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Historical Fundamentalism? Christian Nationalism and Ignorance About Religion in American Political History
Abstract
Religious right leaders often promulgate views of Christianity's historical preeminence, privilege, and persecution in the United States that are factually incorrect, suggesting credulity, ignorance, or perhaps, a form of ideologically motivated ignorance on the part of their audience. This study examines whether Christian nationalism predicts explicit misconceptions regarding religion in American political history and explores theories about the connection. Analyzing nationally representative panel data containing true/false statements about religion's place in America's founding documents, policies, and court decisions, Christian nationalism is the strongest predictor that Americans fail to affirm factually correct answers. This association is stronger among whites compared to black Americans and religiosity actually predicts selecting factually correct answers once we account for Christian nationalism. Analyses of “do not know” response patterns find more confident correct answers from Americans who reject Christian nationalism and more confident incorrect answers from Americans who embrace Christian nationalism. We theorize that, much like conservative Christians have been shown to incorrectly answer science questions that are “religiously contested,” Christian nationalism inclines Americans to affirm factually incorrect views about religion in American political history, likely through their exposure to certain disseminators of such misinformation, but also through their allegiance to a particular political-cultural narrative they wish to privilege.
... While American Christianity is diverse in theology and social views, Whitehead and Perry (2020) argue that White Christian nationalists desire the privileging of a certain form of American Christianity, less predicated on the specifics of theology and religious practice and more invested in social and political power. Adherents of this ideology misrepresent American history to incorrectly center Christianity (Perry et al. 2021a) and, in turn, advocate contemporary policies that benefit White Christians and Christianity (Stewart 2019). This orientation leads to antipathy for people who are not White Christians and support for policies enforcing Christian nationalists' particular vision for American society, the result of which is often support for discrimination against cultural outsiders. ...
In the wake of several high-profile cases of police use of excessive force, renewed critiques of policing have emerged from the Defund the Police movement. Yet, the movement has faced fierce opposition from Americans who subscribe to a color-blind logic that racial inequality in policing and society as a whole reflect differences in merit. In assessing Americans’ use of color-blind racism, support for public spending on social services, and support for punitive social control, scholars have recently emphasized the role of Christian nationalist ideology. Building on this recent work, we use data from the 2021 General Social Survey (GSS), a nationally representative survey of Americans, to test the relationship between adherence to Christian nationalist ideology and opposition to reducing funding for police departments and moving those funds to mental health, housing, and other social services. We find that respondents who score higher on an index of Christian nationalism hold greater odds of opposing shifting funding from police departments, independent of other measures of political and religious orientations. We also consider interactions between Christian nationalist ideology, race, and color-blind racial ideology.
... However, Perry, Braunstein et al. (2022) argument that the ethno-religious CN is a "distortion" of civil religion is only partially accurate since civil religion always contained ingredients that were racially and ethnically exclusionary. But the new ideals of CS (or state-centric CN) are qualitatively different from traditional civil religion because they enlist state power to enforce Christian cultural dominance and ethno-national boundaries, even if the means are antidemocratic, racist, and violent. ...
While posited as a unified ideology, Christian Nationalism (CN) actually contains two distinct views of what it means to be a “Christian Nation”—one which envisions a Christian civil society separate from the profanities of politics, what we call “Religious Traditionalism.” The other envisions a Christian federal government where power is wielded exclusively by ethno‐religious insiders, or “Christian Statism.” Multiple waves of two national surveys confirm that current measures of CN contain these two factors, which have become increasingly divergent in the past 20 years. In addition, we find that Christian Statism predicts nativism, Islamophobia, anti‐Semitism, and racial distrust while Religious Traditionalism, in most instances, predicts the opposite. Historically, Religious Traditionalists have always sought to influence civil society and focused mainly on family/sexual issues. But a different brand of CN has emerged, wherein all federal and state authority should rightfully and exclusively belong to Christian Statists.
This article considers the too-often limited reach of public sociology, focusing on the case of “Christian nationalism.” Despite growing media attention to Christian nationalism, partly reflecting current events along with considerable efforts to engage in public sociology on the topic, I anticipate public awareness of the term is concentrated in theoretically predictable ways. Given the growing conservative skepticism toward academics (particularly sociologists) and increasingly siloed media consumption, I theorize Americans most familiar with “Christian nationalism” would be sociologists’ “choir,” namely, those who are more educated, less religious, more liberal/Democratic, and who trust more liberal news sources. Drawing on two representative surveys fielded in mid-September and November/December of 2022, findings affirm the strongest predictors of Americans hearing/reading more about “Christian nationalism” were being more liberal, educated, being non-Christian (in one survey), and trusting more liberal news sources (in another survey). Interactions show exposure to the term among liberals, Democrats, and those who trust liberal news sources increases substantially with educational attainment. Despite the considerable amount of sociological research and public sociology addressing “Christian nationalism,” those most aware of the term in late 2022 were educated, liberal/Democratic, seculars most likely to already be exposed to and trust the work of sociologists. In other words, to the extent public sociologists have sought to inform the public about “Christian nationalism,” they have likely been “preaching to the choir” more than to those most susceptible to embracing the ideology (less educated, conservative/Republican, Christians). I conclude by discussing implications for sociology’s public impact as a discipline.
