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COVID-19 and the 'Great Reset': Responding
to Energy Transition and Sustainable Development
Challenges in Sub-Saharan Africa
by T. Acheampong and B. Menyeh
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Oil, Gas & Energy Law Intelligence
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ISSN
:
1875-418X
Issue
:
Vol. 19 - issue 5
Published
:
December 2021
This paper is part of the OGEL Special
Issue on ” COVID-19 and the Energy
Transition”. Editors:
Dr. T. Acheampong
Energy Economist &
Political Risk Analyst
View profile
Prof. T. Soliman Hunter
Macquarie Law School,
Macquarie University
View profile
1
COVID-19 and the ‘Great Reset’: Responding to Energy
Transition and Sustainable Development Challenges in
Sub-Saharan Africa
Theophilus Acheampong*, Bridget Okyerebea Menyeh**
Abstract
The coronavirus (COVID-19) pandemic has profoundly impacted economies, disrupted energy
markets, and catalysed the pace of the energy transition with more ambitious ‘green growth’
initiatives being announced by several countries and regions. In the Sub-Saharan African
(SSA) context, the pandemic has exacerbated the fragility of its economies, causing the region’s
first recession in many decades and its largest economic contraction on record. This article
critically analyses what the energy transition means for developing Sub-Saharan Africa’s
energy and extractives industry – mining and oil and gas industry – and the attainment of the
sustainable development goals (SDGs), specifically SDG 7 on affordable and clean energy,
and SDG 13 on climate action. We undertake a state-of-play analysis on the attainment of these
two SDGs in the sub-region, based on the following timescales: pre-pandemic (2000-2019),
during the pandemic (2020-2021), and likely post-pandemic trajectory. Our findings show that
fiscal constraints during the pandemic meant that several SSA countries could not implement
adaptation and climate resilience measures, which were already struggling for funding pre-
pandemic. Even more so, SSA also faces acute multidimensional energy poverty, made more
onerous by the pandemic and prior economic dislocations such as the 2014-2017 commodities
price slump. Nevertheless, in the context of the energy transition and attainment of the SDGs,
SSA governments are increasingly prioritising their transition responses premised on using
both conventional and renewable energy resources at their disposal. This approach also
balances national priorities such as increasing energy access, industrialisation, and economic
diversification. In an increasingly decarbonising world, SSA may have offer a higher
‘transition risk premium’ on oil and gas projects due increassing environmental, social, and
governance (ESG) pressures, else it would struggle to find investors. The opposite is likely to
be the case for mining, aside known country risk factors. Recognising that transitions can
create winners and losers and magnify the struggles of vulnerable groups, policymarkers and
industry stakeholders need to ensure that citizens are equipped with new skillsets to take up the
new opportunities that the transition presents. Pursuing this requires strong coordination of
energy and industrial policies at the Pan-African, regional and country levels.
1. Introduction
The coronavirus (COVID-19) pandemic and accompanying ‘Great Lockdown’ of 2020 has
been a time and crisis like no other. Several bodies, including the IMF, forecasted one of the
worst economic downturns since the Great Depression of the early 1930s.1 The pandemic has
* Centre for Energy, Petroleum & Mineral Law and Policy (CEPMLP), University of Dundee, UK., and Aberdeen
Centre for Research in Energy Economics and Finance (ACREEF), University of Aberdeen, UK. Corresponding
author. Email: tacheampong01@dundee.ac.uk
** Modern Energy Cooking Services Programme, School of Social Sciences and Humanities, Loughborough
University, UK.
1 Gopinath, G. (2020). The great lockdown: Worst economic downturn since the great depression. IMF blog, 14,
2020. Available: https://blogs.imf.org/2020/04/14/the-great-lockdown-worst-economic-downturn-since-the-
great-depression/ (Accessed: 15 November 2021)
2
and continues to impact livelihoods and economies dramatically.2 Globally, economic growth
declined by 3.4% in 2020, according to IMF3 and other estimates.4 This contraction was much
worse than witnessed during the 2008–09 financial crisis and one of the worst on record.5
Output in the advanced economies — comprising United States, Euro Area, Japan and United
Kingdom, among others — dropped by negative 4.6% real GDP in 2020 and negative -2.1%
real GDP in emerging market and developing economies such as China, India, Russia and
Brazil.6 Likewise, in Sub-Saharan Africa (SSA), several economies saw a sharp slowdown in
2020 due to the pandemic. For example, whereas the IMF’s World Economic Outlook in
October 20197 predicted most SSA economies growing by more than 3% real GDP, this had
changed to negative growth in most countries on the continent by the time it issued its April
20208 Outlook. The region witnessed a negative 3.3% growth in 2020, leading to its first
recession in 25 years and eroding almost five years of progress in fighting poverty.9 It was also
estimated that the pandemic could drive about 40 million people into extreme poverty in Africa
in 2020 alone.10
Many governments and multilateral institutions offered, and are still offering, considerable
fiscal and monetary stimulus to mitigate the impacts of the pandemic.11 The fiscal support
encompasses credit policies and support packages for individuals and businesses, reduction in
VAT, CIT, and control of non-priority expenditure.12 The monetary and macro-financial
policies included reductions in the policy rate and lowering the primary reserve requirement
and capital conservation buffers of commercial banks, among others.13 These interventions led
to a recovery starting from the second half of 2020 – albeit fragile - and which is expected to
gain more traction in 2021 and beyond as global COVID-19 vaccination efforts ramp up.
2 Ferraresi, M., Kotsogiannis, C., Rizzo, L., & Secomandi, R. (2020). The ‘Great Lockdown’ and its
determinants. Economics letters, 197, 109628.
3 IMF (2021a). Global economy on firmer ground, but with divergent recoveries amid high uncertainty. Available:
https://www.imf.org/en/Publications/WEO/Issues/2021/03/23/world-economic-outlook-april-2021 (Accessed:
15 November 2021).
4 World Bank (2021). GDP growth (annual %). Available:
https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GDP.MKTP.KD.ZG (Accessed: 15 November 2021)
5 Ibid (n 3); Gill, I. (2020) The world economy in 2020—the IMF gets it mostly right, Brookings. Available at:
https://www.brookings.edu/blog/future-development/2020/04/14/the-world-economy-in-2020-the-imf-gets-it-
mostly-right (Accessed: 15 November 2021)
6 IMF (2021b). Fault Lines Widen in the Global Recovery. Available:
https://www.imf.org/en/Publications/WEO/Issues/2021/07/27/world-economic-outlook-update-july-2021
Accessed: 15 November 2021)
7 IMF (2019). Sub-Saharan Africa Regional Economic Outlook: Navigating Uncertainty. Available:
https://www.imf.org/en/Publications/REO/SSA/Issues/2019/10/01/sreo1019
8 IMF (2020). World Economic Outlook, April 2020: The Great Lockdown. Available:
https://www.imf.org/en/Publications/WEO/Issues/2020/04/14/weo-april-2020
9 World Bank (2020). World Bank Confirms Economic Downturn in Sub-Saharan Africa, Outlines Key Polices
Needed for Recovery. Available: https://www.worldbank.org/en/news/press-release/2020/10/08/world-bank-
confirms-economic-downturn-in-sub-saharan-africa-outlines-key-polices-needed-for-recovery
10 Ibid (n 8).
11 Benmelech, E., & Tzur-Ilan, N. (2020). The determinants of fiscal and monetary policies during the COVID-
19 crisis (No. w27461). National Bureau of Economic Research.; Wei, X., & Han, L. (2021). The impact of
COVID-19 pandemic on transmission of monetary policy to financial markets. International Review of Financial
Analysis, 74, 101705. Fornaro, L., & Wolf, M. (2020). Covid-19 coronavirus and macroeconomic policy.; Padhan,
R., & Prabheesh, K. P. (2021). The economics of COVID-19 pandemic: A survey. Economic Analysis and
Policy, 70, 220-237.
