Access to this full-text is provided by Springer Nature.
Content available from Husserl Studies
This content is subject to copyright. Terms and conditions apply.
Vol.:(0123456789)
Husserl Studies (2022) 38:107–127
https://doi.org/10.1007/s10743-021-09299-6
1 3
Husserl onMinimal Mind andtheOrigins ofConsciousness
intheNatural World
BencePeterMarosan1,2
Accepted: 12 November 2021 / Published online: 8 December 2021
© The Author(s) 2021
Abstract
The main aim of this article is to offer a systematic reconstruction of Husserl’s
theory of minimal mind and his ideas pertaining to the lowest level of conscious-
ness in living beings. In this context, the term ‘minimal mind’ refers to the mental
sphere and capacities of the simplest conceivable subject. This topic is of significant
contemporary interest for philosophy of mind and empirical research into the ori-
gins of consciousness. I contend that Husserl’s reflections on minimal mind offer a
fruitful contribution to this ongoing debate. For Husserl, the embodied character of
subjectivity, or consciousness, is essential for understanding minimal mind. In his
view, there is an a priori necessary constitutive connection between the subjective
and objective aspects of the body, between Leib and Körper, and this connection is
especially important for exploring minimal mind from a phenomenological perspec-
tive. Thematically, the essay has three main parts. In Sect.2, I present an overview
of how minimal mind is framed in contemporary philosophy of mind and empiri-
cal research. I then analyse Husserl’s conception of embodiment with regard to the
problem of minimal mind in Sect.3. Finally, I present a more detailed investigation
into Husserl’s account of minimal mind, highlighting features from his descriptions
of animal mind and consciousness in early infancy (Sects.4 and 5).
1 Introduction
Throughout Husserl’s entire career, ‘the mystery of subjectivity’ was the central
problem of his philosophy (Husserl, 1976:3; Moran, 2000: 60). His work set out
to understand the essence of subjectivity, where subjectivity is understood as con-
sciousness. According to Husserl, consciousness has several different layers and
* Bence Peter Marosan
Marosan.Bencepeter@uni-bge.hu
1 Faculty ofInternational Management andBusiness, Budapest Business School, Diósy Lajos
utca 22-24, Budapest1165, Hungary
2 Faculty ofHumanities andSocial Sciences, Pázmány Péter Catholic University, Egyetem u. 1,
Piliscsaba2087, Hungary
Content courtesy of Springer Nature, terms of use apply. Rights reserved.
108
Husserl Studies (2022) 38:107–127
1 3
forms, of which a fully mature, rational, and responsible human mind—capable of
highly sophisticated conceptual thought—is the highest and most developed form.
In his various works and numerous research manuscripts, Husserl took up different
approaches to render the deepest layers of consciousness accessible in a phenome-
nologically legitimate manner. The fundamental level of consciousness—that is, the
line which separates conscious mental states and actions from the unconscious1—
and the border which divides conscious living beings from the non-conscious are
limit cases which pertain importantly to the essence of consciousness in general. In
this article, I focus on Husserl’s various attempts to disclose the lowest conceivable
level of subjectivity and to explore how the mental life of the simplest conscious
organisms might be rendered phenomenologically accessible.
In Husserl, we can find two fundamental approaches to exploring the deeper
layers of subjectivity: self-reflection (wherein the philosopher reflects on her own
consciousness) and intersubjective constitution (wherein the philosopher reflects on
other ostensibly ‘less evolved’ minds). In the former approach, Husserl’s method
chiefly involves ‘dismantling-deconstructing’ (Abbau) —carefully attempting to
abstract higher layers from experience in order to make the lower levels accessi-
ble.2 The second approach thematizes ‘lower level’ subjects—such as animals and
children—as anomalous agents who motivate empathy that constitutes them as
conscious beings within the philosopher’s lived experience, despite their respec-
tive differences. Amongst these anomalous subjects, there are some who differ in
the extreme, at least from the perspective of a mature rational subject, and could
be regarded as examples of the simplest conceivable minds—such as invertebrate
animals3 and embryonic consciousness. The key question concerns how far it is
possible for phenomenologically motivated empathy to conceive these subjects as
subjects.
Husserl’s theory of embodiment is also highly relevant to any inquiry into the
limits of subjectivity. First, according to Husserl, embodiment is an a priori neces-
sary structure in the self-constitution of the ego. In other words, concrete personal
subjectivity cannot be constituted without the bodily character of existence (e.g.
Husserl, 2012: 380); and embodiment fundamentally affects every layer of mental
life. Second, again following Husserl, the constitution of concrete intersubjectivity is
founded through embodiment. I am only capable of grasping another subject’s body
as the living sensing body of an experiencing person because there is an essential
constitutive similarity between my body (as a concrete unity of subjective and objec-
tive aspects, as Leib and Körper) and the body of other subject. Empathy is princi-
pally motivated by this structural similarity between my body and this other body.
1 Unconsciousness is a key problem for phenomenology in general, and it was discussed at length by
Husserl. A full review of this issue, however, exceeds the scope of this present study.
2 Husserl understood that these lower levels would only ever be indirectly accessible because the higher
layers—such as conceptuality—could never be entirely removed in this process.
3 From time to time, Husserl mentions jellyfish as an example of an animal which might be conscious at
a minimal level (Husserl, 1973a: 112–119, Husserl, 2003: 136, Husserl, 2020: 52f).
Content courtesy of Springer Nature, terms of use apply. Rights reserved.
109
1 3
Husserl Studies (2022) 38:107–127
Husserl’s notion of subjectivity as inherently embodied implies that minimal mind
involves a certain form of minimal embodiment.
I contend that Husserl’s investigations concerning minimal mind and embodiment
have considerable potential to enrich contemporary philosophical and scientific
research on the origins of consciousness in the natural world. Husserl’s particular
conception of embodiment, as derived through his phenomenological methodol-
ogy, offers a promising foundation for a deeper theory of minimal mind—one which
might guide scientific endeavours towards understanding where and under what con-
ditions consciousness first appears.
Bringing together the aforementioned topics, this article is divided into five main
sect.: 2. The problem of minimal mind in general; 3. Husserl’s theory of embodi-
ment and its relevance for the minimal mind; 4. The question of animal conscious-
ness in Husserl; 5. ‘Lower-level’ consciousness: invertebrate and embryonic mind;
and 6. Conclusion.
2 The Problem ofMinimal Mind inGeneral
2.1 Initial Conceptual Clarifications
The words ‘mind’ and ‘consciousness’ are strongly interrelated terms, but they are
not entirely synonymous. For the purposes of this article, ‘mind’ refers to the entire
mental life of a subject, including her subconscious mental contents and processes.
‘Consciousness,’ in the strict sense, here means subjective phenomenal awareness.
Husserl famously defined consciousness in terms of ‘intentionality,’ but he also
emphasized that intentional experience has certain non-intentional components,
such as ‘sensation’ (Empfindung). In his view, we are not intentionally directed to
sensation, but rather we live it through (erleben). Sensation is nevertheless still a
part of consciousness.
‘Minimal mind’ refers to the internal life of a subject (or living being) who has
the most basic capacity for mental activity. In this context, however, we are primar-
ily interested in subjects who can have phenomenally conscious experiences at the
lowest conceivable level. We can and do have subliminal contents in our mental
life but, from a Husserlian perspective, organisms are ‘minimal subjects’ in a strict
sense only if they are capable of having phenomenally conscious experiences (cf.
e.g. Husserl, 1973b: 42–48). A conscious experience of the lowest intensity could be
referred to as ‘minimal consciousness’. For Husserl, the capacity for phenomenally
conscious experience is an essential structural component of minimal mind.
2.2 Contemporary Views ontheOrigins ofConsciousness inNature
In contemporary philosophy of mind and empirical research, there are three main
conceptions concerning the origins of consciousness in the natural world. Interest-
ingly enough, all three of these positions can be found in Husserl’s texts too.
Content courtesy of Springer Nature, terms of use apply. Rights reserved.
110
Husserl Studies (2022) 38:107–127
1 3
The first main standpoint holds that consciousness exists at the bottom-most level
of physical reality. All distinct physical entities—including subatomic and atomic
particles—possess a certain grade of consciousness. This view is called panpsy-
chism, and it is a very popular standpoint among philosophers and a considerable
number of scientists. In an unpublished manuscript from 1908/09 (Ms. B I 4),4 Hus-
serl entertains the panpsychist perspective but ultimately dismisses this stance due
to the impossibility of phenomenological evidence.
In this article, I cannot go into detail concerning the problems of panpsychism. I
would only like to mention here that, in my opinion, panpsychism violates the prin-
ciple of Ockham’s razor; it demands of us that we assume consciousness even at a
level where there is no evidence. Despite its philosophical advantages, if we take
contemporary empirical research on consciousness into consideration, I think that it
is most unlikely that consciousness is present at the lowest level of physical reality.