The volume fits into an older endeavor of the author to identify segments of the interaction between the political and the religious in the Romanian space, with previous extensive research dedicated to similar subjects such as the relationship between neoliberalism, post-communism, and Orthodoxy, the incipient forms of consecrating a Christian-Democratic political formula in the Romanian space, the tension between restricting religious life in the pandemic and international standards regarding religious freedom2, as well as articles published in academic journals.
The volume posits a working hypothesis that in democratic regimes, Churches have no other legal status than that of voluntary associations of civil society, they do not stand isolated in the sphere of private life and convictions, but through their testimony (social public worship) they create a general framework for public
governance not only when they are in close connection with political power but also when they are absent from the proximity of political power. Therefore, I am not interested in the state-church relationship from the perspective of judging history and its actors, but from the perspective of the mutual influence that the state has had on the Church and vice versa. In the historical period analyzed, there is a notable interest of the political and cultural elites in the way the (Orthodox) Church is defined and conceptualized, a process seen by the actors of the times as a contribution to public governance, and not necessarily as an interference in
ecclesiastical affairs.
Recent debates about whether educators should teach America's racist history have sparked activism and legislation to ensure students are taught American history in such a way that promotes “patriotism,” amplifying cherished national myths, emphasizing American exceptionalism, and erasing negative historical facts. Building on insights from both social dominance theory and Christian nationalism research, we propose Christian nationalism combines legitimizing myths that whitewash America's past with authoritarian impulses and thus seeks to enforce “patriotic” content in public school classrooms. We also theorize this connection varies across racial, partisan, and ideological identities. Data from a nationally‐representative survey of Americans affirm Christian nationalism is by far the leading predictor Americans believe “We should require public school teachers to teach history in a way that promotes patriotism.” This association is consistent across race (possibly due to divergent meanings of both “Christian nationalism” and “patriotism” across groups), but varies by partisanship and ideological identity for whites. Specifically, Christian nationalism brings whites who identify with the ideological and political left into complete alignment with their conservative counterparts who are already more likely to support mandatory patriotic education. Our findings provide critical context for ongoing battles over public‐school curricula and education's role in perpetuating social privilege.
A principal concern regarding nationalist sentiment is the tendency to sanctify “the nation” and support it as chosen and pure regardless of its complicity in injustice. Building on research showing the tendency to whitewash America’s past is primarily localized to white Americans, and particularly those who stress its Christian heritage, we theorize Christian nationalism amplifies Americans’ willingness to endorse “blind patriotism” (supporting the nation even in the wrong), but only for white Americans as opposed to Blacks or Hispanics. General Social Survey data affirm the more Americans conflate Christian and American identities, the more they agree citizens should support their country even if it is wrong. As anticipated, this association is pronounced for white Americans, but virtually non-existent among Blacks and Hispanics. Stemming from American religious and national identities being deeply racialized, conflating the two sanctifies “the nation” but only among whites, whose national membership and hegemony were historically assumed.
A wide range of right-wing movements are bound together by their adherence to a nostalgic vision of the United States as a “Christian nation,” yet there are meaningful differences in the specific narratives promoted by these groups that are not fully understood. This article identifies two ideal-typical versions of this narrative: the white Christian nation and the colorblind Judeo-Christian nation. The two narratives share a common declension structure, but differ in their framing of how religion and race intersect as markers of American belonging and power. Although participants in right-wing movements often slide back and forth between the two narratives in practice, distinguishing between them analytically enables us to better understand how the two renderings of American history carry different meanings and perform different kinds of political work for participants in these movements. Theoretically, the analysis extends the insights of a “complex religion” approach to sites beyond organized religion, while also demonstrating how scholarship on Christian nationalism and on right-wing movements’ use of national history could each be enhanced by greater attention to the other.
Prior research demonstrates that a number of cultural factors-including politics and religion-are significantly associated with anti-vaccine attitudes. This is consequential because herd immunity is compromised when large portions of a population resist vaccination. Using a nationally representative sample of American adults that contains a battery of questions tapping views about vaccines, we demonstrate how a pervasive ideology that rejects scientific authority and promotes allegiance to conservative political leaders-what we and others call Christian nationalism-is consistently one of the two strongest predictors of anti-vaccine attitudes, stronger than political or religious characteristics considered separately. Results suggest that as Americans evaluate decisions to vaccinate themselves or their children, those who strongly embrace Christian nationalism-close to a quarter of the population-will be much more likely to abstain, potentially prolonging the threat of certain illnesses. We conclude by discussing the most immediate implications of these findings for a possible COVID-19 vaccine.
During the COVID-19 crisis in March/April of 2020, far-right American political leaders and pundits proffered xenophobic explanations for the pandemic while ignoring that poorer, Black Americans and prison populations were being disproportionately infected. We propose such xenophobic and racist evaluations of COVID-19 drew from and appealed to a pervasive and politically strategic ethnoreligious ideology―white Christian nationalism. Panel data fielded before and during the COVID-19 crisis show that Christian nationalism was invariably the strongest predictor that Americans felt it was not racist to call COVID-19 “the Chinese virus,” blamed minorities for their own disproportionate infection rate, favored immigration restrictions to solve the pandemic, and minimized or justified the infections of prison inmates. Racial identity also moderated Christian nationalism’s effect such that it was typically a more powerful influence among whites compared to Blacks. Findings affirm that racist and xenophobic views promulgated during the COVID-19 crisis were undergirded by white Christian nationalism.
