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The political economy of coal: Lessons learnt from 15 country case studies
Abstract
This article summarizes lessons learnt from 15 case studies on the political economy of coal following one integrated framework. It proposes four country categories that show comparable properties to analyze the political economy of coal, including countries that i) phase out coal, ii) phase in coal, iii) are established users and iv) depend on coal exports. Regarding the prevalence of coal investments in many countries, it highlights the role of conflicting societal objectives, e.g. affordable electricity prices being more important than environmental targets. Vested interests are mainly related to locally concentrated job losses, expectations regarding regional development, coal royalties, as well as lobbying by a politically well-connected coal industry. Those factors can be either strengthened or extenuated by structural factors, including multi-level governance issues and the structure of the energy market. Entry points for policy vary for different country categories. De-risking financing of alternatives to coal as well as reforms of energy markets are most important entry points in countries that still invest in coal or plan to phase in coal to their energy systems.
... The water-energy nexus focuses specifically on the relationship between water and energy systems. It examines how water is used for various energy production processes (e.g., cooling in power plants and hydropower generation) and how energy is required for water-related processes (e.g., water treatment, distribution, and wastewater management) [6]. The water-energy nexus considers the trade-offs and potential conflicts that can arise between water and energy demands, especially as water scarcity and energy needs increase. ...
... The approach recognizes that changes in one system can have significant impacts on the others, and that integrated, cross-sectoral solutions are required to address the challenges and opportunities that arise from these interdependencies [5]. The WEF nexus is a complex and interconnected system that underpins sustainable development and human well-being [6]. The nexus refers to the interdependent relationship between water, energy, and food, and the need to balance these three sectors to ensure their sustainable development [7][8][9]. ...
... Cluster #8 is consistent with our searching keyword, and this cluster reflects the objects, indicators, purposes, and methods of this type of research (Table 7). (45,20); climate (41,45); river basin (36,48); energy food nexus (26,27); sustainable development goals (22,47); opportunity (16,27); system dynamics (12,18); river (12,22); hydropower (12,30); tradeoffs (10,27); conservation (8,15); synergy effect (6,18); integrated assessment (6, 13); future (5, 13); resilience (4,12); political economy (4,9) #1 renewable energy water (48,26); energy (42,36); system performance (27,29); politics (18,30); circular economy (15,32); simulation (12,35); efficiency (10,26); biodiversity (10,25); anaerobic digestion (9, 25); desalination (4, 10); economic growth ( (12,26); ecological systems (9, 24); infrastructure (8,21); networks and flows (7,20); environmental policy (6,14); climate change impact (5, 10); sustainability science (4,9) #5 optimization water footprint (36,30); allocation (12,14); optimal design (9, 21); optimization model (9, 25); decision (8,24); use efficiency (7, 12); sensitivity analysis (5, 11); sustainability assessment (5, 10); surface water (5, 17); multi-objective optimization (4, 10); protection (4, 6); environmental sustainability (4, 10) ...
The water-energy-food (WEF) nexus has emerged as a crucial framework for addressing the interdependencies and trade-offs between these vital resources. In the context of a just energy transition, where the pursuit of sustainable and equitable energy systems is paramount, understanding the WEF nexus becomes even more critical. We explore the evolving concept of the WEF nexus and its relevance to achieving a sustainable energy transition that considers social equity, environmental sustainability, and economic development. This paper highlights key challenges and opportunities in implementing a just energy transition within the context of the WEF nexus, with a focus on promoting social inclusion, ensuring water and food security, and optimizing energy production and consumption. Additionally, we discuss the importance of integrated policymaking, cross-sectoral collaboration, and innovative technologies in addressing the complex interactions between water, energy, and food systems.
... The final group of mechanisms that affect coal lock-in and destabilization involves the political action of the state [26,27]. The state may be motivated to either keep or phase out coal based on such imperatives as ensuring secure supply-demand balance [28]. ...
... Another critical factor in the balance of state and market factors is the quality of the state institutions, particularly democracy and transparency (the ability to contain corruption) [5,7,8,33]. The inf luence of interest groups should decrease as democracy increases and corruption decreases, and overcoming the resistance and lock-in of the coal sector should therefore become more likely as these factors change [11,26]. This analysis allows us to identify hypotheses with respect to variables that may speed up or slow down destabilization of coal sector as summarized in Table 1. ...
... Faster growth in electricity generation correlates negatively with the probability of peaking coal Faster growth of electricity demand delays coal destabilization by making governments more concerned about security of supply and weakening the competition between coal and other technologies [18][19][20] Increased dependence on imported coal correlates positively with the probability of peaking coal Dependence on imported coal may speed up destabilization for energy security reasons while the presence of domestic coal strengthens the coal sector and perpetuates lock-in [7,[26][27][28] Increased total energy import dependence correlates positively with the probability of peaking coal Concerns over energy security may favor coal power as established mature technology [26][27][28] Increased share of coal in total generation correlates negatively with the probability peaking coal Larger coal sectors may be more difficult to destabilize [7,15,31,32] Increased age of power plant f leet correlates positively with the probability of peaking coal ...
Transitioning to net-zero carbon emissions requires phasing-out unabated coal power however recently it has only been declining in some countries, while it stagnated or even increased in others. Where and under what circumstances, has coal capacity reached its peak and begun to decline? We address this question with an empirical analysis of coal capacity in 56 countries, accounting for 99% of coal generation in the world. The peaks in national coal power have been equally spread per decade since 1970. The peaks are more likely to occur in country-years with high levels of electoral democracy, higher GDP per capita, slower electricity demand growth, and with low levels of political corruption. Normally, peaking coal power preceded rather than followed political coal phase-out pledges, often with long time lags. We conclude that though the cost of coal alternatives are declining and concerns over climate change increasing, coal power does not automatically peak even in situations with low demand growth, aging power plants and high import dependence. A quick and decisive destabilisation of coal regimes requires, in addition, to have sufficient economic capacities and strong democratic governance.
