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A Modest Proposal: Building a Deliberative System in
Northern Ireland
Jane Suiter
Irish Studies in International Affairs, Volume 32, Number 2, 2021, pp. 247-270
(Article)
Published by Royal Irish Academy
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https://muse.jhu.edu/article/810178/summary
A Modest Proposal:
Building a Deliberative System in Northern
Ireland1
Jane Suiter
School of Communications, Dublin City University
ABSTRACT
is paper sets out a proposal for a deliberative systems approach in the
context of Northern Ireland. It proposes a citizens’ council to run citi-
zens’ juries and an assembly, initially focussing on cross-cuing cleavage
issues perhaps relating to deprivation. Further, it would advocate for a
strengthened youth parliament to ensure intergenerational fairness. e
assembly could later consider how identities could be protected under all
1
Author’s email: jane.suiter@dcu.ie
doi: hps://doi.org/10.3318/isia.2021.32b.23
Irish Studies in International Aairs, Vol. 32, Issue 2, 247–270, Analysing and Researching Ireland, North
andSouth © 2021 e Author(s). is is an open access article licensed under a Creative Commons Aribution-
NonCommercial 4.0 International License.
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248 Irish Studies in International Aairs
possible future constitutional arrangements, as well as possible political,
economic and constitutional compromises. Such a body could then feed into
an assembly in the republic ensuring that citizen input is considered in
advance of any legislative proposals that would be required in advance of a
referendum on possible unity.
INTRODUCTION
e right to self-determination is a fundamental part of the 1998 Belfast /
Good Friday Agreement (hereaer ‘the Agreement’). With changing demo-
graphics, it is an inevitability that the secretary of state for Northern Ireland
will at some point call a referendum on possible Irish unity. As policymakers
and academics focus more on the possibility of such a referendum, the issues
arrive ever more into focus. Concern about escalating division and polari-
sation and indeed even the possibility of securing losers’ consent without
violence means that we see increasing calls for citizens’ assemblies to be part
of any future process. e idea is that such assemblies could be used to help
develop proposals to help structure and inform debate.2
e o-cited precedent of the citizens’ assemblies on marriage equality
(2015) and abortion (2018) in the republic3 are invoked to demonstrate that
salient, contentious and polarising issues on the island can be discussed in
a relatively dispassionate way allowing the emergence of the people’s true
values. Citizens’ assemblies have also been widely used in the UK, most prom-
inently on climate change policy; the Scoish and Welsh governments have
also convened citizens’ assemblies, as has the Scoish parliament as well as
several Westminster commiees. Importantly, citizens’ assemblies have also
been shown to have potential in Northern Ireland albeit convened by civil
society and academic partnerships so far rather than by any parliamentary or
government sponsored initiatives.4
2 Alan Renwick et al., Interim Report of the Working Group on Unication Referendums on the Island of Ireland,
London Constitution Unit, UCL (October 2020). Available at: hps://www.ucl.ac.uk/constitution-unit/sites/
constitution-unit/les/wgurii_interim_report_nov_2020.pdf (5 March 2021).
3 David M. Farrell and Jane Suiter, Reimagining democracy: lessons in deliberative democracy from the Irish front
line (New York, 2019).
4 John Garry et al., ‘Public aitudes to dierent possible models of a United Ireland: evidence from a citizens’
assembly in Northern Ireland’, Irish Political Studies 3 (35) (2020), 422–50.
Jane Suiter—A Modest Proposal 249
As a result, there have been numerous calls for citizens’ assemblies. e
details vary, for example Sinn Féin’s 2020 election manifesto calls for an all-is-
land citizens’ assembly.5 e British and Irish government’s 2020 New Decade,
New Approach document proposed that one citizens’ assembly be held per
year.6 One year on and this commitment hasn’t been fullled. e SDLP
proposed local, regional and national level dialogues to engage with commu-
nities on future constitutional arrangements. e moderate Alliance Party has
urged the commitments in the joint government New Decade, New Approach
to be taken up and to proceed as a virtual assembly in the midst of the pan-
demic.7 is would have a particular age cohort orientation,8 with a focus
on younger and older voters. Other commentators question whether a new
forum is required and point to the Civic Forum, an element of the Agreement
that fell into abeyance following the 2002 Stormont collapse. Notably, such
proposals have not emanated from any of the unionist parties and indeed part
of the reason for the collapse of the Civic Forum was the DUP’s belief that it
did not contain sucient numbers of anti-Agreement opinion.
While there are a wide variety of citizens’ assemblies, forums and juries,
many of those most prevalent in Britain and Ireland comprise randomly
selected citizens who gather over a period of several weekends to learn about
and discuss specic policy questions in depth, with active facilitation, before
making recommendations. In this way, they can come to informed choices
on emotive and salient public policy issues, they can reduce polarisation
and improve the wider information environment. ese deliberative bodies
combine the principles of deliberation (careful and open discussion to weigh
evidence about an issue), representativeness (achieved through random
sampling from the wider population from which a representative selection
is made), and impact (with a link to public decision making).9 Interestingly,
in recent research it seems that such assembles are of particular interest to
5 Sinn Féin, Giving Workers and Families a Break: A Manifesto for Change. Sinn Féin General Election Manifesto
2020, 12, available at: hps://www.sinnfein.ie/les/2020/Giving_Workers_and_Families_a_Break_-_A_
Manifesto_for_Change.pdf.
6 Julian Smith and Simon Coveney, New Decade, New Approach (UK Government Publications, 2020), 23,
available at: hps://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/aachment_data/
le/856998/2020-01-08_a_new_decade__a_new_approach.pdf.
7 Alliance Party of Northern Ireland, ‘Virtual citizens’ assembly should be convened, says Muir’, 29 January
2021, available at: hps://www.allianceparty.org/virtual_citizens_assembly_should_be_convened_says_muir.
8 Social Democratic and Labour Party, ‘New Ireland Commission’, available at: hps://www.sdlp.ie/new_
ireland_commission. hps://www.sdlp.ie/new_ireland_commission.
9 OECD, Innovative Citizen Participation and New Democratic Institutions: Catching the Deliberative Wave
(OECD, 2020).
250 Irish Studies in International Aairs
so-called ‘enraged democrats’—largely anti-system, anti-politics males.10
Hence, there is much optimism about their potential impact in a divided
society beset by threats of violence, such as Northern Ireland.
However, we must remain cautious—citizens’ assemblies or other deliber-
ative methods are no panacea. ere are risks as well as opportunities; these
are heightened in divided society and heightened further when the political
issue at stake is one of identity. In order to achieve the broad principles of
both inclusion and moderation we must ensure we aend to the likelihood of
a unionist party veto. In a recent public consultation, nationalists and neutral
participants favoured the use of citizens’ deliberation while almost no union-
ists did so.11 is raises the question of how to facilitate a discussion between
citizens about the future, if one part of society refuses to take part.
is article rst examines the potential benets of coupling deliberation
with referendums in general, before considering the challenges that arise in a
divided society. I then consider the principles of inclusion and of moderation
as prerequisites of informed deliberation and set out the potential diculties
of such an approach, before elaborating the details of a proposed solution in
terms of a focus on the wider deliberative system, building institutions that
can incubate deliberative principles in the polity, separating identities and
cross-cuing cleavage issues. e proposal then is to invite a multi-stage,
multi-level approach: rst institute a Northern Irish deliberative institution
with a focus on cross-cuing cleavages and youth before considering whether
it is possible to examine how identities can be protected in any future consti-
tutional arrangement, then to deliver the output of this report to an assembly
in the republic. An all-island convention should only be considered in the
event of a referendum outcome that demands it.