Attitudes toward immigrants and immigration policies are divisive issues in American politics. These attitudes are influenced by factors such as political orientation and religiousness, with religious and conservative individuals demonstrating higher prejudice toward immigrants and refugees, and endorsing stricter immigration policies. Christian nationalism, an ideology marked by the belief that America is a Christian nation, may help explain how religious nationalist identity influences negative attitudes toward immigrants. The current research addresses this through four studies among participants in the US. Across studies, our results showed that Christian nationalism was a significant and consistent predictor of anti-immigrant stereotypes, prejudice, dehumanization, and support for anti-immigrant policies. These effects were robust to inclusion of other sources of anti-immigrant attitudes, including religious fundamentalism, nationalism, and political ideology. Further, perceived threats from immigrants mediated the relationship between Christian nationalism and dehumanization of immigrants, and attitudes toward immigration policies. These findings have implications for our understanding of the relations between religious nationalism and attitudes toward immigrants and immigration policy in the US, as well as in other contexts.
This paper assesses the continued relevance of Robert Wuthnow’s seminal theory of “religious restructuring” for explaining the relationship between religious conservatism and political allegiances in the contemporary United States. Employing a comparative approach, we evaluate the link between doctrinal conservatism (or liberalism) and political conservatism across the seven largest US religious traditions, including Islam. We find that for most Christians and Jews, doctrinal conservatism continues to be tightly linked with conservative political attitudes, even after adjusting for demographic differences and religiosity. For Muslims, Black Protestants, and Latinx Catholics however, doctrinal conservatism is unlikely to be associated with political conservatism. In short, Wuthnow’s theory still holds, but only for religious traditions that are majority white. We speculate that being “racialized religious traditions” explains the lack of restructuring we observe among Muslims, Black Protestants, and Latinx Catholics. External social and political pressures have kept unifying racialized religious identities salient for each of these traditions, preventing the internal bifurcation still characteristic of other major American religions. Our findings and approaches contribute to the two growing trends within the sociological study of religion—the analytical integration of considerations of race and racial politics into scholarship on religious life (called “complex religion”) and a recognition of the importance of cultural “styles” of religion in shaping political and social behaviors.
Public discourse is often caustic and conflict-filled. This trend seems to be particularly evident when the content of such discourse is around moral issues (broadly defined) and when the discourse occurs on social media. Several explanatory mechanisms for such conflict have been explored in recent psychological and social-science literatures. The present work sought to examine a potentially novel explanatory mechanism defined in philosophical literature: Moral Grandstanding. According to philosophical accounts, Moral Grandstanding is the use of moral talk to seek social status. For the present work, we conducted six studies, using two undergraduate samples (Study 1, N = 361; Study 2, N = 356); a sample matched to U.S. norms for age, gender, race, income, Census region (Study 3, N = 1,063); a YouGov sample matched to U.S. demographic norms (Study 4, N = 2,000); and a brief, one-month longitudinal study of Mechanical Turk workers in the U.S. (Study 5, Baseline N = 499, follow-up n = 296), and a large, one-week YouGov sample matched to U.S. demographic norms (Baseline N = 2,519, follow-up n = 1,776). Across studies, we found initial support for the validity of Moral Grandstanding as a construct. Specifically, moral grandstanding motivation was associated with status-seeking personality traits, as well as greater political and moral conflict in daily life.
American Blindspot: Race, Class, Religion, and the Trump Presidency is a careful exploration of the forces that led to the election of the 45th president of the United States.Author Gerardo Martí synthesizes the latest scholarship and historical research to examine the roles race, class, religion have played in politics—both historically and today. This book goes beyond the initial claims that the American working class was the force behind Donald Trump's election or policies and instead offers a nuanced perspective on how race, religion, and class have shaped our national views, Trump's election, and his policies.
Recent research suggests that, for white Americans, conflating national and religious group identities is strongly associated with racism, xenophobia, and Islamophobia, prompting some to argue that claims about Christianity being central to American identity are essentially about reinforcing white supremacy. Prior work has not considered, however, whether such beliefs may influence the racial views of non-white Americans differently from white Americans. Drawing on a representative sample of black and white Americans from the 2014 General Social Survey, and focusing on explanations for racial inequality as the outcome, we show that, contrary to white Americans, black Americans who view being a Christian as essential to being an American are actually more likely to attribute black-white inequality to structural issues and less to blacks’ individual shortcomings. Our findings suggest that, for black Americans, connecting being American to being Christian does not necessarily bolster white supremacy, but may instead evoke and sustain ideals of racial justice.
Why did Americans vote for Donald Trump in the 2016 Presidential election? Social scientists have proposed a variety of explanations, including economic dissatisfaction, sexism, racism, Islamophobia, and xenophobia. The current study establishes that, independent of these influences, voting for Trump was, at least for many Americans, a symbolic defense of the United States' perceived Christian heritage. Data from a national probability sample of Americans surveyed soon after the 2016 election shows that greater adherence to Christian nationalist ideology was a robust predictor of voting for Trump, even after controlling for economic dissatisfaction, sexism, anti-black prejudice, anti-Muslim refugee attitudes, and anti-immigrant sentiment, as well as measures of religion, sociodemographics, and political identity more generally. These findings indicate that Christian nationalist ideology-although correlated with a variety of class-based, sexist, racist, and ethnocentric views-is not synonymous with, reducible to, or strictly epiphenomenal of such views. Rather, Christian nationalism operates as a unique and independent ideology that can influence political actions by calling forth a defense of mythological narratives about America's distinctively Christian heritage and future.
