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Walker, S. A., Olderbak, S., Gorodezki, J., Zhang, M., Ho, C., MacCann, C. (2022). Primary and
secondary psychopathy relate to lower cognitive reappraisal: a meta-analysis of the Dark Triad and
emotion regulation processes. Personality and Individual Differences,
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.paid.2021.111394
Primary and Secondary Psychopathy Relate to Lower Cognitive Reappraisal: A Meta-analysis
of the Dark Triad and Emotion Regulation Processes
Sarah A. Walkera, Sally Olderbak b, Julia Gorodezki b, Michael Zhanga, Chelsea Hoa,
and Carolyn MacCanna
a School of Psychology, University of Sydney,
b Institute of Psychology and Education, Ulm University
Author Note
Sarah A. Walker 0000-0002-6767-8604
Sally G. Olderbak 0000-0001-6133-0458
Julia Gorodezki
Michael Zhang
Chelsea Ho
Carolyn MacCann 0000-0001-7789-6368
The analysis and publication of these results are supported by a grant from the German
Research Foundation (Deutsche Forschungsgemeinschaft; OL 452/3-1) and the Margarete von
Wrangell-Habilitationsprogramm für Frauen awarded to Sally Olderbak.
Preliminary analyses of portions of these data were presented at the 2019 Australasian
Conference on Personality and Individual Differences (ACPID).
Correspondence concerning this article should be addressed to Sarah A. Walker, University of
Sydney, Parramatta Road, Sydney, NSW 2006, sarah.a.walker@sydney.edu.au
Abstract
The Dark Triad of socially aversive personality traits (narcissism, Machiavellianism, and
psychopathy) may be linked with emotional deficits, including the use of less effective emotion
regulation processes. In this meta-analysis, we identify 20 sources (n = 23 samples, k = 83 effect
sizes, NTotal = 4,487) examining the association of the Dark Triad domains and facets with emotion
regulation processes of reappraisal (thought to be effective) and expressive suppression (thought to be
ineffective). In line with our hypotheses, we found that both primary and secondary psychopathy were
significantly associated with lower use of reappraisal (ρ = -.18 and -.29 respectively, k = 3 to 4), and
higher use of expressive suppression (ρ = .23 and .19 respectively, k = 9 to 10). There were no
significant associations of either regulation process with Machiavellianism, total narcissism, or
grandiose narcissism. However, vulnerable narcissism was significantly associated with higher use of
expressive suppression (ρ = .37, k = 2), as hypothesized. Results are discussed in relation to how they
may inform our understanding of the emotional deficits of the dark triad, and we emphasise the
importance of considering dark personality at the facet rather than the domain level.
Keywords: Emotion regulation; Dark Triad; Psychopathy; Narcissism; Machiavellianism; Meta-
Analysis
Primary and Secondary Psychopathy Relate to Lower Cognitive Reappraisal: A Meta-analysis of the
Dark Triad and Emotion Regulation Processes
The Dark Triad are three personality domains thought to represent a dark core of personality
(psychopathy, narcissism, and Machiavellianism) (Paulhus & Williams, 2002). High levels of dark
triad traits relate to emotional deficits (Jonason & Krause, 2013), which may be caused by underlying
differences in how people with high dark trait traits regulate their emotions. Emotion regulation
describes the processes people use to influence the nature, intensity, duration, and expression of their
emotions. Emotion regulation can occur in anticipation of an emotion (antecedent-focused) as well as
in response to an emotion (response-focused) (Gross, 1998a). The most well-known antecedent-
focused regulation process is cognitive reappraisal (re-interpreting the meaning of the situation), and
expressive suppression (suppressing or hiding the expression of one’s emotions) is the most well-
known response-focused regulation process. Several studies have examined the extent to which the
dark triad is associated with the use of antecedent-focused strategies compared to response-focused
strategies although results have been inconsistent, leading to the need for a meta-analysis. Exploring
the link between the Dark Triad and emotion regulation may provide additional information relevant
for developing deeper understanding of what drives the characteristics synonymous with Dark Triad
traits. Therefore, we present the first meta-analytic investigation of the link between the three dark
triad domains (and their underlying facets) with these two well-known emotion regulation processes.
In the paragraphs below, we describe the key elements of the Dark Triad and key theories of emotion
and emotion regulation to justify the pattern of relationships we expect between the two emotion
regulation strategies and the dark triad traits.
Emotion regulation
The dominant models of emotion hold that emotion is a process that unfolds over time based
on evaluations of the personal relevance of internal and external stimuli to the individual’s goals (e.g.,
Gross, 1998; Gross, 2015; Scherer, 2009). Figure 1 illustrates the Modal Model of Emotion (Gross,
1998), which outlines a sequence of steps in the emotion generation process: a situation occurs
(situation), the person attends to the personally-relevant attributes of the situation (attention), which
are appraised for personal meaning in relation to the individual and their goals (appraisal), and then
the individual responds (response). Because emotions are a temporal sequence of successive
reactions, they can be regulated at different points during this process, leading to different patterns of
cognition, affect, and behaviour (Gross, 2015).
