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J O U R N A L O F I N T E R N A T I O N A L A N A L Y T I C S 12 (4): 2021
28
Research articles
10.46272/2587-8476-2021-12-4-28-49
The Impact of Foreign
Salafi-Jihadists on Islamic
Developments in Chechnya and
Dagestan1
Domitilla Sagramoso, King’s College London, the UK
Akhmet Yarlykapov, MGIMO University, Moscow, Russia
Correspondence: domitilla.sagramoso@kcl.ac.uk
ABSTRACT
This article intends to revisit the role of foreign fi ghters in the Chechen war and its aftermath,
looking particularly at their impact on Islamic developments in Chechnya and Dagestan during
the 1990s–2010s. The article challenges the argument, which is predominant in the literature,
that foreign jihadists were primarily responsible for transforming the Chechen insurgency from
a secular movement into a religious one. Instead, it argues that Islamist tendencies and Salafi circles
were present in the North Caucasus before the outbreak of the First Chechen war. Secondly, this
article contends that local Salafi jamaats, in conjunction with foreign jihadist fi ghters, provided
the mobilization structures and the ideological framing for the radicalization of the Chechen/
North Caucasus rebel movement. By examining the Salafi -jihadist discourse of both foreign and
local Salafi s operating in Chechnya and Dagestan in the 1990s and 2000s, the article shows how
foreign Salafi s infl uenced and helped shape the ideological framing of local Salafi politicians and
rebel jihadist groups. Yet, this article also shows that many of these Salafi -jihadist projects failed
to gain broader societal support. They did not resonate with the local populations in Chechnya
and Dagestan in the 1990s–2000s. A fi nal section of this article looks at events in the past decade,
particularly at developments since the emergence of ISIS in Syria and Iraq. In this context, the article
explains why many young Muslims in Dagestan became themselves foreign fi ghters and travelled
to Syria/Iraq to fi ght for and live in the Islamic State. It concludes that Salafi projects, although not
indigenous to the region, prospered as a result of the interaction between local Salafi s and foreign
jihadist fi ghters and recruiters.
KEYWORDS
foreign fi ghters, Salafi -jihadism, Chechnya, Dagestan, ISIS, Islam, North Caucasus
1 In accordance with Russian law, the editors deliberately excluded from references all the sources recognized as extremist and
propagandizing terrorism, as well as the electronic addresses of the materials in the footnotes. ISIS is a terrorist organization
prohibited in Russian Federation. Extremist ideologies are considered in the article only from the research viewpoint. Propaganda
thereof is punishable by law in the Russian Federation.
В соответствии с российским законодательством, редакция журнала намеренно убрала из списка литературы источни-
ки, признанные экстремистскими и пропагандирующие терроризм, а также электронные адреса материалов в сносках.
ИГИЛ – террористическая организация, запрещенная в Российской Федерации. В статье экстремистские идеологии рас-
смотрены исключительно с исследовательской точки зрения. Их пропаганда карается по закону в Российской Федерации.
© Domitilla Sagramoso, Akhmet Yarlykapov, 2021
М Е Ж Д У Н А Р О Д Н А Я А Н А Л И Т И К А 12 (4): 2021 29
Исследовательские статьи
This article intends to revisit the role of the foreign jihadist fi ghters who arrived
in Chechnya in the mid-1990s/early 2000s as a result of the outbreak of the war by
examining their impact on Islamic developments in Chechnya and Dagestan during
the period 1990s–2010s. The role of foreign jihadi fi ghters and their eff ect on local
Islamic communities is a topic that has received a great deal of attention among
scholars. The academic work in this fi eld has generally focused on four broad areas
of research: fi rstly, the motivations driving foreign fi ghters to travel abroad and join
an external insurgency;1 secondly, the recruitment and mobilization processes that
facilitate or allow these transfers to happen;2 thirdly, the impact that the involvement
of foreign fi ghters has had on local insurgencies and confl icts;3 and fi nally, the danger
that these fi ghters may pose once they return at home.4 This last aspect has drawn
particular interest in the West and Russia due to the high number of nationals from
Western and Russian-speaking countries who have travelled to Syria and Iraq in 2013–
2016 to join the ISIS and other jihadists’ fi ghts.5 This article looks at the third aspect,
namely the impact of foreign fi ghters on the internal developments of the countries
or regions where they move to. More specifi cally, the article aims critically to analyse
the transformative eff ect of foreign jihadists on the dynamics of the Chechen war and
its aftermath, with particular reference to local Islamic practices in both Chechnya and
Dagestan.
Regarding the paper’s research questions, we ask what impact foreign jihadist
fi ghters and preachers have on the Islamist ideology of the Chechen (and later the North
Caucasus) rebel movement? How have these foreign fi ghters aff ected Islamic political
and societal developments in Chechnya and Dagestan? In other words, to what extent
have the Salafi -jihadist ideologies of foreign fi ghters resonated with Muslim populations
in Chechnya and Dagestan? By examining Islamist communities in the North Caucasus
in the 1990s, the article fi rstly challenges the argument, which is predominant
in the literature, that the foreign jihadists who arrived in Chechnya in the mid-1990s
were primarily responsible for the transformation of the Chechen insurgency from
a secular movement into a religious one. Instead, it argues that Islamist tendencies
and Salafi circles were present in the North Caucasus before the outbreak of the First
Chechen war. These local Salafi communities, or jamaats, became the core around
which Salafi -jihadist projects grew and expanded in the aftermath of the fi rst Chechen
war. Secondly, the article contends that these local Salafi jamaats, in conjunction
with foreign jihadist fi ghters, provided the mobilisation structures and the ideological
framing for the radicalisation of the Chechen – and later entire North Caucasus – rebel
movement.
Utilising an interpretive approach, the paper examines the Salafi -jihadist discourse
of both foreign and local Salafi s operating in Chechnya and Dagestan in the 1990s and
2000s. It shows how foreign Salafi s infl uenced and helped to shape the ideological
framing of local Salafi politicians and rebel jihadist groups. More specifi cally, the article
illustrates how local Chechen and Dagestani Salafi fi ghters, politicians and preachers
1 Moore, Tumelty 2008; Moore 2015; Byman 2019.
2 Hegghammer 2010/2011; Hegghammer 2013; Neumann, Rogers 2007; Carter et. al. 2014; Sagramoso, Yarlykapov 2020.
3 Bakke 2014; Byman 2019.
4 Byman 2019; Ratelle 2016; Youngman, Moore 2017.
5 See Sagramoso, Yarlykapov 2020.
J O U R N A L O F I N T E R N A T I O N A L A N A L Y T I C S 12 (4): 2021
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Research articles
embraced many of the critical tenets of foreign Salafi -jihadists – especially the notions
of jihad and the supremacy of Shari’a law – and adopted them to the local realities.
Furthermore, relying on an empirical approach, the article also shows how local
and foreign Salafi -jihadists interacted on the ground to advance their mutual Salafi -
jihadist project through the development of joint mobilisation structures. We explain
why many of these Salafi -jihadist projects failed to gain broader societal support as they
did not resonate with the local populations in Chechnya and Dagestan in the 1990s–
2000s. A fi nal section of this article looks at events in the past decade, particularly at
developments since the emergence of ISIS in Syria and Iraq. By examining the Salafi -
jihadist discourse of ISIS recruiters in Dagestan and of ISIS’ widely circulated online
magazine Istok, the article shows how the ISIS narrative – especially with regards
to the concept of jihad and the importance of living in an Islamic state – resonated with
sectors of the Dagestani population. Yet, it also argues that moderate forms of Salafi sm
remain predominant among Salafi communities in Dagestan and the North Caucasus
more generally, showing the limits of the relevance of the Salafi -jihadism embraced by
foreign jihadists.