12 Acheampong, T., Bokpin, A, G., Duho, K, C., & Cudjoe, F. (2021). ‘Taxation and Ghana’s Post-Covid
Economic Recovery’. IMANI Centre for Policy and Education Paper. Available:
https://doi.org/10.13140/RG.2.2.17789.69603
13 Ibid (n 12)
3
However, economic growth continues to be impacted by uncertainties, including the spread of
COVID-19 variants (largely delta variant) and the pace of global vaccine rollout. Additional
constraints in many countries, including in SSA, include weak fiscal buffers and sovereign debt
overhang, as well as rising inflationary pressures coupled with weak monetary policy response
from central banks.
Nevertheless, improving economic prospects means a sustained demand for energy, including
oil and related products, which also took a heavy tumbling during the pandemic. COVID-19
profoundly impacted and disrupted energy markets, including upstream oil and gas, power, and
downstream industries, and catalysed the energy transition. We illustrate with four examples:
Firstly, West Texas Intermediate (WTI), the benchmark for US oil, turned negative in April
2020 due to a sharp slump in demand. Secondly, the shocks from the pandemic also led to
reductions in fossil fuel consumption and emissions in 2020, with global energy demand
dropping by 5% to 7%14, energy-related CO2 emissions by 5.4%15 to 6.4%16, and energy
investment by an estimated 20% or almost US$400 billion.17 Thirdly, oil cartel OPEC, which
controls about 42% of global crude oil supply and 80% of crude oil reserves, in its 2020 and
2021 World Oil Outlook indicated that oil demand would plateau in the late 2030s.18 Fourthly,
various national governments, predominantly in the West, announced new net-zero targets and
committed to using significant portions of their pandemic fiscal stimulus on green growth
initiatives. For example, the United States announced a plan to achieve an up to 52% reduction
in GHGs by 2030 from 2005 levels under the ‘building back better’ theme19 . In contrast, the
European Union also announced20 a net-zero by 2050 pledge and new ‘Green Deal’ with EUR-
600 billion (one-third of EUR1.8 trillion investments) funding from the NextGenerationEU
Recovery Plan and the EU’s seven-year budget.
These developments potentially reflect a lasting impact of the COVID-19 pandemic on the
global economy and consumer habits. Long-lasting COVID-19 induced behavioural changes
will structurally impact future consumption trends, including lower future oil demand. That is,
14 Jiang, P., Van Fan, Y., & Klemeš, J. J. (2021). Impacts of COVID-19 on energy demand and consumption:
Challenges, lessons and emerging opportunities. Applied energy, 285, 116441.; Hoang, A. T., Nižetić, S., Olcer,
A. I., Ong, H. C., Chen, W. H., Chong, C. T., ... & Nguyen, X. P. (2021). Impacts of COVID-19 pandemic on the
global energy system and the shift progress to renewable energy: Opportunities, challenges, and policy
implications. Energy Policy, 154, 112322.; Broom, D. (2020). These 3 charts show what COVID-19 has done to
global energy demand. Available at: https://www.weforum.org/agenda/2020/08/covid19-change-energy-
electricity-use-lockdowns-falling-demand (Accessed: 15 November 2021).
15 Tollefson. J. (2021a). Carbon emissions rapidly rebounded following COVID pandemic dip, Nature.com.
Available at: https://doi.org/10.1038/d41586-021-03036-x (Accessed: 15 November 2021).
16 Tollefson. J. (2021b). COVID curbed carbon emissions in 2020 — but not by much, Nature.com. Available at:
https://doi.org/10.1038/d41586-021-00090-3 (Accessed: 15 November 2021).
17 IEA (2021). The Covid-19 crisis is causing the biggest fall in global energy investment in history. Available at:
https://www.iea.org/news/the-covid-19-crisis-is-causing-the-biggest-fall-in-global-energy-investment-in-history
(Accessed: 15 November 2021).
18 Lawler, A. (2021) OPEC forecasts oil demand rebound before post-2035 plateau, Reuters. Available at:
https://www.reuters.com/business/energy/opec-sees-oil-demand-rebounding-then-plateauing-after-2035-2021-
09-28 (Accessed: 15 November 2021).
19 FACT SHEET: President Biden Sets 2030 Greenhouse Gas Pollution Reduction Target Aimed at Creating
Good-Paying Union Jobs and Securing U.S. Leadership on Clean Energy Technologies | The White House (2021).
Available at: https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/statements-releases/2021/04/22/fact-sheet-president-
biden-sets-2030-greenhouse-gas-pollution-reduction-target-aimed-at-creating-good-paying-union-jobs-and-
securing-u-s-leadership-on-clean-energy-technologies
20 European Commission (2021). A European Green Deal. Available at:
https://ec.europa.eu/info/strategy/priorities-2019-2024/european-green-deal_en (Accessed: 15 November 2021).
4
the pandemic catalysing the energy transition, which in some respect was already well
underway before COVID-19, albeit at a slow pace.
However, in the SSA context, its energy and extractives sectors are also navigating through the
pandemic-induced changes in energy demand and the energy transition. While the sub-region
has so far avoided the worst health impacts of the COVID-19 pandemic — in terms of
infections and deaths—, its predominantly primary commodities export-oriented economies
and energy sector have been hit hard. Estimates show that only two of the 28 African upstream
project sanctions expected pre-pandemic were approved in 2020.21 Additionally, several
sanctioned project start-ups were also postponed.22 The Africa Energy Chamber in its 2021
outlook estimates that “CAPEX spending 2020 – 2021 outlook pre-COVID-19 was almost
US$90 billion for 2020 and 2021 but has been significantly reduced to about US$60 billion
due to project delays and cost cutting measures.”23 Large capital spending cuts and project
delays were announced for several projects including Greater Tortue Ahmeyim LNG project
offshore Mauritania and Senegal and the Rovuma LNG in Mozambique. In Ghana, we saw the
indefinite postponement of Aker Energy’s PECAN development in April 2020 and even before
that a relatively underwhelming first competitive licensing round in 2019.