The Process Model of Emotion Regulation (Gross, 1998) classifies emotion regulation
processes according to the five different time points at which emotion regulation can occur, which
map on to the four time-points of the Modal Model of Emotion. These are: situation selection (prior to
the situation), situation modification (during the situation), attentional deployment (during attention),
cognitive change (during appraisal), and response modulation (during the response; Gross, 1998). The
first four of these can collectively be considered antecedent-focused types of regulation, contrasting
with the response-focused processes represented by response modulation (see Figure 1). Antecedent-
focused processes occur early in the time-course of the emotion whereas while response-focused
processes occur after an emotion has been triggered, and reaction tendencies are already present. The
current meta-analysis focuses on two specific regulation processes, one of which is antecedent-
focused (reappraisal) and one of which is response-focused (expressive suppression).
Cognitive reappraisal and expressive suppression
Cognitive reappraisal is a cognitive change process where a person re-assesses the situation
and its significance to change its emotional impact (Gross, 2015). For example, reinterpreting a
situation makes it possible to attenuate or change the emotional impact of the situation. Although
cognitive reappraisal is often used to reduce negative emotion it can also be used to up-regulate,
down-regulate, or maintain both negative and positive emotions (Ochsner & Gross, 2005). Up-
regulating refers to the intention to increase one’s emotion, whereas down-regulating refers to the
intention to reduce one's emotion.
Expressive suppression is a response modulation process. Response modulation processes
attempt to alter experiential, behavioural, and physiological aspects of an emotional state (Ochsner &
Gross, 2005). The goal of expressive suppression is to suppress the expressions of an already
established emotional reaction such as an individual hiding their true feelings from another individual.
For example, you might hide your embarrassment and anger should a superior denigrate you in front
of your work colleagues.
As cognitive reappraisal occurs earlier than expressive suppression in the emotion regulation
process, the trajectory of the emotion is easier to change with cognitive reappraisal than with
expressive suppression (Gross, 2001). Reappraisal appears to be a healthier process than expressive
suppression, leading to more positive emotions and less negative unwanted emotions (Dryman &
Heimberg, 2018; John & Gross, 2004). Long-term use of cognitive reappraisal is related to high life
satisfaction, self-esteem, fewer mental health concerns, and more optimism than expressive
suppression (Gross & John, 2003; John & Gross, 2004). In contrast, the use of expressive suppression
leads to more negative experiences and poorer interpersonal functioning (John & Gross, 2004).
A recent meta-analysis showed that while both cognitive reappraisal and expressive
suppression were effective for regulating emotions (with similar small to moderate effect sizes for
behavioural responses), physiological measures of effectiveness (such as increased heart rate)
indicated a small to moderate negative effect for expressive suppression (d = -.33) but not cognitive
reappraisal (d = .05; Webb et al., 2012). That is, while both processes are effective for regulating
behavioural responses, expressive suppression made things worse in terms of the internal
physiological experience of emotions. These results broadly support the theory that it is better to
regulate emotions earlier (antecedent-focused regulation, such as cognitive reappraisal) than later
(response-focused regulation, such as expressive suppression).
The Dark Triad
In 2002, Paulhus and Williams coined the term the ‘dark triad’, an umbrella term representing
three socially aversive personality domains associated with ethically, morally, and socially deviant
behaviour: 1) narcissism, 2) Machiavellianism, and 3) psychopathy. These three domains are
considered largely independent constructs with an antagonistic core, though there is a clear overlap
between them (Moshagen et al., 2018).
Narcissism
Individuals high on narcissism are generally characterized as being very grandiose, having a
desire for admiration, and a lack of empathy, with each characteristic beginning to manifest in early
childhood (Wink, 1991). While traditionally defined as a personality disorder (i.e., Narcissistic
Personality Disorder in the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders – 5th Edition), the
sub-clinical traits of narcissistic personality exist in the wider population on a continuum (Raskin &
Hall, 1979; Samuel & Widiger, 2008) and are examined as a personality type (Miller & Campbell,
2008). Narcissism consists of two facets: 1) grandiose (or ‘overt’) narcissism, and 2) vulnerable (or
‘covert’) narcissism (Besser & Priel, 2010; Dickinson & Pincus, 2003; Grijalva et al., 2015; Miller et
al., 2011; Rohmannet al., 2012; Wink, 1991). These facets are empirically distinct, despite sharing
several core qualities, such as arrogance, complacency, disregard for others, and sensitivity to
criticism or experiences that threaten their self-esteem (Miller et al., 2011).
Grandiose narcissism is characterized by open arrogance, self-confidence, exploitation of
others, and a desire to be the centre of attention. When threatened, individuals high in grandiose
narcissism tend to devalue others and deny weaknesses (Dickinson & Pincus, 2003; Zhang et al.,
2017). Comparatively, vulnerable narcissism is also characterized by grandiose expectations of
themselves, but these individuals have a much more fragile self-esteem, which in turn leads to
emotional instability and internalised psychopathology (Wink, 1992; Zhang et al., 2017). When
threatened, individuals high in vulnerable narcissism tend to be more susceptible to depression and
anger, with their self-esteem depending on external feedback from others (Dickinson & Pincus, 2003;
Zhang et al., 2017). As such, vulnerable narcissism is also characterized as having hypervigilance
toward negative feedback (Dickinson & Pincus, 2003; Zhang et al., 2017). This emotional instability
is manifested in a constant alternation between delusions of grandeur and feelings of inferiority,
leading to increased distress compared to their grandiose counterparts (Dickinson, & Pincus, 2003).
