"We all have to live somewhere!" The last three decades of the Hungarian housing movement – a bottom-up view –1989-2021

Abstract

This chapter summarizes the last 30 years of the Hungarian housing movement – from a bottom-up view. It gives an insight into how organizations representing disadvantaged people responded to the policy challenges of their era. The story begins in the turbulent 1990s, when – in Hungarian terms – many disadvantaged groups were standing up for their right to housing. In the second half of the 1990s, the movement was institutionalized; a homeless care system was set up, and advocacy programs were launched. The 2000s saw a new state-funded program to dismantle segregated neighborhoods and witnessed the emergence of activist youth critical of globalization. After 2008, the most deprived raised their voice again. Homeless people, public housing tenants, and allies organized on the movement's left-wing, while indebted homeowners promoted claims through right-wing organizations. This chapter aims to process the movement's history to help currently active organizations better assess their role, increase their effectiveness, and enhance possible collaboration.

Full text

Annual Report on
Housing Poverty
2021

AUTHORS:
Anna Zsófia Bajomi, Polytechnic University of Milan, Department of Urban
Planning, Design and Policy
Márton Czirfusz, Centre for Economic and Regional Studies; Periféria Policy
and Research Center
Csaba Jelinek, Periféria Policy and Research Center
Bernadett Sebály, CEU, Doctoral School of Political Science Public Policy
and International Relations
EDITOR:
Lili Vankó, Habitat for Humanity Hungary
FURTHER CONTRIBUTORS:
Eszter Bakondi-Kiss, Habitat for Humanity Hungary
Balázs Dobos, Habitat for Humanity Hungary
Nóra Feldmár, Habitat for Humanity Hungary
Áron Rossman-Kiss
INFOGRAPHICS:
Nóra Feldmár, Habitat for Humanity Hungary
TYPESETTING:
Vera Rochlitz
ANNUAL REPORT ON HOUSING POVERTY 
IMPRINT:
Responsible publisher: Zsolt Szegfalvi, Executive director
Habitat for Humanity Hungary
(HFH International Hungary Nonprofit Kft.)
1027 Budapest, Margit krt. 26.
ISSN: HU ISSN 2732-3439
You can follow our work on our website and Facebook page:
www.habitat.hu
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Habitat for Humanity Hungary
Budapest, 2022.
Cover Images
Gabriella Csoszó @ FreeDoc (p. 37);
Fülöp Dániel Mátyás @ Habitat for Humanity Hungary (p. 1; p. 78);
Markus Spiske @ Unsplash (p. 7)

Contents
Contents 3
About the Authors 6
Anna Zsófia Bajomi
The EU Framework for the Reduction of Housing
Poverty 8
1. Housing problems in the European Union and Hungary 10
1.1. Aordability 11
1.2. Age and energy consumption of buildings 14
1.3. Energy poverty 15
1.4. Housing quality 17
1.5. Segregation 18
1.6. Homelessness 20
1.7. Housing problems in European Parliament resolutions 20
1.8. Housing problems in countr y reports andcountry-specific
recommendations 20
1.9. Summary 21
2. European Union policies on housing 22
2.1. Social aairs and social inclusion 22
2.2. Regional and urban policy 22
2.3. Energy and climate policy 22
2.3.1. Clean Energy for All Europeans package 22
2.3.2. The European Green Deal 23
2.4. Shaping housing policy 24
2.4.1. Expert Organisations 24
3. Financial support 25
3.1. Multiannual Financial Framework 2021–2027 26
3.2. European Instrument for Recovery (NextGenerationEU) 27
4. The application of EU housing policies inHungary 28
4.1. 2014–2020 28
4.2. 2021–2027 29
5. Conclusions 33
6. Proposals 34
6.1. EU 34
6.2. Hungary 35
ANNUAL REPORT ON HOUSING POVERTY 

Bernadett Sebály
“We all have to live somewhere!” 38
The last three decades of the Hungarian housing
movement – a bottom-up view – 1989–2021 38
1. Rescuing what can be rescued! (1989–1995) 40
1.1. Tenants’ Association – the organisation oftenants with secure status 40
1.2. Anti-Ghetto Committee – the organisation of Roma tenants with
insecurestatus and squatters 42
1.3. Roofs Over Our Heads, Erzsébetváros Circle ofPublic Housing
Applicants, and Poor Relief Fund – organisations of squatters,
housing applicants, and their allies 43
1.4. Social Committee for the Homeless and National Front of the Poor
– organisations of homeless people and their allies 46
1.5. Lessons from the fi rst era 49
2. The age of institutionalisation (1995–2002) 50
2.1. Roma Civil Rights Foundation – an organisation for Roma tenants
with insecure status and squatters 51
2.2 . Hab itat for Humanity Hungary and its predecessor, the House- Home
Foundation – organisations of housing applicants 54
2.3. Lessons from the second era 55
3. Globalisation critics and local innovators (2002–2008) 56
3.1. People Of The Streets, Centrum Group, and Food Not Bombs – allies
of homeless people 57
3.2. Hungarian Social Forum – an ally of the house poor 59
3.3. Four Houses and Green Youth – organisations oftenants and their allies 59
3.4. The Organisation for the Roma of Szomolya, Poor Relief Fund Eger
and the Association of Roma Minority Representatives and Advocates
of Nógrád County – organisations of the Roma house poor 60
3.5. Lessons from the third era 61
4. The marginalised and their allies (2009–) 62
4.1. Hungarian Charity Service of the Order of Malta, Habitat for Humanity
Hungary, Association for Community Development, Bagázs,
the Association of Roma Minority Representatives and Advocates
of Nógrád County, Autonomia Foundation – organisations of the house
poor living in extreme poverty or segregated neighbourhoods 64
4.2. The City Is For All – an organisation of homeless people, squatters,
and tenants with insecure status 67
4.3. Streetlaw yer Association, School of Public Life and Calm Heart
Foundation – allies of the house poor 69
4.4. From Streets to Homes! Association, Habitat for Humanity Hungary
and Solidarity Economy Centre – allies of people in need of housing or
living in housing 70
4.5. Metropolitan Research Institute and Periféria Policy and Research
Center – allies of the house poor 72
4.6. Home Defenders – organisations of foreign currency debtors and
people facing eviction 73
4.7. Lessons from the fourth era 75
5. Concluding thoughts 76
Márton Czirfusz, Csaba Jelinek
Housing policies and housing affordability
in Hungaryafter 1990 79
1. Five eras of housing policy 80
1.1. Regime change and crisis management (late 1980s–1995) 80
1.2. Financial liberalisation and new housing finance institutions (1995–2000) 82
1.3. The first hous ing boom and EU instruments (2000 –2009) 82
1.4. The forex loan crisis (2009 –2014) 83
1.5. The second housing boom (2015 –2021) 83
2. Key housing policy instruments 1990–2021 84
2.1. Housing privatisation 84
2.2 . Interventions to address the housing loan crisis of the 1990 s 86
2.3. Policy instruments to support homeownership 87
2.3.1. Social policy allowance, housing construction allowance
andfamilyhousing benefit 88
ANNUAL REPORT ON HOUSING POVERTY 

2.3.2. Supporting private housing construction through loans 88
2.3.3. Refund subsidy, waiver and exemption of taxes and duties 90
2.3.4. Governmental support for contractual savings for housing 90
2.4. Housing allowance 91
2.5. Debt management allowance 93
2.6. Utility price reduction 94
2.7. Expansion of the pub lic housing sector 95
2.8. Tackling the forex loan crisis after 2008 97
2.9. Housing renovation grants 98
2.10. Social and urban regeneration programmes 98
2.11. Supporting homeless people 99
3. Governmental structure and theinstitutional framework
of housing policy at the national level 100
3.1. Competing institutional logics of housing policy 100
3.2. Ministerial responsibilities of housing 101
3.3. Housing strategies 104
3.4. Other institutions implementing housing policy 105
4. Budgetary expenditure on housing 106
4.1. The ‘Housing subsidies’ budget line 107
4.2. Housing expenditure by functional sector of government expenditure 109
4.3. Detailed breakdown of government expenditure on housing 111
5. Housing affordability 119
5.1. The aordability of buying a home 120
5.2. The aordabilit y of housing costs 122
5.3. Energy poverty and aordability 123
5.4. Rental aordability 125
5.5. Household indebtedness and aordability 127
5.6. Evictions 129
6. Summary 130
ANNUAL REPORT ON HOUSING POVERTY 

ABOUT THE AUTHORS
6
Anna Zsófia Bajomi is a social policy and energy poverty
expert. She is currently completing a PhD programme at
the Polytechnic University of Milan, where her research
investigates whether EU energy transition policies can
improve the situation of energy poor households in Hun-
gary that use solid fuel heating. She is the author of sev-
eral previous chapters of Habitat for Humanity Hungary’s
Annual Report on Housing Poverty. She’s been previously
involved in preparing social urban regeneration programmes, as well as in
EU projects aiming to alleviate housing issues. During her traineeship in the
European Parliament, she worked on the Energy Poverty Handbook.
Márton Czirfusz is a geographer, a co-founder of the Periféria
Policy and Research Center, an external researcher at
the Centre for Economic and Regional Studies, as well
as a member of the Working Group for Public Socio-
logy ’Helyzet’. His research focuses on the analysis of
socio-spatial inequalities in Hungary, including hous-
ing policy and housing-related issues. He completed his
under graduate and doctoral studies at the Eötvös Loránd
University in Budapest.
Csaba Jelinek is an urban sociologist and a co-founder of
the Periféria Policy and Research Center. He received his
PhD from the Central European University (CEU) in 2017.
His main research interests are urban transformations
(urban regeneration, gentrification, etc.), housing policies
and innovative housing solutions, and socio-spatial in-
equalities. In addition to his social science research, heis
also carrying out consultancy and organisational work on the
development of the Hungarian non-profit housing sector.
Bernadett Sebály has a degree in communications, cultural
anthropology and public policy, and received a training in
community organising. Currently a PhD student at the
Central European University (CEU), her research focuses
on the policy impact of social movements. She is working
on a network analysis of the Hungarian housing move-
ment between 1989-2020. She is one of the founders of
the housing advocacy group The City Is For All and an educa-
tor at the School of Public Life. For years, she mentored and trained community
organisers as a sta member of the Civil College Foundation.
About the Authors

The EU Framework for the Reduction
ofHousing Poverty
ANNA ZSÓFIA BAJOMI

THE EU FRAMEWORK FOR THE REDUCTION OF HOUSING POVERTY
8
Anna Zsófia Bajomi
The EU Framework for the
Reduction of Housing Poverty
About the author: PhD student at the Milan Polytechnic, Department of Urban Planning,
Design and Policy
The European Economic Community – the European Union’s predecessor –
was established shortly after the Second World War, in 1958, as an economic
cooperation between six Member States. In the next decades, the economic
alliance was joined by a growing number of states and its activity gradually
extended to a variety of policy areas. Since 1993, the economic and political
community has been known as the European Union (EU). Following Great
Britain’s exit from the EU in 2020, the alliance currently includes 27 Member
States. The EU’s economical model is based on a single internal market and
the free movement of goods, services, capital and people. This means, for
example, that EU citizens are free to choose which Member State they want to
study, work or retire in. Economic cooperation is underpinned by shared core
values such as inclusion, tolerance, justice, solidarity and non-discrimination.1
Human rights (dignity, freedom, solidarity, civil rights and the right to justice)
are summarised and recognised in the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the
European Union.
Inter-state cooperation has had many eects on citizens’ lives, ranging from
programmes to support studying, volunteering and working abroad to the sin-
gle European emergency number (112), the EU health insurance card, reduced
roaming charges or the possibility for pets to travel abroad with their owners
(provided they have a chip and passport).
1 Europa.eu (2016). The History of the European Union.
The EU’s founding treaties set out the areas where the EU has exclusive legis-
lative authority (e.g. customs union, monetary policy across the eurozone),
where it cooperates with Member States on shared competences (e.g. energy
policy, social and territorial cohesion) and where it can only provide counsel
and support (e.g. public health, education).
The European Council sets the EU’s priorities and its general political direc-
tion. It is convened every four months, and is formed by the Heads of State or
Government, the European Commission and the President of the Council of
the European Union. Based on the guidelines set by the European Council, the
European Commission is responsible for drafting EU legislation and budgets.
The Commission is responsible for specific policy areas; each Member State
delegates one Commissioner. The draft laws suggested by the Commission
are examined, amended and adopted by the European Parliament – whose
members are directly elected by EU citizens – and the Council of the European
Union – which is made up of ministers from the Member States. Once they
have been ratified by the European Parliament and the Council of the Europe-
an Union, the European Commission is tasked with implementing EU policies
and the EU budget. Under the Lisbon Treaty (which regulates the functioning
of the EU), the European Parliament can ask the Commission to introduce
specific legislation.
Housing policy is not an area of EU action. It is an area of national compe-
tence – meaning that it is up to the Member States to develop their own policy

THE EU FRAMEWORK FOR THE REDUCTION OF HOUSING POVERTY
9
frameworks. Although the EU does not have a general housing policy, its actions
and decisions do have an impact on housing issues – particularly in regards to
improving energy eciency and the situation of people living in marginalised
circumstances. EU policies regarding energy, regional and urban developments,
employment and social aairs – and even wider economic coordination – all
have an impact on housing.2 In these areas, the EU enables the implementa-
tion of its policies through legislation, financial resources, recommendations,
technical assistance, transnational professional cooperation and programs that
facilitate the exchange of experience.
Member States’ access to EU resources is implemented through seven-year
cycles – the multiannual financial framework (MFF). Each Member State’s
objectives must be set out in operational programmes, which must reflect the
main objectives outlined in the EU’s funding guidelines.
Since 2020, one of the EU’s top priorities has been to meet climate-change
related objectives and support the socioeconomic transition to climate neu-
trality. In the framework of this green transition, the EU will explicitly promote
energy-ecient, complex renovation of residential buildings and the fight
against energy poverty by providing a financial and legal framework.
What follows is an overview of the main housing problems in the European
Union – and how they aect Hungary. We will then examine in detail the EU’s
policies related to housing and survey the legal, financial and professional
instruments the EU has at its disposal to improve the overall housing situation.
Finally, we will consider the extent to which Hungary is making use of these
instruments.
2 These are areas of shared competence: the EU and Member States jointly regulate the given area – but
Member S tates can only legislate regarding questio ns the EU has not regulated or does not wi sh to regulate.
Council of the EU
European Council
European Commission
sets priorities
national leaders,
European Commission
President
27 commissioners
proposes legislation
+
oversees the EU budget
European Parliament
ministers from member states
appoints
commisioners
appoints the
European
Commission
President +
scrutinises its work
directly elected members
EU LAW
+
BUDGET
co-decision
Figure 1: The institutions of the European Union. Based on the BBC’s ‘EU Power Structure’ graphic;
thegraphics used in this chapter are the exclusive intellectual property of Habitat for Humanity. For more
information regarding the institutions of the European Union, see this page; for information regarding
EUlegislation (such as regulations, directives, decisions), see this page.

THE EU FRAMEWORK FOR THE REDUCTION OF HOUSING POVERTY
10
1. Housing problems in the European Union
and Hungary
Housing policies and support schemes dier across the European Union.
While some issues are present in most countries (rising house prices and
rents, homelessness) specific structural, economic and historical develop-
ments explain divergences in other areas (e.g. energy poverty, housing quality,
lack of social housing). Social issues – including housing – do not occur evenly
within nation-states themselves: they dier on regional and municipal levels
or depending on the types of settlement.
For the EU and its Member States to be able to eectively tackle the current
housing crisis, its underlying causes and main features must be examined.
What follows is an overview of the European countries’ housing stock, the
main housing issues they face and how the situation in Hungary’s compares
with other EU countries.
The majority of the EU’s population lives in urban areas (37.7% in cities, 33.9%
in small towns or suburbs) with less than a third living in rural areas. There are
nonetheless significant dierences between countries: Malta, for example, has
a strikingly high proportion of urban dwellers, just as the Netherlands, Belgium
and Italy. Four Eastern European countries (Slovakia, Romania, Slovenia and
Lithuania) have the highest proportion of rural population. In Hungary, one
third of the population (32.8%) lives in cities, one third in small towns and one
third in rural areas. Compared to the EU average, the number of people living
in urban areas is 5% lower, while the number living in rural areas is 5% higher
(see Figure 2).3
53.3% of the EU’s population lives in single-family homes and 46% in multi-fam-
ily homes. Ireland has the highest proportion of people living in houses, while
Latvia has the highest proportion of people living in apartments. In Hungary,
3 Eurostat (2021). Distribution of population by degree of urbanisation, dwelling type and income group -
EU-SILC survey.
Figure 2: Distribution of population by level of urbanisation, 2019.
Data source: Eurostat, EU-SILC.
Figure 3: Distribution of population by dwelling type, 2019.
Source: Eurostat, EU-SILC.
100%
90%
80%
70%
60%
50%
40%
30%
20%
10%
0%
Malta
Estonia
Netherlands
Cyprus
Spain
Bulgaria
Portugal
Latvia
Lithuania
Sweden
Finland
EU 27
Denmark
Greece
Germany
France
Ireland
Italy
Poland
Hungary
Austria
Czechia
Croatia
Belgium
Romania
Slovakia
Luxembourg
Slovenia
cities
towns and suburbs
rural areas
Hungary
EU 27
100%
90%
80%
70%
60%
50%
40%
30%
20%
10%
0%
Latvia
Spain
Estonia
Lithuania
Greece
Germany
Malta
Italy
Czechia
Slovakia
Sweden
Bulgaria
EU 27
Austria
Portugal
Poland
Luxembourg
Finland
France
Denmark
Romania
Slovenia
Hungary
Cyprus
Netherlands
Belgium
Croatia
Ireland
Detached house
Flat
Hungary
EU 27

THE EU FRAMEWORK FOR THE REDUCTION OF HOUSING POVERTY
11
more than two-thirds (71%) of the population lives in a house and less than
30% in an apartment (see Figure 3).4
The proportion of homeowners and renters varies across European countries;
in some countries, access to housing mainly revolves around credit mecha-
nisms, while in others, family-support schemes play a more important role.
More than two thirds of the total EU population own their homes; less than a
third are renters. There are, however, significant dierences between countries
(see Figure 4). In Eastern – and some Southern – Member States, the share of pri-
vate ownership is particula rly high and ho using loans only play a minimal role in the
housing market: this reflects the central role family systems (through inheritance
or financial support) occupy in these societies in the area of housing. The rental
sector in Western and Northern countries is overall more institutionalised
than in Eastern Europe and a higher share of the population lives in rented
accommodation. It must nonetheless be noted that given the informal nature
of much of the rental sector in Eastern Member States, ocial statistics do not
accurately reflect its size.5 As for the category of those renting at a reduced
price or for free, it covers those living in social housing, as well as those renting
on a goodwill basis. As a result of the large-scale privatisations conducted
after the 1989 regime change, the share of social housing is low in Eastern
European countries.
1.1. Aordability
Over the last decade, house prices and rents have been steadily increasing
in the EU, with house prices rising by 25.9%6 and rents by 13%.
Estonia is the country that saw the highest increase in house prices (107. 8 1 %)
and in the rent index (144.95%).
4 Eurostat (2021). Distribution of population by degree of urbanisation, dwelling type and income group -
EU-SILC survey.
5 Hegedüs, J. és Horváth, V. (2015). Intra-Team Comparison Report for Bulgaria, Hungary, Romania.
6 Eurostat (2021). House Price Index.
Figure 4: Distribution of population by tenure status, 2019.
Source: Eurostat, EU-SILC.
100%
90%
80%
70%
60%
50%
40%
30%
20%
10%
0%
Romania
Croatia
Bulgaria
Lithuania
Hungary
Poland
Slovakia
Latvia
Greece
Slovenia
Estona
Italy
Malta
Czechia
Cyprus
Spain
EU27
Portugal
Ireland
France
Austria
Finland
Luxembourg
Belgium
Germany
Denmark
Sweden
Netherlands
Owner, no outstanding mortgage or loan
Owner, with mortgage or loan
Tenant, rent at market price
Tenant, rent at reduced price or free
Hungary
EU 27

THE EU FRAMEWORK FOR THE REDUCTION OF HOUSING POVERTY
12
Hungary’s 89.68% increase in house prices is the second highest across
the EU for the period running from 2010 to 2020.
7
In the same period, in-
comes only increased by 70%.8 According to the OECD, the house price to
income ratio in Hungary increased by 26% between 2015 and 2020.9 This is
corroborated by a National Bank of Hungary report which states that ‘com-
pared to 2013, the necessary average income to buy a typical dwelling will
have increased by four years by the end of 2020’.10 According to the National
Bank,‘state subsidies significantly improve the aordability of housing, most
notably for families with three children’11; but such measures also have a direct
eect on the housing market by contributing to higher house prices, which
further worsens the situation of low-income families who have no – or dicult
– access to state subsidies.
According to Eurostat data, Hungary’s rent growth of 43.49% is the fourth
highest across the EU. Data drawn from rental advertisements indicate a
drastic deterioration in housing aordability: ‘over the past eight years, rents
increased by almost 90% nationally and in county capitals, while in Budapest
they increased by almost 130%’.12 In 2020, the number of long-term rents in
Budapest increased due to the drop in tourism caused by Covid-19. This is
one of the reasons why – after many years of uninterrupted growth – rents
fell by 13.3% in Budapest and by an average of 9.8% nationally between Feb-
ruary 2020 and March 2021.13 This was probably only a temporary reprieve:
prices stagnated in early 2021 before rising again.
14
In May 2021, renting a
one-room apartment in Budapest accounted for 43% of the average monthly
net income.15
7 Hungarian Central Statistical Oce. 18.1.1.13. House Price Index.
8 Hungarian National Bank (2020). Housing Market Report (June 2020).
9 OECD (2021). Housing prices (indicator).
10 Hungarian National Bank (2021) Housing Market Report (May 2021), p.19.
11 ibid., p.7.
12 Habitat for Humanity Magyarország (2020). Black Housing Campaign – Problems
13 Hungarian National Bank (2021) Housing Market Report (May 2021).
14 Hungarian Central Statistical Oce (2021). KSH– Ingatlan.com- housing index (April 2021).
15 Hungarian National Bank (2021) Housing Market Report (May 2021).
160
140
120
100
80
60
40
20
0
-20
-40
Italy
Spain
Cyprus
Greece
Romania
Finland
Slovenia
France
Croatia
EU 27
Ireland
Netherlands
Poland
Belgium
Bulgaria
Denmark
Malta
Portugal
Slovaki
Czecia
Germany
Sweden
Lithuania
Austria
Latvia
Luxembourg
Hungary
Estonia
change in house price index
change in rent index
Hungary
EU 27
Figure 5: Changes in house price and rent indices in the EU Member States, 2010-2020,
data source: Eurostat House Price Index and Eurostat HICP (reference year: 2015=100).

THE EU FRAMEWORK FOR THE REDUCTION OF HOUSING POVERTY
13
On average, households in the European Union spent 21% of their income on
housing in 2018, but this number rises up to 41% for those who earn less than
60% of the average income.16 There are also significant disparities between
countries: for example, households in Malta spend only 7.8% of their income
on housing, compared to 40% in Greece.17
The significant increase in house prices and rents has pushed aordable and
decent housing out of reach for a growing number of people. In the EU, 10% of
the population — and more than a quarter of renters — spend at least 40% of their
income on housing.18 In 2018, Hungarian households dovetailed the EU average
by spending just over a fifth (21.2%) of their income on housing — 14.5% less
than they spent in 2008.19 However, the same statistics reveal that low-income
households spent 45.8% of their income on housing in 2018, that is a 4.8%
increase compared to ten years earlier. 20
One of the main driving factors behind rising house prices is the ever-increas-
ing involvement of financial actors in the housing sector. Such investments
tend to push up prices, jeopardising the aordability of housing and mainte-
nance for low-income earners.
21
The increased commodification of housing
marks a shift from its perception as a public good characterised by aordable,
quality homes. Mass tourism also contributes to rising housing and rental
prices — as it simultaneously increases the sector’s investment value and
removes a large number of homes from the long-term rental market.
The decline of aordable housing is also linked to the dwindling budgets al-
located by Member States to social housing.22
16
Eurostat (2021). Share of Housing Costs in Disposable Household Income, by Type of Household and
Income Group Ilc_mded01.
17 ibid.
18
Eurostat (2021). Share of housing costs in disposable household income, by type of household and income
group Ilc_mded01.
19 Eurostat (2021). Housing cost overburden rate by tenure status - EU-SILC Survey ILC_LVHO07C.
20 ibid.
21 European Commission - Joint Research Centre. The Future of Cities.
22 European Parliament (2021).Decent and aordable housing for all.
Figure 6: Changes in house price and rent indices in the EU and Hungary, 2011–2020.
Data source: Eurostat House Price Index and Eurostat HICP (reference year: 2015–100).
Figure 7: Housing cost overburden rate by tenure status. Source: Eurostat, EU-SILC.
80
90
100
110
120
130
140
150
160
170
180
2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020
EU 27 house price index
Hungary house price index
EU 27 rent index
Hungary rent index
90
80
70
60
50
40
30
20
10
0
Greece
Bulgaria
Denmark
Germany
Luxembou…
Netherlan…
EU 27
Sweden
Italy
Romania
Spain
Belgium
Austria
Czechia
Poland
Portugal
Slovakia
France
Latvia
Lithuania
Croatia
Estonia
Hungary
Ireland
Slovenia
Finland
Malta
Cyprus
total population
tenants
Hungary
EU 27

THE EU FRAMEWORK FOR THE REDUCTION OF HOUSING POVERTY
14
1.2. Age and energy consumption of buildings
The age of the housing stock varies drastically across European countries.
The United Kingdom and France have the highest proportion of buildings built
before 1969, while Cyprus and Ireland have an above-average proportion
of newer buildings. The age of buildings is also an indicator regarding the
energy eciency of the housing stock: newer buildings have to meet tighter
requirements. Half of Europe’s residential buildings were built before 197023,
when the first energy performance standards were introduced — which means
their energy eciency is typically lower. Such standards were only gradually
introduced in the Eastern European Member States after 1989 and their sub-
sequent accession to the EU.
Hungary’s share of older buildings is higher than the EU average, with more
than half of the housing stock built before 1970 (see Figure 8). 60% of Hun-
garian dwellings are detached (or terraced) houses, 81% were built before
1990 and 63% are not insulated.24 Overall, 70-90% of the housing stock is in
need of renovation.25
Household energy consumption in Europe accounts for 23% of final energy
consumption26, 63% of which is used to heat residential buildings.27 Dierences
in average energy consumption between dierent countries can reach a ratio
of up to 2.7. Houses in Luxembourg, Belgium, Italy and Hungary consume the
most energy.28
Hungarian buildings account for 40% of the country’s primary energy use.29
While energy consumption decreased in most member states between
2000 and 2018, average energy consumption in Hungary remained stable
23 European Commission. EU Buildings Factsheets | Energy.
24 MultiContact Consulting Kft. (2020). Hungary: Modernisation of Public and Residential Buildings - Iden-
tification and Elaboration of Support Programmes - Executive Summary.
25 ibid.
26 Eurostat (2019). Final energy consumption by sector, EU, 2019.
27 Eurostat (2019). Energy consumption and use by households.
28 Odyssee-Mure (2018). Sectoral Profile - Households Energy Consumption, p.5.
29 MultiContact Consulting Kft. (2020). Hungary: Modernisation of Public and Residential Buildings - Iden-
tification and Elaboration of Support Programmes - Executive Summary.
Figure 8: Distribution of dwellings by year of construction, 2014.
Data source: European Commission, EU Buildings Database.
Figure 9: Energy consumption by end use per dwelling, 2016.
Source: European Environment Agency.
100%
90%
80%
70%
60%
50%
40%
30%
20%
10%
0%
Cyprus
Finland
Croatia
Spain
Portugal
Malta
Estonia
Netherlands
Ireland
Bulgaria
Poland
Italy
Czechia
Latvia
Lithuania
EU
Hungary
France
Germany
Slovenia
Denmark
Belgium
Sweden
before 1945
1945 - 1969
1970 - 1979
1980 - 1989
1990 - 1999
2000 - 2010
after 2010
Hungary
EU 27
2.4
2.2
2.0
1.8
1.6
1.4
1.2
1.0
0.8
0.6
0.4
0.2
0
Malta
Portugal
Bulgaria
Spain
Cyprus
Lithuania
Greece
Romania
Slovakia
Netherlands
France
UK
EU
Italy
Latvia
Poland
Slovenia
Estonia
Ireland
Germany
Croatia
Sweden
Hungary
Denmark
Czechia
Austria
Belgium
Finland
Luxembourg
tonnes of oil equivalent per dwelling
Space heating
Water heating
Cooking
Lighting and electrical appliances
Cooling
Hungary
EU 28

THE EU FRAMEWORK FOR THE REDUCTION OF HOUSING POVERTY
15
(it decreased between 2008 and 2014, before increasing after 2014). In a
climate-adjusted comparison between EU countries, Hungary has the bloc’s
fifth highest household energy consumption.30 Between 2000 and 2018, the
amount of energy used for heating decreased in all EU Member States with
the exception of Poland and Hungary. In the latter, it increased significantly
between 2000 and 2014, and only started to slightly decrease in 2018. 31
1.3. Energy poverty
Households living in energy poverty face diculties in meeting the energy
needs necessary to sustain a decent quality of life. The causes of energy
poverty include low energy eciency in housing and appliances, low incomes,
high energy prices and diculties in accessing energy. The question of energy
poverty has been receiving increasing attention from policymakers in Europe,
where it aects an estimated 50 million people.32
Several studies have underlined the stark dierence in energy poverty levels
between Europe’s centre and periphery33, with eastern and southern (pe-
riphery) Member States more aected by energy poverty than those of the
western and northern (centre) Member States.
The maps above show the EU Member States according to an index based
on the energy poverty of each country’s bottom 20% earners34; it illustrates
each country’s exposure and vulnerability to energy poverty.35
30 Odyssee-Mure (2018). Sectoral Profile - Households Energy Consumption, p.5.
31 ibid.
32 Energy Poverty Observatory. What Is Energy Poverty? | EU Energy Poverty Observatory.
33
Bouzarovski , S. (2018). Energy Poverty (Dis)Assembling Europe’s Infrastructural Divide; OPENEXP. Euro-
pean Energy Poverty Index (EEPI).
34 European Energy Poverty Index (2019)
35
Recalde, M. et al. (2019). Structural Energy Poverty Vulnerability and Excess Winter Mortalit y in the Euro-
pean Union. The vulnerability of a country to energy poverty is determined by structural factors such as
the state of the labour market, the extent of welfare provisions, the state of the housing stock (energy
eciency, age of buildings, housing prices, etc.) and energy prices.
Figure 10: European Household Energy Poverty Index, 2017 data.
Data source: openexp.eu, EEPI Index, 2019. (0 is the worst score and 100 the best).
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
70
80
90
100
score

THE EU FRAMEWORK FOR THE REDUCTION OF HOUSING POVERTY
16
Both rankings are headed by eastern and southern European countries, which
indicates the acuteness of energy poverty in these regions.
The Hungarian Energy Eciency Act36 defines households as energy poor
if the cost of heating their home to 20°C and producing hot water exceeds
25% of their annual household income. While various studies have shown that
8.5% of the population fits this definition37, this does not indicate whether the
home was properly cooled (that is, remaining neither too cold nor too hot) or
what proportion of households would be defined as energy poor if their home
temperature actually reached 20°C.
The proportion of households with utility bills in arrears is often used as an
indicator of energy poverty. In 2019, this concerned 6.2% EU households,
with those in southern and eastern Member States most aected. In Hungary,
10.2% of households had arrears in 2019 — 64% higher than the EU average.
22% of people living on less than 60% of the median income in Hungary and
more than a third (38.2%) of single parents had arrears.
38
Since 2010, the
proportion of households with arrears has fallen by 55% for average-income
and 60% for low-income households; this is partly due to the government’s
utility cost reduction policy (rezsicsökkentés) instituted in 2013. This policy has
however led to more significant savings among higher income earners and
has not aected households relying on wood for heating39 — a group whose
situation is not reflected in data collected on households with arrears. Heating
takes up the largest share of household energy use.
In Hungary, one fifth of dwellings (21%) are only heated with wood, and a fur-
ther 21% use a mix of solid fuel and gas. 37.3% of households in the lowest
income quintile rely exclusively on solid fuels and 14% use a mixture of gas and
wood: this means that more than half of the lowest-income households heat
partly or entirely with wood, with less than one third (31.2%) using only gas.
36 LVII Law on Energy Eciency (2015)
37 Based on KSH data collected as part of the ‘What do we live in?’ publication. (2015). Calculation based
on the research presented by the Sociological Institute of the Centre for Social Science Research under
the title ‘Social Challenges of Energy Use’, Elosztó Projekt.
38 Eurostat (2021). Arrears on utility bills - EU-SILC Survey ILC_MDES07.
39 Elosztó Projekt, subsidies.
group 1
group 2
group 3
group 4
Figure 11: Member States’ vulnerability to energy poverty.
Data source: Recalde, M. et al. 2019, Eurostat.
(A metric of 1 includes the least vulnerable Member States, 4 the most vulnerable).

THE EU FRAMEWORK FOR THE REDUCTION OF HOUSING POVERTY
17
Incontrast, nearly half (47.7%) the households in the highest income quintile
use only gas and less than a tenth (8.5%) rely entirely on solid fuels.40
The price of gas has fallen by 26% since 2013, while the price of wood —typ-
ically used by lower income households — has been steadily increasing for
more than a decade (see Figure 14).
The inability of households relying on wood to cover the cost of heating can
lead to problems such as utility arrears, fuel underuse or the use of inadequate
fuels.
1.4. Housing quality
Building obsolescence is not only a problem in terms of energy consumption.
The population of Eastern Europe and Hungary is aected by housing quality
issues at a significantly higher rate than the EU average.
Households in Eastern and Southern European countries are more likely to be
aected by housing deprivation41, i.e., living in an overcrowded dwelling that
contains one additional major housing quality issue (leaking roof, no toilet or
bathroom, darkness). Peripheral countries also have a higher proportion of
households living under leaking roofs or among damp, mouldy walls than their
western and northern counterparts (see Figure 15). In Hungary, 7.8% of the to-
tal population (1.8 times the EU average) was aected by housing deprivation;
this number rises to 19.8% in the case of single parents. In 2019, 2.8% of the
total population — and 4.7% of children — lived without a toilet or bathroom,
which is 2.7 times the EU average.
40 Prepared using the data set of the Hungarian Central Statistical Oce (HICP 2019) (ref. year 2018). The
calculations and conclusions drawn from the data sets are the exclusive intellectual property of Habitat
for Humanity.
41
Eurostat (2021). Severe housing deprivation rate by age, sex and poverty Status - EU-SILC Sur vey ILC_MD-
HO06A.
100%
80%
60%
40%
20%
0
1. 2. 3. 4. 5.
income quintile
Only solid fuels (firewood,
coal, briquettes, other)
Gas and solid fuels
Only gas
Gas and other heating
methods
District heating
Only electric heating
Other
0
20
40
60
80
100
120
140
0
600
1200
1800
2400
3000
3600
4200
1996
1997
1998
1999
2000
2001
2002
2003
2004
2005
2006
2007
2008
2009
2010
2011
2012
2013
2014
2015
2016
2017
2018
2019
Piped gas (HUF/m3)
Firewood (HUF/100 kg)
Piped gas (HUF/m3)
Firewood (HUF/100 kg)
Utility price reduction
Figure 12: Distribution of households by heating fuel.
Data source: Prepared using the data set of the Hungarian Central Statistical Oce (ref. year 2018).
Thecalculations and conclusions are the exclusive intellectual property of Habitat for Humanity.
Figure 13: Prices of piped gas and firewood, 1996-2020.
Source: Hungarian Central Statistical Oce.

THE EU FRAMEWORK FOR THE REDUCTION OF HOUSING POVERTY
18
In the European Union, 12.7% of the population lived in a dwelling with a damp
roof or damp walls. This issue was particularly acute in southern and eastern
Member States — although overall auent countries such as Luxembourg
and Belgium were also strongly aected.
In 2019, more than a fifth (22.3%) of Hungary’s total population lived in a
dwelling with a damp roof or damp, wet walls — the third highest rate in the
EU. More than a quarter (27.9%) of people under 18 lived in a dwelling with
dampness or mould issues.42 The overall population is 1.7 times more aected
than the EU average, a proportion that rises to twice the EU average in the
case of children. Compared to 2010, the overall number of the aected pop-
ulation has decreased by 7.9% (3.8% in the case of children). Damp, mouldy
housing correlates with unhealthy living conditions and an increased risk of
developing asthma and upper respiratory diseases.
1.5. Segregation
Housing segregation refers to the unequal spatial distribution and unequal
access to housing of social groups, defined in terms of income, ethnicity, ed-
ucation or employment status. In urban areas, this often entails high income
groups living in enclaves fenced o from the outside world, while various ethnic
communities (or groups with low-income and less access to education) live in
other parts of the city. Such areas tend to have poorer housing conditions and
fewer, poorer quality public services.43 Temporary or permanent settlements,
such as refugee camps or emergency housing erected in the city outskirts
are usually considered as segregated areas.
In Members States from Western and Northern Europe, social exclusion is
predominantly an urban problem, with social disparities in large cities also
reflected in the housing exclusion of low-income groups.44 In contrast, those
42 Eurostat. Total population living in a dwelling with a leaking roof, damp walls, floors or foundation, or rot
in window frames or floor - EU-SILC survey [ilc_mdho01.
43 European Commission - Joint Research Centre. The Future of Cities - Social Segregation.
44
European Commission - Joint Research Centre. Proportion of the Population at Risk of Poverty or Social
Exclusion, by Degree of Urbanisation, JRC Elaboration Based on Eurostat Data
0%
2%
4%
6%
8%
10%
12%
14%
Figure 14: Severe housing deprivation rate in EU Member States, 2019.
Source: Eurostat.

THE EU FRAMEWORK FOR THE REDUCTION OF HOUSING POVERTY
19
at risk of social exclusion in Southern and Eastern Europe tend to live in rural,
peripheral areas.45
In Hungary, a significant proportion of Roma and very low-income households
struggle with multiple housing-related issues. A third of Roma households live
in dwellings without running water or a bathroom and 81% use solid fuels for
heating.
46
In 2011, 44% of the Roma population lived in a dwelling with a leaking
roof or damp walls; a fifth faced acute pollution in their immediate environ-
ment.
47
These problems are often concentrated in rural Roma settlements, old
workers’ quarters or other — often literally cut-o— urban areas.
In Hungary, 2.8% of the population (276,244 people) — 30% of them children
— live in 1384 segregated areas dispersed across 709 settlements.
48
More
than half of the settlements aected by segregation are villages.49 Research
shows that there are at least 17 villages in Hungary where settlement-wide
‘ghettoisation’ has occurred and at times, this process has expanded to the
wider area.50 An area is ocially considered segregated if the proportion of
people of working age (15–59 years) with no more than primary education and
no regular income reaches 20% to 50% (this varies depending on the type
of settlement). 51 Although this indicator measures residential segregation, it
does not include data on housing quality or the ethnic makeup of the aected
communities.
45 European Commission - Joint Research Centre. The Future of Cities - Social Segregation.
46
UNDP Europe and CIS (2012). The Housing Situation of Roma Communities: Regional Roma Survey 2011.
47 UNDP, E. U. A. for F. R. (2013). The situation of Roma in 11 EU Member States: Survey results at a glance.
48 State Secretariat for Social Inclusion. Hungarian National Social Inclusion Strategy 2030, p. 103.
49 Balog, I. (2017). Szegregátumok a Statisztika és a Mindennapok Tükrében.
50 Virág, T. (2006). Gettósodó Térség.
51
314/2012 (XI. 8.) G overnment Decree on Settlement Development, the Integrated Settlement Development
Strategy and Settlement Planning Instruments, as well as on the Legal Institutions regarding Special
Settlement Planning.
30%
25%
20%
15%
10%
5%
0
EU Hungary
12% 13% 18% 22% 27% 30%
total population
less than 18 year-olds
members of a single-parent household
Figure 15: Population living in a dwelling with a leaking roof or damp walls in the EU and Hungary, 2019
Source: Eurostat, EU-SILC.

THE EU FRAMEWORK FOR THE REDUCTION OF HOUSING POVERTY
20
1.6. Homelessness
Experts estimate that there could be up 700,000 homeless people within the
European Union on any given night, with 4.1 million people aected by homeless-
ness each year.52 There is no single EU-wide metric to measure the number of
people experiencing homelessness. Experts suggest the following categories:
a) those sleeping rough, b) those living in night shelters or temporary accom-
modation, c) those forced to stay long-term in health facilities in the absence of
alternative solutions; or those who had no place to stay before going to prison;
OR those who are forced to stay with friends or to live in unconventional ac-
commodation (e.g. caravans, mobile homes). Research shows that the number
of homeless people has increased in 24 Member States over the last decade;
during this period, only Finland has seen a significant decrease in homeless-
ness.53 Amongst the structural reasons that have led to the present situation,
we must underline the rising pressure across housing markets as well as the
shrinking social housing sector (see 1.1 Aordability).54 Factors such as poverty
and the erosion of social safety nets have also contributed to rising homeless-
ness. These may be compounded by other institutional factors such as eviction
regulations. Disregard for the housing situation of people being discharged from
institutions such as hospitals, hospices or prison have also probably contributed
to this rise. Finally, relationship- and personal issues — such as mental illness,
addiction, low education levels — also increase the risk of homelessness.55
There is no exact figure for the number of homeless people in Hungary. Ac-
cording to the 2020 Homeless Data Census, ‘at least 2,100 people were sleep-
ing rough in the country on the 3rd of February 2020’.
56
Based on aggregated
data and the turnover data from the homeless shelters, an estimated 15,000
people were sleeping in homeless shelters or public spaces in early 2020.57
This number does not cover families living in temporary shelters or in very
precarious circumstances.
52 FEANTSA, About Homelessness.
53 European Commission (2019). Fighting Homelessness and Housing Exclusion in Europe.
54 European Commission (2019). Fighting Homelessness and Housing Exclusion in Europe.
55 FEANTSA, About Homelessness.
56 February Third Working Group (2020):Report on the 2020 Homeless Data Collection.
57 February Third Working Group (2020):Report on the 2020 Homeless Data Collection.
1.7. Housing problems in European Parliament
resolutions
A report by Green MEP Kim Van Sparrentak ‘Access to decent and aordable
housing for all’ details the main housing problems encountered across the
EU: rising house and rent prices, declining investment in the already depleted
social housing system, scarcity of aordable housing solutions, the burden
of utility costs — especially for vulnerable groups — spatial and housing ex-
clusion among minority and vulnerable groups, the increase in homelessness,
the poor quality and low energy eciency of the building stock. The report
underlines the fundamental role housing plays in terms of social rights; it ad-
vocates for the right to housing, housing security and the inclusiveness of
housing markets (e.g. support for access to housing, action against property
speculation, protection against evictions).
In September 2020, the Parliament adopted MEP Ciarán Cue’s report on
‘Maximising the energy eciency potential of the EU’s buildings stock’. The
report calls on the Commission and Member States to intervene in the housing
market in order to ensure energy ecient renovations. It also highlights the
need to include low-income and energy-poor households in such a project.58
1.8. Housing problems in country reports
andcountry-specific recommendations
The above-mentioned issues related to housing and energy poverty also ap-
pear in European Semester Country Reports, as well as in country-specific
recommendations.
In the case of Hungary, both the European Semester recommendations and the
Country Report highlight the problems related to the quality and aordability
of housing, as well as the widespread issue of energy poverty. The Council of
the European Union recommendation states that ‘the scarcity of social housing
in municipalities and the lack of financial support for tenants are obstacles to
58 Cue, C. (2020): Report on maximising the energy eciency potential of the EU building stock.

THE EU FRAMEWORK FOR THE REDUCTION OF HOUSING POVERTY
21
mobility’.
59
It points to the low energy
eciency of the housing stock and
the impact of solid fuels’s household
use on air pollution. It also under-
lines the serious damage in terms
of public health and the environ-
ment provoked by non-compliance
with air quality standards. Finally, it
highlights the high share of heavily
polluting biomass (10%) and the low
amount of low-carbon renewables
(only 1%) among the country’s gross
energy consumption.60
The Commission’s 2020 Country
Report finds that a significant pro-
portion of the population lives in
poor housing conditions — a par-
ticularly acute problem for families with children and the Roma. It also points
to the dramatic rise in house prices, the lack of aordable rental housing and
the extremely low proportion of social housing. It highlights that generous
state subsidies mainly target the middle class at the expense of low-income
earners, and that the under-regulated and informal rental sector puts both
tenants and landlords at risk. While the legal system criminalises homeless
people living in public spaces, such structural issues make it particular dicult
to exit homelessness.61
The report also points to the failure to meet air quality standards62 and the low
energy eciency of residential buildings; the latter partially accounts for an
energy consumption 12% higher per capita than the EU average despite lower
59
Council Recommendation of 20 July 2020 on the 2020 National Reform Programme of Hungary and
delivering a Council opinion on the 2020 Convergence Programme of Hungary 2020/C 282/17.
60 ibid.
61 European Commission (2020). 2020 Country Report - Hungary
62 European Commission (2020). 2020 Country Report - Hungary, p.60.
incomes.63 Meanwhile, state-regulated, artificially low energy prices provide
no incentive to improve energy eciency.
1.9. Summary
Rising house prices across Europe are restricting access to decent housing.
While this is a widespread issue, it is particularly acute for young people and
low-incomes earners.64 The situation has led to increased levels of indebt-
edness, rising homelessness and households having to cope with high rents
month after month. Housing and energy poverty problems also point to fault
lines dividing Europe, with a higher proportion of people in eastern and south-
ern Member States having to face such issues. Poor-quality, energetically
inecient housing not only reduces households’ quality of life, but also has a
negative impact on physical and mental health (particularly for children and
the elderly); due to higher energy consumption, it also has a detrimental eect
on the environment.
63
Government Briefing Report. In accordance with Government Decree 1330/2011 (X.12.). Decision No.
1330/2011 o n the Implementation of the Interbasin Action Programme for the Reduction of Small Stationary
Particulate Matter (PM10) 2017; Review of the Action Programme for the Improvement of Air Quality in the
“Sajó Valley” Air Quality Zone, Miskolc District O ce, Borsod-Abaúj-Zemplén County Government Oce.
64 European Commission. Futurium | Housing - EU Urban Agenda .
The European Semester coordi-
nates the economic and social pol-
icies of EU countries. Each spring,
Member States prepare a National
Reform Programme and a 3-year
Convergence Programme; the
Council of the European Union sub-
sequently assesses them and for-
mulates recommendations. These
recommendations are — amongst
others — taken into account by
Member States when preparing the
next year’s budget. At the beginning
of each year, the European Commis-
sion assesses the economic situa-
tion in each Member State and the
progress made in implementing the
previous year’s recommendations.

