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Constructivism
Author version of chapter published in Leuffen/Rittberger/Schimmelfennig, Integration and
Differentiation in the European Union. Palgrave 2022
In 1999, the Journal of European Public Policy published a special issue entitled “The Social
Construction of Europe”, which signalled the formation of a ‘constructivist school’ in the study
of EU integration (Christiansen, Joergensen, and Wiener 1999). As in the case of
intergovernmentalism and supranationalism, the theory was imported from IR where
constructivism had established itself a few years earlier as the counterpart to the rationalist
mainstream. Indeed, most of the early proponents of constructivism in EU studies had their
academic roots in IR. Since then constructivism has firmly established itself as an approach to
studying the EU but has not yet consolidated as a theory of European integration on the same
level as liberal intergovernmentalism or neofunctionalism.
Simply put, constructivism claims that social ideas, collective identities and discourses matter
for European integration. This is not to say that ideas had not featured in theorizing on the EU
before. But they were prominent mainly in early theoretical approaches. Federalism relied
heavily on ‘ideas of Europe’ and value-based commitments as a motivation and orientation
for European integration movements (Burgess 1989; Lipgens 1982). Karl Deutsch’s
‘transactionalism’ defined an emerging ‘sense of community’, i.e. a transformation of
identities, as the essence of integration (Deutsch 1957, 5). Neofunctionalism envisaged that
European integration would lead to the socialization of actors involved in the integrated
policy-making process and ultimately result in a shift of citizens’ loyalties and identities from
the nation-state to the supranational community (Haas 1968, 16). Even traditional
intergovernmentalism had a place for ideas such as the diversity of national traditions and the
dominance of national identities – albeit as a limiting factor in European integration
(Hoffmann 1966). By contrast, from the 1980s onwards, theories of European integration
were based on explicitly ‘rationalist’ foundations (see chapters 2 and 3). Liberal
intergovernmentalism accords ideas only a minor role in the formation of preferences for
integration and conceives them predominantly as a residual explanatory factor in situations
of uncertain or negligible material consequences. The supranational institutionalist successor
theories to neofunctionalism started from rationalist micro-foundations as well. The arrival of
constructivism in EU studies thus redirected the theoretical attention to the ideational
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underpinnings, driving forces, constraints, and outcomes of European integration. In recent
years, advances in scholarship on the ‘new institutionalism’, most notably the introduction of
discursive institutionalism (Schmidt 2008), and the different crises which have plagued the EU
– the Euro crisis, the migration crisis or Brexit – have spurred interest in how ideas and
communication about ideas affect EU integration and may even engender (dis-)integration
(Börzel and Risse 2018).
Table 4.1 presents the main building blocks of constructivist theorizing on European
integration. As in the previous chapters, we start at the most abstract level with general
assumptions and hypotheses of sociological institutionalism in IR. On this basis, we outline
building-blocks of a constructivist theory of European integration, on the basis of which we
will finally deduce hypotheses on differentiated integration.
Table 4.1 Building blocks of constructivism
General
assumptions
Sociological institutionalism in International Relations
Primacy of ideas
Logic of appropriateness and arguing
Explanatory
theories
Community theory of institutions
Argumentation theory
Socialization theory
Factors explaining
integration
Ideational consensus
Legitimacy
Exposure to ideas and arguments
General assumptions: ideas and appropriateness
Constructivist assumptions are fundamental to sociological institutionalism in International
Relations. The label ‘sociological institutionalism’ covers approaches to the study of
international institutions that deviate on two accounts from rationalist institutionalism as well
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as historical institutionalism – one relating to structure, the other to agency. First, sociological
institutionalism assumes the primacy of ideational rather than material structures. Second,
rather than behaving instrumentally or strategically, actors follow the ‘logic of
appropriateness’ (March and Olsen 1999, 160) or the ‘logic of arguing’ (Risse 2000).
According to constructivism, the most relevant structures in international relations are social
constructions or, simply put, ideas. These ideas are social insofar as they do not only shape
the thinking and actions of individuals but structure the cognitions of entire social groups.
Ideas can be instrumental or principled. Instrumental ideas (or knowledge) relate to shared
understandings of cause-effect-relationship and problem-solving, e.g. about the causes of
environmental degradation or the best ways to encourage international trade. Principled
ideas comprise values and norms. Political values describe the desired properties and
purposes of political order, e.g. freedom, equality, or economic growth. Norms are collective
standards of appropriate behaviour. They consist of ‘dos’ and ‘don’ts’ that describe the
socially desired behaviour of individuals and organizations and the appropriate means to
achieve the purposes of the political order.
Identities are another important type of ideas. An identity expresses who we are, who belongs
to us and what unifies us. Typically, an identity also conveys what distinguishes us from others,
the ‘in-group’ from the ‘out-group’. The identity of a group can be based on instrumental and
principled ideas. In this case, the group defines and distinguishes itself by its knowledge,
values, and norms. Such identities are in principle universal. Any individual can adopt an
identity and belong to a group by adopting the group’s instrumental and principled ideas. As
in the case of ethnic identity, however, identities may also be based on race, kin, homeland,
or native language. Such identities are also socially constructed but refer to properties that
are difficult or even impossible for individuals or groups to change or adopt voluntarily.