Energy poverty is rife on the continent with an estimated 730 million or 56% of the region’s
population lacking clean fuels and cooking facilities (SDG 7).24 But there is an opportunity to
leverage the sub-region’s vast natural gas resources in addition to renewables to address this
access deficit. IEA estimates25 show that that US$5-trillion of investments per annum is
required between 2021 and 2030, including in decarbonisation and renewable initiatives, to
meet net-zero targets. This raises an interesting question: how can SSA position itself to attract
a portion of these investments? Even 10% of the US$50-trillion investment coming into SSA
will make much difference on the continent. To put it in comparative terms, this is three times
(2.96X) of the combined US$1.69-trillion GDP of SSA as of end-2020; it could spur a major
economic boom and sustainable long-term industrialisation.26
It is against this backdrop that we write this paper. Specifically, we assess the opportunities
and challenges that the energy transition presents in using the region’s vast resources, such as
natural gas, to fuel the industrial and sustainable development of national economies. We
narrow down our focus on SDG 7 — on affordable and clean energy—, and SDG 13, on climate
action. We undertake a state-of-play analysis on the attainment of these two SDGs in the sub-
region on the following timescales: pre-pandemic, during the pandemic and likely post-
pandemic trajectory. The following broad research questions are examined:
21 Berkove, D., Tesfay, N., Bostan, R., Bruce, R., Macri, S., & Fourie, T., (2021). Navigating the storm: African
energy review and outlook. Available at: https://ihsmarkit.com/research-analysis/navigating-the-storm-african-
energy-review-and-outlook.html (Accessed: 15 November 2021).
22 Ibid (n 21)
23 Africa Energy Chamber (2021). Africa Energy Outlook 2021. Available at: https://www.whyafrica.co.za/wp-
content/uploads/2020/11/AEC-Outlook-2021.pdf (Accessed: 17 November 2021), at p.9
24 IEA (2020). The Covid-19 crisis is reversing progress on energy access in Africa. Available:
https://www.iea.org/articles/the-covid-19-crisis-is-reversing-progress-on-energy-access-in-africa
25 IEA (2021). Net Zero by 2050. Available: https://www.iea.org/reports/net-zero-by-2050
26 Acheampong, T. (2021). Leveraging clean energy to drive industrialization in Sub-Saharan Africa: Imaginaries
and Realities. Available at: https://afripoli.org/leveraging-clean-energy-to-drive-industrialization-in-sub-saharan-
africa-imaginaries-and-realities (Accessed: 15 November 2021).
5
(1) What are the energy transition risks on the continent by economy type – for
example, oil exporters, other resource-intensive, fragile states and non-resource
intensive countries?
(2) What are the roadblocks to post-COVID reform of energy policies and systems in
the SSA region?
(3) What strategic responses can SSA governments adopt to address and mitigate
transition risks.
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. The next section discusses the literature on the
energy transition and sustainable development goals (SDGs). Section 3 analyses energy
transition risks in SSA and provides some strategic responses available to governments. We
conclude and provide recommendations in Section 4.
2. The Energy Transition and Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs)
2.1 What is the Energy Transition?
The energy transition, a pathway toward transforming the global energy sector from fossil-
based to zero-carbon, is well underway. The primary driver is the need to tackle the impacts of
climate change, coupled by external pressures, such as consumer preferences and advances in
technology and supported by policies. In essence, it was the science first and then people that
forced the technology and governments to move. For example, oil’s share of the global energy
mix is forecast to drop from the current 90% to about 50% if the 1.5°C global warming target
is to be attained by 205027 while demand for critical minerals such as copper and lithium are
forecast to soar (Figure 1).
Figure 1 Change in oil supply shares and critical minerals demand
Source: IEA (2020). Available: https://www.iea.org/reports/net-zero-by-2050, at p.24
Note: mb/d = million barrels per day; Mt = million tonnes
27 Welsby, D., Price, J., Pye, S., & Ekins, P. (2021). Unextractable fossil fuels in a 1.5 C world. Nature, 597(7875),
230-234.
6
In a bid to reach the 2050 net-zero CO2 targets, some of the key pillars for decarbonising the
global energy system include “energy efficiency, behavioural changes, electrification,
renewables, hydrogen and hydrogen-based fuels, bioenergy, carbon capture, utilisation and
storage (CCUS)”.28 Implementing these measures is estimated to collectively lead to a 51%
reduction in CO2 in 2050 from 2030 baseline.29 Likewise, the energy transition momentum has
picked up and will gain more momentum after the 2021 United Nations Climate Change
Conference (COP26) in Glasgow, United Kingdom where countries such as India announced
net-zeros pledges and new investments in clean technologies.30 Also, more than 40 countries,
including the United Kingdom, South Korea and Vietnam committed to phasing out unabated
coal by the 2050s31, and another 130 countries pledged32 to halt and reverse forest-loss and
land degradation by 2030.
Despite the foregoing developments, Africa’s GHG emissions are among the lowest in the
world on both a volume and per capita basis (Figure 2). For example, whereas the average
United States citizen emitted 15.241 metric tons of CO2 per capita in 2018 and 7.405 metric
ton of CO2 per capita in China, the average SSA citizen emitted less than one (0.8) metric ton
of CO2 per capita in 2018. Thus, while SSA has historically contributed the least to climate
change, it stands to face some of the biggest negative impacts.33 For example, the UNFCCC
estimates that “56% of the coastlines in Benin, Côte d’Ivoire, Senegal and Togo are eroding
and this is expected to worsen in the future” with rising sea levels.34 The imperative then is for
a just transition that addresses the complexity of the global economic systems but also
addresses inequality issues in especially developing countries such as SSA, many of whom are
still largely commodities dependent.
28 IEA (2021). Net Zero by 2050. Available: https://www.iea.org/reports/net-zero-by-2050, at p.64
29 Ibid (n 27)
30 Galway, N. et al. (2021). COP26 climate pledges: What scientists think so far, Nature.com. Available at:
https://doi.org/10.1038/d41586-021-03034-z Accessed: 16 November 2021).
31 Ibid (n 29)
32 UKCOP26 (2021). Glasgow Leaders’ Declaration on Forests and Land Use - UN Climate Change Conference
(COP26) at the SEC – Glasgow 2021. Available at: https://ukcop26.org/glasgow-leaders-declaration-on-forests-
and-land-use (Accessed: 16 November 2021).
33 Serdeczny, O., Adams, S., Baarsch, F., Coumou, D., Robinson, A., Hare, W., ... & Reinhardt, J. (2017). Climate
change impacts in Sub-Saharan Africa: from physical changes to their social repercussions. Regional
Environmental Change, 17(6), 1585-1600.; Connolly-Boutin, L., & Smit, B. (2016). Climate change, food
security, and livelihoods in sub-Saharan Africa. Regional Environmental Change, 16(2), 385-399; Ayanlade, A.,
& Radeny, M. (2020). COVID-19 and food security in Sub-Saharan Africa: implications of lockdown during
agricultural planting seasons. npj Science of Food, 4(1), 1-6.
34 UNFCCC (2020). Climate Change Is an Increasing Threat to Africa t. Available at:
https://unfccc.int/news/climate-change-is-an-increasing-threat-to-africa (Accessed: 16 November 2021).