THE EU FRAMEWORK FOR THE REDUCTION OF HOUSING POVERTY
22
2. European Union policies on housing
In the following section we review various EU policies that have a direct or indi-
rect impact on housing: these range from social and employment aairs to so-
cial inclusion policies, regional and urban policy, and energy and climate policy.
2.1. Social aairs and social inclusion
The European Pillar of Social Rights’ 20 principles aim to guarantee fair and
ecient European labour markets and social protection systems.65 Principle
19 on housing states that
• Access to social housing or housing assistance of good quality shall be
provided for those in need.
•
Vulnerable people have the right to appropriate assistance and protection
against forced eviction.
•
Adequate shelter and services shall be provided to the homeless in order
to promote their social inclusion.66
The European Platform against Homelessness was launched in June 2020,
as part of the implementation of the Pillar’s housing principle. It aims to end
homelessness in Europe by 2030: by then, no one should have to sleep rough,
spend more time than necessary in emergency or temporary accommodation,
be turned away from an institution (such as hospitals, prisons, hospices etc)
without a place to go to. In addition to putting an end to discrimination against
homeless people, it also aims to prevent evictions whenever possible and to
ensure that evictees are oered housing alternatives.
67
In its bid to end home-
lessness, the European Social Fund provides financial support for innovative
services that tackle the issue; in turn, InvestEU supports construction and
investment in aordable and social housing.
65 European Commission. The European Pillar of Social Rights Action Plan.
66 European Commission. The European Pillar of Social Rights in 20 principles
67 European Commission (2021). European platform to combat homelessness is launched.
In the framework of implementing the European Pillar of Social Rights’ objec-
tives related to housing, an EU-wide ‘Aordable Housing’ initiative has been
launched, consisting of renovation pilot project across 100 districts.
2.2. Regional and urban policy
Given its impact on urban problems and spatial disparities, housing is an im-
portant element of the EU’s regional and urban policy.
Through the EU Multiannual Financial Framework, targeted support is provided
to improve the situation of people living in deprived urban areas, or in areas
suering from deprivation or segregation. In the framework of regional and
urban policy funds, complex programmes for people living in marginalised
areas — such as slums — have been implemented. The programmes include
social concerns, but also investments in infrastructure to improve housing and
energy eciency (for example by facilitating households’ move into integrated
environments or by supporting energy ecient renovations).
2.3. Energy and climate policy
At first sight, energy policy might seem only loosely related to housing. Howev-
er, EU energy policies support both the energy-ecient renovation of buildings
and an increasing access to renewable energy sources for households. They
also encourage Member States to improve the situation of people living in
energy poverty and to protect vulnerable consumers. What follows is a brief
overview of policies that promote the renewal of the housing stock and the
reduction of energy poverty.
2.3.1. Clean Energy for All Europeans package
Alongside the creation of an integrated internal energy market, the EU energy
policy supports increasing energy eciency, the diversification of energy
sources, promoting carbon capture, as well as research into low-carbon clean

THE EU FRAMEWORK FOR THE REDUCTION OF HOUSING POVERTY
23
energy. The Clean Energy for All Europeans package — the EU’s most important
energy package to date — aims to facilitate a green transition wh ile simultaneously
preserving the competitiveness of the EU energy market. The directives on Energy
Eciency and Energy Performance of Buildings have made a significant con-
tribution towards improving the energy eciency of new housing and encour-
aging Member States to renovate existing buildings. The Renewable Energy
Directive plays an important role in promoting the uptake of renewable energy
sources and the establishment of energy communities. EU advocacy regarding
energy poverty has also led to the inclusion within the package itself of expec-
tations for Member States to address energy poverty and protect vulnerable
consumers. Under this plan, Member States are required to prepare a National
Energy and Climate Plan (NECP), setting out goals that will contribute to the
EU’s overall climate objectives and the policies through which they will achieve
them. Energy poverty reduction targets and related policies are to be included
within each state’s NECP. These should also take into account the interests of
people aected by energy poverty in energy-related regulations and ensure
that they benefit from the green transition: energy saving policies should be
targeted at households in need68, and low-income households should be en-
couraged to join local energy communities. Given that EU legislation on energy
poverty is established through dialogue between the Commission and Member
States — rather than legally binding —, it should be noted that the extent to
which it is enforced in practice is largely up to Member States.
2.3.2. The European Green Deal
To address the threats and problems posed by climate change and environmen-
tal degradation, the European Green Deal — the EU’s flagship climate policy
package — aims to transform the EU economy into one that is simultaneously
modern, resource-ecient and competitive. While limiting the transition’s impact
on individual and regional levels, it aims to reduce greenhouse gas emissions to
net zero by 2050 and decouple economic growth from resource use.69 The Eu-
ropean Green Deal is a complex climate policy package that covers many areas
68
Directive (EU) 2018/2002 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 11 December 2018 amending
Directive 2012/27/EU on energy eciency
69 European Commission. European Green Deal.
of climate, nature and environmental protection. Amongst other achievements,
it has led to a revision of the Clean Energy Package (the regulations relating to
the EU’s energy policy objectives that cover energy eciency, building energy
and renewable energy) in order to align it with the climate protection agenda.
Renovation Wave
Implemented as part of the European Green Deal, the Renovation Wave strat-
egy aims to double the rate of building renovation in order to reduce emissions
and energy poverty, as well as to promote post-pandemic recovery. The Ren
-
ovation Wave aims to provide targeted funding for energy-ecient renovation
through the EU Multiannual Financial Framework and the NextGenerationEU
flagship initiatives ‘Renovate’ and ‘Power Up’.70
Alongside the Renovation Wave, the ‘Just Transition Mechanism’ has also been
announced as part of the Green Deal. It aims to mitigate the potential negative
socio-economic impacts of the transition, for example by retraining workers in re-
gions heavily dependent on coal production and consumption or by promoting the
transition to renewable energy use.
Fit for 55
Adopted in summer 2021 with the
goal of stepping up the targets of
the European Green Deal, the Eu-
ropean Commission’s ‘Fit for 55’
proposal package aims for a 55%
cut in greenhouse gas emissions
by 2030 (in comparison with 1990
levels.) The proposal would further
tighten emission limits through the
EU’s existing emissions trading sys-
tem (ETS); the inclusion of aviation
and waterborne transport into the
system is slated as well.
70 European Commission. Renovation Wave: doubling the renovation rate to cut emissions, boost recovery
and reduce energy poverty.
The EU Emissions Trading Sys-
tem (ETS) sets an annual cap on
emissions and allows installations
responsible for emissions to trade
allowances. The system thus simul-
taneously pushes for the reduction
of emissions and provides an incen-
tive to reduce emissions where it is
most cost-eective. Member States
use the revenues from emissions
trading to invest in lower-emission
projects. For example, in Hungary,
the ‘Warmth of Home’ programme,
— which supports residential energy
eciency investments — is financed
from emissions trading revenues.

THE EU FRAMEWORK FOR THE REDUCTION OF HOUSING POVERTY
24
In addition to the existing regulations, a new system that would regulate emis-
sions from road transport and buildings is currently being discussed. All ETS
revenue must fund projects related to energy and climate policy; this includes
a share allocated for ‘expenditure related to the potential social impacts on
vulnerable households, micro-enterprises and transport users’.
71
The pro-
posal package raises the targets for renewable energy and energy eciency
and addresses sustainable bioenergy production (including the production
of wood.) Other elements of the proposal include the planting of three billion
trees and vehicle electrification.72
2.4. Shaping housing policy
While housing policy is not currently an EU competence, a number of initiatives
have sought to strengthen EU-wide action to tackle the ongoing housing cri-
sis. An own-initiative report by Green MEP Kim Van Sparrentak was already
adopted by the European Parliament; in the sub-section ‘Housing problems
in European Parliament resolutions’, it calls on the Commission and Mem-
ber States to take action regarding housing problems. Among other things,
the document includes calls to recognise and enforce the ‘right to adequate
housing as a fundamental human right’73, to invest in social, public, aordable
and energy-ecient housing, to reduce aordability problems, to end home-
lessness across the EU by 2030,
and to ensure that EU funding does
not facilitate housing and urban de-
velopments that lead to any kind of
exclusion.
During the discussion of the report,
the Commission has reiterated its
commitment to end homelessness,
improve energy eciency, reduce
71 European Commission. Commission proposes transformation of EU economy and society to meet climate
ambitions.
72 ibid.
73 European Parliament (2021).Decent and aordable housing for all.p.14.
energy poverty, and support investment in social, aordable housing. Home-
lessness and housing aordability are also part of the European Semester’s
country-specific recommendations.
But so far, the Commission has not
shown willingness to expand its pow-
ers in the field of housing: this could,
for example, include tackling hous-
ing segregation or the wider prob-
lems of rising house prices and
rents more eectively. It could also
entail addressing issues amplified
by EU fiscal policy — such as the
financialisation of housing, the rise
of short-term tourist rentals or the fall of public spending on social housing.74
Fiscal policy concessions adopted to cushion the impact of the coronavirus
epidemic could theoretically give EU Member States more leeway to invest in
social housing.75 However, it is doubtful whether such concessions will have
an impact in Member States — particularly those in Eastern Europe, — where
there is no strong institutional backing for social housing.
2.4.1 . Expert Organisations
The European Union supports a number of organisations and partnerships
that can influence Member States’ housing policy practices.
The European Regional Development Fund runs the URBACT programme
which promotes cooperation between cities to develop integrated solutions
to urban problems. In the field of housing, for example, it has mapped out a
series of policy instruments and practical tools to enforce the right to housing.
URBACT’s ‘Ending homelessness’ task force supports cities in applying the
74 OECD (2020). Social Housing: A Key Part of Past and Future Housing Policy.
75 Housing Europe (2021).The State of Housing In Europe 2021.
Own-initiative reports are a way for
MEPs to influence the EU agenda
on a wide range of issues and influ-
ence the early stages of the legisla-
tive cycle. This can include propos-
als to the Commission regarding the
content and focus of legislation. The
Commission is bound to respond to
these proposals.
The European Citizens’ Initiative
(ECI) allows EU citizens to ask the
European Commission to propose
EU legislation regarding a specific
issue. A total of one million signa-
tures must be collected from at
least seven Member States in order
to activate the mechanism.

THE EU FRAMEWORK FOR THE REDUCTION OF HOUSING POVERTY
25
‘Housing First’ model and in collecting data with the aim of eectively ending
homelessness — rather than just managing it.
As part of the EU’s regional and urban policy, a number of cross-sectoral
and cross-governmental partnerships are facilitating the exchange of expe-
rience between cities and the development of EU regional and urban policy.
For example, under the EU Urban Agenda, 12 action plans on urban issues
were established, with a focus on better regulation, knowledge and financing;
these were primarily implemented through the production of technical mate-
rial. Housing was included amongst the 12 Action Plans: its main focus was
on improving state support (i.e. to increase investment in social housing) and
the dissemination of good practices regarding aordable housing. The Urban
Poverty Task Force focused, among other things, on homelessness and the
improvement of neglected urban areas. One of the priorities of the Energy
Transition Action Plan was the promotion of ‘one-stop-shops’ dedicated to
building renovation.
The Energy Poverty Observatory — initiated and supported by the European
Commission— aims to help Member States fight energy poverty by providing
information, data and good practices.
FEAN S TA , a policy institute for organisations working with the homeless,
contributes to research on homelessness at the EU level and provides policy
recommendations.
In addition to EU-funded partnerships and organisations, there are also a
number of independent advocacy organisations working to improve housing.
Housing Europe represents social, cooperative and public housing associa-
tions, while the International Union of Tenants represents tenants’ interests.
Eurocities is a network of European cities; it aims to represent the voice of
cities in EU policy-making, facilitate the exchange of experience between
cities and disseminate information on EU resources and opportunities. In the
field of housing, it seeks to push the EU to invest in the social housing sector
by increasing stock, holding private housing developers accountable and en-
couraging innovation in new, aordable housing.
3. Financial support
The EU supports the fulfilment of its objectives by providing financial resourc-
es, setting up a legal framework and monitoring developments. Given the lack
of legally enforceable elements in areas linked to housing, financial support and
policy coordinations are the most important instruments at the EU’s disposal in this
field. EU financial support is largely allocated on the basis of principles defined
within the Multiannual Financial Framework, which is ratified every 7years. In
addition to the funds covering the 2021–2027 period, the European Instrument
for Recovery (NextGenerationEU) funds will be available to Member States
between 2021 and 2024. On the basis of common pillars, these were intro-
duced in response to the coronavirus epidemic and are intended to mitigate
the socioeconomic problems it has caused, as well as to support the green
and digital transitions. The funding provided by the two financial frameworks
will complement each other in certain areas; a total of 30% must be used for
climate action.
In the continuity of the previous funding period’s objectives related to energy
eciency, urban development and social issues, Member States can allocate
resources to energy-ecient renovation of buildings, improving the housing
situation of people living in marginalised areas or tackling homelessness (in-
cluding the above-mentioned ‘Housing First’ programmes). In order to meet
the EU’s ambitious cli mate targets — inclu ding energy eciency targets and those
linked to the Renovation Wave initiative — increased funding will be available from
2021 onwards for energy ecient renovations. For such investments to be real-
ised, the onus nevertheless remains on Member States, as they must prioritise
energy eciency projects during budgeting. The main EU funds that can be
used to renovate buildings and improve housing opportunities for vulnerable
groups are outlined below.

THE EU FRAMEWORK FOR THE REDUCTION OF HOUSING POVERTY
26
3.1. Multiannual Financial Framework 2021–2027
The financial framework for 2021–2027 amounts to €1210.9 billion, with the
bulk of the resources concentrated under the ‘cohesion, resilience and values’
and ‘natural resources and environment’ headings.
In cooperation with national and regional authorities, 76% of EU funds will
be channelled to beneficiaries through five Structural and Investment Funds
(ESIF). Member States set out in their Operational Programmes how these
resources will be spent during the programming period.76 Of the five EU funds,
the European Regional Development Fund (ERDF) and the European Social
Fund (ESF) play a major role in regards to housing.
The ERDF is dedicated to the reduction of economic, social and spatial dis-
parities in the EU. It aims to improve housing conditions (mainly through en-
ergy-ecient renovations) and by funding projects that advance the situation
of people living in marginalised circumstances (for example through the inte-
gration of people living in segregated or isolated environments.)77
The ESF’s focus is employment, education and training — but part of its re-
sources will also be used to fight poverty and promote social inclusion. For
the 2021–2027 period, one of the fund’s main priorities is the reduction of
child poverty — which includes the provision of adequate housing for children.
25%of the Fund will be allocated to social inclusion programs, including ser-
vices for the homeless and support for housing solutions.
In order to access ERDF and ESF funding under the ‘Active Inclusion’ EU
strategy, Member States must provide an overview of the services they oer
to homeless and vulnerable people.78
76 Directorate-General for Regional and Urban Policy (European Commission) et al. Housing Investments
Supported by the European Regional Development Fund 2007-2013.
77 Directorate-General for Regional and Urban Policy (European Commission) et al. Housing Investments
Supported by the European Regional Development Fund 2007-2013.
78 FEANTSA (2021). FEANTSA Statement: Social Fund Agreement: Opportunities for investing in addressing
homelessness.
Figure 16: Resources of the Multiannual Financial Framework 2021-2027 by area.
Data source: European Commission.
1. Single market, innovation and
digital
2. Cohesion, r
esilience and values
3. Natural resources and
environment
4. Migration and border
management
5. Security and defence
6. Neighbourhood and the world
7. European public administration
0 50 100 150 200 250 300 350 400 450
billion EUR (current prices)

THE EU FRAMEWORK FOR THE REDUCTION OF HOUSING POVERTY
27
3.2. European Instrument for Recovery
(NextGenerationEU)
NextGenerationEU is a €806.9 billion economic recovery package that sup-
ports Member States adversely impacted by the coronavirus epidemic; it also
promotes digital and green transformation, as well as job creation.
Recovery and Resilience Facility (RRF)
This instrument is the central and largest component of NextGenerationEU,
with a total of €723 billion in funding (consisting of loans and €338 billion worth
of grants) The fund’s priorities include energy ecient renovations, the dis-
semination of renewable energy, but also digitalisation, training and sustainable
transport.79 30% of the fund’s resources must be allocated to climate action.
Member States can apply for funding based on their Recovery and Resilience
Plans and in response to the challenges identified in the country-specific rec-
ommendations of the European Semester; these must be allocated to projects
that will contribute to an inclusive and sustainable post-COVID recovery.
While some Member States plan to make significant investments in residential
energy eciency through the Recovery Fund, others — including Hungary —
have minimal plans in this regard.80
Other NextGenerationEU resources also provide intervention opportunities in
the realm of housing. The above-mentioned Just Transition Mechanism provides
support to the regions most aected by the green transition — for instance
coal regions — in order to mitigate its socio-economic impact. Investment
into residential energy eciency is, for example, an excellent tool to facil-
itate the transition — as it simultaneously reduces the energy demand of
buildings (and therefore their dependence on fossil fuels), creates jobs and
promotes the switch to clean heating. Alongside this mechanism, the EU pro-
vides €17.5 billion directly to the concerned regions through the Just Transition
Fun d (JTF ). In addition, budgetary guarantees and a public sector loan scheme
79 European Commission. Recovery and Resilience Facility
80 Lakatos, E. (2021). Overview of relevant parts in the national Recovery Plans
Figure 17: Breakdown of NextGenerationEU funds.
Data source: European Commission.
RRF* non-r
epayable grants
RRF* loans
ReactEU
Horizon Europe
InvestEU
Rural Development
JTF**
RescEU
0 50 100 150 200 250 300 350 400
338
385
50
5
6
8
10
2
billion EUR (current prices)
* Recovery and Resilience Facility
** Just Transition Funds

THE EU FRAMEWORK FOR THE REDUCTION OF HOUSING POVERTY
28
also contribute to the implementation of the Equitable Transition.81 InvestEU
provides budgetary guarantees for specific investments, including energy-ef-
ficient building renovation and aordable social housing.82 Finally, the LIFE
Clean Energy Transition sub-programme has a budget of nearly €1 billion to help
overcome the socio-economic hurdles impeding the transition to renewables.
In addition to the 7-year budget and NextGenerationEU, other financial in-
struments are available to promote energy eciency. One of these is the EU
Modernisation Fund, which allocates 2% of EU quota trading revenues to the
10 lowest-income EU Member States (this includes Hungary); among other
things, these can be used to invest in energy eciency.
The ELENA programme — managed by the European Investment Bank (EIB)
and financed by the Commission — helps local and regional authorities pre-
pare large-scale energy eciency and renewable energy projects83, while the
JESSICA initiative helps fund sustainable investment in urban areas (including
energy eciency improvements).
81 European Commission. The Just Transition Mechanism: making sure no one is left behind.
82
Council of the European Union. InvestEU: Council greenlights provisional agreement reached with the
Parliament.
83 European Investment Bank (2013). Promoting Energy Eciency.
4. The application of EU housing policies
inHungary
Poor housing quality is a major problem in Hungary; while it is widespread,
it particularly aects households with children and Roma communities. The
average age of buildings is high and their energy eciency is low. Energy
expenditure remains relatively high despite reduced energy prices — which
means many households find themselves with utility bills in arrears. The prob-
lem of energy poverty is compounded by the polluting and expensive use of
biomass by low-income groups. The dramatic increase in housing prices and
rents over the last decade has exceeded the EU average. Given the enhanced
role played by private investors in the housing market and state support facili-
tating the purchase of homes by the middle class, further increases in housing
price are likely. In the meanwhile, housing subsidies for low-income earners
remain negligible and — instead of being supported and expanded — the
social housing sector is under threat from privatisation. In addition, the ending
(or at least significant reduction) of housing segregation and homelessness
remain major challenges.
What follows is an overview of the housing interventions financed by EU funds
during the 2014-2020 programming period that were designed to address
these issues. We then outline the picture that emerges from the draft strate-
gies for the post-2020 period in the field of housing, with a specific focus on
energy ecient renovations and energy poverty.
4.1. 2014–2020
Social inclusion programmes
During the 2014-2020 period, Hungary used ERDF and ESF funds to imple-
ment a series of complex programmes within the Operational Programmes
framework to address issues linked to neglected and segregated areas. These
programmes addressed infrastructural and social problems in segregated
areas through measures related to employment, education and community
development; in the process, they aimed to facilitate energy-ecient housing

THE EU FRAMEWORK FOR THE REDUCTION OF HOUSING POVERTY
29
renovation, promote integrated housing solutions and improve public spaces.
Between 2014 and 2020, complex programmes to tackle segregated living
situations were implemented in approximately 100 municipalities, with urban
regeneration programmes implemented in additional locations. Overall these
programmes have only marginally alleviated housing-related issues, as only a
fraction of aected households have seen an improvement in their situation. In
addition, local conflicts are fanned by fears and diculties related to ending
housing segregation.84
Energy efficiency programmes
The 2015 National Energy Strategy for Buildings envisaged the renovation of
700,000 homes within 5 years to achieve the 2020 energy savings targets.
85
While the operational programmes were originally intended to provide non-re-
payable grants for the energy-ecient renovation of residential buildings, the
government eventually redirected the funds towards the renovation of public
buildings, and launched an energy eciency loan scheme instead.
Under the energy eciency loan scheme, 23,869 renovations were granted
subsidised loans over a period of four and a half years86: this resulted in the
renovation of around 0.5% of the housing stock between 2017 and 2021. Ato-
tal of HUF 71 billion was disbursed in loans. The average application amount
was HUF 3.2 million with an average franchise of HUF 415,525.
87
The average
net income of loan applicants during the loan application period (Q1 2017-2021)
was HUF 289 489.88 As the government eventually withdrew non-reimburs-
able funding for energy ecient renovation, many households were unable
to undertake renovations.
Hungary has used part of its ETS revenues to invest in residential energy
eciency through the ‘Warmth of Home’ programme. The programme sup-
ported complex building renovations, the modernisation of gas and district
84 Autonómia Alapítvány et al. (2019). Civil Society Report on the Implementation of the National Roma
Integration Strategies in Hungary, p.89.
85 ÉMI Kft. and Ministry of National Development (2015) National Building Energy Strategy.
86 Data provided by the Hungarian Development Bank (MFB).
87 ibid.
88 ibid.
heating systems, the replacement of windows, doors and large household
appliances. With the exception of the large household appliance programme,
other investments were only covered through reimbursements — making this
form of assistance unsuitable for low-income families. Due to limited funding,
the budget was quickly depleted. The number of complex energy eciency
interventions carried out under the auspices of the programme was negligible
compared to the size of the building stock in need of renovation.
With the exception of the Energy Eciency Loan Programme and the ‘Warmth
of Home’ Programme, no centrally supported energy eciency investments
were made. Similarly to other housing subsidies, these two programmes’ con-
ditions made it dicult for low-income residents to access them. While a
precise statement regarding the renovation targets set in the 2015 Building
Energy Strategy has yet to be made, it is clear that these programmes have
not contributed significantly to the achievement of these targets.
4.2. 2021–2027
The following is an overview of what can be expected in the 2021–2027 pe-
riod in terms of housing renovation and energy poverty; this assessment is
based on the available strategic and planning documents (National Energy
and Climate Plan, Long-Term Renovation Strategy, Recovery and Resilience
Plan, Operational Programme Plans).
National Energy and Climate Plan
The Hungarian National Energy and Climate Plan (NECP) describes how Hun-
gary will contribute to the EU’s 2030 climate and energy targets (for more
details see 2.3.1 Clean Energy for All Europeans Package). The document
states that from 2020 onwards residential building energy investments will
be made on a market basis, within the framework of the Energy Eciency
Obligation Scheme.89
89 Innovation and Technology Ministry (ITM) (2020): Hungarian National Energy and Climate Plan, p.50.

THE EU FRAMEWORK FOR THE REDUCTION OF HOUSING POVERTY
30
In terms of household use of renewable energy sources, the aim is that ‘by
2030, at least 200,000 households will have an average of 4 kW of roof-mount-
ed solar panels’.
90
To promote ecient domestic cooling and heating, non-re-
payable subsidies will facilitate ‘the use of heat pumps and the combustion
of biomass in ecient individual heating systems’ as well as the installation
of decentralised district heating plants.
91
It nevertheless remains unclear how
many households will benefit from investments in heating systems. There
is also no indication as to whether additional energy eciency investments
(insulation, replacement of windows and doors) will be funded in conjunction
with the installation of solar panels and the replacement of heating systems.
The Hungarian NECP contains few concrete targets and policies to reduce
energy poverty and promote energy eciency in households. NECPs should
include energy poverty reduction targets and specific timeframes; in lieu of
clear targets and timeframes, the Hungarian NECP’s subsection on energy
poverty reduction only identifies large families and single pensioners living in
small settlements as target groups for energy poverty interventions. The rest
of the chapter is taken up by an account of the successes of the governments’
utility cost reduction policy and the transformation of the Mátra power plant.
The NECP lists a total of five interventions to reduce energy poverty. It aims to
cover the increase in energy costs through the creation of service packages
for low-income households. In addition, a survey is planned in order to create
targeted programmes for the improvement of vulnerable consumers’ situation.
The most tangible instrument outlined by the Hungarian NECP is to ‘extend the
prepayment system for households living in buildings that are dilapidated or
unsuitable for renovation’
92
; in doing so, it aims to ensure electric heating for at
least one room for families with young children. This would presumably be an
extension of the investments in solar power launched under the Catching-up
Communities programme, whereby a given amount of the income generated
by community solar panels is distributed to disadvantaged families with young
90 Innovation and Technology Ministry (ITM) (2020): Hungarian National Energy and Climate Plan, p.82.
91 ibid, p.84
92 ibid.
children. This amount — charged to families’ prepaid accounts — could be
used to heat one room with a heating panel provided by the scheme.
The Energy Eciency Obligation Scheme will also aim to support households
in need through retrofitting and the promotion of decentralised heating solu-
tions and electricity generation. While details are not provided, these last two
points may refer to the heating solutions already in place under the Catch-
ing-up Communities programme and the EU’s Recovery and Resilience Facility.
Under this scheme, assistance will be provided for households to install solar
panels, heat pumps, electric heating panels and to replace windows. Although
‘upgrading’ (korszerűsítés) is mentioned in the Hungarian NECP, the word dis-
appears in the English version. No further details are given.
In addition, information programmes are planned, which could be combined
with minor energy eciency investments.
While the low energy eciency of buildings is a major cause of energy poverty,
the NECP does not list renovation programmes geared towards energy eciency
among its policies to reduce energy poverty. The subsections on energy poverty
do not report any substantive findings on the root causes of energy poverty
(building stock or energy sources etc.) nor do they justify the selection of
specific target groups. The policies and interventions presented are hardly
substantial: they address the problem of energy poverty only partially and
superficially, without providing adequate solutions to these issues.
Long-Term Renovation Strategy (LTRS)
In order to meet energy and climate targets, Member States are also re-
quired to produce a Long-Term Renovation Strategy (LTRS), which sets out
how they will renovate their buildings to be highly ecient and carbon neu-
tral by 2050. These strategies form an integral part of the National Energy
and Climate Plans (NECPs). Each country’s Long-Term Renovation Strategy
must contain a description of their building stock; it must also list policies
that encourage cost-eective deep renovation, the renovation of the worst
performing buildings, tackling energy poverty and resolving potential conflicts
of interest between tenants and owners regarding renovation. The strategy
also includes sections on smart technologies and training tailored for both

THE EU FRAMEWORK FOR THE REDUCTION OF HOUSING POVERTY
31
the energy eciency and construction sectors. The strategy should include
roadmaps with measurable indicators and milestones assessing the progress
made towards a decarbonised building stock by 2050.
The Hungarian Long-Term Renovation Strategy was adopted by the govern-
ment in June 2021 (more than a year after the original deadline).93 The Strategy
aims to increase the total renovation rate of residential buildings from an an-
nual 1% (the current rate) to 3% by 2030. We examine below the document’s
chapter on residential renovation and the worst performing buildings.
The chapter on cost-eective deep renovations presents the elements to be
used in such renovations. Among the government policies it lists that support
deep renovation, the document mentions the existing Home Renovation Sub-
sidy — even though its current form does not specifically encourage deep
renovation. The policy itself also has a discriminatory nature: it is near impos-
sible for low-income earners to benefit from it and childless households are
not eligible for it. Although the document mentions the possibility of extending
the policy’s scope to ‘financial incentives and subsidies to improve the ener-
gy eciency of buildings’, this commitment is not suciently concrete and
remains dicult to quantify. Among other potential incentives, the document
includes awareness raising, the establishment of a National Energy Eciency
Network and a green finance product finder. However, the LTRS does not
include figures regarding the cost of these renovation packages, the number
of homes that would need to undergo such renovations to reach the annual
renovation target (3% by 2030), and how the cost would be covered. No
specific reference is made to the creation of a financial fund or to a specific
programme to support energy ecient renovation.
The chapter on the worst performing buildings includes a table that classi-
fies them with assorted code numbers; this is followed by a (partial) textual
explanation of which building type these code numbers are assigned to. The
worst-performing buildings are adobe houses as well as detached houses
93
eGov Newsletter (blog) (2021): 134 3/2021 (2.VI.) Government Decision on the adoption of the necessary
Long-Term Regnovation Strategy to meet the eligibility conditions for the payment of cohesion funding
for the period 2021-2027 under (EU) Directive 2018/844.
built before 198994; no information is provided on the households living in
such buildings. The document does not consider adobe houses to be worthy of
renovation given their low market value, the specific technical needs their renovation
necessitates and because ‘most of them have presumably been abandoned or are
unoccupied95 since the NÉeR2 survey was conducted’.96 Yet, the assumption that
most adobe houses have been abandoned is not supported by figures. According to
the 2016 microcensus data, 13% of total dwellings — that is c. 500,000homes
— were inhabited adobe houses. One must therefore ask why the strategy
neglects a significant slice of the worst performing housing stock, and does
not provide their inhabitants with an alternative (e.g. a mobility plan) if their
houses are no longer considered worth renovating.
Regarding the situation of vulnerable households, the document lists the three
main causes of energy poverty (income-related problems, high energy prices
and low energy eciency). It also notes that these problems mainly aect
large families living together in detached houses situated in small settlements,
as well as pensioners living alone either in apartment buildings or detached
houses.97 The term ‘energy poverty’ does not appear in the document.
The document does not give any numbers regarding the proportion of worst
performing buildings the Strategy aims to renovate; the rate, the funding and
the intensity of the process also go unmentioned.
Energy Efficiency Obligation Scheme (EEOS)
The EU’s Energy Eciency Directive requires Member States to promote
energy eciency targets through the introduction of either an energy e-
ciency obligation scheme or alternative policies. Hungary’s Energy Eciency
Obligation (EEO) was adopted in 2020 and came into force in 2021.
98
It oblig-
es electricity and gas traders and suppliers (as well as fuel sellers) to take
measures that will lead to energy savings for both industrial and residential
94 The code number used by the document for the classification of building types does not consistently
allow for a proper identification.
95 ITM (2021): Long-term renovation strategy on the basis of (EU) Directive 2018/844 with the aim to meet
the conditionality that will allow access to cohesion funds for the 2021-2027 period.
96 National Building Energy System 2 (NÉeR2) 2015 - ÉMI Nonprofit Kft.
97 ibid.
98 Law LVII of 2015 on Energy Eciency - Collection of Legislation in Force.

THE EU FRAMEWORK FOR THE REDUCTION OF HOUSING POVERTY
32
end-users. They can also fulfil the obligation by paying an energy eciency
levy, with proceeds primarily going to energy eciency interventions among
energy poor households (defined in this case as households for whom the cost
of heating their home to 20°C and producing hot water exceeds 25% of their
annual household income.)99 Through the EEOS, the Hungarian government
entrusts market actors with the financing of energy eciency investments.
While the scheme is expected to result in significant investments100, it is still
unclear what proportion will be invested in residential buildings, how much will
be raised and allocated to households in need, and how they will benefit from
these investments. Given the lack of funding for the energy ecient renovations
of buildings occupied by low-income households, the scheme could be used for
this purpose. It could also be used to replace household appliances with more
ecient ones — as the current household appliance replacement programmes
do not facilitate the inclusion of disadvantaged households. The scheme could
also contribute to the installation of communal renewable energy sources to
cover the electricity needs of low-income households.
Operational Programmes
Among the drafts prepared as part of the Hungarian Operational Programmes
for the 2021-2027 period, the draft for the Environment and Energy Eciency
Plus Operational Programme (KEHOP+) contains the elements pertaining to
energy eciency. Regarding residential buildings, KEHOP+ mentions the re-
placement of heating equipment and the transfer of individual and community
heating/cooling systems to renewables sources.101 In addition, it will provide
support to energy service companies (ESCOs) and companies aected by the
EEO framework for the implementation of energy eciency interventions in
residential buildings.
102
The draft sets no exact target for the number of house-
holds targeted by the programme; but based on energy eciency investment
targets, it can be deduced that a total of 31 865 households would improve
their energy performance by 2029 through KEHOP+ interventions.
103
This
would mean that — even with the support of substantial EU funds supporting
99 Law LVII of 2015 on Energy Eciency - Collection of Legislation in Force.
100 Felsmann, B. (2020): Olyan rendszer jön januártól, amely pár év múlva energiaár-emelést feltételez | G7
– Gazdasági sztorik érthetően.
101 Environment and Energy Eciency Plus Operational Programme (KEHOP Plus) | Széchenyi Plan Plus.
102 ibid.
103 ibid. p.61
energy eciency — 0.7% of the total housing stock would be renewed over
9 years. This 0.1% annual renovation rate is a far cry from the the Long-Term
Renewal Strategy target of an annual 3% by 2030.
Under KEHOP+, the Just Transition Fund for the counties of Baranya, Bor-
sod-Abaúj-Zemplén and Heves will help reduce the social costs of the transi-
tion to a climate-neutral economy. While target figures are not provided here
either, the document mentions the replacement of residential coal burning with
environmentally friendly methods, as well as complementary energy eciency
interventions.
Under the Human Resources Development Operational Programme Plus, support
for marginalised communities is planned in the form of housing upgrades and
rental housing subsidies for a total of 4,000 people up to 2029.104 In addition,
the programme aims to provide dormitories for students.
Recovery and Resilience Facility
Member States were required to submit their Recovery and Resilience Plans
(RRPs) in spring 2021. Hungary’s Recovery and Resilience Plan aims to reno-
vate 2,500 dwellings and build 600 new social housing units by 2026 under
the Catching-up Communities framework. It also aims to install 26,500 KWp of
renewable community energy generation capacity in the most disadvantaged
settlements.105
The funds could provide 34,920 households with solar panels and/or heating
systems renovation.
106
Such interventions are, however, extremely expensive;
in the case of electric heaters, they are not even ecient without a more sub-
stantial modernisation of the whole building itself.107 Apart from the replace-
ment of windows and doors, the programme would not make any significant
improvements in terms of the energy eciency of buildings.
104 Human Resources Development Operational Programme Plus (EFOP Plus) | Széchenyi Plan Plus p.61
105 Recovery and Resilience Facility (RRF) | Széchenyi Plan Plus.
106 ibid.
107 MTVSZ (2021). Fájó hiányok a magyar költési tervben energetikai-éghajlatvédelmi szemmel.

THE EU FRAMEWORK FOR THE REDUCTION OF HOUSING POVERTY
33
As it does not support complex renovations, the support scheme outlined in the RRP
is not only a missed o pportunity to significantly redu ce the energy demand of build-
ings, but it als o has a lock-in eect: indeed, there is little cha nce that a household will
subsequently carry out the insulation works that state funds did not cover. Studies
examining building renovation programmes have highlighted that deep reno-
vations of residential buildings108(including detached houses109) provide the
highest return and are the most cost-eective. They have also shown that —
although the financial return is lower — the insulation of building envelopes is
by far the most energy-saving investment.110 It is thus precisely support for the
element with the highest savings that has been left out from the investments
planned under the Recovery and Resilience Facility. In addition, among the
planned heating options, the cost of a heat pump is very high and the ecien-
cy of heating panels is not particularly good. The installation of heat pumps
would only result in substantial savings if the energy demand of the building
were also significantly reduced. It must also be noted that electrified heating
systems also entail financial risks for households, as they can sell solar energy
produced in summer at a lower price than energy bought from the grid at a
higher price in winter.111 Complex renovation would also significantly reduce
the cost risk for low-income households. Moreover, the proposed intervention
does not take into account the specificities of dierent building types: com-
plemented by insulation, even a cheaper technology than the one proposed
could achieve more significant emission reductions and energy savings.
108
Ürge-Vorsatz, D. et al. (2010). Employment Impacts of a Large- Scale Deep Building Energy Retrofit
Programme in Hungary.
109 Szórádi, T. (2020). Lakóépületek Felújítási Koncepciói.
110 ibid.
111 MTVSZ (2021). Fájó hiányok a magyar költési tervben energetikai-éghajlatvédelmi szemmel.
5. Conclusions
Both in the EU and in Hungary, a range of problems related to the aordability
and quality of housing aects a large proportion of households: house prices
and rents are rising much faster than incomes, many properties are energy
inecient (and therefore expensive to heat) and overcrowding, low comfort
levels and dampness take a significant toll on households’ quality of life.
While housing policy in the EU is a national competence, EU intervention can
still have a positive impact on households in a number of areas. Regulations,
policies and support instruments related to energy eciency — as well as
to spatial and urban developments — can make a significant contribution
to the overall improvement of the housing stock’s energy eciency and the
housing situation of vulnerable and marginalised groups. Such interventions
can, for example, take the form of programmes targeting urban renewal, the
development of segregated areas or projects providing housing for homeless
people. Through active dialogue and the provision of resources, the EU can
also encourage Member States to act on energy eciency, energy poverty,
urban and regional development, and social inclusion. Since 2018, EU legis-
lation regarding energy (enforceable through dialogue between the EU and
the Member States) has included the fight against energy poverty as an ex-
pectation; additionally, more resources will be available for building renovation
from 2021 onwards as part of the bloc’s fight against climate change. While
some eorts have been made to address the root causes of rising housing
prices and rents (e.g. financialisation, macroeconomic eects), this has yet to
be taken up substantially by the EU – which justifies its stance by reiterating
that housing is a national competence.
In Hungary, house prices have risen sharply compared to the EU average;
energy consumption is among the highest in the bloc (contrary to EU trends, it
has even increased in recent years); and the proportion of poor quality housing
is high. Despite this, Hungary does not spend any of the EU funds allocated
for energy eciency on the complex energy-ecient renovation of residential
buildings. Rather, it has left residential renovations in the hands of the market,
without guaranteeing that these investments will actually be carried out. It is

THE EU FRAMEWORK FOR THE REDUCTION OF HOUSING POVERTY
34
currently still unclear if central funding will be made available for much needed
complex building renovations. The Hungarian government’s strategies do not
appear to ensure that residential buildings in general – including the worst
performing ones – will be renovated at a sucient rate, nor that the number
of households aected by energy poverty will be significantly reduced. The
plans outlined in the Hungarian Operational Programmes also fail to exploit
opportunities to improve the housing situation of vulnerable groups. The el-
ements of the above-mentioned strategies and programmes pertaining to
housing and energy ecient renovation are superficial, show little ambition
(objectives are either vague or entirely missing); furthermore, almost all de-
tails on planned interventions are lacking (resource requirements, financing,
responsibility, timing). While Hungary is grappling with a poor housing situa-
tion – compared to the EU average —, this suggests that its government is
not seeking to significantly improve it through programmes targeting energy
eciency and other renovations.
6. Proposals
6.1. EU
Affordability
Several instruments could be used to reduce the increase in house prices and
rents; these should be designed to respond to the macro- and micro-economic
processes that are driving price increases. For example, data collection on
short-term rentals or real estate investment can help local and national author-
ities gain a better overview of the situation and regulate accordingly. Existing
– and future – channels for the exchange of experiences related to real estate
investment or rent controls can help develop appropriate regulations. There
is also a need to encourage and increase both EU and public investment in
aordable social housing. This requires the creation of a strong institutional
framework in places where social housing is scarce and poorly managed.
Energy efficiency
In order for all Member States to achieve the EU’s ambitious building renovation
targets, it is necessary to set more specific and enforceable targets for the
renovation of residential buildings – particularly regarding the worst performing
ones. The current legislation makes it dicult to hold accountable countries
with little ambition for renovation. To ensure that renovation is not limited to
high-income households, a share of EU funds dedicated to building renovation
should be allocated to the renovation of the worst performing buildings.
Energy poverty
A meaningful reduction in energy poverty requires that the existing (and wel-
come) legal requirements become legally enforceable – thus guaranteeing a
fair energy transition. If Member States are to tackle energy poverty by taking
advantage of the opportunities oered by the energy transition, stronger guar-
antees than those currently in place are needed. It is also necessary to condi-
tion the availability of EU funding on their use as resources to alleviate energy
poverty. For example, the use of funds allocated for energy eciency and re-
newable energy should be subject to accountable conditions: a proportionate

THE EU FRAMEWORK FOR THE REDUCTION OF HOUSING POVERTY
35
share of the funds could go to energy poor households and the osetting of
the social impact of measures designed to fight climate change (carbon tax,
the extension of quota trading). Habitat for Humanity Hungary and the Center
for the Study of Democracy (Romania) have assembled a set of proposals
on how the European Union should address energy poverty in Central and
Eastern Europe in order to achieve common European climate goals.
Housing quality
The energy ecient renovation of the worst performing buildings would also
significantly reduce housing quality problems. This is why it is necessary for
the EU to push Member States to make accountable and enforceable commit-
ments regarding such renovations. The resources allocated for this purpose
must also cover essential the infrastructure interventions on which energy
eciency interventions depend. Funding could also be used to promote the
renovation of low-quality housing, for example by mandating that a proportion
of energy eciency subsidies be spent on the worst performing buildings.
Segregation
Tackling housing segregation should be a priority for both social and regional
development policy. The eradication of segregated, overcrowded conditions
and the provision of integrated and adequate housing should not only be a
stated policy objective; it should also be a condition for other urban and re-
gional developments. As in the case of educational segregation, urban policy
decisions and practices that lead to (and perpetuate) active territorial exclu-
sion must be tackled in a meaningful way. The progress of Member States
in tackling territorial segregation should be monitored. Greater financial and
technical support is needed to enable local and national actors to significantly
reduce the number of people living in segregated conditions.
Homelessness
The implementation of policies that limit the increase in housing prices and
rents, and increase the number of aordable social housing (particularly for
high risk groups) must be encouraged. Such policies have a track record of
reducing the risk of homelessness linked to institutional factors (hospitals,
prisons, public care) and individual ones (appropriate treatment of mental
health problems, addictions); they also facilitate housing solutions that lead
out of homelessness. At the EU level, action should be taken against forced
and illegal evictions.
6.2. Hungary
Hungarian housing policy provides generous support to middle-class fami-
lies with children to access housing and to renovate their homes. The avail-
able subsidies do little (if anything) to alleviate the diculties of low-income
households in either accessing or maintaining housing. Despite the possibility
of developing a subsidy scheme from EU sources, there are no predictable,
widely available subsidies for the energy-ecient renovation of residential
buildings. The pace at which the issue of segregated housing is tackled is slow
compared to the scale of the problem. Regarding homelessness, there has
been no significant progress in terms of prevention measures or exit support;
instead, it has been criminalised.
Affordability
To alleviate diculties regarding housing aordability, the focus should shift
from subsidies for the middle class to support schemes targeting low-income
earners; this should be accompanied by a crackdown on predatory investment
in housing. An increase in the supply of long-term rental housing could also
contribute to the reduction of rents. Possible ways to increase such a supply
include reasonable restrictions on short-term accommodation (e.g. Airbnb;
taxing property that is either left unused or used solely for non-residential pur-
poses is another option –alongside incentives to bring such properties to the
housing market.) Increasing the share of social housing, housing managed by
non-profits and dormitories will have a double eect: it will simultaneously re-
duce the market’s hold on housing and oer an increased number of aordable
options to the population. In response to the ongoing crisis in the rental sector,
Habitat for Humanity Hungary has put together a detailed set of proposals in
the framework of the ‘Black Housing Campaign’; it can be found here.
Energy efficiency
In order for energy ecient renovations to take place on the scale that is
needed, a proper framework should be provided by the state. If the 3% annual

THE EU FRAMEWORK FOR THE REDUCTION OF HOUSING POVERTY
36
renovation target is to be achieved, strategic documents like the Long Term
Renovation Strategy should clearly outline how many buildings can be reno-
vated each year, how much investment is required and what form of financing
is feasible (depending on the financial situation of the occupants). A renova-
tion fund and a one-stop-shop model should be set up to provide financing
schemes targeting a variety of households through the allocation of public and
EU funds. The scheme should include both reimbursable grants to encourage
renovation for higher income earners and non-reimbursable grants – covering
at minima the initial investment costs – for lower income earners.
Housing quality
Substantial steps could be made in tackling the issue of housing quality if the
government viewed the renovation of the worst performing buildings as an op-
portunity – rather than a sub-heading to be ticked o an EU guideline. A large
range of already available EU funds could be used to finance a well-designed
and targeted building renovation programme, possibly supplemented by either
quota revenues or reimbursable funds. A complex renovation of the worst per-
forming buildings would simultaneously save energy and solve many problems
related to housing quality. By providing the population with healthier housing
conditions, the country’s spending on health would also be reduced, as the
likelihood or falling ill, seeking medical care or missing school or work would be
lessened; this would be especially true in the case of children and the elderly.
Energy poverty
EU resources allocated to the energy transition must be harnessed to tackle
energy poverty. A first step in this process would be to identify the house-
holds aected by energy poverty and address their problems with targeted
interventions. This should be accompanied by a wider strategy addressing
the root causes of energy poverty.
Energy-ecient investments should be implemented to ensure that the worst
performing buildings are renovated or replaced by low-consumption housing.
The renovation of the worst-performing building stock should also ensure that
the situation of households living in detached houses is improved. Heating
modernisation programmes should be developed to provide a cost-eec-
tive solution for households relying on poor quality equipment; this should be
implemented as part of complex (even staged) renovations. Such programmes
should also take into account the characteristics of the building types.
Energy costs for low-income households need to be reduced through ener-
gy-ecient investments and the use of renewable energy sources. Installing
solar panels, for example, can cover part of a household’s electricity costs.
However – in the case of heating electrification programmes – a prior assess-
ment should be made to determine whether the solar panels would actually
cover the estimated energy demand and cost of electric heating. As they
create jobs for local residents and small and medium-sized enterprises, la-
bour-intensive, complex energy-ecient renovations can also have a positive
impact on the incomes of energy-poor households and the labour market in
deprived areas.
The involvement of local actors and targeted information campaigns should
be essential components of renovation programmes. The establishment of
one-stop shops for renovation – where planning, financing, implementation
and follow-ups can be eciently managed – would be an essential tool in
such a process.
Segregation
The programmes for 2021–2027 should have included the objective of reduc-
ing housing segregation in a meaningful – and measurable – way. The num-
ber of households reached by desegregation projects should be drastically
increased. Lessons learnt from projects implemented during the previous
programming period should have also been taken into account when devising
the 2021–27 programmes. Methodologies derived from previous experiences
should be provided to those implementing these projects.
Homelessness
Abolishing legislation that criminalises homeless people must be an utmost
priority. It is necessary to eliminate unlawful evictions and evictions carried
out without adequate alternative housing provided: this is especially true in
the case of families or people staying in institutions. Services provided by a
Housing First-type policy should be extended. The social housing network
should be expanded and the supply of aordable housing should be increased.