The narcissism-related responses to self-esteem threats are relevant for developing hypotheses
linking narcissism to expressive suppression and cognitive reappraisal. When their positive self-image
is threatened, a person with high grandiose narcissism will move quickly to stabilise themselves by
devaluing others or denying their own weakness (both of which represent a reappraisal of the
threatening situation). This strategy allows them to maintain their own self-esteem and maintain high
positive affect (Dickinson & Pincus, 2003; Pincus et al., 2009). Individuals high in grandiose
narcissism are also charming and manipulative (Dickinson & Pincus, 2003; Pincus et al., 2009).
Flattery of others involves creating a positive narrative about the other person by focusing on and
exaggerating positive points, which is conceptually similar to the cognitive processes involved in
cognitive reappraisal. To manipulate others and maintain a positive impression the individual high in
grandiose narcissism may also employ emotional suppression, i.e., suppressing their true feelings to
maintain social prestige. Additionally, prior coping flexibility research is also relevant to developing
hypotheses linking narcissism to the use of expressive suppression and cognitive reappraisal. Ng et al.
(2014) found individuals high in grandiose narcissism tended to be more flexible when it came to
coping with negative events than those high in vulnerable narcissism. The coping flexibility of those
high in grandiose narcissism may contribute to the use of more effective emotion regulation processes
such as cognitive reappraisal, but also the flexibility to suppress their emotions when appropriate
given the context. Therefore, our first hypothesis is that grandiose narcissism will be positively
correlated with both cognitive reappraisal (Hypothesis 1a) and expressive suppression
(Hypothesis 1b).
Individuals high in vulnerable narcissism have grandiose fantasises coupled with feelings of
inadequacy and hypersensitivity to criticism (Dickinson & Pincus 2003; Pincus et al., 2009; Wink,
1991). Individuals high in vulnerable narcissism tend to oscillate between self-loathing and self-love
but have been shown to lack flexibility when it comes to coping with negative events (Ng et al.,
2010). That is, during periods self-loathing, there may be attempts to regulate their current emotional
state of self-loathing into self-love. However, the constant oscillation between the two states suggests
such regulation attempts are often unsuccessful. This suggests that emotional regulation of a negative
events is not only about the process, but about how the process is used (Cheng, 2001; Kato, 2012).
As vulnerable narcissism seems related to the inability to regulate emotions, we might assume that
people high on vulnerable narcissism use less of the generally effective regulation processes (such as
cognitive reappraisal) and more of the generally ineffective processes (such as expressive
suppression). Additionally, considering the need for external validation, it is reasonable to assume,
like with grandiose narcissism, that individuals high in vulnerable narcissism may attempt to hide
their emotions by employing expressive suppression in situations where they want to manage the
impressions they leave on others. Thus, we hypothesize that vulnerable narcissism will be
negatively correlated with cognitive reappraisal (Hypothesis 2a) but positively correlated with
expressive suppression (Hypothesis 2b). We also expect that when the distinction between
grandiose and vulnerable narcissism is ignored, that narcissism in general score will show little
relationship with cognitive reappraisal (Hypothesis 3a) and a positive relationship with
expressive suppression (Hypothesis 3b).
Machiavellianism
The core of Machiavellianism is the belief that social interactions are a transaction where the
sole or primary focus is meeting one’s own needs. People high on Machiavellianism have a cold and
cynical worldview, low ideological or moral commitment, pragmatic and immoral beliefs, a lack of
emotionality, are focused on their own needs, and engage in strategic long-term planning and
interpersonal manipulation (Christie & Geis, 1970; Dahling et al., 2009; Furnham et al., 2013). Unlike
psychopathy and narcissism, the study of Machiavellianism as a personality trait did not evolve from
clinical research but instead originated from the writings of philosopher Niccolo Machiavelli.
Machiavelli, a political advisor to the ruling Medici family of Florence in the 16th century, captured
his ideas in his seminal work “Il Principe” (“The Prince”; 1513). Il Principe contains advice to leaders
and is filled with unscrupulous manipulation, deception, and cunning. It was from this work that
Christie and Geis (1970) derived the Machiavellian personality type, which they examined in political
and religious extremists. They had a focus on how leaders of these groups manipulated their
subordinates to achieve their own goals. Their theory proposes that people with high
Machiavellianism are motivated by strategic consequences and tend not to allow emotions to distract
them from goal achievement, suggesting that they experience emotions less intensely (Geis et al.,
1970; Wilson et al., 1996).
However, empirical evidence of the associations between emotional states and
Machiavellianism suggests quite the opposite—highly Machiavellian people may experience more
intense emotions. Evidence shows that Machiavellianism is associated with neuroticism, negative
emotions, faster loss of control, difficulty dealing with stress, and the presence of depression or
anxiety disorders (Monaghen et al., 2016; Szijjarto & Bereczkei, 2015). Moreover, empirical work
suggests individuals high on Machiavellianism experience emotions intensely but are unable to
express them, suggesting a link to expressive suppression (Ali et al., 2009; Austin et al., 2007; Paal &
Bereczkei, 2007; Szijjarto & Bereczkei, 2015). In addition, the distinguishing feature of
Machiavellianism is the engagement in cognitive planning on how to gain power, suggesting a link to
cognitive control or planning around emotions (i.e., cognitive reappraisal). Therefore, we
hypothesize that Machiavellianism will be positively correlated with cognitive reappraisal
(Hypothesis 4a) and positively correlated with expressive suppression (Hypothesis 4a).