The second main standpoint holds that life and consciousness are “co-emer-
gent”—that is to say, every living being, even a single-cell organism, is at least mini-
mally conscious (e.g. Margulis, 2001). This perspective is known as biopsychism.
We can find the outline of such a conception in Husserl too. He refers to the fully
concrete personal subject—with all its mental contents, memories, experiences,
thoughts, habitualities, capacities, etc.—with the Leibnizian term ‘monad’ (e.g.
Husserl, 1950: 102f). From time to time, however, he also speaks about ‘plant mon-
ads’ (Husserl, 1973c: 595f; Husserl, 2006: 171; see also: Lee, 1993: 225ff), and in
some cases he even entertains the possibility of ‘unicellular monads’ (Husserl, 2006:
169, 174f). However, this model appears in Husserl’s texts very rarely and only ever
as a passing hypothetical.
I contend that there are problems with biopsychism which parallel problems
with panpsychism, from a phenomenological perspective in particular. There is no
distinct line between living beings and inanimate entities—consider forms of viral
‘life’, for instance—and therefore this standpoint raises the same questions which
panpsychism attempts to address, thus facing the same theoretical difficulties. There
are some philosophers and scientists who attribute consciousness in a wide sense to
include plant life (e.g. Mahen, 2017). However, this remains controversial consid-
ering how most scientific evidence concerning consciousness in the strict sense—
that is to say, subjective phenomenal awareness—gestures towards the importance
of a nervous system as developed in animals. The third main standpoint takes up
this evidence; certain animals with a nervous system are evidently conscious. This
standpoint is interested in discerning which animals are conscious and why. In other
words, what is the precise relationship between consciousness and the nervous
system?
4 Transcription: p. 30. “Das Bewusstsein steht in Akkord mit anderen Bewusstsein. Es scheint in ein
anderes Bewusstsein hinein: Diesem erscheint ein physisches Ding, das Einfühlung zulässt. Erscheint
jedem Bewusstsein das physische Ding, das es in anderen weckt, als sein Leib? Hat jedes Atom, das ich
in uneigentlicher Weise als Einheit einer Erscheinungsmannigfaltigkeit setze, da ich sie als Dinge setze,
den Charakter eines Leibes, das heißt, es ist ein Bewusstsein, das eine solche unbekannte Erscheinungs-
mannigfaltigkeit in Wirklichkeit und Möglichkeit in sich birgt, und dessen sonstige Erscheinungen zu
ihm analog stehen wie unsere Leibeserscheinungen zu unserem sonstigen Bewusstsein.”.
Content courtesy of Springer Nature, terms of use apply. Rights reserved.
111
1 3
Husserl Studies (2022) 38:107–127
Most scientists and philosophers of mind share this third view. In many of Hus-
serl’s more concrete statements on the topic, Husserl was also of this opinion; he
seemed to think, at the very least, that animals with a nervous system should be
considered conscious beings. There is still much debate over the extent to which the
centralization of the nervous system is connected to the emergence of conscious-
ness. A minority of researchers purport that explicit self-representation is a prereq-
uisite for phenomenal consciousness (Carruthers, 2000). According to this view,
only humans and very few non-humans (e.g. some hominids) are conscious in this
way. Most philosophers and scientists, however, agree that vertebrates more gen-
erally are conscious in the strict sense. Matters concerning invertebrates are less
certain. Are there any invertebrates which could be regarded as conscious, from
scientific and philosophical perspectives? Which ones and why? Cephalopod mol-
luscs (such as octopuses, squid, and cuttlefish) exhibit strong behavioral evidence
that they have phenomenal consciousness (cf. Feinberg & Mallatt, 2016; Ginsburg
& Jablonka, 2019). But what about other, ostensibly simpler invertebrates? What
about insects? Promising research has, in recent years, suggested that insects might
have minimal mind. The next subsection will explore some of these cases. Below
the level of insects and arthropods in general (concerning, for example, worms and
jellyfish), most philosophers and scientists hold that invertebrate behaviour is too
mechanistic, and that these nervous systems are not sufficiently centralized, to attrib-
ute phenomenal consciousness to these life forms.
2.3 Invertebrates asPossible Candidates forMinimally Conscious Being
According to contemporary scientific research on the origins of consciousness, it
is most probable that vertebrate animals are minimally conscious. As mentioned
above, the big question is whether there is sufficient philosophical reason and sci-
entific evidence to support the claim that ‘lower level’ invertebrates—most prom-
inently arthropods (such as insects)—are conscious. Those who already hold that
insects are conscious premise their arguments on striking similarities between the
behavior, functional apparatus (nervous systems), and cognition of vertebrate ani-
mals and insects. In this subsection, I review some recent attempts to demonstrate
consciousness in insects.
Not everyone shares my assumption that creatures with minimal mind are nec-
essarily phenomenally conscious. According to Vincent Torley (2007), minimal
mental representations—different intentional states, desires, beliefs, etc.—need
not be phenomenally conscious. Torley defines minimal mind instead in terms
of a certain flexibility and complexity of behaviour, and he relates mentality to
a degree of goal-oriented agency (intentional agency). He discusses four basic
types of agency relevant for minimal mind: operant (capacity to remember and
learn), navigational (capacity to navigate the environment), tool-related (capac-
ity to use elements of the environment to achieve goals) and social (capacity for
social communication within the species). He attempts to show that, with the
exception of social agency, three of these types can be found in insects. Like
Content courtesy of Springer Nature, terms of use apply. Rights reserved.
112
Husserl Studies (2022) 38:107–127
1 3
Torley, Bryce Huebner (2011) articulates a concept of minimal mind which
avoids the notion of phenomenality. He also assumes that the behavioral and
computational capacities of insects justify the attribution of rudimentary men-
tal states to these creatures. He offers a mechanistic account of minimal mind,
which he conceives in terms of elementary action and goal-oriented mental rep-
resentations (“pushmi-pullyu representations”: 452).
Other researchers contend that phenomenality is necessarily connected to the
mental sphere, and they seek out external indicators of phenomenal conscious-
ness in insects. Michael Tye (2017) emphasizes the structural overlap between
behavioural patterns in humans and insects (pp. 75, 134–159). Barron and Klein
(2016) partly follow Björn Merker (2005, 2007) in stating that we can locate
the neural basis of consciousness in the vertebrate midbrain and basal ganglia.
According to Merker, subjective phenomenal awareness is necessarily predi-
cated on an egocentric perspective, complex decision-making (involving action-
selection, target-selection, and internal motivation), and dynamic modelling of
bodily movements in space. Barron and Klein posit that these very same func-
tions are also evidenced by the activity of insect brains, and thus that we can
conclude that insects are phenomenally conscious.
Feinberg and Mallatt (2016) offer a detailed and far-reaching investigation
into the evolution of the nervous system. They attempt to show isomorphism
between phenomenally conscious mental images and neural patterns. They also
distinguish between different sorts of minimal consciousness, such as exterocep-
tive, interoceptive, and affective consciousness, and they identify various neural
conditions which are necessary for their realization. According to Feinberg and
Mallatt, these neural conditions can indeed be found in certain arthropods. Gins-
burg and Jablonka (2019) focus on the behavioral structure of living beings, and
they take the capacity for dynamic open-ended learning and environmental adap-
tation to sufficiently demonstrate the presence of phenomenal consciousness in
an animal. They emphasize that this behavior is clearly present in insects. Jona-
than Birch (2020), in a recently published article, takes a comparative approach
concerning the respective behavior of humans and insects. He claims that if an
insect shows itself to have certain key behavioral capacities, which are accompa-
nied by conscious awareness when witnessed in humans, then we have a sound
theoretical basis for attributing, at the very least, a minimal degree of conscious-
ness to the insect in question.
These accounts are mostly attempts from the third-person empirical perspec-
tive to understand minimal mind. In phenomenology, the first-person perspective
is the fundamental point of departure. From a phenomenological perspective,
minimal mind is structurally connected to the capacity for phenomenal con-
sciousness. Furthermore, phenomenality is an intrinsic feature of consciousness
at every constitutive level, and thus also at the level of minimal mind (cf. Gal-
lagher & Zahavi, 2008: 113–121). But there is a further crucial point stemming
from phenomenology in this regard—the essentially embodied character of sub-
jective experience. In a phenomenological account of minimal mind, the prob-
lem of embodiment cannot be disregarded (a point made by Husserl long before
the ‘Embodied Cognition’ movement gained traction). Consequently, in the next
Content courtesy of Springer Nature, terms of use apply. Rights reserved.
113
1 3
Husserl Studies (2022) 38:107–127
section, I attend to Husserl’s notion of embodiment with a special regard for the
question of minimal mind.
