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On the Personal Experience of Momentariness in Buddhism

Authors:

Abstract

“You are dying from moment to moment and living from moment to moment and you’re different each time... I am undergoing a transformation and myself is beginning to disappear.” This contemporary account of a person diagnosed as a schizophrenic is a description of experience, very similar to the experience, depicted in some of the ancient texts of the Buddhist Yogāchāra teaching of momentariness. The view that some of the basic ideas in the various Indian teachings, and in Buddhism in particular, are based on a personal experience, is not new. The question to what extent certain ideas used as an object of contemplation, such as that of momentariness, determine the experiences of neophytes remains open. Here we will discuss the mutual relationship between the meditation practices, experience, the teaching (dharma), and the metaphysics of the Yogāchāra teaching of momentariness. The practices, especially invented to view, to realize, even probably to create momentariness, are aimed at destroying the attachment to the world and even to the sense of self. The meditative techniques themselves manipulate the temporal processing of information and thus shake the foundations of a stable view of the world as consisting of objects and relationships between them. The deep knowledge of the central Buddhist teaching dharma is a precondition for providing the mental health of the practitioners. Keywords: momentariness, Buddhism, Yogācāra, meditation, dharma, microgenesis, time experience
Confucius Institute in Sofia, 2021
ПЪТЯТ НА КОПРИНАТА:
Доклади от Шестата международна конференция по китаистика
„Пътят на коприната, организирана от Институт Конфуций – София
4–5 юни 2021 г.
THE SILK ROAD:
Collection of Papers from the Sixth International Conference on Chinese
Studies „The Silk Road”, Organized by Confucius Institute in Sofia,
4-5 June 2021
Техническа редакция и съставителство: Мария Маринова
Коректура: Лиу Сиумин, Ивайло Маринов
Предпечат: Иво Ников
Дизайн: Емил Христов
Печат: Документен център THE NET
ISSN: 1314-9865
Институт Конфуций в София, 2021
Collection of Papers from the Sixth International
Conference on Chinese Studies
Organized by Confucius Institute in Soa
4–5 June 2021
THE SILK ROAD
CONTENTS СЪДЪРЖАНИЕ
CONTENTS
Language, Education and Literature
Език, образование и литература
HISTORICAL CONTENTS IN BULGARIAN LANGUAGE TEACHING IN CHINA
Lin Wenshuang . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
THE INFLUENCE OF NEWS HEADLINES PATTERNS ON THE GRAMMATICAL BEHAVIOUR OF
THE ARGUMENTS IN THE V-O VERBS
Chen Sen, Roula Tsokalidou . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
CAUSAL CONSTRUCTIONS IN MODERN CHINESE
Elena Kolpachkova . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25
CHINESE CULTURAL TERMS IN MORRISON AND MEDHURST’S CHINESE–ENGLISH
DICTIONARIES
Mugur Zlotea . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 38
CHINESE LEARNER CORPORA AND CREATION OF SLOVAK LEARNER CORPUS OF CHINESE
Maria Istvanova . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 48
THE INFLUENCE OF BUDDHIST TEMPLES ON TANG DYNASTY POETRY
Wang Xueting . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 56
FROM SHEN CONGWEN IN XIANGXI TO GIOVANNI VERGA IN SICILY
Yang Zhiya . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 62
FORGOTTEN BOOK, FORGOTTEN LIFE: POLISH OFFICER-SINOLOGIST PAWEŁ
ALEXANDROWICZ AND HIS LAND OF THE DRAGON
Bogdan Zemanek . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 70
CHINESE OLYMPIADS FOR SCHOOLCHILDREN AS AN IMPORTANT ELEMENT OF THE
LINGUOCULTURAL SPACE
Evgenia Mitkina . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 79
LET THE RAIN AND THE FIRE LISTEN TO MY TALE – AN ECONARRATOLOGICAL READING
OF THE LAST QUARTER OF THE MOON, BY CHI ZIJIAN
Ioana Clara Enescu . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 84
БЪЛГАРСКИЯТ ЕЗИК ОТ ПЕРСПЕКТИВАТА НА КИТАЙСКИТЕ СТУДЕНТИ BULGARIAN
LANGUAGE FROM CHINESE STUDENTS’ PERSPECTIVE
Христина Теодосиева Hristina Teodosieva . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 90
CHANGING PERCEPTION OF HU SHI AMONG CHINESE INTELLECTUALS
Yevheniia Hobova . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 99
EDUCATION FOR SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT IN CHINA
Antoaneta Velikova . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 105
Political, Diplomatic and Economic Relations
Политически, дипломатически и икономически отношения
КИТАЙСКИЯТ ДИГИТАЛЕН ПЪТ НА КОПРИНАТА: ВЪЗМОЖНОСТИ,
ПРЕДИЗВИКАТЕЛСТВА, СТРАТЕГИЧЕСКИ ПОСЛЕДИЦИ CHINA’S DIGITAL SILK ROAD:
OPPORTUNITIES, CHALLENGES, STRATEGIC IMPLICATIONS
Валентин Катранджиев Valentin Katrandzhiev . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 114
THE 17+1 FORMAT: SUNSET OR A NEW DAWN?