Psychopathy
Individuals high on psychopathy are characterized as having a lack of conscience, superficial
charm, pathological lying, manipulation, and a lack of empathy (Hare, 1990, 2003). Hare’s model of
psychopathy distinguishes between primary and secondary psychopathy. This division was originally
based on Karpman’s (1948) suggested distinction between two psychopathic subtypes differing in
their aetiology and symptomology: Primary psychopathy (where genetic origins lead to emotional
deficits) and secondary psychopathy (where childhood experiences lead to antisocial and impulsive
behaviour; Karpman, 1948; Levenson et al., 1995). Primary psychopathy (or Psychopathy Factor 1) is
characterized by manipulative behaviour, pathological lying, superficial charm, indifference,
superficial affection, and grandiosity (Hare, 2003). Secondary psychopathy (or Psychopathy Factor 2)
is characterized by antisocial behaviour, an unstable lifestyle, impulsivity, criminality, irascible
behaviour, a lack of long-term goals, and irresponsibility (Hare, 2003; Levenson et al., 1995). It is
assumed that individuals may have manifestations of both primary and secondary psychopathy, but
that one facet tends to be more descriptive of an individual’s psychopathic personality (Karpman,
1941). Both facets of psychopathy are postulated to involve affective elements characterized by
indifference to one’s own and others’ emotions.
Primary psychopathy involves: (a) a lack of fear or anxiety (Patrick et al., 2005); (b)
superficial affect (experiencing both positive and negative emotions only in a superficial way (Casey
et al., 2013); (c) deficits in affective empathy (Wai & Tiliopoulos, 2012), and (d) a lack of repentance
(Hare, 2003; Lee & Salekin, 2010). Overall, high primary psychopathy is associated with a low
intensity of emotional experience, possibly due to a lack of emotional awareness, along with an
indifference to the impact of one’s emotions. In consideration of the affective dysfunction associated
with primary psychopathy (Blair, 2005; Karpman, 1941) it is possible people with high primary
psychopathy scores do not even attempt to positively reappraise their emotions, and any attempts they
do make are ultimately unsuccessful. While it has been theorised that poor emotional
functioning is a central feature of psychopathy (Blair, 2005), it is suggested that this is less a
function of self-regulation efficacy, but rather that the regulation processes themselves are
not initiated (Vitale & Newman, 2009). Manipulation and attempting to maintain an outwardly
positive image are also core characteristics of primary psychopathy which suggests some attempt to
suppress unwanted negative emotions to maintain the positive impression they leave on others. As
such, we hypothesize that primary psychopathy will be negatively correlated with cognitive
reappraisal (Hypothesis 5a) and positively correlated with expressive suppression (Hypothesis
5b).
In contrast, people high on secondary psychopathy tend to experience strong emotions that
they are unable to regulate, and which result in impulsive and antisocial behaviour (Hare, 2003). In
fact, difficulties in emotion regulation have been shown to be a risk factor for impulsive aggressive
behaviour, but not premeditated aggression (Long et al., 2014). This suggests that regulation of
emotions may occur as a response to the emotion (response-focused) rather than attempting to
regulate at the genesis of the emotion (antecedent-focused). Unlike primary psychopathy, individuals
high in secondary psychopathy experience more negative affect showing higher levels of neuroticism
and trait anxiety (Mowery, 2010). As individuals high in secondary psychopathy appear unable to
regulate their negative emotions, they may use more ineffective processes and less effective
processes. As such, we hypothesize that secondary psychopathy will be negatively correlated
with cognitive reappraisal (Hypothesis 6a) and positively correlated with expressive suppression
(Hypothesis 6b). We also expect that when the distinction between primary and secondary
psychopathy is ignored, that psychopathy in general will be negatively correlated with cognitive
reappraisal (Hypothesis 7a) and positively correlated with expressive suppression (Hypothesis
7b).
Method
Literature search (Search Terms and Databases)
In January 2019, and subsequently updated in January 2021, we conducted a keyword-based
literature search of the following databases: PsychINFO, MEDLINE, ProQuest, and Web of Science.
All references up until January 2021 were considered. The search terms were: “(suppress* OR re-
apprais* OR reapprais* OR "Emotion regulation questionnaire" OR ERQ OR CERQ OR "Berkeley
Expressivity Questionnaire" OR BEQ OR “emotion regulation profile revised” OR “emotion
regulation profile-revised” OR ERP-R OR "emotional expressivity scale") AND ("dark triad" OR
"dark personality" OR psychopathy OR psychopathic OR psychopath OR narcissis* OR
machiavellian* OR TriPM OR “Triarchic Psychopathy Measure“ OR SRP* OR "Self-Report
Psychopathy Scale" OR "Self Report Psychopathy Scale" OR PCL* OR "Psychopathy Checklist" OR
PPI OR "Psychopathic Personality Inventory" OR LSRP OR "Levenson Self-Report Psychopathy" OR
"Levenson Self Report Psychopathy" OR NPI OR "Narcissistic Personality Inventory" OR MPS OR
"Machiavellian Personality Scale" OR "Machiavellian Behavior Scale" OR MACH-B OR "dirty
dozen" OR SD3 OR SD4)”. In a second step, in both 2019 and 2021, researchers and authors in this
area of research were personally contacted for any unpublished data.
Inclusion and exclusion criteria
Studies were included in the present meta-analysis if they met the following four inclusion
criteria: (a) contain at least one self-report measure of expressive suppression or cognitive reappraisal;
(b) contain at least one self-report measure or interview measure of psychopathy, narcissism, or
Machiavellianism; (c) the mean age of the sample is 18 years or higher; (d) the full-text is available in
English or German.