A culture consists of the entirety of a group’s ideas. To the extent that a group defines itself
by its culture, it is a community. The members of a community possess a positive collective
identity – they identify themselves as part of the group and with each other – and share values,
norms, knowledge, and other common ideas.
Ideas shape social preferences, interactions, and outcomes, and they do so in ways that
cannot be reduced to material structures and interests. The focus on ideas distinguishes
constructivism from both intergovernmentalism, which gives primacy to the material
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structure of interdependence, and supranationalism, which additionally brings institutional
and organizational structure into play. Constructivism does not deny the relevance of material
and organizational structures. But in the constructivist perspective, ideas shape how actors
interpret interdependence and which solutions they choose to deal with it. In addition, they
may enable or prescribe individuals actions and outcomes that run against actors’ cost-benefit
calculations or power constellations, and they may exclude or prohibit behaviour that would
seem instrumental on the basis of given existing material structures. Finally, constructivism
assumes organizations and their behaviour to be motivated and constrained by organizational
culture (knowledge, values, norms, and identities).
The ‘logic of appropriateness’ is the logic of action that corresponds to the primacy of
intersubjective structures. According to this logic, actors do not judge alternative courses of
action by the consequences for the actors’ utility but by their conformity to values, norms,
and identities, or to the actors’ social obligations. Even if the ideas are unclear or contested,
and thus do not prescribe a single appropriate behaviour, actors do not revert to instrumental
behaviour and to maximizing their self-interest. Rather, they follow the ‘logic of arguing’, i.e.
they enter into a discourse in which they exchange arguments in search for the valid idea and
the appropriate course of action (Risse 2000).
Whereas rational institutionalism assumes governmental preferences to be exogenously
given, sociological institutionalism treats them as endogenous in principle. That is, the
identities, ideas, and interests of states can be modified or changed in the process of
international negotiations and as a result of participating in international institutions. This
transformation of identities and interests can be a result of argumentation and socialization.
Explanatory theories: community institutions, argumentation, and socialization
Sociological institutionalism offers three substantive theories that specify how ideas affect
international negotiations and institutions. The ideational or community theory of institutions
specifies under which conditions international institutions are formed, how they work, and
what they do. It is equivalent to the functional and club theory of institutions in rationalist
institutionalism. Argumentation theory explains the outcome of international negotiations in
which ideas are contested. It is the constructivist counterpart of bargaining theory. Finally, the
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theory of international socialization tells us how international institutions shape and
transform the ideas of international actors. Its purpose is similar to the path dependence
mechanism in historical institutionalism. Sociological institutionalism thus seeks to explain
two cause-effect relationships: the ideational causes of international institutions and their
ideational effects.
Community theory of institutions. According to sociological institutionalism, international
organizations are ‘community representatives’ (Abbott and Snidal 1998, 24). The origins,
goals, and procedures of international institutions are shaped by the standards of legitimacy
and appropriateness of the international community they represent (and which constitutes
their cultural and institutional environment) – rather than by the utilitarian demand for
efficient problem-solving (see e.g. Barnett and Finnemore 1999, 703; Katzenstein 1997, 12;
Weber 1994, 4-5, 32). Different international communities with different collective identities,
values, norms, and instrumental ideas establish international institutions with different
purposes and organizational cultures and structures. Accordingly, an organization of
democratic states will have other goals and rules than an organization of autocratic states,
and an organization of Latin American countries differ from an organization of African
countries.
First, international institutions depend on the strength of international community. The
establishment of international institutions requires shared ideas, and their strength and
stability increases with a common culture. Second, the culture and structure of international
organizations depend on the ideas and identity of the underlying international community.
What international organizations do, how they do it, and how they make and implement
decisions is shaped by the instrumental and principled beliefs as well as the values and norms,
of the community. Third, participation in international institutions is patterned by shared
ideas. The membership and borders of international organizations follows the borders of
international communities. The design and membership of international institutions thus do
not follow considerations of efficiency but community-based standards of legitimacy.
Argumentation theory. Put simply, an argument is a claim justified by a principle (a basic idea).
Arguing is a negotiation mode based on the use of arguments – in contrast with the use of
threats and promises in the bargaining mode. The theory of argumentation explains, among
other things, under which conditions arguments are effective (Schimmelfennig 2003, 208-13).
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First, actors enter into arguing mode when claims are contested. If actors agree on the ideas
and the behaviour that follows from them, there is no point in arguing. Second, the better
argument prevails. The better argument is the one that provides a superior justification for
the claim. The superior justification is either based on the better (correct or more legitimate)
conclusion from a shared principle or – if the principle is contested – by the better (correct or
more legitimate) higher-order idea. The actors with the better arguments thus obtain
argumentative power and are able to define the consensus on the basis of their claims. They
influence or shape the goals of the institution, the rules according to which it works, the
collective decisions, and the distribution of gains and losses. If, however, the participants in a
debate do not agree either on the principle of justification or any higher-order idea that can
adjudicate between controversial claims, arguing does not lead to a consensual outcome.
In addition, the likelihood of argumentative persuasion depends on the institutional setting in
which arguing takes place. In general, these are settings that facilitate or even normatively
proscribe, but certainly do not punish, sincere argumentation and the openness of debates.
