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Commercial Real Estate Loans - Categorization of an Investment Segment

Authors:
Volume 7 Issue 1
ISSN 2694-7161
www.ejobsat.com
COMMERCIAL REAL ESTATE
LOANS – CATEGORIZATION OF
AN INVESTMENT SEGMENT
Beate Monika Philipps1
1Mendel University in Brno, Czech Republic
PHILIPPS, Beate Monika. 2021. Commercial Real Estate Loans – Categorization of an Investment Segment.
European Journal of Business Science and Technology, 7 (1): 5–26. ISSN 2694-7161,
DOI 10.11118/ejobsat.2021.001.
ABSTRACT
Commercial real estate loans (CREL) are a modern essential business segment and of major
relevance to the nancial stability of an economy as they interconnect the nancial markets and
the real economy. Consequently, CREL are of specic interest to regulatory authorities. As far as
the author knows, there exists no universal denition of CREL in the global nancial industry
and the regulatory environment. This has been subject to criticism due to resulting gaps and
bias in data generated by regulatory ling. This study contributes to academia and applied
sciences by providing the missing link. It develops a comprehensive categorization of CREL on
a foundation of 34 sources predominately provided by regulatory authorities in the US and the
EU. The categorization is based on a qualitative synthesis of main CREL characteristics of this
particular heterogeneous asset class outlined in the detected sources. The objective of this work is
to support the development of a common understanding of this investment segment among banks,
institutional investors and regulatory authorities in order to allow an accurate and prompt ling.
KEY WORDS
nancial economics, commercial real estate loans, investment decision, risk management
JEL CODES
G21, G32, G110, R33
1 INTRODUCTION
Commercial real estate (CRE) lending is in-
tertwined with the nancial economy through
nancial intermediaries like banks, insurance
companies or CMBS lenders (Glancy et al.,
2019). A downturn of the CRE markets might
aect the nancial industry through losses from
CRE lending and spread into the real economy.
As evidenced from existing empirical research,
CRE markets tend to be volatile and are
correlated to the economic cycle. In addition, a
6 Beate Monika Philipps
decline of CRE values might lead to a decrease
of CREL funds provided by lenders (ECB
Review, 2007) and shorten the loan supply
necessary for new real estate investments. In
this context, CRE nance is of specic interest
to the regulatory authorities. One of the main
features that separates CREL from other loan
types like consumer loans, commercial and
industrial loans (C&I loans), or residential
real estate loans (RREL) is the linkage to
the CRE that may serve as security for the
loan (OCC Handbook, 2013; Glancy et al.,
2019; Phillips, 2009). The commercial property
represents simultaneously the collateral and
the primary source of repayment of the loan
which is generated by rental income or sale
proceeds (Federal Register, 2006). Corporate
loans in contrary, even if they are secured by a
mortgage on a property, do not qualify as CREL
because their repayment source is funded by the
borrower’s operational business (OCC, BOG,
FDIC Sound RM Practices, 2006). According
to FDIC’s homepage1, CRE lending includes
the “acquisition, development, and construction
(ADC) nancing and the nancing of income-
producing real estate” that is leased to third
parties. The investment segment CREL is
noticeably heterogeneous and its characteristics
are multidimensional. There is, to this author’s
knowledge, per se no common denition for
this investment segment in place despite the
CREL market being globally linked. Bassett
and Marsh (2017) outline the necessity for a
joint understanding of CRE between regulators
and banks in order to generate an accurate data
base, for instance to identify concentrations
of CREL. The global nancial crises of 2008
that was triggered by a downturn of the US
real estate market is a perfect example that
an accurate data base and prompt reporting
is essential. The FDIC Financial Institution
Letter (2008) that was issued on March 17,
2008, only 6 months prior to Lehman Brothers
Holding Inc.’s ling for bankruptcy protection,
illustrates that the FDIC had identied a dete-
rioration of the CRE market that threatened
banks with high CREL concentrations. The
FDIC’s recommendation to combat the risk
had been too late for some of the institutions
to encounter the hazard. This reveals that a
common categorization of CREL is of utmost
importance for regulatory authorities, banks,
and the real estate industry.
The missing comprehensive denition is the
identied white spot and the key motivation for
this study. This work contributes to academia
and applied sciences by establishing a catego-
rization of CREL with the goal of supporting
the supervisory authorities’ ability to analyze
and evaluate their member institutions’ CREL
risk patterns. Their assessment may then be
based on accurate and prompt data processing
and regulatory ling provided by the lenders.
In addition, this study shall support to develop
a common understanding of this asset class for
the nancial industry and regulatory authori-
ties.
First, this paper identies the main charac-
teristics of CREL. Second, it outlines the risks
that are involved in this asset class in order
to develop a universal understanding of CREL.
Third, it establishes a categorization of CREL
based on the predominant loan characteristics
and the inherent credit risk which is closely
linked to the CRE market. Recommended
classications within the categorization reect
the various CREL types subdivided upon their
risk hierarchy. According to Jacob (2004), a
categorization is a composition of groupings
that display similarities based on context or
perception. A classication, in contrast, out-
lines the relation and hierarchy within the
grouping. The borders of a categorization are
permeable and leave room for further perceived
similarities (Jacob, 2004).
The remainder of this paper is organized as
follows. Section 2 covers the various information
sources that were utilized. Section 3 is dedicated
to the identication of the main characteristics
of CREL and outlines the various risks that are
involved in CRE lending. Section 4 contributes
by way of qualitative synthesis in order to
categorize CREL. Section 5 concludes with a
nal recapitulation.
1FDIC Banker Resource Center. For details, please visit https://www.fdic.gov/resources/bankers/credit/
commercial-real- estate-lending/.
Commercial Real Estate Loans – Categorization of an Investment Segment 7
2 INFORMATION SOURCES
According to Pana (2010), supervisory author-
ities have a strong impact on the lending
policies and the risk management of nancial
institutions. Signicant CREL providers are
banks and insurance companies, both regulated
institutions. For this reason, records of super-
visory authorities with the main focus on the
US and the EU were employed for the review.
The US and the EU represent major CRE
and nancial markets. In addition to regulatory
sources, scientic articles from electronic data
providers were employed to complement the
review.
Essential US depository regulators include
the Federal Reserve (Fed), represented by the
Board of Governors (BoG) and 12 regional re-
serve banks, the Oce of the Comptroller of the
Currency (OCC), the Federal Deposit Insurance
Corporation (FDIC) and the National Credit
Union Administration (NCUA). Astonishingly,
US insurance companies are regulated on a
state level and not by federal agencies. The Na-
tional Association of Insurance Commissioners
(NAIC) serves as unifying and coordination en-
tity (Labonte, 2020). The nancial supervision
on EU level is represented through the Euro-
pean Banking Authority (EBA), the European
Securities and Market Authorities (ESMA),
and the European Insurance and Occupational
Pensions Authority (EIOPA). The European
Systemic Risk Board (ESRB) is aliated to the
ECB and is supplementing the three author-
ities. The Federal Financial Supervisory Au-
thority (BaFin) is supervising German nancial
institutions on the national level.
Systematically all homepages of the afore-
mentioned supervisory authorities have been
assessed by using the keywords “commercial
real estate lending” and “commercial mort-
gages”. Throughout the initial screening process
33 relevant sources were detected, 23 sources
thereof were assigned to the US regulation.
The remaining ten sources belong to the EU
regulation. If identical records by dierent reg-
ulatory providers of one country were identied,
only one source was assigned to the review
set. 11 sources were found in the electronic
data providers Google Scholar, Science Direct,
Scopus, Springer, and Core. Ten papers thereof
were published in scientic journals, one source
represents a white paper by the sta of BoG.
The majority of documents have been published
between the years 2003 and 2020. Ten docu-
ments of the original set of 44 identied sources
have been excluded as they either provided
no additional insight or were irrelevant in the
context of CREL. The review was therefore
based on 34 records.
Utilizing the method of coding based on the
Grounded Theory (Schreier, 2012), diverse com-
ponents were detected, grouped and through
qualitative synthesis re-arranged with the aim
to categorize the asset segment CREL. A prole
matrix was established for the coding process
following Kuckartz (2014). The horizontal lines
of the matrix pick up on the research questions
and outline the essential headlines. Special
attention has been paid to add adequate sub-
components during the second screening of the
records. The dierent literature sources were
stringed in vertical columns. The design of
the prole matrix enables a subject-related
overview of the thematic extracts (Kuckartz,
2014). The review of records included a ranking
of the sources which connects to Okoli and
Schabram’s guidelines (2010). The records were
divided into four classes. Laws and regulation
were assigned to the premier quality class 1,
supervisory sources to level 2. Level 3 includes
journals published in renowned journals. Fur-
ther sources were labelled level 4. 23 identied
sources, representing more than two-thirds of
the records, were grouped into the category
level 1 and 2 (legal sources), ten records were
assigned to level 3 (excellent quality) and one
source to level 4 (other).