“We all have to live somewhere!”
The last three decades of the Hungarian housing movement
–a bottom-up view – 1989–2021
BERNADETT SEBÁLY

“WE ALL HAVE TO LIVE SOMEWHERE!”
38
Bernadett Sebály
“We all have to live somewhere!”1
The last three decades of the Hungarian housing
movement – a bottom-up view – 1989–2021
About the author: PhD student at CEU, Doctoral School of Political Science Public
Policy and International Relations
This chapter summarises the last 30 years of the Hungarian housing movement
from a bottom-up perspective. It oers insight into how organisations representing
disadvantaged people responded to the policy challenges of their era. The story
begins in the turbulent 1990s, when many disadvantaged groups stood up for their
right to housing. In the s econd half of the 1990s, the movement was institutionali sed;
a homeless care system was set up, and advocacy programmes were launched.
The 2000s saw the establishment of a new state-funded programme designed
to dismantle segregated neighbourhoods; this period also saw the emergence of
activist youth critical of globalisation. After 2008, the most deprived raised their
voice again. Homeless people, public housing tenants, and allies organised on the
movement’s left flank, while indebted homeowners promoted claims through right-
wing organisations. This chapter aims to process the movement’s history to help
currently active organisations better assess their role, increase their eectiveness,
and facilitate possible collaboration.
Context
Today, approximately three million people in Hungary are aected by housing
poverty.2 This figure includes those who spend a significant share of their
1 This sentence is a recurring theme in the Hungarian political and artistic life. Here is an early example:
„No matter how, we need money because we have to live somewhere and eat something!” Színházi Élet
1930, 1:57.
2 Habitat (2020). Éves lakhatási jelentés. Bevezető.
income on housing costs (rent, utility bills, mortgage, etc.), live in low-quality,
unhealthy, hard-to-heat housing, or are otherwise worse-o and more vulner-
able than average. This figure is not very dierent from the situation 30 years
ago, as reported in 1989 by one of the first housing organisations established
around the time of the regime change, the Social Committee for the Home-
less. Their report, which summarised data from the 1980 census, showed that
the number of people suering from housing poverty was between 2 and 3
million, with their living situation reflecting inequalities linked to geography,
class, and ethnicity.3
After the transition from a socialist planned economy to democratic capital-
ism in 1989, the marketisation of the housing sector reinforced these initial
disadvantages. In the 1990s, the ‘Enabling Housing Market’ concept devel-
oped by the World Bank enjoyed political support in Hungary, while socially
minded interventions were subordinated to budgetary austerity.
4
As the state
withdrew from subsidising housing costs, rising housing expenses played
an increasingly important role in driving more people into poverty. Moreover,
drastic privatisation reduced the supply of public housing.
In line with international trends, Hungary – like all other Eastern European
countries – gradually turned to the market and promoted bank loans to help
3 HTB (1989). Helyzetjelentés 2., gyoripeter.hu, 5 -7.
4 Hegedüs J. (2021). Lakásrendszer és társadalmi egyenlőtlenségek . In: Köllő J. (szerk.). Kertesi Gábor 70
éves: Írások neki és róla. Budapest, Magyarország: Magánkiadás, 143.

THE LAST THREE DECADES OF THE HUNGARIAN HOUSING MOVEMENT  A BOTTOMUP VIEW  
39
people achieve home ownership. However, the volatility of globalised financial
markets, the shortage of public housing and the absence of adequate state
regulation left Eastern European households (including Hungarian ones) vul-
nerable to market forces. As a result, families that took on debt to purchase
homes eventually became the victims of the 2008 financial crisis.5 The global
economic shock did not lead to fairer housing policies in Hungary. After the
crisis, debtors had to wait for three years for the first major bailout, and the
measures oered limited assistance to low-income foreign currency debtors.
After 2015, housing policy became increasingly subordinated to family policy,
from which the house poor hardly benefited.6
This birds-eye-view shows that those working for fairer housing have been
waging an uphill battle for over three decades. This chapter is about their
struggles. On the one hand, their stories expose the contradictions of a dem-
ocratic-capitalist transformation: the impact of urban investments on human
lives through the changes they provoke on urban landscape and the popula-
tion’s makeup; the vulnerability of families to the dominance of financial mar-
kets and corporations; and the total disregard for the interests of homeless
and poor people – which can eventually lead to their exclusion from neigh-
bourhoods targeted by investors. On the other hand, however, their struggles
are also emancipatory, the expressions of a desire for a more democratic and
social system: they show how Roma and non-Roma tenants, homeless people,
squatters, people living in segregated neighbourhoods, people facing eviction,
victims of the foreign currency loan crisis, disabled people, social and housing
professionals, alter-globalisation and human rights activists stand up for them-
selves and their fellow citizens against selfish economic and political interests.
Although these organisations are often not in close contact with each other,
and sometimes have conflicting interests or values, one thing connects them:
housing. While their struggles concern dierent aspects of the housing crisis,
they often involve the same political actors. In this chapter, taken together, we
5
Bohle, D. (2014). Post-socialist housing meets transnational finance: Foreign banks, mortgage lending,
and the privatisation of welfare in Hungary and Estonia. Review of International Political Economy 21(4),
913-948.
6 Habitat (2019). Éves lakhatási jelentés. Bevezető.
consider all these organisations as forming a housing movement.7 Theterm
movement also indicates that the diverse actors working on housing are po-
tential allies.
The extent to which the Hungarian housing movement can represent the cause
of equitable housing depends, among other things, on the actors that make it
up. Although a social movement is more than the sum of its constituent organ-
isations, its organisational composition fundamentally determines the move-
ment’s material resources and knowledge pool. The movement’s organisation
influences what kind of people get involved, what type of issues are taken up,
and the strategies organisers adopt.8 But the composition of a movement is
not fixed. The Hungarian housing movement after the regime change was very
dierent from the one in the 2000s or the following decade. This overview
captures the dynamic and changing nature of the housing movement in the
light of contemporary policy debates, drawing lessons from the dierent eras.
I divided the history of the last 30 years into four periods, with boundaries de
-
fined by the organisational composition of the movement and policy changes.
The focus is on organisations representing disadvantaged people.
Methodology
7 Diani, M. (1992). The Concept of Social Movement. The Sociological Review 40(1), 1-25. A social movement
is „a network of informal interactions between a plurality of individuals, groups, and organisations engaged
in a political or cultural conflict based on a shared collective identity.” In this paper, I therefore consider
all (networks of) NGOs working on housing as a social movement (regardless of their political or policy
orientation). This diers from the colloquial use of the term, whereby any initiative that is intended to be
large-scale is often referred to as a movement from the outset.
8 Minko, D. C. (2002). Macro- Organisational Analysis, in Klandermans, B. , Staggenborg, S. (eds). Methods
of Social Movement Research. University of Minnesota Press, 260-285. (261.)

THE LAST THREE DECADES OF THE HUNGARIAN HOUSING MOVEMENT  A BOTTOMUP VIEW  
40
30 years of struggle
1. Rescuing what can be rescued!
(1989–1995)
Tenants’ Association • Anti-Ghetto Committee • Roofs Over Our
Heads • Erzsébetváros Circle of Public Housing Applicants •
PoorRelief Fund • Social Committee for the Homeless • National
Front ofthe Poor9
Housing was one of the most important sources of legitimacy for the state
socialist regime. The party leadership sought to ensure acceptable conditions
through a public housing system and state-subsidised housing construction
programmes, as well as by keeping utility costs down. From the early 1980s, as
economic performance deteriorated, socialist housing construction gradually
declined, and the operation of the public housing sector became increasingly
unsustainable.10 Centrally controlled rents were becoming increasingly expen-
sive for the state to finance. In addition, the regime’s failure to renovate the pub
-
lic housing stock meant that much of it deteriorated (or was not modernised).11
Tens of thousands of units became vacant, and rent increases more frequent.
12
This caused dissatisfaction not only among tenants but also among those who
needed housing. The late 1980s saw the start of a spectacular wave of organ-
ising among Roma and non-Roma people, tenants, squatters, and homeless
people. Although their interests often clashed, their demands show that in the
late 1980s and early 1990s, many people saw a way out of the growing housing
crisis through a strengthening and reforming of the public housing sector.
9
The organisations presented in each section appear under chapter titles. There are, of course, many
more organisations working with people experiencing housing poverty. The Hungarian names of the
organisations are as follows: Lakásbérlők Egyesülete • Gettóellenes Bizottság • Tetőt a Fejünk Fölé •
Erzsébetvárosi Szükséglakásigénylők Köre • Szegényeket Támogató Alap • Hajléktalanokért Társadalmi
Bizottság • Nemzet Szegényeinek Frontja.
10
Hegedüs J., Tosics I. (1993). A lakásrendszer szociológiai és közgazdasági elemzése. Kandidátusi ért.,
Bp. 26-32.
11 Zolnay J. (1993). A lakástörvény és a tulajdonviszonyok. Esély 4(6):97-108.
12 Matern É. (1990). Önkényes lakásfoglalók, kilakoltatottak. Szociálpolitikai értesítő 2:45-146. (79-99.)
This was brought to an end by capitalist urban development and the housing
privatisation that facilitated it. Capital investment in inner-city neighbourhoods
demanded clear property titles, and the way to achieve this was through the
sale of public housing.13 Unfortunately, the privatisation frenzy also caught
up with tenants’ associations, which eventually sought to negotiate the most
favourable terms for their members to purchase their apartments. Meanwhile,
the organisations of poor people, who were unable to provide housing for
themselves – and thus were demanding access to public housing – had little
professional, ideological or political support. They were unable to shore up
support without resources and, despite their best eorts, were swept away
by the capitalist-democratic economic-political transformation.
1.1. Tenants’ Association – the organisation
oftenants with secure status
Under socialism, the council-controlled Property Management Companies
(PMCs) supervised the housing stock, i.e., they made decisions regarding the
use of renovation funds and vacant apartments. Their operation left much to
be desired, including the preservation of the housing stock or the quality of
the renovations.
14
The Tenants’ Association (LABE, by its Hungarian acronym)
brought together a large group of dissatisfied tenants. With thousands of
members, the national advocacy group typically represented the interests of
tenants with secure status but not necessarily in good financial situation. Its
forerunners were those tenant communities that, as the dictatorship eased in
the 1980s, organised themselves to take over the maintenance of their public
housing units from the PMCs.15
The national Tenants’ Association was founded on September 12, 1988, by
people who suered from the malfunctioning of the PMCs.
16
The founding circle
mainly consisted of relatively wealthy people with a good network of relations
13 Zolnay J. (1993). Terézinvestitura. Változatok tömbrehabilitációra a Terézvárosban. Beszélő, 4(15):17-19.;
Zolnay J. (1994). Lakásprivatizáció a fővárosban. Világosság 35(4): 32- 43 .
14 G yőri P., Matern É . (1995). Lakásügyi szervező dések a 90-es évek elején Magyarországon. OTKA beszám.
12-14.
15 E.g. 48 Csengery Street in 1984, and 46 Vörösmarty Street and 36 Kőrakás Park in 1989. See ibid.
16 Magyar Hírlap, 13 September 1988, 21(219):7.

THE LAST THREE DECADES OF THE HUNGARIAN HOUSING MOVEMENT  A BOTTOMUP VIEW  
41
(dentists, engineers, former party members, film directors, journalists, lawyers,
etc.), but who decided to stand up for the interests of others and build a national
organisation.
17
The issue of public housing became a mobilising force, and the
Tenants’ Association made a powerful impact on public life. In the few months
following its formation, membership grew to a few thousand. The organisation
operated a space where tenants could meet, started a column in a weekly
newspaper, and provided legal aid.
18
Membership groups proliferated both
in Budapest and outside the capital.
19
These groups took up specific issues
(lack of renovations, rent increases) and promoted the idea of tenants taking
over the maintenance of their units from the PMC in the form of ‘self-governing
tenants’ associations.’20 The central organising group’s role was to advocate
for systemic policy change.21 They commented on government housing plans
and draft laws, intervened in the reorganisation of PMCs, and protested against
state measures that would ooad the financial consequences of poor state
housing management onto tenants in the form of higher rents and higher water
and sewerage charges.22 The organisation also tried to form grand coalitions
with disabled people, pensioners, and trade unions.23
The Tenants’ Association was established to advocate fairer public housing.
The organisation’s leaders consistently argued that marketisation and the
liquidation of public housing property would have disastrous consequences
17 Győri, Matern, Lakásügyi szerveződések, 12-15. At the same time, the first president of the organisation,
Miklós Szabó, wanted to buy the property he lived in Pasarét from the very beginning (12.). He also pro-
posed the purchase of housing as an option in discussions with decision-makers. Fővárosi Közlöny, 31
Dec 1989, 39(12):69.
18 E.g., Népszabadság, 16 Sep 1989, 47(219):5, Népszava, 4 Oct 1988, 116(237):5.
19 LABE’s network covered the whole country, including Debrecen, Dunaújváros, Eger, Győr, Kaposvár,
Kecskemét, Keszthely, Pilisvörösvár, Százhalombatta, Szeged, Szolnok, Tata, Vác. They regularly held
forums and general assemblies. In Debrecen, there was a legal aid service, in Kaposvár a demonstration
was organised in 1993, in Vác in 1994, tenants were called to participate in civil disobedience, i.e., the
non-payment of increased rents (Arcanum).
20 Ország-Világ, July-December 1988, 32(49):7., Százhalombattai Hírtükör, 20 June 1990, 3(13):2.
21
Tót É. (1989). A Laká sbérlők Egyesületéről. Eszmélet 1(1):113-117., Győri, Matern , Lakásügyi szerveződések, 15.
22
Vészits Ferenc főtitkár ismer teti, 7 Jan 1989, nava.hu, video; Magyar Nemzet, 9 Jan 1989, 52(7):3; Népsza-
va, 9 Mar 1989. 3, 117(57):5; Heti Budapest, 2 Sep 1989, 1(26):11.
23 Among others, in 1989, the Residents’ Advocacy Organisation (LÉT), initiated by the Independent Trade
Union of Property Management and Urban Workers, the National Federation of Disabled Persons’ Associ-
ations, the National Federation of Pensioners’ Clubs and Senior Citizens’ ‘Life for Years’ and the Budapest
Council of Trade Unions. Népszava , 11 September 1989, 117(214):9.
for both tenants and those in need of housing.
24
However, this stance against
selling o public housing was overwhelmed by events. ‘Initially, the most val-
uable apartments were purchased by their tenants. Later, the tenants of the
poorer, less valuable flats could not be persuaded by any reason why they
should not become owners like their more fortunate fellow citizens. The priva-
tisation snowball proved politically unstoppable, and the process was shrinking
the pool of public housing available for rent.’25 Between 1990 and 1992 alone,
210,000 public housing units were sold to private owners.26 Naturally, a large
part of the Tenants’ Association’s membership became interested in buying.
Although this was the point when a national organisation should have stood
up to defend the public housing sector, the social pressure was so great that
the Tenants’ Association left the decision to its member organisations.27 The
leaders, Ferenc Vészits and Pál Battha had consistently rejected marketisation
in their statements for years.
28
Still, it was not until 1993 – as a reaction to con-
sistent irregularities in the sales process – that the organisation’s leadership
finally took up the issue of the privatisation of public housing.29
The Tenants’ Association had a very modest budget and was primarily based
on voluntary work. Its policy impact and purpose were therefore largely de-
pendent on the skills and self-interest of the local membership.
30
In 1991, it
could not prevent the poorly planned transfer of public housing property to
municipal governments and had very little influence on the 1993 Housing Act
that regulated privatisation.31 Yet, the organisation formulated an alternative
to the sale of the housing stock. From its inception, it promoted the ‘self-gov-
erning tenants’ association’ model of housing maintenance.
32
However, this
proved insucient, perhaps because the ‘self-governing associations’ created
24 E.g., Tót, A Lakásbérlők Egyesületéről, 115. or Népszava, 25 Jan 1992, 120(21):9.
25 Zolnay, A lakástörvény és a tulajdonviszonyok, 98.
26
Dániel Zs. (1996). A bérlakás-privatizáció paradoxona. Nemzeti ajándék vagy ráfizetés? Közgazdasági
Szemle XLIII., March, 204-230. (205.)
27 Győri, Matern, Lakásügyi szerveződések, 18-20.
28 E.g., Népszava, 25 Jan 1992, 120(21):9 (Battha P.) or Vasárnapi Hírek, 22 Mar 1992, 8(12):4 (Vészits F.).
29 E.g., Magyar Nemzet, 27 Dec 1993, 56(301):1. or Magyar Nemzet, 3 Oct 1994, 57(231):4
30 Győri, Matern, Lakásügyi szerveződések, 20.
31 The organisation saw it as its own achievement that a rent freeze was finally included in the Housing Act
(no rent increases were allowed in public housing units until June 30, 1994), the right to buy was extended
and the purchase price was set at a maximum of 50 percent of the market value. Kelet-Magyarország, 5
July 1993, 53(154):9.
32 Magyar Nemzet, 14 Aug 1990, 53(190):3., Magyar Hírlap, 20 May 1991, 24(116):3.

THE LAST THREE DECADES OF THE HUNGARIAN HOUSING MOVEMENT  A BOTTOMUP VIEW  
42
a competition to the PMCs, which were transitioning to become market-based
property management companies,33 and because many tenants eventually
became interested in buying their apartments.34
In the midst of widespread social change, the Tenants’ Association was also
changing. The organisation’s base shrunk – hundreds of thousands of tenants
became owners, and their housing issues changed. The organisation received
an increasing number of inquiries from new owners about backlogs in the
renovation, high maintenance costs, and the operation of condominiums.
35
In addition, the worse-o tenants remained in public housing, a sector the
association did not organise.36 Some of the organisational aliates also ran
for oce in the 1994 municipal elections.37 Over time – especially after the
privatisation process had run its course, – the Tenants’ Association lost its
community character. We will come back to its activities in a later phase of
the movement.
1.2. Anti-Ghetto Committee – the organisation of
Roma tenants with insecure status and squatters
In the early 1980s, deteriorating economic performance led to the country’s
near insolvency, and the prices of many fixed-price products skyrocketed.
Bread prices rose one and a half times, rents increased, and food, clothing,
and housing became more expensive. This soon led to an increase in the
number of people in arrears, to which the system increasingly responded
with collection proceedings and, ultimately, evictions.38 The worsening social
situation hit Roma people particularly hard. They were the first to lose their
jobs. A significant proportion of Roma families lived in poorly served, declining
villages or moved into the slums of cities.39
33 Magyar Nemzet, 14 Aug 1990, 53(190):3., Győri, Matern, Lakásügyi szerveződések, 31.
34 Győri, Matern, Lakásügyi szerveződések, 18.
35 Magyar Hírlap, 6 Oct 1998, 31(234):6., Győri, Matern, Lakásügyi szerveződések, 21.
36 Győri, Matern, Lakásügyi szerveződések, 18, 21.
37 Győri, Matern, Lakásügyi szerveződések, 20., Magyar Nemzet, 10 Nov 1994, 57(264):4.
38 Győri P., Gábor L. (1994). Díjhátralékosok- díjhátralékosság. Kandidátusi értekezés. gyoripeter.hu
39 Ladányi J. (1991). A miskolci gettóügy. Valóság 4:45-54. (45-46.)
In Miskolc, beginning in the early 1970s, Roma families who had been living in
segregated neighbourhoods on the outskirts of the city moved into dilapidated
public housing in the city’s downtown when their earlier dwellings were flood-
ed. Through housing allocations, kinship, or squatting, other Roma families
followed, settling in the same neighbourhood.40 These families, many of them
in arrears or squatters, faced the hostility of the city council in the mid-1980s.
Suddenly, decision-makers wanted to regenerate the city centre, which they
ignored for decades. Initial attempts to provide housing or plots of land for
Roma families in other parts of the city met with residents’ protests. The
local authorities both fanned and agreed with the anti-Roma sentiment; they
subsequently decided to build a settlement for the community, reminiscent
of a ghetto, as it was outside the city limits, far from any infrastructure, in an
area unfit for housing.41
The expulsion of the Roma was prevented by the Anti-Ghetto Committee,
which was formed in 1989 and organised by Aladár Horváth, among others.
At the end of 1988, Horváth, a young Roma teacher, travelled to Budapest,
where he found allies in the Raoul Wallenberg Association
42
and a small group
of Roma and non-Roma intellectuals gathering around the organisation. The
Budapest supporters set up a fact-finding committee and, in February 1989,
took part in the first large-scale meeting of local Roma people in Miskolc.
János Ladányi, a sociologist who was a member of the fact-finding committee,
recalls the meeting:
‘It was astonishing how clearly the families facing eviction saw and under-
stood the situation. In their argumentation, the small size and low standard
of housing played only a secondary role, and they unanimously emphasised
the dangers of total isolation and discrimination. [...] The arguments of
Roma threatened by the action also frequently invoked analogies with the
deportation and extermination of the Roma in 1944.’43
40 F. Havas G. (1990). Hány ember fér el egy szobában? Beszélő 1(2):22-23.
41 Ladányi, A miskolci gettóügy 46-47.; F. Havas, Hány ember fér el 22.
42
The Raoul Wallenberg Association was founded in 1988 to defend democracy, promote tolerance and
protect minorities.
43 Ladányi, A miskolci gettóügy, 49.

THE LAST THREE DECADES OF THE HUNGARIAN HOUSING MOVEMENT  A BOTTOMUP VIEW  
43
By the end of the meeting, the participants decided to organise a local protest,
develop an alternative solution for their housing and mobilise national public
opinion.44
However, on the same day – February 2, 1989 – the local council adopted the
‘ghetto plan’. It took exactly one month for the organisation to change the
course of events. The fact-finding committee, led by sociologists, mapped the
situation of most of the families facing eviction and found that no one wanted
to move to the outskirts of the city. Indeed, most families had concrete ideas
on how they could improve their housing situation if they received social or
administrative support. In addition, they carefully analysed the costs of building
the settlement by the local council. In the report of the fact-finding committee,
published on February 20, 1989, the main argument against the ghetto was
that the costs of the project were irrationally high.45
The council voted on the financial plan for the construction on March 2, 1989.
A few days earlier, on February 27, the Anti-Ghetto Committee had invited
the council members to a debate based on the fact-finding committee report.
Meanwhile, coalition mobilised both local and national media. The strategy was
a success, as the party leadership became uncomfortable with the heightened
attention the case was receiving, and the ghetto plan was ultimately not voted
through at the council meeting. Aladár Horváth explains the organising success
with the following: ‘In Miskolc, the communist regime sought to forget or reduce
its crisis by ghettoising the ‘problematic Gypsies’ in an area two kilometres away
from the city. [...] At the time, we were able to prevent the apartheid plan from
being implemented because the system was crumbling and the plan was incom-
patible with its new principles.’
46
The council set up a committee of experts
with the participation of Roma activists and their advisers, and they launched
a tiered system of public housing exchanges. Those ready to build their own
houses moved out and received financial support, and those applying for an
apartment, or an upgrade of their current public housing unit moved in. The
44 Ibid. 47-4 9.
45 Ladányi, A miskolci gettóügy 50-51.; Horváth A . (2017). Indulás. Roma polgárjogi mozgalom I. Bp.: Wesley
Kiadó.
46
Bányai Gy. (2009). Ettől még nem változik semmi. Horváth Aladár a cigányellenesség okairól. Interjú. 168
óra, Aug 27, 21(35):20 -21.
community was also involved in distributing housing. They selected those on
the waiting list, and an underground charity called Poor Relief Fund provided
financial support.47 However, even in the short term, it was clear that the council
was trying to circumvent the agreement in the absence of social pressure.48
The Anti-Ghetto Committee was an emancipatory form of cooperation be-
tween poor Roma people and – both Roma and non-Roma – intellectuals. Just
as the Tenants’ Association, the organisers also tried to use their knowledge
in the political arena. In April 1989, the first independent Roma organisation,
Phralipe, was founded, and its co-founder, Aladár Horváth, served as a Mem-
ber of Parliament with the support of the liberal Alliance of Free Democrats
(SZDSZ) between 1990 and 1994. He reorganised the Anti-Ghetto Committee
in 1995, under the auspices of the Roma Civil Rights Foundation. The founda-
tion’s activities will be discussed in the next phase of the movement.
1.3. Roofs Over Our Heads, Erzsébetváros Circle
ofPublic Housing Applicants, and Poor Relief
Fund – organisations of squatters, housing
applicants, and their allies
The displacement of poor people (including poor Roma families) from the inner
districts of Budapest, also started to increase in the second half of the 1980s.
For decades, the realistic alternative for those who did not have housing was to
occupy the vacant (and plentiful) public housing.49 In many cases, these were
damp, dirty, dilapidated apartments that no one wanted. For decades, the prac-
tice was that the council would not evict squatters without providing alternative
housing, but from the mid-1980s, this increasingly changed.
50
This developed in
part to curb increased squatting. The dismantling of workers’ hostels and rising
unemployment in the capital further raised the number of people who could not
47 Ladányi, A miskolci gettóügy 52-54.; Horváth, Indulás
48 F. Havas, Hány ember fér el egy szobában?; Ladányi, A miskolci gettóügy 53.
49 In 1990, there were 19,000 vacant public housing units nationwide. Farkas J. , Székely G. (2006). Hely-
zetkép a lakásviszonyokról 1999-2005. KSH.hu, 13.
50 Matern, Önkényes lakásfoglalók 73-75.

THE LAST THREE DECADES OF THE HUNGARIAN HOUSING MOVEMENT  A BOTTOMUP VIEW  
44
find accommodation. The number of those fleeing increasingly oppressive rural
poverty to Budapest also increased in the 1980s.51 Poverty was concentrated
in the inner districts (Józsefváros, Erzsébetváros, Terézváros, Ferencváros,
and in the adjacent parts of Kőbánya and Angyalföld.) Although the squatters
came from various social backgrounds, the evictions had an ethnic dimension:
they disproportionately aected Roma families moving from the countryside
to the capital due to the deteriorating economic situation. One of the first and
spectacular eviction campaigns of the 1980s was the systematic eviction of
dozens of mainly Roma families from Angyalföld in 1987.52
The regime change did not ease the problems of those suering from housing
shortages. Capitalist urban renewal would have required strong advocacy by
and for those in need. The key question was the future of the public housing
stock and whether the district councils would reinvest the profits from pri-
vatisation in the housing sector. However, after 1991, the districts were free
to make decisions in terms of their development plans, which they were not
obliged to discuss with the capital’s leadership or other districts.53 This did
not encourage district councils to find comprehensive solutions to poverty
and housing problems. On the contrary, it was easier to push unwanted resi-
dents from one district to another. The activists of the Poor Relief Fund54 tried
to intervene in the case of several evictions in Budapest on behalf of those in
need, negotiating with the leadership of the district councils; these interven-
tions were filmed with the help of independent film crews.55 To make matters
worse, the local ocials deflected their political responsibility by scapegoating
various minorities. The contemporary press wrote of the atmosphere in Buda-
pest: ‘The capital is already dominated by a destructive, anti-poor public mood
[...] the demands of law and order are perfectly understandable and justifiable,
51 Ibid. 83-89.
52 Ibid. 73-77., 83-89., 95-96.
53 Zolnay J. (1993): Lakásprivatizáció, városfejlesztés, helyi politizálás Erzsébetvárosban. Esély 4(1):8 -13.
54 The Poor Relief Fund was established at the end of 1979 to raise awareness of poverty. Its work mixed
charitable and political elements . In 1990, the Poor Relief Fund founded the Abused Mothers’ Home, which
operated out of a large family house purchased by the organisation and provided short to medium-term
housing for women (and their children) who were victims of domestic violence. Győri, Matern, Lakásügyi
szerveződések 22-23.
55 OSA Archive – Black Box. Kilakoltatás a IX., Vaskapu utcában 1991, call no.: 305-0-3:195/2, Kilakoltatás
a IX., Angyal utcában 1990, call no. : 305-0- 3:234/1, 305-0-3:234/2, 305- 0-3:249/3.
but the anti-poor, anti-Gypsy, anti-Polish, anti-refugee and xenophobic attitudes
that live in symbiosis with them are not.’56
Under these circumstances, Roofs Over Our Heads , an organisation representing
a small group of squatters, was founded in 1991, and the Erzsébetváros Circle
of Public Housing Applicants, founded in 1993, represented those in need of
housing. The ‘CHANCE’ Family Support and Community Development Service
in Erzsébetváros helped establish and strengthen both organisations.
It is estimated that there were 150 squatters in an inner district of Budapest, Er-
zsébetváros at the time.57 Until April 15, 1991, they were protected from eviction
by a ‘moratorium’
58
– in other words, they had to find somewhere else to live until
then. The local family support service sta, ‘CHANCE’ decided to help them
organise themselves to prevent mass evictions. ‘About thirty squatters were
invited to a tea party after several one-on-one meetings. The sta aimed to put
them in a negotiating position. These people had been living illegally, in hiding, for
a longer or shorter time after they had broken into empty flats in desperation and
moved in.’59 That’s how Roofs Over Our Heads was founded. Squatters shared
their stories, and it turned out that a good number of them were paying rent
and utilities, and many had made their flats habitable and renovated them. The
involved social workers thought that these people’s life strategies showed an
exemplary perseverance and resourcefulness that could fuel their advocacy.
The 27 squatters, together with the social workers, published a manifesto in
the press and then began to work together to create a formal organisation.60
However, the organisation fell apart after three months, influenced by the post-
ponement of evictions – i.e., the disappearance of the immediate threat. Even so,
such a short-lived initiative had some eects: the Erzsébetváros district council
began to apply equity criteria to squatters more or less consistently for a while
and also used them partially when evictions resumed in 1992.61
56 Magyar Hírlap, 5 March 1991, 24(54):6.
57 Madlena, E., Zolnay J. (1992). “Lakáspolitika” és közösségi szociális munka. Esély 4:85-92. (91.)
58 The mayor of Budapest issued a recommendation to district councils to refrain from evicting squatters.
The districts responded dierently, but the recommendation contributed to curbing evictions. See Zolnay,
Lakásprivatizáció 9.
59 Madlena, Zolnay, “Lakáspolitika” 91.
60 Magyar Nemzet, 30 Apr 1991, 54(100):6., Madlena, Zolnay, “Lakáspolitika” 91.
61 Madlena, Zolnay, “Lakáspolitika” 92.

THE LAST THREE DECADES OF THE HUNGARIAN HOUSING MOVEMENT  A BOTTOMUP VIEW  
45
The other self-help group launched with the help of ‘CHANCE’ was the Erzsébet-
város Circle of Public Hous ing Applicants (ESZIK in Hungarian). The members of this
ethnically mixed organisation of 20-30 people had been applying for housing for
years at the Erzsébetváros district council of Budapest. Some of them shared
a room with ten people, others lived in rented accommodation, another person
was threatened with homelessness because of unemployment, and someone
else came to meetings from a homeless shelter.62 Géza Gosztonyi, the employee
of the family support service, recalls the group’s beginnings in May 1993:
‘What else could have started the first meeting we proposed but people
articulating their hopeless situation? However, it was as if a strange force
had moved all of them when it turned out that – almost without exception –
each of them knew of one or two vacant flats. They listed addresses with
increasing excitement. One of them suggested to draw up a list of empty
apartments. Another suggested to write down the addresses of the empty
flats they know, to search out as many as possible and share the informa-
tion with the district council. From this point on, it was only a small step to
map the apartments. They divided the entire district into precincts and went
through each house in turn, carefully peering through every window without
curtains and every open door without a handle.’63
In one month, they listed 208 vacant apartments, and on July 8, 1993, they
handed their proposal for redistribution to the mayor. They wrote: ‘We are too
poor ever to buy an apartment, so we don’t understand why the District Council
doesn’t think of people like us when it sells o public housing one by one. [...]
It’s in our fundamental interest to reduce privatisation. We expect this from the
District Council!’
64
However, by then, the sale of public housing was well under
way in the district. A year and a half earlier, the pro-privatisation bloc of the
council collected 10,000 signatures from tenants who wanted to buy their
apartments.65 Despite the brutal headwinds, ESZIK did not give up. Despite
numerous consultations and interventions at committee meetings, they still
62 Sarkadi I. (1998). Evés közben jön meg az étvágy, avagy az E.SZ.I.K. szervezetpszichológiája. Szakdolgozat .
Pécs: Janus Pannonius Tudományegyetem, 28-29. és 9. sz. melléklet: Javaslat; Kurír, 9 July 1993, 4(185):3.
63 Gosztonyi G. (1997). Közösségi szociális munka. Budapest: Budapesti Szociális Forrásközpont. 42-43.
64
9. sz. melléklet: Javaslat, ill. 7. sz. melléklet: Ü res lakások listája . In: Sarkadi, Evés közben jön meg az étvágy.;
Népszabadság – Budapest melléklet, 9 July 1993, I.
65 Madlena, Zolnay, “Lakáspolitika” 89.
had not been given a single flat by early 1994. This is when they presented the
mayor with an ultimatum: either he would hand over the management of the
empty flats to ESZIK or they would occupy them.66 Finally, in March 1994, the
district council signed an agreement that hand over the management of 20
public housing units to the organisation.
67
The deal gave ESZIK a strong man-
date and a sort of responsibility, which it could have only feasibly assumed by
creating an institutionalised social rental agency. However, the district council,
facing elections in 1994, handed over only nine flats, which the organisation
distributed among the housing applicants previously approved by the district
council. The new district leadership was not open to further cooperation, and
the families who had established the organisation left civic activism once they
received housing
68
ESZIK managed housing units for a while
69
but did not
receive enough support to become a strong housing agency.
The ‘CHANCE’ Erzsébetváros Family Support Service, which operated with
the professional support of ELTE University’s Institute of Social Policy, had
pioneered community social work. Still, this activity was but a drop in the
ocean. In addition, tenants who wanted to buy their flats also started organis-
ing – the district councils could then point to the existence of groups wishing
to purchase their apartments to reinforce rapid privatisation.70 As the head of
the housing department in the Zugló district council of Budapest said in 1991:
‘We cannot find a humane solution if we do not create new public housing
units or shelters.’71 In the first decades after the regime change, however, the
balance shifted towards the development of a shelter system rather than a
modern public housing management.
66 16. sz. melléklet: Ne panaszkodj! Cselekedj!, In: Sarkadi, Evés közben jön meg az étvágy; Népszabadság
– Budapest melléklet, 25 Febr 1994, V.
67 20. sz. melléklet: Megállapodás, 21 March 1994, In: Sarkadi, Evés közben jön meg az étvágy
68 Sarkadi, Evés közben jön meg az étvágy 27.
69 Színes Vasárnap, 12 Nov 1995, 2(45):7.
70
Erzsébetvárosiak Klubja- Bérlakásvásárlók köre – Magyar Nemzet, 17 Febr 1992, 55(40):8. , terézvárosi
tüntetések – Zolnay, Terézinvestitura.
71 Magyar Nemzet, 30 Apr 1991, 54(100):6.

THE LAST THREE DECADES OF THE HUNGARIAN HOUSING MOVEMENT  A BOTTOMUP VIEW  
46
1.4. Social Committee for the Homeless and National
Front of the Poor – organisations of homeless
people and their allies
The crumbling socialist system also increasingly cut o help to those living in
workers’ hostels. In 1988, the rent increased sixfold overnight, and later the
hostels were restructured or liquidated.72 This made life for low-paid workers
extremely dicult. Many had to say farewell to their accommodation along
with their jobs. In the late 1980s and early 1990s, the shutting-down of hostels
led many people without family support to the streets. This included those
who had found shelter in these hostels because of disability, domestic vio-
lence, illness, or substance abuse. The Social Committee for the Homeless
was formed on February 28, 1989, to protect their interests. The origins of
the organisation date back to the time when Tibor Ungi, an unskilled worker,
personally requested the support of the Democratic Trade Union of Scientific
Workers in the matter of the hostels’ rent increase.73 It was at this meeting that
he met sociologist Péter Győri. Győri then founded the Social Committee for
the Homeless with several of his colleagues. Ungi – as a hostel tenant – also
became a member of the organisation.74
The Social Committee for the Homeless defined itself as a research and advo-
cacy organisation with two main objectives. Based on its statute, it advocated
for the right to housing. At the same time, in the press and negotiations with
decision-makers, the organisation emphasised the restructuring of shelters
and the expansion of their stang by qualified social workers.75 The Com-
mittee, along with other organisations helping the poor, became particularly
72 MTI, “Felemelték az átmeneti szállások lakbérét”, 8 Nov 1988.
73
Ungi’s beautifully written, sincere letter to TDDSZ , dated 17 October 1988 , is available here in Hungarian.
On January 4, 1989, Győri, Ungi and the latter founders of the Social Committee for the Homeless met
with a Member of Parliament, a representative of the Ministry of Social Aairs and Health, and one from
the Metropolitan Council. They discussed the creation of a working committee to work on the transfor-
mation of the workers’ hostel system. The Social Committee for the Homeless was formed the following
month. gyoripeter.hu
74 1988 Social Committee for the Homeless (Establishment and operation). Founding members overlap with
the Poor Relief Fund and the “CHA NCE” Erzsébetváros Family Support Servic e, among others. g yoripeter. hu
75 Találkozás parlamenti képviselővel jegyzőköny v, 4 Jan 1989; Helyzetjelentés 1, 28 Feb 1989; Tibor Ungi
– Romano Nyevipe, 28 Feb 1989, 5; Péter Győri – Magyar Hírlap, 30 Oct 1989, 5. gyorip eter.hu
important for the authorities in the winter of 1989, when homeless people be-
gan demonstrations in Budapest. These demonstrations made the socialist
leadership – already facing a crisis of legitimacy – uncomfortable, and they
did everything they could to remove poverty from public spaces as quickly as
possible.
The protests began in Budapest on November 29, 1989, three days after a
crucial referendum about the country’s future. They were a response to the
authorities’ decision to close the country’s railway stations for the night (these
waiting rooms were the last refuge for many.) In protest, 50-60 people gath-
ered in Blaha Lujza Square and began a sit-in. The homeless people collected
signatures, and on November 30, a delegation of three – Little Fox, Shark, and
Little, known by their nicknames – met with the Budapest’s mayor.
76
Sándor
Rostás, a demonstrator, shared their demands with the press: ‘We’re doing this
campaign because we’re homeless. [...] We’ve been here since 5.30 pm last night,
and we’re staying until we get a flat. We have handed a petition to the government
and the Metropolitan Council to give us the former workers’ militia houses. There
are so many people in need; let’s not leave all those houses empty.’77 The fact
that many homeless people wanted housing (and not shelters) is underpinned
by another story when one of the protest organisers, Mária Orsós (or ‘Panda’
by her nickname) accompanied by a cameraman and a journalist, requested
housing for herself from the council.78 Later, another demonstrator-organiser
at the Southern Railway Station (Déli Pályaudvar in Hungarian or Déli for short)
also demanded housing: ‘No one can throw us out of here! Not even by force!
Lie around the ticket oces so that they won’t open until there is an apartment!’
79
In the meanwhile, social workers (and later benevolent helpers at the South-
ern Railway Station) were looking for immediate solutions to the crisis. On
November 28, the Poor Relief Fund, the Social Committee for the Homeless,
the Oltalom Charitable Association, and the Újpest Family Support Centre
wrote a letter to the top leaders of the country and the capital oering their
76 Magyar Hírlap, “Csöviék a polgármesternél”, 1 Dec 1989, gyorip eter.hu
77 Mai Nap, “Csövezők indulatos kampánya”, 30 Nov. 1989, gyo ri peter.hu
78 Mária was given the flat on the grounds that she had five years’ employment and had been in state care.
19 Dec 2019, 7:13-8:18 .
79 Hajléktalanok. Rongyosforradalom (1992). Videó-dokumentumsorozat. Rendezte Mihályfy László. 3:57-4:10.

THE LAST THREE DECADES OF THE HUNGARIAN HOUSING MOVEMENT  A BOTTOMUP VIEW  
47
professional help and asking for the allocation of barracks of the workers’
militia or similar facilities.80 From November 30 onwards, the party leadership
oered the leaders of Budapest more and more unsuitable buildings, with the
idea that specialised organisations could run them (e.g., the Red Cross).
81
The
workers’ militia headquarters buildings at 3 Vajdahunyad Street in Józsefváros
and Bánya Street in Kőbánya – the latter without heating and hot water – were
also earmarked for handover these days.82 While the council leadership looked
for the new management of the shelters, it set up a crisis shelter in the gym
of a vocational training school in Csepel, an outer district of Budapest. Ottilia
Solt (Poor Relief Fund), György Mezei (Újpest Family Support Center) and
Péter Győri (Social Committee for the Homeless) presented the opportunity
to the protesters.83 The homeless people first sent a four-member delegation
to Csepel to see the conditions for themselves. The oer eventually divided
the protesters. Some accepted the accommodation and left for Csepel on
December 3, and others went to the Southern Railway Station to reorganise
themselves. In the gym, the sta of the Újpest Family Support Center and a
few homeless people managed the crisis shelter, distributed donations, and
established the rules for those who wanted to stay.84
‘Vajda 3’ (the old militia headquarter in Vajdahunyad Street) was finally taken
over from the leadership of Budapest on December 5 by Győri and Solt, rep-
resenting, respectively, the Social Committee for the Homeless and the Poor
Relief Fund. In the beginning, they organised the new shelter in this dilapidated
building together with 50 or so homeless people. However, this failed after
a short time. In February 1990, the Shelter Foundation was established as a
quasi-successor to the Social Committee for the Homeless, with the help of
80 Magyar Hírlap, “Levél a hajléktalanok ügyében”, 30 Nov 1989. gyoripeter.hu
81 Refugee camp in Bicske; unheated, dilapidated buildings owned by the party. 1989 Blaha demonstration
and events after in 1990.
82
Both are still operating as homeless shelters. The irony of the situation was that at the time of the demon-
strations, the Council of Ministers had been discussing the ‘long-term development concept for housing
policy’ – including the transfer of state-owned housing to municipal ownership, However, they did not
consider solving rampant homelessness as part of the housing policy. Instead, they created substandard
shelters in the barracks of the Workers’ Militia. Magyar Hírlap, 2 Dec 1989, 22(284):1. gyoripeter.hu
83 “Ottilia , I and Gyuri Mezei presented this to the people, and there was a lot of uncertainty, confusion; in
fact, this otherwise key moment of negotiation or persuasion (?) was quite scandalous. Ottilia and Gyuri
came over to Blaha from the Southern Railway Station with a couple of homeless people, who they had
already persuaded to go to the gym [a provisional shelter] in Csepel.” gyoripeter.hu
84 1989 Blaha demonstration and events after in 1990, gyoripeter.hu
four NGOs.85 For those who could not get into Vajda 3 from Csepel, the council
leadership opened the Bánya Street building which was without heating or
hot water. Those who did not wish to move to either of these options were left
with the Southern Railway Station.86
Many people tried to keep the wave of protests alive. One of them was Árpád
Balogh,
87
who announced that the National Council of the Disadvantaged
would hold its inaugural meeting on December 6, 1989, at the steps of the
Southern Railway Station.88 Balogh was instrumental in the protests that re-
started on January 11, 1990. The start of the strike was announced by Gyula
Makovecz, one of the homeless leaders of the protests: ‘Buddies, the strike
will go on, no one will move from here! Circle and block the ticket oces! No
one will open. The strike continues!’ In the meantime, Balogh and a group of
homeless people demonstrated in front of the parliament on January 16, 1990,
with banners and blankets.89
At the same time, the famous comedian András Nagy Bandó published a pro-
vocative idea in Mai Nap (a popular tabloid at the time) on January 17. Home-
less people should form a party and then use ‘the financial support obtained
85
Állami Számvevőszék (2006). Jelentés. A hajléktalanokat ellátó intézményrendszer ellenőrzése., 14.; 1990
Birth of the Shelter Foundation (Establishment and operation), 1989 Blaha demonstration and events after
in 1990, gyoripeter.hu
86 1989 Blaha demonstration and events after in 1990.
87 Árpád Balogh introduces himself from the stage on January 21, 1990, on the day of the formation of the
National Front of the Poor (NFP), on behalf of the Hungarian People’s Party (Hajléktalanok. Rongyosfor-
radalom). Prior to NFP, he founded various well-intentioned, short-lived initiatives related to housing and
to help children in state care, including the Association of Home Creators and the Association for the
Support and Protection of Interests of Disadvantaged Youth. He also advocated the creation of a Hun-
garian kibbutz in Gödöllő. He is associated with the National Council of the Disadvantaged, the Patriotic
People’s Front, the Social Democratic Party and was a member of the Independent Smallholders’ Party
(FKGP). Finally, he was also charged with embezzlement in the case of the Home Creation Foundation
(Reform, 4 Aug 1995, 8(20):28-29; 168 óra, 15 Apr 1997, 9(15):18). Even though the homeless leaders of
NFP expelled him from the organisation in early 1990 (Népszabadság, 3 Feb 1990; 4 8(29):11), Balogh
tried to establish legitimacy by associating himself with NFP at the meeting of the grand committee of
the FKGP (as county president) in 1992. Further source: Arcanum Digitheca.
88 According to an MTI article of Nov 29, 1989, the founders of the National Council of the Disadvantaged
were Árpád Balogh of the Patriotic People’s Front, Fidesz, SZDSZ, the National Roma Council and the
Raoul Wallenberg Association. The National Council of the Disadvantaged was probably Balogh’s private
initiative, announced without the knowledge of the other actors. See also Esti Hírlap, Hajlékhoz juthatnak
a hajléktalanok. 2 Dec 1989 gyoripeter.hu
89 Magyar Hírlap, 17 Jan 1990, 23(24):3.