Methodology
The article is based on a vast array of relevant primary and secondary sources. It relies
on the fi ndings obtained by the authors during their two-decade-long research and fi eld-
work in the eastern North Caucasus, which focused on the dynamics, the nature and
the drivers of Islamist-inspired violence in the region. The researchers have conducted
various trips to the North Caucasus (primarily to Dagestan, but also to Chechnya and
Ingushetiya) from 2004 to 2019, during which several informal, non-structured interviews
were carried out with a variety of individuals, all of whom were relevant to the topic
of research. Interviewees belonged to four broad categories – fi rstly, Muslim ‘‘community
leaders,’’ such as imams and youth workers, and human rights advocates and lawyers
concerned with political violence-related cases. The second category involved law
enforcement and intelligence offi cials in charge of dealing with youth radicalisation
and government offi cials responsible for addressing ethnic and confessional issues
in the North Caucasus. A third group was composed of North Caucasus academic
scholars, journalists, students and teachers, as well as local businessmen, all of whom
had good knowledge of Islamic developments in their republics. The last group involved
relatives of the individuals who travelled to Syria and Iraq in 2013–2015 and ‘‘former
radicals’’ who were close to the Caucasus Emirate and/or ISIS.
Altogether, the authors gathered information from a totality of over 90 individuals
in Dagestan, Chechnya, and Ingushetiya (in the latter case, interviews were conducted
among Chechen internally displaced persons). All this fi rst-hand material was
complemented by analysing additional oral and written primary sources, such
as videos, online platforms, offi cial declarations, and original newspaper articles.
Secondary sources, such as magazines, academic publications, reports produced by
government institutions and independent researchers were also consulted. This multi-
tiered approach allowed the authors to gain fi rst-hand knowledge and insight into
the drivers and dynamics of Islam in the eastern North Caucasus throughout the past
two decades from various sources and varied perspectives.
М Е Ж Д У Н А Р О Д Н А Я А Н А Л И Т И К А 12 (4): 2021 31
Исследовательские статьи
Defi nitions and Literature Review
In his historical analysis of foreign fi ghters, D. Malet provides a general defi nition
of the term, describing these actors as ‘‘non-citizens of confl ict states who join
insurgencies during civil confl icts.’’1 C. Moore and P. Tumelty, in their study on foreign
fi ghters in Chechnya, add quite a bit more detail, defi ning these volunteers as ‘‘non-
indigenous, non-territorialized combatants who, motivated by religion, kinship, and/or
ideology rather than pecuniary reward, enter a confl ict zone to participate in hostilities.’’2
In other words, foreign fi ghters participate in violent confl icts that are external to them
for reasons other than fi nancial rewards. T. Hegghammer, in his seminal analysis
of Arab volunteers joining the Afghan/Soviet war, defi nes these foreign fi ghters as
‘‘unpaid combatants with no apparent link to the confl ict [itself] other than religious
affi nity with the Muslim side,’’ thus emphasising the religious affi nity of Muslim fi ghters
to the Afghan insurgency movement.3 B. Rich’s and D. Conduit’s analysis, relying on
T. Hegghammer’s work, highlights fi ve relevant criteria that defi ne a foreign fi ghter and
are relevant to our analysis. Foreign fi ghters are individuals who join an insurgency
external to them; they lack ‘‘citizenship of the confl ict state or kinship links to its warring
factions’’ and have no ‘‘affi liation to an offi cial military organisation.’’4 Furthermore,
they are not paid for their actions – they are not mercenaries – although they may
receive subsistence support. Finally, in this specifi c case, they adhere to the Sunni
branch of Islam.5
These criteria and T. Hegghammer’s defi nition match quite well with the profi le
of the roughly 700 Middle Eastern jihadist insurgents. The latter travelled to the North
Caucasus to fi ght in support of the Chechen war eff ort. It will, therefore, be utilised
in this article.6 C. Moore argues that foreign fi ghters in Chechnya would be better
described as ‘‘transnational activists’’ given the varied nature of their roles, ranging
from trainers, weapons experts, military planners to propagandists, ideologues, and
fi nancial supporters besides fi ghters.7 This is a very helpful clarifi cation. However, this
paper will stick to the more common defi nition of foreign fi ghters, as most of those
Islamist insurgents who came to Chechnya, even those primarily dedicated to preaching
and recruitment contributed to the war eff ort in some way or other. In this respect,
the notion of foreign fi ghters will be understood quite broadly, involving not just those
dedicated primarily to fi ghting but also those in supporting roles and those developing
the ideological frameworks that underpinned the fi ght.
The impact of jihadist ‘‘foreign fi ghters’’ or ‘‘transnational activists’’ on the Chechen
wars has been the subject of signifi cant research over the past decades. Scholars have
tried to explain how foreign jihadists were coming primarily from the Middle East. The
Gulf and Turkey have transformed the North Caucasus insurgency from a secular
movement into a religious one. For example, B. Rich and D. Conduit have highlighted
the impact of jihadist foreign fi ghters on the radicalisation of the indigenous Chechen
1 Malet 2015, 456.
2 Moore, Tumelty 2008, 412.
3 Hegghammer 2010/2011, 56–57.
4 Rich, Conduit 2015, 114.
5 Ibid.
6 Bakke 2014, 166.
7 Moore 2015, 2.
J O U R N A L O F I N T E R N A T I O N A L A N A L Y T I C S 12 (4): 2021
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Research articles
resistance movement, emphasising the ‘‘foreign’’ nature of Salafi st Islamist currents.
In their own words, ‘‘Although militant Sufi Islamist framing has long been a feature
of anti-Russian confl ict in the Caucasus, the JFF [jihadist foreign fi ghters] entrance into
Chechnya introduced a foreign, Salafi st framing that was distinct to historical traditions
in the region.’’1 In other words, the arrival of the arrival of the JFF primarily from Arab
countries, is seen as signifi cantly altering the nature of the fi ght from a predominantly
secular ethnocultural struggle for independence from Russia to an Islamist jihadi-Salafi
project of global reach.
The foreign jihadist in Chechnya, in B. Rich’s and D. Conduit’s view, ‘‘helped
to normalise the JFF vision of Ichkeria as a front in a broader civilizational clash
between Islam and the West within segments of indigenous Chechen society, orienting
the project image of the cause away from its original secular, ethnocultural roots.’’2
A similar view was taken by L. Vidino, who asserted that foreign mujahedeen ‘‘played
an essential role in shaping the confl ict far beyond their numbers,’’ by ‘‘sacralizing’’
the Chechen separatist confl ict and turning it into primarily a ‘‘militant Islamist
uprising.’’3 According to him, during the First Chechen war, the Islamist dimension ‘‘was
almost non-existent.’’ With only a few exceptions, the main objective of Chechen rebel
fi ghters was, in his view, to build a secular state, which would nevertheless preserve
Chechnya’s social structures and Islamic identities.4 Wahhabism, according to Vidino,
was a foreign-imported ideology that took root in the North Caucasus during the inter-
war period.
This same argument has been brought forward by K. Bakke, who has emphasised
the secular nature of the Chechen resistance movement under D. Dudayev by
highlighting his resistance to introducing Sharia law and Sharia Courts in Chechnya.5
‘‘The Salafi version of Islam, locally known as Wahhabism, she notes, [was] brought
to Chechnya with the transnational insurgents in the mid-1990s.’’6 She further argues
that the entry of Islamist framing into the Chechen struggle against Russia rather than
reinforcing the movement ‘‘led to a clear split between a nationalist and Islamist branch
of the insurgent movement,’’ weakening it further.7 R.W. Schaefer similarly argues that
neither Salafi sm nor Wahhabism played any part in Chechnya’s decision to declare
independence from Russia in 1991. In his view, radical Islam is a consequence and not
a cause of the war.8 It is ‘‘the war itself that brought in a more radical form of Islam
in Chechnya,’’ primarily spearheaded by foreign fi ghters such as Ibn al-Khattab, who
arrived in the region in 1995.
This view is also shared by C. Moore and P. Tumelty, who, in their analysis of foreign
fi ghters in Chechnya, have argued that ‘‘conservative interpretations of Islam had little
credence among the nationalist-separatist Chechen leadership.’’9 Previous authors have
also highlighted the critical relevance of jihadist fi ghters in transforming the Chechen
1 Rich, Conduit 2015, 116.
2 Ibid.
3 Vidino 2006, 1.
4 Ibid., 2.
5 Bakke 2014, 168.
6 Ibid., 171.
7 Ibid., 177–178.
8 Schaefer 2011, 163.
9 Moore, Tumelty 2008, 418.
М Е Ж Д У Н А Р О Д Н А Я А Н А Л И Т И К А 12 (4): 2021 33
Исследовательские статьи
insurgency into an Islamist-inspired fi ght while also impacting political developments
in Chechnya during and after the end of the fi rst war.1 A similar argumentation has
been brought forward by J. Wilhelmsen, who, in turn, has highlighted the instrumental
role played by Islam during the First Chechen war. In her own words, ‘‘Dudayev
discovered that adopting Islamic slogans was a useful mobilising tool.’’2 According
to J. Wilhelmsen, the war itself produced the further radicalisation of the Chechen
resistance movement.