The issue of religious liberty has gained ever-increasing attention among policy makers and the public. Whereas politicians have long championed the idea of religious freedom and tolerance, the actual achievement of these goals has been an arduous battle for religious minorities. What motivates political leaders to create laws providing for greater religious liberty? In contrast to scholars who argue that religious liberty results from the spread of secularization and modern ideas, Anthony Gill argues that religious liberty results from interest-based calculations of secular rulers. Using insights from political economists, Gill develops a theory of the origins of religious liberty based upon the political and economic interests of governing officials. Political leaders are most likely to permit religious freedom when it enhances their own political survival, tax revenue, and the economic welfare of their country. He explores his theory using cases from British America, Latin America, Russia, and the Baltic states.
The religion-science relationship has been the focus of a growing body of research. Such analyses have often suffered from poorly specified concepts related to religion and to science. At the individual level, scholars often assume that an individual's religiosity will affect her orientation towards science. But an orientation towards science consists of several sub-concepts, each of which may have a unique relationship, or lack thereof, with religiosity. We use observed measures from the 2008 General Social Survey to build latent variables representing science orientation sub-concepts and assess their relationships using structural equation modeling. We find that religiosity has no significant association with interest in or knowledge of science. Religiosity does, however, have a significant negative association with confidence in science. This suggests that the lack of faith in science held by religious individuals is not a product of interest or ignorance, but is instead based on theological or institutional reservations.
How do overlapping social identities shape Americans’ views toward contemporary social and moral issues? Drawing upon national-level data and employing the theoretical construct of social identity complexity, we examine the link between Christian nationalism–representing a convergence of national and religious identities–and Americans’ views toward same-sex marriage and civil unions. Multivariate analyses reveal that greater adherence to Christian nationalism is strongly and negatively related to support for both same-sex marriage and civil unions, even after controlling for political ideology, religious controls, attribution of homosexuality, and other relevant correlates. We argue that Christian nationalists, who by definition internalize a high degree of overlap between political and religious identities, are more likely to see gays and lesbians as out-groups and same-sex unions as a threat to their sense of self and community. We conclude by discussing the implications of this study for future research on political and religious identities and intolerance toward socially marginalized populations.
Though the persistence of voter suppression and disenfranchisement in the US is well-documented, we still know little about their contemporary ideological underpinnings beyond partisanship and racial resentment. Highlighting the Christian Right’s influence in driving anti-democratic sentiment in the post-Civil Rights era, we propose contemporary ideological support for restricting the vote generally, and specifically, to those who prove “worthy,” is undergirded by a pervasive ideology that cloaks authoritarian ethno-traditionalism with the ultimacy and polysemic utility of religious language―Christian nationalism. Nationally representative data collected weeks before the November 2020 elections reveal Christian nationalism is a leading predictor that Americans deny that voter suppression is a problem, believe that the US makes it “too easy to vote,” believe that voter fraud is rampant, and support measures to disenfranchise individuals who could not pass a basic civics test or who committed certain crimes. Interactions show Christian nationalism’s influence is particularly strong among men across most outcomes and, regarding voter suppression, whites compared to Blacks. We argue Christian nationalism seeks to institutionalize founding ideals in which civic participation is rooted in hierarchies, being restricted to a “worthy” few. Appeals to America’s religious heritage thus facilitate stratifying America’s citizenry and justifying restricting participation to preserve dominance.
Americans are increasingly polarized by a variety of metrics. The dimensions, extent, causes, and consequences of that polarization have been the subject of much debate. Yet despite the centrality of religion to early discussions, the analytical focus on America's divides has largely shifted toward partisan identity, political ideology, race, and class interests. I show that religion remains powerfully implicated in all dimensions of American polarization, and sociologists must once again make religion more central to their analyses. After outlining research on American polarization, focusing on the role of religion, I survey findings within the burgeoning literatures on cultural transformation processes, (White) Christian nationalism, complex religion, and Americans’ attitudes toward science in order to underscore the centrality of ethno-religious identities, religious demography, and religious institutions for both shaping and exacerbating various forms of polarization. Lastly, I propose an agenda for elucidating religion's ongoing role in understanding polarization beyond public opinion research at the macro-, meso-, and micro-levels. Though polarization research has been dominated by political scientists, leveraging religion in our analyses—not merely as a sui generis variable, but as a site of complex social behavior—facilitates novel sociological contributions to these literatures via our relative attention to multiple levels of analysis, theoretical eclecticism, and methodological fluidity.
Most Americans were shocked by the violence they witnessed at the nation’s capital on January 6, 2021. And bewildered by the images displayed by the insurrectionists: a wooden cross and wooden gallows; “Jesus Saves” and “Don’t Tread on Me”; Christian flags and Confederate Flags; even a prayer in Jesus’s name after storming the Senate chamber. Where some saw a confusing jumble, Gorski and Perry saw a familiar ideology: white Christian nationalism. In this short primer, Gorski and Perry explain what white Christian nationalism is and is not; when it first emerged and how it has changed; and where it’s headed and why it threatens democracy. They explain what makes white Christian nationalism “white.” They show how it took shape over three centuries ago. And how it has influenced American politics over the last three decades. Throughout American history, white Christian nationalism has animated the oppression, exclusion, and even extermination of minority groups while securing privilege for white Protestants. It enables white Christian Americans to demand “sacrifice” from others in the name of religion and nation, while defending their “rights” in the names of “liberty” and “property.” The future of American democracy, they argue, will depend on whether a broad spectrum of Americans—stretching from democratic socialists to classical liberals—can unite in a popular front to combat the threat to liberal democracy posed by white Christian nationalism.