Studies were excluded from meta-analysis if one of the following five criteria were met: (a)
the reported effect sizes were recorded after an intervention; (b) the publication is a case study; (c) the
subjects in the sample are neuro-atypical (i.e., cognitive impairment, brain injury or brain tumour),
substance-dependent or pregnant (possible effects of oxytocin); and (d) the study is based on a sample
that has already been included.
Article screening
The initial 2019 search resulted in 812 hits. The 2021 search was then restricted to studies
published between 2019 and 2021; it resulted in an additional 20 hits. The combined searches resulted
in 832 hits. After removing 228 duplicates, the titles and abstracts of the 612 references were screened
for relevance, leading to the removal of an additional 564 studies. We conducted a full-text screening
of 48 references and excluded an additional 28 studies. For three references, the relevant effect was
not included in the manuscript. For those papers, we contacted the first authors by email to obtain the
relevant effects (n = 3). Finally, researchers and authors in this area of research were contacted for
unpublished data resulting in 4 additional studies. Thus, a total of 20 separate sources were included
in the meta-analysis. The full literature search process is documented in Figure 2.
Coding
Variables including study characteristics, sample characteristics, measurements, and statistics
were coded. For emotion regulation, each record was coded for the test name (e.g., ERQ for the
Emotion Regulation Questionnaire; Gross & John, 2003), the facet of emotion regulation (cognitive
reappraisal or expressive suppression), score reliability, score sample mean, scores sample standard
deviation, effect size, type of effect size (e.g., Pearson correlation, Cohen’s d), and the p-value for
statistical significance. Similarly, each record was coded for dark triad information including the test
name, personality domain and/or facet, score reliability, sample mean, sample standard deviation,
effect size, type of effect size, and p-value.
The studies were coded by three of the co-authors. Of the included studies 70% were coded
twice and interrater reliability was calculated. The proportion of agreement for double coded studies
ranged from .72 to 1.00. The lower values can be traced to an imperfect sorting of the line order. All
deviations were discussed and resolved between the coders. The included studies, study
characteristics, and references for the included studies can be found in supplementary materials
(https://osf.io/j3q45/?view_only=b8fa5570ff474360be789335c9950ffa).
Data analysis
The statistical analysis was performed with R Version 3.6.2 (R Core Team, 2018) using the
Psych package for descriptive statistics (Revelle, 2018).
All correlation coefficients were first corrected for unreliability in both the emotion regulation
and the dark triad scales (Hunter & Schmidt, 2004). For Loeffler et al (2020), the reliability
coefficients were not available and were instead imputed. For the missing ERQ estimates, we used the
median estimate of our coded reliability estimates. For the other scales, we used estimates from
Neumann and Bierhoff (2004), Neumann (2016), and Schütz et al. (2004). The coefficients were then
transformed into Fisher’s z scale to stabilise the variances (Borenstein et al., 2011). The final z-scores
were checked for outliers (values deviating more than 3.5 standard deviations from the mean) using
stem-and-leaf plots and no outliers were identified. Because of the small k, we handled dependencies
between the effects by computing within-study means (based on the z-scores; Card, 2012). This was
only necessary for two studies that included two measures of expressive suppression or cognitive
reappraisal, and for calculating relations with Total Psychopathy when only facets or factor-
correlations were available.
The package metafor was used to get a meta-analytically estimated pooled estimate of
relations (Viechtbauer, 2010). We estimated heterogeneity using Q and estimated random or fixed
effects model accordingly. We present estimates of heterogeneity using τ2 and Higgins I2 (Borenstein
et al., 2011). The pooled estimates were then converted back to r coefficients for easier interpretation
(Borenstein et al., 2011). These coefficients are indicated by ρ, to indicate they reflect disattenuated
relations. Finally, publication bias was investigated using Funnel Plots and Egger’s Regression Test
(Sterne & Egger, 2005).
To avoid dependencies between effects, all bivariate relations were examined in separate
meta-analytic models. Results from models with small sample sizes (k < 10) should be interpreted
with caution.
Results
Descriptive statistics
The literature search resulted in a total of 20 sources (14 peer-review articles [2 with
unpublished effect sizes], 2 dissertations, 4 unpublished data sets) with 23 independent samples and k
= 83 effect sizes based on a total sample of n = 4,487. The weighted mean age of the participants was
25.0 years (range from 19.0 to 44.4 years). The majority of participants were female (weighted mean
64.2%, varying from 0% to 100%) and of Caucasian origin (weighted mean 78.1%, varying from 71%
to 100%). Of the samples, 9 were students only, 9 were community only, 3 were mixed (students and
community), and 2 were forensic. Additionally, 17 studies were conducted in English while 6 were in
a non-English language. No outliers were identified and all effect sizes were included in the analysis.
Table 2 presents a summary of the hypotheses and results.
Hypotheses 1 - 3: Narcissism
In contrast to hypothesis 1, grandiose narcissism was unrelated to cognitive reappraisal and
expressive suppression (see Tables 1 and 2). Vulnerable narcissism was also not significantly related
to cognitive reappraisal. Thus, hypothesis 2a was not supported. However, there was a significant
strong positive correlation with expressive suppression (ρ = .37, k = 2, N = 469) supporting
Hypothesis 2b. Finally, in contrast to our hypotheses, the narcissism domain was not significantly
associated with either expressive suppression or cognitive reappraisal; thus, we did not have support
for Hypothesis 3.