The Relevance of Local Islamist Trends
While there is little doubt that the infl ux of foreign jihadist fi ghters from the Middle
East and the Gulf contributed quite signifi cantly to the ideological radicalisation of
the Chechen rebel movement, it is important to highlight that Islamist – including
Salafi – projects were not entirely new or alien to Chechnya and Dagestan when the First
Chechen war broke out in 1994. In Dagestan, a group of young imams – A. Akhmad-
qadi Akhtaev and the brothers Bagauddin and Abbas Kebedov – had set up the fi rst
underground Salafi communities with the purpose of learning the tenets of Islam in its
purest forms already in the late 1970s.3 When the USSR collapsed and Islam once
again began to fl ourish in the North Caucasus, A. Akhmad-qadi Akhtaev led the more
moderate Salafi current in Dagestan while also heading the local branch of the Islamic
Revival Party (IRP). A. Akhtaev and his followers were eager to ensure the return
to the pure forms of Islam and rid local Islamic practices of bid’a or sinful innovations.4
They were particularly critical of Sufi practices, which had a strong tradition and were
widespread in Dagestan, such as the veneration of saints and sheikhs. They saw these
traditions as a deviation from monotheism or tawhid.5
However, A. Akhtaev and his supporters emphasised their adherence to peaceful
means of Islamic proselytism and recognised the authority of secular organs of power
in the republic.6 A. Akhtaev vocally called against the conduct of violent jihad in Dagestan
and strongly opposed the application of takfi r (non-believer) to non-practising Muslims
and non-Muslims in Dagestan. Instead, he advocated the gradual re-Islamisation
of Dagestani society as a precondition for the subsequent re-Islamisation of the state.7
A small group of Dagestani Salafi s, however, became attracted to more radical views.
Figures such as Bagauddin Kebedov considered the secular governments of the region
to be kafi r (godless) and therefore illegitimate, and thus called for the immediate
introduction of Shari’a law in Dagestan. B. Kebedov and his followers also favoured
the idea of spreading Salafi sm to the rest of the region and uniting the Caucasus under
Islamic rule. This was seen as an intermediate stage on the path towards the future
complete unity of all Muslims in the ummah.8 They took as their models of statehood
the regimes of Sudan and Afghanistan. B. Kebedov and his Salafi jamaat were also
1 Ibid., 418; Moore 2015, 11.
2 Wilhelmsen 2005, 36.
3 Moore, Tumelty 2008, 418.
4 Макаров 2000, 25.
5 Бобровников, Ярлыкапов 1999, 20.
6 Ibid., 21.
7 Мантаев 2002, 74.
8 Макаров 2000, 26.
J O U R N A L O F I N T E R N A T I O N A L A N A L Y T I C S 12 (4): 2021
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Research articles
very critical of the Sufi practices which fl ourished in Dagestan.1 They thus conducted
an active struggle against Sufi sheikhs in Dagestan, which was generally characterised
by a verbal propaganda war. However, at times the confrontation with Sufi murids also
took a violent form.2
In Chechnya, the fi rst underground Salafi communities emerged during the late
1980s – early 1990s. They involved small groups of individuals who met in secret
to discuss ways to replace traditional Chechen Sufi practices with purifi ed forms
of Islam that imitated the life of the faithful during the time of Prophet Mohammed.3
These early Salafi sts, such as Islam Khalimov, A. Akhmad Matayev and A. Adam
Deniyev, worked towards establishing an Islamic underground political organisation,
which would eventually join other similar Islamic groups in the Soviet Union. In
the early 1990s, as the Soviet Union collapsed, they set up a branch of the IRP based
on a quasi-Salafi te ideology. A. Matayev, in particular, was very critical of the many
Sufi traditions which were being practised in Chechnya, such as the veneration of Sufi
sheikhs and the visiting their places of worship.4 However, the infl uence of the IRP
and these Salafi preachers remained rather limited at the time, and their impact was
undoubtedly less signifi cant than that of fellow Salafi s in neighbouring Dagestan.5
Salafi s in Chechnya lacked well-trained, charismatic leaders. In 1992–1993, they had
to compete with the traditional Islamic structures, the Qadiriya and Naqshbandiyya Sufi
tariqats, becoming increasingly infl uential in D. Dudayev’s Chechnya.
The first Salafi scholars in Dagestan and Chechnya were ideologically and
educationally linked to the Sufi Naqshbandiyya and Qadiriya tariqats, who had
received their education. However, they increasingly adopted a more rigid Salafi
stance under the influence of famous Islamic Salafi scholars, such as Mawlana
Maududi and Hassan al-Tura bi, whose writings – translated into Russian – were
published in the region in the 1990s.6 When the Soviet Union collapsed, local
Salafis also became enriched with the teachings of foreign missionaries who came
to the North Caucasus from various Middle Eastern Muslim countries.7 Moreover,
regular contacts with Islamic scholars and education in Arab countries strongly
contributed to the improvement of their knowledge of Islam and, in some cases,
to their radicalization.8 In other words, local Salafi communities in the North
Caucasus were heavily influenced by foreign Salafi ideas, which penetrated
the region in the early 1990s through foreign preachers and Salafist literature.
Although marginal, these early Salafi jamaats nevertheless provided the ideological
framing and mobilizational structures for the radicalisation of the Chechen – and
eventually the entire North Caucasus – rebel movement after the outbreak of the First
Chechen war. Furthermore, while the Chechen independence movement of the early
to mid-1990s was primarily secular in nature, the Islamic religion remained strongly
1 Трусливый ваххабит Багаутдин Кебедов // Youtube. 1 февраля 2019.
2 Ibid.; Makarov, Mukhametshin 2003, 156.
3 Mairbek Vatchagaev, “Strategy and Perspectives on Dokka Umarov’s Rapprochement with the Radicals,” North Caucasus Weekly,
May 2007.
4 Акаев, В.Х. Религиозно-просветительская роль газеты «Зори Ислама» // Южнороссийское обозрение. 2001.
5 Conversations of the author with Chechen journalists, Moscow 2006.
6 Information obtained through interviews in Dagestan, 2005–2007.
7 Interview with Asiyatilov Surakat Khavalovich, former Chairman of the Dagestani Parliamentary Committee on Religious and
Inter-ethnic Aff airs, 1999.
8 Мантаев 2002.
М Е Ж Д У Н А Р О Д Н А Я А Н А Л И Т И К А 12 (4): 2021 35
Исследовательские статьи
intertwined with national, ethnic and cultural identities in Chechnya. This allowed Islam
to take pre-eminence in Chechen political and societal life once war broke out. This
occurred not only because, as J. Wilhelmsen correctly pointed out, “when in trouble,
people turn to God,”1 but also because the Islamic religion became a critical us-versus-
them group identifi er during the war. The violent confl ict soon created a distinction
between Russians and Chechens along religious lines, between ‘’believers’’ and ‘‘non-
believers’’, or kafi r. As rightly expressed by A. Malashenko, “In their confrontation with
Russia, [Chechens] asserted themselves not as an ethnos, but as a distinct ethnic-
confessional community.”2 The war itself was described as jihad or ‘‘holy war,’’ a notion
that resonated strongly among local Chechens. The concept of jihad had fi gured
prominently in the Chechen historical memory – primarily in the form of ghazawat
or ‘‘holy war’’ against the Tsarist forces during the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries.3
However, during the mid-1990s, the jihad against Russia was interpreted primarily
within the context of Chechen national liberation from Moscow’s rule. It was only later,
in the mid-2000s, that the Caucasus insurgency was constructed as global jihad carried
out against Russians, ‘‘Jews and Crusaders’’ for the sake of creating an Islamic state
in the Caucasus.
It must also be noted that even before the war broke out, Islam was already
permeating a signifi cant aspect of Chechen political and social life. Not only did
Chechen society experience a revival of Islam, but local politics also started witnessing
a process of Islamisation under the leadership of D. Dudayev as the latter relied
increasingly on religious structures – the Qadiriya Sufi brotherhood or tariqat,
the lower clergy and the revived Council of Elders (Mekhk-Kkhel) – to strengthen his rule
in the face of domestic opposition in 1993 and 1994.4 All of these institutions called,
to varying degrees, for the introduction of Islamic rule and Islamic law in Chechnya.