... Rather, those targeting individual industries reliant on the production or use of a specific technology or substance will often confront concentrated, well-organized, and powerful opposition. Indeed, several studies 24,25,35,116,117 highlight how the political activities of the nuclear, fossil-fuel, agrochemicals, and transport manufacturing industry have delayed, weakened, or derailed phase-out policies. These sizable sectors contribute significantly to local and national economies, cultural identity, and social prosperity (see McDowal 77 ). ...
... 24,71,88,118 As a general trend, we find that scholars have predominantly investigated such strategies from the perspective of isolated industries. Although we recognize that phase-outs should be tailored to the specific circumstances of individual localities and sectors, 119,117,120 this inclination toward analytical siloes points to a need for cross-cutting analyses that distill generalizable lessons based on common experiences and coping strategies used across heterogeneous industries. ...
... Within this literature, socio-political and economic conditionsparticularly the existence of liberalized electricity markets, carbon pricing schemes, and public pressure-have all been found to be conducive to the emergence of phase-out policies. 117 Conversely, countries characterized by conditions such as coordinated economies, state-owned markets, coal extraction industries, weak environmental governance, and missing societal debates are more likely to see phase-out attempts derailed by vested interests. 24,68,128 Meanwhile, a study on the global proliferation of announcements to abolish gasoline vehicles finds that phase-out ambitions are tightly linked to industrial policy, being most likely to take root in countries perceiving a competitive advantage in accelerating the electrification of their automobile industry. ...
... Second, we compare the country clusters. Studies by Jakob and Steckel [11,50,51] produced country clusters for the political economy of coal including for the 12 countries we analyse in this study. We explain their approach and highlight differences to our method, drawing on individual case studies from [11]. ...
... Three recent studies cluster countries based on their political economy of coal. They synthesise findings from the qualitative case studies shown in Table 4. using the same interview base as we do [11,50] and numbers on coal capacity and coal export [51]. This enables comparison of results while drawing on the individual case studies from Jakob and Steckel [11]. ...
... We find two out of the three countries from the cluster 'Phase-in', Vietnam and Pakistan, in our cluster 'Energy sector planning', together with the Philippines, which was considered a phase-in country in earlier papers as well [11,50]. The overarching content we find for this cluster is the focus on policy planning and the involved private and political actors and how they shape policy making. ...
... Among prior contributions, Dorband et al. (2020) and Steckel and Jakob (2021) provided insights into the political economy of coal in Vietnam, examining the context, actors, and objectives of the country's coal sector. Drivers of international investment in coal power in Vietnam were qualitatively analysed by Gallagher et al. (2021) and quantitatively assessed by Edianto et al. (2022). ...
... Established enterprise models based on existing price signals and technologies, plus distortions that keep the price of domestic thermal coal below the international market price, mean that key incumbents are not highly motivated to change (I5, I13). Long-term fixed contracts for the output of coal power plants have also reduced the ability for solar and wind power to directly compete (Steckel and Jakob, 2021). Solar PV and wind power purchase agreements face bankability problems due to reasons including that take-or-pay obligations currently do not exist for EVN (Do et al., 2020. ...
... Given that most coal power plants are state-owned, a central planning approach could be used to carry out detailed scheduling of coal power plant exits (A7; Tan et al., 2021). Government initiatives will likely play a more dominant role than market forces in Vietnam as well as in other developing countries (Steckel and Jakob, 2021). ...
At the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change 26th Conference of the Parties (COP 26) in November 2021, Vietnam pledged to phase out unabated coal power by the 2040s or as soon as possible thereafter. Achieving this will require major efforts. This study investigates the drivers for Vietnam's coal power phase-out decision, barriers to Vietnam achieving a successful unabated thermal coal phase out, and potential strategies to achieve the pledge. To this end, a survey of 43 experts from government agencies, research institutions, civil society, and industry was carried out, supplemented by 23 follow-up interviews. The results indicate that ambition to attract international support for green growth initiatives in a context of limited financing options for new coal power projects appears to have been the primary driver for the decision. Key barriers include concerns about electricity shortages and incomplete regulatory frameworks for new clean power options. Recommended strategies include: 1) reforming regulations to facilitate investments in clean energy, electricity transmission, and energy storage; 2) continuing political prioritisation; and 3) building broad-based support from the community and enterprises. Vietnam's case is relevant to other developing countries and beyond.
... While critical for driving low-carbon transitions, phase-out policies are politically challenging [7,25]. This is because their feasibility is frequently determined by contestations, struggles and power relations among heterogenous actors, such as policymakers, interest groups (industry and trade associations, unions, etc.) and civil society (NGOs, citizen associations) [26]. Indeed, several studies have found interest groups' influence on energy policies to be significant, even after taking into account other predictors like international influences and macroeconomic factors [27][28][29]. ...
... Moreover, achieving a coal phase-out requires more than mere policy change. Due to the resistive influence and inertia created by vested interests and a wide array of material and non-material lock-in sources such as codified rules, cognitive frames, values and norms [13,26], eliminating coal-based energy systems requires broad changes to the formal and informal institutions that embed a socio-technical regime. To better understand why lock-in forces are overcome in some cases and not in others, we therefore need to look closer at the institutional contestations. ...
... In low-and middle-income countries, coal is often seen as the cheapest option to build new capacity (Steckel and Jacob, 2021). This is due to a number of reasons including the high capital costs which favour coal (due also to differences in the financing structure of renewables) and the fact that coal is an established technology. ...
... In the context of the Ukraine war, many countries including India have been forced to rethink the issue of energy security and import dependence in primary energy sources. In many countries, coal royalties and other vested interests may prevent the phasing out of coal (Steckel and Jacob, 2021). ...