Hypothesis 4: Machiavellianism
Overall, we found Machiavellianism was unrelated with both reappraisal and suppression,
disconfirming Hypothesis 4a and Hypothesis 4b.
Hypotheses 5 – 7: Psychopathy
Next, we meta-analyzed the relation between psychopathy and cognitive reappraisal and
expressive suppression. The first set of models included all studies with total psychopathy scores, or
facets of psychopathy where correlations were averaged within a study to represent total psychopathy
(see the Data Analysis section). The second set considered primary psychopathy effects only, and the
third set considered secondary psychopathy effects only.
Primary psychopathy was significantly related to both cognitive reappraisal and expressive
suppression, showing a small to moderate negative correlation with cognitive reappraisal (ρ = -.18, k
= 3, N = 631; see Table 1) but a small to moderate positive correlation with expressive suppression (ρ
= .23, k = 10, N = 2,215). These results support Hypotheses 5a and 5b.
Secondary psychopathy was also significantly related to lower cognitive reappraisal and to
higher expressive suppression. Specifically, there was a moderate negative relationship between
secondary psychopathy and cognitive reappraisal (ρ = -.29, k = 4, N = 716) and a small positive
correlation between secondary psychopathy and expressive suppression (ρ = .19, k = 9, N = 1,981).
These results support Hypothesis 6a and Hypothesis 6b.
There was also a significant small relationship between total psychopathy and cognitive
reappraisal (ρ = -.12, k = 11, N = 2,392) and a small to moderate significant positive correlation
between total psychopathy and expressive suppression (ρ = .17, k = 19, N = 3,621) supporting
Hypotheses 7a and 7b.
Sensitivity analyses and publication bias
The available data were analysed for publication bias with two methods. Using funnel plots,
we found no evidence of publication bias. This was confirmed by the non-significant findings of the
Egger's test (Sterne & Egger, 2005).
Discussion
Overall, we found mixed support for several of our hypotheses. As expected, total, primary
and secondary psychopathy were negatively related to cognitive reappraisal, but positively related to
expressive suppression. Also as expected, vulnerable narcissism was positively related to expressive
suppression. However, grandiose narcissism, total narcissism, and Machiavellianism were unrelated
to both expressive suppression and cognitive reappraisal. In the paragraphs below, we discuss the
relevance of our findings in terms of the emotional deficits that characterize individuals with high
levels of dark triad traits.
Narcissism
Vulnerable narcissism was significantly positively associated with expressive suppression but
was not significantly related to cognitive reappraisal. While we hypothesized relationships to both
greater expressive suppression and less cognitive reappraisal, the basis for this hypothesis was that
attempts to regulate during times of self-loathing would be unsuccessful due to use of maladaptive
(suppression) rather than adaptive (reappraisal) regulation strategies. However, successful regulation
involves both choice of strategy (i.e., how much you use reappraisal or suppression), and the
successful implementation of the chosen strategies (i.e., not just what you do but how well you do it;
Gross, 2015). It may be that the deficits of narcissism relate to the implementation of regulation
strategies (the specific tactics that are applied in a regulation attempt) rather than the strategies
chosen. This provides additional evidence to support prior research which has suggested that coping
with negative events is not only about the process, but about the implantation of that process (Cheng,
2001; Kato, 2012). Additionally, we found no significant relationship between grandiose narcissism
with either of the emotion regulation processes. We believe this null finding highlights the opposing
associations of the two narcissism facets with emotion regulation processes. There are several models
of narcissism in the literature (Crowe et al., 2019); however the dual model of narcissism comprising
grandiose and vulnerable is the current standard (Crowe et al., 2019). As such, it is reasonable to
expect this distinction holds when examining the relationship between narcissism and emotion
regulation strategies.
While narcissism relates to poor mental health outcomes (Ansell et al., 2015; Giner et al.,
2013; Heisel et al., 2007), the distinction between grandiose and vulnerable narcissism is often
neglected in these studies. The finding that the narcissism domain (rather than the vulnerable
narcissism facet specifically) has poor mental health outcomes may be a result of the common
practice of collapsing grandiose and vulnerable scores into a total score despite the well-documented
polarity of grandiose and vulnerable narcissism (Vize et al., 2019). Examining the facets individually,
it is apparent that grandiose narcissism predicts better mental health outcomes (Casale et al., 2019;
Freudenstein et al., 2012), whereas vulnerable narcissism predicts poorer mental health outcomes
(Casale et al., 2019). Expressive suppression is considered to be a generally ineffective emotion
regulation strategy (e.g., Gross, & John, 2003; John & Gross, 2004), such its positive association with
vulnerable narcissism but not grandiose narcissism supports the idea that the emotional deficits of
narcissism pertain to the vulnerable narcissism facet only.
Grandiose narcissism was unrelated to cognitive reappraisal and expressive suppression.
However, the direction of the relation with cognitive reappraisal is inline with our expectations in
Hypothesis 1a. The wide confidence interval around this effect, along with the heterogeneity
estimates, suggest the presence of a significant moderator. Unfortunately, we did not have the power
to investigate this further. Though far from conclusive, these results provide a basis with which to
more closely examine the differential relationship between grandiose and vulnerable narcissism with
emotion regulation strategies.
Machiavellianism
Despite being theoretically distinct, the high correlation found in the wider literature between
Machiavellian and psychopathy measures may be partially responsible for contradictory findings in
the broader literature (Miller et al., 2017). The current meta-analysis aimed to determine how
individuals high in Machiavellianism regulate their emotions, and furthermore, how they might differ
from individuals high in psychopathy in this respect.