THE ROLE OF DELIBERATION IN MITIGATING
WEAKNESSES IN REFERENDUMS
We know that referendums are not necessarily conducive to democratic delib-
eration; that they risk agenda manipulation, produce majoritarian solutions
risking marginalising minorities, that the discourse around a referendum
10 Jean-Benoit Pilet et al., ‘Public support for citizens’ assemblies selected through sortition: survey and
experimental evidence from 15 countries’, 2020, doi: 10.31235/osf.io/dmv7x.
11 Renwick et al., Interim Report of the Working Group on Unication Referendums on the Island of Ireland.
Jane Suiter—A Modest Proposal 251
vote can produce symbolic bales, increasing polarisation, while providing
few opportunities for reection prior to decision making.12 As a result, the
discourse around a referendum may arouse tensions and incite incivility.
Further, the most problematic of referendums may be plebiscites where the
identity of the people themselves is in question.13
e informational environment is also problematic; referendum campaigns
make serious cognitive demands on citizens, exacerbated when salient. Even
aentive citizens tend to rely on heuristics when making judgments. We
understand that democratic systems require this division of cognitive load
yet there are few institutional supports for what Mark Warren and John
Gastil called ‘good trust decisions by citizens’.14 Further, discourse is mediated
through the news values of journalistic and media organisations, which are
oen inimical to collective deliberation.15
Referendum campaigns also suer from problems and may produce a mis-
alignment of values and votes among some cohorts of voters as voting in line
with values in a referendum may be more challenging than picking, what is
called in the literature, the ‘correct vote’ (one that aligns values with vote at an
individual level) party or candidate at an election.16 Aer all, in a high-stakes ref-
erendum campaign, a voter requires substantial knowledge of the impact of the
proposal, particularly if the status quo is to be rejected, a knowledge of the alter-
natives and an understanding of the issues in ideological or identarian terms.17
e ‘deliberative systems’ turn in democratic theory18 may provide some
answers. is may be achieved through creating new, parallel institutions
to inject more deliberation into the system,19 both through separate deliber-
ative institutions and a focus on social practices underpinning deliberation
12 John Gastil and Robert Richards, ‘Making direct democracy deliberative through random assemblies’, 2013’,
253, available at: hps://journals.sagepub.com/doi/abs/10.1177/0032329213483109.
13 Eilish Rooney et al., Deliberating constitutional futures, 2020, available at: hps://pure.ulster.ac.uk/en/
publications/deliberating-constitutional-futures.
14 Mark E. Warren and John Gastil, ‘Can deliberative minipublics address the cognitive challenges of democratic
citizenship?’, e Journal of Politics 2 (77) (April 2015), 562–74: 562.
15 Richard Jenkins and Mahew Mendelsohn, ‘e news media and referendums’, in Mahew Mendelsohn and
Andrew Parkin, Referendum democracy (Springer, 2001), 211–30.
16 omas Milic, ‘Correct voting in direct legislation’, Swiss Political Science Review 4 (18) (2012), 399–427.
17 Milic, ‘Correct voting in direct legislation’.
18 John S. Dryzek, ‘Rhetoric in democracy: a systemic appreciation’, Political eory 3 (38) (2010), 319–39; John
Parkinson and Jane Mansbridge, Deliberative systems: deliberative democracy at the large scale (Cambridge, 2012).
19 John Gastil, Robert C. Richards and Katherine Knobloch, ‘Vicarious deliberation: how the Oregon citizens’
initiative review inuenced deliberation in mass elections’, International Journal of Communication 8 (2014),
62–89; John Uhr, ‘Testing deliberative democracy: the 1999 Australian Republic referendum’, Government and
Opposition 2 (35) (2000), 189–210.
252 Irish Studies in International Aairs
within society.20 ese deliberative processes and systems have particu-
lar strengths when tied to collective decision making mechanisms such as
referendums, strengthening the connection and legitimacy between the
relatively small numbers within the deliberative institution and the wider
maxi-public looking on.21 is is the hope underpinning the various calls
for deliberative processes to precede a referendum in Northern Ireland.
However, we should also recall that a direct connection to a referendum
increases the salience of the deliberation and in a divided society this can
be problematic, an issue to which we shall return below.
It is useful initially to outline the various mechanisms through which the
benets of deliberation can be harnessed within the information provision
stage of a referendum22 and within the wider deliberative system.23 First, delib-
erative spaces may act as ‘trusted information proxies’ with ‘recommending
force enabling citizens to make beer judgements’.24 ey can do so by rst
acting as a source or repository of rigorous, balanced and informed informa-
tional materials as well as acting as a proxy for citizens’ voices that are more
likely to approximate the general public than political elites and therefore
more likely to be trusted by ordinary voters.
Second, deliberative processes can play a ‘discursive role’,25 allowing the
focus of arguments within the referendum campaign to move to arguments
that have been deliberatively scrutinised.26 In this way, they can impact the
elite agenda connecting claims with narratives in everyday language with a
greater potential to generate extensive media coverage.27 us, deliberative
systems could help narrow the gap between the demand of good judgment
and citizens’ time and cognitive capacity.28
20 André Bächtiger and John Parkinson, Mapping and measuring deliberation: towards a new deliberative quality
(Oxford, 2019); Simone Chambers, ‘Rhetoric and the public sphere: has deliberative democracy abandoned mass
semocracy?’, Political eory 3 (37) (2009), 323–50.
21 John Parkinson, Deliberating in the real world: problems of legitimacy in deliberative democracy (Oxford, 2006).
22 Gastil and Richards, ‘Making direct democracy deliberative through random assemblies’.
23 Parkinson and Mansbridge, Deliberative systems.
24 Michael Morrell, ‘Listening and deliberation’, in André Bächtiger et al. (eds), e Oxford handbook of
deliberative democracy (Oxford, 2018), doi: 10.1093/oxfordhb/9780198747369.013.55; Lala Muradova, ‘Seeing the
other side? Perspective-taking and reective political judgements in interpersonal deliberation’, Political Studies
(May 2020), doi:10.1177/0032321720916605.
25 Nicole Curato and Marit Böker, ‘Linking mini-publics to the deliberative system: a research agenda’, Policy
Sciences 2 (49) (June 2016), 173–90, doi:10.1007/s11077-015-9238-5.
26 Simon Niemeyer and Julia Jennstål, ‘Scaling up deliberative eects: applying lessons of mini-publics’, in
Bächtiger et al. (eds), e Oxford handbook of deliberative democracy (Oxford, 2018), 330.
27 John Parkinson, ‘e roles of referendums in deliberative systems’, Representation 4 (56) (2020), 485–500; Jane
Suiter, David M. Farrell and Clodagh Harris, ‘e Irish Constitutional Convention: a case of “high legitimacy”?’,
in Jane Suiter and M. Reuchamps (eds), Constitutional deliberative democracy in Europe, (Colchester, 2016), 33–52.
