In his 1971 paper “Freedom of the Will and the Concept of a Person” Harry Frankfurt raises a question about the nature of identification. In his pursuit of an account of free action, Frankfurt notices that the motives that may or may not lead us to act fall into two importantly distinct categories. On the one hand there are motives which are somehow alien, or external, to an agent. Examples given
... [Show full abstract] include the craving of the unwilling addict, the “jealously spiteful desire to injure” an acquaintance, and an overwhelming “spasm of emotion.”1 On the other hand, there are motives which are not alien, but are internal to agency, which is to say that the agent is, in some sense, “identified” with them.2 For Frankfurt, these are the motives that are associated with free action. The question is how we should distinguish motives of the first sort from motives of the second. An account of identification will answer this question.