7
Figure 2 CO2 emissions (metric tons per capita), 2018
Source: World Bank. Available:
https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/EN.ATM.CO2E.PC?view=map
2.2 SSA Socio-Economic Context: 50-plus Years of Extractives with Little to Show in
Development Outcomes
The energy transition has major implications for extractives economies such as those prevalent
in SSA. The review of the literature on extractives-led growth shows that many countries on
the continent are still largely primary commodities producers and exporters with little to show
by way of economic diversification (Figure 3). Besides, the evidence in several African
countries also shows that extractives remain enclave activities with little spill-overs35 into the
wider economy despite recent attempts to correct this imbalance through local content
participation36 requirements. Most countries receiving IMF COVID-19 emergency financing
and debt relief are in SSA; these economies have little resilience and very vulnerable to external
shocks.37
35 Hansen, M. W., Buur, L., Mette Kjær, A., & Therkildsen, O. (2016, May). The economics and politics of local
content in African extractives: lessons from Tanzania, Uganda and Mozambique. In Forum for Development
Studies (Vol. 43, No. 2, pp. 201-228). Routledge.; Hansen, M. W. (2014). From enclave to linkage economies? A
review of the literature on linkages between extractive multinational corporations and local industry in
Africa (No. 2014: 02). DIIS Working Paper.; Morris, M., Kaplinsky, R., & Kaplan, D. (2011). " One thing leads
to another commodities"-linkages and industrial development: a conceptual overview.
36 Asiago, B. C. (2017). Rules of engagement: A review of regulatory instruments designed to promote and secure
local content requirements in the Oil and Gas Sector. Resources, 6(3), 46.; Ovadia, J. S. (2016). Local content
policies and petro-development in Sub-Saharan Africa: A comparative analysis. Resources Policy, 49, 20-30.;
Acheampong, T., Ashong, M., & Svanikier, V. C. (2016). An assessment of local-content policies in oil and gas
producing countries. The Journal of World Energy Law & Business, 9(4), 282-302.
37 IMF (2021). Countries Receiving Assistance and Debt Service Relief. Available:
https://www.imf.org/en/Topics/imf-and-covid19/COVID-Lending-Tracker
8
Likewise, extractives have historically fuelled strife and corruption in several jurisdictions,
including in SSA.38 At the same time, local political elites engage in political patronage39 and
rent capture with less appetite for serious reforms (e.g., tax reform) due to easy petro-dollars.
Nevertheless, many government programmes for countries are dependent on extractives
revenues. For example, in the case of Ghana, oil revenues are critical to funding free primary
and secondary education, providing healthcare, building roads and constructing rural
agricultural facilities such as warehouses and silos.40
Figure 3 Total natural resources rent (as % of GDP), 2019
In this regard, the pace of the transition presents challenges as well as opportunities for several
countries and economies. The speed at which the global economies ‘walk’ the ongoing energy
38 Cotet, A. M., & Tsui, K. K. (2013). Oil and conflict: What does the cross country evidence really
show?. American Economic Journal: Macroeconomics, 5(1), 49-80.; Obi, C. (2010). Oil as the ‘curse’ of conflict
in Africa: peering through the smoke and mirrors. Review of African political economy, 37(126), 483-495.; Alao,
A. (2007). Natural resources and conflict in Africa: the tragedy of endowment (Vol. 29). University Rochester
Press.
39 Bhattacharyya, S., & Mamo, N. (2021). Natural Resources and Conflict in Africa: What Do the Data
Show?. Economic Development and Cultural Change, 69(3), 903-950.
40 Chinery, N. & Gyeyir, D. (2021). Energy transition and implication for Ghana’s oil and gas industry. NRGI
Energy Transition Dialogue for Civil Society and Media, 25 May 2021.; Ackah, I., Bobio, C., Graham, E., &
Oppong, C. K. (2020). Balancing debt with sustainability? Fiscal policy and the future of petroleum revenue
management in Ghana. Energy Research & Social Science, 67, 101516.; Ackah, I., Lartey, A., Acheampong, T.,
Kyem, E., & Ketemepi, G. (2020). Between altruism and self-aggrandisement: Transparency, accountability and
politics in Ghana's oil and gas sector. Energy Research & Social Science, 68, 101536.
9
transition ‘talk’ is very critical and has implications for all economies more so given the
potential asymmetric effects. That is, the pace of the energy transition will not be uniform
across the world, more so in SSA, and especially when contrasted with the attainment of the
SDGs.
Revenues of oil-producing countries in Africa are at risk from peak oil demand and the global
energy transition. For example, an accelerated transition to renewables could cost Africa as
much as US$1-trillion in lost oil export revenues over the next 20 years.41 This raises an
interesting philosophical question: how would African nations fund their development if they
are to give up on exploring their natural resources (especially oil and gas) due to climate
concerns? One potential implication of this is that countries with newfound hydrocarbon
resources are likely to have a 30-year window to maximise the outcomes from these resources,
while others with significant critical minerals could enjoy a new super-cycle. Latest analysis
shows that the combination of soaring demand for metals and slower supply changes could
push metals prices to reach unprecedented peaks for a long time, possibly even delaying the
energy transition itself.42
2.3 How is the Energy Transition Connected to the Attainment of the SDGs?
The energy transition should ultimately foster sustainable development. As such, transition and
decarbonisation strategies must at every point assess its contribution to the Sustainable
Development Goals (SDGs). All the SDGs are inextricably linked however looking the at big
picture, the energy transition should seek to uplift people from poverty, provide decent work
and secure good health/well-being of all global citizens (Goals 1, 3 and 8) through development
of industry that embeds innovation and systems that ensure responsible consumption and
production (Goals 9 and 12). Finally, recognising the potential of transitions to create losers
and winners as well as cost of inequalities to sustained development, the transition must be
pursued in a just and inclusive manner to reduce all inequalities including gender and those
with disabilities.
The strongest links, in our view, are to:
• Goal 1 (no poverty);
• Goal 3 (good health and well-being);
• Goal 5 (gender equality);
• Goal 7 (affordable and clean energy);
• Goal 8 (decent work and economic growth);
• Goal 9 (industry, innovation and infrastructure);
• Goal 10 (reduced inequalities);
• Goal 12 (Responsible consumption and production); and
• Goal 13 (climate action).
41 Adeyemi, B. (2021). Nigeria, other African oil-producing countries will lose $1tn oil revenue in 20 years –
PWC (2021). Available at: https://nairametrics.com/2021/01/07/nigeria-other-african-oil-producing-countries-
will-lose-1tn-oil-revenue-in-20-years-pwc (Accessed: 16 November 2021).; Asu, F. (2021). Nigeria, others’ll lose
$1tn oil revenue in 20 years – PwC. Available at: https://punchng.com/nigeria-othersll-lose-1tn-oil-revenue-in-
20-years-pwc (Accessed: 16 November 2021).
42 Boer, L., Pescatori, A., & Stuermer, M. (2021). Energy Transition Metals. IMF Working Paper No. 2021/243.
Available: https://www.imf.org/en/Publications/WP/Issues/2021/10/12/Energy-Transition-Metals-465899;
10
For the purposes of this paper and the rest of the discussion, we would like to narrow down to
SDG 7 on affordable and clean energy, and SDG 13 on climate action. We undertake a state of
play analysis on the attainment of these two SDGs in the sub-region on the following
timescales: pre-pandemic, during the pandemic and likely post-pandemic trajectory. Table 1
shows the SDGs 7 and 13 targets, indicators, and accompanying discussion.43
43 See also Nalule, V. & Acheampong, T. (2021). Energy Transition Indicators in African Countries: Managing
the Possible Decline of Fossil Fuels and Tackling Energy Access Challenges. The Journal of Sustainable
Development, Law and Policy, 12:1, 1-48.