This examination shall capture the main
characterizing elements of CREL detected in
literature and further data. It is beyond the
scope of work to summarize all and each detail
provided by the reviewed sources. This would
diminish the purpose to give an overview of the
major attributes of CREL. This review includes
a critical evaluation of the researched literature
as well as a qualitative synthesis with the aim
to categorize CREL.
8 Beate Monika Philipps
3 RESULTS
3.1 Predominant CREL
Characteristics
One of the main features that distinguishes
CREL from other loan types is the underlying
commercial real estate that serves as collateral
for the loan. The Comptroller’s Handbook
(2013) and further sources of the Federal
Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC), for
example the Federal Register (1992), refer
to CREL as a loan that is secured by a
lien on or interest in real estate. Glancy et
al. (2019) mention the security instrument
commercial mortgage. Phillips (2009, p. 337)
refers to real estate nance that is “almost
universally secured by a mortgage”. Blanket
mortgages may cover multiple properties in
cross-collateralization for one or multiple loans
(Bardzik, 2019). The ESRB as well connects
to CRE as collateral for a loan and refers
in this context to corporate lending (ESRB
Report, 2018). According to the Regulation
(EU) 575/2013 (CRR) (2013) art 14, CREL
is fully secured by the commercial property if
the loan does not exceed the market value or,
depending on the member state, the mortgage
lending value. Robins et al. (2012) dig deeper
in the fundamentals of the US mortgage law
and outline that through a mortgage the lender
receives an interest in the CRE as security
for debt service and repayment of the loan.
The Regulation (EU) 575/2013 (CRR) (2013)
art 208 requires the mortgage or land charge
to be enforceable at loan closing. In case the
mortgagor, which in the vast majority – but not
necessarily – is the borrower, does not perform
according to its duty, the mortgagee has the
right to foreclose on its lien on the property. The
performance of borrower includes its payment
duty as evidenced by the promissory note
(Bardzik, 2019) or due to the loan agreement.
This predominately includes the payment of
debt service and the repayment of loan at ma-
turity. Prior to a foreclosure an event of default
remains uncured (Bardzik, 2019). Depending
on the jurisdiction, the foreclosure includes a
judicial or non-judicial sale of the property
as remedy for the mortgagee’s claims (Robins
et al., 2012). Consequently, the value of the
property is essential for the ultimate repayment
of the loan. This aspect might be captured in
the FDIC Financial Institution Letter (2009)
recommending lenders to appraise the value of
the underlying collateral if the decision of a
loan workout shall be made. The Regulation
(EU) 575/2013 (CRR) (2013) art 208 refers to
commercial immovable property and requires
banks to monitor the value of the CRE once a
year. Depending on the country, the expression
market value is legally dened. The Regulation
(EU) 575/2013 (CRR) (2013) art 4 No 76 refers
to the market value as the sales price on the
evaluation date at which a willing purchaser
buys an at arm’s-length transaction from a
willing seller. In the EU jurisdiction, Regulation
(EU) 575/2013 (CRR) (2013) art 4 No 74,
there exists another property value, the so-
called mortgage lending value, which is dened
as the future value of the property under the
consideration of long-term sustainable rents
under ordinary market conditions. As environ-
mental hazard may cause huge damage to the
commercial property which might result in a
decrease of value, the FDIC has established its
Guidelines for an Environmental Risk Program
for its member institutions (FDIC Financial
Institution Letter, 2006). The security of CREL
does not necessarily depend solely on the CRE.
Also, additional collateral may serve as loan
protection. Federal Register (1992) depicts fur-
ther real estate and unconditional, irrevocable
standby letters of credit as additional security
for CREL.
According to the Federal Register (2015),
the institutions should take the nature of the
underlying collateral into account. This term
might refer to the property type of CRE which
is an outstanding characteristic of the collateral
of CREL. The type of property includes several
dimensions of CRE and it seems quite demand-
ing to categorize this parameter. Supervisory
authorities might consequently face challenges
in their aim to select data from a common data
base provided by banks or nancial institutions.
Commercial Real Estate Loans – Categorization of an Investment Segment 9
Predominantly, the property type refers to
the use of the real estate. The Comptroller’s
Handbook (2013) identies ve primary real
estate types that can also be identied in
further sources: oce buildings, retail prop-
erties, industrial properties, hospitality and
multifamily residential real estate. These main
CRE types might be sub-segmented. Retail
properties have several specications, among
them shopping centers, strip malls, and depart-
ment houses. Industrial properties, for instance,
include manufacturing plants, warehouses or
distribution facilities. Hospitality might in-
clude hotels and motels. The Regulation (EU)
575/2013 (CRR) (2013) art 126 (1) (a) includes
oces or other commercial premises and art
128 (2) (d) hints at speculative immovable
property that is according to (EU) 575/2013
(CRR) (2013) art 4 No 79 bought with the
predominant aim to generate prot due to
resale. The spectrum of CRE usage is broad
and the Comptroller’s Handbook (2013) serves
as a detailed source that refers to assisted-
living facilities, dormitories, residential health
care and religious organization facilities as well.
Case (2003) refers to single-purpose properties
like assisted living or nursing homes. Mixed-
use properties like retail, on the contrary, might
be used for several purposes. This might be an
advantage for the marketability of the premises.
Within the second dimension of property type,
income-producing property is segregated from
real estate under construction or under devel-
opment. Income-producing properties generate
rent that primarily serves for the payment of
debt service. This fact is even narrowed in
the Federal Register (2006) as the guidance
relates to properties where 50% or more rental
income is generated from third parties that
are non-aliated with the borrowing entity.
The OCC Handbook (2013) refers to non-
owner-occupied property in this context and
considers hospitals, golf-courses, car washes,
and recreational facilities as owner-occupied if
not rent to unaliated third parties. BoG,
FDIC and OCC (2016) separate real estate-
secured business loans when the real estate does
not generate the repayment or debt coverage.
The Regulation (EU) 575/2013 (CRR) (2013)
art 402 (2) (d) also distinguishes between
commercial immovable properties under con-
struction and fully constructed. Johnston Ross
and Shibut (2020) refer to a specic feature of
CREL that is essential when segregating the
property types into income-producing property
and construction and development. They point
out that the underlying CRE has not only
the function to secure the loan. Rental income
from the collateralized CRE is partially used for
the payment of debt service. Properties under
construction, however, do not generate rent.
Their sale proceeds are used to repay the loan.
This is the predominant pivotal point where
the nancial markets and the real economy are
interconnected as the commercial property is
the primary source of CREL repayment (Fed-
eral Register, 2006; Regulation (EU) 575/2013
(CRR), 2013). The interrelation between the
CRE sector and the nancial sector is derived
from debt service payment and repayment of
the CREL generated by rents and ultimately
by sale proceeds of the CRE. In their risk
management guidelines, the Board of Governors
of the Federal Reserve System, Federal Deposit
Insurance Corporation, and the Oce of the
Comptroller (Federal Register, 2006) point out
that the cash ow of the property is the primary
source of debt service coverage, whereas the
loan exposure is covered by the value of
property as the secondary source of repayment.
Consequently, corporate loans, even if they are
secured by a mortgage on a property, do not
qualify as CREL as their repayment source is
based on the borrower’s operational business.
The dimension property quality refers to specic
quality metrics of CRE that might belong to
the building substance, the tenant base, as
well as the micro location of the property. In
order to attract tenants, property owners have
to increase their capital expenditures in the
property or make rent concessions (Johnston
Ross and Shibut, 2020). The OCC Handbook
(2013) outlines three classications of oce
buildings, varying from class A (high-quality) to
class C (functional), depending on the quality of
used construction material and quality of design
and xtures and their status of maintenance.