3 Husserl’s Theory ofEmbodiment andits Relevance forMinimal
Mind
Husserl became aware relatively early—at the latest in 1907, in his lectures on
Thing and Space—of the central role of the phenomenon of the body with regard to
experience in general, and specifically in the experiential constitution of self, other,
and world. His account of the body overcomes the rigid Cartesian dualism of mind
and body (cf. Moran, 2013; Zahavi, 1994); according to the latter, body, and mind
are sharply delineated entities. For the purposes of an investigation into minimal
mind, Husserl’s idea of the necessary a priori connection between the subjective
and objective aspects of the body, between Leib and Körper, is especially impor-
tant. This concept of constitutive necessity between bodily subjectivity and objec-
tivity makes it possible to articulate a deeper theoretical explanation of minimal
mind, which is not simply another empirical and contingent (third-person) approach.
In this section, I therefore attempt to shed light on the nature of this ‘constitutive
necessity’ and how this connection between the two sides of the body should be
understood.
3.1 The Notion ofConstitutive Necessity
Husserl’s theory of constitution reached maturity when he elaborated on his idea of
the ‘phenomenological reduction’ around 1906/07. The phenomenological reduction
allows the philosopher to reduce their domain of concern to that which is purely
given in experience, and to treat this as the strict basis for philosophical reflection.
The notion of ‘constitution’ refers to the a priori laws of appearance (Erscheinung)
and sense-bestowal which make it possible for phenomena to appear at all. Accord-
ing to Husserl, these laws are disclosed through the reduction—hence the relation-
ship between constitution and reduction. Reduction enables us to see the a priori
connections between different phenomena and their objective sense through the evi-
dence of experience.
So what is meant by this a priori necessary connection? It means, for example,
that a three-dimensional object, e.g. a cube, cannot appear from the front side with-
out necessarily indicating its unseen rear side. It refers, for example, to the fact that,
if I turn this cube around, the unseen rear side presents itself as seen from the front
and I am able to see it (Husserl, 1950: 77–83). A single spatial object indicates its
internal and external horizons. It cannot appear otherwise. To take a temporal object
as another example, a melody cannot appear without indicating its past and possible
future temporal phases. The experience of a single note (an original impression) is
embedded into the temporal horizons of past and future by eidetic necessity. We can-
not experience temporal objects otherwise (Husserl, 1969). Husserl maintained that
Content courtesy of Springer Nature, terms of use apply. Rights reserved.
114
Husserl Studies (2022) 38:107–127
1 3
there is also a necessary connection between the subjective and objective aspects of
the body; one cannot appear without referring to the other. For Husserl, this bodily
a priori necessary connection is also the constitutive foundation for any concrete
experience of another subject (Husserl, 1950: 138–156).
3.2 Aspects ofembodiment
For Husserl, every other phenomenon gains its specific objective sense in relation to
the experiential constitution of the body. My body appears as the zero-point of ori-
entation—a necessary structural component of the phenomenal field. It is an abso-
lute ‘here’, an ultimate point of departure for the constitution of “thing and space”
(Husserl, 1973d). I can constitute objects in their entirety, as well as the spatial
relations between them, by engaging with them actively through the body. In other
words, I have to go to them, touch them, taste them, and smell them—all of which
requires my active bodily motion. Even if I stay in one place and do not move, the
experience of things presupposes certain actions of my body, such as turning my
head or moving my eyes towards the things in question. My stream of experience is
made up of three fundamental components: interoceptive, affective-emotional, and
exteroceptive experience. The first two refer to a bodily subject’s self-experience.
The latter relates to one’s own body (as experienced from the outside) and its sur-
rounding world.
The interoceptive layer of experience explicitly refers to our lived body (Leib),
as well as affections and emotions related to the subjective side of embodiment.
The lived body is constituted as a unified system of bodily feelings, sensations, and
capacities, including kinaesthetic and proprioceptive sensations and potentialities
such as the consciousness of the “I can”, “I move”, or “I do”. At the same time, I
continuously perceive my body externally, as a physical body, as Körper. My inter-
nal bodily sensations, affections, and capacities gain their more concrete meaning
in relation to this objective aspect of my body; in fact, in the course of my bodily
self-constitution both Leib and Körper show themselves to be different sides of the
same coin—two inseparable interdependent subsystems of the very same phenom-
enal structure (cf. Husserl, 1973a:263, Husserl, 1973b: 75–77). When I move, act,
and live my bodily life, I experience how intimately the moments of these two sides
of my body are interwoven, and phenomenological reflection informs me about the
a priori character of this entwinement.
Leib and Körper together constitute a concrete person. Husserl is very clear
about the fact that no concrete personal subjectivity is conceivable without their
unity (Husserl, 2012: 380);5 this is a necessary structural feature of the constitution
5 Ibid. “Eine Person kann konkret nicht sein, ohne einen Körper als Leib zu haben.”.
It is an important question in the context of the present study as to whether Leib and Körper are suf-
ficient to constitute a person, as well as whether there are any higher cognitive and spiritual elements—
such as rationality and self-responsibility—which are also necessary in the constitution of personhood.
We can speak of persons and personhood both in a narrower and a wider sense in the context of Husserl’s
work. A person in a narrower sense is, in particular, a human person with the faculties of rationality,
clear self-consciousness, and self-responsibility (Cf. Husserl, 1952: 257). There are, however, also non-
human (animal) persons according to Husserl, so persons in a wider sense can be understood in this way.
The Husserlian term ‘monad’ refers to this notion of a person in the wide sense. The idea of the monad—
Content courtesy of Springer Nature, terms of use apply. Rights reserved.
115
1 3
Husserl Studies (2022) 38:107–127
of transcendental subjectivity as a bodily being living in a world (Husserl, 2008:
251–258).6 But exactly how is this unity constituted? According to Husserl, an
investigation into the phenomena of bodily organs can go some way to providing an
explanation.
3.3 The constitutive role oforgans
For Husserl, the term ‘organ’ has a dual meaning. First, an organ can refer to the
entire body, as a means of will for the ego to act in the world (Husserl, 1952:
151–152). Second, a bodily organ can refer to a subsystem of the lived body (Leib),
as a partial system of proprioceptive and kinaesthetic capacities and feelings. The
whole body is an organized system of such organs. Even the faculty of perception
refers to the body and its bodily organs—any particular mode of sensory perception
indicates a correlative bodily organ which realizes the perceptual mode in question
(e.g. visual experience indicates visual organs such as eyes). The subject is con-
nected to the world through its bodily organs and overall system.
In the unification of Leib and Körper, the phenomenon of ‘double sensation’ is
of special importance; when I use my one hand to touch the other, and I can expe-
rience my hand as touching and touched at the same time, so I can constitute my
hand both externally and internally, both as Leib and Körper (Husserl, 1952: 145). I
experience my sense organs from the ‘inside’ through kinaesthetic and propriocep-
tive feelings. These organs connect me to the world, and their functioning is already
accompanied by certain motor sensations and activities—such as oculomotor expe-
rience (Husserl, 1973d). When I perceive and act in the world, I experience my body
as a whole. I experience the interrelatedness of my different bodily organs and that
they are integrated into the organic unity of my body according to their particu-
lar respective functions. My body realizes a unified concrete mode of being in the
world, and its particular organs realize partial moments of my worldly existence. In
everyday experience, I can partially constitute my bodily parts and organs externally
(i.e. as Körper), but my body still largely presents itself as an incompletely consti-
tuted entity. I cannot see my eyes or my back directly, for example. It is only other
subjects who can constitute these parts of my body more concretely and completely.
In Husserl’s view, no phenomena or objective meaning could be constituted con-
cretely in the absence of intersubjectivity; more precisely, they could not be fully
constituted without intersubjectivity (cf. Zahavi,1996, pp. 32–40). Earlier versions
of Husserl’s phenomenological reduction put intersubjectivity ‘out of play,’ bracket-
ing it out as irrelevant. However, Husserl later found a way to bring intersubjectivity
6 From time to time Husserl also considers the possibility of a disembodied mind. (Cf. Husserl, 1952:
294, Husserl, 1971: 117). However, he also makes it clear that a disembodied mind cannot constitute the
world in its concreteness.
as the "full concretion of the ego"—appears in several places as a synonym for the personal ego (Cf.
Husserl, 1950: 102f). In this sense, the capacity of having phenomenal consciousness is sufficient to be
regarded as a person; and the notion of Leib, as subjectively lived body, implies that someone is capable
of phenomenal consciousness. See also: Vergani 2021.
Footnote 5 (continued)
Content courtesy of Springer Nature, terms of use apply. Rights reserved.