THE LAST THREE DECADES OF THE HUNGARIAN HOUSING MOVEMENT  A BOTTOMUP VIEW  
48
by the party to build temporary shelters’ – which could also function as party
headquarters. He called for a public meeting on January 21.90 Although Nagy
Bandó was not sure that anyone would be there, he was welcomed by a few
hundred people, a podium and organisers. Balogh spoke at the demonstration
alongside Nagy Bandó. The demonstrators were determined and dignified,
and a sense of community was palpable.91 With 157 founding members and a
21-member board, the National Front of the Poor (NFP) was formed that day,
with Balogh as its president and Nagy Bandó elected honorary president.
92
The organisation aimed to support and defend the interests of the homeless,
the poor, and children growing up in public residential care. Father Imre Kozma
also spoke at the demonstration. On behalf of the Hungarian Charity Service of
the Order of Malta,93 he oered to request a building for 200 people and help
with providing work and care.94
Nagy Bandó was deeply shocked by the poverty he saw and set to work to
help those in need leave the station. ‘We want to prove that these guys are
capable of so much more than they’re perceived to be. They would become
ordinary human beings if they each received care and attention. If they were all
embraced by a workers’ collective in a factory or a company, it would give these
people back their faith.’95 He hoped – as many others did – that if temporary
accommodation were available, it would be easier to find work and find a
foothold. But in the socio-economic situation of the time, this was a vain hope.
The protests caused significant disruption to the Southern Station’s operations,
so it came in handy for the party leadership that someone managed the crisis
(instead of them, or with their help). The Head of the Defence Forces immediate-
ly handed Nagy Bandó the Csillebérc Pioneer Camp to relocate the squatters.
As a result, the next day, hundreds of people left the station by bus, while others
tried to find accommodation in the existing shelters (Dobozi Street, Könyves
90 Mai Nap, 17 Jan 1990, 2(14):7.
91 Hajléktalanok. Rongyosforradalom
92 Népszabadság, 22 Jan 1990, 48(18):4; Hajléktalanok. Rongyosforradalom
93
On the grassroots origin of the Hungarian Charity Service of the Order of Malta, see Győri, Matern, Lakás-
ügyi szerveződések, 32-36.
94 Hajléktalanok. Rongyosforradalom
95 A Hét, 23 March 1990, 35(12):15.
Kálmán Boulevard).
96
Thanks to Nagy Bandó’s organising, homeless people
received food, shelter, and access to showers at the camp, and they received
assistance to replace their missing documents. They could improve their ap-
pearance with the help of volunteer hairdressers and donations of clothing. They
were examined by doctors and were also provided with emergency aid ‘until
they received a salary.’97 The NFP leadership was divided. Some of them saw
the way out in the development of new shelters or wanted to move to Csillebérc,
others promoted the original idea of Nagy Bandó to establish a party, and some
wanted to continue the pressure with further demonstrations.
98
Eventually, a
few days after the formation of NFP, homeless people – either under duress or
by their own free will – left the Southern Railway Station.
The camp in Csillebérc ran for almost a week thanks to the voluntary work of
homeless people, including one of the leaders of the movement, Makovecz. At
the end of January, they moved to some empty barracks outside Budapest on
the border of Budaörs and Törökbálint, where they established the Homeless
Rehabilitation Home on January 29.99 Initially, like Vajda 3 – which had opened
a few weeks earlier – it was run with the participation of homeless people, with
the reorganised NFP taking a leadership role alongside the Metropolitan Council
ocials. However, after the municipal elections of October 1990, the city council
of Budaörs took control of the camp but failed to establish a well-functioning
institutional system. The shelter was finally closed down in May 1992. The res-
idents moved to other homeless shelters, and the NFP ceased to operate.
100
The fact that many people who were homeless (or on the verge of homeless-
ness) wanted housing instead of shelters is also evidenced by other smaller
protests. For example, in 1989-1990, individuals demanding public housing
went on hunger strikes in Békéscsaba, Eger, and Salgótarján, and in Békés-
csaba in November 1990, eight people held a demonstration at the city hall.
101
96 A Hét, 23 March 1990, 35(12):14-15; Népszabadság, 24 Jan 1990, 48(20):10.
97 Magyar Hírlap, 29 Jan 1990, 23(24):4.
98 Népszabadság 24 Jan 1990, 48(20):10.
99 Hajléktalan, 11 September 1990, MTI .
100
For the conditions in the hostel, see Népszabadság , 3 February 1990, 48(29):11., and K. Pikk (1994). Ahaj-
lék talanokról. Kandidátusi disszertáció, 38-40.
101 Eger – Népszabadság, 16 Aug 1989, 47(192):10., Salgótarján – Népszabadság, 1 Febr 1990, 48(27):10.,
Békéscsaba – Népszabadság, 3 Nov 1990, 48(258):4.

THE LAST THREE DECADES OF THE HUNGARIAN HOUSING MOVEMENT  A BOTTOMUP VIEW  
49
In Budapest, at the beginning of 1990, several people set up tents in front
of the parliament as a form of protest. One of them was Sándor Rostás, the
spokesman of the Blaha Lujza Square protesters. His housing application
was rejected.
102
Later, in September, Rostás tried to revive the protests and
announced a demonstration at the Southern Railway Station between Septem-
ber 29, 1990, and December 31, 1992(!), but the police refused to allow it.
103
In
the meantime, homeless people gathered at the Eastern Railway Station and
paralysed its operation by occupying the carriage depots, waiting rooms and
ticket oces. The railway workers went on strike, the police were deployed,
and the Hungarian Railway Company oered its Madrid Road workers’ hostel
to protesters to help deal with the situation. At the railway station, SZDSZ MP
Ferenc Kőszeg and the railway company’s chief ocer tried to persuade a
group of people to accept the placement at the hostel. The spokesman for the
homeless group was Rostás. They insisted that they would only leave if they
received housing.
104
Hundreds of homeless people were eventually evicted
from the station within a few days.
The first shelters were set up in the winter of 1989-1990 as a result of the
homeless protests. However, the socialist party leadership did not think of
long-term solutions but simply removed the disaected poor out of sight,
taking advantage of the commitment of social workers and benevolent celeb-
rities. The post-transition administration of Budapest also had to act quickly.
By 1992 – when the first central regulations for the homeless care system
were drawn up – there were already some 2,000 shelters in 67 institutions
across the country.
105
However, this rapid growth was not matched by ade-
quate resources. It was impossible to build strong institutions on such shaky
foundations, even as leading figures in the movement entered politics.106 The
dismantling of public housing created a limited homeless care system that
102
Another tent protester, János Szingár, managed to get a 9 sqm substandard apartment thanks to the
intervention of Nagy Bandó. Beszélő, 10 March 1990, 1(9):26.
103 Népszava, 29 September 1990; 118(229):7.
104
Népszabadság , 3 Nov 1990, 48(258):4; A rendszerváltás két éve és a hajléktalanok – az MTI hírek tükrében.
Menhely.hu
105 Állami Számvevőszék, Jelentés, 15.
106
Ottilia Solt (Poor Relief Fund) was an MP between 1990-1994, and Gábor Iványi (Oltalom) was an MP
between 1990-1994 and 1998-2002. Péter Győri (Social Committee for the Homeless) was the chairman
of the Housing Committee of the Municipality of Budapest from 1990-2002. The 1991 law fragmenting
the public housing assets of Budapest and the accelerated privatisation process narrowed their options.
was able to provide support only up to a certain point. Up to this day, it is still
a dead-end for many people and does not provide adequate working condi-
tions for those who work there. As Péter Győri said in front of Vajda 3 in 2019:
‘What are we doing here in former workers’ militia barracks after 30 years?
Why are we not in a newly built Tenants’ House? Why don’t we recall from
a well-furnished, warm institution with single rooms that we started in that
shack 30 years ago? No, we are still there, 30 years later. The homeless
shelters are in the same run-down buildings as 30 years ago.’107
1.5. Lessons from the first era
Stakeholder participation is valuable. Looking back at this 30-year history, it is
clear to see that through their demands for public housing, it was homeless
people, tenants, public housing applicants, and squatters who set the direction
of long-term sustainable housing policy (at least for a while); this stands in con-
trast with the stance of many political leaders and experts. This underlines the
value of knowledge by experience in both the movement and policy making. At
the same time – without a clear definition of objectives and an awareness of the
political context and opportunities – short-term self-interest can easily override
long-term social benefits, as was the case with the Tenants’ Association.
There is strength in cross-class collaboration. The history of housing organising
and activism during this period points to the power of cross-class collabora-
tion. When allies with higher status humbly put their professional skills at the
service of the aected people and the cause, when actors worked together
as equal partners, organisations were able to enhance the advocacy power
of disadvantaged people (e.g., Tenants’ Association, Anti-Ghetto Committee,
Roofs Over Our Heads, ESZIK). The ‘CHANCE’ Erzsébetváros Family Support
Service is a good example of the cross-section of confrontational advocacy
and institutional social work,108 and the participation of ELTE university illus-
trates the fertilising eect that academia can have on social movements.
107 Partizán, “Egy elfeledett sztrájk története.” 25:29-26:15.
108 For more examples, see Udvarhelyi É. T. (2014). Az igazság az utcán hever. Budapest: Napvilág Kiadó, 151.

THE LAST THREE DECADES OF THE HUNGARIAN HOUSING MOVEMENT  A BOTTOMUP VIEW  
50
Financial and intellectual support is necessary to prevent movements from becom-
ing marginalised. Although civil society organisations were intrinsically linked to
the agonistic struggles for democracy on the eve of the regime change, they
became embedded in the emerging non-profit sector in the immediate after-
math of the transition. The concept of non-profit (or third sector) that seeks
to address the tensions inherent to liberal capitalist democracies constrained
the role of organisations to providing social services. While the government
keeps the economy running on free-market principles, it lets NGOs deal with
the harmful eects of economic activity. This social model expects organisa-
tions to compensate for impoverishment by providing services and innovative
programmes.109 This era was also characterised by the belief that economic
recovery would resolve social inequalities. Therefore, economic and social
rights could be temporarily pushed into the background.110 In the absence of
financial and intellectual support, these community initiatives for economic
equality described in this chapter were not able to advance an alternative
direction for the country and were inevitably marginalised – even though they
were important actors.
Citizen initiatives have the (often unrealised) potential to be agents of deeper social
change. There were alternatives to liquidating public housing assets. However,
as József Hegedüs and Nóra Teller write, a sustainable public housing system
would have meant ‘a structural transformation of the sector, not only chang-
ing the rules (apartment allocation, rent control, and rent subsidies) but also
changing the ‘behaviour’ of the owner (municipal governments, companies,
cooperatives), the housing management institution and the tenants.’
111
However,
the political leadership (whether at the government or the municipal level) did
not take on the political risk and economic costs involved. Yet, the movement
overview shows that several organisations could have been partners, and their
strength could have been multiplied with adequate political support.
109
Dagnino E. (2011). “Civil Society in Latin America .” In Edwards, M. (ed.). The Oxford Handbook of Civil
Society, New York: Oxford University Press.
110
Solt O. (1990). “Beszélgetés a szociáldemokráciáról.” Századvég 1:126-127.; Ladányi J., Szelényi I. (2003).
A kirekesztettség változó formái. Budapest: Napvilág Kiadó, 28.; Udvarhelyi, Az igazság az utcán hever,
149-153.
111
Hegedüs J., Teller N. (2006). A támogatott bérlakásszektor növelését célzó programme intézményi és
szer ve zeti feltételeinek elemzése és javaslattétel a bérlakásprogramme alternatív intézményi modelljére.
Város kutatás Kft., 43 .
2. The age of institutionalisation (1995–2002)
Roma Civil Rights Foundation • House-Home Foundation • Habitat
for Humanity Hungary • Tenants’ Association112
By 1999, the number of public housing units had fallen from 750,000 to
230,000.113 As a result of privatisation, the new owners were responsible for
their apartments and the maintenance and renovation of the entire building.
This led to the proliferation of housing cooperatives and condominium associ-
ations in the 1990s.114 However, after the almost complete dismantling of the
public housing sector, municipal governments had few tools left to tackle
housing poverty. From 1993 onwards, the increased housing costs could have
been oset by providing the newly introduced housing benefit, as required by
law. Still, these were typically sabotaged or set at deficient levels by munic-
ipal governments.115 In the absence of an adequate social safety net, many
low-income households were thus forced to move to poorer quality housing or
cheaper neighbourhoods or regions, or turn to the homeless care system for
help.116 Mostly low-income people with serious payment diculties remained
in public housing.117 In the absence of real alternatives, municipal governments
continued to opt for eviction in large numbers in the case of households in
arrears and squatters.
The low level of housing construction exacerbated the housing crisis. Hous-
ing starts had been falling since the 1980s, reaching a low in 1998, before
112 The Hungarian names of the organisations are: Roma Polgárjogi Alapítvány • Házat-Hazát Alapítvány •
Habitat for Humanity Magyarország • Lakásbérlők Egyesülete.
113 Farkas, Székely, Helyzetkép 13.; Hegedüs J. (2006). Lakáspolitika és lakáspiac – a közpolitika korlátai.
Esély 5:6 5-10 0. ( 74.) .
114
The Advocacy Alliance of Housing Cooperatives and Condominiums (LÉTÉSZ) was founded in 1990 and
the National Association of Housing Cooperatives and Condominiums (LOSZ) in 1993 .
115 Misetics B. (2018). Sosem volt elég: Lakásfenntartási támogatás 2015 előtt. Esély 6:3-44. (13-14.)
116 Augustyniak, H., Csizmady A ., Hegedüs J., Laszek-Krysztof Olszewsky, J., Somogyi E. (2019). Posztszo-
cialista lakásrendszerek Magyarországon és Lengyelországban. Közgazdasági Szemle LX VI., Sept, 980-
1004. (988-89.)
117 Hegedüs J. (2009). Lakáspolitika és társadalmi kirekesztés. Előadás, 11.22., 3.

THE LAST THREE DECADES OF THE HUNGARIAN HOUSING MOVEMENT  A BOTTOMUP VIEW  
51
recovering.118 Following the capitalist transformation, the market conditions
for access to housing (and thus for construction) were created by introducing
mortgage-based housing loans, while social policy subsidies were used to
promote the construction of new housing. The socialist Horn government sig-
nificantly increased the so-called ‘szocpol’ allowance
119
in 1994 for families with
two or three children. However, due to the ill-considered distribution scheme,
there was a lot of abuse, and a new type of segregated housing, so-called
‘szocpol settlements,’ emerged.120 The state relied on entrepreneurs and the
non-profit sector to construct housing for the disadvantaged, and both the
conservative Antall and the socialist Horn governments allocated funds for
them. Starting in 2000, the conservative Orbán government launched public
housing construction and mortgage-based housing loans programmes. The
public housing construction programme was popular, reaching low- and low-
er-middle-income groups. Still, the resources were far below the needs, and
the amounts mainly allocated to subsidising housing loans.121 Relevant housing
policy decisions were also influenced by institutional interests, with the banking
lobby winning out over the construction lobby.122 Instead of strengthening the
public housing sector, billions were spent on subsidising housing loans for
the middle class.
Despite the increasing hardship for people of low status, the number of com-
munity advocacy groups for the house poor had declined. The organising of
homeless people essentially disappeared.123 The newly formed Roma Civil
Rights Foundation advocated for squatters and tenants with insecure status,
and the Tenants’ Association also provided services.
124
Disadvantaged people
could also turn to housing construction organisations, e.g., Habitat for Human-
ity Hungary. These organisations (including the Tenants’ Association in this
118
Hegedüs J., Várhegyi É. (1999). A lakásfinanszírozás válsága a kilencvenes években. Közgazdasági Szemle,
XLVI. febr., 101 –120. (102-103.)
119 The social policy allowance was a widespread, non-refundable cash grant subsidy for homeownership,
available to families with children.
120 Farkas Zs . (2017). “Telepszerű lakókörnyezet volt a hivatalos elnevezése…” Doktori értekezés, ELTE Tár-
sadalomtudományi Kar Szociológia Doktori Iskola; Hegedüs, Lakáspolitika 9-10.
121 Hegedüs, Lakáspolitika és lakáspiac 77.
122 Csizmady A., Hegedüs J., Vonnák D. (2019). Lakásrezsim és a devizahitel-válság: intézményi és egyéni
stratégiák. Szociológiai Szemle 29(1):4-32. (11.)
123 Udvarhelyi, Az igazság az utcán hever 186-188.
124 Magyar Nemzet, 17 Jun 1998, 61(140):14.
period) drew on the participation of experts in their management. They did
not build primarily on the knowledge and organisational work of the aected
people (in contrast to the self-governing tenant communities, Anti-Ghetto
Committee, the National Front of the Poor, Roofs Over Our Heads, ESZIK or
Tenants’ Association member organisations in the first phase). Instead, they
hired professionals with the relevant qualifications. As a result, they became
stable pillars of the housing movement and experts in their field. However,
they also risked becoming transactional in their relationship with stakehold-
ers (client-expert, voluntary-professional organisation) or losing touch with
their base altogether. Donors’ expectations of institutionalisation (registered
organisation, accountants), the bureaucratisation involved in the registration
of organisations, and the increasing centrality of the figure of the expert –
which accelerated in the wake of Hungary’s accession to the EU – all pushed
organisations in the direction of professionalisation. This left less space for
organising aected people, even though a grassroots approach was much
needed to highlight problems and increase pressure on decision-makers.
2.1. Roma Civil Rights Foundation – an organisation
for Roma tenants with insecure status and
squatters
By 1995, it was clear that the Roma population was the segment of the popu-
lation that lost most with the regime change. While over half of Roma families
had no active wage-earners, this was true for ‘only’ one-third of non-Roma
families. There was also a housing dimension to their impoverishment, as the
majority of Roma lived in the most deprived rural towns and villages.125 Pushing
Roma people in arrears and squatters out of the cities – where they had pre-
viously moved to escape rural poverty – were therefore not real solution; it is
even more obvious today that such actions only increased the hopelessness
of disadvantaged rural regions.126
125 Kertesi G. (1995): Cigány foglalkoztatás és munkanélküliség a rendszerváltás előtt és után. Esély 4.
126 Ladányi J. (2012). Leselejtezettek. Budapest: L’Harmattan.

THE LAST THREE DECADES OF THE HUNGARIAN HOUSING MOVEMENT  A BOTTOMUP VIEW  
52
The Roma Civil Rights Foundation (in Hungarian RPA), established on May 9,
1995, sought to provide a complex response to the worsening situation of the
Roma. RPA saw the cause of the disadvantages as the combined eect of
several problematic areas. Therefore, in addition to discrimination and ethnic
conflict, it aimed to be active in terms of education, media representation,
dissemination of news to Roma people, employment, and housing.127 As the
Roma had been targeted by an increasing number of evictions and resettle-
ment attempts since the late 1980s, housing was a key focus of the foundation.
RPA was organised by Aladár Horváth, who also played a prominent role in
creating the Anti-Ghetto Committee in 1989.
128
The organisation intervened
on behalf of hundreds of people facing eviction in both rural areas and Buda-
pest.129 It took on the problems that had been taken up a few years earlier by
the squatters of Roofs Over Our Heads and the professionals of the ‘CHANCE’
Family Support Service. The recurrence of evictions was no coincidence.
Capitalist urban planning failed to provide real answers to the problem of
housing poverty. Those who had been pushed out of one district reappeared
in another or in disadvantaged rural towns and villages.130 The organisation
sought to improve the situation of those aected through individual legal case
management, social work, and, where necessary, crisis management at the
municipal level. The primary objective was to negotiate with the municipal gov-
ernments, directly involving the people aected. RPA used protests and human
chains as a last resort. The organisation filled a service gap, also evidenced
by many of its clients being non-Roma. The civil rights leader Jenő Setét was
awarded the RPA prize for his outstanding social work in the organisation.131
127 Aladár Horváth’s Facebook post; Népszabadság, 20 May 1995, 53(117):4. Furthermore, RPA built up the
institutions of the Roma movement. In 1995, it established the Roma Press Centre, in 1996, it organised
Romaversitas, which promotes Roma participation in higher education, and it also shaped memor y politics
through the commemoration of the Roma Holocaust (porajmos).
128 Hor váth returned to civic life in 1995 as a well-known public figure, after four years as an SZDSZ MP in
the Parliament. The foundation’s board of trustees included Roma and non-Roma intellectuals (teachers,
politicians, researchers, filmmakers, journalists). Aladár Horváth’s Facebook post.
129 Among others in the following municipalities: Budapest – Budaliget, Erzsébetváros, Ferencváros, Józse-
fváros, Pesterzsébet, Terézváros, Zugló; Garé, Monor, Ózd, Paks, Sátoraljaújhely, Székesfehérvár, Zámoly.
130 Gould R. V. (1995). Insurgent Identities. The University of Chicago Press; Ladányi, Leselejtezettek.
131
In 2011, Setét set up another important pillar of the Roma movement, the We Belong Here network, which
is still active today.
RPA had been confronted with the disproportionate media attention paid to
Roma squatters from the beginning of its work. Although many more people
were facing eviction for utility or rent arrears, eviction was perceived as a Roma
problem.
132
This is why the organisation carried out a Budapest-wide survey,
led by Jenő Setét, regarding those at risk of eviction. The data collected from
district councils found that the primary group at risk of eviction among people
living in public housing consisted of households in arrears (rather than squat-
ters).133 Although RPA did not have disaggregated data by ethnicity, their field-
work experience suggested that Roma people represented only a minority of
this group – even though the general public perceived housing loss a problem
for Roma people. The use of ‘ethnicisation’ (the attempt to define a social prob-
lem as if it were a characteristic of an ethnic group) as a political tool – and the
divisive eect it entailed – was highlighted by several prominent sociologists
around 2000.134 Setét summarised the adverse eects of ethnicisation in the
case of evictions:
‘It is possible to separate dierent social groups from one another by
shrewd political language, and thus the political pressure by alliance and
coordination of the masses can be prevented. Language, communication
is an essential tool for this. And it is no coincidence that the [legal and
popular] term ‘arbitrary squatting’ was an excellent way of making the
media-consuming masses feel resentment instead of solidarity. [...] Roma
people represent a tiny percentage of the potential evictees, but the media
and social conflicts are the most vocal in their case. [...] The loss of housing
as a problem was ethnicised as a result of media representation.’135
132
There is no standardised dataset on the number of people in arrears . According to Hegedüs, in 2003, there
were around 500,000 households with arrears: according to the Hungarian Central Statistical Oce, in
1999, the proportion of tenants in arrears with utility bills was 16.7 percent and the proportion of owners
in arrears with utility bills was 5 percent. Hegedüs, Lakáspolitika és lakáspiac 75.; Farkas, Székely, Hely-
zetkép, 13. See also Herpai B. (2010). A lakossági díjhátralékok alakulása egy felmérés tükrében. Esély
6:22-40., and the writings of the Periféria Center.
133 Based on an interview with Jenő Setét.
134 Ladány J.-Szelényi I. (1997/2010). „Ki a cigány?” In: Ladányi J., Csanádi G., Gerő Zs., Liskó I., Szelényi I.,
Virág T. Szociális és etnikai konfliktusok: Válogatott tanulmányok (1975-2010). Kánai nyomda, 146 -153.;
Ladányi J. (2003). „Romaügyek pedig nincsenek!” In: Ladányi J., Csanádi G., Csepeli Gy., Szelényi I.,
Nemeskér y A. Társadalom és térszerkezeti átalakulások: Válogatott tanulmányok (1975-2010), Kánai
nyomda, 241-247.
135
Based on the interview with Jenő Setét. According to Ladányi, poverty was similarly ethnicised. According
to his calculations, in 2003 , the number of people living in permanent deep poverty and exclusion was

THE LAST THREE DECADES OF THE HUNGARIAN HOUSING MOVEMENT  A BOTTOMUP VIEW  
53
Of the evictions that attracted much media attention, the Székesfehérvár
resettlement attempt received the most attention. The situation in 1995 was
eerily similar to the 1989 ghetto aair in Miskolc and the response of the
country’s leadership to mass homelessness a few years earlier. The newly
elected city council of Székesfehérvár wanted to dismantle a public housing
estate by rebuilding the building on the city’s outskirts, outside the residential
area. From a building located at 11 Rádió Street, they would have moved 43
families – a total of 150 people, most of them Roma – into a ghetto-like seg-
regated settlement at the edge of town. Similar to Miskolc, RPA reorganised
the Anti-Ghetto Committee in early November 1995 and formed a fact-finding
committee. A few days later, the proposal was ready: 11 Rádió Street was un-
inhabitable, and the only acceptable solution was alternative housing within
a residential area. This was the beginning of years of advocacy, and by 1997,
the city council succeeded in securing housing for the majority of families.
However, 13 families remained, for whom the municipal leadership installed
military containers on the city’s outskirts. The city council made a promise
to contribute 30 million HUF to the construction of permanent housing.136 On
November 24, 1997, RPA and the concerned families organised a demonstra-
tion of 300 people in front of the containers.137 Eventually, the 13 families were
allowed to move temporarily into a vacant city-owned building. The actors
seemed to have agreed, but the city council decided to buy apartments for
the families outside Székesfehérvár. The case then moved to the next level.
While the ethnic conflict was avoided in Székesfehérvár, it was not possible
in the neighbouring towns. On December 10, 1997, a Molotov cocktail was
thrown at the house where one of the families was about to move in the village
of Pátka, and the residents started collecting signatures to prevent the move.
between 600-800,000. While it is true that the transition to a market economy had pushed the Roma
population into greater poverty, and Roma people are over-represented within the excluded, marginalised
population, one quarter to one third of those living in extreme poverty are Roma. ‘A significant proportion
of the Roma are neither poor nor excluded, and a significant proportion of the poor and excluded are not
Roma.’ Ladányi, Romaügyek pedig nincsenek! 243. ; János Bársony, RPA’s legal ocer, also stressed in the
press that the threat of losing housing is a problem for society as a whole rather than a ‘Roma problem’.
Magyar Nemzet, 23 May 2000, 63(119):4.
136
Ladányi J. (1998). A székesfehérvári get tóügy üzenetei. In: Kur tán S., Sándor P., Vass L. (eds). Magyarország
Politikai Évkönyve. Budapest: Demokrácia Kutatások Magyar Központja Alapítvány, 313-321.
137 Népszabadság, 24 Nov 1997, 55(274):9. After the successful Roma protest, the containers stood empty.
Since they were already paid for, the city council of Székesfehér vár aimed to use them as substandard
shelter for homeless people. So on Dec 10, the Oliver Twist Foundation and RPA protested together to
prevent this from happening. Magyar Hírlap, 10 Dec 1997, 30(288):6.
50 Fejér County mayors also called on Székesfehérvár to solve the housing
problem within its administrative boundaries. On December 18, residents in
Belsőbáránd prevented a family from moving in by forming a human chain.138
The ‘Székesfehérvár ghetto aair’ had confronted RPA advocates not only
with the fact that the authorities attempted to solve the housing crisis by
excluding (and blaming) Roma people, but the organisation also realised that
the mismanaged housing crisis would be fertile ground for ethnic conflict.139
RPA made several eorts to thematise housing issues at the national level.
Although the law did not particularly protect the interests of squatters until
1999 (the judicial procedure up to this day is still essentially an administrative
process: the judge does not consider the social conditions of the person con-
cerned and there is no hearing to allow arguments to be put to the court) and
thousands of evictions had already taken place in the previous years, there
was a great outcry when – on the initiative of a conservative Alliance of Young
Democrats (Fidesz) MP – the Parliament criminalised squatters in 1999 and
allowed their eviction by a notary in 2000.140 Organisations took advantage of
the anger, and a broad alliance was organised on May 24, 2000, with RPA as
one of the initiators. The protesters called for increased family benefits and
demanded new jobs and public housing instead of evictions.141 However, only a
few thousand people turned up, despite many organisations joining the event.
Another attempt was made in 2005 when RPA launched a popular initiative
to ban evictions without adequate alternative housing. However, they failed to
collect the 50,000 signatures needed for Parliament to table the issue.142 These
two cases show that – although the organisation represented many people –
it could not mobilise a base in the long run. RPA was left with little energy to
138 Népszava, 19 Jan 1998, 126(15):6.
139 In addition, a debt crisis was unfolding, in conjunction with the 1989 regime change. The socialist state
provided subsidised loans before the transition; however, the post-transition government increased the
loan interest rate and applied the measure retroactively to all debtors. Borrowers suered from increased
loans even in the 2000s, and tens of thousands of families were particularly badly aected, including Roma
people. For example, in 2000, about fift y Roma families in Kunszentmiklós were threatened with eviction.
RPA filed a petition regarding the issue in 1998. Népszava, 10 Feb 1998, 126(34):3; Népszabadság, 2 Aug
2000, 58(179):5.
140 Political Capital (2001). Az önkényes lakásfoglalások hátteréről, nov. 25.
141 Népszava, 20 May 2000, 128(117):4.
142 Origo, 8 June 2005; For comparison, in 2005, disabled people’s organisations collected 50,000 signatures
for a popular initiative. Sebály B. (2020). Social Movements and Policy Change: Case Study on Caregiver
Benefit Policies in Hungary. CEU, researchgate.net.

THE LAST THREE DECADES OF THE HUNGARIAN HOUSING MOVEMENT  A BOTTOMUP VIEW  
54
organise a network of existing or potential local organisations grouped around
the Roma Civil Rights Foundation. It was not able to build a grassroots base
to shore up its national, systemic housing advocacy. The organisation ceased
to exist in 2010. after it had fallen into a financial crisis, and the district council
did not renew its contract for the Nefelejcs Street headquarters.143 The Roma
movement entered a new era, but Roma housing advocacy lost strength with
the disappearance of RPA.144
2.2. Habitat for Humanity Hungary and its
predecessor, the House-Home Foundation –
organisations of housing applicants
Katalin Korompay of the Municipality of Budapest Chief Architect’s Oce shed
some light on how acute the housing shortage was in 1995: ‘We cannot start ren-
ovating the inner, historic part of the city until there is a national housing concept.
But for years, experts and those crammed into a single room have been waiting in
vain for a national housing programme. However, we cannot wait long to renovate
the houses, which are almost a century old and were already in unsatisfactory
condition at the end of the last century.’145 By systematically providing access
to aordable housing, municipal governments could have avoided the urban
renewal-related evictions – carried out without adequate alternative housing
– and forced changes of residence that reduced the quality of people’s lives.
Inspired by the US founded Habitat for Humanity, the House-Home Foun-
dation was set up in 1992 to stimulate housing construction. The initiative
was financed by Lakitelek Foundation, aliated with the conservative party
Hungarian Democratic Forum (MDF), and international Habitat oce itself. It
received state budget support between 1993 and 1995, signed by the MDF
government.
146
The organisation was seen as the Hungarian equivalent of
Habi tat until 1996. The idea of applying a Habitat model in Hungary came from
143 Aladár Horváth’s Facebook post.
144 Hungarian Civil Liberties Union (HCLU) launches its Roma programme in 2010.
145 Népszabadság – Budapest melléklet, 3 Nov 1995, I.
146 Magyar Nemzet, 18 Feb 1992, 55(41):4., Népszabadság, 8 Jun 1993, 51(131):13.
aHungarian businessman in Florida, Kálmán Lőrincz, who had volunteered with
Habitat in the US.
147
He became the director of the Hungarian organisation.
The programme was open to people who had no other means of obtaining
housing (typically large families or young married couples.) Applicants had to
work 500 hours in advance for the organisation to get on the waiting list for a
house, and selected families paid o the construction costs in instalments after
moving in.148 The Habitat model was not culturally alien, as building homes in
communities has a centuries-old tradition in Hungarian peasant culture (called
kaláka). Many families built houses this way during the socialist era too.
House-Home was the first Habitat partner organisation in East-Central Eu-
rope. The first house was built in Bátaszék.149 The programme was very pop-
ular with people in need, but the organisers struggled with a lack of resources
from the beginning. Instead of the thousands of houses they had hoped for,
the foundation finally managed to build around 50 by 1996 – leaving many
people who volunteered their time without housing.150 They could not recruit
enough financial supporters (the tax laws of the time posed an obstacle, too),
only a few municipal governments showed willingness to give away plots of
land for free, and it was not easy to obtain building materials at a wholesale
price. The selection process of the recipients of housing was also not clearly
defined.151 In 1996, the recently elected socialist Horn government withdrew
state budget support for House-Home, and instead provided subsidies for two
other organisations (the Welfare Service Foundation and the National Roma
Minority Self-Government) in its subsidised housing programme.152
Finally, in 1996, the relationship between House-Home and the American Hab-
itat deteriorated, and the latter withdrew its support from the Hungarian part-
ner. The decision was influenced in particular by the unclear and sometimes
subjective selection criteria among applicants.
153
It also caused concern that in
147 Új Magyarország, 24 Apr 1992, 2(97):4.
148 Kisalföld 23 Dec 1992, 47(302):4., Esti Hírlap, 6 July 1995, 40(156):16., Hajdú-Bihari Napló, 7 July 1995,
52(158):4.
149 Kisalföld 23 Dec 1992, 47(302):4.
150 Új Magyarország, 13 Nov 1995, 5(266):10.
151 Népszava, 14 Sep 1992, 120(217):7; Népszava, 9 Aug 1996, 124(186):5.
152 Népszava, 21 Dec 1995, 123(299):5.
153 Népszava, 14 Sep 1992, 120(217):7; Népszava, 9 Aug 1996, 124(186):5.

THE LAST THREE DECADES OF THE HUNGARIAN HOUSING MOVEMENT  A BOTTOMUP VIEW  
55
1995, the far-right Hungarian Justice and Life Party (MIÉP), including its leader
István Csurka, promoted itself at the organisation’s community construction
events.154 In March 1996, the U.S. parent organisation set up its Hungarian
organisation, Habitat for Humanity Hungary. House-Home is still active in the
country and the Hungarian diaspora of the neighbouring countries.
Habitat for Humanity Hungary’s history began in the city of Vác in August 1996.
This is where Habitat volunteers – including former U.S. President Jimmy Carter
– built ten simple houses.155 Subsequently, between 1997 and 2008, 31 houses
were built in Göd, ten in Budapest, 14 in Hajdúböszörmény, 14 in Szarvas, 37
in Csurgó, and 40 in Dunavarsány, where even a street was named after Habi-
tat.156 Although this type of assistance helped many people access aordable
housing, it did not provide a systemic solution to the housing shortage. From
the 2000s onwards, market loans finally boosted housing construction.157 After
2008, the profile of Habitat Hungary changed and took a dierent trajectory
compared to the international Habitat network. Instead of building houses,
Habitat Hungary’s activities have included renovating public housing and social
service institutions, working with families in deprived communities, and provid-
ing innovative financial solutions for people in need. More of his work will be
discussed in the following sections.
2.3. Lessons from the second era
The advantages and disadvantages of institutionalisation. For a successful organ-
isation to survive in the long term, it will eventually need specialised, paid sta.
This is how the Tenants’ Association, RPA, and Habitat could represent hundreds
of people and become stable pillars of the housing movement. However, organ-
isations that become institutionalised also run the risk of being side-tracked
by the burden of financial survival, becoming project-based and transaction-
al in their relationship with beneficiaries. Moreover, organising and sustain-
ing a community base requires specific professional and financial resources.
154 Hajdú-Bihari Napló, 7 July 1995, 52(158):4.; Magyar Fórum, 13 July 1995, 7(28):16.
155 Népszabadság, 6 Aug 1996, 43(183):3.; Népszava, 9 Aug 1996, 124(186):5.
156 Habitat’s own records.
157 Augustyniak et al, Posztszocialista lakásrendszerek 987., 990.
Some of the house poor are not represented by the movement. The organising
of homeless people and housing applicants virtually disappeared from the
movement during this era (between 1995-2002.) At the same time, the voices
of squatters and tenants with insecure status became more vocal than in the
previous period. RPA sought to enshrine the right to housing and a ban on
evictions without adequate alternative housing. The Tenants’ Association con-
sistently commented on policies concerning tenants, tenants-turned-owners,
and disadvantaged people’s access to housing. Still, its organising work was
limited to tenants who wanted to buy their homes.
Press coverage is crucial. The protests of disadvantaged people give impetus to
advocacy and are essential to the development of democracy. However, their
public image depends primarily on journalists and politicians. For example,
from a contemporary media analysis, we know that the media representation
of the residents of Rádió Street in Székesfehérvár gave a distorted picture
of the otherwise self-organising families. In addition, politicians could not al-
ways refrain from racist comments in their public announcements.158 Thus, in
addition to organising the base, influencing media content is essential for the
movement through dedicated preparation for press appearances and inter-
viewees’ strategic selection and training.
Caught in the crossfire of party-political battles. During the third term of the
democratic-capitalist transition, it became clear that political parties do not
demonstrate cross-party cooperation on housing – but consider it a battle-
ground instead. None of the political forces was self-critical of its governmental
performance, and when in opposition, they showed themselves supportive
to the cause in a bid to boost their popularity. When movement leaders align
themselves with a party, they may contribute to housing remaining a tool for
endless party-political games – unless the movement can enforce meaningful,
complex policy responses.
158 Népszava, 19 Jan 1998, 126(15):6; Ladányi, A székesfehérvári gettóügy üzenetei.

THE LAST THREE DECADES OF THE HUNGARIAN HOUSING MOVEMENT  A BOTTOMUP VIEW  
56
3. Globalisation critics and local innovators
(2002–2008)
People Of The Streets • Centrum Group • Food Not Bombs•
Hungarian Social Forum • Four Houses • Green Youth •
Organisation For The Roma Of Szomolya • Poor ReliefFund
Eger • Nógrád County Association Of Roma Minority
Representatives And Advocates
Since the end of the 1990s, economic stabilisation in Hungary had led to a
boom in housing lending and construction. A market-based housing finance
system was set up, making housing aordable for better-o families. Inter-
est-rate subsidy schemes introduced by the first conservative Orbán govern-
ment in 2000 reinforced this trend, which made higher income earners much
more likely to receive more financial support. Unjustifiably large from a housing
policy point of view, the popular interest-rate subsidy burdened the country’s
budget by hundreds of billions of forints until it was phased out in 2004.159
Under the first socialist Gyurcsány government, the subsidy for forint loans
was replaced by cheaper and (due to competition among banks) easily ac-
cessible foreign currency loans, which left households vulnerable to financial
markets because of lax regulation and exchange rate risk.
160
In the meantime,
a state-funded national debt management programme was launched in 2003;
participation was compulsory for municipalities with over 40,000 inhabitants
from 2006. The highly popular programme targeted vulnerable households
with significant arrears in utility bills, common charges, rent, and housing loans.
As a result, tens of thousands of families received substantial debt relief and
debt management counselling.161
Around the same time, the housing allowance was reformed – in 2004, it be-
come a ‘normative benefit’, that is to say that it was financed from the state
159 Hegedüs, Kertesi Gábor 70 éves, 136.
160 Augustyniak et al, Posztszocialista lakásrendszerek 991.; Hegedüs, Lakásrendszer 143.
161 Kőnig É. (2006). Adósságkezelés: sikerek és kudarcok. Esély 1:3-29.
budget, was made available in all municipalities and applied the same eligibil-
ity conditions across the country. This increased access and the municipal
governments’ willingness to provide the subsidy, although the amount granted
was still largely insucient.162
By the early 2000s, urban redevelopment projects were beginning to crowd
out low-income people from urban neighbourhoods.
163
Driven by inspiring
examples from abroad and EU directives, the Józsefváros district council of
Budapest implemented a community-driven pilot programme in the Magdolna
district between 2005 and 2008. As a result, social urban renewal, a pro-
gressive practice in urban development that considers low-income residents’
interests, was designated as a national development objective.
164
On the other
hand, in the spirit of the 1990s, market-oriented urban developments such as
the Gozsdu Courtyard and Corvin Promenade,165 and shady municipal property
sales in Budapest, particularly in Terézváros and Erzsébetváros, continued.166
To save historic buildings left to fall into disrepair to enable property specu-
lation, ÓVÁS! Association initiated a series of projects from 2004 in Erzsébet-
város. The real estate embezzlement in that district – and the harm it caused to
public housing tenants – became a forefront issue thanks to a legal complaint
brought by the Tenants’ Association, the Clean Air Action Group, the ÓVÁS! Asso-
ciation and the victims themselves of the embezzlement. The organisations
exposed the mechanisms of profiteering in detail.167 The transformation of the
urban landscape continued to include the displacement of homeless people.
This included the multi-year underpass renovation programme initiated by the
Municipality of Budapest started in 2002, with the involvement of the Budapest
Police Headquarters, the Budapest Streets Department and the Budapest
Methodological Centre of Social Policy and its Institutions (a homeless care
institute).168
162 Hegedüs, Lakáspolitika és lakáspiac – a közpolitika korlátai, 75.; Kőnig, Adósságkezelés, 20.
163 Jelinek Cs. (2019). A városrehabilitáció korszakai Magyarországon. Tér és Társadalom 33(4):17-37.
164
Alföldi Gy. (2010). Közösségi részvétel a városfejlesztésben – a Magdolna Negyed tanulságai. Építészfórum,
Jelinek, A városrehabilitáció korszakai 2 7.
165
Zolnay J. (2006). Városszövet – bűnszövet. Beszélő 11(7)., Alföldi Gy. (2008). Szociális rehabilitáció a
Józsefvárosban. Falu Város Régió 2:27- 34. (3 .)
166 K-Monitor. Belvárosi ingatlanpanama (VI.-VII. kerület).
167 LABE, Óvás!, Levegő Munkacsoport, KIR ÁLY MP Pénzügyi Szolgáltató Kft. (2006). Feljelentés, júl. 18.
168 Török Á ., Udvarhelyi É. T. (2005). Egy tiszta város piszkos lakói. Világosság 7- 8:5 7-79.

THE LAST THREE DECADES OF THE HUNGARIAN HOUSING MOVEMENT  A BOTTOMUP VIEW  
57
It was only in 2005 (during the fourth government term after the regime
change) that a desegregation programme to reduce rural housing poverty,
targeting mainly Roma people, was launched. At the beginning of the planning
process, the government talked about 440 (sometimes 667) enclaves and
segregated neighbourhoods to be dismantled, for a total of 10.5 billion HUF.
It eventually shrank to 3.2 billion HUF and a model programme for 47 small
towns or villages (54 enclaves and neighbourhoods), including the rehabili-
tation of segregated neighbourhoods. Over the five years of the programme,
a few hundred families received support.
169
‘The real ghettos of the country
(Tiszavasvári, Hajdúhadház, Alsózsolca, Putnok) could not even be reached with
this amount of money.’170 The programme also included educational and em-
ployment components to promote integration – but the budget was eventually
drastically cut, and people were typically employed through public works and
thus unable to access the primary labour market .171
Zsombor Farkas sums up the eects of the desegregation programme as fol-
lows: ‘the ‘handling’ of the problem remained at the level of political declarations.
The responses and the means were not ‘honest’: there was no real intention
to achieve the goals, there was a lack of long-term strategic programmes to
mitigate the complex disadvantages [...]. This is clearly indicated by the mixed,
overall rather unsuccessful outcomes of local projects; and what we see today
on the sites of previous model programmes (new Roma settlements, sprawling
segregated neighbourhoods, ghettoised villages, conflicts between the Roma
and non-Roma).’
172
By the end of the 2000s, it was clear that there was a
lack of political will to adequately address the situation of these substandard
housing enclaves and segregated neighbourhoods inhabited predominantly
by Roma people.
169 Farkas, “Telepszerű lakókörnyezet volt a hivatalos elnevezése…” 90, 102.
170 Varró Sz. (2008). Az MSZP-SZDSZ-kormányok romapolitikája 2002 óta-I.–Céltalanul, Magyar Narancs,
29 May.
171 Farkas, “Telepszerű lakókörnyezet volt a hivatalos elnevezése…” 96 -97.
172 Ibid. 86, 99.
3.1. People Of The Streets, Centrum Group, and Food
Not Bombs – allies of homeless people
The worldwide liberalisation of capitalist markets and trade that has been
unfolding since the 1970s (neoliberal globalisation) was criticised by the so-
called alternative globalisation or alter-glob movement. The intertwining of
the harmful eects of globalisation – pollution, climate change, exploitation of
workers, the destruction of local cultures, wars – led organisations from dier-
ent backgrounds and regions to recognise each other as allies. The alter-glob
movement in the mid-1990s – rooted in developing countries protesting against
US imperialism – gave rise to a multitude of diverse organisations, which were
did not shy away from radical means and were based in both poorer and richer
countries around the world. This included Hungary.
The Humanist Movement was the first in the Hungarian alterglob scene to take
up the cause of housing; in 2004, it set up a network of volunteers called Peo-
ple Of The Streets. The aim of the two founders, Nikoletta Nagy and Anita Sza-
bó, was to change the exclusion of homeless people and the apathy towards
them. They drew inspiration from the humanists’ human-centered, egalitarian
worldview and the African American civil rights movement. Following humanist
principles, they attached as much importance to the social cause as to the
personal development of the volunteers involved in the movement. The organi-
sation’s activities were based on two pillars: campaigning for the constitutional
recognition of the right to housing and providing tangible assistance. 173
The People Of The Streets activists organised the first Solidarity Night in
Budapest in 2004, where they held an all-night demonstration with a vigil
involving homeless people.174 In 2005, together with the Humanist Movement,
they joined a popular initiative of the Roma Civil Rights Foundation that called
for a ban on evictions without adequate alternative housing. Despite lots of
173 Udvarhelyi É., Nagy N. (2008). “Man On The Street”: An Experiment In Social Justice Activism And Activist
Anthropology In Hungary. Urban Anthropology 37(2):139-174. Publications.
174 The event was also held in Pécs and Szeged the following year. The first Solidarity Night was organised
in partnership with the Green Youth Association, whose mission was to promote the creative use and
environmentally conscious development of urban spaces. 168 óra, 25 Nov 2004, 16(47):20-21; Linder B.
(2005). Egy falat, egy korty – Szolidaritás Éjszakája. Magyar Narancs, 24 Nov 2005.