Though the persistence of voter suppression and disenfranchisement in the US is well-documented, we still know little about their contemporary ideological underpinnings beyond partisanship and racial resentment. Highlighting the Christian Right’s influence in driving anti-democratic sentiment in the post-Civil Rights era, we propose contemporary ideological support for restricting the vote generally, and specifically, to those who prove “worthy,” is undergirded by a pervasive ideology that cloaks authoritarian ethno-traditionalism with the ultimacy and polysemic utility of religious language―Christian nationalism. Nationally representative data collected weeks before the November 2020 elections reveal Christian nationalism is a leading predictor that Americans deny that voter suppression is a problem, believe that the US makes it “too easy to vote,” believe that voter fraud is rampant, and support measures to disenfranchise individuals who could not pass a basic civics test or who committed certain crimes. Interactions show Christian nationalism’s influence is particularly strong among men across most outcomes and, regarding voter suppression, whites compared to Blacks. We argue Christian nationalism seeks to institutionalize founding ideals in which civic participation is rooted in hierarchies, being restricted to a “worthy” few. Appeals to America’s religious heritage thus facilitate stratifying America’s citizenry and justifying restricting participation to preserve dominance.
Sociologists have long identified a “perception gap” between Black and White Americans regarding racial injustice, often emphasizing either “epistemologies of ignorance” or “religio-cultural” mechanisms. Integrating and extending these insights, we theorize that conceptions of America’s religio-cultural heritage and identity are racially coded and grounded in White supremacy, but only for those atop the racial hierarchy. From this, we predict the perception gap is largely driven by Whites’ racialized idealization of their own religio-cultural preeminence in American civic life—what we call “White Christian nationalism.” Drawing on nationally representative data with currently relevant measures of Americans’ perceptions of racial injustice, we show the more Whites affirm seemingly race-neutral statements promoting Christianity’s preeminence in American life, the more they affirm White victimhood and deny anti-Black injustice. This association seems to drive the perception gap. Specifically, for Whites, Christian nationalism is powerfully associated with refusing to acknowledge anti-Black discrimination while affirming supposed anti-White discrimination; lower likelihood of attributing Ahmaud Arbery’s murder to racism or to even know about the incident; and greater likelihood of denying racial inequality in policing. For Black Americans, however, affirming the same measures of Christian nationalism produces no consistent change in their recognition of racial injustice. Thus, for Whites, appeals to America’s “Christian” heritage are racially coded and contribute to an ideological defense of White supremacy, including the denial of blatant anti-Black injustice and a commitment to White victimhood.
Religiously conservative Americans consistently demonstrate lower scientific literacy than other Americans. Some argue, however, that Americans’ scientific literacy is contingent on subcultural conflict, showing differences in scientific literacy that emerge only on religiously contested scientific claims. Building on these insights, we find that the most salient factor explaining Americans’ divergence on contested (though not on uncontested) scientific claims is not religious commitment or conservatism per se, but an ideology that seeks political—and consequently epistemic—dominance: Christian nationalism. National data show that Christian nationalism is unassociated with Americans’ answers on questions about uncontested scientific knowledge. However, Christian nationalism is the strongest predictor of incorrect answers on questions about religiously contested scientific claims. Contemporary “culture war” debates over science have little to do with outright ignorance of science, nor are they strictly about religiosity or theological conservatism. Rather, disputes over science and religion reflect politically motivated denials of scientific facts that threaten Christian nationalism’s claims to epistemic and cultural authority.
For decades anti-pornography sentiment and campaigns were driven largely by religious conservatives citing pornography’s “contaminating” moral effects. More recently, however, anti-porn campaigns have sought to support their arguments by appealing to social and cognitive science. This raises the question of whether anti-pornography sentiment is undergoing an “internal secularization,” reflected in a growing connection to scientific authority and weakening connection to religious authority, or conversely, whether the use of “science” reflects a more symbolic and tactical framing used by religious conservatives who already oppose pornography. Using the General Social Surveys (1984–2018), I examine how trust in scientific authority and traditional measures of religious conservatism are associated with anti-pornography sentiment and how these associations have changed since the mid-1980s. The positive association between religious conservatism and support for anti-pornography legislation has either remained the same or, in the case of biblical literalism, grown stronger. In contrast, Americans with greater confidence in science or scientists are less likely to support outlawing pornography, and this pattern has not reversed. Indeed, in recent decades, Americans across all levels of confidence in science have declined in their support for banning porn and now differ only minimally. Together these patterns suggest anti-porn sentiment is actually desecularizing, growing more connected to religious conservatism than views about scientific authority. Findings suggest current anti-pornography sentiment does not stem from scientific authority gaining ground among Americans who oppose pornography. Rather, citing scientific research likely reflects efforts to leverage its cultural authority among those already morally inclined to restrict porn’s availability.