More signifi cantly, in late 1992 and early 1993, several offi cial constitutional projects
were devised, envisioning the adoption of Islam as Chechnya’s state religion and
the introduction of Islamic law. Some had clear Salafi undertones, such as the project
introduced in October 1992 by U. Imayev, Chairman of the Chechen Parliamentary
Committee on Constitutional Reform, which stipulated for the introduction of Shari’a
punishment for criminal off ences.5
There were also calls for the introduction of Islamic law from D. Dudayev’s critics
within the Spiritual Board of Muslims of Chechnya (SBMC), headed by M. Garkayev,
a member of the Naqshbandiyya tariqat. In May 1993, as disappointment with
D. Dudayev’s rule grew, the Council of Ulema of the SBMC issued a declaration calling for
the respect of Islamic law. The SBMC, however, was not promoting the establishment
of a Salafi st legal regime. Instead, it favoured a form of Islam based on the Shafi i school
of Islamic jurisprudence. Yet, the SBMC still made it clear that Islamic law (Shari’a)
had to be implemented. It called on D. Dudayev to change all unconstitutional rulings,
stating “the government must build its work taking strict account of Islamic principles,
regarding what is allowed (halal) and what is forbidden (haram), and only on this basis
1 Wilhelmsen 2005, 38.
2 Малашенко 1998, 168.
3 Malashenko 2002, 297.
4 Малашенко 1998, 168; Добаев et al. 2002, 86; Rotar 2002, 104.
5 Добаев et al. 2002, 86.
J O U R N A L O F I N T E R N A T I O N A L A N A L Y T I C S 12 (4): 2021
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Research articles
can it demand obedience.”1 This creeping Islamisation of Chechnya provided the basis
for radical Islamist projects to thrive and take ground politically once the war broke
out in 1994–1995.
Finally, it must be emphasised that the foreign fi ghters who went to Chechnya
with the outbreak of the fi rst war were not the fi rst Salafi s to arrive in the North
Caucasus. As noted above, they were preceded by a series of Salafi preachers and
charitable organisations which penetrated Chechnya and Dagestan in the early 1990s,
as relaxations on the practice of the Islamic religion were introduced and contacts
were established with the broader Islamic world. Many of these organisations, such
as the Islamic Benevolence Foundation, the Islamic Salvation Organisations and
the Al Haramein fund, had clear Wahhabi leanings and concentrated their support
on the most radical Islamist communities in the North Caucasus – thus contributing
to the spread of Salafi ideas in the region.2 As was noted by
S. Asiyatilov, former Chairman of the Dagestani Parliamen-
tary Committee on Religious and Inter-ethnic Aff airs, ‘‘When
the Soviet Union collapsed, [Wahhabis – authors] came run-
ning here […] they published many books from Ibn Abd al-
Wahhab, their main ideologue, as well as from [the Pakistani
Salafi ideologue – authors] Maududi and several other Wah-
habi authors […] Thousands are now reading these books. And
there are also many [Wahhabi – authors] audio and videotapes
[distributed in the region – authors].’’3
In other words, Salafi sm was not entirely new to the region when foreign fi ghters
and preachers arrived from the Middle East with the outbreak of the war.
These Middle Eastern preachers found a fertile terrain. Salafi sm’s spiritual
purism and its social egalitarianism proved particularly appealing to young Muslims
frustrated with the local socio-economic conditions prevalent in the region. Salafi sts’
condemnation of traditional forms of social organization and local customs struck
a chord with those individuals in search of a remedy for the socio-economic distress
faced by the societies they lived in.4 Yet, the Middle Eastern preachers who arrived
in Chechnya and Dagestan undoubtedly promoted a more austere and fundamentalist
form of Islam (or Wahhabism) which did not have strong roots in the North Caucasus
not resonate strongly with local Islamic traditions and customs. This strict form
of Salafi sm, which had its origins in Saudi Arabia, was seen by many North Caucasus
Muslims as alien to their Islamic faith. Salafi sm, therefore, failed to gain traction among
the vast majority of Chechens and Dagestanis, who generally practised Sufi forms
of Islam. Nevertheless, foreign fi ghters and preachers did help to generate a signifi cant
transformation of the local Chechen insurgency from a primarily ethnonational
or ethno-confessional project into an Islamic-Salafi st one. This, in turn, greatly impacted
local Islamic dynamics in the North Caucasus in the following decades.
1 Малашенко 1998, 168.
2 Макаров 2000, 48.
3 Interview by one of the authors. Dagestan, August 1999.
4 Макаров 2000, 48.
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The Chechen War and the Islamisation of Chechnya
With the outbreak of the First Chechen war in the winter of 1994–1995, Salafi
religious fi gures from the Arab world arrived in Chechnya to support the war eff ort
and spread the Islamic faith.1 They set up their Salafi communities and established
close ties with local Salafi leaders, contributing to the Salafi sation of the Chechen
resistance movement. Of particular relevance was the fi gure of Sheikh Ali Fathi al-
Shishani, a Jordanian of Chechen descent, who established the fi rst Salafi jamaats
in the republic and became very popular among the Chechen youth.2 He possessed
excellent theological knowledge of Islam and proved inspirational to many young
Chechens, to whom he spoke in their native Chechen language. He talked about
the need to live according to Shari’a law and emphasised the moral aspects
of Islamic life, especially as far as marriage, the role of women and dress codes were
concerned.3 However, he did not confront Sufi sheikhs and Sufi rituals as practised
in Chechnya. Instead, he called for the gradual introduction of Islamic principles
through education and proselytizing activities. However, he orchestrated the arrival
of other Afghan Arab fi ghters to Chechnya, including the Emir ibn al-Khattab and
several of his followers.4
Emir Khattab (or Samer ben Saleh ben Abdallah al-Sweleim) came from
northern Saudi Arabia, and like many of his fellow countrymen had followed
the calls of the Jordanian preacher A. Azzam to fight jihad during the Afghan/
Soviet war. Abdullah Azzam became the leading ideologue of jihad for the Afghan
Arabs – those Middle Eastern and North African foreign fighters who had gone
to Afghanistan during the 1980s.5 A. Azzam argued that it was Muslims’ individual
duty (fard ‘ayn) to fight defensive jihad when the enemy had attacked the Islamic
heartland. In his view, jihad was compulsory, ‘‘until the liberation of the last piece
of land which was in the hands of Muslims but has been occupied by Disbelievers.’’6
Jihad in A. Azzam’s view was a sacrament on the level of the five pillars of Islam.
Any Muslim not participating in jihad was, in his view, in a state of sin.7 Khattab
adhered to the same extreme interpretation of Islamic jihad. In an interview with
A. Azzam publications in September 1999, he stated that ‘‘all Muslims must fight
Jihad for the sake of Allah. Allah mentioned several times in the Qu’ran the need
to fight with your wealth and yourself in His [name],’’ and added ‘‘Islam has been
spread all over the world with Dawa and Jihad. Dawa and jihad [thus] go hand
in hand.’’8 He thus embraced the concept of offensive jihad to promote the spread
of Islam to the Dar al-Harb or domain of war. To fulfil these duties, Khattab set
up various training camps in the mountainous areas of Chechnya, where a very
fundamentalist form of Salafi Islam was taught, and military training was provided
to Islamist fighters from all over the North Caucasus. During the late 1990s,
1 Williams 2003; Moore, Tumelty 2008.
2 Personal interview with Chechen refugees. London, 2007.
3 See for example his sermon on the hijab: Шайх Фатхьи проповедь о хьижабе // Youtube. 2 декабря 2013.
4 al-Shishani 2006, 7.
5 Williams 2003.
6 A. Azzam, “Join the Caravan: Part 3: Clarifi cations About the Issue of Jihad Today,” Religioscope, December 9, 1988.
7 Ibid.
8 Ibn al-Khattab, “World Exclusive Interview with Ibn al-Khattab,” Azzam Publications.
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many Salafis and fighters from Dagestan, Ingushetiya, Kabardino-Balkariya, and
Karachaevo-Cherkessiya trained in these camps before setting up their local
Salafi jamaats.