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58
eort, the organisations failed to collect the 50,000 signatures needed.
175
They protested against evictions and local ordinances penalising the so-called
‘silent begging’, the withdrawal of municipal subsidies for the homeless care
system, and against the installation of armrests on public benches to exclude
homeless people from public spaces.176 In 2008, they honoured the memory
of homeless people frozen to death with a striking performance including body
bags.
177
However, the activist group of 10 to 15 people failed to grow, even
though it had a base of followers. Meanwhile, the People Of The Streets split
in spirit from the Humanist Movement in 2007; most of its members wanted to
focus on policies ending homelessness.
178
The main virtue of the organisation
is that it brought back a culture of protest and political demands to the issue
of homelessness (which, since 1990, had been characterised by social assis-
tance. It was also the birthplace of the activists who – a few months after the
demise of People Of The Streets in 2009 – founded the community advocacy
group The City Is For All. Subsequently, many of them became leading figures
in a later phase of the housing movement.
A capitalistic use of space – driven by gentrification and property speculation
– was criticised along anarchist lines by Centrum Group, founded in 2004.179
The group’s activists tried to introduce the culture of squatting in Hungary; they
occupied properties on four occasions – these were either expropriated by
real estate investors or left vacant for years due to municipal property specula-
tion.
180
The Centrum Group squatters emphasised the impact of capitalism on
everyday life, the housing problems of young people, the homeless and abused
women, gentrification, and the lack of measures to protect historical monu-
ments. Although some homeless people were involved in their actions, their
members typically occupied houses out of social conviction rather than out of
necessity. They were also not associated with the thousands of need-based
175 Kisalföld, 29 Jul 2005, 60(176):5.
176 Népszabadság, 4 Apr 2007, 65(79):8; Népszabadság, 29 Jun 2007, 65(150):6; Magyar Nemzet, 14 Dec
2007, 70(340):4; Udvarhelyi É. (2010). Man On The Street. Practicing Anthropology, 32(2):17-20. Publica-
tions.
177 Magyar Hírlap, 1 March 2008, 41(52):2.
178 Udvarhelyi, Nagy, “Man On The Street” 158, 163-164.
179
For my research on the Centrum Group, I relied extensively on the analytical, self-critical study of Viktor
Kotun, who was one of the original squatters. Kotun V. (2008). A Centrum Csoport és Budapest. Helikon
54(4):571 -620. Compare with Dunajcsik P. M. (2006). Foglaltház és civil társadalo m. Civil Szemle 3(6):69 -96.
180 For Hungarian traditions of squatting, see Kotun, The Centrum Group 592-593.
squatters (or organisations linked to them). In the occupied spaces – with the
exception of the last occupation – they created cultural-artistic projects. The
group built up a substantial infrastructure to carry out their actions. They had
units of people organised to open the buildings, turn on water, electricity, and
other infrastructure, clean the house, organise programmes and press com-
munications. In all cases, they also actively relied on media outlets that were
sympathetic to their goals and whose presence served a protective function.
Their first action, at the end of October 2004, was the occupation of the
Centrum Pioneer Department Store,181 which had been vacant for two years.
It was followed by the occupation of the Flórián Cinema on September 1, 2005
(vacant for five years) and the occupation of 41 Kazinczy Street (vacant for
three years) The latter had been operating as a kosher butcher’s and meat
factory between 1900 and 2002. At least 100 squatters took part in this ac-
tion. They stayed in the Pioneer Department Store for two weeks; in Kazinczy
Street, they agreed to leave before the opening of the squat in exchange for
the promise that the Erzsébetváros district council would negotiate with them
about the use of the building.
182
However, the negotiations never happened,
and in January 2006, the activists were prosecuted for a misdemeanour, a
case the court subsequently dropped for lack of social danger.
In the meantime, the group had fallen apart due to the unsuccessful squatting
attempts and the tension between ideals and outcomes.
183
Some, however,
occupied an empty apartment building in Újpest – no longer out of social
conviction, but for housing purposes. They did not call the media but went
into hiding. However, they were soon subject to the same measures as other
squatters. ‘Municipal paramilitary security guards spotted the hiding squatters,
threatened them and – when none of them were on the premises – ‘someone’
ransacked the property and the furnishings, causing measurable material and
incalculable emotional damage.’184
181 Kirschner P. (2004). Házfoglalók az úttörőben. Budapest 2 7( 1 0) : 37.
182
Miavecz N. (2005). Szabálysértő szabadságérzet-A Kazinczy utcai há zfoglalás utóélete. Magyar Narancs,
3 Nov.
183 Kotun, A Centrum Csoport 616.
184 Ibid. 6 17.

THE LAST THREE DECADES OF THE HUNGARIAN HOUSING MOVEMENT  A BOTTOMUP VIEW  
59
The Hungarian aliate of Food Not Bombs, founded in the 2000s, worked
with the People Of The Streets and Centrum Group among others. Like the
Humanist Movement and Centrum Group, they also drew on foreign models
in their critique of capitalism. Food Not Bombs draws attention to the contra-
diction between the wasteful lifestyle of capitalist consumerism and hunger
through vegan and vegetarian food distribution. The activists primarily prepare
food from ingredients that – despite their good quality – would be discarded
by supermarkets. Food Not Bombs provided food during the Solidarity Night
and when occupying squats
185
and, in line with the international movement,
protested the war in Iraq in 2003 by distributing food.186 The group, which still
exists today, created a culture in Hungary whereby food distribution can be
interpreted as a protest – and not only as an act of charity.
The significance of these three organisations lies in the fact that they linked
the culture of protest to homelessness, in contrast to the culture of social as-
sistance dominant since 1990. Through their innovative and, at times, radical
tactics – and network of contacts – they increased the visibility of housing
problems in the media and led many young people to embrace this cause. The
activists also brought civil and political rights organisations somewhat closer
to the issue of housing, thanks to their socio-cultural-linguistic proximity. The
squatters of Kazinczy Street, for example, were defended by the Hungarian
Civil Liberties Union (HCLU) in 2006.
3.2. Hungarian Social Forum – an ally of the house
poor
The growth of the alterglob movement was also fuelled by the civil and po-
litical ascendance of the Latin American left. The World Social Forum – the
movement’s first global meeting – was first organised in 2001 and was had for
the first three years in Porto Alegre, Brazil, a city led by the Brazilian Workers’
Party. The Hungarian Social Forum was founded in Hungary in October 2002
on the model of this event. Among others, hundreds of organisations such as
185 Ibid. 604; 168 óra , 25 Nov 2004, 16(47):20-21.
186 Magyar Nemzet, 24 March 2003, 66(69):5.
the Humanist Movement, the Green Youth Association, the Roma Civil Rights
Foundation (RPA), the Society of People Living Below the Subsistence Level,
187
trade unions, and religious communities joined the NGO network initiated by
ATTAC Hung a ry.
188
At the opening event in Miskolc in April 2003, sociologists
Erzsébet Szalai and Zsuzsa Ferge also spoke about social rights and eective
action against neoliberalism. Although the organisation saw itself as non-parti-
san, politicians from MSZP and the Workers’ Party regularly appeared in these
circles under the banner of NGOs.
189
However, the Hungarian Social Forum
failed to fulfil its role as a network organiser and increasingly functioned as an
independent organisation. It embraced the issue of homelessness from 2008
onwards, and regularly published the number of casualties of hypothermic
death among house poor.190 By then, the organisation was fully represented
by Endre Simó, who had participated in the Second World Social Forum in
Porto Alegre in 2002 and had been one of the organisers, spokespersons,
and authors of articles for the Hungarian initiative from the very beginning.191
After 2009, the Hungarian Social Forum stood up for foreign currency debtors,
discussed in the next section.
3.3. Four Houses and Green Youth – organisations
oftenants and their allies
The alterglob movement, following the principle of ‘Think globally, act locally!’
was also involved in the creative use and environmentally conscious devel-
opment of urban community spaces. They were given scope for action in the
social urban renewal programmes. A pioneering example of this was the Mag-
dolna Neighbourhood Programme I in Hungary implemented as a pilot project in
Central Józsefváros between 2005 and 2008. One component of the complex
intervention coordinated by the urban development agency Rév8 was a series of
public housing refurbishments with the participation of tenants. The cooperation
187
The most famous action of Society of People Living Below the Subsistence Level was a hunger strike
against the introduction of the two -rate VAT in November 1992. For the history of the organisation, see
Udvarhelyi, Az igazság az utcán hever, 161-163.
188 Simó E. (2003). Magyar Szociális Fórum felé. Ezredvég 13(4):87-103 .
189 Népszabadság, 28 March 2003, 61(73):5; Népszava, 29 March 2003, 131(74):3.
190 Magyar Nemzet, 17 Dec 2008 , 71(344):5; Magyar Hírlap, 2 Febr 2010, 43(27):21.
191 Simó, Magyar Szociális Fórum felé

THE LAST THREE DECADES OF THE HUNGARIAN HOUSING MOVEMENT  A BOTTOMUP VIEW  
60
between the development agency and the tenants was facilitated by the Four
Houses Association, formed in 2007 by the tenants of the four buildings con-
cerned in the programme. The renewal of the courtyards was organised by the
Green Youth Association, founded in the 2000s, in a process that took several
months and involved the tenants.192 The Magdolna Programme also included
educational, employment, and crime prevention components. Although the
houses were made more liveable, the social problems in the neighbourhood
could not be solved overnight, and the tensions and abuses caused by poor
public housing management were still pervasive in the lives of the residents.193
Nevertheless, the many positive aspects of the Magdolna Programme made
social urban renewal a nationally endorsed (EU-funded) development objective
– although the professional experience gained through the programme was only
sporadically applied in subsequent development cycles.
3.4. The Organisation for the Roma of Szomolya,
Poor Relief Fund Eger and the Association of
Roma Minority Representatives and Advocates
of Nógrád County – organisations of the Roma
house poor
According to the 2011 census data, there are nearly 1,400 predominantly Roma
segregated neighbourhoods or enclaves with substandard housing; these
are inhabited by 280-300,000 people across more than 700 municipalities
throughout Hungary.194 In such conditions, rehabilitation or desegregation is
often a protest action in itself.
In the Béke-settlement, a segregated neighbourhood on the outskirts of Eger
in Northern Hungary, Roma families had to convince the local Roma minor-
ity self-government and the city council to supply the settlement with basic
192 Alföldi, Közösségi részvétel 8., Bálint M., Deák A. Á . (2009). Közösségpalánták. Földrajzi Közlemények
133(4):51 6- 522 .
193 Budaházy G. (2010). Négy ház. 8ker blog.; Alföldi, Közösségi részvétel
194
Farkas, “Telepszerű lakókörnyezet volt a hivatalos elnevezése…” 55-56.; Weinhardt A. (2019). Hatalmas
EU-pénzeket szánt a kormány a romatelepek felszámolására, de alig halad a programme. Portfolio, 6 Dec.
public utilities. The Eger aliate of the Poor Relief Fund has been running a
so-called settlement house (a community-based support centre with various
services) since 1996. After three months of preparation, the organisation and
half a dozen parents took action in 2003 at the annual public hearings of the
minority self-government and the city council. As a result, the issue received
publicity in the local media, and the community had another meeting with the
elected representatives. In the meantime, more and more community members
joined the initiative, and in early 2004, the Association for the Rehabilitation of
the Béke-settlement was founded.195 To this day, Poor Relief Fund Eger and the
community work together to empower the people living in the settlement.
In Szomolya, a village in Northern Hungary, the municipal government partici-
pated in the 2005-2010 state-funded desegregation programme only because
a local NGO had fought for it. In the 2000s, one-third of the Roma – a total
of 120 people – lived in 26 cave dwellings carved into the hillside on the edge
of the village. Despite this, in 2005, the municipal leadership refused to apply
for the desegregation programme. In response, local Roma people founded
the Organisation for the Roma of Szomolya. The leader of the organisation was
driven by personal motivation, as she had lived in one of the cave dwellings
for a long time. With the help of a mentor delegated by the Ministry of Social
and Labour Aairs (who happened to be the head of Poor Relief Fund Eger)
they pushed the ministry to allow the Organisation for the Roma of Szomolya
and the local Roma minority self-government to become the lead organisation
in applying for the grant. The Roma organisations and Poor Relief Fund Eger
worked with the beneficiaries living in cave dwellings to plan their move to the
village. Meanwhile, the municipal government was lobbying against the pro-
gramme, leading to several sellers withdrawing from the purchase or raising
the prices of the properties the Roma people would have moved into. Asmall
group of people, including the health worker and the kindergarten head, col-
lected signatures in protest against the move of Roma people.196
The dynamics were similar in another town in Northern Hungary, Bátonytere-
nye. Here, the battle-hardened Association of Roma Minority Representatives
195 Farkas Zs. (2012). Hidak és sorompók. Társadalmi együttélés. Interdiszciplináris e-folyóirat.
196 Farkas, “Telepszerű lakókörnyezet volt a hivatalos elnevezése…” 123-14 3.

THE LAST THREE DECADES OF THE HUNGARIAN HOUSING MOVEMENT  A BOTTOMUP VIEW  
61
and Advocates of Nógrád County, founded in 1996, planned to dismantle two
segregated neighbourhoods (formerly mining settlements) in 2009, involving
a total of 15 families. The municipal leadership opposed the programme, and
the far-right party Jobbik distributed leaflets. The deputy mayor tried to raise
public awareness against the move-in through public forums and signature
collection. In addition, the owners raised prices, and the municipal government
withdrew local subsidies for some beneficiaries of the programme.197
In the end, organisations at Szomolya and Bátonyterenye managed to settle
the conflicts, reached an agreement with the owners, and dismantled the entire
segregated neighbourhoods. Both projects involved local Roma people. The
Organisation for the Roma of Szomolya became the organiser of the com
-
munity and a negotiator with the municipal leadership. At the same time, the
Bátonyterenye association (which had already been an influential actor in town)
set up a social cooperative to employ people in need. In both cases, the houses
purchased and then renovated were initially owned by the organisations and
rented by the beneficiaries. Although the housing integration was successful
overall, no lasting results were achieved in education and employment through
the desegregation programme; this was to be expected given its poor dotation.
That being said, organisation for the Roma of Szomolya, the Association of
Roma Minority Representatives and Advocates of Nógrád County, and Poor
Relief Fund Eger, together with many other organisations, play an important part
in the fragile development of the housing movement in Hungary.
3.5. Lessons from the third era
Apparently strong movement infrastructure. By the mid-2000s, we see a complex
housing scene in its organisational composition. There is a relatively well-de-
veloped homeless care system, professional advocacy organisations (RPA,
Tenants’ Association, etc.), committed local innovators, and regional devel
-
opers (Poor Relief Fund Eger, the Association of Roma Minority Representa-
tives and Advocates of Nógrád County, Habitat for Humanity, etc.), as well as
more socially conscious urban development projects. The housing crisis was
197 Ibid. 16 0-1 7 7.
linked to a culture of radical protest through organisations coming out of the
alterglob movement. However, this image is deceptive. The actors were not
unified, did not necessarily see each other as allies, and were often alienated
by each other’s strategies, tactics, and language. Organisations failed to frame
a message or build a narrative that many people could relate to – including the
hundreds of thousands of beneficiaries.
Subculture and change. Given the results of the 2000s, the question remains
whether groups that belong to a subculture can change the housing crisis in
Hungary. When a sophisticated social critique is combined with an identity
defined in contrast to the majority society, it often has diculty accommodat-
ing and can become exclusionary. Knowledge, language, and values unknown
to the outside world can provide a sense of security and self-armation for
members of the subculture; but also distance them from those who have a
dierent point of view or are simply still developing their worldview.
The issues of many social groups aected by housing poverty are not addressed.
Organisations represented the most disadvantaged groups – homeless people,
squatters, people living in Roma segregated neighbourhoods, and disadvan-
taged public housing tenants. The movement lacked the capacity to address
the housing problems of the lower middle class, e.g., Roma and non-Roma
low-income families renting housing from the market, young people, first-
time homebuyers or households in arrears, pensioners, victims of domestic
violence, commuters from deprived areas with poor transport conditions, etc.
Several trade unions, a pensioners’ and a women’s organisation did join the
housing demonstration initiated by RPA in 2000 – which showed the aware-
ness of housing problems and the openness of organisations to join forces.
Disability movement organisations were not prominent in the alliances of this
period either. Reaching out to these interest groups could give a new impetus
to the housing issue.

THE LAST THREE DECADES OF THE HUNGARIAN HOUSING MOVEMENT  A BOTTOMUP VIEW  
62
4. The marginalised and their allies (2009–)
Hungarian Charity Service of the Order of Malta • Habitat for
Humanity Hungary • Association for Community Development
• Bagázs • Association of Roma Minority Representatives
and Advocates of Nógrád County • Autonomia Foundation
• Roma Civil Rights Movement • The City Is For All • Street-
lawyer Association • School of Public Life • Calm Heart •
From Streets to Homes! Association • Solidarity Economy
Center • Metropolitan Research Institute • Periféria Policy
and Research Center • Home Defenders198
Aordable housing solutions remained small-scale, and governments turned to
the market to enhance homeownership through bank loans. State-subsidised
loans, introduced by the first conservative Orbán government in 2000, became
part of the electoral race. The beneficiary base expanded, and the loans swelled
to unsustainable levels. It was only in 2004 that the socialist-liberal government
MSZP-SZDSZ withdrew this credit support. However, due to the high budget
deficits accumulated by these two governments, the central bank kept interest
rates relatively high, making the forint loans expensive compared to foreign
currency loans. Under the circumstances, foreign currency loan products with
lower interest rates seemed to be a rational alternative from expert and con-
sumer perspectives. Their popularity grew rapidly, with their share of housing
loans rising from 1 percent to 63 percent between 2000 and 2008.199
At first, it seemed that all parties (the state, the Hungarian National Bank (HNB),
the banks, and the public) would benefit from the foreign currency loans. But
198 The names of the organisations in Hungarian are: Magyar Máltai Szeretetszolgálat • Habitat for Humanity
Magyarország • Közösségfejlesztők Egyesülete • Bagázs • NMCKKSZSZ • Autonómia Alapítvány • Roma
Polgárjogi Mozgalom • A Város Mindenkié • Utcajogász Egyesület • Közélet Iskolája • Nyugodt Szív • Utcáról
Lakásba! Egyesület • Szolidáris Gazdaság Központ • Városkutatás Kft. • Periféria Központ • Otthonvédők.
199 Csizmady, Hegedüs, Vonnák, Lakásrezsim és a devizahitel-válság 11-12.
as soon as the 2008 economic crisis hit, it became clear that the risk taken
by both parties was drastically uneven. Moreover, competition between banks
had loosened the credit approval system, a phenomenon exacerbated by the
shortcomings in the supervision of the agency system. Over time, large loans
were made available to people who did not have the necessary collateral. The
impact of the crisis was underestimated by the HNB and leading analysts until
2010. They reiterated the foreign currency debtors’ responsibility or saw the
issue as a middle-class problem; on this basis, the Gyurcsány and then the
Bajnai governments took (practically minimal) measures.200 In 2011, the Orbán
government systematically articulated the responsibility of the various actors.
They did this, however, in support of their political agenda. ‘[The] programmes
had political ambitions that went beyond the housing sector, including rearrang-
ing power relations among banks [i.e., increasing the share of domestic banks],
the consolidation of the financial position of the middle class, the pacification of
those in need, and the political neutralisation of alternative movements.’201
In 2011, the first households to benefit from the first government-backed relief
scheme (the final repayment option) were typically in a better financial position.
They were able to repay their foreign currency loans in one lump sum (170-
180,000 households). The worst-o families were bailed out through the Na-
tional Asset Manager, set up in 2012. The National Asset Manager eectively
created a public housing scheme by buying out former owners who became
tenants in their former property for low rents (34-36,000 households). Fami-
lies in intermediate situations received some help from the exchange rate limit
introduced in 2012, but this group typically faced massive housing losses.202
The series of measures was completed in 2014 by the conversion of foreign
currency mortgage loans into forints.203
Thousands of people were evicted after the outbreak of the foreign currency
debt crisis. Meanwhile, as in the previous decades, evictions of people in
200 Ibid. 13 -19.; Új Egyenlőség (2019). Ki volt a felelős a devizahitel válságért? Interjú Király Júliával, 7 June.
201 Ibid. 19.
202
Ibid. 20; Júlia Király estimates the number of foreign currency borrowers at 400,000; Csizmady, Hegedüs
and Vonnák work with an estimate of 850,000 households including HUF mortgage borrowers in payment
diculties (i.e. threatened with loss of housing). Csizmady, Hegedüs, Vonnák, Lakásrezsim és a deviza-
hitel-válság 21.
203 For a full list of interventions (Ócsa, personal bankruptcy, eviction moratorium), see ibid. 20-21.

THE LAST THREE DECADES OF THE HUNGARIAN HOUSING MOVEMENT  A BOTTOMUP VIEW  
63
arrears and squatters continued. Although hundreds of thousands of private
homeowners and public housing tenants were in severe arrears in the 2010s,
the third Orbán government virtually abolished the state-funded housing bene
-
fit and debt management programme in 2015.
204
The housing benefit provided
assistance (only a few thousand forints) to nearly half a million households a
year, while the debt management support benefited more than 10,000 families
through a significant amount of 100,000 HUF on average.205
In the meantime, to tackle persistent rural poverty, new desegregation and re-
habilitation programmes were launched in 2012 with tens of billions of forints of
EU funding, covering complex areas such as social service, community devel-
opment, education, health, training, and employment. In the absence of in-depth
analyses, questions remain about the eectiveness of these intervention in im-
proving life in segregated neighbourhoods and substandard housing enclaves.
It is unclear whether these programmes create real opportunities for families to
leave the segregated living conditions or contribute to the gradual dismantling
of the segregated neighbourhoods.206 The challenge for these interventions is
to develop links between people living inside and outside the segregated neigh-
bourhoods.207 In addition, the success of these programmes depends largely on
the ability of the ‘larger policy systems’ 208 to provide access to education, health
care, social services to people who are moving out of segregated neighbour-
hoods.209 One bad example of the dismantling of a segregated neighbourhood
is the so-called numbered streets of Miskolc: the eviction of public housing
tenants was carried out amid stigmatising, intimidating municipal measures.210
In addition, the know-how gained in social urban renewal programmes in the
2000s was applied to a lesser extent in the second project cycle.211
204 On the extent of population in arrears, see footnote 121.
205 Habitat (2015). “Gondolatok az adósságkezelési szolgáltatás megszüntetésével kapcsolatban”, 24 Febr;
Habitat (2015). “Megszűnik a lakásfenntartási támogatás”, 25 Febr.
206 Weinhardt, Hatalmas EU -pénzeket szán a kormány a romatelepek felszámolására.
207
Autonómia (2012). A Telepfelszámolás vízió és gyakorlat című szakmai műhelyen megvitatott kérdések,
arésztvevők á ltal megfogalmazott véleménye k, javaslatok összegzése, 2 May. Hős utca és a Kontúr Egyes ület
208 Zsombor Farkas opinion, János Zolnay opinion
209 Judit Berki opinion, Nóra Teller opinion, Gábor Havas opinion
210 AJBH (2015). Az alapvető jogok biztosa és a Magyarországon élő nemzetiségek jogainak védelmét ellátó
biztoshelyettesének közös jelentése az AJB-1474/2014. számú ügyben; OSCE-ODIHR (2016). A romák
lakhatási jogai Miskolcon. Jelentés a helyszíni vizsgálatról, 27 Apr
211 EMMI és Államtitkárság (Aug 2015). Telepszerű lakhatás szakpolitikai stratégia , 50.; Jelinek Cs. (2019):
A városrehabilitáció korszakai Magyarországon. Tér és Társadalom, 33(4):31
The hateful rhetoric included the criminalisation of homelessness in 2010,
which was then incorporated into the Fundamental Law in 2013 to circumvent
the Constitutional Court’s striking-down of the initial ban. The measure was
further tightened in 2018.212 The situation may be reminiscent of previous ac-
tions against squatters. Although the municipal leadership of the 1990s evicted
squatters, Fidesz sought to facilitate this practice by introducing two new bills
in 1999 and 2000.213 Similarly, the organised removal of homeless people from
underpasses and public spaces was not new. Still, Fidesz legitimised the ongo-
ing practice and opened the way for its intensification. The measure was also
cruel because it was not linked to aordable housing solutions accessible to
homeless people or capacity-building in the homeless care sector. Yet, Shelter
Foundation estimates that on a single winter’s day across the country, at least
14,000 people are homeless, which means that at least 2-3,000 people are
certainly not able to access shelters on any given day.
214
Moreover, the number
of programmes that oer a way out of mass shelters is still low.215
The dismantling of mass residential institutions for people with disabilities is
also proceeding very slowly.
216
Although the 1998 Equal Opportunities Act
provided for the dismantling of large institutions (up to several hundred peo-
ple), a systemic overhaul of the social care system started only after 2010.2 17
Approximately 14,000 people live in institutions for people with disabilities,218
and between 2012 and 2016, 672 people moved to community-based care
and residential homes after six institutions were dismantled.219 According to
organisations, one of the main problems is that residential homes are typically
212 AVM (2018). Az Alaptörvény hetedik módosításával immár kétszeresen is üldözhető a hajléktalanság, 26
June.
213 Political Capital (2001). Az önkényes lakásfoglalások hátteréről, 25 Nov.
214 AVM (2018). Kérdezz-felelek a hajléktalanságról, 1 Nov.
215 See Habitat (2013). Nyitás az utcára! BMSZKI programme; exit flats; LÉLEK-houses e.g. in Józsefváros
and Kőbánya.
216
Kovács V. (2020). Fogyatékos emberek lakhatási helyzete – akadálymentesség a fővárosban és azon
kívül. Habitat Éves Jelentés 2020.
217
There were residential homes in the past, but they were set up by N GOs or run under the authority of mass
institutions. For more information, see Kézenfogva and Tamás Verdes (2009). A ház az intézet tulajdona,
Esély (4): 107.
218
Kozma Á., Petri G., Bernát Á. (2020). Kiszolgáltatottság és stagnálás: fogyatékos emberek társadalmi
helyzete a 2010-es években. In: Kolosi T., Szelényi I., Tóth I. Gy. (eds), Társadalmi Riport 2020, Budapest,
393., 396.; KSH (2019). Szociális Statisztikai Évkönyv, 2018. Budapest, 155.
219 Környei Kristóf – TASZ (2020). Tíz éve próbálkozik az állam a fogyatékos otthonok felszámolásával.

THE LAST THREE DECADES OF THE HUNGARIAN HOUSING MOVEMENT  A BOTTOMUP VIEW  
64
located on the outskirts of town, far from services.220 However, the integration
of residential homes into the town fabric often provokes protests of the major-
ity, similar to the cases of homeless people or Roma people, as happened in
Derekegyháza in 2011, Bélapátfalva in 2012, and Szilvásvárad in 2013.221 The
best solution would clearly be supported housing, i.e., an apartment where a
disabled person can live an independent life alone or with a partner of their
choice or with a flatmate, receiving the necessary assistance.222 As one mem-
ber of the Living Independently – Living in Community self-help group puts it:
‘Ishould be the driving force behind any kind of help I request.’223
4.1. Hungarian Charity Service of the Order of Malta,
Habitat for Humanity Hungary, Association
for Community Development, Bagázs, the
Association of Roma Minority Representatives
and Advocates of Nógrád County, Autonomia
Foundation – organisations of the house
poor living in extreme poverty or segregated
neighbourhoods
In the post-2010 rehabilitation programmes of segregated neighbourhoods,
the Hungarian Charity Service of the Order of Malta (in Hungarian MMSZ) and its lo-
cation-based, ongoing social work received a prominent role (and occupied an
ample space). MMSZ’s Presence Programme started from a Roma settlement
in Monor. In 2000, the municipal government evicted more than 20 families
from their substandard public housing units, which were condemned to dem-
olition; the value of the inner city plots on which they were built skyrocketed
220 MEOSZ (2018). Kiváltás: A MEOSZ ragaszkodik ahhoz, hogy a fogyatékos emberek jogai álljanak a kö-
zéppontban. MEOSZ analyzes the location of the new residential homes from an integration perspective.
221 Tamás Verdes – TASZ (2013). Szilvásvárad és a nyilvánosság ereje. Finally, they managed to move out of
the institution.
222 Tamás Verdes (2021). Kitagolás: Miért nem érti egymást kormány és civilek?
223 Living independently – Living in community (2021). “Nekem az önálló élet. ..” Video.
after the regime change.2 24 The Roma Civil Rights Foundation (RPA) organised
a human chain of 50 people against the evictions – but unfortunately, this was
only enough to temporarily halt them.
225
Squatters and tenants in arrears were
not oered alternative housing, or they were moved into circus trailers.
226
With
no better options, the families moved their caravans to the existing Roma row
called Tabán. By the time a woman living in these conditions turned to MMSZ
for help in 2003, the former Roma row had become a slum. Miklós Vecsei and
Father Imre Kozma visited the field and saw the need for long-term support.
This is how work began in 2004, based on much trial and error, on what was
to become the Presence Programme.227
After 2012, the programme expanded by leaps and bounds and now operates
in 18 municipalities or parts of municipalities with varying degrees of success
as a model for managing large segregated neighbourhoods (of hundreds of
people).228 The variety of the tools applied – family support, debt manage-
ment, learning support programmes, health and employment services, housing
assistance, community space – depends on local needs and the length of
time the programme has been in place. In the absence of an impact analysis,
questions remain regarding the programme’s ability to provide the families
with opportunities to move out of segregated living conditions and whether
it can contribute to the eradication of segregated neighbourhoods over time.
Housing assistance often involves joint house renovation to provide the es-
sentials (e.g., to prevent leaks and collapses, to provide heat and lighting) and
the cleaning up of the surroundings; according to organisational reports, a few
families managed to move out over time.229
Between 2012 and 2015, H abitat for Humanity Hungary helped renovate homes
of families living in deep poverty in segregated neighbourhoods or villages
in Ág, Bag and Mátraverebély, providing technical assessment and renovation
224
Népszabadság – Pest Megyei Krónika supplement, 2 June 1997, 41., Magyar Nemzet, 23 May 2000,
63(119):4.
225 Magyar Hírlap, 1 Dec 2000, 33(281):5
226 Magyar Hírlap, 26 Oct 2000, 33(251):13.
227
Kiss D., Lantos Sz., Marozsán Cs., Németh N. (2013). “Jelenlét.” Tarnabod was the first municipality in the
programme where homeless families from Budapest were housed.
228 Autonómia, A Telepfelszámolás vízió és gyakorlat
229 Kiss et al, „ Jelenlét”; Málta – Monor, Tabán programme bemutatkozó videó.

THE LAST THREE DECADES OF THE HUNGARIAN HOUSING MOVEMENT  A BOTTOMUP VIEW  
65
advice, as well as inexpensive and locally available building materials and tools.
Participants worked in teams and contributed materials. In all three cases, the
house renovations were embedded in a multi-year community development
process.
In Ág, residents started working on housing poverty with experts from the
long-established Association for Community Development with the involvement
of Habitat. As a result of this collaboration, nearly 20 families were able to
renovate their homes in 2013. This community action laid the foundations for
further development work, and today locals run a social cooperative and a
thrift store in the village.
230
In Bag, the renovation was embedded in the work of
Bagázs, an organisation founded in 2011 to provide services (legal clinic, debt
management group, adult education, women’s club) according to the needs
and requests of people living in segregated neighbourhoods in the town.231
In Mátraverebély, Habitat worked with the Association of Roma Minority Repre-
sentatives and Advocates of Nógrád County in 2013-2014, for whom the coopera-
tion with the aliate of an international organisation was a major resource not
only in the renovations but also in negotiations with the municipal government
and the heads of institutions. Habitat’s role as an external facilitator turned the
balance of power to the advantage of the local organisation, and together they
brought new services to the municipality.232 The Roma association took on
the rehabilitation of a segregated neighbourhood of 181 people in Salgótarján
between 2018-2021.233
Several other organisations provide innovative services and a helping hand to
people living in extreme poverty or in segregated neighbourhoods, including
Autonomia Foundation, the Jai Bhim Community, National Association of Disad-
vantaged Families, Real Pearl Foundation, InDaHouse Hungary, Kiút Programme,
Polgár Foundation, Profilantrop Association, Szocsoma Foundation, and Van He-
lyed Foundation.
230 Boda K. (2019). Még az Ág is húzza? Egy zsáktelepülés jövőt épít magának. Parola 1.
231 About Bagázs – introduction on the website.
232
Habitat (2014). A párbeszéd segített valódi változásokat elindítani Mátraverebélyen; A Településfejlesztési
Kerekasztal bemutatása az NMCKKSZSZ részéről.
233 Forgách-telepi komplex programmeok.
One bad example of the dismantling of a segregated neighbourhood is the case
of the numbered streets (a workers’ housing estate turned segregated area,
where streets were given numbers instead of street names) in Miskolc, where
in 2014, the city council carried out mass evictions amid intimidating measures
without providing adequate alternative housing. The displacement, triggered by
stadium construction and property development, aected around 900 people
(200 families).
234
After the ghetto aairs in Miskolc in 1989 and Székesfehérvár
in 1995-97, this was another critical stage in the struggle for Roma integra-
tion. But in 2014, the evictions were not prevented. In the city, joint raid-like
inspections by the authorities in predominantly Roma neighbourhoods began
in the 2010s. The main target for a while was the Avas South housing estate,
which suered a series of scams related to the Fészekrakó programme.235 The
inspections organised by the Miskolc Municipal Police Department involved,
in dierent combinations, the police, utility providers, public health and child
protection agencies, and property management, among others. Between April
2013 and April 2014, more than 2,700 properties and nearly 4,500 people were
aected, including residents of the numbered streets.236
In 2014, the Fidesz-led city council aimed to renovate the Diósgyőr Stadium
with a five billion HUF investment. They decided to eliminate the numbered
streets ‘blocking’ the development project. The neighbourhood consisted
mainly of public housing units. In May 2014, the Fidesz-majority council, as-
sisted by the opposition, voted in favour of a discriminatory housing decree
targeting Roma tenants. They promised money to those who agreed to move
outside Miskolc’s borders.237 In the meantime, the city council took every op-
portunity to force those without a valid contract (whether they had arrears
or not) to leave the numbered streets. Following the example of Miskolc in
1989 and Székesfehérvár in 1995, local Roma leaders formed the group ‘We
stay in Miskolc!’ – Committee Against Displacement. The initiators were the
234 OSCE-ODIHR (2016). A romák lakhatási jogai Miskolcon. Jelentés a helyszíni vizsgálatról, 27 Apr, 15.
235 Ibid. 20.; Havasi V. (2018). Még mindig szilánkos, Romológia 6(1):61-91.
236 AJBH (2015). Az alapvető jogok biztosa 18.
237 Under the amended housing decree, the city council of Miskolc oered compensation of up to 2 million
HUF to tenants who were willing to terminate their contract on the substandard social housing unit they
were living in. Tenants who received compensation after the termination of their contract would have had
to use the compensation to buy property. Only property outside Miskolc could be purchased, and it could
not be sold or mortgaged within five years. OSCE-ODIHR , A romák lakhatási jogai Miskolcon 15.

THE LAST THREE DECADES OF THE HUNGARIAN HOUSING MOVEMENT  A BOTTOMUP VIEW  
66
Miskolc Roma self-government and the Roma intellectuals working with them,
and the county leaders of the Roma Civil Rights Movement, founded in 2003.
They also involved civil rights activists from Budapest, including Aladár Horváth
and Gábor Havas. No fact-finding committee was set up, but they conducted
research with the participation of prominent sociologists and local Roma ac-
tivists.238 However, the Committee did not formulate a package of proposals
until August, and no consultations started with the city council.239
The numbered streets quickly became a battleground for Fidesz-KDNP and
Jobbik in the run-up to the October 2014 municipal elections.
240
After the
housing decree received much criticism, Fidesz asked its supporters for a
mandate in June to dismantle the neighbourhood. In response to the 35,000
signatures collected, Jobbik also launched a petition241 and organised a
provocative march of 40-50 people in the numbered streets on 14 June.
242
Meanwhile, surrounding municipalities introduced ordinances preventing the
ex-tenants from moving in.243
On June 25, 300-400 Roma activists and residents of the numbered streets
marched in front of the City Hall and presented a petition to the mayor. When
the evictions started, on August 7, a small group of activists pitched a tent in
St Stephen’s Square in protest, but this was a symbolic action more than any-
thing else. There was no complete unity of force within the local organisation.
Moreover, the dynamics were exacerbated by the approach of MMSZ. The
charitable organisation was also active in the case and did not take an open
stand against the city council’s incitement campaign. Instead, it presented it-
self as a ‘mediator’ between the local people and the authorities. This became
clear to the Roma activists when they were told at a meeting at the Ministry of
Interior that MMSZ would be the civic partner of the city council.244
238 Roma Sajtóközpont (2014). Maradjanak-e cigányok Miskolcon?, index.hu, 1 Sep.
239 Horváth A. (2019). A száműzött utcák története, romnet.hu, 6 Feb.
240 This battle started already in 2012-2013 with the World Tent project.
241 Matkovich I. (2014). „Gyerünk, kifele!” – Kitelepítési tervek Miskolcon. Magyar Narancs, 1 September.
242 Népszabadság, 16 June 2014, 72(139):7. The march was organised by Péter Jakab.
243 OSCE-ODIHR, A romák lakhatási jogai Miskolcon 16.
244 Horváth, A száműzött utcák; OSCE-ODIHR, A romák lakhatási jogai Miskolcon 19.
Fidesz won the October municipal elections. Evictions continued, and MMSZ
started individual case management and made personalised agreements with
the tenants. In 2015, legal authorities made a series of judgments in favour of
the Roma people deprived of their housing. The Equal Treatment Authority or-
dered the city council of Miskolc to provide housing for all people concerned.245
Unfortunately, by the summer of 2016, an estimated 75-80 families had left
the neighbourhood,246 and several houses had been demolished. Many moved
to other slums in the city or homeless shelters; some left the country. It is
estimated that eight families received public housing, and two left the city
with cash compensation.247 Finally, in April 2016, following the decision of
the Equal Treatment Authority, the city council set up an Aordable Housing
Agency. It gave MMSZ 30 apartments to manage in the abandoned part of
the neighbourhood previously condemned to demolition. The organisation
renovated and supplied these houses with basic public utilities. Families who
had previously lived in public housing units in other parts of the neighbour-
hood, complied with the rules, and faced eviction because of the demolition,
were allowed to move into these houses. If the tenant lived in a neighbour-
hood exempted from demolition, the public housing unit was to go under the
management of MMSZ. The contract is in eect for three months and can be
renewed. The organisation would not help those who had moved out, become
homeless, or moved to another slum.248
The local Roma organisation around the numbered streets could not compete
with the municipal election campaign. In addition, the division of roles between
the movement actors was dierent from previous arrangements. Whereas
earlier in Miskolc and Székesfehérvár, the Anti-Ghetto Committee and later
RPA was responsible for the representation of the beneficiaries, in 2014, so-
cial work and advocacy could not reinforce each other. The RPA’s success in
Székesfehérvár in coordinating the fact-finding mission, social work, militant
community organising, and legal advocacy was not replicated in Miskolc.
245 For a full list of legal proceedings and their results, see ibid. 22-26.
246
Neuberger E. (2019). Végleg elengedte az elűzött számozott utcaiak kezét Miskolc önkormányzata , 6
June, with the estimates of Gabriella Lengyel and Gábor Havas.
247 Aladár Horváth’s estimate.
248 Neuberger, Végleg elengedte.

THE LAST THREE DECADES OF THE HUNGARIAN HOUSING MOVEMENT  A BOTTOMUP VIEW  
67
4.2. The City Is For All – an organisation of homeless
people, squatters, and tenants with insecure
status
The City Is For All (AVM in Hungarian) was founded in August 2009 in Bu-
dapest by homeless and non-homeless participants in a training held by the
homeless community advocacy organisation Picture The Homeless from New
York. The training was initiated by Anna Bende, Bálint Misetics, Tessza Éva Ud-
varhelyi, and Bálint Vojtonovszki, four activists from the People Of The Streets,
which had dissolved a few months earlier. AVM still exists today and had been
a key player in the movement for almost ten years. Three important movement
institutions for the house poor grew out of this organisation, strengthening
the housing movement infrastructure: Streetlawyer (Utcajogász in Hungarian),
a legal advocacy organisation, From Streets to Homes! (Utcáról Lakásba! or
ULE for short) a housing agency providing innovative housing solutions, and
the School of Public Life training center.249
The mission of AVM (which consists primarily of homeless people, public
housing tenants, and their allies) is to enforce the right to housing in Hungary.
In this respect, it took over the baton from its predecessors. The objectives
of the short-lived Social Committee for the Homeless included the ‘practical
implementation of the right to housing’ for homeless people. In the 2000s,
RPA and, from 2004, the People Of The Streets advocated the codification
of the right to housing.250 What was new about AVM was that this message
was not formulated publicly by experts but by the people aected. Homeless
people were no longer despised actors in the history of poverty in Hungary
but self-conscious and proud political activists. They demanded change in
housing policy from decision-maker, the extension of the public housing sys-
tem, the utilisation of vacant flats, and a ban on eviction without adequate
alternative housing.
249 Udvarhelyi T. (2019). Building a movement for the right to housing in Hungary. Urban Research and Practice
12(2):192-200.
250 Helyzetjelentés 1, 28 Febr 1989; Magyar Hírlap, 9 Dec 2000, 33(288):4; Magyar Nemzet, 9 March 2005.
9., 68(66):2; Népszabadság, 4 March 2005, 63(53):4.
AVM operates as an informal activist group. During its most active period,
the groups’s core consisted of mostly 30-40 people who were homeless or
facing eviction and 6-8 highly skilled allies not directly aected by the housing
crisis. They worked in thematic working groups (housing, care institutions,
street homelessness, homeless women, and a unit responsible for AVM’s
organisational development). They alternated between intensive community
work and public actions. Activists were well aware that such a social divide
among the members posed a real challenge to the group’s integrity and could
not be bridged by goodwill alone. The key to stability was a sophisticated or-
ganisational structure, and the operation was based on the deep belief in the
equality of people. Activists aimed to ensure that homeless people remained
the majority in the organisation, so they regularly recruited new members.
Members had plenty of learning opportunities through training, events, or
participatory action research. Spokespeople to the media, who were primar-
ily homeless people or people facing eviction, received additional training.251
A moderator facilitated regular group meetings. The group made decisions
based on consensus and organised a multi-day strategic retreat every six
months.252 Beneficiaries and allies alike took on roles and responsibilities, and
positions rotated. They shared tasks, and the organisation was represented
to the public and decision-makers by the house poor or, together with allies.
The ally role, therefore, required a particular kind of approach: the aim was to
empower homeless people, not to shine a spotlight on their plight.253
AVM has been involved in a wide range of cases, primarily in Budapest and,
from 2015, also in Pécs.
254
AVM’s campaign against the criminalisation of
homelessness contributed to the fact that the authorities did not vigorously
enforce the 2013 tightening of rules on the use of public spaces, and relatively
few homeless people living on the streets faced penalties.
255
The group tried
251 A Város Mindenkié – Képzések; Részvételi akciókutatás.
252 A Város Mindenkié – Elvonulások.
253
Sebály B. (2015). Közösen akarnak tenni és tesznek a megbélyegzés és megaláztatás ellen. A Város
Mindenkié hajléktalan érdekvédelmi csoport belülről. Ezredvég 25(3):127-139
254
These included the prohibition of homeless people from public spaces, demolition of shacks, the utilisation
of vacant apartments , evictions, children in foster care and state care, access to day service centers and
luggage lockers, public toilets, identity check, health care, address registration, and voter turnout. AVM’s
activities are documented in unique detail on the organisation’s website.
255 AVM, 11 Nov 2018; Misetics B. (2017). Homelessness, citizenship and need interpretation: reflections on
organising with homeless people in Hungary. Interface 9(1):389.423. (393.)

THE LAST THREE DECADES OF THE HUNGARIAN HOUSING MOVEMENT  A BOTTOMUP VIEW  
68
to prevent the evictions of hundreds of people – mainly people living in public
housing, typically in Budapest and Pécs. Although this was not consciously
done, they took over the recently defunct RPA’s activities regarding evictions,
using partly similar but still very dierent tactics. To this day, activists receive
eviction-related emergency calls and initiate negotiations with municipalities.
They post calls to the public when a concern person needs financial support,
maintain a phone tree to organise protests before the eviction, and form a
human chain when necessary. Civil disobedience actions also involve people
living in housing poverty.256 Advocacy in individual cases is strenuous in the
absence of aordable housing alternatives and widely available subsidies.
It is rarely possible to help people find a long-term solution. In addition, due
to the lack of capacity in the social services system, assistance with case
management, mediation, and paperwork mostly falls on homeless and ally
activists. Yet, in many cases, they still manage to keep people in housing or
buy them time.257 One of the most successful actions was the tenant organ-
ising in 8/C Bihari Street in Kőbánya. The district council planned to demolish
a 73-unit public housing and initially refused to help tenants with fixed-term
contracts. Six tenants and their families worked with AVM, five of whom man-
aged to settle their contracts with the district council. However, their situation
is volatile because four of the tenants are in a building, whose survival is still
uncertain.258
AVM’s biggest success was its advocacy for shack dwellers. In October 2014,
a precedent-setting case ruled that shacks cannot be demolished without
due process because the shack and the property inside cannot be treated as
‘garbage’.259 The judgment was handed down after the Zugló district council of
Budapest in October 2011 had demolished the shacks of at least 16 homeless
people living next to train tracks without proper prior notice, thus forcing them
into mass shelters or onto the streets. The demolished shacks had heating
and were furnished. AVM and the dispossessed homeless people filed a law-
suit together with the Legal Defence Bureau for National and Ethnic Minori-
ties. Three years later, the court awarded the victims 500,000 HUF each and
256 A Város Mindenkié – Kilakoltatások.
257 The documentation of cases is available here.
258 AVM (2019). Mi a helyzet a Bihari utcai családokkal?, 24 May.
259 AVM (2014). Lezárult a kilakoltatott zuglói kunyhólakók pere az önkormányzat ellen, 13 Febr.
ordered the district council to issue an apology.
260
It is unclear to what extent
the possibility of compensation lawsuits – without activists confronting the
authorities – would deter undue process. There have been numerous violent
shack demolitions since then.261
The first long-term Housing First262 programme in Hungary grew out of a pro-
test organised by AVM to protect huts from demolition; it eventually provided
housing for homeless people living in shacks. In June 2012, the Kőbánya dis-
trict council of Budapest planned to demolish the shacks of about 50 people
in the Terebes forest for real estate development – without a proper adminis-
trative procedure or a notary’s decision. The shack dwellers were given two
weeks to leave. AVM first defended the dwellers with a human chain and then
entered negotiations with the district council together with the aected people.
Finally, the municipal leadership understood that many of the people involved
ran households and maintained their homes independently.
263
As a result, the
district council was open to allocating two previously vacant and dilapidated
public housing units. The shack dwellers and AVM activists renovated these
flats in 2013 with the support of the Social Construction Camp Association
and many other organisations and volunteers.264 Thanks to the success of this
cooperation, two activists from AVM formed the From Streets to Homes! Asso-
ciation, which later launched similar programmes in other districts. In 2014, the
Kőbánya district council launched its Housing First programme together with
this organisation. Since then, they have allocated two vacant public housing
units for homeless people living in shacks every year.265
The fact that the opposition parties stood united on housing issues before
the 2018 general election266 and many campaigned with this issue in the run-
260 AVM (2014). Jogerős ítélet a zuglói perben: jogszerű eljárás nélkül nem lehet kunyhókat bontani, 16 Oct.
261 AVM (2018). Erőszakos kunyhóbontás Kispesten, 25 Oct.
262 In Housing First programmes, homeless people with psychiatric and/or addiction problems sleeping rough
move directly into permanent housing and receive other complex, integrated support. Fehér B. (2012).
Közterületen élők lakhatási programmejai. Esély 4:65- 89. (72).
263 AVM (2012). Most a kőbányai önkormányzat próbálja kiszorítani a hajléktalan embereket, 12 Jun.
264 AVM (2013). Erdőből lakásba – két szociális bérlakást adtak át Kőbányán, 28 March.
265 AVM (2014). A hajléktalan emberek lakásba költöztet ése mű ködőképe s modell , 28 Apr.
266 AVM (2017). Hat párt állt az AVM követelései mellé, 13 Oct.