The real estate industry often refers to land-
10 Beate Monika Philipps
mark buildings and trophy buildings as quality
classication. Bardzik (2019) refers to quality
with regard to the overall construction status
of the building, the location, the occupancy
rate, and the demand for the property in
the market. BaFin refers to core real estate
as fully leased properties with creditworthy
tenancy base and tenancy structure in prime
locations (BaFin Fachartikel, 2012). The cash
ow of the property is as well determining
the classication. Further risk classications
for real estate investments are core, core plus,
value add, and opportunistic, depending on the
degree of involved risk. During the recent years,
building certications in context with environ-
mental social and governance (ESG) require-
ments of supervisory authorities have become
more signicant. Eichholtz et al. (2019) refer to
LEED and Energy Star property certication
systems in their examination. They show that
the building certication has a positive impact
on the cash ow of the building. Some countries
in the EU, like the Netherlands, have already
started to require a minimum environmental
label in order to reserve the right to operate a
building. Remarkably, CRE markets might be
dened by property type. The various property
types include corresponding risk intensities in
response to economic downturns.
The Regulation (EU) 575/2013 (CRR) (2013)
art 126 uses the term commercial immovable
property for CRE which relates to an ele-
mental feature of real estate. It is bound to
its location and has to respond to changes
of the environment. The evaluation of the
property should include an extensive analysis
of the location. The micro location describes
the immediate surroundings of the property and
its position within the immediate competitors.
Each constellation is unique which supports the
heterogeneous character of real estate (OCC
Handbook, 2013; ESRB Report, 2018). The de-
termining factors of the site analysis according
to the OCC include the access of the property,
the availability of public utilities, adjacent
shopping utilities and further amenities, and
possible future land development (OCC Hand-
book, 2013). Closeness to public utilities like
schools or universities are positive aspects that
increase the property value. Also, the vacancy
rate of property compared to its competitors
is important. Certainly, the evaluation of micro
location should take the property type as well as
competing neighboring real estate into consider-
ation. The micro location requirements for large
shopping malls, for instance, are completely
dierent compared to multifamily estates. The
macro location analysis responds to the broader
economic environment of the property. Indica-
tors for the economic developments are, among
others, the employment rate and population
trends including demographical developments
(Federal Register, 1992). According to OCC,
the demographic analysis should answer the
question of household formation and household
income (OCC Handbook, 2013). The OCC
refers to the U.S. Census Bureau data provider
in this context. Glancy et al. (2019) collect
information on geography based on the zip
codes of the properties. Some sources refer
to location as geographic location, geographic
market or geographic region (Federal Register,
2015; Federal Register, 2006; ESRB Report,
2018). Those terms are not dened but may
be assigned to macro location. The Regulation
(EU) 575/2013 (CRR) (2013) art 126 (2) (a)
brings up macro-economic factors that may
impact the value of the real estate. Case (2003)
refers to the geographic region in terms of con-
centration risk. He illustrates that properties of
the same region are likely to be impacted by
similar economic factors. This seems to be co-
herent, but might depend on the property type.
A distribution center might not respond as
severely to negative regional economic changes,
compared to an oce building. Most sources
do not distinguish between micro and macro
location. Bardzik (2019) refers to location in
general. The CRE markets can be dened in
terms of micro and macro location as pri-
mary, secondary and tertiary markets (Bardzik,
2019). In relation to retail properties, the
micro location classication might vary from 1a
locations (most frequented micro location) to 2b
locations (mediocre frequented micro location,
mixed use location). They include favorable
site conditions, compared to B or even C
locations. This connects to the risk classication
Commercial Real Estate Loans – Categorization of an Investment Segment 11
core, core plus, value add, and opportunistic.
The classication of macro locations reects
the criteria metropolitan area, urban aria and
suburban area. Cities can be classied from A
cities to D cities, depending on their economic
signicance to the region.
The value of the property is essential as
it covers, in its function as collateral, the
loan exposure. Especially at loan maturity it
is an indicator for loan coverage (Bardzik,
2019). But as well throughout the loan term
the property value is considered in the de-
termination of the nancial covenant loan to
value (LTV). The property is usually evaluated
by an independent appraiser that has the
required knowledge (Federal Register, 1990).
The market value is dened as the most likely
property price in a regular market and at
fair sale conditions under which the purchaser
and seller maneuver in a far-sighted savvy
manner (Federal Register, 1990). The FDIC
Financial Institution Letter (2009) refers to
the market value in the context of collateral
valuation. The market value reects the value at
a certain point in time, it may change due to the
market conditions (FDIC Financial Institution
Letter, 2009). The FDIC refers to three basic
valuation methods known as cost approach,
direct sales comparison approach and income
approach (FDIC RMS Section 3.2 Loans, 2020).
For the evaluation of income-producing CRE
the income approach is essential. Basically, it
represents a discounted cash ow method to
determine the net present value of the property.
The value of income-producing real estate
depends on the vacancy rate of the property,
the lease renewal trends inclusive projected
rents, discount rates, and direct capitalization
rates (FDIC Financial Institution Letter, 2009).
With regard to developments, the OCC refers
to the market value on an as-is, as-completed
or as-stabilized basis (OCC Handbook, 2013).
The Regulation (EU) 575/2013 (CRR) (2013)
art 229 (1) refers to valuation rules and to an
independent appraiser to evaluate the market
value. Unforeseen events like environmental
hazard might negatively impact the property
value and shall be taken into consideration in
the assessment of the value (FDIC Financial
Institution Letter, 2006). Further explanation
of the approaches is beyond the scope of this
study. The BOG, FDIC and OCC (2015) refer
to low capitalization rates and rising property
values. The capitalization rate (cap rate) is
the ratio between rental income and the value
of the real estate. It reects the protability
of the investment and the risk pattern of the
CRE. The higher the cap rate, the higher the
investment risk in the real estate market. The
cap rate is an indicator of the CRE market
condition for a dened property type but also
a property value determinant. The Regulation
(EU) 575/2013 (CRR) (2013) art 229 (1) refers
to the mortgage lending value as a further
value to appraise the property. This value is
dened in Regulation (EU) 575/2013 (CRR)
(2013) art 4 No 74. It shall be determined by a
prudent assessment of the future marketability
of the real estate based on long-term sustainable
criteria of the property under regular market
conditions. In Germany, for example, the mort-
gage lending value is based on the Pfandbrief
Act and the Regulation on the Determination
of the Mortgage Lending value (BelWertV).
Usually, the mortgage lending value is a more
conservative value compared to the market
value.
Bardzik (2019) refers to the borrowers of
CREL as corporate entities or private indi-
viduals. Usually in this loan segment, ring
fenced special purpose vehicles (SPV) are the
borrowing entities. Frequently, the borrower
and the property owner are the same entity.
An SPV’s only function is to own and operate
the collateralized property and this is usually
of non-recourse to the sponsor. The sponsor
is the managing and controlling entity of the
borrower and the equity investor (Robins et al.,
2012). Fig. 1 illustrates the sponsor – borrower
relationship in connection with an SPV as
mortgage borrower. The capital from the share-
holders might be provided to the borrowing
entity through shareholder loans which should
be subordinated to the CREL by means of a
subordination agreement (FDIC RMS Section
3.2 Loans, 2020). The non-liability of the
sponsor is one reason according to the ESRB
Report (2018) why CREL is relatively volatile
12 Beate Monika Philipps
Fig. 1: Commercial Real Estate Ownership Structure with Senior Lender, Junior Lender, and Mezzanine Lender.
Following Robins et al. (2012).
in comparison to RREL where the private
individual’s home represents the collateral. The
sponsor, nonetheless, plays an important role
for the success of the undertaking and asset
management of the property. Special attention
shall be paid to its track record and market
standing. A sponsor might, depending on the
risk prole of the CREL, provide a guarantee
for the nancing as additional collateral. In
order to evaluate the guarantee, a lender shall
consider the nancial capacity of the guarantor
and its ability to cover and repay its total in-
debtedness (FDIC Financial Institution Letter,
2009). Especially with regard to developments
of CRE, the sponsor’s capabilities to complete
the project within the predetermined cost and
time budget is essential (OCC Handbook,
2013). The Regulation (EU) 575/2013 (CRR)
(2013) art 126 (2) ascribes to CREL a par-
ticular risk dimension, as the value of the
property depends upon the credit quality of
the borrower. The performance of the borrower
as the owning SPV and the performance of
the securing property to repay the CREL are
unconditionally linked. The motivation for a
borrower to engage in debt nancing rather
Commercial Real Estate Loans – Categorization of an Investment Segment 13
than to contribute in an equity investment, is
based on the desire for diversication (Phillips,
2009). The so-called leverage eect plays a
further dominant role. The return on equity
might be increased employing debt nancing.