Impact of Foreign Jihadists on Chechen and Dagestani Salafi s
Khattab’s ideas found strong support among infl uential Chechen Salafi s
in the insurgency movement, such as M. Udugov, and popular Chechen warlords,
such as Sh. Basayev. M. Udugov was an ardent Salafi st who considered Sudan
under H. Hassan al-Turabi and Afghanistan under the Taliban1 as the models to be
emulated when establishing an Islamic state in Chechnya. M. Udugov insisted
on the supremacy of the Islamic Shari’a as the only source of law and legitimacy,
rejecting all other secular forms of government: ‘‘All modern forms of government,
from elected democracies to totalitarian regimes are de facto tyrannies, whether
communist, democratic, monarchical, totalitarian, authoritarian or other.’’2 In August
1997, he founded the movement Islamskaya Natsiya intending to unite Chechnya and
Dagestan under a single Islamic state.3 To materialise such an idea, the ‘‘Congress
of Peoples of Ichkeriya and Dagestan’’ was set up in April 1998, under the leadership
of S. Basayev, aiming to join both nations under Islamic rule. The Congress was soon
transformed into a military-political organisation whose military wing – the Islamic
Peace-making Battalion – was intended to unify Chechnya and Dagestan under Islamic
rule.4 This battalion, headed by S. Basayev and Khattab, carried out the invasion of
the Botlikh region of Dagestan in the summer of 1999. As noted by S. Basayev himself:
‘‘What is going on in Dagestan is a mighty jihad, a holy war to expel the infi dels from
an Islamic land, which has been in the Islamic fold for thirteen centuries […] We
are fi ghting for the proclamation of an Islamic republic and the establishment of
a greater Chechen empire in Chechnya, Dagestan and Ingushetia.’’5 M. Udugov took
an even more radical stance, by arguing in favour of turning the future Chechen
Islamic state into a stronghold from where to spread global jihad worldwide.6 In his
view, Dagestanis and Chechens were not struggling against Russia but were actually
fi ghting against global Zionism and, therefore, the fi nal aim was ‘‘the liberation
of Jerusalem.’’7
Radical Dagestani Salafi s, such as B. Kebedov, who fl ed with his entourage
to Chechnya in 1997, also believed that the highest form of jihad entailed a campaign
to spread Islam worldwide, including through violent means. B. Kebedov and his
followers viewed jihad as a defensive armed struggle to overcome those obstacles that
Islam’s enemies had placed in the path of its peaceful proliferation.8 Jihad, according
to B. Kebedov, was ‘‘the source of Muslim strength and glory.’’ In his view, ‘‘As long as
Muslims followed the path of jihad, they would never be defeated.’’9 In 1999, B. Kebedov
1 Taliban is a terrorist organization prohibited in the Russian Federation.
2 Удугов, М., Леонтьев, М. Большевизм: Кремлевский или Исламский? // Caucasus Times. 21 апреля 2006.
3 Rotar 2002, 109.
4 Макаров 2000, 49.
5 al-Aman 1999.
6 Rotar 2002, 110.
7 Ibid., 110.
8 Ярлыкапов 2003, 589.
9 al-Dagestani 2006, 510–511.
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Исследовательские статьи
appealed to the ‘‘Islamic patriots of the Caucasus’’ to ‘‘partake in jihad’’ and help ‘‘liberate
Dagestan and the Caucasus from Russian colonial joke.’’1 B. Kebedov considered
the secular governments of the region to be godless and therefore illegitimate and
thus called for the immediate introduction of Shari’a law in Dagestan. B. Kebedov
told his followers that ‘‘Any law, which is not based on the Quran and the hadiths is
to be considered taghut (idolatry), […] any government which does not rule according
to Allah’s law is to be considered taghut, and must therefore be shunned. Instead, Allah
and his laws must be embraced.’’2
Salafi projects also enjoyed the support of a very active Dagestani Salafi s group
based in the central Dagestani district of Buinaksk. Under the spiritual and military
leadership of D. Radjbaddinov, in the spring of 1998, they took control of four
mountainous villages in the Kadar zone – Karamakhi, Chabanmakhi, Durangi and
Kadar – after a series of confrontations with the local militia. In August 1998, they
went as far as proclaiming these areas an ‘‘Independent Islamic territory,’’ and started
introducing Shari’a law with the tacit consent of the Russian Federal authorities. These
Dagestani regions established closed contacts with many Arab jihadist fi ghters who
had arrived in Chechnya during the fi rst war. Khattab, for example, spent quite some
time in this ‘‘Wahhabi enclave’’ in 1996, where he wedded a local Karamakhi woman.
More importantly, he helped to arm and train militarily many of the local Salafi s in this
area.3 Arab Salafi preacher Sheikh A.O. al-Sayf also spent time in the Kadar zone,
married a girl from Karamakhi, and apparently, also became instrumental in setting
up this military Salafi jamaat.4 Both Khattab and A.O. al-Sayf participated in the 1997
raid, together with Dagestani Salafi s from the Kadar Islamist enclave, in the attack on
a Russian military base in Buinaksk. In other words, foreign jihadists interacted closely
with local Salafi s, not only in Chechnya but also in Dagestan, to further the realisation
of their Salafi projects. In these two republics, they found local Salafi communities
or jamaats ready to embrace their more extreme Islamist views, and if necessary,
fi ght next to each other when considered necessary – as occurred in 1997 and again
in the summer of 1999.
Salafi sts also favoured the Chechen leadership that emerged after the Russian
1996 defeat, particularly with Z. Yandarbiyev, who was appointed acting President
after D. Dudayev’s death in 1996. The war transformed Z. Yandarbiyev into an ardent
Salafi st who supported the introduction of Shari’a rule in Chechnya. ‘‘Only Sharia [law –
authors] could help Chechens address the social, economic and political diffi culties
that they faced in 1996 and 1997,’’ he noted when interviewed in 2004.5 When he took
offi ce, he replaced the existing secular Constitution with an Islamic one, clearly stating
that the Quran and the Shari’a were the principal sources of legislation in Chechnya.6
He also introduced an Islamic criminal code based on the Sudanese 1983 model, which
1 Emil Souleimanov, “Chechnya, Wahhabism and the Invasion of Dagestan,” The Middle East Review of International Aff airs,
December 2005, accessed December 1, 2021, https://web.archive.org/web/20120420105113/http://meria.idc.ac.il/journal/2005/
issue4/jv9no4a4.html.
2 Мухаммад, Б. Признаки смерти // ImamTV.com. 22 августа 1997 г.
3 Igor Rotar, “Islamic Radicals in Dagestan,” Prism, March 20, 1998, accessed December 1, 2021, https://jamestown.org/program/
islamic-radicals-in-dagestan/; Murphy 2004, 45.
4 Murphy 2004, 44–45.
5 “Jihad in Chechnya, Part 1,” BBC, accessed December 1, 2021, http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=gdjKUN08tvE&feature=related.
6 Bobrovnikov 2000.
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followed the Maliki doctrine of Islam.1 Secular courts were disbanded, and a Shari’a
judicial system was slowly introduced. Islamic law and Arabic were made compulsory
at schools, although a severe shortage of teachers meant that only a few schools could
off er such teachings.2 All sale of alcohol was forbidden, and criminals began to be
tried according to Shari’a law, although there were few death sentences or corporal
punishments.3
In his eff ort to Islamise Chechnya, Z. Yandarbiyev relied on the support of both
foreign and local Salafi s. When he took offi ce, he invited Dagestani Salafi preacher
B. Kebedov to Chechnya to help him establish Sharia law in the new republic. He also
placed many Salafi s in key government positions, especially in the courts, security
units, and military.4 For example, the leading Chechen Salafi Islam Khalimov became
Minister of Shariah state security. At the same time, the Saudi-born Salafi preacher
Sheikh A.O. al-Sayf was appointed head of the religious Shari’a courts, under the title
of Chairman of the Committee of Judges and Fatwas. In his new position, al-Sayf
implemented Shari’a law according to the rigorous Saudi Arabian legal model and
relied in his rulings on the legal advice of renowned Saudi Salafi religious scholars,
such as Sheikh M.S. al-Uthaymeen.5
A.O. al-Sayf and his Saudi Salafi companion Abu Zaid al-Kuwaiti (also known as Abu
Omar al-Kuwaiti, or Ahmed Nasser al-Azmi) considered democracy a form of heresy.