Antonina Habova . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 132
THE “THREE SEAS INITIATIVE” VS. INITIATIVE “16/17 + 1” CEEC AS AN AREA OF
GEOPOLITICAL CONFRONTATION BETWEEN THE USA AND CHINA
Evgeniy Kandilarov . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 139
THE PEOPLE’S REPUBLIC OF CHINA TODAY – ACHIEVEMENTS, PROBLEMS, TRENDS AND
PERSPECTIVES
Nako Stefanov . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 145
SOCIO-ECONOMIC DYNAMICS OF THE “NEW SILK ROAD”: THE CHINA–EUROPE RAIL
SERVICE AND THE BELT AND ROAD INITIATIVE
Lyu Yuan . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 153
CHINESE POP-CULTURE: THE SOFT POWER TOOL FOR CULTURAL DIPLOMACY IN CHINA’S
INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS
Jood Sharaf . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 161
AZERBAIJAN AS AN INTERCULTURAL UNIT IN THE SOUTH CAUCASUS ON THE SILK ROAD
Bisserka Veleva . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 168
GREENING THE DRAGON: TRENDS IN CHINA’S RENEWABLE ENERGY REVOLUTION
Elizabeth Yoneva . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 178
CHINA AND IRAN – A NEW DYNAMICS WITHIN THE STRATEGIC COOPERATION
Bogdana Todorova . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 188
CHINA’S ARCTIC DREAMS – PROJECTS, PARTNERS AND REALITIES
Katina Yoneva . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 197
ИРАНСКИЯТ ДЕТОНАТОР В ГЕОСТРАТЕГИЧЕСКИЯ ПРОЕКТ НА КИТАЙ „ЕДИН ПОЯС,
ЕДИН ПЪТ“ THE IRANIAN FULMINATOR IN CHINA’S GEOSTRATEGIC PROJECT “ONE
BELT, ONE ROAD”
Михаел Козарски, Валери Иванов Michael Kozarski, Valeri Ivanov . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 205
Historical Links and Cultural Exchange
Исторически връзки и културен обмен
“一带一路”倡议下中国文化在保加利亚传播的新特点 NEW FEATURES OF THE PROMOTION OF
CHINESE CULTURE IN BULGARIA UNDER THE “ONE BELT, ONE ROAD” INITIATIVE
陈瑛 Chen Ying . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 220
TECHNIQUE ADOPTION AND ARTISTIC ADAPTION: SILK WEAVINGS OF THE KHITAN LIAO
(907–1125)
Hang Lin . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 226
CHINA’S CULTURAL HERITAGE IN A HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE
Joanna Wardęga . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 238
唐代绸之路与中印关系 THE SILK ROUTE IN THE TANG DYNASTY AND SINO-INDIAN
RELATIONS
Vivek Mani Tripathi (智辉) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 247
TYPOLOGICAL CHARACTERISTICS OF PREHISTORIC BURIALS IN XINJIANG
Maria Marinova . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 256
ПРЕДСТАВЛЕНИЯ НА СЪЧУАНСКА ТРАДИЦИОННА ОПЕРА ЧУАНДЗЮ (CHUANJU 川剧) В
БЪ Л ГА РИ Я ПР ЕЗ 19 59 ГО ДИ НА И ТЯ ХН АТА РЕ ЦЕП ЦИ Я PERFORMANCES OF TRADITIONAL
SICHUAN OPERA (CHUANJU 川剧) IN BULGARIA IN 1959 AND THEIR RECEPTION
Миглена Ценова Miglena Tzenova . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .267
CULTURAL HERITAGE IN CHINA: PROTECTION AND RESTITUTION OF CHINESE CULTURAL
GOODS
Magdalena Łągiewska . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 274
ЗА НЯКОИ ПАРАЛЕЛИ МЕЖДУ СЪВРЕМЕНЕН ИРАН И САСАНИДСКИ ИРАН ОТ VІІ В. –
ПРОЕКЦИЯ НА СИЛА ПО ПЪТЯ НА КОПРИНАТА PARALLELS BETWEEN PRESENT-DAY
IRAN AND SASANIAN IRAN FROM THE 7TH CENTURY – POWER PROJECTION ON THE SILK
ROAD
Марио Аппен Mario Appen . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 282
Philosophy and Religion
Философия и религия
CHRISTIAN ARTIFACTS AND IMAGES FROM TANG TO YUAN DYNASTY
A BRIEF ACCOUNT ON PRACTICING CHRISTIANITY ALONG THE SILK ROADS FROM THE 7TH
TO THE 15TH CENTURY
Antonio De Caro . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 292
ON THE PERSONAL EXPERIENCE OF MOMENTARINESS IN BUDDHISM