THE LAST THREE DECADES OF THE HUNGARIAN HOUSING MOVEMENT  A BOTTOMUP VIEW  
69
up to the municipal elections has long-term potential for the movement.
267
This is also a result of AVM’s consistent actions. The organisation regularly
commented on party platforms,268 mobilised voters before elections,269 and
promoted its housing policy proposals to the governing party and the oppo-
sition.270 The polarised political playing field and the ruling party’s campaign
against homeless people were also factors in AVM’s success in engaging the
opposition. As a result, in 2017, at an election forum organised by AVM, six
opposition parties publicly expressed their commitment to what the organisa-
tion considers to be key housing issues. They agreed, among other things, to
enshrine the right to housing in the constitution, re-regulate and significantly
expand the public housing sector, re-introduce the housing benefit and debt
management programme, make the private rental sector safer and more af-
fordable, institutionalise the right to housing for families with children, and
immediately repeal legislation criminalising homelessness and squatting.271 So
far, since the 2019 municipal elections, the ban on evictions without adequate
alternative housing was partially realised; it was enshrined in regulations at the
metropolitan and, in some places, district level.272 This is not unconnected to
the fact that several of AVM’s leaders were appointed to influential positions
in the management of Budapest: for example Bálint Misetics became the Bu-
dapest mayor’s senior advisor on housing and social policy, and Éva Tessza
Udvarhelyi was chosen to be the head of the Community Participation Oce
in the Józsefváros district council of Budapest.
267
Index (2019). Karácsony bérlakásprogrammemal és Budapest Agorával száll ringbe az előválasztáson, 26
Jan; Mérce (2019). Köztisztaságot, önkormányzati lakásközvetítőt és propagandamentes kerületi médiát
ajánl Pikó András a józsefvárosiaknak, 28 Aug, Budavár – Itt lakunk (2019). Polgármester-választás: V.
Naszályi Márta budavári programmeja, 27 Sept.
268 AVM (2014). Mit ajánlanak a pártok a hajléktalan és a lakásszegénységben élő embereknek? – az MSZP
programmeja; márc. 23.; AVM (2014). Az Együtt-PM programmeja: előremutató javaslatok, kevés konk-
rétum, 26 March.
269 AVM (2014). Választási fórum a fűtött utcán, 15 March; AVM (2014). Választási fórum a Felvonulási téren,
márc. 25.; AVM (2018). Választási kisokos lakcímproblémákkal küzdő embereknek, 19 March.
270 Pl. AVM (2016). Üldözés helyett otthonokat! Írj te is az országgyűlési képviselőknek, 4 Apr.
271 AVM (2017). Hat párt állt az AVM követelései mellé, 13 Oct.
272 Scale (2020). Módosul a lakásrendelet, senki sem kerülhet utcára fővárosi tulajdonú bérlakásokból, 26
May; Új józsefvárosi lakásrendelet tervezet, 9 June 2021; Zugló banned the eviction without adequate
alternative housing in 2016. At the time of adoption, Gergely Karácsony was the mayor of Zugló and Bálint
Misetics was an external advisor.
AVM is an exemplary model of organising poor people and cross-class and
cross-generational cooperation. That said, it is questionable whether the me-
ticulous, time-consuming organisational model – which has relied on the ardent
work of one or two dozen volunteers – can be replicated with such intensity.
Choosing the path of institutionalisation could have potentially helped with
keeping up such a scale of activities (as we can see with Streetlawyer and
From Streets to Homes! choosing to take up an institutionalised form over
being a more informal activist group). However, the activists could never bring
themselves to make the necessary changes in the organisational culture and
structure. It remains to be seen whether a homeless community organisation
can build a broad base of supporters for the right to housing, i.e., whether it
can eectively reach out to other social groups aected by the housing crisis.
This is an issue that AVM had faced within a few years of its founding. Action
against evictions of families with children had already signalled a change of
strategy – but this risked marginalising homeless advocacy within the organ-
isation. With the departure of AVM’s old organisers, the group faces a new
phase. Still, it is clear that elected representatives sympathetic to the housing
cause will need external pressure to keep their promises.273
4.3. Streetlawyer Association, School of Public Life
and Calm Heart Foundation – allies of the house
poor
Streetlawyer, which provides free legal aid to people in need, started as a
legal clinic for homeless people in 2010. Organised by volunteer lawyers, the
service grew out of AVM and developed in close cooperation between the two
organisations.274 Every Friday, the volunteer lawyers and AVM activists set up a
table on Blaha Lujza Square to receive inquiries. The clientele of Streetlawyer
expanded rapidly, and it became a ‘base of support’ for people experienc-
ing various forms of housing poverty. For a long time, homelessmembers
of AVM also played a role in dealing with the problems of homeless clients
273 Udvarhelyi É. T. (2021). Sose hagyjátok abba!, Jan. 1.
274 AVM (2010). Önkéntes jogászokat keresünk, 4 Apr.

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70
after receiving specific training from Streetlawyer. Clients sometimes also
got involved in the work of AVM.275 The team of lawyers was also a constant
source of support for AVM activists in their campaigns. For example, if a
family was threatened with eviction, the streetlawyers would explore the legal
options and help with the negotiations with the municipal government or the
debt collector. On the other hand, legal arguments were backed up by AVM’s
direct actions and, when necessary, the forming of a human chain.276 In the
meantime, Streetlawyer became an independent organisation; it is run today
by 22 volunteer lawyers and sta, who deal with around 2,000 housing and
social care cases a year. They also comment on legislation aecting homeless
people, evictions, and social benefits, and undertake strategic litigation. They
successfully shaped Budapest’s ban on eviction without adequate alternative
housing. Alongside legal work, there is an equal emphasis on raising the house
poor’s legal awareness and advocacy capacity. They publish user-friendly
handbooks and provide legal assistance for the victims to represent their cas-
es.277 However, the main pillar of their work and the vehicle of Streetlawyer’s
spirit remains the public legal aid service on Blaha Lujza Square, operating
every Friday for 11 years.
AVM’s training courses were organised by the AVM Academy. The School of
Public Life later took over this role. The organisation was founded in 2014 by
two AVM activists, Mariann Dósa and Tessza Éva Udvarhelyi. Over the years,
the organisation grew into a versatile training and research center. For many
years, its training courses were attended by homeless members from AVM
Budapest and Pécs, some of whom also acted as trainers. It also played a prom-
inent role in knowledge production through the participatory action research
on the history of the Hungarian housing movement.278 In the years following its
foundation, the School of Public Life’s publication for disadvantaged people,
co-edited with the Kettős Mérce news portal, was distributed at AVM actions
and in homeless shelters, family shelters, and workers’ hostels.
279
The School of
Public Life still organises community learning programmes in care institutions.
275 AVM (2013). Utcajogász képzés és vizsga az AVM hajléktalan tagjainak, 29 Dec.
276 Udvarhelyi, Building a movement, 19 7.
277 Utcajogász, Rólunk-Céljaink-Sikereink.
278 Közélet Iskolája – Tettek ideje.
279 Közélet Iskolája – Kiadványaink.
They provide From Streets to Homes! Association with help to develop their
strategy. The self-help group of people with disabilities, Living Independently –
Living in Community, also grew out of their work.280 The mission of the School
of Public Life, however, is much broader than housing. Because of its status
as a training institution, it does not take on community organising tasks or play
an active role in building alliances in the movement; this means its impact on
housing depends on other movement organisations’ eectiveness.
The Calm Heart Foundation was founded in 2015 by writer and poet Endre
Kukorelly out of his indignation at the plight of homeless people. It provides
support to families most often in arrears with rent or utility bills. The organisa-
tion responds to individual requests from people in need by providing financial
donations, which are vital to maintaining housing at a given moment.281 Calm
Heart thus tries, with modest means, to fill the void left by the former debt
management programme, which ceased to exist in 2015. In some respects,
it performs a similar function to Poor Relief Fund, which – also through the
activity of intellectuals critical of the system – provided donations to help those
in need (e.g., improving their housing after the Miskolc ghetto aair).
4.4. From Streets to Homes! Association, Habitat
for Humanity Hungary and Solidarity Economy
Centre – allies of people in need of housing or
living in housing
Today, innovative solutions for aordable housing are being implemented and
promoted by From Streets to Homes! Association, Habitat for Humanity Hun-
gary and the Solidarity Economy Centre – but all these associations have very
dierent roots.
From Streets to Homes! Association grew out of the confluence of an inno-
vative student initiative and a protest against shack demolition. In 2010, a few
280 Közélet Iskolája – Önállóan lakni.
281 Nyugodt Szív – Tevékenységünk.

THE LAST THREE DECADES OF THE HUNGARIAN HOUSING MOVEMENT  A BOTTOMUP VIEW  
71
students organised the Social Construction Camp to help indebted public
housing tenants in Nagykanizsa work o their rent arrears by renovating public
housing.282 Vera Kovács, one of the initiators of the Construction Camp, later
joined AVM. Her knowledge as a construction manager was put to good use in
2013, when the Kőbánya district council, following long negotiations, withdrew
its aim to demolish shacks and finally gave AVM the opportunity to help four
shack dwellers move to public housing instead of a homeless shelter. The va-
cant apartments, which were in a bad need of repair, were renovated with the
help of the Social Construction Camp, among other organisations.
283
Inspired
by this success, AVM activists Vera Kovács and Anna Bende, together with
Zoltán Sipos and Viktória Kandikó, founded the association From Streets to
Homes! in 2014 and launched the ‘From Huts to Homes’ programme. Currently,
they utilise 21 previously uninhabitable, vacant public housing units in three dis-
tricts of Budapest (Kőbánya, Kispest and Pesterzsébet) and support tenants
in keeping their apartments through social work.284 Despite these successes,
it still often requires a protest to create housing opportunities for poor people
– just as with desegregation programmes. In 2018, the Zugló district council
made it impossible for From Streets to Homes! to renovate public housing
units for families in need.285 In 2020, the Soroksár district council prevented
the association from building aordable housing, or so-called mobile homes,
on its property.286
After 2008, Habitat for Humanity set out on a distinct trajectory from the one em-
braced by the international network. The organisation launched its Housing First
programme in 2014. For five years, in cooperation with the Oliver Twist Foundation
and the district councils of Újpest and Budafok-Tétény, Habitat helped homeless
people who had lost their homes (including shack dwellers whose homes were
destroyed by the 2013 floods.) Six homes were renovated in the process; in
2015, Habitat – together with From Streets to Homes! – renovated another two
282 “A Társadalomelméleti Kollégium (TEK) bemutatja,” video, 16 Apr 2010; Építészfórum, 13 Jun 2012.
283 Kovács V. (2014). A Város Mindenkié csoport „Utcáról lakásba” kísérlete Kőbányán. Esély 1:92-106.
284 As in the case of Kőbánya , the cooperation in Kispest is also the result of a direct action of The City Is
For All.
285 Ács D. (2018). A zuglói Fidesz és MSZP együtt vették el a lehetőséget a rászoruló családoktól, hogy
lakásban élhessenek, 444.hu, 20 Jun.
286
Neuberger E. (2020). 15 milliós kárt okozott az Utcáról Lakásba Egyesületnek a lakásépítésüket megtiltó
soroksári önkormányzat, 444.hu, 20 Oct.
public housing units in Kőbánya. In the following years, the organisation worked
with the district councils of Újpest, Zugló and Rákospalota-Pestújhely-Újpalota,
and renovated another 12 units by 2019.287 In 2015, the organisation launched
its Second Chance programme, which provided long-term, secure housing for
families living in family shelters. They cooperated again with district councils
and renovated dilapidated public housing units. The programme is still ongoing,
and by the summer of 2021, it provided homes for nearly 70 people, including
more than 40 children, in Újpest, Zugló and Rákospalota-Pestújhely-Újpalota,
through the renovation of 16 units. 288
Both organisations aim to make more ecient use of privately-owned hous-
ing for people in need, of which nearly 400,000 are vacant.289 From Street to
Homes! set up the Housing Now! Aordable Housing Agency, through which
homeowners can rent out their flats to low-income earners at below-mar-
ket prices. The association currently manages the rental of 11 apartments.
In return, it takes care of the renting, selects tenants, and carries out minor
renovation and maintenance work when necessary.290 Habitat, on the other
hand, launched a petition in 2017 to address two problems in the private rental
sector: high rents and a lack of legal certainty due to unclear responsibilities;
in 2020, it developed a package of proposals adapted to the Hungarian legal
and institutional environment.291
Both organisations also provide services to help retain housing. From Streets
to Homes!’s Give me a Job! programme helps people in need find work by me-
diating between potential employees and employers. The programme, which
includes community-building and community social work, brings people in
need together every week.292 In 2008-2011, Habitat, in partnership with Erste
Bank, provided low-interest housing renovation loans to people on low but sta-
ble incomes under the Van Esély! (‘There is hope!’) programme; unfortunately,
they were unable to substantially expand the programme. In the same period,
Habitat pushed the National Asset Manager to introduce a debt management
287 Habitat’s own records.
288 Habitat’s own records.
289 KSH (2014). 2011. évi népszámlálás. 12. Lakásviszonyok. 22.
290 ULE. Programmejaink.
291 Habitat. Feketelakás.
292 ULE. Programmejaink.

THE LAST THREE DECADES OF THE HUNGARIAN HOUSING MOVEMENT  A BOTTOMUP VIEW  
72
mentoring programme for socially vulnerable debtors who participated in the
National Asset Manager scheme and could not repay their loans. More than
2,200 families have already used the service. In addition, under the Újpest
Urban Renewal Programme launched in 2018, four social workers working
through Habitat provide 130 families with a variety of personalised support
through location-based social work. By the summer of 2021, 27 households
and more than 150 people received help.293
A tenant housing cooperative scheme could increase the capacity of the small
public housing sector. To make this happen, raising the necessary funding
and developing the institutional framework was undertaken by the Solidar-
ity Economy Center, established in 2019 and promoting mutually supportive
and ecologically sustainable initiatives, with the support of Periféria Policy
and Research Center.
294
Unlike the existing Hungarian housing cooperatives,
in this model, both the apartments and the common spaces are owned by
associations or cooperatives rather than by private owners. The tenants pay
below-market rents and jointly manage the house and its finances. The option
is ideal for people who have some stable income but cannot access a mort-
gage. The advantages of the model – reminiscent of the self-governing tenant
communities of the 1980s and 1990s – include sharing household and family
tasks (e.g., childcare) and being a response to loneliness. Sharing food can
also reduce household expenditure and emissions. However, in the absence of
targeted loan subsidies or state funding, the initiative is very capital-intensive.
Only the Zugló Collective House Association (founded in 2018) operates in this
form. The two organisations also developed a version of the model applicable
to trade unions.
295
Another capital-intensive alternative to the housing cooper-
ative model is when a foundation provides aordable housing on its property
– similarly to the house owned and run by the Poor Relief Fund for female
victims of intimate partner violence in the 1990s.296 A recent implementer of
this model is the Biró Foundation, which provides medium-term housing for
medical students and health workers.2 97
293 Habitat’s own records.
294 Szolidáris Gazdaság Központ, lakhatás projekt.
295 Jelinek Cs., Pósfai Zs., Szabó N. (2020). Szakszervezetek és lakhatás, nov.
296 Győri, Matern, Lakásügyi szerveződések, 23.
297 Jelinek Cs., Pósfai Zs. (2020). A bérlői lakásszövetkezeti modell Magyarországon. Bu dap est . 67.
The examples above show that the use of vacant public housing, the activation
of private housing and the private rental sector, or the tenant housing coop-
eratives are viable responses to the housing problems of the poor or those
earning a low or moderate income. However, for these solutions to make a real
dierence in reducing housing poverty – i.e., having an impact on the lives of
hundreds of thousands – an appropriate financing and legal environment is
essential. A solution to expanding the utilisation of empty apartments could be
a new housing agency. The foundation of the Metropolitan Aordable Hous-
ing Agency was announced in March 2021 and is currently being developed
by the Municipality of Budapest, From Streets to Homes! and the Metropolitan
Research Institute. This agency would be able to provide district councils and
private owners with the opportunity to rent out their empty flats.298 The con-
cept was threatened by a national bill submitted in May 2021, which would
have obliged municipal governments to privatise their public housing units at
a low price, eectively eliminating the remaining public housing sector. Thanks
to the pressure and concerted action by the From Street to Homes! and other
organisations, the proposal was largely withdrawn, and a much more lenient
version of the bill was found unconstitutional by the Constitutional Court.299
4.5. Metropolitan Research Institute and Periféria
Policy and Research Center – allies of the house
poor
The two policy and research centres of the movement, the Metropolitan Re-
search Institute and the Periféria Center, also have similar missions but very
dierent backgrounds.
The Metropolitan Research Institute (MRI) was founded in 1989 under the leader-
ship of József Hegedüs and Iván Tosics, and grew out of an economic working
group that had been operating since the early 1980s.
300
In the housing reform
298 Neuberger E. (2021). Szociális lakásügynökség segíthetne biztonságosabbá, igazságosabbá, megfizet-
hetőbbé tenni a bérlést Budapesten, 444.hu, Mar. 16.
299 Szakmai szer vezetek közös tiltakozása az önkormányzati lakástulajdon kiárusítása ellen.
300
In this summary, I rely on an interview with József Hegedüs, co-founder and co-managing director of MRI.

THE LAST THREE DECADES OF THE HUNGARIAN HOUSING MOVEMENT  A BOTTOMUP VIEW  
73
debates that took place during the period of the regime change, the new think
tank supported a slow, gradual privatisation process and a three-sectoral
rental housing system – market, cost-based and social.
301
This idea proved to
be so unpopular that they received drawings of gallows in their Erzsébetváros
oce, in the centre of Budapest. The MRI sta sought to address the challeng-
es facing low-income earners in the transition to democratic, market-based
models. Their policy work has included the development of a rent subsidy
scheme, proposals for tackling arrears and financing subsidised housing,
analysis of privatisation processes and the social consequences of housing
market transformation, and – since the 2000s – research on homelessness
and desegregation programmes. Since the early 1990s, they have submitted
their policy proposals to key actors302; their implementation remained always
far from complete, and their recommendations were distorted by political
interests. The think tank saw its task in formulating policy proposals rather
than advocating for them and taking a part in their implementation. They could
have attempted to compensate for the lack of real political support by working
with pressure groups within the movement, but neither side showed initiative.
This began to change with Habitat for Humanity Hungary’s new trajectory in
the early 2000s and the emergence of AVM and From Streets to Homes!;
indeed, these organisations’ activists understood both the language of policy
and grassroots organising and could thus bridge the two worlds. In 2013, MRI,
in cooperation with Habitat, developed the concept for an aordable housing
agency adopted to the Hungarian context and is now working with the Munic-
ipality of Budapest and From Streets to Homes! to implement it in the capital.
From 2018, the movement’s policy capacity expanded with the Periféria Center,
which maintains strong grassroots connections. The organisation was founded
by researchers who have been living in communal housing for years, partic-
ipated in the creation of the Zugló Collective Housing Association, and were
members of the system critical Social Theory College and AVM. The policy and
301
This was in contrast to the ‘Enabling Housing Market’ approach advocated by the World Bank and imple-
mented in Hungary. In principle, it had two clearly distinct pillars, public housing privatisation and social
interventions. Hegedüs, Kertesi Gábor 70 éves, 143.
302
World Bank, USAID, Gábor Demszky – Mayor of Budapest (1990-2010), the Erzsébetváros district council
in the 1990s, 1996-2012 Housing Policy Council, the first Orbán government’s (1998-2002) housing con-
cept, the second MSZP-SZDSZ government’s (2002-2010) housing concept, Gergely Karácsony – Mayor
of Budapest (2019-present).
research center (which grew out of the Critical Urban Research Workshop)
aims to channel its proposals into policy-making and organisations working in
the field. For example, they used their research on household indebtedness
to connect organisations working in the field. In addition, they cooperate with
the Solidarity Economy Center, which promotes sustainable grassroots initi-
atives, to develop the financing and institutional framework needed to build a
Hungarian tenant housing cooperative network.303
4.6. Home Defenders – organisations of foreign
currency debtors and people facing eviction
In 2007, it was estimated that the circular debt of domestic entrepreneurs
amounted to between five and six hundred billion HUF. At the end of the
chain were the less capital-rich small and medium-sized enterprises, for whom
lengthy legal procedures could not provide any real help against bankruptcy.
304
The Alliance for the Protection of Interests of Enterprises (in Hun garian VÉSZ) was
set up in April 2008 to protect these businesses. As a construction contrac-
tor, founder Ádám Éliás drew on his experience: often he was only paid for
his work when he threatened to go public with the claim of not being paid or
resorted to physical violence against objects.305 VÉSZ first established with
experts whether the contractor who had not been paid had actually completed
the work; then, they indicated to the customer that the claim was justified. If
the customer still refused to pay, the so-called Rapid Response Self-Defense
Zone would spring into action. The sta of the companies concerned would
go to the construction site and, if necessary, dismantle doors, fittings, or other
parts of the building.306
It was on the basis of this radical action that the ‘Social Association of Home
Defenders’ was formed. After VÉSZ announced at the end of April 2009 that
303 Periféria Központ – Témáink.
304 Cégvezetés (2007). A körbetartozás. 108(5); Origo (2006). Ezermilliárd is lehet a körbetartozása, 1 Jun.
Although the government passed a law in 2007 and launched a progressive programme to reduce circular
debts in 2009, non-payment of subcontractors occurred later, including in state-funded projects.
305 Magyar Nemzet, 21 Jun 2008, 71(168):24-25.
306
Magyar Nemzet, 3 Apr 2008, 71(91):11; Magyar Nemzet, 12 Sep 2008 , 71(250):13; Magyar Nemzet, 21 May
2009, 72(138):13; Magyar Nemzet, 25 Sep 2009, 72(263):13; Magyar Nemzet, 21 Apr 2010, 73(108):11.

THE LAST THREE DECADES OF THE HUNGARIAN HOUSING MOVEMENT  A BOTTOMUP VIEW  
74
it would create rapid-response self-defense zones to prevent evictions,
307
the Hungarian Social Forum and other civil society organisations joined the in-
itiative.308 By May 2009, several groups of home defenders were established
across the country.
309
The basis of their operation was that people living in the
aected neighbourhoods would join forces and mobilise together to prevent
evictions. The first (unsuccessful) action, which received press coverage, was
in Győr in defence of a public housing tenant310; this was followed by several
successful actions. If nothing else, they won a grace period for people. Some-
times a phone call was enough; at other times, home defenders chased away
the debt collector and then pressured the debt collection agency to restruc-
ture the debt.311 Members of the groups also disrupted auctions.312
In addition, using a belligerent, war-like rhetoric, VÉSZ launched an action
against banks. In July 2009, they called on financial institutions to declare a
moratorium on foreclosures and evictions for those who become insolvent
until the end of the summer. Subsequently, several banks were blacklisted
by the organisation. They sent threatening letters to the financial institutions
and asked the public to boycott their services so that the banks could be ‘de-
stroyed.’313 In December, the financial institutions filed a complaint against the
leader, Éliás, and he was sentenced to a suspended prison sentence in 2011,
which was finally lifted in 2012.314 In 2015, the court dissolved the organisation
on the grounds that it had not stopped its direct action on behalf of indebted
businesses, despite a court injunction.315
307 Magyar Demokrata, 29 Apr 2009, 13(17):16-19; Magyar Hírlap, 8 May 2009, 42(107):7; A Gyorsreagálású
Önvédelmi Zónák 12 pontja, veszov.hu; Origo, 29 May 2009; The indebted small and medium entrepre-
neurs repeatedly mortgaged their homes, so VÉSZ quickly realised that the two cases were interlinked.
The organisation decided to stand up for the hundreds of thousands of families threatened with losing
their homes – whether they were entrepreneurs or not. Népszabadság, 21 May 2009, 67(118):4.
308 MSZF (2009). Megalakult az Otthonvédő mozgalom, 6 May.
309 According to a May 2009 statement by the organisations, there were hundreds of home defender groups
across the country, including in Szerencs, Zalaegerszeg, Győr, Szolnok and the 11th and 15th districts of
Budapest. Népszabadság, 21 May 2009, 67(118):4.
310 Magyar Hírlap, May 2009. 14., 42(112):20.
311 Magyar Hírlap, 25 Jul 2009, 42(173):22; Magyar Nemzet, 24 Aug 2009, 72(231):11.
312 Magyar Hírlap, 28 Jan 2010, 43(23):5.
313 Magyar Nemzet, 3 September 2009, 72(241):2; Népszabadság, 3 September 2009, 67(206):17.
314 Veszov.h u; Fejér Megyei Hírlap, 31 March 2011, 56(75):2; Magyar Nemzet, 14 Apr 2012, 75(102):2.
315 HVG, 30 Nov 2015.
The advocacy of the foreign currency debtors was typically embedded in a
freedom-fighting narrative defending the Hungarian nation, often interspersed
with radical national symbols and slogans.
316
Another important actor, Koppány
group, followed this more radical line among home defenders. Koppány group
was founded in 2012, and the organisers were speakers of the 2006 anti-gov-
ernment protests in Kossuth Square, including Béla Balogh. The organisation
was formed after an unsuccessful action to prevent an eviction. An enraged
Balogh started recruiting and built up a network of several hundred people.
They prevented or at least postponed several evictions until 2014, using a
human chain or other means of radical resistance.317
Organisations catalysed each other; other civic groups attended the home
defenders’ actions and demonstrations organised by the Koppány group.318
Árpád Kásler, president of the Organisation for th e Protection of Interests of Bank
Debtors, also used freedom-fighting rhetoric and had a mobilising power. After
winning a lawsuit against the Hungarian bank OTP in April 2012, he launched
a country-wide campaign interspersed with lectures and demonstrations and
founded the Home(land) Is Not For Sale M ovement, which later became a party.319
Dozens of other organisations with a small or large base, sometimes led by
political fortune hunters, sprang up and remained active for a few years in the
housing movement’s home defenders’ wing.320
These organisations were often a source of psychological support and infor-
mation for foreign currency debtors. As activists from the groups For The Rule
Of Law and I Will Not Give Up My House confided: ‘I was just wondering around
and I went to protests to get information. And then we were sitting there during
protests on the ground for hours, just talking and talking…’ and ‘someone told
me there are demonstrations, and then I saw there that I am not alone. Until then,
I felt guilty, but then I was surprised how many people are aected by the same
316 Zubor Z. (2013). Zaklatott lázadók vezetnék a népet a devizahitelek ellen. HVG.hu, 23 Aug.
317
Szabó N . (2018) We are the State, We are the People: Forex Loan Debtors’ Struggles for Citizenship in
Hungary. Thesis. Budapest: CEU, Dep. of Sociology and Social Anthropology, 32.; According to a 2013
statement of the president of the organisation, they recruited 1,500-2,000 members, and had representa-
tions in 16 counties, Origo, 1 July 2013; HVG, 18 Sep 2013.
318 Szabó, We are the State, 3 1 - 37.
319 Délvilág, 27 Apr 2012, 68(99):3; Fejér Megyei Hírlap, 13 Jun 2013, 58(136):4; Összefog a nemzet, ege r.hu
320 A Kispest GYŐZ Mozgalom és a Mozdulj Magyarország Összefogás blokádja , Videó.

THE LAST THREE DECADES OF THE HUNGARIAN HOUSING MOVEMENT  A BOTTOMUP VIEW  
75
problem and so I started to go regularly to these demonstrations.’321 In addition,
several organisations, such as the Alliance for the Protection of Interests of For-
eign Currency Debtors, founded in 2011, or the Credibility Movement, started as
self-help groups, where foreign currency debtors self-educated themselves
and found ways to advocate. For those who lacked the necessary information,
the Shelter Foundation’s Key-keeper programme, which started in 2011 and was
based on individual case management, provided valuable support. Its sta also
highlighted the power of psychological support and collective thinking as one
of the most important components of problem-solving.322
A few left-wing activists critical of the system also took part in the demon-
strations,323 but overall, the 2008 foreign currency debt crisis in Hungary was
uniquely thematised by the right.3 24
4.7. Lessons from the fourth era
The movement was polarising. In the years following the economic crisis of
2008, the left and right wings of the housing movement were clearly demar-
cated. The left-wing bloc (still) took the lead in representing the most disad-
vantaged house poor, while the slightly better-o foreign currency debtors
were represented by organisations using a typically right-wing narrative. There
was little crossover between the two blocs; they were also distinct in terms
of issues, social groups, and discourse. The left completely failed to address
one of the most important housing issues of the decade.
The movement infrastructure is strengthening. While right-wing housing organ-
isations were unable to create lasting movement institutions, the ranks of
left-leaning organisations have been enlarged by several new players. AVM
321 Szabó, We are the State, 36- 37.
322 Habitat (2013). Otthon megtartó Kulcs-tartó programme a Menhely Alapítványnál, 21 Nov.
323 A HaHa és a Koppány csoport közös tüntetése, Magyar Nemzet, 17 Aug 2013, 76(224):3.; HVG, 16 Aug
2013; Népszabadság, 5 July 2013, 71(155):9.; Szabó József (Hiteles Mozg.) beszéde az AVM tüntetésen,
21 Dec 2012.
324
Mikecz D. (2014). A Koppány-csoport és a tiltakozás kultúrája. Dinamó Műhely blog, 14 Jan.; Gagyi Á.,
Jelinek Cs. (2017). Bringing Back Uneven Development to the Urbanisation of Politics: Understanding
Right Wing Reactions to the Forex Mortgage Crisis in Hungary. Annual RC21 Conference Paper.
actively shaped public thinking on the housing crisis for nearly ten years and
achieved the self-organisation of homeless people that their predecessors
in ’89 had failed to complete. With Streetlawyers Association, the movement
regained an organisation that provides legal aid service and stands up for
housing and social rights. With the School of Public Life, it expanded with an
educational institution. The range of organisations providing innovative servic-
es and development and the number of research centres has also grown; with
the Periféria Center and the Metropolitan Research Institute, policy know-how
can be put at better use by the movement.
The various groups aected by housing poverty are not visible in the movement.
The housing crisis caught the foreign currency debtors by surprise – but the
movement was not prepared for it either. It was indeed another indebted group
– VÉSZ, an organisation representing small and medium enterprises – that
first showed solidarity with foreign currency debtors. It is conceivable that
new social groups with little organisational representation (e.g., tenants in
the private rental sector) will have to face the consequences of the flawed
housing policies of the last decades, for example as a result of the handling
of the coronavirus pandemic. This could either lead to the polarisation of the
movement (as it did after 2008) or it could strengthen its unity. In reviewing the
fourth era, we saw that some organisations began to represent new causes
and social groups. For example, Habitat is addressing tenants in the private
rental sector, and Periféria Center (with its tenants’ housing association) tar-
gets people with stable but low income. The experience of this period shows
that there is a need for advocacy organised by constituencies because a group
can only take up the interests of another target group at a certain price and
with certain limitations.

THE LAST THREE DECADES OF THE HUNGARIAN HOUSING MOVEMENT  A BOTTOMUP VIEW  
76
5. Concluding thoughts
It is often stated that there is a housing crisis in Hungary today. In fact, the sit-
uation has not changed much since the 1990s; even the number of house poor
has remained steady, at 2-3 million. In practice, the same problems have been
lingering for decades. There is no extensive public housing sector (or other
widely available aordable housing alternatives) – which means the answer
to insolvency is often eviction without adequate alternative housing. In most
cases, the overburdened and underfunded social care system cannot provide
real solutions either. The last 30 years show how the housing crisis, neglected
and swept under the carpet for decades, is time and again manifested through
the diculties of homeless people sleeping rough, people facing evictions or
living in slums, or low earners forced into risky loans. But it is not necessary to
put on a scientist’s glasses to understand how flawed or uncommitted housing
policies continue to cause housing poverty.
To make a real dierence in solving the housing crisis, we also need commit-
ment and cooperation from political parties. Innovative civic initiatives, tried
and tested over the years, will not deliver a response on the scale required
without the right financial and legal environment. Time and again, the move-
ment is trying to win political support by having some of its leaders run for
oce, work as elected representatives or in close proximity to political leaders
– as after the 2019 municipal elections. However, political decisions are made
in the midst of power games, and therefore, they require a lot of compromise.
For those ‘on the inside’ to remain true to their principles and committed to
pushing through housing policy measures, it is necessary for those ‘on the
outside’ to put pressure on those preventing changes and to demonstrate
social support for the cause. Otherwise, there is a concern that good policies
will be implemented in a piecemeal fashion, with few resources or distorted
by political interests – as has too often been the case in the past.
To gain more influence, we must think about how to make movement-building
more eective. For example, could the movement take on the representation of
additional groups aected by housing poverty that have not been represented
before? What resources would be necessary to achieve such a goal? Is there
currently a good mix of organisations working with dierent strategies – such
as service provision, policy research, legal advocacy, training, and community
organising? Are there still barriers to cooperation among these organisations,
or do they see each other as allies? To what extent does the movement rep-
resent concrete interests through the participation of beneficiaries, and not
‘simply’ values and professional opinions?
A healthy ‘movement infrastructure’ depends on getting to know each other’s
work and being open to each other – even if we have very dierent ideas about
the paths and strategies that can lead to social change. But in our atomised
society, not only our relationships but our struggles have been fragmented
into disparate elements. We are often unaware of each other’s eorts, and
we fail to see how our work fits into the larger struggles that others have
initiated before us. This also means that we cannot learn from the mistakes
of our predecessors, or draw strength from their successes, or understand
the historical tradition which (for better or worse) we are all part of. Yet, we
share the same struggle: our eorts should complement each other. The key
question is whether the movement’s actors can create the awareness that
they are building something together.

THE LAST THREE DECADES OF THE HUNGARIAN HOUSING MOVEMENT  A BOTTOMUP VIEW  
77
Methodology
I used qualitative methods to research the history of the housing movement.
In addition to the relevant literature, I reviewed a dataset on two decades
of Hungarian protest events325 and the non-profit dataset of the Hungarian
Central Statistical Oce (KSH)326; I also processed and organised more than
800 press articles (Arcanum Digitheca), contemporary video footages (OSA
– Black Box, László Mihályfy - Rongyosforradalom, NAVA.hu), and conducted
ten semi-structured interviews with leaders of the movement. Data from
dierent sources were triangulated. Last but not least, I drew on the results
of my participant observations. As an activist, I was involved between 2009
and 2017 in the founding and organising of the community advocacy group,
The City Is For All. This allowed me to closely follow the activities and internal
dynamics of the movement during that period. In presenting this history,
I sought to complement rather than simply repeat existing analyses and
narratives; in doing so, I aimed to contribute to a deeper understanding of the
wider dynamics. I worked with Diani’s definition of a social movement, which
describes a social movement as a network of individuals and organisations
(see footnote 7). In this chapter, I consider a network of all NGOs working
in the field of housing as a movement (regardless of their political or policy
orientation) and assess the role of organisations representing disadvantaged
people through the examples presented. I relied primarily on resource
mobilisation theory (resources, organising model) and political opportunity
structure theory (impact of the political context on movements). The method
used does not fully allow for reflecting on the strength of the framing and the
narratives used by the actors involved. I tried to address the policy impact of
the movement and the relationships between actors – but such attempts were
somewhat limited by the scope and length of the present work. I divided the
history of the last 30 years into four periods, with boundaries defined by the
movement’s organisational composition and policy change.
325
Greskovits, B ., Wittenberg, J . (2016). Civil Society and Democratic Consolidation in Hungary in the
1990s and 2000s, Feb 27.
326
Central Statistical Oce (www.ksh.hu). Non-profit organisations - tabular dataset compiled on
request. Special thanks are owed to István Sebestény for his help.

Housing policies and housing aordability
inHungary after 1990
MÁRTON CZIRFUSZ,
CSABA JELINEK

HOUSING POLICIES AND HOUSING AFFORDABILITY IN HUNGARY AFTER 
79
Márton Czirfusz, Csaba Jelinek
Housing policies and housing
aordability in Hungary after 1990
About the authors:
Márton Czirfusz (Periféria Policy and Research Center; Centre for Economic and Regional
Studies)
Csaba Jelinek (Periféria Policy and Research Center)1
Introduction2
During the era of state socialism in Hungary, one of the most important so-
cial policy objectives of the regime was to solve the ‘housing problem’; in
other words, to increase the number of dwellings and improve their quality.3
According to the Hungarian Central Statistical Oce, the number of dwellings
increased by more than 56% between 1949 and 1990 – from 2.47 million to
3.85 million.
4
At the same time, the quality of housing units also improved
rapidly. For example, the proportion of dwellings with access to piped water
increased from 17.1% to 83.3% over the same period.
5
Despite the significant
increase in housing quality, experts estimated that in 1990, 2–3 million people
were still experiencing some form of housing poverty.6 According to contempo-
rary estimates, the problem of housing poverty remains at a roughly similar
1
Csaba Jelinek’s research was conducted with support from the National Research, Development and
Innovation Fund of Hungary, financed under the PD_16 funding scheme (project no. 139049).
2
The original manuscript was finished in August 2021 . Posterior developments are not part of the analysis.
3 Horváth, S. (2012). Két emelet boldogság: Mindennapi szociálpolitika Budapesten a Kádár-korban. Buda-
pest: Napvilág Kiadó.
4
KSH [Hungarian Central Statistical Oce] (2013). 2011. évi népszámlálás: 6. A lakások és lakóik. Budapest:
Központi Statisztikai Hivatal.
5 KSH [Hungarian Central Statistical Oce] (201 3). 2011. évi népszámlálás: 6. A lakások és lakóik. Budapest:
Központi Statisztikai Hivatal.
6 See the study by Bernadett Sebály.
leveltoday: 20–30% of the population is still experiencing some form of hous-
ing poverty in 2021.7
During the state socialist period, the involvement of the state in the field of
housing increased significantly compared to earlier times. By the 1980s, how-
ever, this involvement had already begun to shrink, as the eects of global
financial crisis of the 1970s rippled through the region. The end of this period
was marked by the 1989-1990 regime change, after which the political empha-
sis on housing faded away – resulting in a considerable shift in public policies
dealing with this issue. In this chapter we will analyse the changes that have
occurred since 1990.
In the chapter’s first section we divide the past three decades’ history into
five eras; in doing so, we aim to highlight the most important continuities and
changes that took place during this period. The second section consists of a
list – and introduction – of the most important housing policy tools introduced
over the last thirty years. The third section introduces the institutional and ad-
ministrative framework used by the dierent governments to implement their
housing policies. In the fourth section we analyse housing policies from the
7 See Habitat for Humanity’s annual reports on housing poverty, especially the 2019 and 2018 editions.

HOUSING POLICIES AND HOUSING AFFORDABILITY IN HUNGARY AFTER 
80
perspective of the public budget – that is, we show how much public money
the Hungarian state has spent on housing in dierent periods. The final sec-
tion reviews how various housing policy instruments have aected housing
aordability, housing poverty and housing inequality.
The five sections underline three main observations regarding the period
under review. Since 1990 the political weight of housing policy has been system-
atically eroded compared to the previous decades. Housing policy has become
a fragmented field of public intervention, influenced by at times contradictory
logics. As a result, housing policy tools were unable to respond eectively
to the housing problems faced by dierent social groups, – particularly the
poorer segments of society. As a consequence, s ince 1990, housing – and more
broadly – social inequalities in Hungary have continued to grow,8 and the housing
crisis has deepened. Finally, our analysis suggests that – apart from the political
and administrative marginalisation of housing – the main reasons for this negative
process are the disproportionate support of private homeownership, the severe
and systematic under-financing of public and collaborative forms of housing, and
the advantageous treatment of wealthier social groups. Although there have been
numerous public policy changes in the field of housing over the past three
decades, these three features characterise housing policy in contemporary
Hungary with surprising consistency.
8 Éber, M. Á. (2019). Class Structure of ‘ Hungarian Society’ in the Modern World-System. A historical outline.
STRG Working Papers.
1. Five eras of housing policy
We begin with a brief overview that draws heavily on insights from previous
similar studies.9 The five policy eras we have identified from the last three
decades’ development broadly follow the housing market fluctuations of the
period. While the periodisation could have followed an analysis of the politi-
cal/policy cycles of various governments in power, we did not feel that such
milestones (i.e. the starting and end dates of dierent governments) were the
most relevant for out study. Many of the measures – or the spirit of specific
measures – were not strictly tied to political cycles; in our view, the major
breakpoints should be rather associated with turning points in economic and
housing market cycles, punctuated by crises and booms. The housing market
cycles – the phases of housing booms and busts – are well illustrated by Fig-
ure 1, which shows the number of dwellings constructed annually in Hungary.
1.1. Regime change and crisis management (late
1980s–1995)
A study of the transformation that occurred during the 1970s – that is, roughly
the middle of the state socialist period – reveals a number of public policy
changes linked to Hungary’s growing external debt, its deteriorating position
in the global economy and the way this influenced its shrinking fiscal space.
10
The impact of the global economic crisis on Hungary also triggered a num-
ber of important changes in the field of housing, leading to a relative decline
in the role of the state and the emergence of dierent types of crises.11 The
1989–1990 regime change took place during a period of crisis whose eects
on the living standard of ordinary people had already been felt for several
9
See for example Misetics , B. (2017). Lakáspolitika és hajléktalanság. In Ferge Zs. (ed.) Magyar társadalom-
és szociálpolitika (1990–2015) (pp. 338– 363). Budapest: Osiris Kiadó; Hegedüs, J . (2006). Lakáspolitika és
lakáspiac – a közpolitika korlátai, Esély; Hegedüs, J. et al. (2019). Housing market and housing indicators.;
or ÁSZ [State Audit Oce of Hungary] (2009). Jelentés a lakástámogatási rendszer hatékonyságának
ellenőrzéséről, Budapest: ÁSZ.
10
Éber, M. Á. et al. (2014). 1989: Szempontok a rendszerváltás globális politikai gazdaságtanához, Fordulat.
11
Jelinek, Cs. (2021). Turning a ‘Socialist’ Policy into a ‘Capitalist’ One: Urban Rehabilitation in Hungary
during the Long Transformation of 1989, Journal of Urban History.

HOUSING POLICIES AND HOUSING AFFORDABILITY IN HUNGARY AFTER 
81
years. The nature of the crisis was subsequently transformed by the rapid
public policy changes ushered by the regime change. Consequently, the first
phase is best characterised by the public policy changes associated with
marketisation and the management of the deepening transformational crisis
that followed. József Hegedüs  a prominent housing sociologist – described
the fragmentation of housing from a more or less integrated public policy area
into ad hoc crisis-management as a ‘drift’.12
The privatisation of public housing started already in the late 1980s, but its
pace was accelerated with the new Housing Act of 1993 – which probably
caused the most profound change in housing policy in the last thirty years. At
the time of the regime change, roughly 20% of the country’s housing stock
was still in public ownership. In the last three decades this figure has fallen to
around 2%. In the wake of the regime change, public housing units formerly
managed by state socialist councils were transferred into the ownership of
newly elected local governments.13 This policy transferred a significant part of
the responsibility of public housing from the central government to municipal-
ities. Municipalities were, however, not given sucient financial resources for
such a task, meaning their new-found political autonomy and responsibilities
were not matched with sucient fiscal room for manoeuvring: as a result,
most of them could not aord to properly manage local social and housing
problems. With the onset of privatisation, the municipal housing sector not only
began to shrink, but also started to suer from serious structural problems
that persist to this day. It was during this period that the ongoing crisis in the
public housing sector started to deepen.
Within a few years, the central government had rad ically cut back on housing spe nd
-
ing. Another significant problem for policymakers was the issue of heavily sub-
sidised housing loans in a context of high inflation rates; in 1990, these subsi
-
dies already amounted to 8% of the annual GDP.
14
Meanwhile, there were hardly
any significant socially targeted housing subsidies: the ‘social policy allowance’
12 Hegedüs, J. (2006). Lakáspolitika és lakáspiac – a közpolitika korlátai, Esély, 66.
13
In Hungar y there are approximately 3200 settlements; each of these has its own elected local government.
Counties also have their own democratically elected local government. In Budapest, there is a two-tier
system: there are 23 district-level local governments and there is also a city-level local government.
14 Hegedüs, J. (2006). Lakáspolitika és lakáspiac – a közpolitika korlátai, Esély, 67.
Figure 1: Annual number of dwellings constructed in Hungary.
Data source: Hungarian Central Statistical Oce.
80 000
60 000
40 000
20 000
0
1980
1982
1984
1986
1988
1990
1992
1994
1996
1998
2000
2002
2004
2006
2008
2010
2012
2014
2016
2018
2020
Number of dwellings constructed
Late 1980's -
1995
1996 -
2001
2002 -
2008
2009 -
2014
2015 -
1st era 2nd era 3rd era 4th era 5th era

HOUSING POLICIES AND HOUSING AFFORDABILITY IN HUNGARY AFTER 
82
(szocpol)
15
– which had existed under state socialism – remained in place, but
neither housing allowances nor debt management services were introduced
until the very end of the period. The negative social impacts caused by the
drastic public policy changes introduced during this era resulted in a series
of demonstrations and political actions regarding housing.16 The ‘temporary’
and ‘emergency’ interventions – partially in response to the social outcry – in-
troduced during this period notably set in motion the path-dependent devel-
opment of the institutional homeless care sector.
1.2. Financial liberalisation and new housing finance
institutions (1995–2000)
The first and second eras are divided by an austerity-fuelled macroeconomic
recovery that followed the regime change crisis (and the subsequent institu-
tional reforms that enshrined marketisation). After the ‘emergency’, ‘drifting’
character of the first era, the second era focused on a more conscious institu-
tion-building and the widespread adaptation of market mechanisms. This process
largely followed the (neo)liberal principles of international organisations such
as the World Bank.17 At the beginning of this era, housing finance was in crisis18
and housing construction reached a record low in 1999.
19
In the mid-1990s,
the state-subsidised ‘building society’ scheme was launched (1996); mort-
gage-based housing loans were relaunched as well (1998) after six decades
– all of which eventually fuelled the first post-regime change housing boom.
During this era, the dominant institutional logic regarding housing policy was
dominated by financial and macroeconomic perspectives.20
15 The social policy allowance was a widespread, non-refundable cash grant subsidy for homeownership,
available to families with children.
16 See the study by Bernadett Sebály in this volume.
17 See for example World Bank (1991). Housing Policy Reform in Hungary.
18 The share of housing loans in total housing investment fell from 20% at the beginning of the decade to
3– 4% in 1997, see Lakner, Z. (200 3). Versengő célok, versengő elvek . Lakáspolitika és p olitikai motivációk
1990–2003, Esély, 74. See also Hegedüs, J., Várhegyi, É. (2000). The crisis in housing financing in the
1990s in Hungary. Urban Studies.
19 See the time series on housing and holiday construction by the Hungarian Central Statistical Oce.
20 See the rest of this chapter for more details.
The shifting institutional logic is most clearly illustrated by the housing policies
of the first Orbán government (1998–2002) – attempting a somewhat unified
approach to housing. Self-provision became the keyword of the new governmental
measures (these ranged from state-subsidised housing loans to support for
private housing construction through tax incentives and renovation schemes
targeting socialist-era apartment blocks). The beneficiaries of those measures
were mostly members of the (upper) middle class, including young families; in
eect, this contributed to the further marginalisation of those living in housing
poverty. The share of households receiving socially targeted housing allow-
ances, for example, decreased throughout the period. The overall picture is
somewhat nuanced by the fact that the first Orbán government supported
an increase in the number of public housing units  the first such initiative
since the regime change. In three years, a total of 11,000 new rental units
were added to the drastically reduced stock through acquisitions and new
constructions.
1.3. The first housing boom and EU instruments
(2000–2009)
After the relatively coherent housing policy of the first Orbán government,
housing policy during the rest of the 2000s was characterised by renewed ‘frag-
mentation’.
21
However, this era also saw the first housing boom after the regime
change. This was largely the result of institutional reforms introduced in the
second half of the 1990s and the first years of the 2000s.
Socialist-liberal coalition governments after 2002 tried to implement several more
socially sensitive policy instruments. For example, they re-regulated access to
the social policy allowance and increased its amount in several steps; they
also re-regulated state subsidies and tax incentives linked to the construc-
tion of private housing. Housing allowances targeting people living in housing
poverty were increased more than twofold in 2003 (financed by a central
governmental block grant). A centrally regulated debt management allowance
21 Lakner, Z. (2003). Versengő célok, versengő elvek. Lakáspolitika és politikai motivációk 1990–2003,
Esély, 55.