Instead, they supported the Salafi -jihadist way, which was said to be perceived as
‘‘a thorn in the side of [our] enemies, hypocrites and apostates.’’6 They, therefore,
called for the immediate implementation of Shari’a law and the establishment of an
Islamic Constitution in Chechnya along the lines of the Saudi Arabian model.7 In their
attempts to spread their Salafi ideology in the Caucasus, these foreign Salafi preachers
obtained the support of several foreign Islamic charities, whose activities signifi cantly
expanded with the arrival of Khattab and his followers in Chechnya. Organisations
like Al-Haramein, the World Assembly of Muslim Youth, and the Islamic Benevolent
Foundation became especially active during the second half of the 1990s. They
intensifi ed their eff orts to spread the Islamic Salafi faith among Muslims in Chechnya.
They proved to be particularly eff ective in their proselytizing activities among young,
disenfranchised Chechens because of the funds they were able to off er.8
The Outbreak of the Second Chechen War and 9/11
With the Second Chechen war outbreak in the autumn of 1999, Salafi projects
in the eastern North Caucasus were dealt a severe blow. Russia bombed the ‘‘Wahhabi’’
enclaves in Dagestan, crushed the advances of S. Basayev and Khattab into Dagestan’s
Botlikh district, and used massive force to bring Chechnya back into Russia’s fore.
Moreover, in all republics of the North Caucasus, a ban on the practice of ‘‘Wahhabism’’
1 Bobrovnikov 2000.
2 Rotar 2002, 105.
3 Bobrovnikov 2000.
4 Murphy 2004, 41.
5 al-Shishani 2006, 9.
6 Murad B. al-Shishani, “Is the Salafi -Jihadist Way still an Obstacle to Russia in Chechnya,” The Central Asia-Caucasus Analyst, 18
May 2005.
7 al-Shishani 2006, 9.
8 Ibid., 9.
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Исследовательские статьи
was introduced, followed by a campaign of severe repressions against suspected
fi ghters and Salafi followers. As a result, most members of Salafi jamaats in the North
Caucasus were pushed underground, and many moderate Salafi s became increasingly
radicalised.1
Within this context, the contingent of foreign Middle Eastern jihadists in Chechnya
adopted a more radical stance. It tried increasingly to align itself with the goals and
tactics of global jihadist movements. Abu Walid al-Ghamidi, Emir Khattab’s successor
as military leader of the foreign jihadists in Chechnya, became increasingly concerned
with events in the broader Islamic world, particularly with the United States’ war
in Iraq.2 In June 2003, he sent a message through the Qoqaz website, in which he
encouraged Iraqis to participate in suicide operations.‘‘According to [his] experiences
in Caucasus,’’ he wrote, ‘‘such operations will aff ect American and British troops.’’3 In
turn, Abu Walid’s successor, Abu Hafs al-Urdani, fully aligned his rhetoric with that
of al-Qaeda4 and al-Zarqawi when he became leader of the Arab jihadist in Chechnya
in 2004 even vowed to attack the United States.5
Many of the Arab Salafi preachers who had arrived in Chechnya during the fi rst
war, such as al-Kuwaiti, also started calling for the spread of violent jihad as a means
of implementing their Islamist Salafi project. In al-Kuwaiti’s own words, ‘‘if monotheism
is not achieved through Jihad, it [simply] becomes a tradition and not a religion […]
the heart of the Salafi -Jihadi project is establishing an Islamic state using violent
means.’’6 Following in the footsteps of Abu Walid, al-Kuwaiti and al-Sayf also started
calling for jihad not just against Russia in the North Caucasus but against the West
as well, and in particular, against Americans in Iraq.7 Al-Sayf and al-Kuwaiti described
the US war in Iraq as a Western ‘‘Crusade’’ and saw Iraq as the ‘‘graveyard’’ of American
troops.8
These developments undoubtedly impacted the Caucasus Emirate insurgency, as
indicated by its embrace, in the late 2000s, of global jihadist discourse. ‘‘We are an
inseparable part of the Islamic Ummah,’’ the Caucasus Emirate leader D. Umarov noted
in 2007, ‘‘Today our brothers are fi ghting in Afghanistan, Iraq, Somalia and Palestine...
Those who attack Muslims are our common enemies; our enemy is not only Russia but
all those who conduct war against Islam and against Muslims.’’9 Furthermore, several of
the Caucasus Emirate jihadists’ websites, such as Kavkazcenter, VDagestan or Islamdin,
began making constant references to other jihads taking place in the Muslim world –
in Afghanistan, Iraq and Palestine – and regularly reported the views of famous Islamic
jihadist clerics, such as Sheikh Anwar Al-Awlaki and Abu Muhammad Asem al-Maqdisi.10
Moreover, renowned Middle Eastern Islamic preachers were consulted for advice and
1 Sagramoso 2007.
2 Moore, Tumelty 2008, 422.
3 Nokhcho, Howard 2005.
4 al-Qaeda is a terrorist organization prohibited in the Russian Federation.
5 Moore, Tumelty 2008, 422; Bill Roggio, “Chechen al Qaeda Emir Abu Hafs Killed,” Long War Journal, accessed December 1, 2021,
https://www.longwarjournal.org/archives/2006/11/chechen_alqaeda_emir.php.
6 al-Shishani 2006, 5.
7 Murad B. al-Shishani, “Is the Salafi -Jihadist Way still an Obstacle to Russia in Chechnya,” The Central Asia-Caucasus Analyst, 18
May 2005.
8 Ibid.
9 Умаров, Д. Официальный релиз заявления Амира Докку Умарова о провозглашении Кавказского Эмирата // Кавказ Центр.
21 ноября 2007.
10 Sagramoso 2012, 564.
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guidance on Islam and the Caucasian Emirate, further strengthening ties between
North Caucasus jihadists and global Salafi -jihadist networks. More signifi cantly, North
Caucasian jihadists also started adopting more explicit anti-Western and anti-Jewish
discourses, as shown in several of their speeches and publications.1 Furthermore,
jihadist fi ghters began once again in 2010 to conduct indiscriminate terrorist acts
against civilians, causing a high number of casualties and replicating a practice usually
conducted by jihadists closely associated with al-Qaeda – thus aligning themselves with
the tactics and not just with the narrative of global jihadist movements.
With the Second Chechen war outbreak, foreign jihadists also began exerting
intense pressure on the Chechen rebel leader A. Maskhadov, demanding him to ‘‘rule’’
according to strict Islamic principles. Under pressure from these foreign fi ghters and
local warlords such as S. Basayev, Maskhadov was forced to approve the introduction
of changes in the Chechen Constitution, which brought the latter closer to Islamic
norms.2 The new Constitution of the now ‘‘virtual’’ Chechen Republic of Ichkeriya stated
that ‘‘the source of all decisions [taken by the authorities in Chechnya] is the Quran
and the Sunnah.’’3 Supreme authority of the state was bestowed onto the Majlis al-
Shura, a Supreme Council composed of those Amirs and Ulema who had taken an
active part in the jihad.
While Chechen President A. Maskhadov embraced political Islam only reluctantly,
and under intense pressure from foreign jihadist fi ghters, his successors adopted
a much more radical stance. With Sheikh Abdul-Khalim Sadulayev as ‘‘President’’
of Chechnya after A. Maskhadov’s death in 2005, the rebel movement acquired an
increasingly religious dimension. A. Sadulayev, who had previously been the Chairman
of the Supreme Shari’a Court, brought the ‘‘virtual’’ Chechen Constitution further in line
with Islamic law. In a statement issued on 11 February 2006, he reiterated the principle
that the Chechen Republic of Ichkeriya was a sovereign, independent, Islamic legal
state (Islamskoe pravovoe gosudarstvo), created on the basis of the self-determination
of the Chechen people. He also reaffi rmed the principle that the Qur’an and the Sunnah
had to be the source of all decisions taken by the authorities.4 He turned the Majlis Shura
of the Republic of Chechnya into the Supreme organ of state power and specifi ed that
it be elected according to Islamic law. The institution of the president was abolished
and replaced with that of Emir of the Chechen-Republic of Ichkeriya’s Majlis Shura.5
A. Sadulayev, however, was not a radical Wahhabi. He belonged to the Shafi i juridical
school of Islam and did not espouse any strict Salafi doctrines. No reference was ever
made in his speeches to the concepts of tawhid or takfi r. In his view, the jihad taking
place in Chechnya was primarily ‘‘defensive.’’