Institutional settings that blur role identities, privilege authority based on expertise and or
moral competence, and oblige chairs to be neutral have been credited with the propensity to
favour argumentative persuasion, whereas the effect of publicity is ambiguous (see e.g.Risse
and Kleine 2010). At any rate, and in contrast to explanations of rational institutionalism, the
substantive outcomes of international negotiations and the activities of international
organizations do not necessarily reflect constellations of material preferences and bargaining
power. Rather, they mirror constellations of ideas and the power of the better argument.
Socialization theory. International organizations are not only community representatives but
also community-building agencies. According to sociological institutionalism, they are able ‘to
impose definitions of member characteristics and purposes upon the governments of [their]
member states.’ (McNeely 1995, 33) (cf. Finnemore 1996). They ‘define international tasks
[and] new categories of actors [...], create new interests for actors [...], and transfer models
of political organizations around the world’ (Barnett and Finnemore 1999, 699). In that way,
they do not simply regulate state behaviour but constitute state identities and interests. How
and under which conditions they are able to induct actors to the community culture is the
subject of theories of international socialization.
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Constructivists have established a widely accepted catalogue of conditions under which
international socialization is likely to be effective (Checkel 2001, 562-3; Johnston 2001, 498-9;
Risse 2000, 19).
• Actors face novel situations characterized by high uncertainty. This makes them
susceptible to learning new ideas, whereas their old ideas appear inadequate.
• The organization possesses the authority to act on behalf of a community with which a
particular actor identifies (or to which an actor aspires to belong). Actors that do not
identify themselves positively with the community or do not accept the authority of the
international organization are less likely to accept the community’s constitutive ideas or
the organization’s prescriptions.
• Actors are exposed intensely and consistently to the community ideas. The more closely
and frequently actors participate in and interact with the community organization, and
the more consistent the messages are that they receive from it, the more effective
international socialization is likely to be.
• Socialization concerns norms and rules which enjoy high legitimacy in the community.
• Socialization takes place in an environment which encourages deliberation and is
characterized by the absence of external and political constraints. Put differently, arguing
is more conducive to socialization than bargaining.
• The domestic or societal resonance of the community ideas is high. If community ideas
appeal to or can be demonstrated to build on existing domestic ideas, they are accepted
more easily.
Socialization agencies and processes that fulfil these conditions are more likely to shape and
transform the ideas to which international actors adhere.
Constructivism and European integration
In the constructivist perspective, European integration is at its core a process of community-
building. Over time, community-building and (institutional) integration mutually influence and
potentially reinforce each other. Initially, strong communities with shared ideas and a positive
collective identity are conducive to growth in integration. In turn, integrated institutions that
provide for dense interactions and possess high legitimacy deepen the community through
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socialization processes. While constructivism highlights the social processes leading to
community-building and integration, postfunctionalism (see chapter 5) focuses on the rigidity
of national identities and Eurosceptic ideologies as counter-forces to EU-wide community-
building.
The constructivist research program in European integration studies has three distinct foci
that can be seen in a temporal sequence – roughly equivalent to the three-step explanation
of integration in liberal intergovernmentalism. The first focus is on the effects of ideas on
integration preferences. The main assumption here is that institutional integration depends
on the strength of transnational community: the stronger the collective, ‘European’ identity
and the larger the pool of common or compatible ideas, the more institutional integration we
will see. By contrast, weak European and strong national identities generate resistance to
institutional integration. Without shared normative and causal beliefs, common institutions
and integrated policies are hard to agree on.
The second focus asks how the intersubjective context of negotiations and decision-making
affect integration outcomes. Thirdly constructivists are interested in the effects of European
integration and institutions on community-building. These latter two perspectives start from
the assumption that institutional integration promotes community-building. Moreover, they
provide the theoretical foundations for neofunctionalist expectations of upgrading the
common interest, actor socialization, and shifting identities and loyalties (Lindberg and
Scheingold 1970: 117-120). Integrated policy-making generates intense and frequent contacts
and cooperation and takes place in a distinct environment structured by community norms.
This environment facilitates integration-friendly decisions and promotes social learning
processes that have the potential to transform identities, restructure discourses, and lead to
common meanings and beliefs. The three foci correspond roughly to the three explanatory
approaches. The community theory of institutions explains integration by ideational
preferences, the theory of argumentation explains the outcome of negotiations, and
socialization theory explains the effect of community institutions on actor beliefs and
preferences.
Ideas and integration preferences
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The constructivist account of integration starts with ideas. In a first step, ideas shape the
integration preferences of individual actors. In a second step, the constellations of ideas across
relevant actors determine the chances for integration to occur. The most general hypothesis
stipulates that the likelihood of integration increases with the agreement of pro-integration,
‘European’ ideas among the relevant actors. This hypothesis triggers further, more concrete
questions: Which ideas matter? What is the meaning of ‘Europe’ or ‘European’? How much
agreement is needed? Who are the relevant actors?
All types of ideas are potentially relevant for community formation.
• The integration of policy sectors requires that the actors share instrumental ideas
regarding the best or appropriate way to achieve policy goals – including the belief that
the policy is best pursued through regional integration. In a constructivist perspective, the
Common Agricultural Policy is based, among others, on the belief that a secure supply of
food in Europe requires protecting and subsidizing farmers by the Community. The
‘meaning of Europe’ at the instrumental or policy level consists in specific ideas on
‘European governance’, which are distinct both from national policy-making and global
governance beyond Europe.