11
Table 1 SDG 7 and 13 indicators tracking and outlook
SDG 7: Ensure access to affordable, reliable, sustainable and modern energy for all
Target
Indicator
Pre-COVID (2000-2019)
COVID-19 (2020-2021)
Post-COVID Outlook
Target 7.1:
Universal
access to
modern
energy
• Indicator 7.1.1 -
proportion of
population with
access to electricity
• Indicator 7.1.2 -
proportion of
population with
primary reliance on
clean fuels and
technology
• In 2000, 26% of SSA’s 665
million population access to
electricity (i.e.,74% did not
have access). In 2019, 47%
of SSA’s 1.107 billion
population had access to
electricity (i.e., 53% did not
have access). This represents
a compounded annual
growth rate (CAGR) of
2.9% in improving
electricity access in the sub-
region. Also, electricity
access is mostly
concentrated in the urban
centres (78% in 2019).
• In 2000, 9.3% of SSA’s
population had access to
clean fuels and technologies
for cooking. In 2019, this
had merely risen to 14.3%.
About 730 million of the
continents population still
lack access to clean fuels
and facilities for cooking
• IEA estimates44 indicate that
almost 6% of SSA’s population
of that hitherto, already had
electricity access were likely to
lose the ability to afford basic
electricity services during 2020.
• The most affected populations
were Nigeria, the Democratic
Republic of the Congo and
Niger.45
• To safeguard livelihoods, many
SSA governments during the
pandemic, also provided short-
term waivers or suspension of
utility bills although many of the
stimulus packages did not
explicitly outline support for
energy sector companies.46
• Other research shows, for
example, that 25% of informal
urban households switched
cooking fuel from LPG to wood
• Bridging the energy access
gap remains a key priority
for many African
countries.
• As highlighted in the 2022
Africa Energy Outlook,
published by the Africa
Energy Chamber, “to make
energy poverty history by
2030”, Africa’s electricity
generation capacity needs
to expand rapidly by over
6% a year to support strong
economic growth, foster
industrialisation, and
safeguard livelihoods.”48
44 IEA (2020). Electricity Market Report - December 2020- Report extract 2020 Regional focus: Africa. Available: https://www.iea.org/reports/electricity-market-report-
december-2020/2020-regional-focus-africa
45 Ibid (n 44)
46 Akrofi, M. M., & Antwi, S. H. (2020). COVID-19 energy sector responses in Africa: A review of preliminary government interventions. Energy Research & Social
Science, 68, 101681.
48 Africa Energy Chamber (2021). The State of African Energy 2022 Report, at p.66
12
or kerosene during COVID-19
lockdown.47
Target 7.2:
Increase
global
percentage of
renewable
energy
Indicator 7.2.1 -
renewable energy share
in the total final energy
consumption49
• In 1990, renewable energy
consumption constituted
71.13% of total final energy
consumption, comprising
mostly hydropower. This
slightly reduced to 70.13%
in 2015.
• Data for 2020-21 not available
• Various SSA countries
have plans to increase the
RE share (excluding
hydro) in final energy
consumption mix. This
includes countries such as
South Africa, Morocco,
Kenya, Ghana, among
others.
50
Target 7.3:
Double the
improvement
in energy
efficiency
Indicator 7.3.1 - energy
intensity measured in
terms of primary
energy and GDP
• Energy intensity of primary
energy in 1990 was 2.76
kilowatt-hrs (kWh) per
$2011 PPP GDP. This
dropped to 1.96 kWh/$2011
PPP GDP in 2015, an
absolute change of -0.81
kWh/$.
• SSA remains the least
efficient region with 5.6
MJ/USD GDP. Latin
America & the Caribbean is
the most efficient region
with 3.4 MJ/USD GDP
• Data for 2020-21 not available
• Data not available
Target 7.A
Promote
access,
technology
and
7.A.1 - international
financial flows to
developing countries in
support of clean energy
research and
• SSA attracted 65% of global
off-grid RE investments
between 2007-2019, with
most investments
• There was a 28% increase in
international project finance for
renewable energy deals from
• USD40 billion is needed
through to 2050 for RE
projects in Sub-Saharan
Africa. This represents at a
47 Shupler, M., Mwitari, J., Gohole, A., de Cuevas, R. A., Puzzolo, E., Čukić, I., ... & Pope, D. (2021). COVID-19 impacts on household energy & food security in a Kenyan
informal settlement: The need for integrated approaches to the SDGs. Renewable and Sustainable Energy Reviews, 144, 111018.
49 This is measured as renewable energy (inclusive of solar, wind, geothermal, hydropower, bioenergy and marine sources) as a share of final (not primary) energy
consumption. Energy mix includes electricity, transportation and cooking/heating fuels. See: https://sdg-tracker.org/energy
50 See Alemzero, D., Acheampong, T., & Huaping, S. (2021). Prospects of wind energy deployment in Africa: Technical and economic analysis. Renewable Energy, 179,
652-666.; Acheampong, T., Menyeh, B.O., & Agbevivi, D.E. (2021). Ghana’s Changing Electricity Supply Mix and Tariff Pricing Regime: Implications for the Energy
Trilemma. Oil, Gas & Energy Law. OGEL 3 (2021).
13
investments in
clean energy
development and
renewable energy
production, including
in hybrid systems.
concentrated in East
Africa.51
USD9.1 billion in 2019 to
USD11 billion in 2020.52
fourfold increase compared
to 2018 levels.53
SDG 13: Take urgent action to combat climate change and its impact
Target
Indicator
Pre-COVID (2000-2019)
COVID-19 (2020-2021)
Post-COVID Outlook
Target 13.1:
Strengthen
resilience and
adaptive
capacity to
climate-related
disasters
Indicator 13.1.1 -
number of deaths,
missing persons and
directly affected
persons attributed to
disasters per 100,000
population
• Many SSA countries
reported between 0.01 to 5
deaths and missing persons
per 100,000 people per year
persons due to all forms of
natural disaster in 2017.
Only one country (Sierra
Leone) was in the 1-5 band
in 2017.54
• Many SSA countries reported
between 0.5 to 5 deaths and
missing persons per 100,000
people per year persons due to all
forms of natural disaster in 2020.
However, nine countries
including Liberia, Namibia,
Niger, Zimbabwe and Kenya
were in the 1-5 band in 2020.55
• There were between 10,000 and
3 million internally displaced
persons per SSA country from
natural disasters in 2020 with
many countries being in the
upper quartile of this band.
• If nothing is done about
climate change, then many
SSA countries stand to be
severely negatively
impacted from rising sea
levels to droughts, among
others. This can
significantly increase the
death and mission persons
rate beyond 2020 baseline
levels.
Indicator 13.1.2 -
number of countries
that adopt and
implement national
disaster risk reduction
strategies in line with
the Sendai Framework
• Almost all SSA countries
have signed the Sendai
Framework for Disaster Risk
Reduction 2015–2030 and
even developed five
• As was the case pre-COVID,
many SSA governments
struggled to implement disaster
risk management services due to
the lack of funding (and cuts in
some cases) during the pandemic.