116
Husserl Studies (2022) 38:107–127
1 3
back in a strictly phenomenological manner. In his 1910/11 lectures, The Basic
Problems of Phenomenology, he discusses a ‘double reduction’. By this, he means
that the phenomenologist should first bring the experience of interest into the sphere
of pure immanence (i.e. attending only to aspects directly given in experience),
before then focusing on the intentional content of this experience in a strictly phe-
nomenological manner (Husserl, 1973a: 178). The double reduction in Husserl’s
work exclusively discloses the meaning which is implied in a given experience of
interest. Not only could intersubjective experiences be thematized in this way under
the phenomenological reduction, but also certain positive scientific assumptions and
hypotheses as well—in a very limited and strictly conditional way, but always within
the parameters of a phenomenological inquiry. In Ideas (1912), Husserl does not
explicitly mention the double reduction, but clearly applies this method.
This point is important due to the fact that Husserl, in the second book of Ideas
and in certain other texts, attempts to thematize a very particular type of organ
from a phenomenological point of view—namely, the nervous system.7 How can
we thematize the nervous system under the epochē in a phenomenologically legiti-
mate manner, when this organ is barely accessible at all through direct experien-
tial intuition? According to Husserl, the nervous system is an organ, the particular
function of which is to realize the partial psychophysical dependency of the soul on
the body (Husserl, 1952: 294–297; cf. also Yoshimi, 2010). It is the organ which
implements the ultimate unity of Leib and Körper, and which ensures communica-
tion between subjective and objective aspects of the body. It is important to note,
however, that the nervous system for Husserl is not what the pineal gland was for
Descartes. Husserl instead attempts to offer a phenomenological explanation. For
him, the nervous system is a phenomenal subsystem in the constitution of the entire
concrete body, the meaning of which is to coordinate the functioning of different
bodily parts, to connect the psyche to the body, and to realize our concrete conscious
bodily being-in-the-world.
As we can see, there is a certain circularity in the constitutive relationships
between bodily self, other persons, and the world. This circularity, however, has a
priori necessary features, and the body still has a certain precedence in the concrete
constitution of experience in general. The role of embodiment in concrete subjec-
tivity and intersubjectivity is evidently pertinent for the present investigation into
minimal mind. Neither the self-reflective deconstructive approach nor the intersub-
jective reconstructive approach to understanding minimal mind can begin without
such reflections on the necessity of embodiment for subjectivity.
7 Husserl (1952): 39, 156, 165, 189, 218, 231, 288–297, 343, 372–373. Cf. also: Husserl (2020): 50–53.
Content courtesy of Springer Nature, terms of use apply. Rights reserved.
117
1 3
Husserl Studies (2022) 38:107–127
4 The Question ofAnimal Consciousness inHusserl’s Thought
There is an incredibly rich body of secondary literature on Husserl’s account of the
animal.8 Especially for the late Husserl, the similarities and differences between
humans and animals comprised an essential question. The topic came to prominence
within the context of his studies on intersubjectivity, wherein animals appeared as
an anomalous form of subjectivity. Here I will only sketch out his basic framework
on the topic as relevant for our present concern, i.e. for understanding the nature and
genesis of minimal mind.
In this section, I analyse animal consciousness in general as a ‘lower’ form of
consciousness and its differences in contrast with human consciousness. I offer a
closer examination of three ways in which Husserl approached the problem of ani-
mal subjectivity: (1) empathy and intersubjective constitution; (2) the deconstruc-
tive-dismantling analysis (Abbau) of one’s own subjectivity; and (3) instincts.
4.1 The Animal intheContext ofEmpathy andIntersubjective Constitution
A fundamental concept in Husserl’s theory of intersubjectivity is empathy (Ein-
fühlung). Empathy is a particular form of intentionality, which renders the other as
other present directly while at the same time making us aware that other persons’
mental spheres can only be attained indirectly—thus their experiences cannot be
accessed in their originality (Husserl, 1950: 151ff). In empathy, directness and indi-
rectness are entwined. Empathy is, moreover, a founded experience, founded upon
the experience of the other person’s physical objective body (cf. Moran, 2000: 176).
There is another body, which is partly similar to mine and which I can apper-
ceive as analogous to my body. The partial similarity of my body to the other’s
makes it possible to experience the other’s physical body as the body of another
subject, as having an inner mental aspect. This experience is a direct act, though
it is founded; I apperceive the other’s body as the physical manifestation of a sub-
ject immediately, ‘in one blow’. As Husserl put it in 1935, in an unpublished manu-
script, “The physical body, that we call lived body, expresses through its ‘appear-
ance’ a person, a human subject, who lives and exists corporeally in the world” (Ms.
K III 14, p. 14,my translation).9 The particular intentional structure which makes
this achievement possible—the apperception of a physical body as another sub-
ject’s lived body—is empathy itself, which is motivated by the external similarity
of my own and the other’s body. Due to empathy, I know that the particular physical
8 Just to mention a few references: (Cabestan, 1995; Depraz 1995, Martín and Peñaranda, 2001; Lotz,
2006; Painter, 2007; Di Martino, 2014; Dufourcq, 2014; Monod, 2014; Ciocan, 2017; Ferencz-Flatz,
2017; Zirión, 2020) (Manuscript). More recently: Vergani (2021). In this context, I want to highlight Ver-
gani’s achievement in particular, who has carried out a rich and extensive comparative analysis of Hus-
serl’s various statements on different kinds of animals, and also gives a detailed account of how Husserl
tried to extend personhood to animals.
9 Pagination of transcription. “Der Körper, der da Leib heisst, drückt durch sein „Aussehen “ eine Person
aus, ein menschliches Subjekt, das in der Welt leibt und lebt’”.
Content courtesy of Springer Nature, terms of use apply. Rights reserved.
118
Husserl Studies (2022) 38:107–127
1 3
body, which I see now, is not just a physical thing in nature, but also a lived body of
another person who has thoughts, feelings, and experiences, just like I do.
Husserl approaches the problem of animal subjectivity first and foremost through
an understanding of animal body. On his interpretation, the phenomenon of organic
animate body founds the phenomenon of psyche or soul (e.g. Husserl, 1952: 176,
182ff, 203f). The similarity between my own and another subject’s body motivates
my empathy with this other. Even the body of an animal is, anatomically and func-
tionally, similar to mine. It has body parts like mine—legs, arms, and a head, as well
as organs like my own, including lungs, a stomach, and a brain, etc. According to
Husserl, I perceive the animal body as an anomalous body, as an abnormal variant
of the human body (Husserl, 1973b: 126). The animal appears on the horizon of my
perception as an abnormal version of a human being (Husserl, 1950: 154; see also
Ciocan, 2017).
Despite the differences, the animal’s body is similar enough to motivate empathy.
Nonetheless, I cannot communicate with an animal in a strictly linguistic way; I can
instead grasp their internal mental states as expressed in their bodily gestures and
behavior (cf. Husserl, 1973c: 662; also: Ms. K III 14, pp. 8–10).10 I can perceive joy
and suffering in the behavior of animals. I can even communicate with them after a
fashion, e.g. my dog or cat can figure out what I want from them and vice versa (cf.
Monod, 2014; also Ferencz-Flatz, 2017). As far as I can constitute animals as con-
scious living beings, I can also conceive of them as transcendental co-subjects, with
whom I constitute the world together in its entire concreteness (see Dufourcq, 2014;
Ferencz-Flatz, 2017). Annabelle Dufourcq goes as far as saying that a world without
animals cannot be intelligibly constituted (Dufourcq, 2014, p. 90f).
In Ideas II, Husserl takes a bottom-up approach to understanding the constitution
of animal psyche. He starts out by considering inorganic nature—the realm of mere
substantiality and causality. He contrasts this with the phenomenon of life—living,
self-controlling, and self-sustaining organisms. At a certain point along this spec-
trum, I am motivated by empathy to constitute living beings as conscious creatures,
as organisms which are complex and similar enough to me that I conceive of them as
experiencing subjects. The question—which is the main topic of the next part of this
essay—is where the border between conscious and non-conscious organisms lies,
where intelligibly motivated empathy begins (cf. Zirion 2020). An organic body that
I can constitute as an anomalous variant of my human body implies an anomalous
soul as its internal aspect. Husserl discusses ‘somatology’ in a phenomenological
context, the task of which, amongst others, is to make a phenomenologically legiti-
mate distinction between conscious and non-conscious organisms (Husserl, 1971:
5–20). His conclusion is, in Ideas III at least, that while it is highly problematic that
10 Pagination of transcription. “Hinsichtlich der Menschen und der sonst < igen > animalischen Realen
ist das zum Ausdruck kommende die Person (bzw. das tierische [10] Subjekt). In schlichter Erfahrung
des Menschen (so schlicht, dass eben ohne weiteres, als unmittelbar erfahren ein Mensch für uns als
dieses Reale „da “ ist)/ ist der körperliche Leib nicht als purer Körper erfahren (es wird nicht abstrahiert),
sondern zwar als daseiend, aber ohne weiteres als Ausdruck eines personalen Seins, das seinerseits nur
durch Ausdruck als menschliche Person erfahren ist” (op. cit. 9–10).