• Principled ideas shape both the policy goals and the constitution of the EU. For
constructivists, European integration is based on and committed to promoting specific
values and norms. To learn about these principled ideas and see what ‘Europe’ means,
one can turn to the Treaties. Liberty, democracy, respect for human rights, fundamental
freedoms, and the rule of law, solidarity, national diversity, and economic and social
progress are listed in the Preamble to the Treaty on European Union. These and other
principles inform decisions on integration as well as EU policy. According to the concept
of ‘normative power Europe’ (Manners 2002), for instance, liberty, democracy, human
rights, fundamental freedoms, and the rule of law provide the ‘normative basis’ for the
EU’s role in the world and its foreign policy.
• Finally, identities matter greatly for constructivist integration theory. Identities can be
ethnic or civic. An ethnic conception of identity would conceive of European identity in
terms of a sense of belonging and allegiance to the imagined community of Europeans as
defined by a common culture or history. The second, civic conception of a European
identity is based on the values and norms of European integration. In this view,
‘Europeanness’ is defined by adherence to such principles as liberal democracy, national
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diversity, multilateralism, and supranational integration. We can also distinguish these
two conceptions of ‘Europe’ as ‘thick’ and ‘thin’ European identities. Whereas a thick
European identity resembles national identities in being based on group identification, a
thin European identity consists of abstract transnational values and norms.
How much agreement is needed? At least in the beginning of the integration process, the
ideas that shape integration preferences mostly stem from the national political and cultural
environment. National policy paradigms regarding economic and other policies, national
constitutional values and norms, and national identities and images of Europe inform
preferences on the desirability, form, and substance of European integration. Constructivists
assert that these ideas need not necessarily be harmonized but must at least be compatible
in order to allow for integration. For instance, empirical research shows that exclusive national
identities weaken support for the EU (Hooghe and Marks 2005; Kuhn 2019). Having a national
identity, however, is not necessarily detrimental to support for European integration if people
feel at least somewhat ‘European’, too. In the Brexit referendum, for example, feelings of
Scottishness were more pronounced on among Scottish ‘remainers’ than among Scottish
leave voters. In England, to the contrary, strong feelings of Englishness translated into a high
likelihood to vote leave (Kuhn 2019). Conceptions of national and European identity are thus
not always compatible, because of the different conceptions of Europe that are embedded in
national identity discourses. Still, for EU integration to ensue national identities need not to
be replaced by a harmonized European vision. It is sufficient if these visions are compatible
and include the European project as a part of national identity (Waever 2009).
Constructivism as such does not take any particular stance regarding the relevant actors in
European integration. Ideas can operate at the level of governments, parties, associations,
citizens, and supranational organizations. To some extent, whose ideas matter has to do with
opportunities and constraints in the decision-making process – just as liberal
intergovernmentalism relies on institutions and power constellations to determine whose
interests become the national interest. Most fundamentally, there is an elite-mass or class
divide on European integration. Educated and well-to-do people are more likely to see
themselves as Europeans (Fligstein 2008, 145), and mainstream parties are generally in broad
support of European integration. Conversely, exclusive national identities and the Euro-
scepticism that they engender are most likely to be found outside the political mainstream.
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Consequently, progress in integration depends on the extent to which mainstream elites
remain in control of the national preference formation process or their opponents are able to
mobilize identity-based dissent. Not only constructivists highlight that the support of
mainstream elites is essential for the advancement of the integration process,
supranationalism (chapter 3) and intergovernmentalism (chapter 2) also underline the
importance of political and economic elites as drivers of EU integration. Widespread
mainstream elite support for EU integration was largely unquestioned until the early 1990s.
Not least since the Maastricht Treaty, identity-based conflicts over EU integration have
become more prominent, effectively ‘politicizing’ EU integration (Hooghe and Marks 2009)
and awakening of the ‘sleeping giant’ (Van der Eijk and Franklin 1997). A permissive consensus
and elite agreement about EU integration has given way to an intensification of political
conflict over EU integration. The rise of Eurosceptic mass identities and populist challenger
parties is indicative for the politicization of EU integration. Postfunctionalist theory (see
chapter 5) explores systematically how this new cleavage, which pits conflicting ideas and
visions about Europe against each other, constrains mainstream elites in steering the
integration process.
Negotiations in a community environment
Constructivist integration theory emphasizes the diversity of national identities, images of
Europe, integration discourses, institutional traditions, and policy paradigms. At least in the
initial phases of integration, when European institutions are still young and weak, long-
standing and well-established national ideas and discourses are likely to dominate. This state
of affairs poses a problem for the constructivist explanation of progress in integration. After
all, it starts with the assumption that integration depends on transnational community. The
national constitution of ideational integration preferences will only be unproblematic under
two conditions: first, that national ideas and preferences are similar or at least compatible; or
second, that integration remains limited to ‘technical’ issues without notable identity or value
connotations, which are unlikely to be politicized. In addition, however, constructivism
proposes mechanisms of argumentation and appropriate behaviour in negotiations on
European integration that facilitate consensus in the face of diverse and value-laden
preferences.