28 Warren and Gastil, ‘Can deliberative minipublics address the cognitive challenges of democratic citizenship?’
Jane Suiter—A Modest Proposal 253
ird, the introduction of a deliberative phase would extend the time period
during which the issues would become a focus of debate and deliberation in
the wider public sphere and also create a cohort of citizens who can make
deliberately derived public contributions on either side of the debate.29 us,
direct and deliberative democracy can provide reciprocal assistance30 when
connected to both the informal public sphere and formal decision making.31
In sum, deliberation can allow information to ow within the informa-
tion environment, leading to the potential to act as a trusted proxy. Perhaps
more importantly, in what is likely to be a very salient referendum campaign,
increasing the deliberative spaces could generate a greater discursive role for
citizens, particularly if generated over a period of time. Further, the knowl-
edge generation potential is likely to be of benet in two close yet distinct
polities on the island of Ireland, where a mutual lack of knowledge is likely.
Advantages of deliberative scrutiny
e perceived advantages of such deliberative scrutiny are multifaceted,
including helping to counter elite manipulation; facilitating perspective
taking and empathy building,32 and increasing reection;33 delivering system-
atic improvements in democratic outcomes such as alignment between values
and votes, i.e. correct voting;34 and reducing polarisation.35
To examine each of these perceived advantages briey, there is evidence
that pre-deliberative preferences are oen strongly inuenced by symbolic
concerns,36 oen underpinned by emotive appeals propagated across the
public sphere by elites, mass media and across social media. ese appeals,
largely relating to symbolic politics, distort participants’ preferences. In two
cases in Australia, deliberation allowed participants to develop and consider
29 Jane Suiter and eresa Reidy, ‘Does deliberation help deliver informed electorates: evidence from Irish
referendum votes’, Representation 4 (56) (October 2020), 539–57.
30 Michael Saward, ‘Making democratic connections: political equality, deliberation and direct democracy, Acta
Politica 36 (4) (March 2021), 361–79.
31 Parkinson, ‘e roles of referendums in deliberative systems’.
32 Morrell, ‘Listening and deliberation’; Muradova, ‘Seeing the other side?’
33 Muradova, ‘Seeing the other side?’; Lala Muradova Huseynova, ‘Reasoning across the divide: interpersonal
deliberation, emotions and reective political reasoning’ (2021), available at: hps://lirias.kuleuven.be/
retrieve/612059; Jane Suiter et al., ‘Scaling up deliberation: testing the potential of mini-publics to enhance the
deliberative capacity of citizens’, Swiss Political Science Review 3 (26) (2020), 253–72.
34 Suiter and Reidy, ‘Does deliberation help deliver informed electorates’.
35 John S. Dryzek et al., ‘e crisis of democracy and the science of deliberation’, Science 363 (6432) (2019),
1144–46.
36 Simon Niemeyer, ‘e emancipatory eect of deliberation: empirical lessons from mini-publics’, Politics &
Society 1 (39) (2011), 103–40.
254 Irish Studies in International Aairs
positions that extended beyond the narrow range of symbolic issues ostensi-
bly at the heart of the deliberation. us, there is evidence that deliberation
among citizens has the potential to counter elite manipulation, fostering a
deeper understanding that beer allows participants to deal with issue com-
plexity and beer express their own subjectivity.37 In the Northern Ireland
context the possibility of ameliorating the emotional and symbolic roots of
extremist ethnic politics must be a prerequisite to a referendum campaign
that could do much to stir up such divisions.
ere is also evidence that deliberation can deliver a greater understanding
of other people’s perspectives. Indeed, many theorists question if deliberation
is even possible without a modicum of empathy.38 In an ideal deliberative envi-
ronment, participants would engage in ‘deliberation within’,39 reecting over
their own positions as well as being empathetic about others’ viewpoints. Lala
Muradova argues that when citizens are facilitated to imagine the world from
another’s perspective, they can favour other regarding thinking. She argues that
a deliberative environment has the potential to create an environment capable of
evoking empathy for the other side. Empirical work is still relatively rare on the
role of empathy but there is some evidence that actively imagining the feelings
and thoughts of those on the other side of a debate elicits greater empathy as
well as feelings of concern. In turn, this empathetic concern increases the odds
of changing one’s mind on an issue. Indeed, this increase in perspective-taking
among citizens has been found in the case of the Citizens’ Assembly in the
republic,40 while in Finland an experiment on the contentious issue of immigra-
tion found outgroup empathy increased during deliberation.41
Furthermore, evidence suggests that along with increases in knowledge,
deliberation can result in a greater alignment between values and vote or
so-called ‘correct voting’,42 where an individual’s stated value choices are in
line with their vote choice. Correctness can be dened by the ‘fully informed’
values and beliefs of the individual voter, and the voter voting in line with
37 Niemeyer, ‘e emancipatory eect of deliberation’.
38 Jane J. Mansbridge, Beyond adversary democracy (Chicago, 1983); Tali Mendelberg, ‘e deliberative citizen:
theory and evidence’, 22, available at: hp://www.princeton.edu/~talim/mendelberg%20-%20deliberative%20
citizen.pdf; Morrell, ‘Listening and deliberation’.
39 Robert E. Goodin, ‘Democratic deliberation within’, Philosophy & Public Aairs 1 (29) (2000), 81–109.
40 Muradova, ‘Seeing the other side?’
41 Kimmo Grönlund, Kaisa Herne and Maija Setälä, ‘Empathy in a citizen deliberation experiment’, Scandinavian
Political Studies 4 (40) (2017), 457–80.
42 Richard R. Lau, David J. Andersen and David P. Redlawsk, ‘An exploration of correct voting in recent US
presidential elections’, American Journal of Political Science 2 (52) (2008), 395–411.
Jane Suiter—A Modest Proposal 255
these rather than with any particular ideology.43 In the republic, an uptick in
correct voting was found following the introduction of a deliberative phase
in the referendum process; further, this alignment between values and vote
grew over time as deliberation became more embedded.44
In addition, forming a shared understanding of an issue aids in the narrow-
ing of polarisation. e evidence shows that group think, which can exacerbate
identity rearmation and polarisation, does not thrive under deliberative
conditions, even in situations of enclave deliberation,45 although reduction of
polarisation does increase in mixed groups where both sides can hear testi-
mony from the other.
In terms of examining the demand side there is only limited and emerging
evidence. is suggests that so-called ‘enraged citizens’, and men, are more
likely to be in favour of assemblies. Further, there is greatest demand in terms
of day-to-day issues of concern to citizens, in particular issues such as social
care. But caution is required, in that citizens will only favour an assembly
they think may produce an outcome that they agree with.46
In the republic, there is an increasing tendency to hold citizens’ assem-
blies before referendums on contentious issues. e evidence, while still not
conclusive, tends to suggest that a pre-referendum deliberative phase maers;
it leads to people voting with greater levels of both objective and subjec-
tive knowledge, increasing correct voting and voting with greater empathy.
Indeed, these assemblies have been held on some of the most contentious and
polarising issues in the republic; abortion and marriage equality required an
update of the 1937 Irish Constitution (Bunreacht na hÉireann) which included
a range of provisions heavily inuenced by Catholic social thinking and the
social mores of the time.