Content courtesy of Springer Nature, terms of use apply. Rights reserved.
119
1 3
Husserl Studies (2022) 38:107–127
a plant might be considered a conscious creature, I can indeed constitute an animal
as a conscious being (Husserl, 1971: 10).
4.2 The Deconstructive‑Dismantling Analysis (Abbau) ofone’s Own Subjectivity
While Husserl was developing his genetic phenomenology in the 1920s, he was also
undertaking thorough investigations into animal being—the animal within—through
a deconstructive analysis of human subjectivity. As pointed out earlier, an anoma-
lous body implies an anomalous soul which differs from me in essential ways. The
most important difference between human and animal souls is the lack of rationality
in the latter, as can be demonstrated by phenomenological analysis of their bodily
functions and behaviour (cf. e.g. Husserl, 1973c: 405, Husserl, 1988: 99f, Husserl,
2004: 239f, see also Di Martino, 2014). A more ‘primitive’ body involves a more
rudimentary consciousness which constitutes the world (its environment) in a much
more limited way than rational human consciousness. There are many animals with
far better and more precise sensory organs than humans (e.g. the eagle’s eye, the
dog’s nose, the cat’s ear, etc.), but these animals still arguably constitute the world in
a much more limited sense than humans due to their lack of rationality and concep-
tuality. There are several layers to my subjectivity, and I can abstract from the higher
levels in order to reconstruct what a lower form of consciousness might be like from
the first-person perspective.
It should be emphasized that this ‘layer-cake’ model of subjectivity, even in Hus-
serl, has its limits. The layers of consciousness interpenetrate, form, and co-deter-
minate each other; I cannot abstract from one layer without having a fundamentally
new type of subject as a result. There is, however, scope for phenomenological
reconstruction. There are basically two interrelated approaches to deconstructing-
reconstructing animal subjectivity—the genetic method and eidetic variation. With
respect to the former approach, Husserl, in his genetic phenomenology, always
attempted to maintain the connection between the lower and higher levels of subjec-
tivity—from simple sensation (Empfindung) to perception, and finally to conceptual
thought. We can reconstruct a subject without conceptual thought, a subject capable
of sensation only, or, on a higher level, of non-rational non-conceptual perception.
This subject would only have an environment of sensual data and, on a higher level,
perceptual connections to which it is instinctively bound.
The latter approach, which is strongly related to the former, is eidetic or imagina-
tive variation. I can undertake a complete eidetic analysis of the essential structure
of human consciousness. Then I can vary it; I can abstract from one or more essen-
tial features or elements, in order to eidetically reconstruct an abnormally function-
ing consciousness (madness) or a functionally normal lower form of subjectivity
(that is to say, an animal mind), or even the lowest possible type of subjective being
(Husserl, 2012: 328–334, 337f, 358–362). Husserl concludes that the animal mind,
just like human consciousness, has an egoic structure (Ichstruktur, Husserl, 1973c:
177); animals are embodied, like us, and they constitute a sensuous (and perceptual)
environment through passive instincts. The question of animal instincts will be the
topic of the next subsection.
Content courtesy of Springer Nature, terms of use apply. Rights reserved.
120
Husserl Studies (2022) 38:107–127
1 3
4.3 Animal Instincts
Since Nam-In Lee’s classic monograph on Husserl’s phenomenology of instincts,
most Husserl scholars accept the importance of the problem for the late Husserl
(Lee, 1993). The role of instincts in the reconstruction of animal subjectivity is
of special relevance to this article. Instinct intentionality in the phenomenological
sense was, for Husserl, a passive teleological directedness at unfolding, reaching,
and constituting certain appearances and their connections in an entirely (or pre-
dominantly) passive way. According to Husserl, four main levels of instinct inten-
tionality can be identified—the hyletic, the perceptive, the intersubjective, and the
spiritual-cultural (i.e. the instinctive striving after rationality and culture). The first
three can be found in animals, while the fourth is exclusive to human beings.
Later, in the 1930s, Husserl elaborated a more detailed phenomenological theory
of transcendental instincts.11 As indicated before, he inferred that there were lower
and higher levels of instincts, which correlated to lower and higher levels of subjec-
tivity and constitution. The highest form of instinct is a passive directedness towards
rationality, while the lower instincts function at the level of perception and—on the
lowest level—pure hyletic sensibility. Understanding the functioning of instinct in
the phenomenological sense can, for this reason, help us to understand the lower lev-
els of subjectivity—that is to say, the animal mind. The phenomenology of instinct
could be an indispensable means for reconstructing animal subjectivity, and to have
a partial understanding of what it is like to be an animal.
It is problematic to presuppose whether or not there is any possible subjectivity
without intersubjectivity. In this respect, intersubjective instinct forms a fundamen-
tal type of instinct on its own. Even on the level of hyletic constitution, there is an
instinctive passive openness to the other (see e.g. Husserl, 1973c: 605–608; also:
Lee, 1993: 198ff; Pugliese, 2009). Intersubjective instincts can clearly be identified
in animals; for instance, there is an instinctive relationship between the animal child
and its mother, and social instincts are present among other animals (cf. e.g. Husserl,
2006: 212f, 217f; Husserl, 1973c: 602, Husserl, 1992: 10f). While hyletic instincts
can be found in all animals, perceptual instincts are most obviously present only in
‘higher’ level animals.
Self-preservation (Selbsterhaltung) is an especially important manifestation of
instinct in Husserl’s view (Husserl, 2014: 98–102). In this context, self-preservation
is to be understood as an instinctive striving for the preservation of bodily existence
on both the individual and genetic level (self-reproduction and sexual reproduction).
From a phenomenological point of view, instinctive self-preservation on the physi-
cal level is to be interpreted as a perpetual and constitutive renewal, sustainment,
and preservation of embodiment. This instinctive constitution means, on the one
hand, experiential subjects have a passive openness to certain hyletic and perceptual
patterns and relations; and on the other hand, subjects have a passive teleological
drive towards such sensible appearances pertaining to their self-preservation.
11 Sources include Husserl (1973c), Husserl (1992), Husserl (2008), Husserl (2014), Husserl (2006).
Content courtesy of Springer Nature, terms of use apply. Rights reserved.
121
1 3
Husserl Studies (2022) 38:107–127
It is a crucial point in Husserl’s conception of instinctive animal life, and instincts
in general, that the passivity of instinctive intentionality and action is never to be
conceived straightforwardly as mechanistically determined consciousness and
behaviour. Instincts do not force a living being to act mechanistically, nor do they
imply a mechanistic attitude. Instinctive intentionality and action are motivated; they
open and articulate a horizon of possible actions; they always offer several options
in an indeterminate way. Instincts present certain non-specified goals to us, but they
do not inform us about how to attain them. This much falls to us, or to the animal in
question. Husserl’s philosophy of life is never deterministic, not even in the case of
animals.
5 Lowest Levels ofConsciousness: Invertebrate andEmbryonic Mind
All the essential components have now been reviewed such that it is possible here
to reconstruct Husserl’s account of minimal mind. Husserl’s points of departure for
conceiving of the ‘lower’ forms of consciousness are anomalous forms of subjectiv-
ity, such as the minds of animals and children. These types of consciousness have
a normality of their own; there is a normality in relative abnormality (cf. Ciocan,
2017: 10). According to Husserl, however, there are extremely anomalous forms of
consciousness, which can be considered as examples of minimal mind. Access to
such forms of subjectivity can be gained ontogenetically and phylogenetically—in
other words, from the most primitive organism in nature that has conscious expe-
rience, and from the earliest stage of human ontogenesis in which consciousness
appears. Husserl, in this context, explicitly draws parallels between the ‘lower-level’
animals on the one hand and the embryo and the infant on the other (e.g. Husserl,
1973b: 112–120, Husserl, 2014: 218–227). These considerations again raise ques-
tions concerning empathy: which kinds of beings can be constituted as conscious
from the phenomenological point of view? (Cf. Makkreel, 1996; Zirión, 2020).