Gergana Ruseva . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 301
ДОКТРИНАТА ЗА АЛАЯВИДЖНАНА В РАННИТЕ БУДИСТКИ ТЕКСТОВЕ THE DOCTRINE
OF ĀLAYAVIJÑĀNA IN EARLY BUDDHIST TEXTS
Елия Аличкова Eliya Alichkova . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 315
THE UNDERLYING PRINCIPLES OF THE ARISTOCRATIC WORLDVIEW IN THE FOREWORD
OF SHIN KOKIN WAKASHŪ COMPOSED IN CLASSICAL CHINESE
Aleksandar Ivanov . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 320
NATURAL PHILOSOPHY IN DAOISM
Desislava Damyanova . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 326
TAOIST PALACE TAIQING IN THE CONTEXT OF THE HISTORY OF THE CITY OF SHENYANG
(BASED ON FIELDWORK)
Elena Varova . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 333
Tourism, Spiritual and Physical Culture
Туризъм, духовна и физическа култура
PROMOTING CHINESE CULTURAL TOURISM THROUGH EVENTS AND EXHIBITIONS IN
SOFIA BETWEEN 2017 AND 2021
Sonya Alexieva . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 340
THE DAWN OF HEAVEN: AN INTERCULTURAL APPROACH ON THE MYTHICAL FOUNDER
THROUGH RENÉ GIRARD’S SCAPEGOAT MECHANISM
João Marcelo M. Martins . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 349
КИТАЙСКИЯТ ТРАДИЦИОНЕН ПРАЗНИК ЦИНМИН (ДЕН ЗА ПОЧИСТВАНЕ НА
ГРОБОВЕТЕ) КАТО КОЛЕКТИВЕН РЕСУРС ЗА СПРАВЯНЕ С ЕКЗИСТЕНЦИАЛНАТА
КРИЗА НА ПРЕХОДА МЕЖДУ ЖИВОТА И СМЪРТТА В НЕТРАДИЦИОННИТЕ УСЛОВИЯ
НА ПАНДЕМИЯТА ОТ КОВИД-19 TRADITIONAL CHINESE FESTIVAL QINGMING (TOMB
SWEEPING)AS A RESOURCE FOR DEALING WITH THE EXISTENTIAL CRISIS BETWEEN LIFE
AND DEATH UNDER THE NON-TRADITIONAL CONDITIONS OF THE COVID PANDEMIC
Евелина Хайн Evelina Hein . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 356
ANCIENT WISDOM IN CHINESE TRADITIONAL MEDICINE: THE NEW FACE FROM MODERN
SCIENCE
Denka Marinova . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 366
ЦИГУН, ДАОСКИ ПРАКТИКИ И ТАЙЧИ КИТАЙСКИЯТ ПОДХОД КЪМ ЗДРАВЕТО
В УСЛОВИЯТА НА COVID-19 QIGONG, TAO PRACTICES AND TAI CHI – THE CHINESE
APPROACH TO HEALTH IN CONDITIONS OF COVID-19
Румяна Буджева Rumiana Budjeva . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 372
HEALTHY CHINA 2030: A PLAN TOWARDS GROWTH, DEVELOPMENT AND INNOVATION IN
HEALTH SECTOR AND GLOBAL GOVERNANCE
Anabela Santiago . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 380
ДАО – ПЪТ НА ВОЙНАТА И МИРА TAO – THE WAY OF WAR AND PEACE
Валери Иванов Valeri Ivanov . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 389
THE BESTIARY’S CODE OF CHINESE CULTURE THROUGH THE IMAGES OF THE DRAGON,
TIGER AND TURTLE
Tatyana Mishchenko, Nikita Pochtarev . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 396
301
On the Personal Experience of Momentariness in Buddhism
Gergana Ruseva,
SoaUniversity“St.KlimentOhridski”
Abstract
“You are dying from moment to moment and living from moment to moment and you’re
different each time… I am undergoing a transformation and myself is beginning to disap-
pear.” This contemporary account of a person diagnosed as a schizophrenic is a descrip-
tion of experience, very similar to the experience, depicted in some of the ancient texts of
the Buddhist Yogāchāra teaching of momentariness. The view that some of the basic ideas
in the various Indian teachings, and in Buddhism in particular, are based on a personal
experience, is not new. The question to what extent certain ideas used as an object of
contemplation, such as that of momentariness, determine the experiences of neophytes
remains open. Here we will discuss the mutual relationship between the meditation prac-
tices, experience, the teaching (dharma), and the metaphysics of the Yogāchāra teaching
of momentariness. The practices, especially invented to view, to realize, even probably to