Both votes stood in contrast to traditional Catholic teachings, with much
rancour and divisiveness in all previous votes on this longstanding liber-
al-conservative divide.47 Abortion was enormously divisive and controversial
and it is also notable that the issues were rather intractable, with the abortion
vote in 2018 being the sixth referendum question put before the people on
43 Lau, Andersen and Redlawsk, ‘An exploration’, 586.
44 Suiter and Reidy, ‘Does deliberation help deliver informed electorates’. Kimmo Grönlund, Kaisa Herne and
Maija Setälä, ‘Does enclave deliberation polarise opinions?’, Political Behavior 4 (37) (2015), 995–1020.
45 Grönlund, Herne and Setälä, ‘Does enclave deliberation polarise opinions?’.
46 Pilet et al., ‘Public support for citizens’ assemblies’.
47 Suiter and Reidy, ‘Does deliberation help deliver informed electorates’.
256 Irish Studies in International Aairs
this question since 1983.48 ese referendums are notable in that they were
preceded by deliberative assemblies, the Irish Constitutional Convention
and the Irish Citizens’ Assembly respectively. It is clear that this deliberative
phase resulted in greater knowledge among voters,49 an increase in values
aligning with vote, and further, that the alignment between values and vote
grew as deliberation became more embedded and normalised.50 However, it
is also the case that the randomly selected members of the assembly may
have been slightly skewed towards those more in favour of the undecided and
those in favour of abortion legislation, possibly due to some people choosing
to exclude themselves from the process,51 and a decision not to include ai-
tudes to the issue as a selection criteria. Interestingly, not selecting on the
issue also appears to have ensured that the vote at the assembly mirrored the
vote at the referendum. is is a useful lesson from a Northern Irish perspec-
tive, where it will be important to ensure representativeness along the usual
demographic lines (age, gender and location) but also on identity (unionist,
neutral and nationalist).
Overall, the evidence is encouraging in terms of long-term planning for
a deliberative precursor to any reunication referendum. Integrating a citi-
zens’ deliberation phase into the process could enhance outcomes. However,
these eects are not a guarantee, of course not. Good deliberation takes plan-
ning, there are a number of essential components and civility norms. ere is
also rather less experience to date of deliberation in deeply divided societies,
although the evidence that is emerging is encouraging.
DELIBERATION IN DIVIDED SOCIETIES
It is clear from the preceding discussion that the potential for deliberation in
democracy is signicant, albeit no panacea. ere are also signicant chal-
lenges in implementing the necessary institutional and cultural changes that
work towards such benets. ese challenges are likely to be particularly
48 eresa Reidy, ‘Abortion referendums in Ireland’, in S.D. Brunn and R. Kehrein (eds), Handbook of the changing
world language map (New York, 2020), 2311–323.
49 Johan A. Elkink et al., ‘Understanding the 2015 marriage referendum in Ireland: context, campaign, and
conservative Ireland’, Irish Political Studies 3 (32) (2017), 361–81; Johan A. Elkink et al., ‘e death of conservative
Ireland? e 2018 abortion referendum’, Electoral Studies 65 (2020), 102142.
50 Suiter and Reidy, ‘Does deliberation help deliver informed electorates’.
51 David M. Farrell et al., ‘When mini-publics and maxi-publics coincide: Ireland’s national debate on abortion’,
Representation (6 August 2020), 1–19.
Jane Suiter—A Modest Proposal 257
signicant in a deeply divided society and crucially are not without risk.
Indeed, there are those who warn that it is simply not possible in deeply
segmented or polarised societies,52 and that it could backre and iname sec-
tarian political conict.53 For those embedded in consociationalism it is the
elites who will prove more willing to compromise.54 For example, Brendan
O’Leary stresses that ‘deliberation takes place in languages, dialects, accents,
and ethnically toned voices all of which make the job of reaching mutual
deliberate decisions much more complicated’.55
A central problem for deliberative resolution around identity in Northern
Ireland may result precisely from the form of consocialism, which has
allowedchange under the Agreement. e central feature is of course that
it is an agreement between the dierent blocs to share power; the result
is that any contentious deliberation is carried out largely at an elite level
between the leaders of dierent blocs. e result is that the discourse of
the public is oen channelled into within-bloc channels because, as John
Dryzek points out, ‘segmental autonomy’ is one of Arend Lijphart’s den-
ing features of consociationalism.56 However, cleavages are frozen at least
to some extent and thus deliberation risks falling foul of the rules of group
polarisation.57
In order to consider whether these challenges can be overcome, we need
to consider whether the circumstances of Northern Ireland t the meta-re-
quirements of deliberation and how the requirements of deliberative systems
can be adapted to local circumstances and culture. Ian O’Flynn oers a useful
normative argument where he sets out that a deliberative account of political
equality necessary for deliberation requires both inclusion and moderation,58
which he argues can lead to a robust and durable form of political stability.
Inclusion essentially implies that any decision-making process must include,
52 Dennis F. ompson, ‘Deliberative democratic theory and empirical political science’, Annual Review of
Political Science 11 (2008), 497–520; John S. Dryzek, ‘Deliberative democracy in divided societies: alternatives to
agonism and analgesia’, Political eory 2 (33) (2005), 218–42.
53 John McGarry and Brendan O’Leary, ‘Must pluri-national federations fail?’, Ethnopolitics 1 (8) (2009), 5–25.
54 Arend Lijphart, e politics of accommodation: pluralism and democracy in the Netherlands, Vol. 142 (California,
1975).
55 Brendan O’Leary, ‘Debating consociational politics: normative and explanatory arguments’, in Sid Noel (ed.),
From power sharing to democracy: post-conict institutions in ethnically divided societies 3 (McGill, 2005), 3–43: 10.
56 Dryzek, ‘Deliberative democracy in divided societies’.
57 Cass R. Sunstein, ‘e law of group polarization’, University of Chicago Law School, John M. Olin Law &
Economics Working Paper, no. 91 (1999).
58 Ian O’Flynn, ‘Review article: Divided societies and deliberative democracy’, British Journal of Political Science
4 (37) (2007), 731–51.
258 Irish Studies in International Aairs
on equal terms, all those subject to its decisions.59 Moderation, for John Rawls,
says if we enter such a process we must be prepared to moderate our claims
in the face of the opposing views of our fellow participants.60 ese are very
dicult conditions to meet when deliberating in a deeply divided society.
First, if we accept that deliberative inclusion requires the substantive
participation of all aected citizens then we must ensure that all communi-
ties come to the room. e most debilitating obstacle is of course a unionist
veto, from both the DUP and UUP and of course Jim Alister’s hard-line
TUV, a rather likely event. Aer all, in the Irish Constitutional Convention
of 2012 to 2014, all political parties on the island were invited to partici-
pate. No unionist party did so, with only the nationalists and the Alliance
Party taking up the invitation. Further, unionist parties did not respond to
the All-Island Civic Dialogue on Brexit convened by the government in the
republic, where even the UUP, which had supported Remain, refused to be
part of it. In 1973, on the occasion of the rst border poll, when deciding
on whether to remain in the UK or to join the republic, nationalists exer-
cised a veto and boycoed the vote. is resulted in a 99% vote in favour
of remaining in the UK, with a turnout of just 59%. ere is thus scope for
strategic eorts from unionist parties to undermine the process of inclusion.
e UCL-led Working Group that largely interacted with elites reported
that many in the unionist community would be unwilling to participate in
any discussion about a United Ireland.61 e Interim Report argues that this
could imply that a discussion on the specics of legislation underpinning
a referendum could not happen until aer referendums have been held in
both jurisdictions.