• One lesson from the
COVID-19 pandemic is the
need for integration and
regulator update of disaster
risk management strategies
and plans.59
51 IRENA and CPI (2020), Global Landscape of Renewable Energy Finance, 2020. International Renewable Energy Agency, Abu Dhabi, at p.9
52 UNCTAD (2021). World Investment Report 2021. Available at: https://unctad.org/webflyer/world-investment-report-2021
53 IRENA and CPI (2020), Global Landscape of Renewable Energy Finance, 2020. International Renewable Energy Agency, Abu Dhabi, at p.52
54 See SDG Tracker.Org - https://sdg-tracker.org/climate-change
55 Ibid (n 54)
59 Ashraf, A. (2021). Lessons learned from COVID-19 response for disaster risk management. Natural Hazards, 107(2), 2027-2032.
14
for Disaster Risk
Reduction 2015–2030.
additional five targets for the
continent.56
• Studies indicate that 88% of
countries had a national
disaster risk management
policy or legislation with
benchmark to, for example,
reduce disaster mortality,
incorporate disaster risk
management in their
country’s educational
systems, among others.57
• Several SSA countries score
between 0.1 and 0.75 on the
Sendai Framework.
58
Indicator 13.1.3 - the
proportion of local
governments that adopt
and implement local
disaster risk reduction
strategies in line with
national disaster risk
reduction strategies.
• Many local governments
have local disaster risk
reduction strategies in line
with national disaster risk
reduction strategies but lacks
funding to implement them.
For example, the data shows
that 276, 188 and 52 local
governments in Ghana,
Tanzania and South Africa
have adopted these
strategies.60
• Nevertheless, the evidence
base, suggests or indicates a
clear lack of implementation
• As was the case pre-COVID,
many SSA local governments
struggled to implement disaster
risk management services due to
the lack of funding (and cuts in
some cases) during the pandemic.
• The lack of effective
decentralisation and
financial/fiscal autonomy
of many local governments
in the sub-region means
that many of these local
disaster risk reduction
strategies will struggle to
be implemented despite the
impacts of climate change
being felt locally.
56 van Niekerk, D., Coetzee, C., & Nemakonde, L. (2020). Implementing the Sendai Framework in Africa: Progress Against the Targets (2015–2018). International Journal
of Disaster Risk Science, 11(2), 179-189.
57 Ibid (n 56)
58 Ibid (n 54)
60 Ibid (n 54)
15
in many countries61, and in
some cases it is actually
NGOs which are delivering
the majority of disaster risk
management services instead
of the local governments.
62
Target 13.2:
Integrate
climate change
measures into
policy and
planning
Indicator 13.2.1 -
number of countries
that have
communicated the
establishment or
operationalisation of an
integrated
policy/strategy/plan
which increases their
ability to adapt to the
adverse impacts of
climate change and
foster climate
resilience and low
greenhouse gas
emissions
development.
• Many countries in the sub-region
have communicated establishing or
operationalising of an integrated
policy/strategy/plan which
increases their ability to adapt to
the adverse impacts of climate
change. These are also found in
their respective Nationally
Determined Contributions
(NDCs)/Intended Nationally
Determined Contributions
(INDCs) as per Article 4 of the
2015 Paris Agreement.63
• However, many of these countries
do not have the financial resources
to operationalise or implement
these plans. For example, a 2018
African NDCs gap analysis report
shows that “mobilisation of
finance, access to technology and
requisite capacity as the top three
needs or constraints to the
• Fiscal constraints during
the pandemic meant that
several SSA countries
could not implement
adaptation and climate
resilience measures.
• As expected, the COVID-
19 pandemic and
subsequent lockdowns led
to reduction in emissions
from some countries on the
continent. For example,
South Africa, which is one
of the region’s wealthiest
economies, had its CO2
emissions dropping by a
reported 20% during the
pandemic.66
• Forecasts indicate that the
pandemic only caused a
temporary blip in CO2
emissions due to the
economic slowdown.
• Many assessments indicate
CO2 emissions, including
that from SSA, will
continue to increase in a
post-pandemic world and
61 Van Niekerk, D., & Wentink, G. J. (2017). The capacity of personnel in disaster risk management in South African municipalities. TD: The Journal for Transdisciplinary
Research in Southern Africa, 13(1), 1-10.; Chatiza, K. (2019). Cyclone Idai in Zimbabwe: An analysis of policy implications for post-disaster institutional development to
strengthen disaster risk management.
62 Kita, S. M. (2017). “Government doesn't have the muscle”: state, NGOs, local politics, and disaster risk governance in Malawi. Risk, Hazards & Crisis in Public
Policy, 8(3), 244-267.
63 UNFCCC (2021). Nationally Determined Contributions (NDCs). Available at: https://unfccc.int/process-and-meetings/the-paris-agreement/nationally-determined-
contributions-ndcs/nationally-determined-contributions-ndcs (Accessed: 17 November 2021).
66 The Mail & Guardian (2020). Covid-19 brings South Africa’s daily carbon emissions down by 20%. Available at: https://mg.co.za/coronavirus-essentials/2020-05-20-
covid-19-brings-south-africas-daily-carbon-emissions-down-by-20 (Accessed: 17 November 2021).
16
successful implementation of
NDCs”.64
• SSA contributes less than 4% of
carbon emissions globally (the
lowest region globally).
• CO2 greenhouse gas emissions in
SSA was in 0.72 metric tons per
capita 2000 and 0.76 in metric tons
per capita in 2018.
65
Target 13.3:
Build
knowledge and
capacity to
meet climate
change
Indicator 13.3.1 -
number of countries
that have integrated
mitigation, adaptation,
impact reduction and
early warning into
primary, secondary and
tertiary curricula.
• Several SSA countries have
integrated mitigation,
adaptation, impact reduction
and early warning into
education curricula at all
levels. For example, 74% of
countries with legislation or
policies on disaster risk
management have
incorporated these in
country’s educational
systems at all levels.67
• However, the resources to
effectively teach these are
often lacking.
• Whereas most European
countries have mainstreaming of
global citizenship and sustainable
development in their teacher
education processes, national
education policies, and student
assessments, only four (4) SSA
countries had this as of 2020.68
These were Burkina Faso,
Democratic Republic of Congo,
Malawi and Mauritius.69
Target 13.A:
Implement
then UN
Framework
Convention on
Climate
Change
Indicator 13.A.1 - the
mobilised amount of
United States dollars
per year between 2020
and 2025 accountable
towards the US$100
billion commitment.
• Developed countries at the
United Nations climate
summit in Copenhagen in
2009 committed to
mobilising USD100-billion a
year by 2020 to support
developing countries in
• At COP26 in November 2021,
the Organisation for Economic
Co-operation and Development
(OECD) indicated that the
US$100 billion goal is likely to
be met in 2023, and that
developed countries are also
• The African Group of
Negotiators on Climate
Change at COP26 are
reported to have indicated
a need of US$1.3 trillion of
finance a year to
64 African Development Bank (2018). GAP ANALYSIS REPORT: African Nationally Determined Contributions (NDCs). Available:
https://www.afdb.org/fileadmin/uploads/afdb/Documents/Generic-Documents/African_NDCs_Gap_Analysis_Report.pdf (Accessed: 17 November 2021), at p.ii
65 World Bank - CO2 emissions (metric tons per capita) - Sub-Saharan Africa. Available: https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/EN.ATM.CO2E.PC?locations=ZG (Accessed:
17 November 2021).
67 Ibid (n 56)
68 Ibid (n 54)
69 Ibid (n 54)
17
climate mitigation and
adaptation. This promise
was again extended by five
years through to 2025 at the
2015 Paris Climate Summit.
• USD64-billion has provided
between 2013 and 2019. The
data also shows that between
2016- 2019, 43% of climate
finance went to Asia while
26% went to Africa.70
• Interestingly, about 79% of
such funding provided in
2019 were bilateral and
multilateral loans, namely
concessional loans and other
non-grant instruments.71 A
2020 Oxfam report
highlights that “The
excessive use of loans and
the provision of non-
concessional finance in the
name of climate assistance is
an overlooked scandal.”