create momentariness, are aimed at destroying the attachment to the world and even to the
sense of self. The meditative techniques themselves manipulate the temporal processing of
information and thus shake the foundations of a stable view of the world as consisting of
objects and relationships between them. The deep knowledge of the central Buddhist teach-
ing dharma is a precondition for providing the mental health of the practitioners.
Keywords: momentariness, Buddhism, Yogācāra, meditation, dharma, microgenesis, time
experience
At the beginning we will focus on the Yogācāra doctrine of momentariness. Then
we will examine some accounts of contemporary experience that is in close connection
with the momentariness doctrine and anātman doctrine. Afterwards, we will pay more
attention to some Buddhist practices of meditation which on the basis of contemplation of
the impermanence – anityatā, produce the experience of momentariness kaikatā and of
no-self anātman. Next, we will sketch out one akin to the Momentariness doctrine modern
neuropsychological theory, created on the basis of the accounts of people with psychic
problems. In the short final discussion, we will consider briefly also the role of the teach-
ing (dharma) in the mental health of the practitioners.
302
Momentariness – a brief introduction
According to the Buddhist doctrine of momentariness not time, but existence and
the phenomena are atomized temporally. They are dissected into a succession of discrete
momentary entities of experience, dharmas. So, everything passes out of existence as soon
as it has originated and, in this sense, everything is momentary. As an entity vanishes, it
gives rise to a new entity of almost the same nature. Thus, there is an incessant flow of
causally connected momentary entities of almost the same nature, that form something
like continuum (santāna). These entities succeed each other so fast that the process cannot
be discerned by ordinary perception.1 Because of the similarity of earlier and later entities
within one continuum, we conceive that there is only one temporally extended entity,
not a series of causally connected momentary entities.2 According to the Momentariness
doctrine, the world is a different entity at every moment, linked to the past world and to
the future world by the law of causality (pratītyasamutpādadependent origination’).3 This
doctrine can be illustrated by analogy with the cinematography.4
The Buddhist denial of a permanent self had led to the conception of the mind as a
flow of mental events, entities that are fundamental units of experience – dharmas. Their
momentariness was deduced probably from the speed with which mental events follow
each other.5 On this basis and probably also from the testimony of yogins who had claimed
that they have experienced the incessant rise and fall of the phenomena at every moment
the doctrine of momentariness had emerged.
Contemporary accounts of experiences of momentariness
and of the lack of self
“You are dying from moment to moment and living from moment to moment and
you’re different each time… I am undergoing a transformation and myself is beginning
to disappear.6
1 Rospatt 1995: 1.
2 See Rospatt 1995: 1–12; Rospatt 1998; Rospatt 2004; Stcherbatsky 1993: 79–118; Harris 1991: 108, 157–172; Li 2016;
Tola, Dragonetti 2004: xxxvii, 111–113.
3 Rospatt 1995: 1–2. The idea of momentariness of the world is not looking so strange if we have in mind some of
the contemporary theories of perception and cognition, and the Yogācāra doctrine of the world as vijñāptimātra or
“[reduced to] cognition only”.