However, senior unionist leaders such as Peter Robinson have argued that
preparation is necessary and that ‘vision can provide the thrust to resolve
our dierences in this present generation’,62 although more recently he has
expressed concern about the levels of disaection within unionism. Further,
that decision could also have implications in terms of ceding centre ground
to the Alliance and ensuring all three could only compete for a maximum of
40% of the unionist vote.
59 Iris Marion Young, Inclusion and democracy (Oxford, 2002), 52.
60 John Rawls, Political liberalism (New York, 2005), 60; Amy Gutmann and Dennis F. ompson, Democracy and
disagreement (Boston, 1998), 9–56.
61 Renwick et al., Interim Report of the Working Group on Unication Referendums on the Island of Ireland, 51.
62 Peter Robinson, ‘Peter Robinson’s een’s University Speech: Full Text’, Belfast Newsleer, June 2018:
hps://www.belfaselegraph.co.uk/news/northern-ireland/peter-robinsons-queens-university-speech-full-
text-36992405.html.
Jane Suiter—A Modest Proposal 259
Second, in the Rawlsian view, if we enter into such a process with other
equal citizens we ought to be ready to moderate our claims63 and to listen
with respect. It seems likely that many will be fundamentally unhappy that
questions that go to the heart of identity could be subject to such treatment.64
What could be at stake here is in essence a contest for the state with a con-
joining risk that such engagement could fall foul of the rule of intended
consequences, precipitating ever deepening divisions. In this instance, it
seems likely that decisions would trump deliberation. At a minimum, if we
are to hold a legitimate expectation of reasonableness given the binary, mutu-
ally antagonistic, identities at play, it would seem that identarian questions
would need to be framed around discussion about the protection of identity
and other rights for all groups under dierent models.
ere may be grounds for optimism, given that the Agreement itself is
built upon compromise with a shared commitment to principles of self-de-
termination, democratic equality, tolerance and mutual respect (although, of
course, the DUP has never signed up to its principles). If so, what is the way
forward? Dryzek’s answer is to deliberate on a less contested policy that is
not tied to the fate of the state.65 If we are to go down this route and to main-
tain the principle of inclusiveness then we must look to the openness of the
agenda and the chosen topics must be a reection of the preferences of the
general population.66
ere are a number of criteria that must be satised to ensure inclu-
sion in the agenda seing phase. It would be important that this inclusive
potential would not only address majority and minority communities and
identities, but also nd ways to include minorities within minorities.67 It is
worth noting that lile aention is paid to minorities in Northern Ireland,
with no dierentiation in the census and high levels of hate crime.68 Any
process should also begin with salient issues within the public sphere at
some remove from the core identarian issue. And indeed, in the limited
63 Ian O’Flynn, ‘Review article: divided societies and deliberative democracy’, British Journal of Political Science
4 (37) (2007), 738.
64 Dryzek, ‘Deliberative democracy in divided societies’.
65 Dryzek, ‘Deliberative democracy in divided societies’.
66 Didier Caluwaerts and Min Reuchamps, ‘Strengthening democracy through boom-up deliberation: an
assessment of the internal legitimacy of the G1000 Project’, Acta Politica 2 (50) (2015), 151–70.
67 Anna Drake and Allison McCulloch, ‘Deliberative consociationalism in deeply divided societies’, Contemporary
Political eory 3 (10) (2011), 372–92.
68 Bimpe Archer, ‘Disappointment that Northern Ireland Census 2021 is ‘ignoring minority religions’, Irish
News, March 2021, available at: hp://www.irishnews.com/news/northernirelandnews/2021/03/04/news/
disappointment-that-northern-ireland-census-2021-is-ignoring-minority-religions--2242939/.
260 Irish Studies in International Aairs
number of deliberative events that have taken place in Northern Ireland,
this is precisely what we see. e deliberation, based on the deliberative poll
model on education in Omagh, facilitated members of both communities
to come together and some emerged with enhanced knowledge as well as
change in policy aitudes.69 In 2018 a number of civil society groups ran a
citizens’ assembly on social care policy70 and agreed a set of resolutions. In
2019, a research project convened a one-day assembly to examine aitudes
to the border in light of Brexit.71 ey found a dierence between those
with more xed positions, who were less open to debate but nonetheless
increased participants’ knowledge. It is not possible to ascertain from the
paper what portion of Protestants who participated were strongly in favour
of the union to begin with and how that matched population opinion.
Nonetheless, the results are very encouraging.
e way forward is likely to conceive of the public sphere in Northern
Ireland as part of a deliberative system rather than envisaging a single con-
tested deliberative assembly preceding a poll on the future of the polity. e
initial topics here should be about improving the lives of all citizens, about
learning to live together well in advance of any ultimate decision on which
jurisdiction in which to do so. It would seem then that any deliberative insti-
tution considered should be conceived in its own right, to benet the people
of Northern Ireland. e rst topics must be cross-cuing, and provide evi-
dence to all that the process can work and can be trusted. is was the modus
operandi of the rst Constitutional Convention in the republic, which consid-
ered issues such as the length of the presidential term and a reduction in the
voting age in its rst weeks before moving on to the more polarising topic of
marriage equality.
Building legitimacy and trust
Once established and trusted, the assembly could , if conditions allow, turn its
aention to a specic focus on the protection of identities under any future
constitutional arrangement and ask questions around both possible outcomes
to a future referendum. ‘If a referendum on Northern Ireland’s constitu-
tional future returns a majority in favour of maintaining the Union, what in
69 James Fishkin et al., ‘A deliberative poll on education: what provision do informed parents in Northern
Ireland want?’, 2007, available at: hps://cdd.stanford.edu/mm/2007/omagh-report.pdf.
70 Involve, ‘Citizens’ Assembly for Norhern Ireland’ (London, 2018), available at: hps://www.involve.org.uk/
sites/default/les/eld/aachemnt/Citizens%20Assembly%20for%20Northern%20Ireland%20Full%20Report.pdf.
71 Garry et al., ‘Public aitudes to dierent possible models of a United Ireland’.
Jane Suiter—A Modest Proposal 261
your view would be the most important mechanisms or changes necessary
to protect Irish identity, and the identities of minority groups, within that
Union?’; ‘If a referendum on Northern Ireland’s constitutional future returns
a majority in favour of a united Ireland, what in your view would be the most
important mechanisms or changes necessary to protect British identity, and
the identities of minority groups, within that new political entity?’ e report
could be delivered as the input to an assembly in the republic, although care
must be taken that there is no sense of subordination or hierarchy and that
the bodies are seen as equal. It will be vital to choregraph this carefully.
Such an approach would help build trust in the deliberative process and
approach. For politicians and policymakers, deliberation can help inform
judgments on a range of policy issues and can serve as anticipatory publics to
guide policymakers in contentious policy areas.72 Crucial, however, will be to
provide clarity and transparency about its modus operandi as well as its end
goals. Unionism could worry that such an assembly would be a Trojan horse,
designed to lure its people into deliberating on the specics of the united
Ireland to which they remain opposed. It therefore must be clear to the wider
public that Northern Ireland’s venture down the deliberative route is initially
to manage Northern Ireland’s future post-Brexit, to ensure the well-being
and livelihoods of Northern Irish people and to ensure that the voices of the
people can be listened to.
is link with the political and representative system is vital for legitimacy.