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In the rationalist perspective, integration outcomes result from constellations of interests and
power. If national interests diverge, states with superior bargaining power are able to shape
integration according to their interests. By contrast, constructivists claim that actors with
conflicting preferences engage in a process of arguing in which the ‘better’ argument prevails.
The quality of an argument is mainly determined by its relative legitimacy in a given
community environment. A more legitimate argument is, for instance, based on a more
fundamental, time-honoured, consensual, or formalized community idea than another
argument. In the context of European integration, preferences and arguments based on treaty
rules, basic principles of the EU, uncontested identities, values and norms, or long-standing
practice will thus have higher legitimacy than preferences and arguments referring to
secondary law, technical rules, contested ideas, and recent practice.
The most far-reaching outcome of arguing is persuasion: actors with weaker arguments are
convinced by the better arguments and change their integration preferences. In the end,
consensus reigns. However, actors do not necessarily change their preferences. Rather, actors
whose preferences are not (or less) in line with the community identity, norms and values are
subjected to negative social influence like shaming and shunning, ostracism and opprobrium
(Johnston 2001). To avoid these sanctions and to restore their reputation as a community
member, these actors conform to the legitimate arguments and behaviour without changing
their convictions (Schimmelfennig 2001; Thomas 2009).
Studies of enlargement provide ample evidence for ideational effects on negotiations and
their outcomes. Already in the early 1960s when the big member states favoured giving
Franco’s Spain a membership perspective, the Parliamentary Assembly of the EEC invoked the
liberal-democratic (and anti-fascist) identity of the Community to mobilize successfully against
association (Thomas 2006). In the early 1990s, the same liberal democratic identity worked in
favour of Eastern enlargement. When a powerful majority of self-interested member states
were reticent to give the Central and Eastern European countries (CEECs) a firm membership
perspective, the CEECs’ governments and their supporters in the EC framed enlargement as
an identity issue, referred to the pan-European and liberal-democratic enlargement norms of
the EC and reminded the opponents of past promises made to the East (Schimmelfennig
2001). This ‘rhetorical entrapment’ compelled the reluctant member states to agree to
enlargement (without harmonizing their enlargement preferences). The same mechanism has
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been at work in EU-Turkey relations ahead of the start of accession negotiations in 2005
(Schimmelfennig 2009).
In the constructivist perspective, the constitutionalization of the EU has likewise been a result
of arguing dynamics (Rittberger and Schimmelfennig 2006; Schimmelfennig 2010). Integration
systematically undermines traditional channels of parliamentary representation and
accountability by pooling sovereignty and delegating it to supranational institutions for
reasons of efficiency. For the same efficiency reasons, governments are generally not
interested in empowering the European Parliament or other supranational institutions. In
addition, their ideas about what constitutes a legitimate constitution for Europe diverge
(Rittberger 2005). In this situation, actors with a preference for democratizing the EU
scandalized the democracy deficit, invoked the uncontested principle of parliamentarism, and
successfully put normative pressure on reticent member state governments in order to
strengthen the competences of the EP.
Even if arguing fails because standards of legitimacy are too weak or too controversial to
adjudicate between claims, negotiations do not necessarily resort to hard, strategic
bargaining. Rather, constructivist analyses point to informal norms of deliberation,
compromise, and consensus that govern intergovernmental negotiations and decision-making
in the EU (Joerges and Neyer 1997; Lewis 2003, 2003). Jeffrey Lewis (2010) argues that the
insulation from domestic politics in in-camera settings, a high intensity of interactions, a wide
scope of issues under negotiation, and a dense set of formal and informal norms facilitate
cooperative, accommodative behaviour – and he finds these conditions in the Council and its
committee system. Risse and Kleine (2010) compare negotiations on the same issue in an
Intergovernmental Conference and in the Convention that drafted the Constitutional Treaty.
They find that the less rigid roles, the transparent debate, and the expert-based leadership
during the Convention facilitated arguing and persuasion.
Finally, political agreement among domestic and EU-level elites may prove insufficient to
advance the course of EU integration, since publics need to be persuaded as well. Discursive
institutionalists have pointed out that for EU integration to be successful, policy coordination
among elites through deliberation and persuasion is necessary but insufficient for policy
agreement (Schmidt 2008). To obtain support, political elites have to engage in a mass process
of public persuasion – a ‘communicative discourse’ – about the necessity and appropriateness
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of a proposed policy or political program (Schmidt 2008, 2010). In her analysis of the Euro-
crisis from the purview of discursive institutionalism, Schmidt (2014) argues that failures in
crisis management were due to both, ideational clashes among EU leaders hampering
attempts at persuasion at the elite level, as well as the incommensurability between elite-
level discourses and communicative discourses between elites and publics. Given the strength
of the electoral connection with national publics, national leaders considered national
communicative discourse more important than the EU elite-level discourse. Placating and
convincing national publics seemed more important, even when it jeopardized the adoption
and success of crisis management measures (see also Degner and Leuffen 2020).
In sum, constructivists see a stark contrast between negotiations and decision-making in
domestic, mass-level politics, which are likely to mobilize exclusive national identities and limit
or slow down integration (as emphasized by postfunctionalism, see chapter 5), and in
international, elitist forums, where community standards of legitimate policy and appropriate
behaviour are likely to dominate and facilitate further integration. In both arenas, integration
is shaped fundamentally by ideas and communicative interactions.