... There is a growing amount of research focusing on coal phaseout (Blondeel et al., 2020;Diluiso et al., 2021;Jewell et al., 2019;Steckel & Jakob, 2021) that highlights the importance of "vested interests" and "carbon lock-in'' to explain why the phasing out of coal is so challenging. Membership of the prominent "Powering Past Coal Alliance" (PPCA; a coalition of national and subnational governments, businesses, and organizations working to advance the transition from unabated coal power generation to clean energy) is mainly confined to countries with a relatively old coal fleet or a low share of coal in electricity generation (i.e., where the influence of vested interests is on the decrease; Jewell et al., 2019). ...
... Building on work by Meckling and Nahm (2021), we focus on the role of (strategic) state capacity in the context of coal phaseout by proposing a mixed-methods research design where we explore: (a) whether there is a systematic link between levels of state capacity and progress in terms of the phasing out of coal using quantitative methods, and (b) what other types of strategy beyond compensation are used by countries to phase out coal and how these could be linked to the level of state capacity using qualitative methods. Overall, there have been many single or comparative case studies of coal phaseout (Diluiso et al., 2021;Markard et al., 2021;Oei et al., 2020;Rentier et al., 2019) but only a few studies including cases that would shed more light on generalizable patterns (Blondeel et al., 2020;Jewell et al., 2019;Steckel & Jakob, 2021;Vinichenko et al., 2021). This is not surprising, given that there are not very many cases where coal phaseout has been observed and, additionally, it is not very clear how countries in the different stages of coal phaseout (Nacke et al., 2022) should be compared. ...
To reach the mitigation goals of the Paris Agreement, many countries will have to phase out their coal power plants prematurely , i.e., before the end of their normal lifetimes, which will lead quite possibly to significant stranded assets. This could present a major challenge, particularly for many of the rapidly developing countries whose electricity demand is growing and which are currently expanding their coal fleets. Recent research shows that countries with aging power plants and decreasing coal consumption are more inclined to phase out coal, but little is known about where, why, and how coal power plants are being prematurely retired. In the context of the hybrid Paris Agreement, attention is increasingly shifting to domestic mitigation capacities and, alongside this-given the vested interests involved in different sectors-to state capacity to implement the transformations required to achieve deep decarbonization. In this article, we aim to study those capacities in the context of coal phaseout. We use a recent and comprehensive global dataset on coal power plants and employ a mixed-methods research design to (a) identify general emerging patterns with respect to premature coal fleet retirement, and (b) derive stylized types of political strategies to prematurely retire coal power plants. We find state capacity to be a robust predictor of general and premature coal retirement, and we identify three main strategies that countries have used to date to prematurely retire coal: (a) rein-in using top-down regulatory enforcement of environmental, climate, or other regulations that affect the operating licenses of coal plants; (b) buy-out or provision of compensation to companies and regions to appease vested interests; and (c) crowd out where accelerating market and price dynamics in the power sector crowd out coal. We propose that future research should explore more systematically the kinds of strategy that might be most promising in the regions and countries needing to rapidly phase out coal, taking into account their political structures, and also the implications that such strategies might have for global mitigation efforts.
... Second, we increase the understanding on the underlying mechanisms of the Chinese expansion with a particular focus on drivers behind the dominating coal support in the observed portfolio. This part builds on the literature on the political economy behind coal power in recipient countries to cover the demand side (e.g., Steckel and Jakob, 2021;Ordonez et al., 2021;Dorband et al., 2020), as well as literature on the Chinese political economy behind foreign energy related state-finance flows (e.g., Kong and Gallagher, 2017;Kong, 2019) to cover the supply side. Furthermore, it builds on a recently published work from Kong and Gallagher (2021a), Kong and Gallagher (2021b) who established the link between supply and demand in the electricity sector for China's two major policy banks as well as on a study from Gallagher et al. (2021) that conducted expert interviews in four recipient countries of Chinese coal finance to investigate the drivers on the demand side. ...
... All seven countries would need to invest a significant share of their GDP (1.8-3.8% between 2016 and 2030) to satisfy their rising electricity investment needs and to provide electricity to 100% of their population by 2030 (Global Infrastructure Hub, 2017; see Table A.6). Despite rapidly declining costs for renewables, coal might still have been the cheapest option, at least in the short term (Interview ID PS16, PS11; Steckel and Jakob, 2021). A lack of domestic financial resources (Interview ID NP3), comparably low and subsidized interest rates from CDIs (Interview ID PU8; Burke et al., 2019) and decreasing availability of finance from MDBs (in general and for coal in particular; Section 3; Steffen and Schmidt, 2019) made CDI finance particularly attractive to address development challenges (Interview PU3) and support various socio-economic development indicators (e.g., Moner-Girona et al., 2021) that are linked to electricity access (or at least constituted a powerful narrative for coal-supporting incumbents). ...
Public developmental institutions are pivotal in shaping the contours of the electricity sector of the developing world and its associated greenhouse gas emissions pathways. However, we have a fragmented and incomplete picture of the evolution of their investments over time and space. This is particularly the case for the recent rise of various Chinese Developmental Institutions (CDIs) for which infrastructure investment estimates range in the trillions under China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) and for which data is mostly not publicly disclosed. We address this gap in two ways: first, we compile and analyze a novel dataset that draws on commercial data tracking, publicly available datasets, and more than 1,000 supporting documents to match financial transactions by the main CDIs and traditional Multilateral Development Banks (MDBs) to power plant projects worldwide. This allows us to conduct a quantitative, comparative analysis of the role of CDIs and MDBs to understand the relative size, technology, and country focus of such investments in the period 1999–2020. Second, we complement the quantitative dataset with 39 expert interviews to shed light on the drivers behind the Chinese investments, with a particular focus on coal projects. The analysis shows that CDIs have rapidly emerged as the largest public finance provider for the electricity sector in the developing world. We also find that, in contrast with the increasingly green BRI rhetoric, the technology portfolio of CDI investments in power plants is still heavily dominated by coal plants. Over time, however, CDIs have increasingly supported more efficient coal plants and increased the share of their portfolio supporting non-hydro renewables and supported a growing number of projects jointly with MDBs. Steering China’s bilateral coal finance flows through international efforts into a more sustainable direction to meet climate goals will require careful consideration of a set of drivers and enablers of the involvement of CDIs and recipient countries in coal projects, which we discuss, as well as of the role of other finance providers, including traditional MDBs.