4 The best description of this analogy I have met in the literature is given in Rospatt 1995: 1–2: “Just as the rapid
projection of distinct pictures evokes the illusion of continuous action on the screen, so the fast succession of distinct
momentary entities gives rise to the impression that the world around us (and also we ourselves) exist continuously
without undergoing destruction and being recreated anew at every moment. And just as the change of events on the
screen is caused by the qualitative difference between earlier and later pictures on the film reel, so the change in the
world – this includes the change in spatial location, i.e. movement – is brought about by the qualitative difference
between earlier and later entities. Moreover, just as each projected picture only consists of differently shaded points
which by their specific ar rangement give rise to the perception of composite shapes, so the world around us consists
of without undergoing destruction and being recreated nothing but distinct atoms which are arranged in such a way
that they convey the impression of compact bodies.” See also Rospatt 1998: 470.
5 Rospatt 1998: 471.
6 This experience is cited in Chapman (1966): 232. The whole extract of the account of the patient (duration of illness
303
This account of an experience of the patient in the relatively early stage of schizophre-
nia is very similar to the Buddhist adepts’ descriptions7 of momentariness experience.
From such accounts it is seen that an experience of momentariness and/or of fragmentari-
ty of the world can emerge spontaneously under specific conditions. This fact may lead us
to different conclusions about the practice-experience-meditation-teaching-metaphysics
mutual relationships as factors with different weight working together towards the goal –
emancipation, omniscience, enlightenment.8 The idea that one of the factors is with great-
er or less importance than the others will always be fragmentary – in the holistic process
of human cognition different functions and modes of consciousness is not so precisely
differentiated.
But such ideas do occur and even is very popular. According to Sharf and his pro-
found study (Sharf 2005 [1995]: 255) “the role of experience in the history of Buddhism
has been greatly exaggerated in contemporary scholarship.” The “phenomenological ap-
proach” to Buddhism, as Sharf (2005 [1995]: 258) points out may be misleading and “it may
reveal more about the dangers of projection and transference in the study of Buddhism
than it tells us about Buddhism itself”.9
Schmithausen (2014: 630, 635–636; 2005 [1973]) have stated that the theory of momen-
tariness is “predominantly, rooted in spiritual practice.10 This idea has been critiqued
in Franco 2009a, 2009b, 2018. Rospatt (1995: 209) suggested that the notion of momentari-
ness could be incorporated in smtyupasthāna practice “as the adequate understanding of
impermanence”. I want to emphasize here that both levels of experience – that of meta-
physical understanding, and that of personal practice and meditation, were actively and
simultaneously used for attaining the state “without becoming” – nirvāa.11
What may we conclude from the above-mentioned experience? It is possible that an
experience of this kind has triggered the whole notion about momentarity, or probably,
some of the especially acute practices as maraasmti (see below) have provoked an ex-
perience of momentariness before the kaikatā doctrine had emerged. Or, on the basis
6 months, at the time of interview – a 20-year-old student of arts) is: “When you feel in a trance, you tend to identify
yourself with the other person, but that does not matter for if he moves you go back into a trance. You are dying from
moment to moment and living from moment to moment and you’re different each time. You don’t know you’re in it.
When I look at somebody my own personality is in danger. I am undergoing a transformation and myself is beginning
to disappear”. Another example is: “When I start walking I get a fast series of pictures in front of me. Everything
seems to change and revolve around me. Something goes wrong with my eyes and I’ve got to stop and stand still,”
Chapman (1966): 243. The idea in citing these experiences here is not to diminish the yogic feats into investigation of
the nature of cognition and reality, but to emphasize the common base of experience, and eventually to point out some
possible Buddhist strategies to understand the cognition processes deeply. See some other deficits in visual movement
perception that are briefly discussed below and also see Kelly 2005; Wandell 1995: Chapter 11: Miracle cures.
7 Although there are voluminous Buddhist mārga treatises, delineating the stages on the Buddhist path, they have
never been depicted from the first-person point of view. See Sharf 2005 [1995], Franco 2009a.
8 There are many investigations dealing with this theme. See Schmithausen 2014: 630, 635–636; Schmithausen 2005
[1973]; Franco 2009a, Franco 2009b, Franco 2018; Eltschinger (2009); Sharf 2005 [1995].
9 For a broader Indian context see Ruseva-Sokolova 2011.
10 Schmithausen 2014: 630. But he points out in Schmithausen 2005 (1973): 243 that “Of course, spiritual
practice seems hardly possible without any theoretical presupposition.”
11 See also Deleanu 2013.
304
of the anityatā doctrine Buddhists may have developed meditative practices, that induce
such an acute experience, or that some of their practices lead as a byproduct to the ex-
perience of momentariness. And so on. The more interesting question is about the goal
of such an experience of momentariness. From one hand, probably to apprehend the
quantum’ of experience (dharma), from the other, to have a nirvikalpa (non-conceptual,
see below) perception12 and experience, and from the other, to experience fully the ani-
tyatā– non-eternity.