Integration and socialization
In European integration, socialization processes are considered to take place at three different
levels: the socialization of states or governments inside and outside the EU; the socialization
of individual officials participating in integrated policy-making; and the socialization of
citizens. The general causal factors of socialization listed above can be grouped under two
main conditions: exposure and legitimacy. First, European socialization is more likely to be
successful if actors are frequently and intensively exposed to the outcomes of European
integration, EU institutions, and European ideas. Exposure is facilitated if the actors are willing
to engage in contacts with the EU and open to adopting new ideas. Second, European
socialization requires that actors find these ideas legitimate. This is more likely to be the case
if they identify with ‘Europe’, European ideas resonate with prior individual or national ideas,
and socialization takes place in a deliberative setting (see, e.g., Lewis 2005).
We speak of ‘state socialization’ when countries incorporate EU policy ideas, values, and
norms into their state institutions or policy rules. The socialization of governments means that
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governments as corporate actors come to share EU ideas and identities and include them in
their policy programs and behavioural repertoires. State and government socialization
operate at a collective, institutional level; they do not necessarily imply that individual
members of government or state officials change their individual beliefs and attitudes. States
or governments are more likely to be socialized and change their ideas in line with EU policy
and normative ideas under the following conditions:
• States are new (e.g. newly independent), unconsolidated, or in a process of restructuring,
which makes them more open to (and interested in) external ideas.
• State structures and institutions are conducive to supranational integration or multi-level
governance (e.g. in federal states or states with international-law friendly constitutions).
• States have policy rules that resonate with EU rules.
• Governments do not run on a nationalist or anti-integration platform or do not include
coalition partners that do so.
• States and governments are in frequent and intense contact with the EU.
Although it is often assumed that long-standing member states are more likely to be socialized
to EU policy ideas, values, and norms, these conditions make clear that this needs not be the
case. Whereas old member states have been exposed to integration for a longer time, novelty
and uncertainty work in favour of new member socialization. Finally, identification, legitimacy,
and resonance may vary independently of how long a state has been an EU member. Old
member states with strong national identities, centralized and unitary state structures, and
protectionist policy rules may be more resistant to European socialization than new member
states with integration-friendly institutional and policy legacies.
These conditions also hold for non-member states. Factors like novelty and uncertainty in the
international system, identification with the EU community of values and norms, perceived
legitimacy of the EU and its rules, resonance of EU norms and rules with domestic ones, and
exposure to the EU explain the propensity of non-member states to seek membership and to
adopt EU rules as well as the willingness of member states to support their accession.
Constructivism thus explains enlargement (and horizontal integration in general) as a result of
successful socialization.
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At the individual level of socialization, we can distinguish individuals, who are directly involved
in European institutions and policy-making processes, from ordinary citizens. The first group
consists of officials who either work for the EU or are sent to Brussels by their governments
but may also include lobbyists and journalists. Studies of officials hypothesize that
socialization depends on factors such as the length of stay, the intensity of contact, previous
experiences, age, and prior attitudes. Officials who are employed by the EU full-time, started
their work for or with the EU at a young age, and were favourably disposed toward ‘Europe’
are more likely to adopt and internalize pro-European ideas than those who are only seconded
by their governments late in their career and for a short-time – and those who come to
Brussels with strong national identities and beliefs in state sovereignty. Empirical studies
emphasize the key role of prior beliefs and attitudes acquired at the national level and
domestic recruitment and selection patterns and point to the limited relevance of exposure
(Beyers 2005; Hooghe 2005; Kassim et al. 2013). However, the fact that pro-European officials
are more likely to participate in EU politics facilitates European policy-making even in the
absence of strong exposure effects.
Regarding the European socialization of ordinary people, constructivist analyses stipulate
similar conditions. Direct experience of European integration such as paying with the Euro or
crossing Schengen borders should strengthen European identity (Kuhn 2015). But direct
experience with Europe can also be negative. European attitudes and identification were
negatively affected by the EU-imposed financial and economic crisis measures, which had hit
several EU member states with economic recessions and harsh austerity programs throughout
the 2010s. Polyakova and Fligstein (2015) show, for instance, that citizens in the countries hit
hardest by economic downturns, identified less with the EU and turned to their national
identities instead. More generally, however, young age, the knowledge of foreign European
languages, and travel experiences also have a positive influence on opportunities to interact
with other Europeans and to build pro-European attitudes (Fligstein 2008). For instance, the
Brexit vote exhibits a strong class, educational and generational divide among remain and
leave voters. While younger and higher educated voters voted in favour to stay in the EU, the
less educated and more precariously employed voters supported the leave side (Hobolt 2016).
Constructivist integration theory is open to the possibility that integration and socialization
create a self-reinforcing process. As integration increases, so will the exposure of
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governments, officials, and ordinary people. To the extent that exposure is perceived as
beneficial, these actors will adopt a pro-European identity and European policy ideas. This will
then translate into pro-integration preferences and enable further integration. The ‘virtuous
circle’ is not a foregone conclusion, however. Whether exposure results in positive
socialization depends on prior attitudes and the nature of the exposure. Nationalist
governments and individuals are likely to feel culturally threatened by increasing integration.