5.1 The Phylogenetic Approach toMinimal Mind—the Jellyfish
At certain points, Husserl hypothesizes about ‘lower-level’ animals, such as jel-
lyfish, and the potential to reconstruct any semblance of consciousness therein
(Husserl, 1973b: 112–119, Husserl, 2003: 136). If the potential for consciousness
is restricted to animals with a nervous system then the jellyfish, with its decentral-
ized nervous system, could well be considered to be the bottom of the phylogenetic
tree—at least amongst animals with nerves. As stated in subsection3.3, the nervous
system could be interpreted, from a Husserlian perspective, as a functional subsys-
tem of the physical body (Körper) which integrates living being into nature, serv-
ing as a phenomenal bridge between the realms of motivation (spirit) and causation
(nature) and fundamentally contributing to the constitutive being-in-the-world of the
organism in question. Following this logic, it could be supposed that organisms with
more complex nervous systems constitute a more complex experience of the world.
Content courtesy of Springer Nature, terms of use apply. Rights reserved.
122
Husserl Studies (2022) 38:107–127
1 3
Consequently, the world of a jellyfish is perhaps the most primitive experiential
world of the simplest subject.
From a phenomenological point of view, a living being can be constituted as a
minimal subject ‘from the outside’ if it intelligibly motivates empathy while taking
into account, in a phenomenologically reflective manner, the best possible and rel-
evant scientific research concerning the functionality of organic bodies. There must
be a structural and functional analogy between a jellyfish’s body and our own; it
must have organs and body parts like ours—organs to move, sense, feed, urinate,
sexually reproduce, metabolize, and process information concerning its external and
internal environment (Husserl, 1973b: 67–70, 88f). The specific bodily constitution
and functioning of an organism, its organic structure, and the particular character-
istics of its organs mirror its specific environment. The body parts and organs are
intentionally related to certain functions and moments of being-in-the-world. It is
also important that a functional sublayer, like the nervous system, connects those
other organs to the psyche. Of particular importance from a phenomenological per-
spective is the meaning of those bodily organs and their functionality.
When attempting to reconstruct a minimal subject ‘from the inside’ (e.g. to re-
enact ‘what it is like to be a jellyfish’), every higher level of consciousness should be
abstracted away, leaving only the most basic structures of subjectivity without which
no subject or subjectivity of any kind could be conceived. Even at the lowest level
of consciousness, it seems that there is an egoic structure (‘ego–cogito–cogitatum’)
so there must also be an experiencing subject.12 With all higher layers of conscious-
ness removed, only the most primitive capacities remain. At this level, there is only
a rudimentary environment made up of the most elementary data—an environment
of constantly flowing and changing hyletic contents which nevertheless form certain
patterns to which an organism can respond.
A minimal subject, such as a jellyfish, discloses a ‘minimal environment’ with
characteristics that are absolutely indispensable for its survival. There are minimal
structures of purely passive instinctive intentionality, which are directed towards the
surrounding world in ways that are crucial for the self-preservation of the subject.
The subject experiences its own body, which makes up a system of primal kinaes-
thesia and proprioception. Such bodily experiences are necessary for the subject to
continually adjust its position to a changing environment. The animal’s instincts
enable it to navigate around possible food, sexual partners, or threats, for example. It
instinctively moves towards positive stimuli and away from the negative. Instincts of
12 At the lowest level of experience, the ‘cogitatum’ can be understood as the ‘hyle’ which are ‘alien to
the ego’ (ichfremde). At that level, it is not necessary for there to be intentional morphe in order to have
a ‘cogitatum’ in a wider sense. An ‘intentional morphe’ is an achievement of the intellect, according to
Husserl, so it is the accomplishment par excellence of a higher subjective capacity. Husserl, however,
in the C-Manuscripts (Husserl, 2006) and other late materials on genetic phenomenology, is quite clear
that, at the lowest level of subjectivity, which is the level of primal passivity (Urpassivität), the hyle
represents peculiar objective elements and relations in the world, and thus that the hyletic flow represents
the world as such on its own. At the lowest level, the hyle (the hyletic relations, complexes, and the hyl-
etic flow as such) is an immediate manifestation of something ego-transcendent, objective, or even the
world as such.
Content courtesy of Springer Nature, terms of use apply. Rights reserved.
123
1 3
Husserl Studies (2022) 38:107–127
self-preservation have their own periodicity. After satisfying periodic instincts, such
as hunger and sexual drive, the urges return again and again, motivating the organ-
ism to explore its environment.
Furthermore, certain textual instances by Husserl support this view, according
to which the fundamental level of consciousness could also be characterized as an
elementary form of self-relatedness—a sort of self-disclosure (cf. Husserl, 1969: 83;
also: Zahavi, 2017: 198).
5.2 The Ontogenetic Way totheMinimal Mind—the Primal Child
The late Husserl also attempted a systematic reconstruction of early childhood con-
sciousness—particularly that of an embryo—which can similarly be understood as
an approach to phenomenology of minimal mind.13 In this context, he differentiated
between a first and a second childhood. The first refers to the embryonic ego. The
subject in the first childhood is the ego in the womb, in the mother’s body. At this
stage, the embryo co-exists in a unity with its mother, and its immediate environ-
ment is the womb. The second childhood is early infancy–the childhood of the new-
born baby. In this context, attention should be drawn to Alice Pugliese’s research on
the ‘primal child’ (Urkind) and its connection with the instinctive sphere of the ego.
According to Pugliese, “By means of the phenomenological reduction, drives reveal
a peculiar subject, the ‘original child’ (Urkind), which is described not as a figure
of developmental psychology but as a transcendental subject pre-forming the way
the world appears to us” (Pugliese, 2009: 141). It is of special importance for our
present concern that the primal child is here understood as a transcendental subject.
On my interpretation, the primal child in Husserl is to be understood as the first
awakening of the ego, and its early infancy is the beginning of its worldly constitu-
tion (cf. Husserl, 2006: 104f). We can speak of the primal child in the narrower
sense of an embryo and in the wider sense of the newborn infant. The notion of
primal child thus embraces and connects the concepts of first and second childhood
(Husserl, 1973c: 604–608, cf. also Depraz, 2004: 207f). Thus the first and second
childhoods merit a closer look.
Already feeling and perceiving, the embryonic ego is the most primitive earliest
form of subjectivity. In its immediate environment in the womb, the embryo experi-
ences itself in direct unity with its mother (cf. Miglio, 2019). It has a flow of primal
kinaesthetic experiences, and it experiences its environment in the flow of primal
hyletic data (cf. Husserl, 1973c: 604f; Husserl, 2014: 27). In the embryonic mind,
this hyletic flow is connected with a flow of primordial present. The embryo has
a rudimentary time-consciousness of its own (cf. Husserl, 2006: 74). According to
Husserl, it inherits a complete system of instincts from the mother (Husserl, 2014:
222). This instinctual system is less developed in the womb, because the embryo has
less developed needs and does not have to act and move much. Its needs are satisfied
13 Cf. e.g. (Husserl 1973b: 178–185, 233, 582ff, 595, 605–609; Husserl 2008: 466ff, 478–482, 485f;
Husserl, 2012: 221f; Husserl, 2006: 74f, 104f, 108, 440, 444.)
Content courtesy of Springer Nature, terms of use apply. Rights reserved.
124
Husserl Studies (2022) 38:107–127
1 3
immediately through the mother’s physiological processes. Being in the mother’s
womb in the embryonic stage of development, the embryo has no world of its own.
World-constitution in the strict sense begins when the child is born. The newborn
child is still a primal child. Everything is fresh for the newborn; in a stage of perpet-
ual becoming and beginning, there are not yet any crystallized structures. Unlike the
embryo, however, the newborn also has perceptions—not merely a flow of hyletic
data. The child inherits a set of instinctual structures responsible for the constitution
of its bodily being-in-the-world. This instinctual set, however, has several layers,
some of which are inactive in the early stage of infancy, with the higher instinctual
layers gradually activating as the child grows older. The whole instinctual set of self
and world-constitution evolves and is activated as the child reaches full maturity.
In early childhood, the child’s world is multi-centred. The emergence and stabi-
lization of the ego-centric perspective arrives with age. In early infancy, there are
two centres in the life of the primal child—its own and that of its mother. The primal
child is instinctively directed to its mother, on whom it is dependent for food (Hus-
serl, 2006: 326), love, and safety. The primal child constitutes itself and its world in
a constitutive entanglement with the mother. According to Husserl, the mother—
child relationship is the first and primordial intersubjective relation (Husserl, 1973c:
511; see also Zahavi, 2003: 113; Pugliese, 2009: 154). It is a bi-polar unity of two
subjects who constitute a world together.
With regard to the reconstruction of minimal mind, there is a fundamental differ-
ence between the child and the animal. A child inherits instinctual structures which
eventually establish a teleology towards infinite rational worldly engagement (cf.
Husserl, 1973c: 403–405; see also Di Martino, 2014: 67–71). An animal’s instinc-
tual structures settle into a finite teleology, and enclose it into a finite environment.
In Husserl’s opinion, the most important differences between child and animal are
that the animal lacks the capacity of self-reflexivity and active transformation of its
environment (cf. Husserl, 1973c: 184f). By contrast, the human child is instinctively
directed towards rationality as infinite and universal praxis.