Can meditation give a new suitable knowledge, not attainable otherwise? According
to Franco (2009a: 9) for the Buddhists the goal of meditation is “to gain deeper under-
standing of the truths handed down by the tradition”. As Eltschinger (2009) points out, for
Dharmakīrti the sequence of deeds for the Buddhist practitioners is study, reflection and
meditation, and the interpretation of experiences in meditation is based on the teachings
(which are especially abundant in this area).13 One is not expected to have a radical new
experience that does not accord with the teachings.14
Here, in connection with another Buddhist doctrine – that of non-self, I will cite also
the conclusion of the investigation made by Ataria and Neria (2013: 18–19) of accounts of
the extreme human experience – that of a war captive:
During captivity, captives who suffer from extreme sensory deprivation frequently lose
their sense of bodyThe loss of the sense of body results in the loss of one’s sense of
objectivity because the body is not only an object of consciousness but also of time as
an objective dimension. The arrow of time, a primary condition for rational and logi-
cal thought, ceases to exist/function. Similarly, the sense of nowness and the sense of
duration collapse… In other words, time as a Newtonian/objective dimension is merely
an illusion… The sense of time lies at the heart of the structure of the human subject as
Being-in-the-World. Since the sense of time mirrors the current state of relations between
thought, body, and the world it constitutes the first indicator of a disintegration of the
relationship between the subject and the world. Lacking a sense of body is intimately
linked with the collapse of the sense of time, and in extreme situations this may result in
a collapse of the sense of self.
Being closed in a cave for a long time is a well-known practice among the Buddhists,
and the non-self (anātman)15 experience is central in Buddhism.
12 Bronkhorst 2011.
13 See also Deleanu 2013.
14 Although, the Buddha’s own experience in meditation had given new knowledge, that is not based on any tradition.
If we can reach such a knowledge in meditation independently of any teaching, as Buddha did, the teachings are not
needed, and if we can not reach such a knowledge as a personal experience of reality, it is redundant. See Taber 2009.
See also McCrea 2009.
15 For the use of some metaphoric words and expression in Yogācāra see Tzohar 2018 and especially for the metaphor
of self see Tzohar 2018: 158–161.
305
Some Buddhist practices for realizing the anityatā
The realization of the impermanent nature of existence anityatā (‘noneternity’) is the
first step on the Buddhist path of enlightenment,16 and early Buddhism emphasizes brev-
ity of life and mortality of all living beings.17
“Seyyathāpibrāhmaā,thullaphusitakedevevassanteudakabubbūa khippameva paivigacchati
na ciraṭṭhitikahoti,evamevakhobrāhmaā,udakabubbūupamajīvitamanussāna paritta
lahuka bahudukkhabahūpāyāsa,mantāyaboddhabba. Kattabba kusala caritabba brah-
macariya.Natthijātassaamaraa.”(Anguttaranikaya IV. 137.) (7.2.2.10.3 Arakasuttam)18
“Just as a line drawn on water with a stick will quickly vanish and will not last long,
so too, brahmins, human life is like a line drawn on water with a stick. It is limited and
fleeting; it has much suffering, much misery. One should wisely understand this. One
should do what is wholesome and lead the spiritual life; for none who are born can es-
cape death.” (Aguttara Nikāya)19
In the Pāli canon many different practices for comprehension of the transience of life
are depicted, most of them based on the manipulation of the time sense/perception.20
These include contemplation of death in the charnel fields, with the awareness that the
decaying corpse is one’s own body, or at least, that one’s own body will end in the same
manner; gradually reducing in the mind the time that is left to live to a single breath
(smtyupasthāna) in order not to waste time and to be mindful of the present;21 concentrat-
ing on the impermanent nature of existence.
One technique to achieve the profound realization of anityatā was the contemplation
of death in the charnel fields. The Buddhist practitioner observes the various states of de-
composition of the human corpses, aware that his own body will end up in the same way.
So, he begins to see directly the impermanent nature of his body.22 A less dangerous is the
practice of recollecting death (maraasmti). Here the stretch of time that a monk should
expect to live gradually is reduced to the time taken for a single breath, so he should be-
come mindful of the present.