Contrary to expectations, Machiavellianism was unrelated to both cognitive reappraisal and
expressive suppression. Our hypotheses were derived from theoretical and empirical findings in the
literature, and we predicted a positive association with both cognitive reappraisal and expressive
suppression. From a theoretical perspective, it can be argued that Machiavellians should be able to
reappraise negative situations in order to adapt to changing situations (Collison et al., 2018). The
ability to adapt, reappraise and reassess a situation may be key factors differentiating
Machiavellianism from psychopathy, for example. Additionally, manipulation of others arguably
requires suppressing one’s emotions in order to hide negative emotions when things do not go
according to plan, or to hide positive emotions when they do. While the non-significant results for
narcissism may be a function of the small number of studies, it may also highlight the distinction
between strategy selection (i.e., whether people engage in expressive suppression and reappraisal) and
skilled implementation of regulation tactics (Gross, 2015). In fact, Machiavellianism may involve not
just the use of reappraisal and suppression, but the agility in implementing specific tactics—it is
inherently a tactical concept.
Finally, the instrument used to measure Machiavellianism may have influenced the results.
The small k for Machiavellianism across expressive suppression and cognitive reappraisal coupled
with the number of measures used to assess Machiavellianism makes it difficult to test for significant
moderators. However, on the face of it, it appears that there were consistently smaller or negative
relations between Machiavellianism and both cognitive reappraisal and expressive suppression when
the Dirty Dozen (Jonason & Webster, 2010) used in contrast to the use of other instruments. While the
relations between Machiavellianism, and cognitive reappraisal, and expressive suppression were not
significant, they were in the hypothesised direction.
Psychopathy
The study of emotional deficits in persons high in psychopathy is popular area of research.
Understanding the emotion regulation strategies used by persons with high levels of psychopathy
provides an opportunity to better examine these deficits from a regulatory perspective. However, the
theoretical underpinnings of psychopathy remain a hotly debated topic (Sleep et al., 2019)
complicated by multiple theories of psychopathy combined with multiple instruments for measuring
psychopathy (Miller et al., 2019). These complications have made it difficult to tease apart and
understand the relationship between psychopathy and emotion regulation strategies.
Meta-analytic results showed both primary and secondary psychopathy were significantly
associated with lower cognitive reappraisal but higher expressive suppression. That is, results follow
the expected pattern such that individuals with high levels of primary and secondary psychopathy are
ill-equipped to reappraise negative situations, and instead use suppressive regulatory processes. These
results showing that people with high primary and secondary psychopathy use a suppressive emotion
regulation process provides support for recent studies where the classic image of the unfeeling
psychopath was challenged (Gullhaugen, 2012; Gullhaugen & Nøttstad 2011; 2012). That is, there is
evidence that people high on psychopathy show less emotion because they suppress their emotions,
rather than because they do not experience emotions in the first place. In fact, because high
psychopathy is associated with using less antecedent-focused processes (such as cognitive reappraisal)
but more response-focused processes (such as expressive suppression), people with high psychopathy
people may feel more intense emotions—they show lower use of earlier regulation processes that alter
the emotion before it is fully formed.
Prior research has highlighted the importance of examining the differences in emotion
development and processing at the facet level of psychopathy (Kimonis et al., 2012). While our
results were similar between primary and secondary psychopathy, what underlies and drives those
differences may not be the same and requires further investigation. For example, in the earliest
descriptions of psychopathy, secondary psychopathy was described as possessing high anxiety, and
emotional disturbances resulting from traumatic childhood experiences (such as abuse and neglect;
Karpman, 1948; Skeem et al., 2003). The impact of these experience on children may hinder their
ability to develop healthy emotion regulation strategies. In contrast, primary psychopathy has been
associated with emotional deficits in interpersonal relationships showing low responsiveness to
emotional cues (Karpman, 1948). Despite these early theories of two dominant facets of psychopathy
much of the research conducted examining emotional regulation and psychopathy has treated
psychopathy as a homogenous, unidimensional construct. That is, psychopathy has been assessed with
total psychopathy scores rather than examining these relationships at the facet level. Presenting
predominantly total psychopathy scores makes it difficult assess whether there are differences in
emotion regulation between the subtypes and what those differences may be. There are potentially
considerable implications for clinical work where the type of therapies administered may benefit from
a more nuanced understanding of emotion regulations processes for those with high levels of primary
and secondary psychopathy.
Future Directions
Limitations of the current meta-analysis warrant consideration. The limited research in this
area means the results for vulnerable narcissism (k = 2) should be considered with caution. While
there were sufficient studies to test the hypotheses, we were unable to test additional moderators, and
effects such as gender, test instrument, and publication status meaning their effects could not be
accounted for. Consequently, heterogeneity between studies must be assumed since the studies used a
variety of test instruments based on different theoretical models of the dark triad traits. This meta-
analysis was unable to adequately address heterogeneity.
This meta-analysis provides a foundation for future research which seeks to further
understand the emotional deficits associated with the dark triad. While much of the research on
emotion regulation has largely focused on how people regulate their own emotions, the extended
process model of emotion regulation (Gross, 2015) also represents how people regulate the emotions
of others. Examining how individuals with high dark triad scores regulate the emotions of others may
provide important additional insight into the emotional deficits of the dark triad, whether the deficits
are differ depending on relationship status (i.e., friend, family, romantic partner), and perceived
quality of the relationship. Furthermore, it would be beneficial to investigate whether differences in
emotion regulation occur at different stages of the emotion regulation process (i.e., antecedent vs
response-focused) rather than just focussing on the processes (i.e., cognitive reappraisal, expressive
suppression) themselves.