On the one hand, the deliberative institution deepens citizen participation on
the decision-making process,73 but citizens also require the engagement of
MPs and other actors in the representative system for their political uptake.
Without some ‘ownership’ of the assembly there is a risk that parties could
be incentivised to decry the initiative as happened in the G1000 in Belgium,74
potentially raising the threshold for future assemblies. Further, political
parties are unlikely to have any direct impact without being supported by the
institutions of representative democracy,75 and this is likely to be especially
strong if the representatives have no involvement in the design of the pro-
cess.76 In contrast, the Constitutional Convention in the republic consisted of
72 Parkinson and Mansbridge, Deliberative systems, 97.
73 Graham Smith, Democratic innovations: designing institutions for citizen participation (Cambridge, 2009).
74 Caluwaerts and Reuchamps, ‘Strengthening democracy through boom-up deliberation’.
75 Robert Goodin and John Dryzek, ‘Deliberative impacts: the macro-political uptake of mini-publics’, Politics &
Society 34 (June 2006), 219–244, doi:10.1177/0032329206288152.
76 Didier Caluwaerts and Min Reuchamps, ‘Generating democratic legitimacy through deliberative innovations:
the role of embeddedness and disruptiveness’, Representation 1 (52) (2016), 13–27.
262 Irish Studies in International Aairs
one-third political representatives giving an opportunity to build trust and a
sense of ownership among all political parties involved.
Ideally, the deliberative institutions, as suggested in the New Decade, New
Approach document, could be set up either under the auspices of the Stormont
Executive or the Assembly Commission, the corporate body that runs the
Assembly. is would allow the citizens’ assembly to be set up by Motion
in Stormont, in a similar manner to the establishment of the assemblies in
the republic by Oireachtas Motion, albeit there initiated by the executive.
However, this is most unlikely due to strategic vetoes and thus consideration
must be given to drawing on the experience and expertise of an organisation
such as the Special EU Programmes body (which administers the cross-com-
munity and cross-border PEACE and INTERREG programmes), and the
International Fund for Ireland. In this way there may be an opportunity to
bring civic voices77 to the table in Northern Ireland in a way that doesn’t
require Northern Ireland Executive or Assembly sanction.
If it were to go ahead, one issue of concern would be lobbying or outside
partisan forces requiring people to vote on partisan lines. Civil society in
Northern Ireland is structured largely on partisan lines and the parties and
indeed the former paramilitaries on both sides are still active in NGOs and in
community groups. ere are fears that undue inuence or even threats could
be brought to bear on any members of such an assembly. In the republic the
secretariat warned interest groups that lobbying members would ensure they
would not be ‘in the room’ to give evidence. Such an eort may not be so suc-
cessful in Northern Ireland. It will be crucial to ensure the absolute secrecy of
the ballot, which must be a sine qua none of all votes and it may also be impor-
tant to hold some elements in a secure online environment for similar reasons.
e maer of a chair or co-chairs will be vital and such a person will be
required to command respect from both sides. It is unlikely that the British
convention of a convenor role, or a lead facilitator(s) who acts as a link between
the citizens and the secretariat, would be sucient in such a contested space.
e model from the republic, where the chair is a respected independent
gure, such as a former senior member of the judiciary or civil service, could
be more appropriate. Consideration should be given to an agreed neutral and
independent international gure such as a George Mitchell, although it will
of course be dicult to reach agreement on this.
77 Gerry Moriarty, ‘“Civic unionism” group issues riposte to “civic nationalism”’, Irish Times, 24 February 2018; Gerry
Moriarty, ‘Up to 1,500 people to aend “civic nationalism” conference in Belfast’, Irish Times, 18 January 2019.
Jane Suiter—A Modest Proposal 263
TOPICS AND SEQUENCING
If we accept that it will be useful to institutionalise deliberation before
tackling issues of identity then we should consider the many policy ques-
tions that are likely to tap into cross-cuing cleavages, and while it is
true that the most salient will dominate the outcomes, others will help
shape the discourse. Some interesting evidence emerges from the appli-
cation of Voter Advice Applications (VAAs) in Northern Ireland. e VAA
provides policy relevant questions on parties in a pre-election period and
then advises a putative voter on which party they’re closest to, taking into
account a wide range of policy issues including, economic, moral and social
dimensions as well as questions relating to the most salient ethno-national
cleavage. In a consociational, deeply divided system, we would of course
expect the laer to dominate and indeed that is the case. But there is also
at least some evidence of a moral liberal-conservative dimension of pol-
itics,78 although drawing aention to it within a VAA does lile to alter
voter preferences,79 and indeed unionists can become even less likely to
support a dierent party when presented with this evidence, perhaps due
to cognitive dissonance.
Voting preferences are almost perfectly aligned along the ethno-na-
tional division, with fewer than 10% of either religion giving a preference
to an opposing party on the national question, and vote choices are largely
independent of people’s policy stances on economic or social issues.80
Cleavages on economic le vs right and on moral issues appear to have
dissipated as the eects of the power-sharing institutions become man-
ifest.81 Further, birth cohort has a signicant impact on vote choice for
both DUP and Sinn Féin,82 but yet is associated with social liberalism
in Northern Ireland,83 a topic on which the parties had not at that time
78 John Garry, Neil Mahews and Jonathan Wheatley, ‘Dimensionality of policy space in consociational
Northern Ireland’, Political Studies 2 (65) (2017), 493–511.
79 John Garry et al., ‘Does receiving advice from voter advice applications (VAAs) aect public opinion in deeply
divided societies? Evidence from a eld experiment in Northern Ireland’, Party Politics 6 (25) (2019), 854–61.
80 James Tilley, John Garry and Neil Mahews, ‘e evolution of party policy and cleavage voting under power-
sharing in Northern Ireland’, Government and Opposition (2019), 1–19.
81 Tilley, Garry and Mahews. ‘e evolution of party policy and cleavage voting under power-sharing in
Northern Ireland’.
82 Bernadee C. Hayes and Ian McAllister, ‘Gender and consociational power-sharing in Northern Ireland’,
International Political Science Review 2 (34) (2013), 123–39; James Tilley and Georey Evans, ‘Political generations
in Northern Ireland’, European Journal of Political Research 5 (50) (2011), 583–608.
83 Jocelyn Evans and Jonathan Tonge, ‘Partisan and religious drivers of moral conservatism: same-sex marriage
and abortion in Northern Ireland’, Party Politics 4 (24) (2018), 335–46.
264 Irish Studies in International Aairs
changed their positions. Indeed Sinn Féin’s decision to support abortion
legislation was a major policy change in 2019.
Arguably, deliberation can help in separating these values from vote
choice,84 facilitating deliberation into cross-cuing value cleavages. A focus
on these cross-cuing cleavages can facilitate both inclusion in that they
are in the interest of both communities, and moderation, in that they are
not at the heart of identity. Sequencing can allow a series of deliberative
spaces and moments, building a culture of deliberation and trust in the
process.