... Some of these barriers have been highlighted in previous studies on the political economy of coal in Indonesia, which relied on interview data from Ordonez et al. (2021) collected in 2018 (Jakob et al., 2020;Steckel and Jakob, 2021;Ohlendorf, Jakob and Steckel, 2022;Manych, Müller-Hansen and Steckel, 2023). This paper seeks to update and deepen the analysis from these studies using a narrative literature review and 10 interviews with key respondents conducted in 2023. ...
Coal combustion accounts for the largest share of energy-related greenhouse gas emissions globally and must be rapidly phased out to keep the global climate targets within reach. Indonesia currently relies on coal for over 60% of its power generation. Thus, phasing out coal power in Indonesia can deliver substantial emissions reductions. However, significant political barriers remain for phasing out coal power in Indonesia. Applying the Actor-Objective-Context political economy framework, this study analyzed the barriers to phasing out coal in Indonesia and how they might be overcome using a literature review and interviews with 10 key respondents. Some previous findings were confirmed, for example, that actors such as the Ministry of Energy and Mineral Resources, the coal mining industry, and political elites with ties to the coal industry strongly oppose phase-out. However, the research also contributed new findings. For example, electricity oversupply issues exacerbated by the overexpansion of coal-fired power plants are identified as a new contextual barrier, and this study suggests a direct causal link with its emergence and incumbent actors' objectives. New objectives that could shift the political economy in favor of coal phase-out were also identified, such as the Ministry of Finance's desire to reduce the state-owned utility's subsidies. 2
... Many studies have highlighted that easy availability of low-cost finance can support the transition towards renewable energy (Egli, 2020;Hall et al., 2018). So, it is necessary to work and engage with the finance sector to ease the transition to renewable energy across all sectors (Olleik et al., 2022;Steckel & Jakob, 2021). ...
The IPCC's6th Assessment Report of Working Group I projects the view that world will exceed the Paris Goal to limit global warming to 1.5 °C over the pre-industrial levels by as early as 2035 due to the “widespread, rapid and growing” nature of climate change. To stop climate change, there is an urgent need to redefine our industrial and agricultural practices. Decarbonisation and circular material management of resources require global implementation to resolve climate change challenges. More importantly, developing nations need proper framework and strategies to enable a decarbonisation pathway. In the present study, we discuss performance of developing countries (taking the case of India and its environmental, social, economic backgrounds) in achieving ‘net zero vision’ as discussed in the Conference of Parties (COP) under UNFCCC. In this research, we have emphasised on: (a) sustainable practices countries need to follow, (b) key elements of the net-zero framework, and (c) key institutional strategies to support key elements of sustainability practices. The study includes 15 relevant scopes to work upon (called the pillars of Green India). These pillars encompass the institutional areas of policy regulations, awareness, technology and finance. Some major areas of focus in this domain include: switch to renewables (policy and politics in its adaptation), electricity usage and its transformation (policy and politics in the adaptation of the same), and market value design for carbon pricing (making strategies for its adaptation). This study helps in developing a proper framework that is essential to achieve the vision of COP 26 and COP 27 on “net zero” and the way forward for COP 28. Bibliometric mapping of countries shows that developed nations such as the USA and UK are way ahead in “decarbonisation” research as compared to developing nations like India and other South Asian countries.
Graphical abstract
... This was most evident on two occasions: (i) the rejection of a "climate contribution" that would have allowed the timely closure of older inefficient coal plants (Oei et al. 2020a, b), (ii) decisions around the timing of the German coal phaseout and resistance to the adoption of EU air quality regulations. The unions pushed for a "gradual" coal phase-out alongside demands for benefits and support packages for affected workers (Steckel and Jakob 2021). High political capital of the coal regime systematically fueled regional and national concerns over job losses, energy security, and import dependence, thereby allowing Germany to outlast its European counterparts in sustaining the coal sector (David and Gross 2019). ...
China produces nearly half of the world’s coal and more than half of the global coal-fired electricity. Its CO2 emissions are higher than the combined volumes of the next three world regions—the US, Europe, and India. China has announced a net-zero commitment by 2060. This timeline creates enormous pressure to maintain energy security while phasing down coal use. Despite the localized nature of China’s coal production with nearly 80% of its thermal coal industry concentrated in four provinces, the dependencies are complex and extensive. Large-scale changes to energy systems will result in a range of social, cultural, and economic disruptions across China’s urban, rural, and remote regions. This paper examines experiences with coal transitions in other jurisdictions and considers implications for China. We examine the drivers, successes, and failures of coal phase-down in Germany, Poland, Australia, the UK, and the US. Despite significant differences in scale and complexity, these experiences offer important insights for China as it works to meet its climate commitments.
... The actors-objectives-context (AOC) framework has recently been applied to case studies based on semi-structured interviews, for example in Vietnam [72], India [73], Indonesia [74] and the Philippines [75]. A collection of 15 case-studies using the AOC framework has been recently published in an edited volume [76], while major insights from the book have been condensed to a research article [77]. The generic actor-centered framework design allows for conceptual extensions and for comparisons of countries with different political systems and institutional structures. ...
Political economy factors are key to explain why some countries keep expanding their coal capacity. Yet, comparable cross-country evidence is scant. We consult 123 energy experts for eight major coal countries through an online survey, to assess which political economy factors affect coal-related policies. Regardless of the political or economic system, we find that the ministry for energy, the head of state and the ruling party are consistently the most important political actors, while utilities and mining companies are the most influential economic actors. Generally, other societal actors are the least influential. Economic growth, electricity system stability and low electricity costs are very relevant objectives the major arguments of pro-coal actors. The most relevant contextual factors are the influence of the power sector and structure of the power market. Actors, objectives, and contextual factors related to the environment are consistently less important. The insights of this study help identify entry points for politically feasible policies to phase-out coal.