When anityatā is dealt within the terms of momentariness the adept reduces the exis-
tence of entities to infinitesimal instants without any temporal extension. By contemplat-
ing anityatā in terms of momentariness, the impermanence can be understood as destruc-
tion and annihilation in every moment of existence.23
16 See Rospatt 2004.
17 Coomaraswamy 1947: 30–33.
18 GRETIL.
19 The translation is of Bhikkhu Bodhi (2012: 1096).
20 Here I will mention only some of them as depicted by Rospatt (2004) who made a profound and detailed study on
the subject. See also Ruseva 2018; Ruseva 2021.
21 See Rospatt 1995: 210–212.
22 Some Pāli texts note that this practice led to waves of suicides among the monks. Rospatt 1995: 210–212; Rospatt
2004.
23 Rospatt 2004.
306
So, what is the goal of such practices – probably to bug the so-called normal activity
of the brain in order to destroy the existing schema or matrix of the world view, of the
normal thinking and cognition, in order to see the big picture, how the mind works, how
the thought process is structured, what is cognition.
A contemporary neuro-psychological theory
When something goes wrong in the psyche, the very mechanism of the work of the
psyche can become clear. Based on this observation and on empirical experience, a neu-
ro-psychological theory so called microgenesis24, quite reminiscent of the doctrine of
momentariness25 was built. For our further analysis, let us cite an extract from Samyut-
tanikaya:
“Añ ñ a t re va āvuso saviṭṭha,saddhāyaaññatraruciyā aññatraanussavāaññatraākāraparivi-
takkā aññatra diṭṭhinijjhānakkhantiyāahametajānāmi,ahametapassāmibhavanirodhonib-
anti.”(Sayuttanikāyo II. 117)26
“Friend Savittha, apart from faith, apart from personal reference, apart from oral tradi-
tion, apart from reasoned reflection, apart from acceptance of a view after pondering it, I
know this, I see this: ‘Nibbana is the cessation of becoming.27” Sayutta Nikāya (Kosam-
bi 68.8, II. 117)28
But what is ‘becoming’? Time is judged with the rise and maintenance of the self, its
creation at all times is closely linked to the creation of time. Time is created simultaneous-
ly29 with the becoming and with the creation of self (or self-extension – identity). “the
time of a becoming is the time the becoming creates.30
The scheme of the phases of descent in the mental state proposed by Brown (2008: 371)
and given also here (Scheme 1) is up to some degree consistent with the Buddhist ideas
concerning the process of becoming if we don’t pay attention to the notion ‘core self’ – in
Buddhism there is no such things as core, or as self. Buddhists are quite aware that this
core and this self are created in the process.
24 See Brown 1996, 1999, 2000, 2008.
25 Brown 1999.
26 GRETIL.
27 Here I prefer the variant ‘becoming’ instead of Bhikkhu Bodhi’s ‘existence’. The word bhava from the verb root
√bhū – ‘to become’, ‘to exist’, ‘to be’, can mean both. Coomaraswami (1947: 33) also prefers ‘becoming’.
28 The translation is of Bhikkhu Bodhi (2000: 610).
29 We should keep in mind that simultaneity can be judged only retrospectively. See Zhou, Pöppel, Bao 2014.
30 Brown (1996: 3).
307
In the microgenesis theory “each mental state is a recurrent transition from core to
empirical self to external world.31The complete sequence from depth to surface con-
stitutes the mind/brain state. In this theory, reality is not the starting point but the goal of
an act of knowledge.32
In Buddhism all these processes and phases are objectified, and consequently tran-
scended. The Buddhist tries to withdraw beyond the initial phase in the mental state be-
yond the creation of time, beyond self and objects, beyond becoming.33
Time experience
There are some special deficits in seeing and experiencing movement that throw
some light on the question of how man creates time.34 According to Wandell (1995: Chap-
ter 11, Miracle cures, 5) the ability to integrate images acquired from different positions at
different times is crucial for seeing motion. The ability to see a single object out of many
images has to be learned for people blind as infants and then cured. In order to see a
moving object, one must be able to integrate different images of the object over time. “To
perform this integration, then, requires a means of short-term visual storage that can be
used to represent recent information and visual inferences.35 The patients suffering from
akinetopsia, or motion blindness, can perceive only stationary objects: the coming car is
first very far away, then very near, without any experience of moving between, but they
don’t have problems cognize different objects.36
To see momentary scenes in which there is no movement corresponds to the primary
31 Brown 2008: 371.
32 Brown 1999: 261.
33 See also Ruseva 2018; Ruseva 2021.
34 See Kelly 2005, Wandell 1995: Chapter 11: 1. Miracle cures.
35 Ibid., 8.
36 Kelly 2005.
308
perception in the moment (lasting no more than 40 ms[=0,04 s]), in this ‘functional mo-
ment’ the difference between an earlier and a later event is not felt, and events in this
range are considered simultaneous. In the range of up to 3 seconds, the independent im-
ages are integrated into an object that can move – i.e., in order to perceive movement, it
is necessary to create the object and realize this object as the same, but moved over time.