6 Conclusion
By following Husserl’s phylogenetic and ontogenetic approaches, as well as his
comparative analyses of animal and child, this paper has offered a systematic recon-
struction of Husserl’s theory of minimal mind. These reconstructive efforts lead to
the conclusions that (1) even a minimal subject must have the ego–cogito–cogitata
tripartite structure, and that (2) no consciousness, be it of the lowest level, can be
conceived without phenomenality. Moreover, the minimal ego must constitute itself
as a bodily being in a very primitive environment. It must have some kinaesthetic
and proprioceptive experiences; it possesses a set of instincts through which it is
directed to the constitution of certain hyletic data, which make up its environment.
This paper had two principal theses. First, I claimed that Husserl had a system-
atic theory of minimal mind and that, throughout his career, he perpetually worked
on various methodological approaches that might render minimal mind accessible
for phenomenological reflection. ‘Lower level’ animals (such as invertebrates) and
Content courtesy of Springer Nature, terms of use apply. Rights reserved.
125
1 3
Husserl Studies (2022) 38:107–127
embryos represent subjects with such a minimal level of mentality. I have attempted
to reconstruct the various important pathways through which he thematized the low-
est level of subjectivity from the first-person perspective and in other subjects. In
doing this, I drew upon the methodology of phenomenological reflection, according
to which the concept of mind—mentality in the strict sense—cannot be separated
from the general possibility of having phenomenally conscious experiences of the
lowest intensity. My second main thesis was related to Husserl’s idea of the essential
embodiment of the ego. According to Husserl, there is a fundamental a priori neces-
sary connection between the subjective and objective aspects of the body, between
Leib and Körper, that affects the subject’s entire mental life. This was important
with respect to the overall argument in this article for two reasons. On the one hand,
this conception of embodiment made it phenomenologically legitimate to regard
bodily behavior as an indubitable indication of the subject’s internal life. On the
other hand, this indication serves as a Leitfaden in conceiving of the simplest pos-
sible subject capable of any mental activity whatsoever. Minimal mind, due to the
inevitable embodiment of subjectivity, implies minimal embodiment.
It is my hope that these theoretical considerations offer a fruitful contribution to
contemporary research on the origins of consciousness in the natural world.
Acknowledgements I would like to express my gratitude for the contribution, comments and remarks
offered to this present study by the following persons: Andrew Barron, Flóra Besze, Jonathan Birch,
Marco Cavallaro, András Csillag, Patrizia D’Ettorre, Christoph Durt, Todd Feinberg, Thomas Fuchs,
Shaun Gallagher, Matías Graffigna, Lajos Horváth, Bryce Huebner, Colin Klein, Nam-In Lee, Jon Mal-
latt, David Morgan, Andrei Simionescu-Panait, Antonio Zirión Quijano, Jessie Stanier, Attila Szabó,
Evan Thompson, Vincent Joseph Torley, Tünde Vajda, Péter András Varga, Thomas Vongehr, Roberto
Walton, Jeffrey Yoshimi, and Dan Zahavi. I am grateful to the editors-in-chief of Husserl Studies, to
Walter Hopp and Hanne Jacobs. I would also like to thank my blind peer reviewers for their detailed,
thorough, and helpful reflections and suggestions.
Funding Open access funding provided by Budapest Business School - University of Applied Science.
This study was supported by the János Bolyai Research Scholarship of the Hungarian Academy of Sci-
ences (Project: BO/00421/18/2) and by the No. 138745 project of Hungarian Scientific Research Fund.
Open Access This article is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International License,
which permits use, sharing, adaptation, distribution and reproduction in any medium or format, as long as
you give appropriate credit to the original author(s) and the source, provide a link to the Creative Com-
mons licence, and indicate if changes were made. The images or other third party material in this article
are included in the article’s Creative Commons licence, unless indicated otherwise in a credit line to the
material. If material is not included in the article’s Creative Commons licence and your intended use is
not permitted by statutory regulation or exceeds the permitted use, you will need to obtain permission
directly from the copyright holder. To view a copy of this licence, visit http:// creat iveco mmons. org/ licen
ses/ by/4. 0/.
References
Barron, A., & Klein, C. (2016). What insects can tell us about the origins of consciousness? PNAS,
113(18), 4900–4918.
Birch, J. (2020). The Search for invertebrate consciousness. Noûs, 1–21.
Cabestan, P. (1995). La constitution de l’animal dans les Ideen. Alter, 3, 39–79.
Content courtesy of Springer Nature, terms of use apply. Rights reserved.
126
Husserl Studies (2022) 38:107–127
1 3
Carruthers, P. (2000). Phenomenal consciousness. A naturalistic theory. Cambridge University Press.
Ciocan, C. (2017). Husserl’s phenomenology of animality and the paradoxes of normality. Human Stud-
ies, 40, 175–190.
Depraz, N. (1995). Y a-t-il une animalité transcendantale? Alter, 3, 81–114.
Depraz, N. (2004). The Husserlian theory of intersubjectivity as alterology. Emergent theories and wis-
dom traditions in the light of genetic phenomenology. In D. Moran & L. Embree (Eds.), Phenom-
enology: Critical Concepts in Philosophy. Volume 2. (pp. 201–214). London: Routledge.
Di Martino, C. (2014). Husserl and the question of animality. Research in Phenomenology, 44(1), 50–75.
Dufourcq, A. (2014). Is a world without animals Possible? Environmental Philosophy, 11(1), 71–92.
Feinberg, T., & Mallatt, J. M. (2016). The Ancient Origins of Consciousness. How the Brain Created
Experience. MIT Press.
Ferencz-Flatz, C. (2017). Humanizing the animal, animalizing the human: Husserl on pets. Human Stud-
ies, 40, 217–232.
Gallagher, S., & Zahavi, D. (2008). The Phenomenological Mind: An Introduction to Philosophy of Mind
and Cognitive Science. Routledge.
Ginsburg, S., & Jablonka, E. (2019). The Evolution of the Sensitive Soul. Learning and the Origins of
Consciousness. MIT Press.
Huebner, B. (2011). Minimal minds. In T. L. Beauchamp & R. G. Frey (Eds.), The Oxford Handbook of
Animal Ethics (pp. 441–468). Oxford University Press.
Husserl, E. (1950). Cartesianische Meditationen und Pariser Vorträge. S. Strasser (Ed). Husserliana I.
Den Haag: Nijhoff.
Husserl, E. (1952). Ideen zur einer reinen Phänomenologie und phänomenologischen Philoso-
phieZweites Buch: Phänomenologische Untersuchungen zur Konstitution. M. Biemel (Ed.). Hus-
serliana IV. Den Haag: Nijhoff.
Husserl, E. (1969). Zur Phänomenologie des inneren Zeitbewusstesens (1893–1917). R. Boehm (Ed.).
Husserliana X. Den Haag: Nijhoff.
Husserl, E. (1971). Ideen zur einer reinen Phänomenologie und phänomenologischen Philosophie.
Drittes Buch: Die Phänomenologie und die Fundamente der Wissenschaften. M. Biemel (Ed.). Hus-
serliana V. Den Haag: Nijhoff.
Husserl, E. (1973a). Zur Phänomenologie der Intersubjektivität. Texte aus dem Nachlass. Erster Teil.
1905–1920. I. Kern (Ed.). Husserliana XIII. Den Haag: Nijhoff.
Husserl, E. (1973b). Zur Phänomenologie der Intersubjektivität. Texte aus dem Nachlass. Zweiter Teil.
1921–28. I. Kern (Ed.) .Husserliana XIV. Den Haag: Nijhoff.
Husserl, E. (1973c). Zur Phänomenologie der Intersubjektivität Texte aus dem Nachlass. Dritter Teil.
1929–35. I. Kern (Ed.). Husserliana XV. Den Haag: Nijhoff.
Husserl, E. (1973d). Ding und Raum. Vorlesungen 1907. U. Claesges (Ed.). Husserliana XVI. Den Haag:
Nijhoff.
Husserl, E. (1976). Die Krisis der europäischen Wissenschaften und die transzendentale Phänomenolo-
gie. Eine Einleitung in die phänomenologische Philosophie. W. Biemel (Ed.). Husserliana VI. Den
Haag: Nijhoff.
Husserl, E. (1988). Aufsätze und Vorträge. 1922–1937. T. Nenon & H.R. Sepp (Eds.). Husserliana
XXVII. Den Haag: Kluwer.
Husserl, E. (1992). Die Krisis der europäischen Wissenschaften und die transzendentale Phänomenolo-
gie. Ergänzungsband. Texte aus dem Nachlass 1934–1937. R. N. Smid (Ed.). Husserliana XXIX.