In case of portfolio nancing, multiple bor-
rower might be engaged. In this context it
is important that each borrower is jointly
liable and that a defaulting borrower, due to
insolvency, is triggering a cross-default. Special
attention within the risk monitoring shall be
paid, if the borrower is an out-of-territory entity
(FDIC Financial Institution Letter, 2015). In
order to determine the utilization of borrower
limits, the lenders shall identify the borrower’s
respectively the sponsor’s aggregate exposure
including derivatives (Federal Register, 2006).
3.2 Broader CREL Characteristics
CREL comprise specic loan structures. The
maximum loan term should correspond with the
type of property (Federal Register, 1992; OCC
Handbook, 2013) and should not exceed the
remaining useful life of the real estate. The OCC
refers to CREL secured by income-producing
multifamily properties with a longer loan term
and hotel nancing with a shorter term (OCC
Handbook, 2013). Warehouse facilities repre-
sent a property type for an even compressed
loan term due to their relatively short useful
life span. The FDIC Financial Institution Letter
(2009) and the Federal Register (2006) refer
to the loan term and the structure of the
loan. The OCC outlines a maximum term of
30 years, even if the property might have a
longer useful life (OCC Handbook, 2013). The
amortization schedule shall be in line with the
loan term because the amortization protects
against any diminishing collateral value during
the loan term (OCC Handbook, 2013). Closely
associated with the appropriate loan term is the
tenancy structure. In case of a single tenant
property, the lease expiration date should sur-
vive loan maturity by a determined timeframe
in order to provide for a smooth loan exit. It
is benecial, if a part of the free cash ow is
swept into a re-leasing and capital expenditure
reserve to cover expenditures for refurbishment,
rent concession, and rent-free periods. With
regard to multi-tenant properties, the loan
term might be linked to the weighted average
lease term or the weighted average lease term
to break option. If leasehold properties are
involved, the loan term should expire at least
ten years prior to the ground-lease expiration
(OCC Handbook, 2013). Black et al. (2017) nd
that construction loans are short-term loans.
Glancy (2019) shows that banks usually provide
short-term loans whereas life insurers tend to
lend long-term with more than ten years until
maturity. Bardzik (2019) nds that commercial
banks may provide shorter term loans based
on underlying properties with less stable cash
ows in contrast to life insurance companies.
Ambrose et al. (2003) nd that nonbank lenders
that are not publicly traded or undergo a
separate tax regime, like insurance companies,
tend to be long-term lenders. Usually, the
CREL is not completely paid o at maturity
which requires a careful assessment of the
property value to ensure loan exposure coverage
at the end of the loan term (Bardzik, 2019).
Johnston Ross and Shibut (2020) nd that
only 20% of the loan proceeds were repaid
at maturity in their sample data of FDIC
loans. This may have resulted from the sample
date having included shorter-term bank loans.
Black et al. (2017) nd out that CMBS lenders
provide in majority a loan term of ten years.
Case (2003) nds that the average loan term
for the nancing of fully constructed properties
amounts to ve years and to one year for
development and construction loans. The loan
agreement may provide for termination rights
or extension rights of the borrower. In case of
early termination, the lender should make sure
that a prepayment fee at-arms-length will be
due to compensate for the lost interest portion
respectively the reinvestment loss.
Loan term and amortization are closely
interlinked. Both inuence the loan structure
(OCC Handbook, 2013). According to the
Federal Register (2015), the borrower shall
repay the loan in a timely manner. This might
be done through graduate payments (Johnston
Ross and Shibut, 2020) or annuity payments.
As Bardzik (2019) states, each amortization
14 Beate Monika Philipps
reduces the loan exposure. The repayment of
CREL might be recorded in an amortization
schedule (Federal Register, 1992) which could
include interest-only payment periods (BOG,
FDIC and OCC, 2015). Ongoing amortization
for CREL is generated by the rental income of
the real estate securing the loan (FDIC Finan-
cial Institution Letter, 2015; Federal Register,
2006; Case, 2003). According to the Regulation
(EU) 575/2013 (CRR) (2013) art 126 (2) (b),
the repayment of CREL is derived from the
performance of the underlying property. Pana
(2010) describes this as main characterization
of CREL. According to the OCC Handbook
(2013), the amortization criteria is dependent
on the loan type. Construction loans usually do
not require ongoing amortization (OCC Hand-
book, 2013). They are usually repaid by sale
proceeds of the project. OCC Handbook (2013)
recommends to limit the interest-only periods
until the cash ow from property is stabilized.
Interest-only loan structures require a bal-
loon payment at maturity (Johnston Ross and
Shibut, 2010). Any re-amortization throughout
the loan term increases the risk potential of
the lender (OCC Handbook, 2013). The exit
scenario relates to the ultimate payo of the
loan which might be accomplished through the
renance of the current lender or an alternative
lender, through the sale of the property or, in
a worst-case scenario, by foreclosure proceeds.
The latter follows an event of default with accel-
eration of the loan (Bardzik, 2019). Mandatory
repayments of the loan prior to maturity might
be triggered through a sale of the property or
the sale of shares in the borrowing entity that
might be followed by a change of control. In case
of portfolio nancing, the loan documents might
allow for partial repayment by sale proceeds
from released units. The lender is advised to
specify the allocated loan amounts for the sold
units in order to maintain the quality of the
remaining portfolio. During an ongoing event of
default, proceeds from captured cash ow after
debt service might be used to repay the loan
amount. This usually follows an uncured cash
trap or cash sweep event.
Traditionally, CREL are high loan volume
transactions. The Federal Register, 2015 pushes
the responsibility to the bank and points out
that its loan procedure should take the loan
amount into consideration. The loan approval
process should consider the volume of the loan
in connection to the property type and to the
initial loan to value (LTV) as well as outlined
in the supervisory maximum LTV limits of the
Federal Register (1992). The Federal Register
(2006) and the OCC Handbook (2013) pick
up on these two determinants, too. In addition
to these features, the lender shall consider the
maximum loan amount per transaction and
the maximum loan exposure of the borrower
group in order to limited the maximum possible
underwriting volume. Construction facilities
usually include a budgeted interest reserve that
increases the loan amount (FDIC Financial
Institution Letter, 2009). This forces the bor-
rower at the time of loan origination to fund
the remaining necessary investment volume
via equity or mezzanine loan proceeds. The
loan documents should include cash trap or
cash sweep mechanism to force borrower to
partially repay the loan amount in case of
non-compliance with the LTV covenant during
the loan term. Glancy et al. (2019) nd that
CMBS transactions exceed portfolio lender loan
amounts by 200% on average. Black et al.
(2017) call up on this fact as well. Wong and
Kaminski (2019) nd that the loan volume
per transaction of life insurance companies
is usually higher compared to loan amounts
provided by property and casualty insurances.
It is common in the CREL industry, that a
club of lenders is providing a high-volume loan.
Club deals or participations are types of loan
syndication.
Basically, the CRE loan type may be classied
according to the usage of the loan proceeds,
the purpose of the loan, as well as the degree
of borrower’s liability. Following this rationale,
CREL can be classied as land development
loans (Federal Register, 2006; Pana, 2010),
commercial construction or development loans
(Federal Register, 2006; FDIC RMS Section 3.2
Loans, 2020; Johnston Ross and Shibut, 2010),
and acquisition loans. In the case where the
loan proceeds are allotted to the improvement
of the property (BOG, FDIC and OCC, 2015),
Commercial Real Estate Loans – Categorization of an Investment Segment 15
the classication includes refurbishment loans.
The acronym ADC includes acquisition, devel-
opment and construction loans (FDIC Finan-
cial Institution Letter, 1998; OCC Handbook,
2013). The OCC Handbook (2013) further
relates to bridge loans to cover the short-
term period of rental income stabilization of
the property and to bridge the time slot until
the renancing of the loan. The renance of
CRE is the replacement of an existing mortgage
with a new loan. Depending on the individual
circumstance, the total loan amount might
be divided into several tranches, such as an
acquisition tranche and a capital expenditure
tranche. The capital expenditure advances shall
be used to improve the property quality and
might increase the chance of successful re-
leasing in case of value-add properties. The
loan proceeds might not be necessarily invested
in the underlying property but may be used
for other purposes. Depending on the degree
of borrower’s liability, CREL are non-recourse
loans, recourse loans or partially recourse loans
(Federal Register, 1992). Frequently, CREL are
provided to non-recourse ring-fenced borrower
structures due to sponsor liability protection
but as well to shelter the lender from any cross-
default within the sponsor entity structure.