... Rather, those targeting individual industries reliant on the production or use of a specific technology or substance will often confront organised and powerful opposition. Indeed, our dataset contains numerous accounts [18,19,[38][39][40][41] where the self-preservation interests of nuclear, fossil fuels, agrochemicals and transport manufacturing have delayed, weakened or derailed phase-out policies. Since these sectors are typically large, employing wide-reaching populations, and contributing significantly to local and national economies, resistance can arise equally from workers, the public and politicians. ...
Phase-out has emerged as a policy approach to confront multiple sustainability crises. From ozone-depleting substances and hazardous chemicals to fossil fuels and transport technologies, phase-out experiences have been documented by diverse scientific communities. To consolidate this dispersed knowledge and inspire more systematic research, we map the evolution of scientific discussions about phase-out through a systematic literature review. Examining 870 papers published since 1970, we trace the evolving nature of phase-out strategies in terms of targets, geographic and industrial contexts, policy instruments and drivers. This provides a multi-faceted overview of an emerging and rapidly growing ‘phase-out science’ rooted across the full spectrum of scientific enquiry. Evolution of this science is marked by broadening engagement with a growing diversity of targets, contexts, and policies. Our analysis also shows how phase-out policies have recently gained momentum as a tool to tackle climate change, with a particular focus on fossil fuels and associated technologies.
Soil constitutes the basic resource for diverse human activities and is considered one of the most essential natural resources invaluable to human survival on Earth. From time immemorial, the soil is utilised to provide critical services including water filtration, growing medium, and habitat for micro- and macroorganisms. Generally, soil utilisation supports practices in which soil is used for the provision of various services, processes, and functions or purposes such as agriculture, construction, and others. Soil utilisation patterns can contribute to the economic status of a nation especially those in the Global South. Therefore, it must not be neglected in any development endeavour, either at local, regional, or global levels. The majority of functions performed by the soil are closely connected with humans, ecosystems, and biodiversity well-being. However, agricultural production is the most pronounced, recognised, and acknowledged soil utilisation pattern. Note that soil utilisation patterns are different in developing and developed countries. The soil utilisation patterns that are practiced in a particular location are determined by many factors such as characteristics of the soil, agricultural activities and processes, socioeconomic status, urban and regional planning, geographical conditions, and political situations. This chapter aims to examine soil utilisation patterns in the Global South and their impacts on socioeconomic activities. Therein, the most essential soil utilisation patterns practiced in the Global South are outlined and discussed. The chapter emphasises the most essential soil utilisation patterns that continue to contribute to and sustain the economy of the Global South. These patterns include the use of soil for agricultural production, water storage, habitat for biodiversity, waste recycling agent, storehouse for mineral raw materials, and landscape engineering and urban development. It is assumed that the information and knowledge shared in this chapter will be necessary to improve the attitudes of people on innovative and sustainable soil utilisation patterns.
The phase-out of unabated coal power is crucial for meeting climate agreements in coal-dependent economies such as Indonesia and Vietnam. Despite both countries committing to the 2021 Global Coal to Clean Power Transition Statement, translating phase-out pledges into action poses considerable challenges. Drawing insights from interviews with government, civil society, and industry experts, this study identifies the key barriers hindering coal phase-out in each country. Concerns about potentially escalating electricity prices and power shortages loom large, with the former being more prominent in Indonesia and the latter more prominent in Vietnam. The obstacles appear particularly significant in Indonesia for reasons including its higher coal dependence. We conclude that prioritizing renewable energy growth, as well as halting the construction of new coal plants, would be the most practical and viable way forward for both countries rather than an oversized early focus on coal plant closures. The analysis is of high relevance to informing plans under the two countries' Just Energy Transition Partnerships.
The sustainable energy transition to a low-carbon and climate-neutral economy by 2050 requires a consistent increase in the share of renewable energy sources (RESs) at the expense of the share of fossil fuels. The coal power plants in the Republic of Bulgaria have provided about one third of the annually produced electric power for decades, utilizing mainly locally available sources of lignite. The present work aimed to review the progress of the energy transition, its rejection and acceptance at the national and international scene alongside the available research for cleaner coal combustion in Bulgaria, as well as discuss a Bulgarian perspective for coal share reduction options for power generation during the energy transition. A comprehensive review was carried out, based on freely accessible data such as research and open media articles, officially published field reports, legislative and strategic acts as well as validated statistical data. Three groups of critical gaps (socioeconomic, sociotechnical and cultural and political) were indicated, claimed to be capable of guiding the just transition. Key factors influencing the process dynamics were identified and categorized in the context of the critical gaps. The peculiar policy criteria for the carbon-intensive regions are as follows: the dominant energy carriers, existing infrastructure, involved actors and choice of strategy. The observations allowed us to conclude that in addition to the efforts achieved and ambitious political will, the identification of reliable technological and socioeconomic measures is needed more than ever (accompanied by interdisciplinary research involving the technical, social and environmental and policy factors), while renewables still have long way to go towards complete substitution of the fossil fuels for power generation, transport, and manufacturing. Limited literature was found for reducing the share of coal from currently operating Bulgarian coal-fired power plants (CFPPs). Herein, short- and/or medium-term measures for carbon emission reduction were discussed, capable of promoting the limited operation of existing CFPPs, thus paving the road towards a sustainable, long-term transition. These measures concerned the typically used power units in the largest CFPPs located at the Maritsa Iztok Mining Complex (MIMC). Analyses of the biomass production, supply and cost for the same type of power units were proposed, considering the use of 100% biomass. Estimated costs, unit efficiencies and power generation were discussed along with the evaluations about the land use, ensuring a given annual productivity of wood chips from fast growing plants, e.g., Paulownia.