The major transformation of the Chechen rebel movement into a North Caucasus
Salafi -jihadist force occurred under the leadership of D. Umarov, who in November 2007,
offi cially declared the creation of a ‘‘Caucasian Emirate,’’ in replacement of the existing
1 See the work by the Caucasian Emirate Qadi, Ali Abu Muhammad: Кадий ИК Абу Мухаммад: Оправдание по невежеству и
крайности, в которые попали две группы // KavkazCenter. 19 сентября 2011. In the text, there are several negative references
to Jews and Christians as kafi rs.
2 Амир Сейфуллах. Джихад против вероотступников // KavkazCenter. 10 марта 2007.
3 Масхадов, А. «Положение о ГКО – Маджлисуль-Шура разработано в полном соответствии с Конституцией ЧРИ и законом
“О военном положении”» // Чеченпресс. 22 октября 2002 г.
4 Шейх Абдул-Халим. Заявление Президента ЧРИ Шейха Абдул-Халима // KavkazCenter. 13 февраля 2006.
5 Ibid.
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Исследовательские статьи
secular structures of power which were still offi cially ruling the resistance movement.1
The declaration of the Emirate was intended to ensure the full embracement of Islamic
Shari’a law, along Salafi lines, by the entire North Caucasian rebel movement, which
expanded from Dagestan to Karachayevo-Cherkessiya. The Caucasian Emirate was
to be ruled by a Supreme Amir (D. Umarov), who was the only source of power in this
virtual ‘‘state.’’2 Umarov abolished all remnants of the secular institutions of the ‘‘virtual’’
Chechen Republic of Ichkeriya and replaced them with Islamic structures.
In the 1990s and early 2000s, D. Umarov had been a moderate, secular fi gure (a
follower of the Sufi Qadiriyya tariqat) who had placed greater emphasis on the liberation
of the Chechen people from Russian rule rather than on jihad in the North Caucasus.
Yet, his views started to change in 2006, as he came under the infl uence of foreign Arab
jihadists and North Caucasian Salafi s, such as the renowned preacher from Kabardino-
Balkariya, A. Astemirov. The latter had been an ardent supporter of peaceful Salafi Islam
during the 1990s. Still, in the mid-2000s, he became increasingly supportive of jihadist
Islam in response to the harsh repressions carried out by the local authorities against
suspected terrorists and members of his jamaat.3 He, together with Arab Salafi s, who
pressured D. Umarov into declaring the Caucasus Emirate, clearly showed the deep
interaction between local Salafi s and foreign jihadist fi ghters4 once again.
The rise of ISIS
In the early 2010s, the Russian government carried out a brutal counter-insurgency
campaign against jihadist fi ghters in the North Caucasus – especially in 2013–2014,
given the upcoming Sochi Winter Olympics. These operations saw the elimination
of many of the Caucasus Emirate leaders and the drastic repression of unoffi cial
Salafi st practices in both Chechnya and Dagestan. The infl uence of Middle Eastern
jihadists also decreased as many foreign jihadist leaders were assassinated by Russian
special forces (Khattab in 2002) or killed in military operations (Abu al-Walid al-
Ghamidi in 2004, Abu Zaid al-Kuwaiti and Abu Omar al-Sayf in 2005, Abu Hafs al-Urdani
in 2006). Foreign jihadists also lost many of their traditional funding sources, further
reducing their ability to infl uence local developments.5 In view of these developments,
Salafi s in the North Caucasus became increasingly attracted to the Islamist projects
that began to emerge in the Middle East, in particular within the context of the Syrian
civil war. The outbreak of war in Syria and the plight of Sunni Muslims at the hands
of B. Assad’s military machine touched a sensitive chord among Muslims in the Russian
North Caucasus, many of whom felt the need to travel to the region and fi ght jihad
in support of their co-religionaries. More importantly, the territorial successes of
the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS) in 2014–2015, together with the possibility
of living in a state ruled by Shari’a law, proved to be particularly appealing to pious
North Caucasus Muslims. In the Islamic State, young Muslims saw a Sunni-controlled
1 Умаров, Д. Официальный релиз заявления Амира Докку Умарова о провозглашении Кавказского Эмирата // Кавказ Центр.
21 ноября 2007.
2 Ibid.
3 Sagramoso, Yemelianova 2009, 125–130.
4 Sagramoso 2012, 591.
5 al-Shishani 2006, 13–14.
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territory organised around a rigorous interpretation of Islamic law. They, therefore,
found an opportunity to realise their dream of living in a society regulated by Shari’a
law and escape persecution at home.1
Personal recruiting networks and online propaganda outlets, such as ISIS’ widely-
distributed Russian-language Istok magazine, played a crucial role in mobilising young
Muslims in the North Caucasus by actively calling on them to join the Islamic state.
In the Islamic state, Muslims would fi nally be able to live according to their faith and
the Shari’a. As expressed in the Istok magazine, ‘‘The Islamic State is fi ghting to ensure
the supremacy of the word of Allah. And there is no supremacy of the word of Allah
until we establish Sharia [law].’’2 Within the Islamic States, Muslims would feel safe
and would no longer be persecuted. All other lands where Muslims lived, or even
lands ruled at the time by Muslim rulers, were not considered genuinely Muslim, as no
Muslim laws were enforced correctly.3 The existence of the Islamic State in Iraq and
Syria reinforced this paradigm even further and proved to be a potent recruitment
tool. In the Middle East, young Muslims from the North Caucasus saw a controlled
territory and a chance to realize their dreams of living in a society regulated by Shari’a
law.4 As noted by a Dagestani citizen who had met an ISIS recruiter: ‘‘He [the recruiter –
authors] praised the Islamic state. He stated that the Islamic State was an authentic
state for Muslims, a real Caliphate. If you are a true Muslim, he added, you must travel
to the Islamic State and help them build a strong Islamic state. You cannot live and
serve in a non-Muslim state.’’5
ISIS recruiters made clear that it was the individual duty (fard ’ayn) of every young
Muslim to join his brothers and sisters in Syria and the Levant to fi ght on the side of
the Islamic State.6 Appeals were made to join the fi ght or jihad against the Crusaders,
from ‘‘both the West [France, the United States and other European countries – authors]
and the East [i.e., Russia – authors],’’ who were conducting a ‘‘war of aggression against
Muslims,’’ in their attempts to destroy the Islamic State.7 Muslims were encouraged
to attack Russia and the West through terrorist acts, which would ensure that ‘‘the
Crusaders would taste suff ering that they had not expected.’’8 Those ISIS ‘‘martyrs’’
who had perished in their attempts to hit the West (during the Paris 2015 attacks, for
example) were to be revered as ‘‘heroes of monotheism and jihad,’’ who ‘‘had given
their souls to the noblest of causes.’’9 In an interview with an individual who had met
ISIS recruiters, one of this article’s authors was told: ‘‘This recruiter told us that it was
imperative to travel to Syria because that is where ‘real jihad’ is currently taking place.
Soon the Day of Judgement will come, and Muslims have to take the right side.’’10
These calls for jihad resonated strongly within elements of the Dagestani
society, primarily because the religiosity among Muslims in this republic had become
exceptionally high by then. A large-scale sociological survey conducted by the Ministry
1 Personal interview by one of the authors with relatives of ISIS travellers. Dagestan, 2017.
2 Благо в установлении Исламского государства // Исток. Выпуск 3.
3 Ibid.
4 Interview by authors with relatives of ISIS travellers. Dagestan, 2017.
5 Interview by authors with individuals who met an ISIS recruiter. Dagestan, 2015.
6 Дни расплаты // Исток. Выпуск 3, 3.