With regard to the loan risk evaluation of the
supervisory authorities, CREL may be classied
as substandard, doubtful, loss, and special
mention depending on borrower’s capability
of repayment (FDIC RMS Section 3.2 Loans,
2020; FDIC Financial Institution Letter, 2009).
Depending on the ability to repay the loan,
CREL may be assigned to performing loans and
non-performing loans.
An important feature of the CRE loan
structure is the lender’s contractual ranking
of security position. The ranking classies the
loss absorption in case of a foreclosure (Robins
et al., 2012). CREL might be structured with
regard to the risk prole of the lender (OCC
Handbook, 2013). There might be senior loans
and junior loans in place depending on the
ranking of the lien on the property, also
referred to as rst lien and second lien (OCC
Handbook, 2013). Bardzik (2019) refers to
subordinate ranking in connection with second
and third mortgages. Depending on the lender’s
risk appetite, the structuring of a senior and
a junior portion might be obsolete and the
lender might nance the so-called whole loan.
In case of a restructuring of a loan, the
inclusion of rst and subordinate liens might
be reasonable in order to distinguish between
performing and non-performing tranches (FDIC
Financial Institution Letter, 2009). Mezzanine
loans are often referred to in connection with
CREL. But in contrast to CREL they are
secured by a pledge of ownership interest in the
property owner and not by a mortgage on the
property (Bardzik, 2019). Upon foreclose in the
company shares, the mezzanine lender might
bid and ultimately become the indirect owner
of the property. Mezzanine loans include an
in place structural subordination to senior and
junior loans (Robins et al., 2012). Therefore,
they provide a higher risk component com-
pared to CREL but represent a lower risk in
comparison to equity (Phillips, 2009). Fig. 1
displays the specic loan relationships including
senior/junior nance and mezzanine nance in
an SPV structure.
Of utmost signicance are the loan documents
of CRE nance as the loan agreement and the
accompanying nance documents establish the
contractual frame for the relationship between
lender and borrower throughout the whole loan
term. As expressively pointed out in the Federal
Register (2015), the lender shall make sure
that its legally valid loan claim is enforceable.
According to FDIC Financial Institution Letter
(2006), the loan agreement should as well
protect the lender against any environmental
liability in connection with the contamination
of the property. Also, loan purchase and partic-
ipation agreements that concern the relation of
lenders amongst each other are of high relevance
(FDIC Financial Institution Letter, 2015). It is
important that voting and enforcement rights
within the lender group should be addressed
as well. Additionally, the right to sell the
loan participation should be included (FDIC
Financial Institution Letter, 2015). Intercred-
itor agreements rule the relationship among
the lenders with diering ranking, especially
the relationship between mortgage lenders and
16 Beate Monika Philipps
mezzanine lenders (Robins et al., 2012). The
lender may mandate an external legal advisor
for the review of the participation agreement
and especially for high volume CRE nance
documents (FDIC Financial Institution Letter,
2015). A certain degree of standardization with
regard to the loan documentation is benecial
to maintain the fungibility of the CREL and
to keep the loan transaction costs low. The
standardization of loan documents is evidenced
by CMBS transactions that are usually less
complex than loan documents used in portfolio
transactions (Robins et al., 2012). The loan
market association standard (LMA) for loan
agreements is also well known in the industry.
One disadvantage of standardized nance docu-
ments is, that they do not provide space for ex-
ibility, for instance during times of special situa-
tions. This is where portfolio lenders generate a
comparative advantage using non-standardized
loan agreements (Black et al., 2017).
The interest rate structure of CREL ranges
between xed and adjustable rates (FDIC
RMS Section 3.8 O-Balance Sheet Activities,
2019; Federal Register, 2006). Life insurers and
CMBS lenders tend to arrange xed rates with
the borrower, banks usually provide oating
rate loans (Glancy et al., 2019; Black et al.,
2017). Pricing components like commitment
fees, upfront fees, and agency fees impact
the price structure of CREL. The interest
rate shall bear the cost of loan funding, loan
administration and credit risk. The interest rate
should as well compensate illiquidity cost since
CREL are a rather illiquid asset class with only
a secondary market in place. The prot/risk
prole shall also take the type of the underlying
property into consideration (Federal Register,
1992). Compared to oce buildings, leisure
accommodation and hotels represent higher risk
as those property types quickly respond to
economic downturns. Therefore, they demand
a higher pricing (Glancy et al., 2019). The
recent changes in the perception of the nancial
industry of environmental sustainability and
ESG performance might have an impact on
future pricing of CREL. A rst approach in
this context has been included in the BaFin
Guidance (2020).
The cash ow generated by rental income or
sale proceeds deducted by operating costs of
the underlying property impacts the structure
of the loan. Johnston Ross and Shibut (2020)
point out that CREL are structured with regard
to lease payment schedules. The Regulation
(EU) 575/2013 (CRR) (2013) art 126 (2) ex-
plicitly relates to the cash ow generated by the
underlying property. Pana (2010) refers to the
cash ow as main source of repayment of CREL.
The cash ow shall grant the appropriate debt
service coverage at all times during the loan
term and the repayment of the loan (BOG,
FDIC and OCC, 2015). Certainly, a long-term
predictable cash ow is benecial for CMBS
transactions (Black et al., 2017). The cash ow
analysis is the pivotal element in the evaluation
of CREL and based, among others, on the lease
agreements. The cash ow projections should
account for appropriate vacancy rates and
adequate re-leasing periods (OCC Handbook,
2013). The analysis should as well take rent
increases (Bardzik, 2019) and indexed rents
into consideration. In the case of insucient
cash ow in combination with shortage of
reserves or equity, the borrower might take
third party capital providers into consideration
(Robins et al., 2012). Eichholtz et al. (2019) nd
that environmentally certied buildings might
account for a constant cash ow and reduce
consequently the risk of CREL.
CREL might include loan covenants in the
loan documentation that may impact the loan
quality. Financial covenants may bridge the
information gap between borrower and lender
and might reduce lenders’ risk. The LTV or
the modied version loan to mortgage lending
value (LTMLV) belong to the capital covenants.
The LTV represents a limit for the maximum
loan amount L. Tight senior loan LTV-limits
require higher borrower equity or third-party
contributions (Robins et al., 2012). According
to the Federal Regulation (1992), the maxi-
mum supervisory LTVs are connected to the
underlying property type. The loan amount
shall not excess a certain threshold of the
property market value V(Cremer, 2019), all
senior liens shall be taken into consideration
(OCC Handbook, 2013). Some German banks
Commercial Real Estate Loans – Categorization of an Investment Segment 17
prefer to focus on the LTMLV as dened in
the Regulation on the Determination of the
Mortgage Lending Value (BelWertV) instead of
the market value as it reects a conservative
sustainable property value. Glancy et al. (2019)
examine the LTV limits by lender type and
discover that banks even provide loans above
75% LTV, life insurers generally oer loans
within the range of 50% to 67% LTV and CMBS
lenders from 60% to 71% LTV. Equation (1)
reects the LTV ratio.
LTV =L
V(1)
The performance covenant yield on debt
(YoD) exposes the property cash ow Ctrel-
ative to the loan amount Ltat a dened point
in time. This reects the ability of property’s
cash ow to cover indebtedness. Equation (2)
outlines the YoD ratio.
YoDt=Ct
Lt
(2)
The debt service covenant (DSCR) or in-
terest service covenant (ICR), belong to the
performance covenants as well. The DSCR is
the key indicator to measure the debt cover-
age capability of the property’s net operating
income (NOI). DSCRtdepicts to what extend
the debt service for a loan amount Ltis covered
by cash ow Ctor by NOItof the property
(Cremer, 2019; OCC Handbook, 2013). Lenders
determine a DSCR covenant depending on the
risk grid of the underlying property. As an
example, the DSCR covenant for a loan secured
by an oce building might be lower compared
to a DSCR of a hotel nancing. Glancy et al.
(2019) detect the typical DSCR at 1.50, for
hotel nancing at 1.85. The DSCR covenant is
outlined in equation (3).
DSCRt=Ct
Lt
(3)
The ICR is an alteration of the DSCR
covenant and a “second line of defense” (Cre-
mer, 2019, p. 378) outlining coverage in case
of deferral of amortization or in case of bullet
loan structures. There exist further covenants
like guarantor nancial requirements or require-
ments of minimum borrower equity. LTV and
DSCR should not be a static reection at
loan origination but should be calculated on
an ongoing basis during loan term (Bardzik,
2019). Non-compliance with nancial covenants
might lead to an event of default and ultimately
to the acceleration of loan and the foreclo-
sure.
