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LegalTech

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Abstract

LegalTech 1.0, 2.0, 3.0, Tokenization, smart contract, AI, Eu ID. The use of technological solutions, increasingly often referred to as LegalTech, in the administration of justice is nowadays necessary. It is impossible to imagine courts functioning without information systems or law firms not using electronic databases of case law and legal literature. However, technology is developing further and starting to go beyond the comfort zone of traditional legal services. Solutions are appearing which can and sometimes do replace people in tasks which people used to deal with not so long ago. Such solutions are e.g. those based on artificial intelligence, resulting in various algorithms functioning in practice, not always understandable for statistical users of legal services. This is, among other reasons, why in many aspects the use of the LegalTech tool raises significant doubts and leads to many unavoidable questions, including: Will traditional lawyers survive? Will robots and automatons replace us? Will artificial intelligence replace us in providing legal advice, creating contracts or issuing judgments? Is the effectiveness of LegalTech tools greater than the work of traditional lawyers? Or perhaps we are irreplaceable, irremovable and have nothing to worry about, and the role of the lawyer will not change? Of course, such and similar questions can be multiplied, and the answer to them basically boils down to explaining what the various LegalTech tools are, whether and how to implement them, and whether it is necessary or just useful? In this monograph we try to explore this research area and to bring the reader closer to the next stage of development of law, which more and more courageously uses various technological tools. Undoubtedly, the previously separate “worlds” of law, engineering, information technology and technology have come together in everyday life. Traditionally, the law regulated technical issues, defined technical standards, influenced the way IT systems were built or operated, including Internet platforms, while engineers followed the advice or opinions of lawyers. It was the law and lawyers who regulated technology and indicated the directions of implementation. However, the last stage of the digital revolution has quite significantly changed this situation, resulting in the equalization of law and technology, and thus the influence of lawyers on engineers. Increasingly, engineering is entering a domain that until recently was reserved exclusively for lawyers, and information systems are effectively replacing the work of a lawyer. In some aspects, such as Blockchain orBitcoin, engineering has even overtaken the law, forcing lawyers to learn, pioneered research directions and forced new, necessary regulations on the market. And, as you might think, more challenges lie ahead, and there is no turning back from the digital road. It is the time of algorithms, the time of legal technologization, the time of LegalTech. Therefore, the aim of our research is not only to indicate how the law and the lawyer's work is changing now, but also how much this area will change in the coming years. The book is an effect of scientific research of an inter-university team of an international group of scientists dealing with problems of new technologies and law in the aspect of digital economy 3.0 and economy 4.0. The first results of the team's work have already been published in Polish as part of the publication “LegalTech. Czyli jak bezpiecznie z narzędzi IT w organizacji, w tym w kancelarii oraz dziale prawnym” (LegalTech. How to safely use IT tools in an organisation, including a law firm and a legal department), published by C.H. Beck (Warsaw 2021). The current publication is a slightly revised and updated version of the Polish book, which also includes new texts and a new perspective on the rapidly changing technological reality that surrounds us. The publication is divided into two parts. The first part is more theoretical and explains the basic aspects and legal framework of technological tools, while the second part presents LegalTech solutions functioning in selected countries around the world. In the first part, we reflect on the limits of technology, algorithms and various possibilities of applying LegalTech tools in practice. In turn, in the second part, we show how particular legislators have applied technological possibilities and how this has improved the work of their judiciary. Undoubtedly, our publication does not explain all aspects of technological tools in the administration of justice. However, we believe that it can provide a voice in the discussion on the current and future shape of the legal services market. Therefore, we encourage you to discuss it with us. Since the work has a collective character, it should be emphasised here that the individual authors represent their own views. The fact that in such a group we do not always agree on a particular thought, in our opinion, only proves that we are open to other views, and the law is only the art of interpretation, for which in the changing technological reality, there is much room.We must add that the publication was financed within the framework of a scientific project conducted at the Andrzej Frycz Modrzewski Krakow Academy. 30.06.2021 Krakow, Dariusz Szostek, Mariusz Załucki
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