Averting dangerous climate change requires expediting the retirement of coal-fired power plants (CFPPs). Given multiple barriers hampering this, here we forecast the future retirement ages of the world's CFPPs. We use supervised machine learning to first learn from the past, determining the factors that influenced historical retirements. We then apply our model to a dataset of 6,541 operating or under-construction units in 66 countries. Based on results, we also forecast associated carbon emissions and the degree to which countries are locked in to coal power. Contrasting with the historical average of roughly 40 years over 2010-2021, our model forecasts earlier retirement for 63% of current CFPP units. This results in 38% less emissions than if assuming historical retirement trends. However, the lock-in index forecasts considerable difficulties to retire CFPPs early in countries with high dependence on coal power, a large capacity or number of units, and young plant ages.
The European Commission has proposed a Carbon Border Adjustment Mechanism (CBAM) to enable ambitious climate policies in EU member states and to incentivize emission reductions in other countries. This paper adopts a dynamic, multilevel, polycentric perspective to discuss how domestic as well as foreign interest groups would be affected by the policy. Our analysis yields three central insights. First, diplomatic efforts should be focused on a small number of countries that would be most severely affected by the CBAM. Second, the CBAM should be implemented as an enabler of domestic mitigation efforts in an open climate alliance instead of an attempt to extend EU climate policy to other countries. Third, gradually phasing in the CBAM while phasing out free emission permits for EU producers and supporting the transformation of carbon-intensive sectors in third countries can ease political opposition from domestic as well as foreign industries.
This paper focuses on the practice of “just coal transitions,” which are proving to be more difficult to execute and much slower to realize than anticipated. The authors discuss what has been learned from coal transition experiences – including those occurring in Australia, West Virginia, and Poland – and how lessons from these regions can be applied to managing any just coal transition around the world. The analysis concludes with recommendations on enhancing the integration of policy and practice.
Coal use needs to rapidly decline in the global energy mix in the next few decades in order to meet the Paris climate goals of keeping global warming well below 2-degrees Celsius. In emerging economies such as India (the second largest producer and consumer of coal) this would entail reducing long-term coal dependency. Prior work has focused on a coal transition in India from a techno-economic point of view, yet little attention has been given to the socio-economic dimensions of this transition. This is in part due to lack of availability of datasets required for such analysis. The first step in understanding the socio-economic dimensions of a coal transition in India is to understand the scale of current socio-economic dependency on coal at sub-national level. We contribute to this literature by creating a novel dataset comprising of all 459 operational coal mines in India using multiple Right to Information Act applications (India's Freedom of Information Act) and then combining this dataset with coal company wise employment factors to estimate direct job numbers at a district level (a sub-administrative unit). We find that coal is produced in 51 districts in 13 states in India with large variations in employment numbers among these districts. While Korba district in Chhattisgarh state is the highest coal producing district, Dhanbad district in Jharkhand state is home to the highest number of coal mining workers. This is the first attempt at understanding the socio-economic dependency on coal at a district level and future work could focus on other quantifying other district level socio-economic indicators such as coal related revenues. The new dataset and the results of this paper will be useful for scholars conducting future work on coal transitions and related topics.
To what extent did growth during the Industrial Revolution depend on coal? We answer the question using a panel of European city sizes between 1300 and 1900. Prior to 1750 there was no relationship between proximity to coalfields and growth; after 1750 cities closer to coalfields grew substantially faster than those further away. We instrument for coal proximity using proximity to Carboniferous-era rock strata.
Global power generation must rapidly decarbonize by mid-century to meet the goal of stabilizing global warming below 2°C. To meet this objective, multilateral development banks (MDBs) have gradually reduced fossil fuel and increased renewable energy financing. Meanwhile, globally active national development finance institutions (DFIs) from Japan and South Korea have continued to finance overseas coal plants. Less is known about the increasingly active Chinese DFIs. Here, we construct a new dataset of China's policy banks’ overseas power generation financing and compare their technology choices and impact on generation capacity with MDBs and Japanese and South Korean DFIs. We find that Chinese DFI power financing since 2000 has dramatically increased, surpassing other East Asian national DFIs and the major MDBs’ collective public sector power financing in 2013. As most Chinese DFI financing is currently in coal, decarbonization of their power investments will be critical in reducing future carbon emissions from recipient countries.
Net anthropogenic carbon dioxide (CO2) emissions must approach zero by mid-century (2050) to stabilize global mean temperature at the levels targeted by international efforts1–5. Yet continued expansion of fossil-fuel energy infrastructure implies already ‘committed’ future CO2 emissions6–13. Here we use detailed datasets of current fossil-fuel-burning energy infrastructure in 2018 to estimate regional and sectoral patterns of ‘committed’ CO2 emissions, the sensitivity of such emissions to assumed operating lifetimes and schedules, and the economic value of associated infrastructure. We estimate that, if operated as historically, existing infrastructure will emit about 658 gigatonnes (Gt) of CO2 (ranging from 226 to 1,479 Gt CO2 depending on assumed lifetimes and utilization rates). More than half of these emissions are projected to come from the electricity sector, and infrastructure in China, the USA and the EU28 countries represent approximately 41 per cent, 9 per cent and 7 per cent of the total, respectively. If built, proposed power plants (planned, permitted or under construction) would emit approximately an additional 188 (range 37–427) Gt CO2. Committed emissions from existing and proposed energy infrastructure (about 846 Gt CO2) thus represent more than the entire remaining carbon budget if mean warming is to be limited to 1.5 °C with a probability of 50–66 per cent (420–580 Gt CO2)5, and perhaps two-thirds of the remaining carbon budget if mean warming is to be limited to below 2 °C (1,170–1,500 Gt CO2)5. The remaining carbon budget estimates are varied and nuanced14,15, depending on the climate target and the availability of large-scale negative emissions16. Nevertheless, our emission estimates suggest that little or no additional CO2-emitting infrastructure can be commissioned, and that infrastructure retirements that are earlier than historical ones (or retrofits with carbon capture and storage technology) may be necessary, in order to meet the Paris Agreement climate goals17. On the basis of the asset value per ton of committed emissions, we estimate that the most cost-effective premature infrastructure retirements will be in the electricity and industry sectors, if non-emitting alternative technologies are available and affordable4,18.