EU policies that do not resonate with domestic values and policy beliefs produce ideas-based
resistance toward integration, too. In addition, coercive, heavy-handed, or redistributive EU
policies could trigger opposition, as was evidenced by the EU’s multi-crisis. ‘Too much’
integration may therefore lead to ideationally motivated backlash, a point which we will
return to in the chapter on postfunctionalism (chapter 5).
General hypotheses
According to constructivism, integration is shaped by the nature and distribution of ideas –
and by their development and transformation over time. Integration fundamentally depends
on the extent of ideational consensus among the actors participating in the integration
process. The more compatible or common the relevant identities, norms, values, and policy
beliefs are, the more likely integration can be achieved. This effect is reinforced or supported
by the institutionalization of common norms, values, and policy ideas in the EU and by
argumentative settings at the supranational level. Successful integration contributes to the
further institutionalization of ideas in the EU and generates socialization processes, which
potentially increase the commonality or compatibility of ideas among the participating actors
– in particular if the integration outcome increases exposure and enjoys high legitimacy. Both
institutionalization and socialization increase the likelihood of future integration.
Supranationalism and constructivism thus share the view – rejected by intergovernmentalism
– that institutions have an independent and integration-friendly effect on the preferences and
behaviour of actors. According to supranationalism, however, supranational institutions
support integration mainly by altering the cost-benefit calculations of state actors, whereas
they change actors’ ideas in the constructivist account. On this basis, we can formulate three
general constructivist hypotheses about integration.
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Integration increases with the commonality of (pro-integration) ideas. The more that the
relevant actors in European integration share ideas of ‘Europe’, the more likely it is that they
can agree on further vertical and horizontal integration. The relevant actors are those that
have a say in the making of integration decisions. In order to work in favour of integration,
these ideas obviously have to support integration or at least should not be anti-integrationist:
if, for instance, all actors shared the idea of the primacy of national sovereignty, integration
would not obtain despite a strong value consensus. Moreover, the ideas need to fit the scope
of the envisaged integration step. Whereas a shared pro-European identity facilitates
integration in general, agreement on policy ideas may promote further integration in the
specific policy-area. Whereas further horizontal integration requires an expansion of
ideational community to other countries, vertical integration requires shared ideas about the
appropriate level of national sovereignty, the appropriate division of competences between
the national and the supranational level, and legitimate decision-making rules beyond the
nation-state.
The substantive terms of integration are shaped by consensual ideas. European policies mirror
policy ideas that are widely accepted as legitimate and that resonate well with national policy
ideas among the member states. The constitution of the EU reflects European constitutional
norms.
Integration is facilitated by the supranational institutionalization of ideas and decision-making
in argumentative supranational settings. There are two reasons for this. First, ideas (norms,
values, and policy beliefs) that have been institutionalized at the European level (in treaties,
in declarations, or in political practice) enjoy high legitimacy and help form a consensus
around contested integration proposals. Second, it is easier to build support for integration
among elites (who tend to be more integration-friendly than ordinary citizens) at the
supranational level, where decision-making is partly removed from the conflicts of domestic
politics, and in committees that privilege the reasoned search for consensus. At the other
extreme, domestic mobilization of national identity and decision-making involving
referendums are most likely to block further integration.
Constructivism and differentiated integration
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The constructivist explanation of differentiated integration is structurally similar to
intergovernmentalism but based on legitimacy rather than efficiency considerations. Whereas
intergovernmentalism stresses unequal interdependence as the main source of
differentiation, constructivism emphasizes imperfect ideational consensus. The
‘heterogeneity of preferences’ in intergovernmentalism corresponds to ‘ideational
heterogeneity’ in constructivism.
Conditions
The factors that influence differentiation in European integration in the constructivist
perspective follow from the general hypotheses outlined above. The extent of ideational
consensus is the fundamental factor. In addition, argumentation and socialization effects
matter.
Legitimacy of constitutional ideas. The extent of differentiation depends on legitimate
constitutional ideas. If there was an ideational consensus that the level of integration has to
be the same across all policy sectors, we would not see vertically differentiated integration,
and if it was legitimate that all member states should be subject to the same rules and that
non-member states ought not to participate in EU policies, we should not observe horizontal
differentiation. By contrast, if the dominant constitutional ideas about European integration
allowed for or even proscribed vertical or horizontal differentiation, we should observe it
more frequently. For instance, the actors may believe that trade policy ought to be more
integrated than defence policy, or that member states should be allowed to select
autonomously which integrated policies to participate in.
Ideational contestation. In general, ideational contestation produces integration failure or low
levels of integration. If it varies across policies, however, it is source of vertical differentiation.
Policies with a strong ideational consensus are likely to be more integrated – and integrated
earlier – than those in which policy ideas are contested. The difference in the extent and
timing of integration in trade and defence could therefore alternatively be attributed to the
early existence of shared policy ideas in trade and to contested policy ideas in defence. The
larger the difference in ideational consensus across sectors, the more vertically differentiated
integration will be. A similar reasoning applies to horizontal differentiation: societies and
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states with a strong consensus on the ideational foundations of integration and policies are
likely to be uniformly integrated, whereas ideational contestation between groups of states is
conducive to horizontal differentiation.