The distinctions at the facet level of the dark triad domains highlighted in this meta-analysis
point to the critical importance of considering dark triad facets as well as the domains. Few studies
differentiate at the facet level instead using combination measures such as the Dirty Dozen or the
Short Dark Triad to measure the dark triad domains as a total score. While use of these scales
provides researchers with quick, efficient measurement of the dark triad (Jonason & Webster, 2010),
they also prevent close examination of the unique contributions of the facets. The same issue arises
when aggregating data into total scores from tests which can provide a facet score. Although
collapsing of facets into a total score is common within the dark triad literature, it may result in
missing important details present in the data. Consequently, further development of an evidence-based
theory of the dark triad including both at the domain and facet level is hindered. Although the scope
of this meta-analysis is small, it is an essential addition to the growing body of research highlighting
the importance of examining the dark triad at the facet level (Miller et al., 2011; Szabo & Bereczkei.,
2017; Walker et al., 2021).
This is the first meta-analysis examining the relationship between emotion regulation and the
three socially aversive traits of the dark triad of personality. Despite limited prior investigation, this
aspect of dark personalities has rich potential for future research. While questions regarding these
relationships remain unanswered, there were important new insights garnered from this meta-analytic
review. Vulnerable narcissism, total, primary, and secondary psychopathy were positively associated
with expressive suppression. Total, primary and secondary psychopathy were negatively associated
with reappraisal thus highlighting specific patterns of emotion regulation in individuals high in the
dark triad. Little is currently known about emotion regulation in individuals high in dark triad traits
and these findings suggest the importance of future research in this area. Adopting a faceted approach
to future research in this area will provide the opportunity to understand the underlying mechanisms
of the dark triad and emotion regulation to better understand the emotional landscape associated with
these personality traits.
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Journal of Social Psychology, 20(3-4), 232–237. doi: 10.1111/ajsp.12191
Table 1
Meta-analytic associations of the dark triad domains and facets with cognitive reappraisal and expressive suppression emotion regulation processes
Dark Triad Trait Regulation
Process k n ρp95% CI I²² Forest Plot
Psychopathya
Reappraisal 11 2,39
2-.12 .045 [-.22, .00] 80.8
4
.0
3
Suppression 19 3,62
1.17 < .001 [.08, .26] 82.0
7
.0
3
Primary
Psychopathy
Reappraisal 3 631 -.18 < .001 [-.26, -.09]
Suppression 10 2,21
5.23 < .001 [.13, .32] 73.6
9
.0
2
Secondary
Psychopathy
Reappraisal 4 716 -.29 .001 [-.44, -.13] 66.6
8
.0
2
Suppression 9 1,98
1.19 .001 [.08, .29] 73.3
1
.0
2
Narcissismb
Reappraisal 7 1,73
0.09 .15 [-.03, .20] 73.3
3
.0
2
Suppression 9 2,29
9.05 .52 [-.10, .20] 88.6
8
.0
4
Vulnerable
Narcissism
Reappraisal 2 469 -.03 .59 [-.13, .07]
Suppression 2 469 .37 < .001 [.28, .46]
Grandiose
Narcissism
Reappraisal 6 1,32
1.11 .16 [-.04, .25] 75.9
0
.0
3
Suppression 8 1,89
0-.02 .79 [-.13, .10] 73.7
6
.0
2
Machiavellianism
Reappraisal 5 1,36
5.15 .22 [-.09, .38] 92.5
0
.0
7
Suppression 7 1,93
4.13 .07 [-.01, .27] 86.0
8
.0
3
Note. Coefficients have been corrected for attenuation. Models with significant
heterogeneity, according to the Q statistic were estimated with random effects, and those
without were estimated as fixed effects models. Heterogeneity statistics (I2 and ²) are only
presented for random effects models. Psychopathya = total psychopathy scores, Narcissismb
= Individual vulnerable, grandiose, or total narcissism scores.
Table 2
Summary of hypotheses and results for Dark Triad traits and emotional regulation strategies reappraisal
and suppression
Hypotheses Results
# Dark Triad
Cognitive
Reappraisal
(a)
Expressive
Suppression
(b)
Cognitive
Reappraisal
Expressive
Suppression
1 Grandiose narcissism Positive Positive .11 -.02
2 Vulnerable narcissism Negative Positive -.03 .37***
3 Total narcissism Positive Positive .09 .05
4 Machiavellianism Positive Positive .15 .13
5 Primary psychopathy Negative Positive -.18*** .23***
6 Secondary psychopathy Negative Positive -.29*** .19***
7 Total psychopathy Negative Positive -.12*.17***
Note: (a) = Hypotheses 1-7a, (b) = Hypothesis 1-7b. * p < .05, ** p < .01 *** p < .001. See supplementary materials for more details on the specific
results.
Figure 1.
Diagram representing the Process Model of Emotion Regulation, showing cognitive reappraisal as a cognitive change/antecedent-focused process and
expressive suppression as a response modulation/response-focused process (Figure adapted from Gross [2015], p. 6).
Figure 2.
PRISMA diagram of papers included in the review.
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Authors who did not
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Response from authors
n = 2