Typical CREL lenders are commercial banks,
life insurance companies and CMBS lenders
(Glancy et al., 2019; Bardzik, 2019). The ECB
Review (2007) further includes pension funds
as CRE debt investors but not as immediate
CREL lender. According to BaFin, banks might
withdraw from the CREL market due to high
capital charges in respect to Basel III and in-
surers might bridge the resulting nancing gap
(BaFin Fachartikel, 2012). Commercial banks
perform in their function as loan originator
and balance sheet lender and benet from the
immediate borrower relationship (Downs and
Xu, 2015). CMBS lenders, on contrary, have
almost no deeper relationship to the borrower
(Downs and Xu, 2015). The lender strategy
might focus on a loan sale right after origination
without recourse to the purchaser (Federal
Register, 1992). Especially after the excessive
loan sales experienced during the global nan-
cial crisis 2008, this type of business might
be currently rather limited. Some institutions,
especially those without direct relationships to
potential CRE customers, implement loan par-
ticipations in their business model. The main
drivers for this business strategy are fast CREL
exposure increase and the diversication of risk
and protability (FDIC Financial Institution
Letter, 2015). For the selling institutions risk
diversication is a benet as well. In addition,
exhausted borrower limits might get released
in order to provide leeway to originate new
business with the CREL borrower (FDIC RMS
Section 3.2 Loans, 2020).
3.3 CREL Inherent Risks
According to the OCC Handbook (2013), CRE
lending might be accompanied by seven risk
categories. These comprise the credit risk,
interest rate risk, liquidity risk, operational risk,
compliance risk, strategic risk, and reputation
18 Beate Monika Philipps
risk. The various risk types may be in place
simultaneously. They may as well interrelate
and interconnect.
The underlying CRE might serve as collateral
and debt service provider for the CREL and
in this respect could be considered as a two
lines of defense system (Kim, 2013; Johnston
Ross and Shibut, 2020). The CRE markets are
essential risk drivers of CREL as rents impact
the cash ow of a property and its value.
Prospering CRE markets depend on an intact
legal, economic and political system. These
attributes as well dene a performing debt
market (Phillips, 2009). The OCC refers to the
CRE markets as the “key elements of risk” of
CRE nance (OCC Handbook, 2013, p. 1). The
CRE markets are correlated to the real economy
(Black et al., 2017) and thus respond to local
and national economic developments (OCC
Handbook, 2013). As outlined in the Statement
on Prudent Risk Management for Commercial
Real Estate Lending rents, sale prices, and
operating expenses impact the repayment and
debt service coverage of the loans (BoG, FDIC
and OCC, 2015). According to the Federal
Register (2015), the lenders shall analyze the
respective market of the underlying CRE. The
Federal Register (1992) recommends a market
condition monitoring in order to adequately
respond to market changes. According to the
Federal Register (1990) abnormal market de-
velopments shall be explicitly outlined in an
appraisal. Those market developments could be
caused due to excessive price increases of certain
CRE that follow the strong demand of investors
in a dened risk bucket (BaFin Fachartikel,
2012). The turning of CRE markets with asset
price deterioration or increasing vacancies could
cause non-compliance with contractual LTV
covenants or, in the worst case, unsecured
loan exposures and uncovered debt service.
The FDIC Financial Institution Letter (2008)
recommends to request from borrower current
cash ow statements and rent schedules. It
might be necessary for the lender to mandate a
revised appraisal in case of deteriorating CRE
market conditions in order to re-evaluate CREL
collateral (FDIC Financial Institution Letter,
2008). This emphasizes the linkage between the
CRE markets and the CREL inherent credit
risk. Once CREL defaults become systemic,
they may infect the nancial economy and
ultimately harm the real economy (ESRB Re-
port, 2018). A CRE market bubble might be
inated as a result of a long-term low yield
environment (ESRB Report, 2018) caused by
investor’s high demand of additional alpha.
Signs for a turning CRE market might be
the increase of rent concessions, substantial
amendments to construction and development
projects inclusive construction delay, prolonged
re-leasing of rental space and slow unit sale
(FDIC RMS Section 3.2 Loans, 2020). Exces-
sive property development activities with vast
increase of supply of CRE space might aect
the CRE markets negatively (FDIC Financial
Institution Letter, 1998). Cheap loan supply
and extensive lending could even boost CRE
market developments but also cause an im-
mediate market drop if the loan supply runs
dry (Bassett and Marsh, 2017). Property types
might respond to economic changes dierently
(OCC Handbook, 2013). The hotel sector may
be intensely linked to the development of wages
and the unemployment rate. The success of
construction projects depends on the accurate
timing within the economic cycle and the
demand of the market participants. According
to the OCC Handbook (2013), construction
projects respond extremely sensitive to the
economy. As Case (2003) points out, supervi-
sory authorities, as the Federal Reserve Board,
deem construction loans as highly sensitive to
downturns of the CRE markets. To mitigate
the risk, lenders should insist on adequate
pre-leasing or pre-sales. Important economic
indicators for CRE markets are demographic
changes, the development of income and of the
unemployment rate (OCC Handbook, 2013).
Changes to existing laws like rent control or
condominium conversion rules, could strongly
impact the CRE market condition (OCC Hand-
book, 2013). Both, lender and borrower might
be hit by a CRE market downturn. However,
they might be aected with dierent severity.
Depending on the LTV of the nancing, the
lender might disproportionally participate in
the investment compared to the borrower’s
Commercial Real Estate Loans – Categorization of an Investment Segment 19
equity contribution. Notwithstanding this fact,
borrower’s equity can be deemed as the rst
loss piece if the property value drops. The
Directive 2009/138/EC (Solvency II) (2009) art
105 No 5 (c) refers to property risk in connection
with “market prices of real estate”. In addition,
the Commission Delegated Regulation 2015/35
(Solvency II) (2014) art 174 reects the CRE
risk within the risk sub-module property risk.
The ECB Review (2007) refers to the CRE
market risk in connection with the potential of
cross-border spreading of CRE price decreases.
The Federal Register (2015) refers to in-
creased credit risk as the outcome of extensive
lending. This risk is dened as the borrower’s
inability to repay its loan obligations. The
Directive 2009/138/EC (Solvency II) (2009) art
13 denes credit risk as “the risk of loss or
adverse change” of the counterparty’s nan-
cial condition. The Regulation (EU) 575/2013
(CRR) (2013) mentions the terminology credit
risk 263 times which emphasizes its signicance
to this regulation. A loss might occur if the
loan exposure is not suciently covered by
foreclosure proceeds of the underlying property
or if the cash ow generated by the CRE
does not cover the debt service during the
loan term. According to the Federal Register
(1990), the quality of a lender’s collateral is
inuenced by the physical condition of the
building. The lender shall pay special attention
to the triangle of loan exposure, potential sale
price of the property and the market demand
for the type of property (FDIC RMS Section
3.2 Loans, 2020). Black et al. (2017) outline
the property type as a predominant risk driver.
According to the FDIC RMS Section 3.2 Loans
(2020, p. 23), “adverse economic developments”
could cause the lender to re-evaluate the credit
risk. Construction delays might result in cost
overruns (FDIC RMS Section 3.2 Loans, 2020)
and threaten the completion of the project.
Excessive and especially speculative property
developments might negatively impact the ex-
isting properties in a sub-market, jeopardize
their long-term nancing, and ultimately lead
to a loan quality deterioration (Bassett and
Marsh, 2017). Usually, CREL are provided on a
non-recourse basis without liability of the spon-
sorship (ESRB Report, 2018). The Commission
Delegated Regulation 2015/35 (Solvency II)
(2014) art 42 (2) connects the credit risk to the
defaulting counterparty and art 42 (5) explicitly
states that the probability of Default (PD) of
a borrower is related to its assets. The ECB
refers to the credit risk as the main risk driver
in CMBS transactions (ECB Review, 2007).
Higher equity contributions of the sponsor,
result in a lower LTV at origination, which
might mitigate the credit risk. This shifts the
risk from lender to the borrower and improves
the risk sharing between lender and borrower
(ESRB Report, 2018). The credit risk of dis-
tressed loans might be increased by asymmetric
information distribution between lender and
borrower, agency conicts of securitized loans,
contracting frictions in case of multiple lenders,
and regulatory pressure (Downs and Xu, 2015).
