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2013 Report: Ignorance
Shiseida Sade Kelly Aponte
Arizona State University
Author’s Note
This report has been created by the independent empirical analysis of the student,
Shiseida Sade Kelly Aponte. In no way shall there be reproduction of any part of
this academic work without proper citation or explicitly expressed permission from
Shiseida Sade Kelly Aponte. If there are any questions, comments, suggestions, or
concerns, please contact Shiseida Sade Kelly Aponte.
Abstract
Ignorance, viewed as a social construction, appears to be a contributing factor to
the failure of individuals and societies not attaining their highest potential.
Delusions, pluralistic ignorance and self-deception are often products of aberrant
cognitive processes that comprise ignorance. The motivation supporting these
cognitive forms seems to be both self-destructive and self-sustaining; thereby,
creating a cyclical perceptual cognitive product that can result in long-term
detriment. Biased inferences, cognitive load, goal orientation, heuristics,
knowledge accessibility, and schemata appear to be involved in the creation and
perpetuation of delusions, pluralistic ignorance, and self-deception. Due to the
bereft state of ignorance, the stemming perceptual output might be remedied by a
societal construction that stimulates advanced cognitive skill and rewards mature
critical analysis.
Ignorance can be defined as a deliberate or naturally occurring lack of knowledge,
whose deficiency manifests different forms of aberrant cognitive processes. The
aberrant cognitive processes consist of false mental models whose attributions,
dispositional factors, inferences, heuristics, schemata and valence quality have
evolved to favor information that operates in accordance with the deficiency
despite contextual information attesting to the contrary (e.g. chronic outcome
focus, confirmation bias, false consensus effect, prediction error). Non-normative
cognitive outputs appear to be motivated by survival functions that support a
cohesive, comprehensive reality, whose interpretation operates in tandem with the
needs of existence(, such as the definition of self, esteem, identity ideals, and
social goals). As such, when information appears to conflict with the needs of
existence, an individual can become motivated, either consciously or
subconsciously, to form a false belief or a system of false beliefs to retain the
sense of psychological homeostasis. Such a motivation is dependent upon whether
basic needs have been reliably satisfied; accurate identification of needs,
together with consistent need gratification, enables the organism to effectively
manage more complex cognitive loads. Delusions, pluralistic ignorance and self-
deception are some of the types of erroneous output that result from the aberrant
cognitive processes, stemming from chronically afflicted motivation and comprising
the state of ignorance
Delusions emanate from a system of false beliefs that usually arise in the form of
elaborate false narratives, based on inaccurately interpreted factual or
incomprehensible nonfactual information. These delusions can be so intricately
incorporated into the belief system that they persist even amid stark confrontation
with facts. Delusional content can be so convincing that the afflicted individual
continuously integrates information into their false narrative, despite direct
confrontation with reality. Due to the ineffectively regulated cognitive processes
involved in delusional narratives, in addition to concurrent psychological factors
that incapacitate normative functioning, behavioral and mental functioning can be
sufficiently unsuitably adapted to warrant the need for psychological treatment.
Pluralistic ignorance often involves a collectively shared or individual delusion,
such that participation in a false reality continues despite insight or personal
beliefs that should lead one to behave otherwise. Within the collective,
individuals are aware of something amiss, but misjudge the perceptions of others
and, to avoid the potential consequences of violating consensual norms, they
continue to participate in the false belief without disruption. Self-deception is a
type of delusional belief, however more modest in its output than delusions;
typically consisting of untruths that serve an adaptive function. Used as a defense
mechanism, self-deception serves to compensate or explain the loss of dignity and
violation of self-governing principles that can occur when confronting reality.
Delusions are common in the clinical population (i.e. patients, unsuitably adapted
persons yet diagnosed), while pluralistic ignorance and self-deception are rather
frequent in non-clinical populations (e.g. business, economics, education,
entertainment, mass communications, marketing) often involving delusional factors
that are known to be a consensual norm, irrational, uncertain or untrue. As such,
one might logically consider the significance of the cognitive, cultural and social
industries who appear to propagate and maintain the propounded "logical"
manifestation of these distorted cognitive outputs without understanding the extent
of their implications. For, inaccurately construed perceptions, through lower
standards of ethical analysis and poor decision processes, are often haphazardly
imposed and/or not easily regulated; thus, it is plausible to conceive of positing
ignorance as a probable (and pertinent) stochastic social issue.
In summary, ignorance often involves the deliberate false consensus of data,
inaccurate understanding of information, or unintentional absence of knowledge.
Impaired belief formation, selective perception, and uninformed analysis often
results from aberrant cognitive processes that produce ignorance. Different forms
of ignorance involve delusions, pluralistic ignorance and self-deception. Delusions
are often pathological, while pluralistic ignorance and self-deception are,
typically, mundane, with a cumulative pernicious effect if the organism does not
learn to critically analyze information. Due to the prevalence of delusional
beliefs in the public sphere of influence, it seems imperative to effectively
address the construction of society with this information in mind, particularly
considering the fact that such consideration would be of most benefit when seeking
to prevent the conditions which hinder the human organism from attaining it highest
potential.
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