72
likely to mobilise more than
US$100 billion per year
thereafter.73
developing countries, made
available from 2025.74
• Africa needs USD240-
billion a year to shift to
clean energy, according to
South African President
Cyril Ramaphosa.75
• Most of this funding must
come from grant funding
instead of the current
loans.
Source: Authors’ construct, based on data from World Bank, IEA, Sustainable Energy for All (SEforALL), and others
70 OECD (2021a). Forward-looking Scenarios of Climate Finance Provided and Mobilised by Developed Countries in 2021-2025: Technical Note, Climate Finance and the
USD 100 Billion Goal. OECD Publishing, Paris. Available at: https://doi.org/10.1787/a53aac3b-en.; OECD (2021b). Statement from OECD Secretary-General Mathias
Cormann on climate finance in 2019 (Accessed: 17 November 2021). Available at: https://www.oecd.org/environment/statement-from-oecd-secretary-general-mathias-
cormann-on-climate-finance-in-2019.htm (Accessed: 17 November 2021)
71 Ibid (n 72);
72 Oxfam (2020). CLIMATE FINANCE SHADOW REPORT 2020: ASSESSING PROGRESS TOWARDS THE $100 BILLION COMMITMENT. Available at:
https://oxfamilibrary.openrepository.com/bitstream/handle/10546/621066/bp-climate-finance-shadow-report-2020-201020-en.pdf (Accessed: 17 November 2021), at p.3
73 UKCOP26.org (2021). Climate Finance Delivery Plan: Meeting the US$100 Billion Goal. Available at: https://ukcop26.org/wp-content/uploads/2021/10/Climate-
Finance-Delivery-Plan-1.pdf (Accessed: 17 November 2021)
74 Ainger, J. (2021). Africa Wants $1.3 Trillion Annual Climate Finance as Rich Nations Miss Target. Available at: https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2021-11-
04/africa-wants-climate-finance-boost-as-rich-nations-miss-target (Accessed: 17 November 2021)
75 Vecchiatto, P. (2021). Africa Needs $240 Billion for Clean Energy Shift, Ramaphosa Says. Available at: https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2021-09-29/africa-
needs-240b-to-transition-to-clean-energy-ramaphosa-says (Accessed: 17 November 2021).
18
3. Addressing Energy Transition Risks in Sub-Saharan Africa
3.1 What are the Roadblocks to Post-COVID Reform of Energy Policies and Systems in SSA?
A series of crisis, including not least the COVID-19 pandemic, have created political opportunities for
reform of the sub-region’s energy sectors. However, to understand the entry points for reform, one must
diagnose the challenges or roadblocks. We highlight some of these roadblocks in Figure 4 below,
categorised into political, economic and social.76
Figure 4 Energy sector roadblocks in SSA
Source: Author’s construct
76 For a detailed discussion of some of these points, see: Eberhard, A., Gratwick, K., Morella, E., & Antmann, P.
(2016). Independent power projects in Sub-Saharan Africa: Lessons from five key countries. World Bank Publications;
Acheampong, T., Menyeh, B.O., & Agbevivi, D.E. (2021). Ghana’s Changing Electricity Supply Mix and Tariff Pricing Regime:
Implications for the Energy Trilemma. Oil, Gas & Energy Law. OGEL 3 (2021)
Political
•Policy instability: from
regulatory uncertainty
to lack of political
commitment and
government
intervention in
domestic markets (e.g.
subsidies)
•Government instability
–political uncertainty,
contract revisions
•Obstacles in the
planning process -
excessive bureaucratic
procedures and overlap
of mandates
•Unclear arbitration
procedures
Economic
•Access to finance –
insufficient capacity
addition
•Inability to recover cost
of new generation via
current electricity tariffs
•Inefficient fuel mix in
the generation and
inaccurate prioritization
of investments
•Non-existence of
wholesale electricity
market and ineffective
unbundling
•Ageing infrastructure
across value chain –
transmission and
distribution losses
•Inflation, FX
convertibility and other
poor macroeconomic
conditions
Social
•Rapid population and
urban growth
•‘Poverty paradox’ –
energy affordability
driving protests and
riots
19
3.2 Some Strategic Responses to the Energy Transition
The energy transition in Africa should be about prioritising economic diversification and not just about
decarbonisation given that the region contributes the least to global GHGs and has a low economic
resilience.
Below, we outline some steps that African governments could take to support their post-COVID-19
transition drive:
• Mainstreaming SDGs in government policy planning and implementation – By
incorporating SDGs into planning, there can be specific and measurable indicators that measure
the effectiveness of initiatives towards sustainable development. Doing this also ensures that
there is little duplication of efforts across sectors as linkages can be established for greater
efficiency in the use of resources.
• Enabling access and affordability with a combination of conventional, especially natural
gas, and RE generation: The transition that Africa needs is one from lack of adequate energy
to one that can foster development hence universal access is the destination. Research shows
that a mix of grid and off-grid solutions are required. The importance of
decentralised/distributed renewable energy generation systems such as minigrids are key for
reaching communities where the grid has not or cannot reach. The power of natural gas in
bridging the electricity access gap is well documented and the fast-tracking development of gas
pipelines as well as sorting pricing issues will be a key determinant in the successful gas
resources can be leveraged to address the electricity access challenge. Although gas as a fossil
fuel has a not-so bad reputation, attracting financing will increasingly be a challenge given calls
by agencies such as the IEA and others that that “there is no place for new coal, oil or gas
exploration or supplies”. Considering this, regional multilaterals such as AfDB can play a
crucial role while Sovereign Wealth Funds can be leveraged to fund gas infrastructure. This
requires a stable policy and regulatory environment to improve bankability of projects and
deliver affordable power.
• Pursuing electrification and clean cooking together: Access to modern energy cooking
services has over the years lagged electricity access efforts despite the multiple implications of
this at the health, environment, and gender fronts. With the increasing availability of highly
efficient electric cooking devices that are compatible with numerous African cuisines77, the
argument for promoting electric cooking both on affordability and cultural compatibility
grounds is more strengthened. Coupling electricity planning with the requirements for cooking
will enable governments to kill two birds with one stone.