According to FDIC Financial Institution Let-
ter (2009), distressed loans are classied as
substandard loans, doubtful loans, loss assets,
and special mention. Loss assets are dened
as loan exposures that are not covered by the
market value of the property (FDIC Financial
Institution Letter, 2009). If a loan is in distress,
it is crucial to accelerate the decision, if a
restructuring shall be processed or if the loan
shall be foreclosed upon. Downs and Xu (2015)
detect that portfolio lenders seem to resolve
a special loan situation quickly compared to
lenders of a securitization. They point out that
balance sheet lenders, in contrast to CMBS
lenders, are more likely to foreclose on a loan
than to restructure the loan. The lender should
not solely rely on the appraised value as the
actual sales price of the property could dier
(FDIC RMS Section 3.2 Loans, 2020). Inap-
propriate loan documentation might increase
the credit risk (FDIC RMS Section 3.2 Loans,
2020). The risk measure expected loss (EL)
might be used as a pricing component for CREL
to compensate for the credit risk (Bardzik,
2019). The EL includes the PD, the loss given
default (LGD) and exposure at default (EaD)
as outlined in equation (4).
EL =PD ·LDG ·EaD (4)
20 Beate Monika Philipps
According to Kim (2013), the property cash
ow has an impact on the PD whereas the
LGD depends on the property value. Environ-
mental property certication might positively
inuence the cash ow due to rent increases
or short re-leasing periods (Eichholtz et al.,
2019). Johnston Ross and Shibut (2020) are of
the opinion that defaulting non-seasoned CREL
are stronger impacted by economic turmoil
and reveal higher LGDs compared to seasoned
CREL. Increasing property values over time
due to successful re-leasing or indexed rents
might be the reason. The quality of a lender’s
loan portfolio might be classied by EL groups.
Another signal of portfolio quality might be the
extend of delinquencies (Pana, 2010).
The lender could be aected by the interest
rate risk on its portfolio level. This risk might
be hedged through derivatives like swaps (FDIC
RMS Section 3.2 Loans, 2020). On transac-
tion level, rising interest rates that are not
accompanied by an increase of the property
cash ow could cause a loan default (Phillips,
2009). The lender may push back this risk to
the borrower and require borrower to enter
into an interest rate hedging. Interest rate lock
commitments counter borrower’s interest rate
risk during the loan approval process (FDIC
RMS Section 3.2 Loans, 2020). The Regula-
tion (EU) 575/2013 (CRR) (2013) addresses
the terminology interest rate risk 21 times.
The Commission Delegated Regulation 2015/35
(Solvency II) (2014) art 165 requires insurance
undertakings to cover this risk with capital.
CREL are an illiquid asset class. The ECB
Review (2007) refers to the underlying commer-
cial property as illiquid. This emphasizes the
fact that the liquidity risk of CREL is linked
to the liquidity risk of the underlying asset.
The liquidity risk is inherent during the entire
loan term and especially at loan maturity as
most of the CREL are not amortized during
loan duration. The exit possibilities of CRE
lending include the renancing of the loan by a
dierent lender, the securitization or the sale of
the loan, and the full amortization throughout
the loan term (OCC Handbook, 2013). The lack
of fungibility of CREL represents the liquidity
risk for the lender (Directive 2009/138/EC
(Solvency II) (2009) art 13 No 34). The Reg-
ulation (EU) 575/2013 (CRR) (2013) refers to
the terminology liquidity risk nine times, much
less in comparison to the reference to credit
risk. The ESRB refers to this risk as lender’s
renancing risk caused by a lack of liquidity
to repay the loan at maturity (ESRB Report,
2018). Eichholtz et al. (2017) refer to the
benecial inuence of environmental certied
buildings as collateral on the cost of funds for
the CRE nancing. This mitigates the liquidity
risk and might be an indicator for the quality
of CREL. Environmental certication of the
asset may reduce the liquidity risk during loan
term and at maturity (Eichholtz et al., 2019).
The Commission Delegated Regulation 2015/35
(Solvency II) (2014) art 326 requires the value
of the asset of an SPV to be sucient to
cover the liquidity risk among others. The ECB
refers to this risk bucket with regard to indirect
investment products like speciality funds that
do not have a primary market in place and
therefore are less fungible (ECB Review, 2007).
BoG, FDIC and OCC (2015) refer to the
operational risk as the risk that is inherent
in a lender’s internal processes and connected
to lender’s risk management. The FDIC Fi-
nancial Institution Letter (2015) relates to
this risk in context with lenders’ activities in
unfamiliar business segments or new markets.
It is emphasized, that those segments and
markets shall be comprehensively monitored
and controlled. The OCC refers to strategic
risk as a lender’s risk of failure to eectively
oversee the CRE lending activities which could
lead to a non-compliance with the lender’s CRE
lending policy (OCC Handbook, 2013). This
risk per denition could also be assigned to the
operational risk bucket. A signicant amount
of defaulting loans might cause banks to adjust
their lending strategy which ultimately could
result in restrictive lending. In the worst case,
this might trigger a credit crunch and limit
the real economy’s new investments (ESRB
Report, 2018). Supervisory requirements could
as well aect the lender’s strategy. Pana
(2010) investigated changes in the strategies of
banks prior to the global nancial crisis. Pana
showed that banks adjusted their strategy and
Commercial Real Estate Loans – Categorization of an Investment Segment 21
shifted from CRE lending to RRE lending in
order to decrease supervisory capital charges.
The Regulation (EU) 575/2013 (CRR) (2013)
mentions the terminology operational risk 53
times. The Directive 2009/138/EC (Solvency
II) (2009) art 13 No 33 specically denes
this risk as risk resulting from internal pro-
cesses that could also be triggered by external
factors. The Commission Delegated Regulation
2015/35 (Solvency II) (2014) art 204 encloses
the calculation of capital requirements for the
operational risk. The ECB points out that this
risk may be inherent in transactions of private
equity funds and hedge funds (ECB Review,
2007). These investment groups usually are
not regulated. They might not have sucient
internal processes and control systems in place.
Environmental issues like the contamination
of the property do not only impact a lender’s lia-
bility but may also account for a lender’s reputa-
tion risk. The FDIC Financial Institution Letter
(2006) require lenders to organize an adequate
environmental risk assessment during the entire
loan term. In general, the reputation of a lender
could be negatively aected by lender liability
lawsuit (OCC Handbook, 2013) or the negative
inuence of the borrowing entity or by a shady
tenancy base. The Regulation (EU) 575/2013
(CRR) (2013) uses the terminology reputation
damage only once. According to Directive
2009/138/EC (Solvency II) (2009) art 102 (4),
this risk is allotted to the operational risk.
The OCC Handbook (2013) refers to com-
pliance risk as the risk of non-compliance with
laws and regulation, including environmental
laws. The Regulation (EU) 575/2013 (CRR)
(2013) does not refer to the term compliance
risk at all. According to the Commission
Delegated Regulation 2015/35 (Solvency II)
(2014) art 270 (1), the undertaking shall set
up a compliance management to encounter the
compliance risk.
The Federal Register (1992) directly men-
tions the necessity for an institution to diversify
its loan portfolio with respect to loan type,
geographic market and loan quality in order to
face the concentration risk. It is important that
the lender takes the transaction loan amount
and lender’s entire CREL loan exposure into
consideration. The concentration risk refers to
a lender’s portfolio cash ow correlation. The
risk may be higher if the cash ows of a
portfolio are positively correlated, which could
be the case in connection with properties of
the same macro location and similar economical
exposure (Case, 2003). The Federal Register
(2006) forces the supervised institutions to
report in case their CREL exposure exceeds
a dened threshold, such as construction loan
threshold of 100% of the total capital of the
institution or other CREL threshold of 300% of
the total capital of the institution. The FDIC
RMS Section 3.2 Loans (2020) includes the
risk of the lender’s loan exposure to a single
entity or person. Some lenders have diculties
in diversifying their loan portfolio with regard
to location or business segment as they are
only active in limited local markets (FDIC RMS
Section 3.2 Loans, 2020). According to BoG,
FDIC and OCC (2015), the management board
shall approve concentration limits within its
risk management process. The Regulation (EU)
575/2013 (CRR) (2013) mentions the termi-
nology concentration risk ten times. According
to the Directive 2009/138/EC (Solvency II)
(2009) art 13 No 35, this risk could be severe
and threaten the undertaking’s going concern.