HOUSING POLICIES AND HOUSING AFFORDABILITY IN HUNGARY AFTER 
83
was introduced as well. A subsidy for household gas bills was also introduced
during this period – eventually becoming socially targeted in 2007 (until then,
the wealthier segments of the population received larger amounts than the
most deprived).
The housing boom that started in the early 2000s aected dierent sec-
tions of society in dierent ways. The wealthier classes were able to improve
their housing situation (albeit some of them only temporarily) first through
state-subsidised loans and then thanks to the proliferation of forex loans22
enabled by lax regulation. At the same time, the majority of society still failed to
improve its housing situation, despite some minor housing policy interventions
undertaken with this aim. Overall, however, the predominance of poorly tar-
geted support for private homeownership meant that no meaningful alleviation
of housing poverty occurred. A new element that appeared during this period
was the risky and growing indebtedness of large swaths of the population.
Another characteristic of this era was the introduction of EU funding for hous-
ing-related purposes, and the parallel development of the institutions managing
these EU-funded projects. This era also saw experts prepare the first major ur-
ban and settlement rehabilitation projects. During this period, almost 200,000
households were directly reached by the expanding renovation scheme of
socialist-era apartment blocks; these renovations were initially financed by
the central government, and later increasingly by EU funds.
1.4. The forex loan crisis (2009–2014)
The first post-1990 housing boom was brought to an end by the global eco-
nomic crisis of 2008–2009, which severely aected hundreds of thousands of
households w ith forex loans and also th e wider national economy. The early stage
of the crisis was marked by the implementation of severe austerity measures. It
was followed by the gradual introduction of housing policy measures address-
ing the negative eects of the crisis: a moratorium on evictions, a forex loan
22 Loans denominated in foreign currencies (mainly in Swiss franc, euro and Japanese yen). In the early
2000s, these loans had significantly lower interest rates than loans denominated in Hungarian Forint
(HUF). However – as their interest rates were not fixed – after the 2008 crisis with the rapidly devalued
Hungarian forint the monthly instalments to be paid for forex loans skyrocketed.
prepayment scheme, a law on compulsory conversion of forex loans to HUF
loans, and the establishment of the National Asset Manager, a public institution
that took over private properties threatened by foreclosure. Just as the vast
majority of housing policy measures introduced since the regime change, most
of these interventions were in eect helping the more auent. The only programme
targeting people in housing poverty consisted in the creation of the National
Asset Manager: this allowed for the largest wave of public housing expansion
since 1990, with the purchase of more than 30,000 apartments.
In the course of the cris is, several existing allowances (most of them targeting peo-
ple living in hous ing poverty) were either tightened or withdrawn: the social policy
allowance was withdrawn, access was restricted to the housing allowance
and debt management allowance, and subsidies for the households’ gas bills
was eventually replaced by the ‘utility price reduction’ measures of the Orbán
regime. Since 2010, a series of governments with a constitutional majority led
by PM Viktor Orbán have been in power. The anti-poor politics of the Orbán
regime are exemplified by the criminalisation of homeless people (which was
also enshrined in the Fundamental Law of Hungary – the country’s constitu-
tion). In the domain of housing, crisis management and utility price reductions
were the priority of the central government until 2015; the housing policy
principles of the Orbán regime only became clear after 2015, at the start of
the second post-1990 housing boom.
1.5. The second housing boom (2015–2021)
Our analysis of the Orbán regime splits it into two parts, with a turning point
occurring in 2015: this marks the advent of the second post-1989 housing
boom. In this era, the governments introduced several housing policy instruments
that went well beyond the ‘crisis management’ character of the previous era. In 2015,
the government decided to introduce the family housing benefit (CSOK); this
was followed by the introduction of subsidised loans for families planning to
have children (the so-called ‘baby expecting loan’) and the home renovation
subsidy. All these measures have similar objectives: to support (upper) mid-
dle-class families with several children. Meanwhile, the socially targeted – and
centrally regulated – housing allowance and debt management allowance

HOUSING POLICIES AND HOUSING AFFORDABILITY IN HUNGARY AFTER 
84
schemes were either abolished or downscaled in 2015. During this period,
socially targeted governmental housing expenditure fell – which inevitably
led to increasing inequalities. The reprivatisation of 90% of the National As-
set Manager’s housing portfolio (and the transfer of the remaining 10% to
religious organisations) fit into this trend. Throughout this period, the only
major socially targeted investment with a housing component have been the
EU-funded urban and rural regeneration programmes. Overall, the impact of
such programmes has nonetheless remained minimal – particularly as the
centralisation of EU funding allocation has only reinforced the paternalistic
nature of these projects.
Similarly to the era of the first Orbán government (1998–2002), this one is also
characterised by the subordination of housing policy to other policy domains:
macroeconomic and family policy considerations continue to shape housing-re-
lated decision-making. While it is important to highlight that neither of these
characteristics is new or unique to the Orbán governments, other traits are
distinct features of this era: the systematic disregard of people living in housing
poverty, unconditional ideological support for a housing system dominated by
private homeownership, and the wholesale rejection of the public or non-profit
rental housing sector.
2. Key housing policy instruments 1990–2021
The following section is a brief overview of housing policy instruments intro-
duced during the last three decades, grouped according to the logic guiding
them. The groups discussed below cover the most important interventions.
As dozens of housing policy instruments have been introduced by dierent
governments over the period under review, we have not attempted to be ex-
haustive – instead, we have focused on the instruments that are significant
in terms of the public funding allocated to them and in terms of the number
of people they reached. For each group, we outline historical milestones and
– where possible – the extent of government resources used, the number of
people reached and their impact on housing poverty and aordability.
2.1. Housing privatisation
The contemporary Hungarian housing system has been largely shaped by the
decisions taken during the regime change – most importantly those related to
the privatisation of housing. These decisions led to a historically unprecedented
loss of state assets; they also signifi cantly reduced the state’s room for manoeuv re
in the field of housing. The legal possibility to privatise state-owned housing
units was already introduced in 1969; but in eect privatisation started in the
1980s – well before the regime change. For example, in 1988 c.10,000 flats
were privatised nationwide, and 20,000 in the following year.
23
In 1990, the
share of state-owned flats was about 20% nationwide and 50% in Budapest.
Internationally, this proportion was not particularly high: at the same time,
the number of publicly owned dwellings in England was also 20%, despite a
privatisation wave that had been ongoing for years.24
In 1990, the former state-owned flats were transferred to local municipalities;
until 1993 they could decide on their own whether to sell them to sitting tenants
or not. From 1993 onwards, housing privatisation was regulated by the new
23 Farkas, E., Szabó, M. (1995). Privatizáció és szociálislakás-gazdálkodás, Statisztikai Szemle, 1002.
24 For a historical timeline see: the Ministry of Housing, Communities & Local Government website.

HOUSING POLICIES AND HOUSING AFFORDABILITY IN HUNGARY AFTER 
85
Housing Act,25 which made it compulsory for municipalities to sell flats upon
request to sitting tenants, (subject to certain conditions).26 The 1990s saw an
unprecedented shif t in the ownership structure of the housing sector, with more than
half a million dwellings being privatised in a single decade. The process has not
stopped since then: between 1990 and 2018, 623,000 public housing units
were privatised by local municipalities. In recent years roughly 1,000 dwellings
have been privatised annually (Figure 2).
A much-debated element of housing privatisation was the highly discounted
purchase price. Figure 2 shows that the purchase price paid by sitting tenants
remained well below the market price throughout the period. Figure 3 shows
the ratio of privatisation revenues in relation to the estimated market value of
the sold dwellings. The dierence between the two values can be called a ‘na-
tional gift’27 that sitting tenants received when they privatised their homes; this
simultaneously reduced the potential revenues and assets of the municipality
(this amount is shown in current prices).
Over the past three decades, a total of 663 billion HUF (at current prices) has
been given as a ‘national gift’ to sitting tenants who privatised their dwellings:
this process has aected roughly 1.6 million people.28 In the early 1990s, ten-
ants were able to buy public housing units at roughly 20–30% of market prices;
today, they can purchase them for 70–80%.
The main beneficiaries of housing privatisation have clearly been the better-o
groups of sitting tenants:
29
they have been able to obtain high-value assets at a
much-reduced price. On the one hand, the losers of privatisation were tenants
with lower status, who were able to buy their flats – but could no longer cover
25 Act LXXVIII of 1993.
26 Dwellings in listed buildings and areas earmarked for urban regeneration were not subject to compulso-
ry privatisation. In 2021, a proposed amendment to the Housing Act sought to extend the scope of the
law to these dwellings. This caused much debate and the the Constitutional Court eventually ruled this
unconstitutional in July 2021.
27 Dániel, Zs. (1997). The paradox in the privatisation of Hungar y’s public housing: a national gift or a bad
bargain? Economics of Transition and Institutional Change
28 The estimated number of aected residents is calculated by multiplying the number of sold dwellings by
the average household size.
29 Dániel, Zs. (1997). The paradox in the privatisation of Hungary’s public housing: a national gift or a bad
bargain? Economics of Transition and Institutional Change
Figure 2: Number of dwellings privatised by municipalities (in thousands),
their purchase price and market value (thousand HUF/sqm, current prices).
Source: Yearbook of Housing Statistics, 2018.
Figure 3: Amount of the ‘national gift’ given to sitting tenants through privatisation
(at current prices, billionHUF) and privatisation revenues as a share of estimated market value (%).
Source: own calculation based on the Yearbook of Housing Statistics , 2018.
0
20
40
60
80
100
0
40
80
120
160
200
1990
1991
1992
1993
1994
1995
1996
1997
1998
1999
2000
2001
2002
2003
2004
2005
2006
2007
2008
2009
2010
2011
2012
2013
2014
2015
2016
2017
2018
thousand dwellings
thousand HUF / sqm
Number of privatised dwellings average market value / sqm
average purchase price / sqm
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
70
80
90
100
0
10%
20%
30%
40%
50%
60%
70%
80%
90%
100%
1990
1991
1992
1993
1994
1995
1996
1997
1998
1999
2000
2001
2002
2003
2004
2005
2006
2007
2008
2009
2010
2011
2012
2013
2014
2015
2016
2017
2018
billion HUF
'National gift' (current prices) Privatisation revenues as a share of estimated market value

HOUSING POLICIES AND HOUSING AFFORDABILITY IN HUNGARY AFTER 
86
the freshly commodified maintenance costs; many amongst them were either
displaced or forced into a spiral of debt. On the other hand, tenants who were
unable to buy their homes because of their modest financial situation, are also
on the losing end of the process. The housing portfolio that remained in the
hands of the municipalities was thus typically in poor condition and – in many
cases – was not properly maintained and managed. From the perspective
of the municipalities, privatisation temporarily increased their revenues, but
drastically reduced their assets and their subsequent room for manoeuvre in
housing policy. According to the report of the State Audit Oce of Hungary,
even though the Housing Act stipulated that privatisation revenues should
be reinvested in the housing sector, ‘[i]t can be reasonably assumed that the
revenues generated during this period [1991–1995] were not used to alleviate
the problems of the public housing sector’30 but rather to temporarily cover
the operating deficits of resource-poor municipalities.
2.2. Interventions to address the housing loan crisis of
the 1990s
One of the rarely discussed moments in the history of Hungarian regime
change is the housing loan crisis, which pushed the largest bank on the brink
of bankruptcy31 in the early 1990s. During the state socialist period, the val-
ue of households’ housing loans increased exponentially (Figure 4): in 1988,
loans for housing construction and purchase accounted for 94% of all loans to
households.32 During this period, an increasing share of housing construction
was carried out with the help of housing loans.
30 ÁSZ [State Audit Oce of Hungary] (1997). Jelentés a helyi önkormányzatok lakás- és nem lakás célját
szolgáló ingatlanvagyonával való gazdálkodásának ellenőrzési tapasztalatairól, 23.
31
During most of the state socialist period, Hungary had a one-tier banking system, where the state-owned
OTP Bank was the most important – and almost only – actor in housing finance.
32
Lengyel, I. (1992). Adósságaink és hiteleink, Esély, 35. Out of this figure, 85% were housing loans granted
by OTP and savings banks; a further 9% were employer and municipal loans. Consumer loans accounted
for the remaining 6%.
Figure 4: Households’ housing loans at credit institutions (stock, billion HUF, current prices).
Source: MNB.
350
300
250
200
150
100
50
0
1969
1970
1971
1972
1973
1974
1975
1976
1977
1978
1979
1980
1981
1982
1983
1984
1985
1986
1987
1988
1989
billion HUF (current prices)

HOUSING POLICIES AND HOUSING AFFORDABILITY IN HUNGARY AFTER 
87
These loans were mostly issued by the state-owned OTP Bank on favourable
terms:33 the annual interest rate was fixed (maximum 3.5%) until 1988 with a
maturity of up to 35 years. The dierence between the low, fixed interest rate
and inflation was financed by the state. However, with the surge in inflation in
the late 1980s, this put an increasing burden on the public budget. With the
regime change, these low interest rates were abolished: not only for newly
issued loans (e.g. in 1990 a housing loan on the market had an interest rate
of 36%), but also retrospectively for households that were already indebted.
In 1989, the so-called Housing Fund was set up as a separate state fund to
take over long-term housing loans from financial institutions (OTP Bank and
260 smaller savings institutions) in exchange for bonds. In 1992, the bonds
issued by the Housing Fund were replaced by 25-year government bonds (with
interests paid by the state to the financial institutions until 2016); the Housing
Fund was dissolved, and the remaining loans were returned to the financial
institutions (but continued to be subsidised by the state).34
In 1991, households with housing loans had to choose between two options:
either their interest rate was increased to 15%, or half of their loans were
waived – but with the condition of having to repay the other half at market
interest rates (32–36%!).35 The majority of the population chose the second
option. However, most households with modest income could not take ad-
vantage of this opportunity. Between 1989 and 1995, the stock of housing
loans at OTP thus fell from 244 billion HUF to 42.8 billion HUF. In 1995 OTP
still had repayment arrears of HUF 10 billion – even in 1997, tens of thousands
of households with housing loans were in arrears. 36
This issue has never been completely settled and has reappeared in almost
every era over the past thirty years: the first Orbán government in 200137 and
33 From 1985 onwards, savings cooperatives were also allowed to issue housing loans to households (this
was previously the monopoly of the state-owned OTP Bank). From 1989 onwards, commercial banks
were allowed to enter the housing loan market, but the volume of lending remained very low in the early
1990s – until the reintroduction of mortgage-backed lending in 1996.
34 For more details, see an annex of the 1992 Budget Implementation Act (pp. 251–256)
35 Lengyel, I. (1992). Adósságaink és hiteleink, Esély.
36
Dániel, Zs. (1997). Lakástámogatás és társadalmi újraelosztás, Közgazdasági Szemle, 851.; Kőnig, É.
(2006). Adósságkezelés: sikerek és kudarcok, Esély, 9.
37
Government Decree 66/2001 (IV.20.). Under this scheme, nearly 30,000 households received assistance
to repay their arrears. Kőnig, É. (2006). Adósságkezelés: sikerek és kudarcok, Esély, 16.
the socialist-liberal government in 200538 issued a decree to ease repayments
on old housing loans. Despite attempts to speed up repayments, the issue
remained unresolved – the governmental budget had continuously allocated funds
for this matter from the regime change until 2016. Besides this direct budgetary
impact, the housing loan crisis also had a far-reaching impact on housing fi-
nance as a whole during the 1990s – with banks hardly disbursing any housing
loans. Consequently, the share of housing loans in housing investments fell
from 20% in 1991 to 3-4% in 1997.39
2.3. Policy instruments to support homeownership
Throughout the three decades since the regime change (and even in the last
two decades of the state socialist period), one of the most prominent principles
has been the state’s support for hom eownership. While this has taken many forms,
the basic logic is has remained unchanged: non-repayable state subsidies, tax
refund subsidies or state-subsidised loans are used to help households to buy a
home. These interventions are typically demand-side interventions since they
use public resources to increase demand on the housing market. One of the
main criticisms regarding these interventions is that they usually increase
the supply prices in the housing market; as a result, part of the subsidies are
automatically channelled to property developers and construction companies
(in the case of new housing construction or renovation) or to homeowners (in
the case of second-hand housing transactions). Another important criticism
is that the targeting of these instruments can hardly be described as ‘social’ – in
most cases, they encourage households that are already better-o to engage
in housing transactions, thus further increasing housing inequalities.
38 Government Decree 11/2005 (I.26.).
39
Lakner, Z. (2003). Versengő célok, versengő elvek. Lakáspolitika és politikai motivációk 1990–2003,
Esély, 74.

HOUSING POLICIES AND HOUSING AFFORDABILITY IN HUNGARY AFTER 
88
2.3.1. Social policy allowance, housing construction allowance and
family housing benefit
In recent years, the government has often referred to the introduction of the
family housing benefit (its Hungarian acronym is CSOK) as a new, innovative
housing and family policy instrument; in reality, the family housing benefit is a
slightly modified and rebranded version of the support known colloquially in Hungar-
ian as ‘szocpol’, which was introduced in 1971 and then temporarily discontinued be-
tween 2009 and 2012 . Ocially called ‘social policy allowance’ (hence ‘szocpol’)
between 1971 and 1995, then ‘housing construction allowance’ and, since 2015
‘family housing benefit’, this public policy instrument is designed to help house-
holds with children to build (or buy, or expand) a home by providing non-repay-
able state support. To this extent, it can be seen as a housing policy instrument
with an important demographic aspect through the promotion of childbearing – an
objective that the government has been keen to emphasise since 2015.
Between 1990 and 2020, the state spent 918 billion HUF at current prices
on ‘social policy allowance’-type of subsidies. However, various experts have
voiced criticism about the eectiveness of such an instrument.
40
For lower-sta-
tus families, it was more dicult to obtain the necessary starting capital. This
subsequently led to aordability problems or encouraged the purchase of
poor quality and poorly located properties – this eventually trapped those who
chose this option in a poverty trap, where they ended up in deprived areas and/
or poor quality housing.
41
Overall, the ‘szocpol’ type of subsidies, and especially
CSOK in recent years, have tended to favour inverse redistribution, i.e. they have
helped better-o households, instead of helping those that are more in need.42
‘Szocpol’ type of subsidies have reached a significant number of households
in recent decades, typically during housing booms. For example, in the 2000s,
40 Misetics, B. (2017). Lakáspolitika és hajléktalanság. In: Ferge, Zs. (ed.). Magyar társadalom- és szociál-
politika (1990–2015). Budapest: Osiris Kiadó
41 KSH [Hungarian Central Statistical Oce] (2012). Társadalmi helyzetkép 2010, Lakáshelyzet, 3.
42
Elek, Zs., Szikra, D. (2018). Fordított újraelosztás a lakáspolitikában: a CSOK versengő céljai, Új
Egyenlőség. CSOK also excludes various societal groups: for example, poor people not paying social
security contributions, those in the government’s public works scheme, or people with a criminal record
are not eligible for the subsidy.
15–18 thousand applicants were registered annually,43 and by the end of the
2010s, roughly 30 thousand CSOK applications were received per annum.44
Hundreds of thousands of households benefited from these subsidies since
1990.
The amount of the subsidies has changed every few years in nominal terms but
has fluctuated strongly in real terms: while in the 1990s it deteriorated sharply
in real terms due to high inflation, it increased in the 2000s. One important
change since 2010 is that households with three or more children receive a
much higher amount of subsidy than households with only one child (Table 1).
1985 1990 1995 2002 2004 2005 2016
1 child 40 50 700 500 800 900 600
2 children 80 200 1200 1600 2000 2400 2600
3 children 160 600 2200 2700 3000 3600 10000
Table 1: Amount of ‘szocpol’ type of subsidies for the purchase of a new dwelling (in thousand HUF, current
prices). Sources: Lengyel 1991, Lakner 2003, ÁSZ 2009, Elek, Szikra 2018.
2.3.2. Supporting private housing construction through loans
The promotion of private housing construction with state-subsidised loans
has been cyclically present since 1990. This type of support was typically
more pronounced when the macroeconomic environment was already more
favourable (pro-cyclical approach).
As described above, the phasing-out of heavily subsidised housing loans after
the socialist period continued to place a burden on the central budget until
the late 2010s. The credit crisis of the 1990s also contributed to the overall
crisis in housing finance. This temporary crisis ended with the reintroduction of
43
ÁSZ [State Audit Oce of Hungary] (2009). Jelentés a lakástámogatási rendszer hatékonyságának
ellenőrzéséről. Budapest: Állami Számvevőszék.
44
In contrast, during the global financial crisis, only 1,638 households applied for social assistance between
2012 and 2014.

HOUSING POLICIES AND HOUSING AFFORDABILITY IN HUNGARY AFTER 
89
mortgage lending in 1998 (which was not available for six decades),45 and with
the launch of central government sponsored interest-rate subsidy schemes in
2000. Two other important turning points were two legislative changes: one
speeding up the previously cumbersome land registrations,46 and the other
ensuring the rapid initiation of enforcement proceedings against defaulting
borrowers in the case of loan contracts.47 The first post-1990 housing boom
in Hungary can be dated from here; it ends with the 2008 crisis.
Between 2000 and 2003, there were two major types of interest-rate sub-
sidies: the supplementary interest-rate subsidy and the general interest-rate
subsidy. The former was targeted at young couples under 35 and families
with three or more children, while the latter was available to anyone who
could aord a mortgage. The supplementary interest rate subsidy capped
the interest payable by the borrower at 8% (and 6% from 2001) for the first
ten years of repayment, while the state took over 3% (4.5% from 2001) with
the general interest rate subsidy. Thus, in a market environment where the
average interest rate on housing loans was around 19%, the general inter-
est-rate subsidy beneficiaries could achieve interest rates as low as 13–14%.48
In addition to private individuals, legal entities investing in (or renting) housing,
housing cooperatives and condominiums, or even municipalities, were eligible
for interest-rate subsidies during this period. Between 2001 and 2008, a total
of 404,000 state-subsidised housing loans were contracted, i.e. 8–10% of the
population benefited directly from this form of support.
In 2003, the socialist-liberal government tightened the eligibility criteria for
interest-rate subsidies, with the aim of excluding the wealthiest groups. In
2005, the Fészekrakó (‘Nesting’) programme was introduced, which provided
young people a state guarantee for the down payment on their housing loans:
45 Botos, J. (2002). A magyarországi jelzálog-hitelezés másfél évszázada. Budapest: Szaktudás Kiadó Ház,
178. The reintroduction of mortgage lending was already advised by the World Bank around 1989, and it
was a requirement before EU accession in 2004.
46 The newly introduced Act on Real Estate Registration imposed legal sanctions for slow registration and
administration.
47 Previously, banks could expect years of protracted litigation, but from this point on, enforcement could
be launched in 30 days . See Lakner, Z. (2003). Versengő célok, versengő elvek. Lakáspolitika és politikai
motivációk 1990–2003, Esély.
48
Lakner, Z. (2003). Versengő célok, versengő elvek. Lakáspolitika és politikai motivációk 1990 –2003,
Esély.
this meant that in some cases young households could obtain a housing loan
even without a down payment. Between 2005 and 2008, 44,000 housing
loan contracts were issued under the auspices of the Fészekrakó programme.
In 2004, forex loans (i.e. loans denominated in foreign currencies) appeared
in Hungary, in parallel with the first tightening of the government sponsored
interest-rate subsidy scheme. In hindsight, these financial products imposed
an extremely high risk on borrowers. Foreign currency loans were essentially
‘developed’ by the market, without state support – but took advantage of the per-
missive nature of state regulation. Forex loans which oered very low initial in-
terest rates compared to other loans denominated in HUF, were taken out by
hundreds of thousands of households, creating serious problems following
the 2008 crisis.49
After the crisis, housing loan penetration started to grow again around 2015,
triggering the second post-1990 housing boom. In the period since then,
state-sponsored, subsidised housing loans have been mostly linked to the
family housing benefit: beneficiaries of the family housing benefit are also eli-
gible for a state supported loan. In addition, baby expecting loans (introduced
in 2019) have also been very popular in the last three years. This financial
product is not a housing loan, but a state-subsidised personal loan. However,
according to data from the Hungarian National Bank, 44% of borrowers use
them to buy a home. In 2019-2020, a total of more than 110,000 baby expect-
ing loan contracts were signed by Hungarian households.
50
According to data
by the Hungarian Central Statistical Oce, more than 471,000 housing loan
contracts were signed between 2016 and 2020, of which 13.9%, or roughly
65,000 loans, were state-subsidised.51
In total, more than half a million state-subsidised housing loans were signed during
the two housing booms after the regime change; according to our estimate, these
49 Király, J. (2020). Hungar y and Other Emerging EU Countries in the Financial Storm: From Minor Turbu-
lences to a Global Hurricane. Springer Verlag.
50
MNB (2021). Housing Market Report, 31 May 2021. Baby expecting loans can be taken by young couples.
The more babies they will have after taking the loan, the more interest-rate subsidy they get. In case they
have three common children, their loan will be cancelled.
51 Hungarian Central Statistical Oce: Housing loans (half year data).

HOUSING POLICIES AND HOUSING AFFORDABILITY IN HUNGARY AFTER 
90
could have directly aected one and a half or even two million people.52 How-
ever, this type of public policy instrument has typically targeted the more auent
sections of the population. At times when its targeting became more socially
sensitive (for example in the mid-2000s), regulatory shortcomings have in many
cases led to corrupt fraudsters targeting families in need; meaning that in eect
these programmes may have had the opposite eect to the one intended.53
2.3.3. Refund subsidy, waiver and exemption of taxes and duties
Another type of measure to support private homeownership is the (partial or
full) waiving of taxes and duties by the government (e.g. real estate purchase
tax). Unlike previous instruments, this does not entail direct budgetary expend-
iture but reduces the revenue of the central budget. Since the regime change,
a number of such instruments has been used by successive governments. In
almost all cases, they have been subject to the same criticism as other meas-
ures to support private homeownership: they tend to help the wealthier rather
than those in need. Given the fluctuating rules and the high number of specific
interventions, we highlight a few emblematic decisions.
Although housing-related tax refund subsidies can be found in budget acts as
early as the 1990s,
54
it was the first Orbán government (1998–2002) that appl ied tax
refund subsidies on a larger scale for the first time after the regime change. It is also
symbolic that the first Orbán government’s first housing policy decision in 1999
was to provide a tax refund subsidy to housing developers.55 The instrument
did not immediately become popular and was phased out in 2005 with the
introduction of austerity measures. From 2001 onwards, households received
a similar benefit: borrowers could deduct 40% of the repayments on housing
loans from their personal income tax. This measure was phased out in 2007.
52 Since state-subsidised loans were typically targeted at families with children, it is likely that the average
household size of those taking out subsidised loans was larger than the average Hungarian household
size (2.4).
53 See for example the summary of the Miskolc ‘Fészekrakó case’ on the K-Monitor website.
54 Bozsik, S. (2001). A lakáshitelezés állami támogatása a rendszerváltás után, Eszmélet.
55
Lakner, Z. (2003). Versengő célok, versengő elvek. Lakáspolitika és politikai motivációk 1990–2003,
Esély.
After 2015, similar instruments have appeared in the government’s housing
policy toolbox. For example, a temporary reduction of VAT on the sale of
newly built housing units (from 27% to 5%) was introduced between 2016
and 2020, and then reintroduced in 2021 for a further five years. Analysts
say that such a VAT reduction will not contribute to lowering prices, rather will play
a part in further increasing them.
56
In addition, from 2021 onwards, this reduced
VAT can be reclaimed for an amount of up to 5 million HUF for private indi-
viduals – provided that the applicant is also a recipient of the family housing
benefit (CSOK). Those who build their home with self-financing will also be
able to benefit from a similar tax refund, also up to a limit of 5 million HUF.57
This means that a wealthier family buying or building a larger property – when
taking advantage of all the above-mentioned benefits – can receive up to 15
million HUF in state subsidies and a further 10 million HUF in state-subsidised
low-interest loans; in the meanwhile, households in need can only access a
fraction of such subsidies.
2.3.4. Governmental support for contractual savings for housing
The legal conditions for the establishment of building societies in Hungary
were laid down in 1996, during the period of the institutionalisation of the hous-
ing market that largely followed the German Bausparkasse model.58 Building
societies under the Hungarian regulation are specialised credit institutions
which – under strong regulations – manage both the contractual savings for
housing of their customers and the subsidies (top-ups) from the state; they
also provide housing loans. From the customer’s point of view, what happens
is that they deposit a certain amount of savings every month for a few years in
the building society. At the end of the contractual term, they can withdraw the
amount increased by the pre-fixed interest on the deposits
59
and by the state
subsidy (governmental top-up). They have to spend the withdrawn amount on
purchasing or upgrading their own housing units. Additionally, customers can
56 Portfolio.hu (2021). Mit hoz az áfacsökkentés a lakásárakban? – Hat pontban összessedtük a lényeget.
57 Bankmonitor.hu (2021). 5 buktató, amire figyelni kell az áfa-visszatérítés igénylésekor.
58 Szóka, K. (2019). Lakástakarékpénztárak. In Kovács, T., Szóka, K ., Varga, J. (eds.) Pénzügyi intézmény-
rendszer Magyarországon. Sopron: Soproni Egyetem Kiadó.
59 This has typically been 1– 3% in Hungary over the last decade.

HOUSING POLICIES AND HOUSING AFFORDABILITY IN HUNGARY AFTER 
91
take out a loan for their housing investment at the end of the term, which usu-
ally has a fixed and cheaper-than-market interest rate. All in all, this is another
housing policy instrument that helps those households who are able to accumulate
savings to become private homeowners or to upgrade their private housing.
In Hungary, from 1996 to 2018, the central government granted 30% of the
contractual savings deposited as state support,
60
capped at 36,000 HUF
per year until 2003 and 72,000 HUF per year thereafter. Contractual savings
typically had a maturity of four years, during which customers could achieve a
return of up to 10% (with the governmental top-up). The product was popular:
in 2000, Hungarian building societies managed deposits of 55 billion HUF,61
which increased to 1,098 billion HUF by 2019.
62
While in 2008, building socie-
ties issued roughly 4% of all housing loans in the country, by 2019 they issued
14%. By then, a total of more than 617 billion HUF in state subsidies had been
injected into the building societies system at current prices; at the time of the
phasing out of state subsidies (in 2018), there were roughly one million housing
savings accounts registered with building societies in Hungary – that is slightly
less than the one million two hundred thousand contracts in 2008.63 In other
words, at every given point in time during the 2010s, on average 10% of the
population had a housing savings account with a building society.
In 2018, the government decided to phase out state subsidies for savings
accounts at building societies. Since then, three of the four providers on the
market suspended their activities, as other savings options (e.g. a government
bond scheme with annual returns of around 5%) were more attractive than
contractual housing savings investments without state subsidies. In 2021, only
Fundamenta (one such remaining building society) will oer similar services –
without state subsidies.64 The state support is currently being phased out in
a degressive pattern, i.e. subsidies for contracts concluded until 2018 is still
part of the central budget expenditures.
60 40% for a short period in 1996 –1998.
61 Szóka, K. (2019). Lakástakarékpénztárak. In Kovács, T., Szóka, K., Varga, J. (eds.) Pénzügyi intézmény-
rendszer Magyarországon. Sopron: Soproni Egyetem Kiadó.
62 Portfolio.hu (2020). Újabb nagy változás a lakástakarékoknál: nehéz döntést hozott az Erste.
63 ÁSZ [State Audit Oce of Hungary] 2009.
64 Portfolio.hu (2020). Újabb nagy változás a lakástakarékoknál: nehéz döntést hozott az Erste.
Overall, public support to private savings at building societies is likely to have
had only a small impact on people living in housing poverty; it can therefore
also be considered a policy instrument that has contributed to rising housing
inequalities.
2.4. Housing allowance
In the three decades since the regime change, housing allowance has been almost
the only housing-related allowance available for an extended period that specif-
ically targeted people in need. This type of demand-side intervention is also
widespread internationally, particularly in the context of declining supply-side
government interventions (i.e. state-led housing construction programmes)
that followed the global neoliberal turn.65
In Hungary, the 1993 Social Act
66
defined housing allowance as a form of
support that could be provided by local governments. This Act also defined
an income threshold for this support, on the basis of which roughly two-thirds
of Hungarian citizens became eligible. Until 2004, local governments were able
to determine the exact conditions of eligibility as well as amount of the al-
lowance. This autonomy also meant that local authorities had to finance this
allowance based on their own resources. The result was that the financially
disadvantaged local governments – which also contained a higher proportion
of people in need – gave the least support, with the more auent ones being
more generous. For example, in 1997, two-thirds of local governments with
fewer than 3,000 inhabitants, the local authority did not provide any housing
allowance at all.67
Until the first major reform of this form of support (in 2004), roughly 200,000
people were receiving housing allowance annually; in 1996, the average claim-
ant received 1,000 HUF per month, and in 2004 this figure had risen to 2,500
HUF (Figure 5). In real terms, the value of the subsidy has stagnated. Overall,
the housing allowance reached a relatively large number of people, but certainly not
65 Misetics, B. (2018). Sosem volt elég: Lakásfenntartási támogatás 2015 előtt, Esély.
66 Act III of 1993.
67 Monostori, J. (2000). Lakásfenntartási támogatás a városokban, Esély, 73.

HOUSING POLICIES AND HOUSING AFFORDABILITY IN HUNGARY AFTER 
92
all those in need – th is was particularly the case for those livi ng in small settlements.
The amount of support was extremely modest compared to both average
monthly incomes68 and to similar support in neighbouring countries.
In 2004, the housing allowance became a ‘normative benefit’, i.e. it was made
available in all municipalities under the same (compulsory) conditions and 90%
of the costs were covered by a block grant coming from the central budget.
Until the next major reform, in 2015, the number of households receiving sup-
port increased: in the second half of the 2000s, more than 300,000 people
received the normative housing allowance annually, and during the crisis years,
400,000–500,000 people received it.69 Between 2000 and 2015, a total
of HUF 212 billion was paid out to people as housing allowance at current
prices.70 The 2004 reform also made the benefit more equitable: more people in
need received the benefit and inequalities of distribution between municipalities
were reduced. However, after 2010, the second Orbán government rolled back this
equalising trend. The real value of the average subsidy rose to one and a half
times its 2003 level in the second half of the 2000s, before falling back to its
2004 level after the 2009 cuts.
In 2015, the normative housing allowance was abolished: the framework for
this form of subsidy is no longer part of the Social Act. Since 2015, local
authorities are no longer obliged to provide this type of allowance and the
central government no longer provides block grants for financing housing
allowance. Local governments can distribute ‘municipal social benefit’ – but
it is only financed by the central government if some specific conditions are
met. This means that in 2015, 8% of local governments (in which 40% of the
overall population lives) were not eligible for central governmental compen-
sation for issuing municipal social benefit. These municipalities could only
provide municipal social benefit to their residents from their own resources.71
However, municipal social benefit is not necessarily targeted at people in
68 In the lowest income decile in 1993, for example, the average amount of housing allowance received was
roughly 10% of average monthly income. Own calculation based on Misetics 2018.
69 Misetics 2018, 22.
70 We estimate that the contribution of the central budget was around 180 billion HUF.
71 Misetics, B. (2019). Kevesebbet, kevesebbeknek: A lakásfenntartás önkormányzati szintű támogatása ,
Esély, 4.
Figure 5: Number of people receiving housing allowance (in thousands)
and total expenditure on housing allowance (billion HUF, current prices).
Source: Kőnig 2006; Hungarian Central Statistical Oce.
0
100
200
300
400
500
0
5
10
15
20
25
1994
1995
1996
1997
1998
1999
2000
2001
2002
2003
2004
2005
2006
2007
2008
2009
2010
2011
2012
2013
2014
2015
thousand people
billion HUF
Number of beneficiaries Total expenditure on housing allowance

HOUSING POLICIES AND HOUSING AFFORDABILITY IN HUNGARY AFTER 
93
housing diculties; it aims to cover a population with more diverse needs,
with housing being just one of the many problems.
Studies on the imp act of phasin g out the normative housing allowance have shown
that the decision has strongly hit already struggling local governments and house-
holds with several children living in extreme poverty.72 Although most local gov-
ernments (especially larger ones) continued to provide some form of support
to households struggling with housing diculties, the average level of support
has been reduced; it also usually targeted at a narrower group of people and
often includes arbitrary, subjective elements73 among the eligibility criteria.
2.5. Debt management allowance
Alongside the housing allowance, the debt management allowance has been the
most important public policy instrument specifically targeting people living in (hous-
ing) poverty over the last thirty years. While the housing allowance aimed to pro-
vide targeted support for housing expenditures of families in need, the debt
management allowance (and in some cases the associated debt management
services) sought to help households to clear their arrears.
In the first years after the regime change, the relative weight of housing-relat-
ed costs increased for a significant proportion of the population: while in the
1980s housing costs averaged 10% of household income, this figure doubled
by the mid-1990s and remained stable at around 20% for the next twenty-five
years.
74
The most crucial element of this rapid increase was the soaring utility
prices (well above inflation levels) after the phasing-out of socialist-era price
subsidies. In the 1990s, centrally regulated, systematic debt management
programmes were not yet established: public policy interventions seeking to
manage debt were ad hoc and temporary. For example, between 1990 and
1994, two smaller tenders were launched by the then Ministry of Welfare to
72 Kováts, B. (2015). Rezsitámogatás- csökkentés. Az új lakásfenntartási célú települési támogatások vizs-
gálata 31 önkormányzat példáján, Esély; Misetics 2019.
73 For example, a mayor can distribute the benefits in the absence of clear, objective criteria, or one condi-
tion could be that households must meet the undefined criteria of ‘running a decent household’. These
subjective rules make people in extreme poverty even more exposed to local decision-makers.
74 Kőnig, É. (2006). Adósságkezelés: sikerek és kudarcok, Esély, 3.
help municipalities to settle the debts of local households with utility arrears.
The debt was settled in one lump sum and roughly half of the cost was borne
by the central budget (a further 20–30% by the municipality, 10% by the utility
providers and 20% by the concerned households).75 These interventions did
not solve the structural causes of debt: a significant number of households
became indebted again shortly afterwards.
The experience gained from these first ‘emergency’ interventions triggered a
number of changes. In 1995 a new training of debt counsellors started in the
north-eastern city of Salgótarján. The training followed a pre-existing Dutch
model and was also financed by incoming Dutch grants. The programme was
ushered by the recognition that, in addition to financial support, the role of spe-
cialised social workers and family support workers is essential for eective debt
reduction and for helping households escape the debt trap.76 In 1998 – for the
first time since 1990 – a nation-wide regulation was introduced regarding the
conditions of central governmental support for municipal debt settlement
programmes.
77
It was not, however, permanently integrated into the ocial
social policy toolbox. Through this tool, roughly 400 municipalities (c. 9,000
families) settled about 1.5 billion HUF worth of utility debts.78
The real turning point came with the 2003 amendment of the Social Act,
which provided the legal framework for debt management and for its finan-
cial support from the central budget – this continued until 2015. A three-pillar
system was established, with the debt reduction allowance (90% of which
was covered by a block grant from the central budget) complemented by a
debt management service and an automatic eligibility for housing allowance.
Compared to previous programmes, in this three-pillar system the one-o cash
assistance was backed up by the professional help of social workers and by the
reduction of household expenditures (by providing access to housing allowance).
The 2003 amendment did not initially make debt management a compulsory
municipal task – but from 2006 onwards, it became compulsory in munici-
palities with a population of over 40,000 (and in all the districts of Budapest).
75 Kőnig, É. (2006). Adósságkezelés: sikerek és kudarcok, Esély, 6.
76 Kőnig, É. (2006). Adósságkezelés: sikerek és kudarcok, Esély, 7.
77 Government Decree 96/1998 (V.13.).
78 The decree also regulated the settlement of the so-called OTP loans – see subsection 2.2.

HOUSING POLICIES AND HOUSING AFFORDABILITY IN HUNGARY AFTER 
94
From the second half of the 2000s, roughly 8-10 thousand households, and in
the early 2010s, nearly 20 thousand households were able to take advantage
of the debt management allowance every year (Figure 6). During its peak pe-
riod, the state spent HUF 1.9 billion per year on the programme. Even though
the scheme provided help to its beneficiaries, a significant proportion of those
in need were excluded (typically because they could not aord the necessary
co-payments); additionally, the total volume spent on the scheme only covered
a fraction of the total volume of arrears (e.g. 1% in 2009).79
In 2015, just as the normative housing allowance was scrapped, the government
also abolished the legal framework for a centrally subsidised debt management
allowance. From then on, municipalities were tasked with deciding whether to
provide such support to their residents – from their own budgets, without any
block grants. A 2015 survey showed that municipalities were providing only
a smaller proportion of this service under the new legal framework, and that
the target group was shifting away from the those most in need towards the
lower middle class.80
2.6. Utility price reduction
Among all the costs faced by an average household, the fastest rise since
the regime change has been linked to utility costs. From this perspective, it
is easy to understand why the government launched the so-called ‘fight for
utility prices’ before the 2014 parliamentary elections – and why it has been
an essential governmental talking point ever since.
The ‘fight for utility prices’, as proclaimed by the Orbán government, did not become
a central topic of political d iscourse in the mid-2010s; it has been a feature of publ ic
policy debates through out the last three decades. The housing allowance has not
been able to compensate for the increase in utility costs; this is why govern-
ments have been introducing various ‘utility price reduction’ programmes since
79 Gyarmati, A . (2016). Adósságkezelési szolgáltatás: mint a magáncsőd intézményének kiegészítő eszköze,
Kézirat.
80 Kováts , B. (2015). Rezsitámogatás-csökkentés. Az új lakásfenntartási célú települési támogatások vizs-
gálata 31 önkormányzat példáján, Esély.
Figure 7: Consumer price increase in dierent expenditure groups (1990=100).
Source: Hungarian Central Statistical Oce.
0
500
1000
1500
2000
2500
3000
3500
4000
1992
1994
1996
1998
2000
2002
2004
2006
2008
2010
2012
2014
2016
2018
2020
Consumer price index - Total
Consumer price index - Electricity, gas, and other fuels
utility price reduction
Figure 6: Number of beneficiaries of the debt management allowance (thousands).
Source: Hungarian Central Statistical Oce.
20
18
16
14
12
10
8
6
4
2
0
2003
2004
2005
2006
2007
2008
2009
2010
2011
2012
2013
2014
2015
thousand people

HOUSING POLICIES AND HOUSING AFFORDABILITY IN HUNGARY AFTER 
95
the 1990s. The first intervention specifically aimed at reducing utility prices
took place during the 1995/1996 heating season, when individuals in need
were eligible to claim a monthly subsidy of 600 HUF for six months.
81
Accord-
ing to experts, the targeting of the scheme was ineective, and its overall cost
was very low compared to other housing-related interventions. The so-called
Energy Fund was set up in 1997 at the initiative of the government, with a total
budget of 2.5 billion HUF.82 In a relatively short period 370,000 households
received electricity price compensation and 410,000 households received gas
price compensation83 – but this was still only a temporary, ad hoc intervention.
A significant change occurred after 2003, when the residential gas price com-
pensation scheme was introduced. The scheme absorbed a significant chunk
of government subsidies dedicated to housing
84
and reached more than 3
million consumers. The targeting of the scheme was very broad in the first
years but was somewhat narrowed after 2007. Overall, many people in need
were excluded from the scheme – as a significant proportion of people in housing
poverty do not use gas heating. Another problematic part was that it provided
relatively more support to more auent households, since the compensation
was consumption-based.
85
The gas price compensation scheme’s phasing
out process started in 2009 and ended in 2011.
The next major series of interventions to reduce utility prices was carried out
by the post-2010 Orbán governments and became a major issue in the 2014
election campaign (at a time when gas prices were rising significantly globally).
The logic of the intervention was fundamentally dierent from the prevailing
logic of the pre-2010 period. Instead of demand-side subsidies (which were
a major burden on the central budget before 2010) the nationalisation of pre-
viously privatised utilities and the capping of prices at lower levels – that is a
complete restructuring of the supply side – began.
86
This has resulted in more
81 Kőnig, É. (2006). Adósságkezelés: sikerek és kudarcok, Esély, 5.
82 Of this, 1.7 billion was paid by the central budget and 1 billion by utility companies.
83 Kőnig, É. (2006). Adósságkezelés: sikerek és kudarcok, Esély.
84 In 2006 alone, for example, 158 billion HUF was spent on this purpose. Between 2003 and 2011, the
central budget spent a total of 602 billion HUF on this purpose at current prices.
85 Misetics, B. (2018). Sosem volt elég: lakásfenntartási támogatás 2015 előtt, Esély.
86 The interventions related to utility companies illustrate the political-economic logic of the Orbán regime
- for an analysis see Éber, M. Á. et al. (2019).
predictable utility bills for the population, but without any social targeting what-
soever: yet again, the scheme benefitted the better-o rather than the most
deprived households. In the light of developments in distribution, energy e-
ciency and global markets – gas prices have since fallen, and then risen again
significantly – many experts have strongly criticised the Orbán government’s
‘fight for utility prices’.
87
However, it is estimated that utility price reduction
after 2014 reduced overall household spending by around 600 billion HUF.
Compared to this project, the volume of the ‘social firewood’ scheme (3-5 billion
HUF annually) seems extremely small. In recent years the scheme has been
organised by the Ministry of Interior to provide firewood for families in need,
who are on average much less able to benefit from other interventions aiming
to reduce utility prices.88 Here it is also important to mention the ‘vulnerable
consumer’ status and prepayment meters: both started to become widely used
after the 2008 crisis. The former allows for preferential utility price payment
options for some low-income households, while the latter tries to prevent in-
debtedness with a technological innovation: utility services (mainly energy)
are only available if the meter is topped-up. Even though prepayment meters are
generally seen as a decent solution to avoid the debt trap both by energy supplier
corporations and by most NGO s working with people living in housing poverty, there
is much international literature criticising this instrument as should a household lack
the finances to top up their meter, their access to electricity and gas is cut o.89
2.7. Expansion of the public housing sector
As discussed in the subsection on housing privatisation (2.1.), the number
of public housing units declined radically in the 1990s, and then slowly but
steadily continued to decrease thereafter. Only two programmes in the last
three decades have worked against this trend.
87 Sebestyénné Szép, T., Weiner, Cs. (2020.) The Hungarian utility cost reduction programme.
88 See Gosztonyi, Á., Vankó, L. (eds.) (2020). Annual report on housing poverty in Hungary 2020. English
summary. Budapest: Habitat for Humanity Hungary.
89
Herrero, S. T. et al. (2020.) Smart Meters Tackling Energy Poverty Mitigation: Uses, Risks and Approaches,
conference presentation.