7 Ibid.
8 Ibid.
9 Ibid., 6.
10 Interview by authors with individuals who met with an ISIS recruiter. Dagestan, 2015.
М Е Ж Д У Н А Р О Д Н А Я А Н А Л И Т И К А 12 (4): 2021 45
Исследовательские статьи
of Youth Aff airs of the Republic of Dagestan in 2019 brought to light the increased
support for religious answers to public issues in Dagestan, especially among the young.1
To the question, ‘‘how should society address its problems?’’ 47,6% of those interviewed
among the Dagestani youth indicated a preference for religious norms and Shari’a
law, as opposed to ‘‘science and secular laws,’’ a response supported only by 30,1% of
the respondents.2 The same survey showed that 52% of young Dagestanis considered
that Muslims should not, in any way, engage in any activity that contradicted Shari’a
law in the conduct of their offi cial duties. In comparison, only 6,6% of those interviewed
noted that Dagestanis should fulfi l their duties regardless, even if they contradicted
Shari’a law. These surveys indicate that fi rstly, a signifi cant number of Muslims
in Dagestan wished to live in an Islamic state (even if they were not entirely familiar
with Shari’a law) and secondly, that their fi rst identity and attachment was towards
the Muslim ummah – rather than towards the Russian state or their ethnic nationality.
This perception by Dagestani Muslims of belonging to a broader Islamic community
was reinforced from 2000 to 2010 as a result of the strengthening of Islamist traditions
and the spread of Islamic education inside Dagestan.3
This explains why so many Muslims from Dagestan felt the need to travel
to the region and fi ght jihad in support of their co-religionaries. It has been estimated
that roughly 5,000 young Muslims from Dagestan moved to Syria and Iraq to fi ght jihad
against B. Assad’s forces and support ISIS or simply raise their families in an Islamic state
and live under Shari’a law.4 Within the Caucasus Emirate insurgency movement, in turn,
many senior rebel leaders began in 2014 and 2015 to pledge allegiance to the Islamic
State, setting up, in this way, a branch of ISIS in the North Caucasus – the Wilayah al-
Qawqaz.5 These defections and the drain of many North Caucasian fi ghters to fi ght
in Syria and Iraq created a signifi cant concern among Caucasus Emirate jihadists that
their movement would become fragmented and eventually be absorbed into ISIS.
D. Umarov and his successor in 2013, Emir A.A. Mukhammad al-Dagastani, therefore,
tried hard to convince local Muslim fi ghters that the North Caucasus jihad had to take
precedence over the jihad in Syria – even though both struggles were considered part
of the same global Islamist fi ght against the ‘‘infi dels.’’6
Conclusion
There is little doubt that the spread of Salafi trends and more extreme Salafi -
jihadist ideologies in the eastern North Caucasus republics of Chechnya and Dagestan
owes a great deal to the arrival of foreign fi ghters and preachers to the region
in the mid-1990s, many of whom came to Chechnya with the outbreak of the war
in 1994–1995. The First Chechen war became a signifi cant catalyst for the radicalisation
1 Final Analytical and Information Report of the Ministry of Youth Aff airs of the Republic of Dagestan on the implementation of
continuous sociological monitoring and analysis of the situation in the Republic of Dagestan in order to identify the causes of
extremist manifestations among young people in 2015,» Ministry of Youth Aff airs of the Republic of Dagestan, 2015. (Personal
archive of one of the authors).
2 Абдулагатов 2019, 75.
3 Sagramoso, Yarlykapov 2020, 49.
4 Yarlykapov 2018b; Yarlykapov 2018a, 178.
5 Mairbek Vatchagaev, “Strategy and Perspectives on Dokka Umarov’s Rapprochement with the Radicals,” North Caucasus Weekly,
May 2007.
6 Joanna Paraszczuk, “The Clear Banner: The Clash over ‘Real Jihad’ in Syria: ISIS vs. the Caucasus Emirate,” Jihadology, June 6,
2014.
J O U R N A L O F I N T E R N A T I O N A L A N A L Y T I C S 12 (4): 2021
46
Research articles
of local Salafi communities and a powerful ‘‘attraction pole’’ for young individuals from
the Middle East. They were eager to fi ght jihad to protect their fellow Muslims under
attack. Figures such as Khattab and Sheikh Fathi proved instrumental in transforming
the Chechen insurgency from a separatist movement into a religious jihad against
the Russian ‘‘infi del’’ state. Their proselytising activities and military-training eff orts
aff ected quite signifi cantly specifi c sectors of the Chechen insurgency movement,
leading to the latter’s further radicalization. However, it is essential to highlight
that Salafi communities and radical Salafi preachers already existed in the region
before the outbreak of the Chechen war. Individuals such as B. Kebedov in Dagestan
or I. Khamilov in Chechnya had already set up their Salafi communities or jamaats
in the late 1970s–early 1990s. Together with the foreign fi ghters who arrived
in the region during the 1990s, they played a signifi cant role in transforming local
Islamic communities into fi ghting jamaats once confl ict broke out in Chechnya. During
the Chechen inter-war period, they tried to implement their more radical projects, which
involved establishing an Islamic state in the North Caucasus that would encompass
Chechnya and Dagestan and neighbouring Ingushetia. For some, like M. Udugov, this
Islamic state had to become the seat of ‘‘global jihad.’’
Yet, despite the eff orts of both local and foreign Salafi s to transform the eastern
North Caucasus, and in particular Chechnya, into an Islamic state, Salafi projects failed
to fl ourish. Not only were Salafi communities in Dagestan persecuted and destroyed
during the Second Chechen war (and its members forced to go underground), but
Chechnya lost its semi-independent status. As a result, the Islamist-jihadist project of
the North Caucasus was denied a ‘‘safe-haven,’’ where it could develop, leading to its
collapse. Although the North Caucasus Islamist insurgency – the Caucasus Emirate –
managed to remain alive during most of the 2000s, it lost steam by the mid-2010s,
primarily as a result of the eff ective counter-terrorist operations carried out by Russian
federal forces and their local allies. Furthermore, most foreign jihadist fi ghters were also
eliminated during these campaigns. Devoid of fi nance and manpower, they increasingly
lost infl uence. More importantly, the Islamist projects failed to obtain the support of
the majority of the local populations in the North Caucasus. As highlighted above, not
many Muslims in Chechnya or Dagestan proved eager to embrace Salafi sm in the late
1990s and early 2000s. For most local Muslims, the more rigid forms of Islam promoted
by foreign jihadists and local Salafi s proved alien to their local traditions. Sufi forms
of Islam remained predominant in the region during the 1990s and the 2000s.
The evidence available seems to indicate that Salafi currents managed nevertheless
to survive and prosper among certain groups of young Muslims in the North
Caucasus during the 2010s. However, this mainly occurred underground, and despite
the pressure exerted on Salafi communities by the authorities. The signifi cant outfl ow
of foreign fi
ghters from the North Caucasus to ISIS in Syria and Iraq in 2013–2015 is
a clear testament of the continued relevance of such Salafi trends in the region. It
indicates that Salafi sm and the desire to live in an authentic Islamic state remains
alive in Chechnya and Dagestan. Yet, for many, the Salafi sm embraced is of a more
moderate form, along the lines of the Islam preached by the Egyptian Islamic scholar
al-Qardawi and his Saudi followers. As expected, these Salafi trends are no longer
promoted by foreign fi ghters and preachers, as the latter no longer have easy access
to the region. Instead, they are transmitted primarily through electronic sources.
М Е Ж Д У Н А Р О Д Н А Я А Н А Л И Т И К А 12 (4): 2021 47
Исследовательские статьи
Internet sites and social media platforms have become essential conveyors of radical
Salafi views and ideas to the North Caucasus region. Yet, the role of local Islamic fi gures
remains very relevant, as they remain essential carriers of these Salafi ideas among
Muslims in the region. The evidence shows that North Caucasians have continued
to embrace Salafi forms of Islam, inspired by preachers and fi ghters operating in other
parts of the Muslim world.
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Authors
Domitilla Sagramozo,
PhD, Senior Lecturer in Security and Development, King’s College London.
Strand Campus, Strand, London, WC2R 2LS.
e-mail: domitilla.sagramoso@kcl.ac.uk
Akhmet Yarlykapov,
PhD, Senior Research Fellow, Institute for International Studies, MGIMO University.
Vernadsky Ave. 76, Moscow, 119454.
e-mail: itbal@mail.ru
Additional information
Received: September 15, 2021. Revised: November 15, 2021. Accepted: December 6, 2021.
Disclosure statement
No potential confl ict of interest was reported by the authors.
For citation
Sagramoso, Domitilla, and Akhmet Yarlykapov. “The Impact of Foreign Salafi -Jihadists on Islamic
Developments in Chechnya and Dagestan.”
Journal of International Analytics 12, no. 4 (2021): 28–49.
https://doi.org/10.46272/2587-8476-2021-12-4-28-49