The Paris Agreement—which is aimed at holding global warming well below 2 °C while pursuing efforts to limit it below 1.5 °C—has initiated a bottom-up process of iteratively updating nationally determined contributions to reach these long-term goals. Achieving these goals implies a tight limit on cumulative net CO2 emissions, of which residual CO2 emissions from fossil fuels are the greatest impediment. Here, using an ensemble of seven integrated assessment models (IAMs), we explore the determinants of these residual emissions, focusing on sector-level contributions. Even when strengthened pre-2030 mitigation action is combined with very stringent long-term policies, cumulative residual CO2 emissions from fossil fuels remain at 850–1,150 GtCO2 during 2016–2100, despite carbon prices of US$130–420 per tCO2 by 2030. Thus, 640–950 GtCO2 removal is required for a likely chance of limiting end-of-century warming to 1.5 °C. In the absence of strengthened pre-2030 pledges, long-term CO2 commitments are increased by 160–330 GtCO2, further jeopardizing achievement of the 1.5 °C goal and increasing dependence on CO2 removal.
We estimate the cumulative future emissions expected to be released by coal power plants that are currently under construction, announced, or planned. Even though coal consumption has recently declined and plans to build new coal-fired capacities have been shelved, constructing all these planned coal-fired power plants would endanger national and international climate targets. Plans to build new coal-fired power capacity would likely undermine the credibility of some countries' (Intended) Nationally Determined Contributions submitted to the UNFCCC. If all the coal-fired power plants that are currently planned were built, the carbon budget for reaching the 2 °C temperature target would nearly be depleted. Propositions about 'coal's terminal decline' may thereby be premature. The phase-out of coal requires dedicated and well-designed policies. We discuss the political economy of policy options that could avoid a continued build-up of coal-fired power plants.
Prepublication proofs available here: http://journals.sagepub.com/doi/pdf/10.1177/0306312717709363. What theories or concepts are most useful at explaining socio technical change? How can - or cannot - these be integrated? To provide an answer, this study presents the results from 35 semi-structured research interviews with social science experts who also shared more than two hundred articles, reports and books on the topic of the acceptance, adoption, use, or diffusion of technology. This material led to the identification of 96 theories and conceptual approaches spanning 22 identified disciplines. The article begins by explaining its research terms and methods before honing in on a combination of fourteen theories deemed most relevant and useful by the material. These are: Sociotechnical Transitions, Social Practice Theory, Discourse Theory, Domestication Theory, Large Technical Systems, Social Construction of Technology, Sociotechnical Imaginaries, Actor-Network Theory, Social Justice Theory, Sociology of Expectations, Sustainable Development, Values Beliefs Norms Theory, Lifestyle Theory, and the Unified Theory of Acceptance and Use of Technology. It then positions these theories in terms of two distinct typologies. Theories can be placed into five general categories of being centered on agency, structure, meaning, relations or norms. They can also be classified based on their assumptions and goals rooted in functionalism, interpretivism, humanism or conflict. The article lays out tips for research methodology before concluding with insights about technology itself, analytical processes associated with technology, and the framing and communication of results. An interdisciplinary theoretical and conceptual inventory has much to offer students, analysts and scholars wanting to study technological change and society.
Effective mitigation of climate change requires investment flows to be redirected from high- to low-carbon technologies. However, especially in developing countries, low-carbon investments often suffer from high risks. More research is needed to address these risks and allow sound policy decisions to be made.
Indonesia is among the countries with the largest planned coal power capacity additions worldwide, thereby posing a substantial challenge for global climate change mitigation goals. To understand the underlying political drivers, we carry out expert interviews and examine how individual actors and their objectives, as well as the country context influence energy policy formulation. We find that under President Joko Widodo, energy policy formulation has been driven by the development of public infrastructure, while securing popularity for the presidential election in 2019. State-owned enterprises represent a source of political patronage and are employed to achieve those goals. Diminishing export markets have incentivized the politically well-connected and highly concentrated Indonesian coal industry to lobby for the construction of coal-fired power plants in order to raise domestic demand. There is also a strong incentive to sustain coal mining as a key economic activity, as associated royalties significantly contribute to local and national public budgets. Local pollution and climate change mitigation are of low priority. Despite the government’s documented awareness of the energy sector as the biggest contributor to future emissions, climate protection is narrowly framed as a forestry and land-use issue.
The Philippines encounter a rapidly growing electricity demand which is planned to be met mainly with coal. The build-up of coal-fired electricity generation is the result of a complex interplay of political economy factors. This analysis follows a novel political economy framework to shed light on actors, their objectives and how they influence policy-making given the country's context factors, such as the vulnerability to climate change and the oligopoly in the power sector. It is based on 35 semi-structured expert interviews with 50 stakeholders conducted in Metro Manila in October and November 2019. We identify four main goals determining electricity sector policy: reducing energy poverty, energy security, ecological sustainability, as well as private profits. Our insights on the political economy of the electricity sector in the Philippines can help to identify possible entry points for policies to decarbonize energy production.
Indian coal power capacity has doubled in the last ten years, and its coal pipeline is the second largest on the globe. This paper analyzes the political economy determinants of India's reliance on coal in the power sector. We base our analysis on a novel theoretical framework to assess how actors having different objectives shape coal investment decisions in India. Our results are based on the analysis of 28 semi-structured expert interviews conducted in Delhi. We find that India's substantial expansion of coal power can be explained by the following factors. First, the power sector was liberalized to ensure sufficient supply. This resulted in large industry conglomerates investing in coal and securing long-term profits as renewable energy support was ineffective. Second, the planned public investments in new coal capacity are motivated by securing the long term availability of electricity. Third, the reliance on coal in Eastern India for jobs, and the presence of local vested interests, are major barriers to a transformation away from coal. Fourth, pollution regulations that would limit coal use are ineffective because of the strong political influence of coal-proponents.