The decline in trust in the scientific community in the United States among political conservatives has been well established. But this observation is complicated by remarkably positive and stable attitudes toward scientific research itself. What explains the persistence of positive belief in science in the midst of such dramatic change? By leveraging research on the performativity of conservative identity, we argue that conservative scientific institutions have manufactured a scientific cultural repertoire that enables participation in this highly valued epistemological space while undermining scientific authority perceived as politically biased. We test our hypothesized link between conservative identity and scientific perceptions using panel data from the General Social Survey. We find that those with stable conservative identities hold more positive attitudes toward scientific research while simultaneously holding more negative attitudes towards the scientific community compared to those who switch to and from conservative political identities. These findings support a theory of a conservative scientific repertoire that is learned over time and that helps orient political conservatives in scientific debates that have political repercussions. Implications of these findings are discussed for researchers interested in the cultural differentiation of scientific authority and for stakeholders in scientific communication and its public policy.
Numerous studies show biblicist Christianity, religiosity, and conservative political identity are strong predictors of Americans holding skeptical attitudes toward publicly controversial aspects of science, such as human evolution. We show that Christian nationalism—meaning the desire to see particularistic and exclusivist versions of Christian symbols, values, and policies enshrined as the established religion of the United States—is a strong and consistent predictor of Americans’ attitudes about science above and beyond other religious and political characteristics. Further, a majority of the overall effect of political ideology on skepticism about the moral authority of science is mediated through Christian nationalism, indicating that political conservatives are more likely to be concerned with particular aspects of science primarily because they are more likely to be Christian nationalists. Likewise, substantial proportions of the well‐documented associations between religiosity and biblical “literalism” with views of science are mediated through Christian nationalism. Because Christian nationalism seeks to establish a particular and exclusivist vision of Christianity as the dominant moral order, adherents feel threatened by challenges to the epistemic authority undergirding that order, including by aspects of science perceived as challenging the supremacy of biblicist authority.
Recent studies demonstrate that white Americans who adhere to “Christian nationalism”―an ideology that idealizes and advocates a fusion of Christianity and American civic life―tend to hold authoritarian, exclusionary, and overtly prejudicial attitudes, particularly regarding ethno-racial minorities. We use data from the 1996 and 2014 General Social Surveys and consider relative political tolerance toward old-fashioned racists (i.e., persons who believe black Americans are genetically inferior) compared to other historically stigmatized groups, including anti-religionists, communists, militarists, and homosexuals. Viewing Christian identity as essential to American civic belonging is among the strongest predictors of whites’ being politically intolerant of all stigmatized groups, racists included. However, when we examine relative tolerance toward racists compared to other stigmatized groups, white Christian nationalists show greater tolerance than other whites. This effect is distinct from personal religiosity which is associated with lower relative tolerance toward racists. Additionally, we find both time and gender moderate the association between white Christian nationalism and relative tolerance toward racists. Findings ultimately demonstrate that white Americans who adhere to Christian nationalism exhibit authoritarian tendencies―expressing lower tolerance for all groups considered―while making greater relative allowance for old-fashioned racists, who may be allies in the task of social control and coercion.
During the COVID‐19 pandemic, Americans’ behavioral responses were quickly politicized. Those on the left stressed precautionary behaviors, while those on the (religious) right were more likely to disregard recommended precautions. We propose the far right response was driven less by partisanship or religiosity per se, but rather by an ideology that connects disregard for scientific expertise; a conception of Americans as God's chosen and protected people; distrust for news media; and allegiance to Trump―Christian nationalism. Analyzing panel data collected in the thick of the COVID‐19 crisis, we find Christian nationalism was the leading predictor that Americans engaged in incautious behavior like eating in restaurants, visiting family/friends, or gathering with 10+ persons (though not attending church), and was the second strongest predictor that Americans took fewer precautions like wearing a mask or sanitizing/washing one's hands. Religiosity, in contrast, was the leading predictor that Americans engaged in more frequent precautionary behaviors. Findings document that Christian nationalism, not religious commitment per se, undergirded the far‐right response to COVID‐19 that disregarded precautionary recommendations, thus potentially worsening the pandemic.
Do partisan disagreements over politically relevant facts, and preferences for the information sources from which to obtain them, represent genuine differences of opinion or insincere cheerleading? The answer to this question is crucial for understanding the scope of partisan polarization. We test between these alternatives with experiments that offer incentives for correct survey responses and allow respondents to search for information before answering each question. We find that partisan cheerleading inflates divides in factual information, but only modestly. Incentives have no impact on partisan divides in information search; these divides are no different from those that occur outside the survey context when we examine web‐browsing data from the same respondents. Overall, our findings support the motivated reasoning interpretation of misinformation; partisans seek out information with congenial slant and sincerely adopt inaccurate beliefs that cast their party in a favorable light.
Some of the strongest predictors of voting for Donald Trump in the 2016 presidential election were Christian nationalism and antipathy toward Muslims and immigrants. We examine the interrelated influence of these three factors on Americans’ intentions to vote for Trump in 2020. Consistent with previous research, Christian nationalism and Islamophobia remained strong and significant predictors of intention to vote for Trump; however, the effect of xenophobia was stronger. Further, xenophobia and Islamophobia significantly and substantially mediated the effects of Christian nationalism. Consequently, though Christian nationalism remains theoretically and empirically distinct as a cultural framework, its influence on intending to vote for Trump in 2020 is intimately connected to fears about ethnoracial outsiders. In the penultimate year before Trump’s reelection campaign, the strongest predictors of supporting Trump, in order of magnitude, were political party, xenophobia, identifying as African American (negative), political ideology, Christian nationalism, and Islamophobia.