Integration norms. Differentiation is potentially inhibited by integration norms. The most
general one is enshrined in the general principle of ‘ever closer union’, which entails two
norms that are relevant in the context of differentiated integration: the unity norm and the
integration norm. The unity norm demands that the member states preserve the unity of the
EU and EU law. The integration norm obliges the member states to integrate further. Both
norms work together in discouraging differentiated integration if it destroys the unity of the
EU without promoting integration. They are compatible with vertical differentiation if issue-
areas are integrated more strongly and more quickly than others and if new integrated policies
start at a lower level of vertical integration than older ones. The premise is that the less
integrated areas will catch up in due course. By contrast, regressive vertical differentiation
resulting from a reduction in integration would run counter to these norms. Horizontal
differentiation is also permissible if it permits one group of countries to move ahead with
integration rather than being blocked at a low level of uniform integration – especially if it
allows and encourages the laggards to join later.
Institutionalization of ideas and argumentative setting. Negotiations in a community
environment further increase the chances that integration can be achieved and differentiation
can be circumvented – even if there is no ideational consensus to begin with. Agreement on
further and unified integration is most likely to obtain if the ideas on which a policy is based
are in line with fundamental values and norms and well-established instrumental beliefs of
the community, and if these values, norms, and beliefs have been institutionalized in EU rules
and practice. Under these conditions, they possess high legitimacy and exercise a consensus
and compliance pull on the actors. The norms of arguing and consensus operating in the
supranational negotiating forums of the EU reinforce this effect.
Socialization. Socialization may reduce differentiated integration if the conditions are right.
Assume that, initially, the integration of a policy is low or differentiated because of high
ideational contestation. Exposure to the new policy – and the European institutions executing
it – may then soften the initial opposition and help building a consensus that makes stronger
integration possible and persuades member states to give up their opt-outs. As time elapses,
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the new policy is likely to gain legitimacy. In addition, officials and citizens of the opt-out
countries may feel marginalized and seek to reconnect fully with the community. Thus, all else
being equal, both institutionalization and socialization can be expected to reduce
differentiation over time.
Conjectures
On the basis of these considerations, we can now formulate general conjectures about
(differentiated) integration. The main conditions are consensus and legitimacy. Consensus
refers to the commonality of integration-friendly ideas across countries and legitimacy to the
institutionalization of such ideas in the EU.
Table 4.2 Constructivist conjectures
Integration outcomes
Explanatory factors
Vertical and horizontal
integration increase
with
• legitimacy of ideas
• ideational consensus
• supranational institutionalization of ideas
Vertical differentiation
increases with
differences in
• legitimacy of ideas
• ideational consensus
• institutionalization of ideas
between policies
Horizontal
differentiation
increases with
• ideational contestation of the policy
• differences in legitimacy beliefs
across countries
These factors also affect the timing of integration. Policies are integrated earlier and faster if
they exhibit higher consensus and if integration is viewed as more legitimate. Turning to the
timing of integration of countries, constructivists expect that the likelihood of a state to
participate in the integration of a policy increases with the adoption of transnational identities
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and perspectives, the proximity of its policy ideas and values to the other participating states,
and the domestic legitimacy of EU integration. Conversely, countries with more exclusively
national identities, outlier ideas, and contested domestic legitimacy of European integration
are more likely to participate in European integration later or more selectively, and seek opt-
outs from further integration.
In the constructivist perspective, a decrease in horizontally differentiated integration requires
that collective identities, ideas and legitimacy beliefs converge transnationally. Constructivism
assumes that socialization can further these developments, especially if actors are highly
exposed to institutionalized ideas in supranational contexts conducive to argumentative
discourse.
Self-test and discussion questions
1. Constructivists emphasize the analytical primacy of social over material structures.
Identify and describe the most important social structures according to constructivism.
2. What is the difference between “arguing” and “bargaining”?
3. Why should a citizen’s age impact attitudes on European integration from a
constructivist point of view?
4. Consider any pair of EU states, e.g. Germany and France or Hungary and Poland. How
would you describe their EU-related identities? What are the consequences of these
identities for EU integration?
5. EMU is more vertically integrated than defence policy. How would constructivism
explain this vertical differentiation?
6. Sweden has an opt-out from the Euro, but it participates in the Schengen area. How
would constructivists explain this variation?
7. How would constructivism explain the lack of a joint EU response to the migration crisis
and, conversely, the joint integrative response to the Euro crisis?
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Further reading
The collection of essays in Thomas Christiansen, Knud Eric Joergensen and Antje Wiener (eds)
(1999) The Social Construction of Europe, Journal of European Public Policy 6(4) set the scene
for constructivism-inspired analyses of EU integration.
Checkel, Jeffery and Moravcsik, Andrew (2001) ‘A Constructivist Research Program in EU
Studies? European Union Politics, 2(2), 219-249 engages in a lively debate about the promises
and pitfalls of constructivism in explaining EU integration.
Lewis, Jeffery (2005) ‘The Janus Face of Brussels: Socialization and Everyday Decision Making
in the European Union’, International Organization 59(4): 937-971 demonstrates how the
socialization of high-ranking government officials into a Brussels-based collective culture
affects the process and outcome of EU-level negotiations.
Risse, Thomas (2015). A Community of Europeans?: Transnational Identities and Public
Spheres. Ithaca: Cornell University Press explores the long-term effects of EU integration on
citizens’ political identities.