To meet its rapidly growing electricity demand, Vietnam envisages ramping up its coal-fired generation capacity substantially. Realizing all coal-fired capacity additions that are planned globally would undermine international climate targets. This paper systematically analyzes the political economy shaping climate and energy policies in Vietnam, and finds that the country's coal developments are primarily motivated by political rather than economic considerations. Based on extensive data collected in semi-structured interviews, we identify the relevant actor groups and how their objectives influence energy policy formulation. This allows us to unravel the complex political channels that link Vietnam's move to coal to four overarching energy goals, which are, in turn, closely entangled with the Communist Party's strategy to legitimize its power: affordability, security of supply, promoting the domestic energy industry, and environmental sustainability. We show why Vietnam's tightly regulated electricity market, dominated by state-owned enterprises and vested interests, favors large-scale coal investments and weakens renewable energy regulations. While environmental and health concerns are becoming politically more relevant on the provincial level, silo mentalities within the administration and among international organizations result in weakly integrated environmental strategies. These in-depth insights from Vietnam have wider implications for understanding the adoption of coal in other country contexts.
Devising policies that facilitate a transition to low-carbon energy systems requires a close understanding of the country-specific political economy of energy and climate policy. We develop a generalized AOC (‘Actors, Objectives, Context’) political economy framework to inform and enable comparison of country-specific case studies of how economic structure, political institutions, and the political environment shape policy outcomes. Our actor-centered perspective is built on the assumption that those policies are implemented that best meet the objectives of actors with the greatest influence on policy decisions. Applying the framework in practice includes four basic steps: i) identifying the societal and political actors most relevant for the formulation, implementation and enforcement of energy and climate policies; ii) spelling out these actors’ underlying objectives; iii) assessing the economic, institutional, discursive and environmental context which determines how certain objectives matter for certain societal actors; and iv) analyzing the dynamic interactions among these factors leading to aggregate policy outcomes. Context factors determine how societal actors influence political actors engaged in formal public policy formulation, implementation and enforcement, and how the dynamic interplay of different political actors’ interests results in energy and climate policy outcomes. The framework can accommodate a wide range of theoretical perspectives. We illustrate how the framework enables conducting comparable energy and climate policy country case studies, using the example of coal use in India, Indonesia and Vietnam. Finally, we discuss how the framework can contribute to the identification of entry points that could bring about policy change.
Different energy sources have different spillovers on economic development and industrialization. Pathways of economic development based on renewable energy sources might require additional policies to support industrial development.
Even though costs for renewable energy sources keep falling, the initial investments required for their build-up can pose a substantial challenge in countries with high capital costs. In this paper, we start from the observation that when capital costs are high, carbon pricing alone is unlikely to be sufficient to achieve high shares of renewable energy sources in the power sector. Instead, complementary measures to decrease investors' capital costs are required. We then discuss how financing costs can be lowered by either addressing the underlying sources of investment risk (policy de-risking) or shifting risk away from private sector investors (financial de-risking) on the domestic and the international level.
Though climate change is an urgent problem especially for vulnerable developing countries, international negotiations are in a gridlock. Standard game-theoretic models that describe climate change mitigation as a public good problem predict few incentives for individual countries to act. Nevertheless - despite the absence of a globally binding agreement - we can observe some developing countries launching unilateral climate policies. Being one of th\ose, Vietnam has recently announced to strive for a low-carbon economy. Based on interviews with Vietnamese policy makers and other stakeholders, this explorative case study examines Vietnam's motivation for a policy change that has shifted from emphasizing the responsibilities of developed countries for climate change towards accepting responsibility of developing countries to also reduce their emissions. While Vietnam's high vulnerability has contributed to put climate on the political agenda, the policy shift from a pure adaptation towards a mitigation focus was mainly driven by expected multiple climate policy benefits other than climate change abatement (so-called co-benefits). These include restructuring of the economy, addressing energy security concerns and accessing international finance to counteract a phase-out of conventional development assistance. Air quality considerations, by contrast, do not seem to play a major role for Vietnam's shift in climate policy.
Late and expensive: The political economy of coal phase-out in Germany
- L Hermwille
- D Kiyar
Hermwille, L., & Kiyar, D. (forthcoming). Late and expensive: The political economy of
coal phase-out in Germany. In The Political Economy of Coal: Obstacles to Clean Energy
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Positioned for consensus: Market-based approaches, civil society and the role of the state in Chile’s coal phase-out
- P Destephano
- B Hernandez Perez
- C Huepe Minoletti
- T Klug
- V Plutshak
DeStephano, P., Hernandez Perez, B., Huepe Minoletti, C., Klug, T., & Plutshak, V.
(forthcoming). Positioned for consensus: Market-based approaches, civil society and
the role of the state in Chile's coal phase-out. In The Political Economy of Coal:
Obstacles to Clean Energy Transitions. Routledge.
Unraveling the political economy of coal: Insights from the United States
- J Lu
- G Nemet
Lu, J., & Nemet, G. (forthcoming). Unraveling the political economy of coal: Insights
from the United States. In The Political Economy of Coal: Obstacles to Clean Energy
Transitions. Routledge.
Vietnam coal plant pullout — a sign of things to come?
- Manila Times
Vietnam coal plant pullout -a sign of things to come? Manila Times
- Manila Times
Manila Times. (2021). Vietnam coal plant pullout -a sign of things to come? Manila
Times. https://www.manilatimes.net/2021/03/10/opinion/editorial/vietnam-coal
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Renewable energy in the context of sustainable development. Special report on renewable energy sources and climate change mitigation
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- J Christensen
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- J Fujino
- G Heath
- M Mirza
- H Rudnick
- A Schlaepfer
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