Den Haag: Kluwer.
Husserl, E. (2003). Transzendentaler Idealismus Texte aus dem Nachlass (1908–1921). R. D. Rollinger &
R. Sowa (Eds.). Husserliana XXXVI. Dordrecht: Kluwer.
Husserl, E. (2004). Einleitung in die Ethik. Vorlesungen Sommersemester 1920 und 1924. H. Peucker
(Ed.). Husserliana XXXVII. Dordrecht: Kluwer.
Husserl, E. (2006). Späte Texte über Zeitkonstitution (1929–1934). Die C-Manuskripte. D. Lohmar (Ed.).
Husserliana Materialienband VIII. New York: Springer.
Husserl, E. (2008). Die Lebenswelt. Auslegungen der vorgegebenen Welt und ihrer Konstitution. Texte
aus dem Nachlass (1916–1937). R. Sowa (Ed.). Husserliana XXXIX. New York: Springer.
Husserl, E. (2012). Zur Lehre vom Wesen und zur Methode der eidetischen Variation. Texte aus dem
Nachlass (1891–1935). D. Fonfara (Ed.). Husserliana XLI. New York: Springer.
Husserl, E. (2014). Grenzprobleme der Phänomenologie. Analysen des Unbewusstseins und der Instinkte.
Metaphysik. Späte Ethik (Texte aus dem Nachlass 1908–1937). R. Sowa & T. Vongehr (Eds.). Hus-
serliana XLII. New York: Springer.
Content courtesy of Springer Nature, terms of use apply. Rights reserved.
127
1 3
Husserl Studies (2022) 38:107–127
Husserl, E. (2020). Studien zur Struktur des Bewusstseins. Teilband III. Wille und Handlung. Text aus
dem Nachlass (1902–1934). U. Melle (Ed.). Husserliana XLIII/3. New York: Springer.
Lee, N.-I. (1993). Edmund Husserls Phänomenologie der Instinkte. Kluwer.
Lotz, C. (2006). Psyche or person? Husserl’s phenomenology of animals. In D. Lohmar & D. Fonfara
(Eds.), Interdisziplinäre perspektiven der phänomenologie. Neue felder der kooperation: Cognitive
science, Neurowissenschaften, psychologie, soziologie, politikwissenschaft und religionswissen-
schaft (pp. 190–202). Dordrecht: Springer.
Mahen, C. (2017). Plant Minds. A Philosophical Defence. London & New York: Routledge.
Makkreel, R. A. (1996). How is empathy related to understanding? In T. Nenon & L. Embree (Eds.),
Issues in Husserl’s Ideas II (pp. 199–212). Springer.
Margulis, L. (2001). The conscious cell. Annals of the New York Academy of Sciences, 929, 55–70.
Martín, J. S. & Peñaranda, M. L. P. (2001). Animal life and phenomenology. In S. Crowell, L. Embree,
& S. J. Julian (Eds.), The Reach of Reflection. Issues for Phenomenology´s Second Century. Chap-
ter15. Electropress. Electronic.
Merker, B. (2005). The liabilities of mobility: A selection pressure for the transition to consciousness in
animal evolution. Consciousness and Cognition, 14, 89–114.
Merker, B. (2007). Consciousness without a cerebral cortex: A challenge for neuroscience and medicine.
Behavioral and Brain Sciences, 30, 63–81.
Miglio, N. (2019). Affective achemas, gestational incorporation, and fetal-maternal touch: A husserlian
inquiry. Humana Mente, 36, 66–99.
Monod, J.-C. (2014). Why I talk to my dog: Husserl and the extension of intersubjectivity. Environmental
Philosophy, 11(1), 17–26.
Moran, D. (2013). The phenomenology of embodiment: Intertwining and reflexivity. In R. T. Jensen & D.
Moran (Eds.), The Phenomenology of Embodied Subjectivity (pp. 285–304). Springer.
Moran, D. (2000). introduction to phenomenology. London & New York: Routledge.
Painter, C. (2007). Appropriating the philosophies of Edmund Husserl and Edith Stein: Animal psy-
che, empathy, and moralsubjectivity. In C. Painter & C. Lotz (Eds.), Phenomenology and the Non-
Human Animal (pp. 97–115). Springer.
Pugliese, A. (2009). Triebsphäre und Urkindheit des Ich. Husserl Studies, 25, 141–157.
Torley, V. J. (2007). The Anatomy of a Minimal Mind: A model of the simplest kind of mind that an
organism could have, based on a philosopher’s synthesis of the latest scientific research. 30 April
2020, from https:// www. angel fire. com/ linux/ vjtor ley/ Anato my. pdf
Tye, M. (2017). Tense Bees and Shell-Shocked Crabs. Are Animals Conscious? Oxford University Press.
Vergani, M. (2021). Husserl’s hesitant attempts to extend personhood to animals. Husserl Studies, 37(1),
67–83.
Yoshimi, J. (2010). Husserl on psycho-physical laws. The New Yearbook for Phenomenology and Phe-
nomenological Philosophy X, pp. 25–42.
Zahavi, D. (1994). Husserl’s phenomenology of the body. Études Phénoménologique, 19, 63–84.
Zahavi, D. (1996). Husserl und die transzendentale Intersubjektivität. Kluwer.
Zahavi, D. (2003). Husserl’s Phenomenology. Stanford University Press.
Zahavi, D. (2017). Husserl’s Legacy. Oxford University Press.
Zirión, A. Q. (2020). Animal Body and Animal World. Phenomenology in the Border of Empathy.
Manuscript.
Publisher’s Note Springer Nature remains neutral with regard to jurisdictional claims in published
maps and institutional affiliations.
Content courtesy of Springer Nature, terms of use apply. Rights reserved.
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
Terms and Conditions
Springer Nature journal content, brought to you courtesy of Springer Nature Customer Service Center
GmbH (“Springer Nature”).
Springer Nature supports a reasonable amount of sharing of research papers by authors, subscribers
and authorised users (“Users”), for small-scale personal, non-commercial use provided that all
copyright, trade and service marks and other proprietary notices are maintained. By accessing,
sharing, receiving or otherwise using the Springer Nature journal content you agree to these terms of
use (“Terms”). For these purposes, Springer Nature considers academic use (by researchers and
students) to be non-commercial.
These Terms are supplementary and will apply in addition to any applicable website terms and
conditions, a relevant site licence or a personal subscription. These Terms will prevail over any
conflict or ambiguity with regards to the relevant terms, a site licence or a personal subscription (to
the extent of the conflict or ambiguity only). For Creative Commons-licensed articles, the terms of
the Creative Commons license used will apply.
We collect and use personal data to provide access to the Springer Nature journal content. We may
also use these personal data internally within ResearchGate and Springer Nature and as agreed share
it, in an anonymised way, for purposes of tracking, analysis and reporting. We will not otherwise
disclose your personal data outside the ResearchGate or the Springer Nature group of companies
unless we have your permission as detailed in the Privacy Policy.
While Users may use the Springer Nature journal content for small scale, personal non-commercial
use, it is important to note that Users may not:
use such content for the purpose of providing other users with access on a regular or large scale
basis or as a means to circumvent access control;
use such content where to do so would be considered a criminal or statutory offence in any
jurisdiction, or gives rise to civil liability, or is otherwise unlawful;
falsely or misleadingly imply or suggest endorsement, approval , sponsorship, or association
unless explicitly agreed to by Springer Nature in writing;
use bots or other automated methods to access the content or redirect messages
override any security feature or exclusionary protocol; or
share the content in order to create substitute for Springer Nature products or services or a
systematic database of Springer Nature journal content.
In line with the restriction against commercial use, Springer Nature does not permit the creation of a
product or service that creates revenue, royalties, rent or income from our content or its inclusion as
part of a paid for service or for other commercial gain. Springer Nature journal content cannot be
used for inter-library loans and librarians may not upload Springer Nature journal content on a large
scale into their, or any other, institutional repository.
These terms of use are reviewed regularly and may be amended at any time. Springer Nature is not
obligated to publish any information or content on this website and may remove it or features or
functionality at our sole discretion, at any time with or without notice. Springer Nature may revoke
this licence to you at any time and remove access to any copies of the Springer Nature journal content
which have been saved.
To the fullest extent permitted by law, Springer Nature makes no warranties, representations or
guarantees to Users, either express or implied with respect to the Springer nature journal content and
all parties disclaim and waive any implied warranties or warranties imposed by law, including
merchantability or fitness for any particular purpose.
Please note that these rights do not automatically extend to content, data or other material published
by Springer Nature that may be licensed from third parties.
If you would like to use or distribute our Springer Nature journal content to a wider audience or on a
regular basis or in any other manner not expressly permitted by these Terms, please contact Springer
Nature at
onlineservice@springernature.com
