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Unity of Russian Society. Importance of Building Social Cohesion for the Security of Russian Federation
Abstract
A sense of unity in any society is a great value. United society is a strong support for rulers and their policies. Public support often legitimizes the actions of rulers. Social unity is built on the basis of shared values and beliefs. The assumed goal of the research is focused on analyzing these categories in the context of their importance for building social unity. Such a goal has led to a question: What is the importance of these categories in building social cohesion for Russians? To solve the indicated problems, theoretical methods were used. Russians are convinced of the uniqueness of their society. This sense of uniqueness affects the sphere of security. It gives rise to their unwillingness to take part in formal alliances and international organizations, if Russia is not in a dominant position. Such views are deeply rooted in the consciousness of Russian society. Simultaneously, Russia airs grievances against the West, claiming that it does not notice its uniqueness.
In recent years, many Chinese game manufacturers have chosen to reflect the national culture of the real world when establishing their game worldviews. Many Chinese games contain elements of Russian culture. This is because Russia is a country with great influence and strong regional characteristics. Out of a strong curiosity about the intersection between Russian culture and the Chinese video game world, we explore many Russian Video Games, and how Russian cultural elements are reflected in Chinese games. This survey studies Chinese video games that contain Russian cultural elements. Through case studies and player reception analysis, it explores how Chinese video game manufacturers selectively use Russian cultural elements to enrich their game content and how these elements are integrated with their game worldviews.
The transformation of the Russian foreign and security policy based on a more courageous use of military potential is a fact. Over the past several years, Russia has moved from articulating its interests to their enforcement with the use of military force. This article focuses on analyzing this process and identifying its potential consequences for global security. The conclusions drawn by the author, based on the conducted research, allow to state that the armed forces are and will be an important instrument of the Russian foreign and security policy. This does not mean, however, that the Russian Federation will strive for an armed conflict posing a threat to international security.
Objectives
The elite of Russian power and Russian society have never come to terms with the collapse of the Soviet Union. They also did not accept the world order with the primary role of the United States. The purpose of this article is to characterize the policy of the Russian Federation, which is aimed at rebuilding the superpower position of this state, and to identify the reasons that clearly define Russia’s determination in this respect.
Methods
Achieving the formulated goal will be possible by answering the question: Why does Russia strive to rebuild the status of the global superpower and what actions it undertakes in its policy? This question is the main research problem, which the authors of the article have taken up.
In order to solve the indicated problem, theoretical methods will be used in the form of: source and literature criticiam, analysis, synthesis and inference.
Results
Nobody negates the fact that Russia is still one of the largest countries in the world. Nonetheless, it is much smaller and weaker than the USSR. By means of assertive, not to say aggressive, and anti-western politics it demands to be recognized as a superpower eligible to decide on the international order. However, in the contemporary world, the territory decides about the superpower status to a much smaller extent.
Conclusions
The foundations of the Russian superpower status are weak, and the popular anti-western narrative is not conducive to strengthening the Kremlin's position internationally.
This paper substantiates the need for measures of state regulation of the development of the agro-industrial complex of Russia in the current socio-economic and political conditions. The results of analyzing the level of development of agricultural production and budget financing of the agrarian sector of the economy under conditions of import substitution are given, the priority directions of the agricultural and food policy of the state are identified, and the main directions of its improvement at the federal and regional levels are proposed.
In Vladimir Putin’s Russia, opaque financial flows and an equally murky network of ex-KGB officers, with its roots in the 1990s, come together in a distinctive system of corruption. This system serves dual purposes: Those at the top follow the imperative of self-enrichment, but they also find in corruption a highly effective tool for consolidating domestic political control and projecting power abroad. At home, omnipresent corruption makes property claims and business ventures contingent on the whims of the authorities, while keeping officials themselves permanently under the threat of selective punishment. Abroad, corruption serves as a key lever of Russian influence in other post-Soviet states, as well as a tool for undermining established democracies. Yet it also creates vulnerabilities that can make Russia prone to reckless and extreme measures. Although Russia’s kleptocracy is a self-sustaining system, it faces a growing backlash in the forms of international sanctions and domestic discontent. © 2018 National Endowment for Democracy and Johns Hopkins University Press.
Vladimir Putin’s long period in power has so far raised scant discussion about the political concepts that underpin real state and societal unity, and especially about the domestic political implications of these concepts. Despite this, key concepts of his political regime, such as ‘sovereignty’ and ‘sovereign democracy’, have frequently been used in Russian political discourse. This essay examines the way the current Russian administration has used concepts that stress strong societal unity, and the creation of a stable state and societal unity to support the development of real functioning dynamics in the society. It charts the shift from ‘sovereign democracy’ to ‘sovereignty’ around 2011–2012 as a key discursive concept in moving towards a more isolationist international stand and consolidating Putin’s power by emphasising Russia’s unique political tradition, which requires a strong leader as the basis of national unity and to ensure Russian sovereignty.
This study seeks to address both the theoretical and empirical aspects of national holidays' selection. Noting a breadth of historical events that a state may choose to celebrate, this study asks how and why only some events are selected for national remembrance and commemoration. I answer this question by considering the role of national holidays in politics of history and memory and state- and nation-building. Using an example of the Russian government replacing an established public holiday — the Revolution Day, celebrated on 7 November — with a new holiday — the National Unity Day, celebrated on 4 November — I set out to demonstrate how the choice of historical events for national celebration hinges on their potentiality to be reconstructed and deployed for the present political agendas.
This article reveals Russian paradox: the combination of high level of corruption with strong and relatively effective government. In the focus of attention lies the examination of relations between the corruption and the processes of socio-political transformations of the end of the XX – beginning of the XXI centuries and the particularities of the corruption integration into the government of Russia. Basing upon the concept of the corruption as a political and administrative rent the author arrives to the conclusion about the formation of the corrupt model of governance in Russia. The article analyses factors which give relative efficiency to the Russian model of corrupt governance as well as the costs and contradictions of it. The author also reaches the conclusion that corruption-oriented model of governance is prospectless and makes a point that effective anti-corruption measures in Russia can be carried out only in case of current regime change and consequent realization of democratic, market and administrative reforms.
In Russia and elsewhere, proponents of rapid, mass privatization of stateowned enterprises (ourselves among them) hoped that the profit incentives unleashed by privatization would soon revive faltering, centrally planned economies. The revival didn?t happen. We offer here some partial explanations. First, rapid mass privatization is likely to lead to massive selfdealing by managers and controlling shareholders unless (implausibly in the initial transition from central planning to markets) a country has a good infrastructure for controlling self-dealing. Russia accelerated the selfdealing process by selling control of its largest enterprises cheaply to crooks, who transferred their skimming talents to the enterprises they acquired, and used their wealth to further corrupt the government and block reforms that might constrain their actions. Second, profit incentives to restructure privatized businesses and create new ones can be swamped by the burden on business imposed by a combination of (among other things) a punitive tax system, official corruption, organized crime, and an unfriendly bureaucracy. Third, while self-dealing will still occur (though perhaps to a lesser extent) if state enterprises aren?t privatized, since self-dealing accompanies privatization, it politically discredits privatization as a reform strategy and can undercut longer-term reforms. A principal lesson: developing the institutions to control self-dealing is central to successful privatization of large firms. http://deepblue.lib.umich.edu/bitstream/2027.42/41203/3/wp269a.pdf http://deepblue.lib.umich.edu/bitstream/2027.42/41203/1/wp269.pdf
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