Taking America Back for God conclusively reveals that understanding the current cultural and political climate in the United States requires reckoning with Christian nationalism. Christian ideals and symbols have long played an important role in public life in the United States, but Christian nationalism demands far more than a recognition of religious heritage. At heart, Christian nationalism fights to preserve a particular kind of social order, an order in which everyone—Christians and non-Christians, native-born and immigrants, whites and minorities, men and women—recognizes their “proper” place in society. The first comprehensive empirical analysis of Christian nationalism in the United States, Taking America Back for God illustrates the scope and tremendous influence of Christian nationalism on debates surrounding the most contentious social issues dominating American public discourse. Drawing on multiple sources of national survey data collected over the past several decades and in-depth interviews, Whitehead and Perry document how Christian nationalism radically shapes what Americans think about who they are as a people, what their future should look like, and how they should get there. Regardless of Americans’ political or religious characteristics, whether they are Ambassadors, Accommodators, Resisters, or Rejecters of Christian nationalism provides powerful insight into what they think about immigration, Muslims, gun control, police shootings, atheists, gender roles, and many other political issues—even who they want in the White House. Taking America Back for God convincingly shows how Christian nationalists’ desire for political power, rigid social boundaries, and hierarchical order creates significant consequences for all Americans.
Recent research shows that Americans who adhere to Christian nationalism-an ideology that idealizes and advocates a fusion of Christianity and American civic life-tend to hold authoritarian and exclusionary attitudes, particularly regarding ethno-racial minorities and nontraditional family forms. Such findings suggest a fundamental connection between Christian nationalism and rigid symbolic boundaries, which would likely extend to Americans' understanding of gender roles. Drawing on notions connecting religious nationalism with defenses of patriarchal norms and utilizing a recent national, random sample of American adults, the current study examines the link between contemporary Christian nationalism and traditionalist gender ideologies. Our analyses reveal that Christian nationalism is the strongest predictor of holding a more traditionalist gender ideology, even after taking into account a host of political and religious characteristics. Moreover, the relationship between Christian nationalism and gender traditionalism holds across religious traditions, including more gender-egalitarian groups like Mainline Protestants and even the unaffiliated. We conclude by highlighting the implications of these findings for understanding contemporary populist support for Donald Trump, which previous studies have shown is undergirded by both Christian nationalism and sexism.
© 2019 Canadian Sociological Association/La Société canadienne de sociologie.
Many scholars argue that evangelical Christian beliefs and traditions are central to dominant conceptions of American national identity, but most empirical studies in this area focus on the activities and identities of evangelical Christians themselves. Missing is an assessment of how evangelical-infused understandings of national belonging shape the views of people outside the white evangelical subculture. We analyze how Americans of all religious backgrounds evaluate a secularized evangelical discourse (SED) - a repertoire of political statements that are phrased in religiously nonparticularistic terms, but have roots in evangelical Christian history and epistemologies and have been politicized through social movements and party politics. Using latent class analysis and nationally representative survey data, we identify four prevailing profiles of support for claims about public religious expression anchored in this repertoire: ardent opposition, moderate opposition, moderate support, and ardent support. We find that a majority of Americans, not just evangelicals, respond positively to propositions that employ SED. Consequently, we argue that conservative Christianity influences contemporary politics not only by furnishing individuals with beliefs and identities, but also by providing a durable and flexible source of boundaries around a culturally specific vision of national belonging that resonates far beyond the boundaries of the evangelical subculture. © 2018 The Author(s). Published by Oxford University Press on behalf of the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill. All rights reserved.
Objectives
Negative sentiment toward immigrants helps fuel preferences for restrictive immigration policy. Religious commitments have been linked to both positive and negative dispositions toward immigrants, Muslims, and immigration. This study tests how religious factors impact negative sentiments toward immigrants and Muslims, and preferences for more restrictive immigration policy.
Methods
We analyze data from the 1996 and 2004–2016 General Social Surveys (GSS), examining scales for negative sentiment toward immigrants, civil liberties for Muslims, and preferences to restrict immigration. Ordinary least squares and ordinal regression models are used to examine the effects of religious factors net of social background and political identifications.
Results
Sectarian Protestants, white Catholics, and biblical literalists were found to have more hostile views of immigrants and Muslims, while nonwhite Catholics, non‐Christians, the unaffiliated, and those with secular beliefs held more positive views of immigrants and immigration.
Conclusions
While elite sectarian Protestants and the Catholic Church hierarchy have urged tolerance for immigrants and immigration, our findings suggest that the sectarians, white Catholics, and biblical literalists hold negative views of immigrants, Muslims, and immigration. Subscription to Christian nationalism also appears to play a role in structuring negative views of immigrants and Muslims.
While some research argues that religious pluralism in the United States dampens conflict by promoting tolerance, other work documents persistent prejudice toward religious out-groups. We address this ambiguity by identifying a distinct cultural style that structures Americans’ attitudes toward religious others: support for public religious expression (PRE). Using data from a recent nationally representative survey, we find a strong and consistent relationship between high support for PRE, negative attitudes toward religious out-groups, and generalized intolerance. Addressing the previously overlooked public aspects of religion and cultural membership in the United States has important implications for studies of civic inclusion.