One clear area of cross-cuing cleavage is deprivation: Northern Ireland
has higher levels of multiple deprivation than the rest of the UK, with one third
of the population living on or below the poverty line, and far greater social
deprivation than the republic, across both nationalist and unionist communi-
ties.85 As a result, young Northern Irish people experience lower educational
aainment, and poorer standards of childhood health, with severe repercus-
sions on well-being.86 ese ‘wicked problems’, or dicult social problems,
including poverty, crime and social division,87 are oen the most intracta-
ble with traditional governance structures, particularly when dominated
by authoritarian mode, or needing to be seen to be doing something; or the
competitive mode’s need to put narrow political success/survival above the
broader problem resolution. Yet in western Australia and elsewhere, delibera-
tive governance has in some instances been found to be eective in reducing
the governance gap and tackling these kinds of problems,88 facilitating the
adoption of a more collaborative approach.
An initial focus on a wicked problem in areas of signicant common
concern would allow deliberation on cross-cuing cleavages. For example,
issues such as the mental health of young people, or drugs, could be inde-
pendent enough of identity and cross-cuing to be workable.
84 John Gastil et al., ‘Participatory policymaking across cultural cognitive divides: two tests of cultural biasing
in public forum design and deliberation’, Public Administration 4 (94) (2016), 970–87.
85 ‘Poverty and social exclusion: dening, measuring and tackling poverty’, Northern Ireland (blog), March 2021,
hps://www.poverty.ac.uk/community/northern-ireland#:~:text=Northern%20Ireland%20has%20higher%20
levels,will%20have%20enough%20to%20eat.
86 Brendan Browne and Clare Dwyer, ‘Navigating risk: understanding the impact of the conict on children and
young people in Northern Ireland’, Studies in Conict & Terrorism 9 (37) (2014), 792–805.
87 Horst W.J. Riel and Melvin M. Webber, ‘Dilemmas in a general theory of planning’, Policy Sciences 2 (4)
(1973), 155–69.
88 Robert Weymouth and Janee Hartz-Karp, ‘Deliberative collaborative governance as a democratic reform to
resolve wicked problems and improve trust’, Journal of Economic & Social Policy 1 (17) (2015), 62.
Jane Suiter—A Modest Proposal 265
However, it could be useful not to be top-down in specifying topics. Perhaps
building on the ideas in the SDLP’s New Ireland Commission, the provisions
in the New Decade, New Approach or on the initial experimental work on
We the Citizens in the Republic89 input could be sought from communities
across Northern Ireland on issues of signicance to them in their daily lives.
A further way to work on cross-cleavages is among the young. Despite the
commonalities and cross-cutting cleavages across societies, sectarianism and
division reecting collective identities remain resistant to change.90 A useful
starting point could be the Young Life and Times (YLT) survey, an annual atti-
tudinal survey of 16-year-olds in Northern Ireland that has been running since
2003, which reveals cross-cutting cleavages in terms of the liberal-conserva-
tive dimension. Clearly, when looking to the future, it is essential that young
people’s views are sought and facilitated to feed into policy. Further, children
and young people are a strategic priority in the 2016 to 2021 Programme for
Government. It would seem then to make sense to focus on these cross-cuing
cleavages on deprivation and the results, particularly among young people.
A strengthened youth parliament, perhaps based on the successful Scoish
Children’s Parliament,91 could be a useful ongoing source of input. at par-
liament had a vital role in informing the outputs of the Scoish assembly on
climate, ensuring the voices of younger generations were heard, underpin-
ning intergenerational fairness.
is focus on cross-cuing cleavages and on younger people would seem
to be an opportunity to build trust and legitimacy, cross-community ties and
links. e idea would be to build a deliberative system that would later be
capable of focusing on protecting the communal identities and on symbols,
traditions and cultures that divide.92 e focus would be to answer Jennifer
Todd’s call for deliberation that would recognise the need to foster the iden-
tities and values underpinning unionism rather than focus on organising or
solving contentious politics, ‘allowing an evolution of traditions rather than a
sense of identity under siege’.93 Of course, this raises other questions around
89 Farrell and Suiter, Reimagining democracy.
90 Martina McKnight and Dirk Schubotz, ‘Shared future, shared values? Taking stock of the peace process in
Northern Ireland: teenagers’ perspectives’, Cultural Trends 3 (26) (2017), 216–32.
91 ‘Scoish Childrens’ Parliament’, Children’s Parliament, available at: hps://www.childrensparliament.org.
uk/about-us/.
92 Martina McKnight and Madeleine Leonard, ‘Bordering in transition: young people’s experiences in ‘post-
conict’ Belfast’, in Children and Borders (Springer, 2014), 164–79.
93 Jennifer Todd, ‘Unionism, identity and Irish unity: paradigms, problems and paradoxes’, Irish Studies in
International Aairs: ARINS 2 (32) (2021), 53–77, doi:10.3318/isia.2021.32b.8.
266 Irish Studies in International Aairs
legitimacy, and executive follow-on, among others, to which I shall return in
the following institutional section.
e second issue around sequencing is the importance of either syn-
chronous or asynchronous deliberation in the republic. It is clear from the
experience of Brexit that voters in both Northern Ireland and in the republic
would need to be clear about the institutional and political implications of
their vote. ere are many other articles in this series which have eloquently
pointed to issues around symbols and traditions and their importance in a new
policy. ere are constitutional questions around whether the republic might
write a new constitution, decide on a new ag, guarantee power sharing, or
even rejoin the Commonwealth, for example. ere are also political implica-
tions around issues such as the future of the National Health Service, where
most might consider the Northern Ireland model to be superior, or economic
issues around the welfare state, where the current environment is likely more
generous in the republic.
ere would seem to be three possibilities around sequencing assemblies
in Northern Ireland and in the republic; an all-island approach; a synchro-
nous approach; or an asynchronous approach. However, it would seem that
an all-island approach would by necessity leave unionists in a minority and
thus would not satisfy requirements for inclusion. A synchronous approach
would mean that the assemblies in both polities could proceed in tandem
with experts and perhaps even citizens, giving evidence to one another,
enabling joint learning. An asynchronous approach could involve an initial
deliberative event in the republic, seing out the parameters of where the
‘public’ in the republic might be. However, if this were to formally feed into
the Northern Irish assembly, it might again exacerbate the threat of veto and
our principle inclusion. It would seem then that the most appealing mode
may be an asynchronous approach where a Northern Irish deliberation
on the symbolic, cultural, political and constitutional issues of importance
would later feed into an assembly in the republic. Citizens who participated
in the event in Northern Ireland could be asked to deliver their perspectives
to those in the republic. is approach would arguably minimise the dangers
of exclusion, maximise the possibility of moderation, and enable citizens in
the republic to deliberate on the measures they would be willing to take in
light of evidence from dierent publics in Northern Ireland. is would also
allow the government in the republic to dra or in some way codify what
the options might be in the event of a vote against the status quo in any ref-
erendum, in either polity.
