wage preferences of workers are controlled
for. If bargaining institutions remain a significant predictor controlling
for average wage preferences of workers, this would indicate that bar-
gaining institutions affect wage moderation without inducing a change
in individual preferences, for example by moderating the bargaining
policies of unions. Finally, future research should examine whether there
are patterns to workers’ wage (dis-)satisfaction, e.g. whether it is broadly
distributed in some countries vs. polarised in others, and whether such
patterns are related to different growth models.
Acknowledgements
Previous versions of this article were presented at the Conference of the
Society for the Advancement of Socio-Economics (New York, 2019), the
virtual Conference of the Council for European Studies (2020), the virtual
workshop ‘Working Class Politics in the 21st Century’ (University of Geneva,
2020), and the Political Economy Seminar Series of the Political Studies
Association (2021). We thank the participants, as well as Chris Howell, Georg
Picot, Jonas Pontusson, and Armin Schäfer for many helpful comments and
suggestions.
WEST EUROPEAN POLITICS 1277
Notes
1. In this article, we use ‘wage moderation’, ‘wage restraint’, ‘wage satisfaction’,
and their opposites, ‘wage militancy’, and ‘wage dissatisfaction’, interchangeably.
We also use ‘wage preferences’ and ‘wage attitudes’ interchangeably.
2. See, in a very long list: Hall and Franzese 1998; Iversen 1999; Kenworthy
2002; Mares 2006. The literature has also discussed at length which type of
bargaining structure is ‘optimal’, i.e. associated with lowest inflation and/or
unemployment. Calmfors and Driffil (1988) argued that both decentralised and
centralised bargaining structures have good macroeconomic performances, while
Soskice (1990) argued that decentralised bargaining is inefficient and found a
monotonic relationship between bargaining coordination and macroeconomic
outcomes.
3. The extent to which public sector unions may accept wage moderation has
been found to vary across countries, depending on the existence of the
above-mentioned corporatist institutions, the role of fiscal federalism, and the
government´s fiscal situation (Di Carlo 2020; Ibsen 2016; Johnston and
Regan 2016).
4. The literature on the effects of globalisation on individual-level preferences
has studied preferences towards issues such as free trade (Mayda and Rodrik
2005) or social policies (Busemeyer and Garritzmann 2019; Walter 2017). To
the best of our knowledge, to date no study has examined how globalisation
affects individual preferences towards wages.
5. The countries are Australia, Austria, Belgium (Flanders only), Denmark,
Finland, France, Germany, Iceland, Italy, Japan, Korea, New Zealand, Norway,
Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, the United Kingdom, and the United States.
6. We use the 2008 wave of the ESS as the wave closest to the ISSP 2009 wave.
For the calculations we include only those twelve countries that are also included
in both ISSP waves in 1999 and 2009 (Austria, Belgium, Switzerland, Germany,
Denmark, Spain, Finland, France, Norway, Portugal, Sweden, and the United
Kingdom).
7. See Mayda and Rodrik (2005) for a similar but less precise approach. Mayda
and Rodrik match each occupational category to a specific sector based on
information from secondary data. They then assign values of sectoral trade
exposure to the corresponding occupations to construct a measure of trade
exposure at the occupational level. However, by assigning each occupation to a
specific sector, Mayda and Rodrik are unable to consider the probability distri-
bution of occupations across sectors, which likely leads to measurement error.
8. The measure of GDP growth we use is based on current PPP, i.e. expresses
cross-country values in a common currency.
9. As a robustness check, we also use the absolute growth contribution of exports
(without dividing for total growth). This alternative model leads to very similar
findings (Table A.9 in the online appendices). Moreover, results do not change
if we divide the absolute growth contribution of import-adjusted exports by a
measure of GDP growth based on national currency as opposed to PPP.
10. In additional models, we also controlled for whether a respondent has
supervisory responsibilities since this might also affect their wage preferences.
These additional models do not alter our main findings. Because the variable
on supervisory responsibilities is not available for all countries, we do not include
it in the final analysis.
1278 L. BACCARO AND E. NEIMANNS
11. The results hold if we add the lower level components of our cross-level
interaction terms, occupational trade exposure and union membership, as random
slopes (cf. Heisig and Schaeffer 2019), and if we include random intercepts only
at the country-year level (Table A.12 in the online appendices).
12. This and the following references to effect sizes are based on average mar-
ginal effect estimates of the multilevel logistic regression results.
13. Vice versa, if being female is dropped from the model, part-time work
remains significantly negatively related to wage dissatisfaction.
14. If levels and changes in export-led growth are interacted, changes in export-led
growth, and their interaction with levels of export-led growth are insignificant,
while levels of export-led growth remain clearly significant (Table A.11 in the
online appendices).
15. When using the operationalisation of export-led growth based on GDP
growth measured in national currency as opposed to PPP, Japan becomes a
country outlier with exceptionally high levels of export-led growth. The effect
of export-led growth holds in these alternative models, but becomes stronger
when Japan is excluded (Table A.9 in the online appendices).
16. The interaction between wage growth and union centralisation is statistically
significant in Table A.6, Model 8. However, this result is driven by Austria with
its exceptionally high level of union centralisation. If Austria is dropped from
the models, the interaction becomes insignificant.
17. However, wage bargaining coordination and export dependence are positively
correlated (r = 0.53, p = 0.02) and this makes it difficult to disentangle their
respective effects on wage (dis-)satisfaction. We also tested the interaction
between export-led growth and bargaining coordination and found that it is not
statistically significant (Table A.7, Model 4, see online appendices).
Disclosure statement
No potential conflict of interest was reported by the authors.
Notes on contributors
Lucio Baccaro is Director at the Max Planck Institute for the Study of Societies
in Cologne. His current research focuses on the political economy of growth
models. [Baccaro@mpifg.de]
Erik Neimann s is Senior Researcher at the Max Planck Institute for the Study
of Societies in Cologne. His research interests include the politics of growth and
macroeconomic policies. [Neimanns@mpifg.de]
ORCID
Erik Neimanns http://orcid.org/0000-0002-9558-8948
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