This paper argues that the national populisms of Northern and Western Europe form a distinctive cluster within the wider north Atlantic and pan-European populist conjuncture. They are distinctive in construing the opposition between self and other not in narrowly national but in broader civilizational terms. This partial shift from nationalism to “civilizationism” has been driven by the notion of a civilizational threat from Islam. This has given rise to an identitarian “Christianism”, a secularist posture, a philosemitic stance, and an ostensibly liberal defence of gender equality, gay rights, and freedom of speech. The paper highlights the distinctiveness of this configuration by briefly comparing the national populisms of Northern and Western Europe to the Trump campaign and to the national populisms of East Central Europe. It concludes by specifying two ways in which the joining of identitarian Christianism with secularist and liberal rhetoric challenges prevailing understandings of European national populism.
Since the Tea Party Movement (TPM) emerged, observers have drawn parallels between this movement and the Religious Right (RR). This article deepens our understanding of this relationship by providing a detailed analysis of religiosity in the TPM versus the RR. We find that compared to the RR, the TPM mobilized a religiously heterogeneous membership. Although roughly half of TPM members were also members of the RR, the other half of this movement reported lower levels of religious orthodoxy and commitment, and included relatively large numbers of nonreligious individuals. Yet a majority of TPM members, including disproportionately high numbers of nonreligious members, believed that America is a Christian nation. Our findings complicate the notion that religious “nones” are predictably liberal and that Christian nationalist views are necessarily linked to Christian identity, instead raising the possibility that Christian-America rhetoric can operate—even for some nonreligious individuals—as symbolic boundary-work that marks certain groups as political “others.”
Americans have always put the past to political ends. The Union laid claim to the Revolution--so did the Confederacy. Civil rights leaders said they were the true sons of liberty--so did Southern segregationists. This book tells the story of the centuries-long struggle over the meaning of the nation's founding, including the battle waged by the Tea Party, Glenn Beck, Sarah Palin, and evangelical Christians to "take back America."Jill Lepore, Harvard historian andNew Yorkerstaff writer, offers a wry and bemused look at American history according to the far right, from the "rant heard round the world," which launched the Tea Party, to the Texas School Board's adoption of a social-studies curriculum that teaches that the United States was established as a Christian nation. Along the way, she provides rare insight into the eighteenth-century struggle for independence--the real one, that is. Lepore traces the roots of the far right's reactionary history to the bicentennial in the 1970s, when no one could agree on what story a divided nation should tell about its unruly beginnings. Behind the Tea Party's Revolution, she argues, lies a nostalgic and even heartbreaking yearning for an imagined past--a time less troubled by ambiguity, strife, and uncertainty--a yearning for an America that never was.The Whites of Their Eyesreveals that the far right has embraced a narrative about America's founding that is not only a fable but is also, finally, a variety of fundamentalism--anti-intellectual, antihistorical, and dangerously antipluralist.
It is now a common refrain among liberals that Christian Right pastors and television pundits have hijacked evangelical Christianity for partisan gain. The Politics of Evangelical Identity challenges this notion, arguing that the hijacking metaphor paints a fundamentally distorted picture of how evangelical churches have become politicized. The book reveals how the powerful coalition between evangelicals and the Republican Party is not merely a creation of political elites who have framed conservative issues in religious language, but is anchored in the lives of local congregations. Drawing on her groundbreaking research at evangelical churches near the U.S. border with Canada-two in Buffalo, New York, and two in Hamilton, Ontario-Lydia Bean compares how American and Canadian evangelicals talk about politics in congregational settings. While Canadian evangelicals share the same theology and conservative moral attitudes as their American counterparts, their politics are quite different. On the U.S. side of the border, political conservatism is woven into the very fabric of everyday religious practice. Bean shows how subtle partisan cues emerge in small group interactions as members define how "we Christians" should relate to others in the broader civic arena, while liberals are cast in the role of adversaries. She explains how the most explicit partisan cues come not from clergy but rather from lay opinion leaders who help their less politically engaged peers to link evangelical identity to conservative politics. The Politics of Evangelical Identity demonstrates how deep the ties remain between political conservatism and evangelical Christianity in America.
This book examines the evidence supporting claims that America's founding principles are based in part on religion. These claims usually center on the Puritan background to republican government (e.g. the Mayflower Compact), assertions of divine providence directing the leaders and events of the American Revolution, and the religious beliefs of various Founders. The book demonstrates that the notion of a Christian origin for American government is one of the nation's leading founding myths, one that was consciously created during the early nineteenth century as part of the drive to establish a national identity. In seeking to unify the nation and proclaim its unique status to the world, proponents created the myth of America's religious origins out of a desire to sanctify the founding. Modern-day proponents of America's religious foundations need to understand the purposeful origins of the narrative upon which they rely.
We test for relationships between anti-Muslim attitudes and opinion and competing religious identity and religious belief variables in an evangelical Christian constituency. Original survey data from a statewide sample of 508 likely voters in Oklahoma are subjected to a robust regression analysis to determine (1) indicators of holding Christian nationalist beliefs and (2) the relationship between belief measures of Christian nationalism, evangelical Christian identity, and subsequent anti-Muslim sentiment. Christian nationalism is more prevalent among self-identified evangelicals. Christian nationalist beliefs and strong belief in Biblical literalism are significantly related to negative and restrictive views of Muslims. Anti-Muslim sentiments in the form of general disapproval and the desire to limit Muslim worship are shaped more by beliefs than identities or behaviors. Evangelical self-identification does not help us disentangle domestic opinion regarding Muslims as well as measures that disentangle beliefs from identity.