Jane Suiter—A Modest Proposal 267
INSTITUTIONALISING DELIBERATIVE MODELS
In much of the previous discussion I focused rather generically on delibera-
tive events and spaces. ere are, however, many distinct models, all useful
in dierent circumstances and more or less prevalent across dierent geog-
raphies. e model that has been the focus of much previous commentary in
Northern Ireland is the citizens’ assembly, the predominant model in Ireland
and in the UK for all deliberative large-scale and constitutional events. ese
assemblies oen meet for ten or more days over several months or even
longer. e original is the British Columbia Citizens’ Assembly on Electoral
Reform,94 later followed by the Irish Constitutional Convention and Citizens’
Assembly,95 and the French as well as the Scoish Citizens’ Assembly on
Climate Change.96 Crucially, assemblies should incorporate public consulta-
tion in their design. is may be through open submissions, public hearings
or online inputs, but the crucial element is that the public’s input is consid-
ered in their deliberation.97
is model of assemblies in the UK is oen augmented with small-scale
citizens’ juries for smaller events (a citizens’ jury is similar to an assem-
bly, but on a smaller scale). Globally, the citizens’ jury/citizens’ panel (most
common in Canada) is the most widely used model of representative delib-
erative process, comprising 42% of all cases.98 e jury model, developed by
Ned Crosby in the Jeerson Centre in 1971 follows a rigid structure, usually
made up of between 12 to 24 people, and typically runs three to six days con-
secutively. In terms of topic, for Crosby the agenda should be tight and clear
and ‘works beer on value questions than technical issues’.99 Both citizens’
assemblies and citizens’ juries share essential features, such as randomly
selected participants, learning, facilitation, and the development of collective
recommendations. In general, citizens’ juries or citizens’ assemblies are made
up of randomly selected citizens stratied along demographic and some-
times aitudinal or other quotas, with the aim of representing society or a
94 Mark E. Warren and Hilary Pearse, Designing deliberative democracy: the British Columbia Citizens’ Assembly
(Cambridge, 2008).
95 Farrell and Suiter, Reimagining democracy.
96 Hélène Landemore, Open democracy: reinventing popular rule for the twenty-rst century (Princeton, 2020).
97 Nicole Curato et al., Deliberative mini-publics: core design features (Bristol, 2021).
98 OECD, Innovative Citizen Participation and New Democratic Institutions, 21.
99 Ned Crosby, ‘Citizens juries: one solution for dicult environmental questions’, in Ortwin Renn, omas
Webler and Peter Wiedemann (eds), Fairness and competence in citizen participation: evaluating models for
environmental discourse. Technology, Risk and Society (Dordrecht, Netherlands, 1995), 157–74: 157.
268 Irish Studies in International Aairs
microcosm of society.100 e only qualication is a willingness to engage in
deliberation on the issue.101 In a divided society, it would seem to make sense
to emphasise aitudinal convergence rather than a discursive approach that
includes all aitudes and discourse on the maer,102 and takes into consider-
ation the political positions of potential participants.103 For example, the 2017
Brexit citizens’ assembly asked how people had voted in the referendum.
To date, these processes are largely ad hoc; however, if we consider the
need for inclusion and for moderation then it seems that a form of institu-
tionalisation of the process within Northern Ireland would be most suitable.
According to the OECD, there are ve reasons to institutionalise: to take hard
decisions; to conduct beer deliberative processes more easily and less expen-
sively; to enhance public trust; to enrich democracy by expanding meaningful
citizen participation; and to strengthen the civic capacity of citizens.104 A per-
manent representative deliberative structure that complements the existing
institutions of representative decision-making would allow new institutional
arrangements facilitating representative citizen deliberation to inform public
decision making on an ongoing basis. A deliberative culture and deliberative
system can be built, the views and preferences of the young can be incorpo-
rated into policymaking and a norm of listening with respect built.
Perhaps the most useful model here is the Ostbelgien model in the German
speaking part of Belgium—essentially, a permanent assembly that has the
mandate to both set the agenda and initiate citizens’ panels. In Ostbelgien,
some 24 randomly selected citizens form a Citizens’ Council and have an
explicit mandate to represent their fellow citizens for 18 months. Half of the
members are randomly selected citizens from the region, six are selected from
a previous panel and six are politicians, one from each party. One third of the
members change each six months. is ensures political buy-in in the initial
stages (politicians are eventually replaced by citizens) and that the group does
not itself become institutionalised. Both bodies aim to be representative of the
region in terms of gender, age, education and residence. e initial indications
are that the invitation-acceptance rate is 10%, which is a high level for this
100 Curato et al., Deliberative mini-publics: core design features.
101 Anna Coote and Deborah Mainson, Twelve good neighbours: the citizen as juror, Discussion Paper 31
(London, 1997).
102 John S. Dryzek, ‘Legitimacy and economy in deliberative democracy’, Political eory 5 (29) (2001), 651–69.
103 Emilien Paulis et al., ‘e POLITICIZE dataset: an inventory of deliberative mini-publics (DMPs) in Europe’,
European Political Science, 2020, 10.
104 OECD, Innovative Citizen Participation and New Democratic Institutions, 6.
Jane Suiter—A Modest Proposal 269
type of experience.105 is Council can initiate up to three panels (or juries)
on topics of their choice, while citizens and the parliamentary or party groups
can make proposals. Crucially, the regional parliament is legislatively bound
to debate and respond to recommendations. is is perhaps the best example
of an institution that extends the agenda-seing power to citizens and pro-
vides citizens with the tools to explore issues of their choice.106
In the Northern Irish context, I suggest a role for the Assembly and to
include a number of these representatives within the citizens’ council. is
would act to assuage unionist fears of nationalist dominance or excessive
inuence from the republic.
CONCLUSION
In conclusion, it seems clear that there is potential for deliberation in
Northern Ireland and that a deliberative phase is a very useful addition to any
referendum campaign. However, in a deeply divided society, much caution
must be exercised. It is essential that any model works towards ensuring both
inclusion and moderation. Inclusion is a particularly hard test, with many
incentives for a strategic boyco driven by unionist parties.
105 International Observatory on Participatory Democracy (IOPD), ‘e Ostbelgien Model: a long-term citizens’
council combined with short-term citizens’ assemblies’, available at: hps://oidp.net/en/practice.php?id=1237.
106 OECD, Innovative Citizen Participation and New Democratic Institutions, 35.
Figure 1. Proposed Northern Ireland Model (Adapted from the Ostbelgien Model).
270 Irish Studies in International Aairs
is suggests that the focus should be on rst building the overall deliber-
ative system in Northern Ireland. By oering a variety of spaces and a venue
for discussion, a new model could facilitate an underpinning of its legitimacy
by all communities. e focus must be a Northern Irish institution rather than
an all-island assembly, which is likely to simply mean that unionists’ voices
will not be included.
In terms of promoting the possibility of moderation, it seems clear that
avoiding the central identarian question itself is a necessity. A focus on cross-
cuing cleavage issues could be essential to build trust in the process. e
inclusion of the voices of the young, whether through the youth parliament
or other mechanism, would be essential, as would an independent chair.
Once established and trusted, this institution could then, if desired, be
deployed to consider the contentious issues of symbols, institutions and cul-
tures that will be vital to debate and carefully consider in advance of any
referendum. Following this, the citizens’ assembly in the republic could delib-
erate on the outcome, considering the necessary changes to institutions,
cultures and values that would be necessary in the republic. Building such a
deliberative system and institutionalising the process would allow the most
solid foundations in advance of any reunication referendum. If a referendum
were passed, it would then be vital to enable dialogue and deliberation on an
all-island basis to consider the future arguments. More work is required to
develop the detail of this proposal; but a cautious approach is warranted.