The Commission Delegated Regulation 2015/35
(Solvency II) (2014) recital (62) refers to
geographical or sector concentration of assets.
According to Bardzik (2019), lender’s CREL
portfolio concentration may include LTV, YoD,
DSCR, EL, PD, LGD segmentation in addition
to property type and to the geographic area of
the property. The diversication of asset classes
and geographical markets creates a possibility
to mitigate concentration risk. Pana (2010)
fears that smaller banks might not encounter
concentration risks fast enough to diversify
their loan portfolio if necessary. This could be
the case for local banks that provide CREL to
borrowers in a limited geographical area. The
ESRB also addresses the risk of concentration
of losses and recommends cross-border syndica-
tion of CREL in order to mitigate the nancing
risk (ESRB Report, 2018).
22 Beate Monika Philipps
4 DISCUSSION
CREL are an essential investment segment in
the economy which accounted in 2019 for 14%
of the US GDP (Glancy, 2019). Commercial
banks, life insurance companies, and CMBS
lenders are the main CREL providers (Glancy
et al., 2019; OCC Handbook, 2013). As in-
termediaries, they clearly inuence the capital
ow into the real estate sector. Supervisory
authorities extensively monitor the institutions’
CREL activities as any deterioration in the
nancial market could infect the real economy.
A synchronized and accurate database is essen-
tial for eective CREL supervisory monitoring,
mainly because the asset class is particularly
heterogeneous. Data gaps have been criticized
especially by regulatory authorities (ESRB,
2018). With regard to the ling of the banks’
CREL data base, time is of the essence. This
was clearly evidenced by the experience made
shortly prior to the global nancial crisis of
2008 which was triggered by the deterioration
of the US real estate market. Accordingly, the
supervised institutions themselves might have
an interest to ll this gap as their capital
charges correlate with their risk weighted assets.
Surprisingly, and as far to this author’s knowl-
edge, no universal denition of CREL exists
in the global nancial world. Only few articles
of the reviewed set explicitly dene this loan
type, among them the Federal Register (2006)
and Pana (2010). Although they provide a solid
guidance, in some respect their denition might
be misleading and ambiguous. The Federal
Register (2006) basically ties CREL to the
rental income generated by the underlying
property as primary source of repayment and
draws a second quantitative precondition. In
the case where the borrower or an entity of the
borrowing company group is providing 50% or
more of the rental income, the criteria for CREL
is not met. This is a notable approach to capture
loans that are correlated to the CRE market
risk. In this author’s opinion, the threshold of
50% is rather high as consequently up to 49%
of the rental income could be derived from the
borrowing company group. This represents a
risk sphere other than the CRE market. The
risk of distortion of the tenancy schedule would
shift from CRE market to the borrower’s nan-
cial ability. Pana (2010) interconnects CREL
to the cash ow from the property as well, but
her denition does not include any threshold for
third party rental income. She connects CREL
to the usage of the loan for construction, land
development, and other land loans. This list
could have been completed by the acquisition
of CRE, the refurbishment of the property,
and the renance of CREL. Pana (2010, p.
17) denes CRE among others as “multi-family
residential properties”. This gives room for in-
terpretation. It is unclear if the term is based on
the denition of multifamily property according
to 12 CFR §1266.1 which includes nursing
homes, dormitories and homes for elderly. The
Federal Register’s denition (2006) takes land
development loans, construction loans and land
loans into account and explicitly includes 1-to-4
family residential construction and commercial
construction. This would comprise one family
residential construction which rather should be
allotted to RREL. The denition includes as
well multi-family and nonfarm nonresidential
properties. It is benecial, that loans to REITs
and unsecured loans to developers are dened
as CREL (Federal Register, 2006) as they are
correlated to the CRE markets, too. Pana
(2010) does not refer to these borrower groups
at all.
In order to categorize CREL it is in this
author’s opinion important to focus on the main
risk drivers of CREL and to understand how
they impact the asset class. The general risk of
providing loans is the inability of borrower to
pay the debt service and ultimately, the risk
of non-repayment of the loan obligation. This
risk is dened by regulators as credit risk. The
generated cash ow that provides for the debt
service and the repayment of the loan is in
focus. The Regulation (EU) 575/2013 (CRR)
(2013) art 126 (2) (b) relates to exposures where
the risk of repayment of the CREL is derived
from the “performance” of the collateralized
commercial property and is not generated by
other sources. The Federal Register (2006)
Commercial Real Estate Loans – Categorization of an Investment Segment 23
Fig. 2: Commercial Real Estate Loan Categorization and Classication
refers to the cash ow that is produced by CRE
as a primary source of repayment. This excludes
loans that are secured by CRE but where the
primary source of repayment comes from the
business operations that owns the property.
It also excludes CRE where the borrowing
entity is a tenant who exceeds a threshold of
the tenancy base. The Federal Register (1992)
interlinks the requirement to appraise a prop-
erty by a State certied or licensed appraiser
to those loans whose repayment depends on
the sale or rental income as primary source.
The BOG, FDIC and OCC (2015) deem the
CRE cash ow analysis broken down to rents,
sale proceeds and operating costs of extreme
importance in order to evaluate the borrower’s
loan repayment ability. The OCC, in addition,
outlines the signicance to comprehend “the
income generating capacity of real estate”
(OCC Handbook, 2013, p. 36). Despite the
rental income, sale proceeds of the CRE are
essential for the repayment of the CREL, either
generated through open sale or upon foreclosure
on the loan. The value of the property is either
determined by future rents or sale prices. The
Federal Register (2015) requires institutions to
evaluate the value of collateralized properties.
The Federal Register (1992) refers to the value
of mortgaged CRE as main credit factor of
the loan decision. The determination of market
value is essential and for this reason it should be
perfected by an independent appraiser (Federal
Register, 1990). Cost approach, Direct Sales
Comparison Approach and Income Approach
are the main valuation concepts (FDIC RMS
Section 3.2 Loans, 2020; BOG, FDIC and OCC,
2016). Their approach to evaluate the property
interconnects with the evaluation of the CRE
markets (BOG, FDIC and OCC, 2015).
Credit risk seems to be closely linked to the
CRE markets. Following this rationale, CREL
might be categorized as loans whose primary
source of repayment and debt service is derived
from CRE, either from rents or sales proceeds
sourced mainly by non-borrower-aliated third
parties. The primary source of repayment might
be derived from CRE that serves as collateral
for the CREL. Secured or even unsecured loans
to SPVs or real estate companies that own and
manage CRE, like REITs, should be included
24 Beate Monika Philipps
as well in the categorization of CREL as their
repayment is dependent on the development
of the CRE markets. Classications beneath
the categorization might be established to
dierentiate among the various CREL risk
characteristics. First, CREL might be classied
as loans that are secured by liens or interest in
the property depending on their security rank-
ing. Second, CREL might be grouped in non-
mortgage-secured loans to SPVs like mezzanine
loans. Third, CREL might be clustered as non-
mortgage-secured CREL to corporations, as
REITs or other real estate companies. Fig. 2
exemplies this categorization of CREL.
The developed categorization of CREL allows
a broad approach on the one hand, and on the
other hand captures dierent characteristics of
this asset class. It separates CREL from further
loan types like RREL where the risk is assigned
to the value of the real estate as well, but where
the cash ow is derived by other sources of
the borrower, such as wages. The categorization
separates CREL from corporate loans secured
by properties where the cash ow that covers
the debt service is generated by the operating
business of borrower.
5 CONCLUSION
The aim of this work is to establish a catego-
rization of CREL that is, to this author’s knowl-
edge, missing in the global nancial sector. The
developed categorization shall close the gap and
provide a consistent structure of an extremely
heterogeneous asset class. The classications
within the categorization of CREL shall set up
a risk hierarchy and could support supervisory
authorities’ ability to analyze and evaluate the
institutions’ CREL risk pattern. A compre-
hensive CREL categorization might support
lenders in their accurate and prompt data
processing and regulatory ling. Additionally,
this work shall assist in creating a common
global understanding of this asset class between
banks, institutional investors and regulatory
authorities.
6 ACKNOWLEDGEMENT
We acknowledge the nancial support of the Internal Grant Agency of the Mendel University in
Brno, Grant No. 121106. The usual disclaimer applies.
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AUTHOR’S ADDRESS
Beate Monika Philipps, Department of Economics, Faculty of Business and Economics, Mendel
University in Brno, Zemědělská 1, 613 00 Brno, Czech Republic, e-mail: xphilipp@mendelu.cz
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