Visible movement is created through this integration of the independent images obtained
in the ‘functional moments’. Short-term memory is also involved in this process.37
According to Vasubandhu at the moment of perception there is only the so-called nir-
vikalpa38 or non-conceptual ‘momentary’ perception, typical for very young children and
highly trained yogins. Subsequently, the so-called savikalpa perception or reasoning by the
mind is fulfilled without the presence of the already perceived object.39
Discussion
In the framework of the Yogācāra tradition, that sees the whole world as being cog-
nition-only (vijnāptimātra), or being mind-only or consciousness-only (cittamātra, cittaiva),
the manner in which the world operates is the same as the manner in which the mind
operates. The meditative practice is probably not structured specially to catalyze or pro-
voke beforehand determined state of consciousness, but to bug the scheme / the matrix of
everyday cognition, thought, and reason, to decompose the experience.
Through observations of experience from different points of view – from the outsider
that has assembled many accounts of personal experience of his patients and from the
point of view of the experiencer, and from the point of view of the Yogācāra traditional ac-
counts, and then analyzing this experience according to the dogmas of different frames of
investigation, one can make some conclusions about the way the mind and psyche operate.
The experience of momentariness is not the goal, it is just a step on the way to pro-
foundly realize the impermanent nature of all the existence. The deep knowledge of the
central Buddhist teaching dharma40 is a precondition for providing the mental health of
the practitioners.
This experience of time on different scales the ‘functional moment’ lasting a few
mini seconds, the experienced moment’ lasting up to 3 seconds, and the ‘mental pres-
37 For more detail of different temporal scales of integration of experience see Wittmann 2011. See also Kent,
Wittmann 2021; Dorato, Wittmann 2015. On the notions of memory in Buddhism see Lopez 1992, Ruseva 2015a.
38 For nirvikalpa and savikalpa perception see Bronkhorst 2011.
39 See for example Tola, Dragonetti 2004: 111–113. For the comparison of the notions of the sense of time and
temporality in Buddhism and in Yogasūtra of Patañjali see Ruseva 2015b, Ruseva 2018.
40 The central for Buddhism word dharma (from the verb root dhṛ) has the whole list of connotations, ‘to support’
– ‘the order, that supports everything’, ‘The Order’; ‘The Teaching [of the Buddha]’; ‘religion’; ‘the Buddhist path’;
‘the momentary entities of cognition’, etc. See for example Kamburov 2015. On the Buddhist notions of ‘order’ and
ethics see Bratoeva 1997a, 1997 b, 2002, 2014, 2015, 2016, 2020; and on the pan-Indian notions of [social] ‘order’ see
Kamova 1995a, 1995b, 1997, 2009, 2017a, 2017b, 2019 a, 2019b. It was very interesting for me to see, that the notions
of ‘religion’ in Islam is quite different than those in Buddhism, see for example Dy ulgerov 2008, 2012, 2014, 2015,
2017, 2018: 47–90.
309
ence’ lasting up to 100 seconds41 is reduced in the Yogācāra meditation to the suspension
of the integration of ‘functional moments’. With this suspension, further functions of con-
sciousness such as time-creation and world-creation cease, and also the more time-con-
suming self-creation.
In such a manner the experience is atomized and only the instantaneous experi-
ence-atom, or dharma, is considered real, but not the integrative function that sews these
instantaneous experiences into ideas, objects and the world, and for longer durations (up
to 100 seconds) – into an experiencing subject. This integrative function ceases in the prac-
tices of Buddhism as a conceptual appendage, a concrete stitching that, though useful in
everyday life, obscures the reality of momentariness, as well as the deepest suffering, that
perhaps there is no such thing as a primordial not-composed42 self or world.
One of the things that can be concluded from this consideration is that the medita-
tive techniques themselves manipulate the temporal processing of information and thus
shake the foundations of a stable view of the world as consisting of objects and relation-
ships between them. A picture that subsequently becomes an idealistic conception of ex-
istence as awareness-only or as reduced only to awareness vijnaptimātra.
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