• Creating more sustainable industrial clusters by leveraging the African Continental Free
Trade Area (AfCFTA). As argued earlier, an issue that the pandemic has highlighted is the
need for SSA to industrialise and diversify its economic base. Post-COVID economic strategies
and funding must be geared towards the creation of linkages in both traditional resourced based
industries such as mining and oil and gas, and also non-enclave type activities such as
manufacturing of components for electric vehicles, solar PVs or wind turbines. In this vein,
77 See Leary, J.; Menyeh, B.; Chapungu, V.; Troncoso, K. eCooking: Challenges and Opportunities from a
Consumer Behaviour Perspective. Energies 2021, 14, 4345. https:// doi.org/10.3390/en14144345
20
leveraging the AfCFTA78 which is the largest free trade area in the world, to position and
manufacture for Africans and by Africans is imperative. For example, both Zambia and the
Democratic Republic of Congo are key global producers79 of copper and copper concentrates,
both critical materials in batteries for electric vehicles (EVs). Demand for these critical minerals
are forecasted80 to soar on account of the energy transition. These concentrates can be used for
battery cell manufacturing in these countries or other countries in the sub-region that have some
competitive and comparative advantages – such as cheap electricity, labour, infrastructure,
among others. Also, SSA countries, working together with the private sector, and non-state
actors such as academic institutions and think tanks, must set up regional research and
development (R&D) centres of excellence on the continent to contextualise and find new
engineering and technical solutions to Africa’s energy and industrialisation challenges.
Recognising that transitions can create winners and losers and magnify the struggles of
vulnerable groups 81, efforts must be made to ensure that the people are skilled to take up the
new opportunities that the transition may present through capacity building and retraining – that
is, fair and inclusive clean energy transitions. Pursuing these strategies would have a much wider
catalytic economic impact in the sub-region. However, it requires strong coordination of energy
and industrial policies at the Pan-African, regional and country level.82
4. Conclusions
The global energy system is changing as the world is moving to a low-carbon economy. This is primarily
driven by advances in technology, new energy policies more so in a post-COVID-world, and evolving
consumer preferences. Global governments, individuals and corporations are under pressure to tackle the
existential threat of climate change. As the recently ended 2021 United Nations Climate Change Conference
(COP26) in Glasgow, United Kingdom indicates: the developed world have to commit to pay for the carbon
transition, and the world’s poorest – mostly in the developing regions - need to be protected against the
financial burden of climate change. Resources are key to addressing climate change.
78 Maliszewska, M., & Ruta, M. (2020). The African Continental Free Trade Area: Economic and Distributional Effects. World
Bank Group.; Abrego, M. L., de Zamaroczy, M. M., Gursoy, T., Nicholls, G. P., Perez-Saiz, H., & Rosas, J. N. (2020). The
African Continental Free Trade Area: Potential Economic Impact and Challenges. International Monetary Fund.; Apiko, P.,
Woolfrey, S., & Byiers, B. (2020). The promise of the African Continental Free Trade Area (AfCFTA) (No. 287). ECDPM
Discussion paper.; Obeng‐Odoom, F. (2020). The African continental free trade area. American Journal of Economics and
Sociology, 79(1), 167-197.
79 IEA (2021). The Role of Critical Minerals in Clean Energy Transitions. Available: https://www.iea.org/reports/the-role-of-
critical-minerals-in-clean-energy-transitions (Accessed: 20 November 2021).; Hund, K., La Porta, D., Fabregas, T. P., Laing, T.,
& Drexhage, J. (2020). Minerals for climate action: the mineral intensity of the clean energy transition. World Bank.
80 Boer, L., Pescatori, A., & Stuermer, M. (2021). Energy Transition Metals. IMF Working Paper No. 2021/243; Bouckley, E.
(2021). Energy transition could see mineral demand run ahead of supply by end of decade Available at:
https://www.spglobal.com/platts/en/market-insights/latest-news/metals/091721-energy-transition-could-see-mineral-demand-
run-ahead-of-supply-by-end-of-decade (Accessed: 24 November 2021).
81 Mayer, A., Smith, E. K., & Rodriguez, J. (2020). Concerned about coal: Security, dependence, and vulnerability among coal
dependent communities in western Colorado. Energy Research & Social Science, 70, 101680.; Carley, S., Evans, T. P., Graff,
M., & Konisky, D. M. (2018). A framework for evaluating geographic disparities in energy transition vulnerability. Nature
Energy, 3(8), 621-627.
82 Odijie, M. E. (2019). The need for industrial policy coordination in the African Continental Free Trade Area. African
Affairs, 118(470), 182-193.; Parshotam, A. (2018). Can the African Continental Free Trade Area offer a new beginning for trade
in Africa?. Available at https://media.africaportal.org/documents/saia_sop_280_parshotam_20180611.pdf (Accessed: 17
November 2021).
21
In a report (White Paper) published last month to the Norwegian Parliament, the government said that
“Norway’s position as an energy nation will be further developed through new initiatives encompassing
hydrogen, offshore wind, strengthening of the power grid and a low emissions oil and gas sector”.83 The
government is keen on adopting all energy resources available at their disposal to create continued
economic growth and new jobs. On the petroleum sector, the government says that “the petroleum sector
will remain a significant factor in the Norwegian economy in the years to come, although not on the same
scale as today. the government will facilitate long-term economic growth in the petroleum industry within
the framework of our climate policy and our commitments under the Paris agreement.”84 The Norwegians
don’t say they will stop oil and gas extraction. Instead, they will focus on making the barrels have greener
street credibility – aka low emissions.
SSA governments could learn a thing or two from the Norwegian approach. Decarbonisation should not
just be about reducing emissions for its own sake. Instead, it crucially needs to be linked, we argue, in the
African context to bridging the energy access gap and encouraging productive uses of energy to create new
competitive industrial clusters - which can create jobs and sustain economies. SSA contributes less than
4% of carbon emissions globally (the lowest region globally). The continent also faces acute
multidimensional energy poverty, made more onerous by the COVID-19 pandemic and prior economic
dislocations such as the 2014-17 commodities price slump. SSA has one of the lowest energy intensity
globally, and if its economies are to develop and create better jobs, that number needs to improve
significantly. The framing of the energy transition narrative matters because there are millions of lives and
jobs at stake, especially in developing countries
Governments are still keen on maximising the value of their oil and gas resources through the energy
transition. However, it also not about individual country diversification but having an integrated African
and costed diversification plan, anchored on the AfCFTA. To do this, SSA governments need to offer the
right package of fiscal and regulatory incentives to continue attracting energy and extractives sector
investments. We note that several countries have already taken steps to reform their fiscal and regulatory
packages during the last commodities price downturn (2014-2017) and are now repeating the benefits with
increased investments while others also increased the fiscal take.85 For countries thinking of leveraging the
transition to build new industrial clusters, such as the manufacture assembly of EVs and or battery
components or assembly of wind turbines and solar panels, they would also need to offer the right package
of tax incentives to both domestic and foreign investors. Governments must also undertake serious reforms
to improve the business environment and overall country competitiveness, thereby enhancing efficiencies
of scale and scope.
83 Norwegian Government (2021). Government publishes White Paper on long term value creation from Norway’s energy
resources. Available at: https://www.norway.no/en/saudi-arabia/norway-sa/news-events/government-publishes-white-paper-on-
long-term-value-creation-from-norways-energy-resources (Accessed: 17 November 2021).; Feder, J. (2021). Norway Will Boost
Green Energy But Won’t Stop Oil and Gas Development (2021). Available at: https://jpt.spe.org/norway-will-boost-green-
energy-but-wont-stop-oil-and-gas-development (Accessed: 17 November 2021).
84 Ibid (n 54)
85 Nakhle, C., & Acheampong, T., (2020). Oil and Gas Fiscal Policies: The Impact of Oil Price, Investment and Production
Trend. Tax Notes International, 100(2), 265-289.