HOUSING POLICIES AND HOUSING AFFORDABILITY IN HUNGARY AFTER 
96
Between 2001 and 2003 the first Orbán government launched the State Sup-
ported Rental Housing Programme, which aimed to encourage local govern-
ments and churches to build, purchase or renovate housing with the help of
central budget subsidies. Municipalities could apply for the construction of
aordable rental housing, so-called Fecskeházak (‘Swallow Houses’),90 re-
tirement homes, or for upgrading public utilities on plots available for future
constructions. Between 2000 and 2005, the central budget allocated a total
of HUF 63 billion for these subsidies,
91
and provided 70% of the costs.
92
Thanks
to this programme, by 2008 the nu mber of publicly owned rental housing units h ad
increased by approximately 12–18 thousa nd, or 5–8% of the total stock at that time.
In total, however, there were only 3–4 thousand dwellings constructed by
municipalities – the rest having been purchased from the market.
93
In addition
to this, 10% of the public housing stock was renovated in this period. Figure
8 shows how the period covered by the programme nevertheless stands out
from the otherwise extremely low figures of municipal housing construction
during this overall timespan. Except for the early 2000s, in most years only
0–2% of all new housing construction was due to municipal investment; since
2010, we have consistently seen the lowest construction figures of these past
decades – in line with the anti-rental housing policies of the Orbán regime.
The other measure to increase the stock of public rental housing was the cre-
ation of the National Asset Manager, which temporarily increased the number
of public rental housing units by 25% in the mid-2010s as part of a bundle of
measures that dealt with the forex loan crisis. This intervention will be dis-
cussed in section 2.8.
90
The target groups for the Swallow Houses were full-time students in higher education, married or in civic
union, and married couples (or couples in civic union) under the age of 35. The latter were required to
open a savings account at a building society. Tenants were allowed to stay in the property for a maxi-
mum of five years, i.e. this form of housing was conceived as a temporary solution, a stepping stone for
young people. Lakner, Z. (2003). Versengő célok, versengő elvek. Lakáspolitika és politikai motivációk
1990–2003, Esély, 82.
91 Hegedüs, J. (2006). Lakáspolitika és a lakáspiac – a közpolitika korlátai, Esély, 95.
92 However, on average only 45% of the actual costs were eventually covered by central aid due to soaring
construction costs. See ÁSZ [State Audit O ce of Hungary] (2009). Jelentés a lakástámogatási rendszer
hatékonyságának ellenőrzéséről, Budapest: ÁSZ.
93
The studies discussing the programme often misrepresent the figures (see Lakner 2003, Hegedüs
2006, ÁSZ [State Audit Oce of Hungary] 2009). While they estimate the number of new constructions
at c.18,000, according to the Hungarian Central Statistical Oce, the actual figure was only a fraction of
this number. See Figure 8.
Figure 8: Number of dwellings built by municipalities.
Source: Yearbook of Housing Statistics, 2018.
0
200
400
600
800
1000
1200
1400
1600
1992
1994
1996
1998
2000
2002
2004
2006
2008
2010
2012
2014
2016
2018
number of dwellings constructed

HOUSING POLICIES AND HOUSING AFFORDABILITY IN HUNGARY AFTER 
97
2.8. Tackling the forex loan crisis after 2008
The second major post-1990 housing crisis started with the global economic
crisis of 2008. The biggest problem in Hungary (besides rising unemployment
and deteriorating economic conditions) were the rising forex loan repayments
and mass defaults.
94
While the loan crisis of the 1990s was mostly due to
soaring inflation, this crisis was amplified by the radical change in exchange
rates after 2008. Before the regime change, the stock of housing loans was
15% of the annual GDP, but by the time the 2008 crisis hit, it was already
25%
95
– thus creating an even more widespread problem. Exp erts estimate that
850,000 households had mortgages at the onset of the 2008 crisis; out of these,
roughly 340,000 suered major losses during the crisis.96
Apart from the introduction of an eviction moratorium in 2009 (which remained
in place until 2014), the socialist-liberal government in power during the very
first period of the forex loan crisis did not attempt any significant intervention
at the systemic level.
The next Orbán government (2010–2014) made it a political priority to address
the issue – partly as a reaction to the significant protest movement organised
by foreign currency borrowers.
97
The first major intervention was a significant
help to the wealthiest group of foreign currency borrowers: between 2011
and 2012, the forex loan prepayment scheme enabled 15–20% of mortgaged
households (that is 170,000 families) to repay their loans in one lump sum with
a significant discount. In 2012, a similar number of people were helped by the
rate-cap scheme: it was targeted at those who did not have enough capital
to participate in the prepayment scheme but were able to pay a maximised
94 At the end of 2014, despite the bailouts, 140,000 borrowers – a quarter of the total mortgage portfolio
– were still in default, i.e. over 90 days late with their repayments. See Dancsik, B. et al. (2015). Comp-
rehensive analysis of the nonperforming household mortgage portfolio using micro-level data. MNB
Occasional Papers Special Issue.
95 By the end of the 1990s, the same indicator was between 0–5%. Hegedüs, J., Somogyi, E. (2016). Mo-
ving from an authoritarian state system to an authoritarian market system: housing finance milestones in
Hungary between 1979 and 2014.
96
Csizmady, A., Hegedüs, J., Vonnák, D. (2019). A housing regime unchanged: The rise and fall of fore-
ign-currency loans in Hungary, Corvinus Journal of Sociology and Social Policy, 22.
97 Szabó, N. (2018). We are the State, We are the People: Forex Loan Debtors’ Struggles for Citizenship in
Hungary, MA thesis.
(capped), below-market repayment rate on a stable basis. Together, the rate-cap
scheme and the prepayment scheme were able to reach around 350,000 house-
holds. The costs of these measures were mostly ooaded onto banks.
However, these programmes have not reached the worst-o forex debtors. This
group of people – many of them aected by housing poverty – was the target
of the National Asset Manager, which operated between 2012 and 2020.98 It
was a well-targeted programme, reaching around 36,000 households in need.99 The
homes of the defaulting debtors who entered the programme became state-
owned, with the former owners allowed to remain in their homes as tenants.
The programme also employed social workers to assist families. The National
Asset Manager increased the number of publicly owned rental housing units
by around 25% over eight years, buying 36,000 apartments with 186 billion
HUF of budget expenditure.
100
The resulting housing portfolio could have been
the basis for a new public rental housing programme, but in 2019 decision-makers
oered tenants the possib ility to buy back their homes at a discou nt, which 90% of
tenants did. In 2021, the government transferred the remaining stock – roughly
4,600 flats – to a newly registered organisation
101
set up by the Hungarian
Charity Service of the Order of Malta and the Hungarian Reformed Church
Aid and promised central support in return for managing the portfolio.102 The
programme is expected to start in 2022, but there are still many unanswered
questions surrounding its functioning.
In 2015, the government announced a law enshrining the compulsory con-
version of forex loans to HUF loans, i.e. the elimination of further exchange
rate risk – this law aected a total of 450,000 loan contracts.
103
From that
point onwards, the government stated that it considered the forex loan cri
-
sis resolved. Nevertheless, between 2015 and 2018, banks have foreclosed
98
The concept of the National Asset Manager was not without precedent in Hungary: in 1998, a similar
scheme was conceived to ‘bail out’ OTP creditors, but due to bad regulations, the programme could not
take o in the end. See Kőnig, É. (2006). Adósságkezelés: sikerek és kudarcok, Esély, 11.
99 Gosztonyi, Á., Vankó, L. (eds.) (2020). Annual report on housing poverty in Hungary 2020. English sum -
mar y. Budapest: Habitat for Humanity Hungary.
100 The budgetary expenditure on the Asset Manager did not reach 40 billion HUF in any year.
101 In Hungarian: MR Közösségi Lakásalap Közhasznú Nonprofit Kft.
102 Nepszava.hu (2021). Jön az egyházi lakásügynökség.
103 Napi.hu (2020). Még mindig kísértenek az egykori devizahitelek.

HOUSING POLICIES AND HOUSING AFFORDABILITY IN HUNGARY AFTER 
98
5,600 properties and a significant amount of debt has been transferred to the
portfolio of debt management companies – meaning that many debtors now
owe them, rather than banks or other financial institutions.
On the whole, public policies dealing with the forex loan crisis also mirrored the ba-
sic principles of housing policy interventions of the whole period (1990–2022). The
governmental interventions were proportionally much more helpful to more auent
families, and the support for families in housing poverty was not part of the policy
priorities – with the exception of the National Asset Manager’s temporary existence.
2.9. Housing renovation grants
In Hungary, during the three decades following the regime change, large-scale resi-
dential building renovation programmes only targeted socialist-era housing estates.
After small-scale experiments, the first nationwide tender for energy-ecient
renovation of prefabricated houses was launched in 2000 by the first Orbán
government, under the name of ‘Panel Programme’ (prefabs are commonly
referred to as ‘panel’ in Hungarian). The 2000 Panel Programme was followed
by the Panel Plus Programme in 2005, which was based on similar princi-
ples, and the Panel I, II and III Programmes in 2008, 2009 and 2014. Initially,
these were financed according to the same rule of thumb: one third of the
renovation costs were covered by the central budget, one third by the local
municipality and one third by the owners of the flats.104 After 2009, the state
also used part of its revenues coming from the trading of carbon credits to
finance these renovation schemes – thus increasing the share of the central
budget in the costs. According to the State Audit Oce of Hungary’s report,
more than 127,000 flats were renovated in the first period of the programme,
between 2001 and 2008, representing overall 15.5% of the total prefab housing
stock. The governments spent almost 20 billion HUF on the programme over
this period.
105
Most of the renovations have improved the energy eciency
of multi-apartment residential buildings. In doing so, both emissions and the
utility costs of the aected households were reduced.
104 Szabó, B., Bene, M. (2019). Budapesti lakótelepek a panelprogramme előtt és után. Területi Statisztika.
105 ÁSZ [State Audit Oce of Hungary] (2009). Jelentés a lakástámogatási rendszer hatékonyságának
ellenőrzéséről. Budapest: Állami Számvevőszék, 22.
None of the Panel Programmes had any social targeting. Moreover, there were no
similar programmes targeting detached houses – even though they account for
three quarters of the Hungarian housing stock.106
However, from 2021 onwards, a new policy instrument (the home renovation
subsidy) will support the renovation of housing inhabited by households with
children (regardless of the type of building) with a maximum of 3 million HUF.
107
The logic of this instrument is similar to the schemes introduced in the second
half of the 2010s: more auent households are likely to benefit from it (this
non-repayable grant is financed ex-post, meaning that beneficiaries need initial
savings). Households without children are not eligible, and – as a demand-side
intervention – it is likely that the scheme will push up construction prices.
Overall, the renovation programmes targeting socialist prefabricated buildings
have improved the housing conditions of hundreds of thousands of house-
holds, but the pu blic policy attention devoted to the issue of housing renovation is
scant compared to the scale of housing qua lity problems. In Hungary, the energy
use in buildings accounts for 40% of total national energy use – from a climate
crisis perspective, energy retrofitting of residential buildings could be one
of the most eective points of intervention.108 In addition, a socially targeted
national residential building renovation programme could be an eective re-
sponse to widespread energy poverty.
2.10. Social and urban regeneration programmes
Social and urban regeneration programmes – including programmes targeting
segregated areas – can be considered the only public policy instruments related
to housing in the last thirty years whose targeting has not only followed social, but
also territorial considerations. Both forms of interventions share the aim of re-
generating spatially and socially segregated areas.
106
Subsidies were available to households for the renovation of non-prefabricated housing under the so-
called ‘Warm Home Programme’.
107 Government Decree No 518/2020 (XI.25.).
108
Bajomi, A . (2014). Institutional framework for energy ecient renovation of social rented housing. MA
thesis.

HOUSING POLICIES AND HOUSING AFFORDABILITY IN HUNGARY AFTER 
99
Social urban regeneration in Hungary emerged in the mid-2000s in Budapest
and then spread all over the country after the EU accession in 2004 – but
especially during the 2007–2013 EU budgetary cycle.109 The vast majority of
these programmes were financed by EU funds. Between 2007 and 2013, 64
social urban regeneration projects were implemented in Hungarian cities with
48 billion HUF of funding.
110
These projects are characterised by an ‘integrated
urban development’ approach, as required by the European Commission and
set out in the Leipzig Charter,111 where social (soft) and infrastructural (hard)
elements, as well as dierent sectoral and territorial interventions, are imple-
mented in a coherent, integrated way. For this reason, although the specific
projects typically have a housing dimension (e.g. renovation of existing public
housing units or the construction of new ones), they also finance a wider range
of interventions (e.g. intensive social work, community programmes, regenera-
tion of community spaces and public spaces, etc.). Although the programmes
launched in the 2014–2020 budgetary cycle have not yet been finalised, it is
estimated that around 70 billion HUF will be disbursed by the end of the period
for social urban and settlement rehabilitation projects, which will be (or have
already been) implemented in hundreds of municipalities.
The history of settlement rehabilitation programmes in Hungary goes back
a long way, and there has been quite some controversy surrounding them.112
A nationwide attempt to eradicate rural slums was launched as early as the
1960s. Even though it radically reduced the number of people living in seg-
regated slums, by the time of the regime change, it treated the problem in
a simplified way primarily as a problem of ‘Roma settlements’. Its arbitrary
implementation prevented complex interventions and the identification of the
root causes.113
109 See the chapter by Anna Zsófia Bajomi in this volume.
110 Jelinek, Cs. (2019). A városrehabilitáció korszakai Magyarországon: Az állam szerepe marginális városi
terek (újra)termelésében. Tér és Társadalom.
111 See the text of the Leipzig Charter.
112 For details see Farkas, Zs. (2017). ‘Telepszerű lakókörnyezet volt a hivatalos elnevezése…’ Telepfelszá-
molási programme ok integrációs hatásai és nem szándékolt következményei a rendszerváltás előtt és
2005–2010 között. PhD thesis.
113 On links with the housing movement, see Bernadett Sebály’s chapter in this volume.
After the regime change, the first major wave of settlement rehabilitation pro-
grammes started in the mid-2000s, in parallel with social urban regeneration
interventions, with the support of EU funds; these continued throughout the
2014–2020 budgetary period. During this budgetary cycle, the methodological
approach was very similar to the integrated approach of social urban regener-
ations, insofar as it sought to address the dierent interconnected dimensions
of socio-spatial segregation by combining ‘hard’ and ‘soft’ interventions.
These interventions have made life easier for thousands of aected house-
holds in many Hungarian municipalities, but the overall volume is just a d rop in a
sea of much larger problems.
114
In addition, the socially unequal nature of national
policies that only end up aggravating segregation can hardly be compensated
for by these small-scale territorially targeted programmes.
115
Nevertheless,
the advantage of the projects – in addition to improving the lives of the peo-
ple concerned – is that they provide technical and methodological experience
which could form the basis of more progressive programmes in the future, when
the political environment will be less openly anti-poor.
2.11. Supporting homeless people
The issue of homelessness was already present in the Hungarian society be-
fore the regime change, even if it was hidden: experts estimated the number of
homeless people at 30,000 in 1990.
116
Around the time of the regime change,
the problem surfaced through various protests and demonstrations that at-
tracted a lot of media attention.
117
In the early 1990s, the government intervened in
this area in an ad hoc, ‘emergency’ manner. These temporary solutions provided
the institutional framework for the newly emerging homeless care system
114 According to the latest comprehensive sur vey, around 300,000 people live in segregated conditions and
extreme pover ty in a total of 1,633 settlements (slums) in H ungary. See Domokos, V., Herczeg , B. (2010). Ter ra
Incognita: magyarországi szegény- és cigánytelepek felmérése – első eredmények. Szociológiai Szemle.
115
For an example from Southern Hungarian city of Pécs, see Jelinek , Cs., Virág T. (2019) Development
Brokers and Place- Based Projects in Deprived Urban Neighbourhoods: The Case of Pécs, Hungary.
Justice Spatiale – Spatial Justice.
116 Misetics, B. (2017). Lakáspolitika és hajléktalanság. In Ferge, Zs. (ed.) Magyar társadalom- és szociálpo-
litika (1990–2015). Budapest: Osiris Kiadó, 360.
117 For more details, see Bernadett Sebály’s chapter.

HOUSING POLICIES AND HOUSING AFFORDABILITY IN HUNGARY AFTER 
100
and formed the basis of the path-dependent structures still in place today.
While we do not have a comprehensive picture of central budget spending on
homelessness,118 experts and social sector practitioners agree that the system
is underfunded and unable to address the root causes.
In 2017, it was estimated that there were 5,000 places in temporary shelters
and night shelters in the capital, with a further 5,000 places outside the capital
and a further 4,000 places in temporary homes for families. However, due to
quality problems in underfunded shelters, more homeless people continue to
sleep in public spaces than in any of these shelters.
One of the biggest problems of the homeless care system – and more generally,
social care sector – is the lack of housing pathways leading out of homelessness: a
significant segment of Hungarian society now spends its daily life in a vicious
circle of poverty, moving between various temporary social institutions, ex-
ploitative ‘market’ opportunities (e.g. oppressive landlords) and the ‘street’.119
The situation is further exacerbated by the criminalisation of homeless peo-
ple and of homelessness. This approach was already dominant in the state
socialist period and did not disappear after 1990, but after 2010 it became
an even more pronounced, symbolic element of government interventions.120
In September 2010 – in the midst of the global crisis – only a few months af-
ter the elections, the Orbán government amended the Building Act to allow
municipalities to punish rough sleeping in public spaces, before criminalising
homelessness in 2011. Although this was declared unconstitutional by the
Constitutional Court of Hungary in 2012, the measure became part of the
new Fundamental Law in 2013 and the Code of Administrative Oences
121
was amended accordingly. Although the use of ‘living in a public place’ as an
oence is rare, its symbolic impact is nonetheless significant.
118 See section 4.
119
Pósfai, Zs. (2018). Annual Report on Housing Poverty in Hungary 2018. English Summary, Habitat for
Humanity Hungary.
120 Udvarhelyi, É . T. (2014). ‘If we don’t push homeless people out, we will end up being pushed out by them’:
The criminalization of homelessness as state strategy in Hungar y. Antipode.
121 See the Streetlawyer Association’s (Utcajogász Egyesület) review.
3. Governmental structure and
theinstitutional framework of housing
policy at the national level
In this section, we discuss where housing policy was located within govern-
mental structures over the past three decades. This allows us to highlight
which institutional actors were taking part in the implementation of policy
instruments discussed in the previous section.
3.1. Competing institutional logics of housing policy
Over the last three decades, the national government’s housing policy has been
influenced by a mixture of four inst itutional logics, with constantly changing empha-
ses and combinations (Figure 9). The identification of the four logics is based on
the location of housing within the governmental structure, names and responsi-
bilities of ministerial units dealing with housing, and housing policy instruments.
• Housing as a local government issue. Housing as a local government issue
was the dominant institutional logic between 1990 and 1998, when the
state-owned housing stock was transferred to the municipalities. This
period also saw the mass-privatisation of housing and the establishment
of legal framework of managing municipal housing. Between 2006 and
2010, this logic became more pronounced, when the ministry overseeing
local government issues took over the political portfolio of housing.
• Housing as a financial issue. According to this institutional logic, housing is
first and foremost a financial issue for the national government. From this
perspective, the crucial question is through which financial instruments
the government subsidises homeownership. This institutional logic was
dominant between 1994 and 2002 and has been a primary institutional
logic from 2012 onwards. A good indicator of this logic is that housing
issues have been added to the political portfolio of the Ministry of Finance
or the Ministry of (National) Economy.

HOUSING POLICIES AND HOUSING AFFORDABILITY IN HUNGARY AFTER 
101
•
Housing as a building issue. The third institutional logic puts the material
assets (buildings) at the forefront, with the government ensuring that con-
struction and renovation of dwellings take with the help of various policy
instruments. This logic was dominant between 2002 and 2006, and during
a short period between 2010 and 2012. The former period represents
an era when the government sought to launch a comprehensive housing
policy, with all four institutional logics present (albeit with a predominance
of the building perspective).
•
Housing as a soc ial or family policy issue. According to this institutional logic,
the government is responsible for developing housing policy instruments
that support social groups in need. This approach identifies the reduc-
tion of housing poverty as a primary goal. Over the past three decades, a
social approac h to reducing h ousing poverty has never been the primary focu s
of Hungarian housing policies but has constantly been a secondary logic
(Figure 9). Since about 2015, the family policy (demographic) dimension of
housing has been strengthened, – although prioritising families has been
a consistent policy dimension for the past five decades.
3.2. Ministerial responsibilities of housing
In parallel to the changing combinations of institutional logics regarding hous-
ing policy discussed above, ministerial responsibilities have also been shifting.
A decisive step that occurred before 1989 was the dissolution of the Ministry
of Construction and Urban Development on January 1, 1989 – which led to the
construction lobby’s loss of weight within the government.122 The government
divided housing responsibilities among dierent ministries in 1990, leading to an
unmanageable structure. Most legislative work was undertaken in the Ministry of
Interior (transferring state-owned housing to municipalities, preparation of the
Housing Act, etc.) and to a lesser extent in the Ministry of Welfare (developing
frameworks of social institutions and social care). In the meantime, the Ministry
of Finance was managing housing subsidies and trying to solve the financing
122 Hegedüs, J. (2006): Lakáspolitika és a lakáspiac – a közpolitika korlátai. Esély.
Figure 9: Changing logics of national housing policies
Figure 10: Ministers primarily responsible for housing policy, 1990–2021
(as of 31 December of each year)
1990
1991
1992
1993
1994
1995
1996
1997
1998
1999
2000
2001
2002
2003
2004
2005
2006
2007
2008
2009
2010
2011
2012
2013
2014
2015
2016
2017
2018
2019
2020
2021
Local government
Financial
Building
Social / demographic
Primary logic
Secondary logic
1990
1991
1992
1993
1994
1995
1996
1997
1998
1999
2000
2001
2002
2003
2004
2005
2006
2007
2008
2009
2010
2011
2012
2013
2014
2015
2016
2017
2018
2019
2020
2021
Shared responsibilities
Minister of Finance
Minister of Economy
Minister of Interior
Minister of Regional
Development
(without a portfolio)
Minister of Local Government

HOUSING POLICIES AND HOUSING AFFORDABILITY IN HUNGARY AFTER 
102
problems arising from increasing interest rates of subsidised housing loans.
In the Ministry of Interior, the Deputy State Secretary for Local Government,
Pál Kara, was responsible for running the municipal logic of housing from 1990
to 2003 under dierent governments. To add to the confusion, in May 1993
the Minister of Industry and Trade was given the task of coordinating housing
policies, by leading an inter-ministerial committee.123 Preparations for writing
a housing strategy failed because of the lack of competence within the first
post-regime change government.
After the next parliamentary elections in 1994, the Minister of Finance became
primarily responsible for housing, but certain aspects remained in the portfolio
of the Ministry of Interior. The financial logic of housing policy became equally
important as the local government logic. Housing spendings were dominated
by carryover eects from pre-1990 subsidies, and austerity measures were
introduced because of the economic crisis. At the same time, there was no
government body with broad information on housing, capable of developing
and implementing a comprehensive housing strategy.124
A comprehensive rethinking of housing policy can be attributed to the first govern-
ment of Viktor Orbán (1998–2002), which prioritised the financial logic. Housing
policy (together with the strategic level of economic policy) was transferred to
the newly established Ministry of Economy, while the financial management of
housing policy instruments remained in the portfolio of the Minister of Finance.
The Minister of the Interior and the minister responsible for social aairs and
family policies also dealt with some housing issues. Establishing a Housing
Policy Unit within the Ministry of Economy slightly improved the representation
of housing in government politics, although the issue of dispersed respon-
sibilities was not resolved. The housing policy was recalibrated to stimulate
economic growth through construction activities; this is why measures related
to homeownership were the dominant feature of subsidies. A programme was
launched to increase the municipal housing stock by construction and buying
– without considerably reducing housing poverty.
123 Government Resolution 1038/1993 (V.21.).
124 See for example Győri, P. (1998). A helyét kereső lakásügyről néhány szóban. Manuscript.
After winning the next elections in 2002, the socialist-liberal coalition govern-
ment appointed Judit Csabai as government commissioner to coordinate hous-
ing policies. Her tasks included developing the national housing programme,
implementing activities related to housing construction, renovation and main-
tenance, and reorganising building control.
125
As the government commissioner
belonged to the Ministry of Interior, units dealing with housing issues were
partly returned to this ministry. The management of housing subsidies, howev
-
er, remained in the portfolio of the Ministry of Finance. The institutional logic
of building strengthened in shaping housing policy, as reflected in the draft of
the housing programme and the name of the responsible departmental unit.
On 1 September 2003, the National Housing and Construction Oce (OLÉH)
was established as an overarching executive agency, to which housing issues
(and also tasks related to the built environment in general) were transferred.
126
Although an article published in the professional magazine Falu-Város-Régió
stated that ‘the new national institution has on its agenda the establishment
of a broader understanding of the housing question based on international
experience, a more complex understanding of housing policy and a closer
link with municipal politics’,
127
these hopes were premature. According to a
2004 Ministry of Interior review, the creation of the Oce did not improve
accountability, internal procedures were lacking, and regulatory gaps were
looming.128 After a cabinet reshue in 2004, the mandate of the government
commissioner was terminated, and housing was transferred to the minister
without portfolio responsible for regional development and social inclusion.
From 2005 onwards, the National Housing and Construction Oce was
commissioned to prepare the national housing programme (the first draft
of which had failed earlier, in 2003 – see below). Within the Oce, housing
policies were dealt with by a unit of 15–16 people129 which did not allow for a
125
The relevant legislations are Government Resolution 1087/2002 (VI.7.) and Government Resolution
1139/2002 (VIII.12.).
126 Government Decree 135/2003 (VIII. 29.).
127
Anon. (2003). Beszélgetés Fegy verneky Sándorral, az Országos Lakás- és Építésügyi Hivatal elnökével.
Falu-Város-Régió.
128 ÁSZ [State Audit Oce of Hungary] (2009). Jelentés a lakástámogatási rendszer hatékonyságának
ellenőrzéséről. Budapest: Állami Számvevőszék.
129 ÁSZ [State Audit Oce of Hungary] (2009). Jelentés a lakástámogatási rendszer hatékonyságának
ellenőrzéséről. Budapest: Állami Számvevőszék.

HOUSING POLICIES AND HOUSING AFFORDABILITY IN HUNGARY AFTER 
103
meaningful execution of tasks. The Oce was dissolved in 2006, after the next
parliamentary elections.
In the same period, after 2002, the socialist-liberal coalition government
launched preparatory works to reorganise social policy, including housing-re-
lated elements. The preparatory work stalled as a result of cabinet reshues
of 2004 and 2006 as well as the crisis management after the 2008 economic
downturn, and there was no real political will to undertake the necessary
reforms.130
After the 2006 elections, housing was transferred to the newly established
Ministry of Local Government and Regional Development (from 2009, named
the Ministry of Local Government), together with the management of housing
subsidies.
131
The Secretary of State for Local Government and Housing (three
dierent persons between 2006 and 2010) was in charge of housing policies.
With the establishment of the Ministry, the institutional logic of building was
receding. According to a report by the State Audit Oce of Hungary, the
Ministry had only a sta of 11 dealing with housing subsidies in 2008; way
below the operational capacity needed to perform analysis and evaluation of
housing policies.132
Viktor Orbán came back to power as prime minister in 2010. The governmental
unit responsible for housing policy changed several times in the next two years.
Initially, housing was taken over by the Ministry of National Economy (under the
leadership of the current president of the central bank of Hungary – the MNB –
György Matolcsy). Within the ministry, the State Secretary for Energy Strategy
and Housing coordinated housing policies. This change brought building issues
back into the spotlight. Linking energy eciency of buildings with housing pol-
icy was a new government philosophy. The state secretary left the ministry at
the end of the year leading to the relegation of energy eciency issues to the
background. In 2011–2012, the institutional logic of building continued (without
130 On the history of the failed reforms, see Győri, P. (2012). Elszabotált reformok – ‘Tékozló koldus ruháját
szaggatja.’ Dialógus Mózer Péterrel. Esély.
131 2/2006 (MK 94.) order of the Minister of Local Government and Regional Development.
132 ÁSZ [State Audit Oce] (2009). Jelentés a lakástámogatási rendszer hatékonyságának ellenőrzéséről.
Budapest: Állami Számvevőszék.
the energy eciency aspect), but in 2012 housing policy was transferred to the
responsibility of the State Secretary for Taxation and Finance (from 2015 State
Secretary for Finance). A subunit within the ministry, the Economic Financing
and Housing Unit became responsible for housing policies in general. From 2012
onwards, the financial institutional logic regarding housing policy became dominant.
Financing housing policy instruments became the primary aim of the government,
with social issues (mostly understood as demographic or family policy questions)
being subordinated to it.
At the Deputy State Secretary level, housing has been managed by László Balogh,
Deputy State Secretary for Financial Policy since January 2014. His opinions on
policy are unknown to this day, as he rarely gives interviews.
133
Within the Ministry
of Finance, housing policy issues currently fall under the responsibility of the
Macroeconomics Unit and the Economic Financing and Housing Provision
Subunit.134 On responsibilities as of 2021 see Table 2.
Housing is a neglected policy field within the ministry, where housing is only one
among the 12 tasks of the responsible Secretary of State and one of the 14 tasks
of the responsible Deputy Secretary of State. In the Macroeconomics Unit, three
of the 12 duties are related to housing, but housing is subordinated to financial
aspects. Housing does not even have a separate unit within the respons ible ministry.
This lack of weight has allowed certain housing policy issues to be transferred (at
least in government communication) to the Minister without portfolio for Families,
Katalin Novák. Although ocially the minister without portfolio only ‘contributes
to the formulation of the Government’s programme of housing provision in co-
operation with the [Finance] Minister’,135 in reality she has shaped – rather than
merely contributed to – housing policy during the past years.136
133 According to the government websites kormany.hu, 2015-2019.kormany.hu and 2010-2014.kormany.hu,
László Balogh has talked about housing issues a total of two times during his entire tenure (here and
here), when he commented on the latest housing construction data of the Hungarian Central Statistical
Oce. In his ocial Hungarian CV, the only indication of expertise in housing policy is being a member
of the Secure Housing Monitoring Committee set up by the government between 2010 and 2011 (the
Committee was set up in 2011, so even the years in the CV are erroneous).
134 See the Ministry of Finance organogram (in Hungarian) on the government website.
135 94/2018 (V.22.) Government decree, 143/C. § (2) g)
136
The Minister without portfolio for Families, Katalin Novák was elected President of Hungary in March
2022.

HOUSING POLICIES AND HOUSING AFFORDABILITY IN HUNGARY AFTER 
104
3.3. Housing strategies
Hungarian housing policy over the past three decades has also been dysfunc-
tional, because no government ever had a comprehensive housing strategy (or
a comparable strategic document). In the mid-1980s, The National Planning
Oce started to prepare a housing concept, but this was not finalised due to
conflicting interests, political concerns (politicians feared a loss of popularity
due to rent increase) and the political changes of 1989–1990.
137
1991 saw an
unsuccessful attempt to develop a housing concept,
138
which was followed by a
government decision to develop such a document in 1995
139
(to never be imple-
mented). In 1998, during the first Orbán government, the Minister of Economy
was responsible for the preparation of the housing concept. In August 1999, a
proposal was approved by the government on the main directions of housing
policy, on the reshuing of housing subsidies, and housing finance. This propos-
al sought to improve access to homeownership through lending and proposed
a programme for increasing the municipal rental housing stock.140 Although this
document setting out the directions of the housing policy was ‘adopted as a
basis for further work’ by Government Resolution 1100/1999 (IX.3.), no com-
prehensive housing policy document was subsequently developed.
After the socialist-liberal coalition government took power in 2002, the Min-
ister of Interior was tasked with drafting the conceptual document of housing
policy. The National Housing Programme141 was prepared by the government
commissioner on housing, Judit Csabai. Although the cabinet discussed the
proposal in December 2003, the programme document was not adopted.
According to a report of the State Audit Oce of Hungary, the main reason
for this failure was that the Ministry of Finance doubted the financial viability
137 On the housing policy around 1990, see housing expert Péter Győri’s discussion with Zsolt Oszlányi, who
worked on housing policy development: Győri, P. (1991). Hogyan készülnek a lakáskoncepciók? Beszélő.
138 As housing expert Péter Győri noted: ‘ In an inward-looking manner – and increasingly excluding other
actors – new variations of the housing concept were prepared [in the Ministry of Welfare]. These resembled
a flowery essay of a sentimental, patriotic adolescent (...) At the end of 1991, there were still only green
(or red-white-green [referring to the colours of the Hungarian flag]) concept crumbs, nothing else.’ Győri,
P. (1992). ‘Lakástörvény’ – koncepció nélkül. Beszélő.
139 Government Resolution 1081/1995 (VIII.31.).
140 The objectives of the proposal are discussed in ÁSZ [State Audit Oce of Hungary] (2009). Jelentés a
lakástámogatási rendszer hatékonyságának ellenőrzéséről. Budapest: Állami Számvevőszék.
141 Miniszterelnöki Hivatal Kormánymegbízott (2003). Otthon Európában. A nemzeti lakásprogram pillérei.
Level Tex t of the legis lation
State Secr etary fo r Fin ance
§ 26 (1) i) e nsure the preparation and imple ment ation of meas ures related to the implementation of
hous ing policy t asks, the devel opm ent of the co ncept of the housing strat egy and the preparatio n o f
legislatio n related to housing managem ent and hous ing provisio n
Depu ty State Secr etary fo r
Financial Policy
54. § (1) c) shall ensure the develo pme nt of the concept of the housin g provis ion strategy and the hous ing
programm e in-l ine with the general policy o f the Govern me nt, as well as measur es related to the
implem entation of housing policy tasks, in particular the la ws on housing, housing co operat ives, rental
housing and renting of premises, and t he disposal of municipal housing and premises, and the laws on
state subsidies for housing (…)
Macro economi cs Un it
Appendix 2 3.6. 1.2.
4. prepares draft amendm ents to the Act on the Central Bank of Hungary in the mo netary polic y field,
drafts legislation on hous ing cooperat ives , on housing rental and rental premises and on the disposal of
municipal flats and premises (…) and on state subsidies for housing,
5. operates the system of national housing subsidies, ensures the professio nal m anagement of housing
subsidies, the updating of the underlying professio nal IT syste ms and t he identification of IT developm ent
needs, (...)
8. develo ps propos als of housing provis ion, ensures the implement ation of hous ing policies, coo perates
with relevant ministries in the develo pme nt of programm es to suppo rt housing of families for
demo graphic purposes
Table 2: Housing responsibilities within the Ministry of Finance.
Source: Order of the Minister of Finance 1/2020 (I.31.) (unocial translation).

HOUSING POLICIES AND HOUSING AFFORDABILITY IN HUNGARY AFTER 
105
of the proposal.142 The draft of the National Housing Programme set out the main
pillars of housin g policy, as part of a comp lex understan ding of housing: this includ ed
15-year targets and monitoring indicators. However, the document remained at the
conceptual level, lacked detailed elaboration of concrete measures, and did not
discuss the financial resources needed to implement it.
Despite this failure, the preparation of the National Housing Programme re-
mained a ministerial task until 2006 – after which even drafting a housing poli-
cy document was removed from the duties of any sitting minister. The political
need to develop a housing strategy and a rental housing programme resur-
faced in 2010, when it became the duty of the Minister of National Economy,
György Matolcsy. A green paper on housing strategy was completed in May
2011,143 but this has not been adopted by the government. The proposal did
not address housing poverty per se, but rather dealt with housing as a housing
loan availability and building issue. Since 2011, state secretaries and deputy
state secretaries are commissioned to prepare the conceptual framework for
housing policy (see Table 2 above), but they failed to put forward any concept
ever since (or – perhaps – such concepts were not made public). The ‘Housing
Programme’ referred to in governmental communication is merely a set of policy
instruments – without an underlying overall strategy and without comprehensive,
publicly available impact assessment and monitoring.144
Habitat for Humanity Hungary’s annual reports on housing poverty and other
academic/professional articles also list a number of strategic documents on
development, economic and social policy (e.g. programming documents for
EU funds, various government strategies) in which housing issues are partially
featured.145 These general policy documents may have shaped housing policy de-
velopments and government de bates in parti cular years, but they have not impacted
142
ÁSZ [State Audit Oce of Hungary] (2009). Jelentés a lakástámogatási rendszer hatékonyságának
ellenőrzéséről. Budapest: Állami Számvevőszék.
143 Nemzetgazdasági Minisztérium (2011). Otthonteremtési stratégia. Szakmai vitairat. Budapest: Nemzet-
gazdasági Minisztérium. Habitat for Humanit y Hungarys position paper on the proposal can b e read here
(in Hungarian).
144 The government advertised that the ‘programme of housing provision became complete’ by the end of
2020; a set of instruments helping middle-class families to acquire private property – see the government’s
website for a summary in Hungarian.
145 For a description of these documents, in addition to Habitat for Humanity Hungary’s annual reports on
housing poverty, see Csermák, K . (2011). Quo vadis, magyar lakáspolitika? Polgári Szemle.
the long-term direction of housing policy and the management of housing policy
instruments. Strategic planning, programming and monitoring tended to char-
acterise the periods of socialist-liberal coalition governments in the past thirty
years (1994–1998, 2002–2010). The technocratic character of Hungarian stra-
tegic planning can rightly be criticised since it totally lacked public participation.
The early years of the post-2010 Orbán government were characterised by an
abundance of concepts and strategies in various policy fields, with the Ministry
of National Economy being the key actor in the process of development.
146
But
these plans were poorly integrated into government politics, and planning itself
largely disappeared by the mid-2010s, with measures in housing generally being
driven by momentary interests and haphazard decision-making.
3.4. Other institutions implementing housing policy
In addition to the above-mentioned institutions, executive agencies, public
bodies and commissions have helped to implement housing policy over the
past three decades. Especially in the 2000s, public tasks – including some related
to housing – were delegated to government agencies, foundations, public founda-
tions and public interest companies (PIC).
147
Although all of them were ephemeral
in the long-term, the most important ones related to housing were the Build-
ing and Housing Management and Maintenance Innovation R&D Foundation
(Épület- és Lakásgazdálkodási- Fenntartási, Innovációs K+F Alapítvány),
148
the ÉMI Non-profit Limited Liability Company for Quality Control and Innova-
tion in Building (previously ÉMI Kht.),149 the Hungarian Housing Innovation PIC
146 These documents have been analysed in detail in the 2012 and 2013 annual report on housing poverty
(Kőszeghy, L. (ed.). (2012). Éves jelentés a lakhatási szegénységről – 2012. Budapest: Habitat for Humanity
Magyarország; Hegedüs, J., Horváth, V. (2013). Éves jelentés a lakhatási szegénységről 2013. Budapest:
Habitat for Humanity Magyarország.). Subsequent reports could not even devote a separate chapter to
the analysis of strategies, because they were not present.
147 On various legal forms in Hungary see: https://www.cof.org/content/nonprofit-law-hungary
148 The foundation was established in 1991 and dissolved in 2015. It engaged in research and development
activities related to the built environment, but its objectives also included ‘exploring decision-making
related to the contradictions between privatisation and the preservation of national (municipal) housing
assets, as well as long-term planning and professional anchoring of optimal housing management’.
149
Estab lished in 2000 as the successor to the Constructio n Quality Control Institute (ÉMI), founded in 1963,
ÉMI is Hungary’s largest institution dealing with complex building and construction materials industry ap-
proval, testing, inspection, certification. https://www.emi.hu/EMI/web.nsf/Pub/professional_activity.html

HOUSING POLICIES AND HOUSING AFFORDABILITY IN HUNGARY AFTER 
106
(Magyar Lakás-innovációs Kht.)150 , the National ‘Kós Károly’ Home Creation
Supporting PIC (Országos ‘Kós Károly’ Otthonteremtést Segítő Kht.) which
ceased to exist in the mid-2000s, the Public Foundation for the Homeless
People of Budapest (Összefogás a Budapesti Lakástalanokért és Hajléktalan
Emberekért Közalapítvány) and the Public Foundation for the Homeless (Ha-
jléktalanokért Közalapítvány). Government advisory bodies in housing were the
National Housing Policy Council151 (1995–1999); the Housing Policy Advisory
Board152 (1999–2002); the National Housing Policy Advisory Board153 (2002–
2004, 2008–2010), the Housing Advisory Board154, the Housing Board155, the
Housing Provision Advisory Board
156
(2011–) and the Secure Housing Moni-
toring Committee157 (2010–?). The actual impact of these bodies on housing
policy has been marginal, and these bodies are usually not considered as
important actors in shaping Hungarian housing policies.
150 MLI Kht. was founded in 2001 to manage housing subsidies distributed through tenders; its tasks were
taken over by the ÉMI Kht. in 2007.
151 The successor to the Inter-ministerial Committee established in 1993. It was a 21-member consultative
body set up to ‘prepare and promote the implementation of a modern and comprehensive housing policy
in a multifaceted manner’, consisting of representatives of state administration and other bodies (local
authorities, tenants’ and owners’ associations, financial institutions and professional organisations) (Gov-
ernment Resolution 1081/1995 (VIII.31.)).
152 The successor of the National Housing Policy Council – enlarged to 28 members, with main activities
unchanged (Government Resolution 1099/1999 (VIII. 31.)).
153 Established parallel to the appointment of Judit Csabai as government commissioner. It was intended to
provide broad social participation in housing policy decision-making (Government Resolution 1139/2002
(VIII .12.)). Between 2008 and 2010, a ministerial advisory body was established under the same name
within the Ministry of Local Government (Order of the Minister of Local Government 5/2008. (HÉ 39.)
ÖM).
154 It was located within the Ministry of Interior (Order of the Minister of Interior 29/2002 (BK. 21.) BM) be -
tween 2002 and 2004. Based on available government documents, its specific tasks are unknown.
155
A ministerial advisor y body in the Ministr y of Local Government and Regional Development, mentioned in
the Order of the Minister of Local Government and Regional Development 2/2006 (MK 94). Its respon-
sibilities remain unknown until this day.
156 The Board drafted the February 2011 green paper on housing. The Board was mentioned in the Ministry ’s
organigram and the Ministry acted as the secretariat of the Board until 2014 (Order of the Minister of
National Economy 4/2010 (X. 5.); Order of the Minister of National Economy 11/2013 (VI.3.)); it is unknown
whether the board actually functioned.
157 The committee was set up by the Minister of National Economy in 2011 and dealt with the issue of foreign
currency lenders and housing loans. Its members were Júlia Király, then Vice President of the MNB (the
central bank of Hungary), László Balogh, Vice President of the Hungarian Financial Supervisory Authority
(PSZÁF) (current d eputy state secretar y responsible also for housing) and András Kármán, State S ecretary
of the Ministry of National Econo my. hvg.hu (2011). Mit java solhat a kormánynak az otthonvéd elmi bizottság?
4. Budgetary expenditure on housing
‘There is no comprehensive data on housing subsidy budget expenditures.
Housing-related expenditures are listed under dierent budget lines in dierent
ministry chapters, and there is no information system developed which would
help decision-makers conceptually or with statistics’, wrote housing sociologist
József Hegedüs in Habitat for Humanity Hungary’s first annual report on hous-
ing poverty, published in 2012.
158
Comprehensive data regarding Hungarian housing
policies has been lacking throughout the past thirty years. Therefore, we have no
exact information of how much the state spends on providing or helping citizens’
housing – meaning it is dicult to verify the accuracy of current government
statements which claim to run ‘the biggest ever home creation scheme’159 in
Hungary, or that ‘the government has increased housing subsidy spendings to
more than two and a half times compared to 2010’.160 The first statement can
be easily refuted, because the government does not have a housing programme
that would define the conceptual framework of housing policy. We will also show
below that it is highly doubtful whether the state spends more on housing in
2021–2022 than at any time in the past three decades (not to mention earlier
times – for example the large-scale housing construction programme of the
state socialist period). The second claim about a two and a half-fold increase
in housing subsidies is true in some respects, but we will show why this claim
is not suitable for assessing the successes and failures of housing policy.
No substantive information is available on housing subsidies beneficiaries i.e.
whether certain instruments have contributed to reducing housing poverty
or whether they have targeted those living in housing poverty. Both Habitat
for Humanity Hungary’s annual reports on housing poverty and housing policy
experts generally agree that budget spendings in the past thirty years were largely
misused because they did not target social groups in need. The details of social
targeting were presented in the previous section.
158 Hegedüs, J. (2012). Lakhatással kapcsolatos költségvetési kiadások. In: Kőszeghy, L. (ed.). Éves jelentés
a lakhatási szegénységről – 2012. Budapest: Habitat for Humanity Magyarország, 38.
159 See the government’s English language website: abouthungary.hu (2021). Hungarian government to launch
its biggest ever home creation scheme this year.
160 kormany.hu (2021). Egyre több lehetőség, egyre több családnak.

HOUSING POLICIES AND HOUSING AFFORDABILITY IN HUNGARY AFTER 
107
In this section, we look at housing expenditures of the central government
(the national level) in three ways.
1 The first estimate shows spending changes of the ‘Housing subsidies’
budget line of the central government budget since 1990, based on data
from the Closing Accounts Acts and the Budget Acts.
2 The second estimate analyses government expenditure on housing on the
basis of the Classification of the Functions of Government (COFOG) – an
internationally standardised methodology of thematic areas of govern-
ment spending that has remained largely unchanged since the mid-1990s.
3 The third estimate is based on a detailed data collection of budgetary
expenditure on housing, by processing Closing Accounts Acts and Budget
Acts (including annexes in the bills). This method has been followed by
previous annual reports on housing poverty, but we slightly modified the
classification in order to adapt it to the longer timeframe under review.
4.1. The ‘Housing subsidies’ budget line
The ‘Housing subsidies’ (Lakástámogatások) budget line item has been constant-
ly present in the central government budget since 1990, with only slight changes
in terms of what included under this heading. The current name has been used
since 1998 – previous designations being ‘home building subsidies’ (1997)
and ‘subsidies of self-organised home building’ (until 1996). The Budget Acts
themselves do not provide any information on the internal structure of this
budget line item (i.e. division of projected spendings according to specific policy
instruments), the exact contents are revealed in the annexes of the Budget Bills and
Closing Accounts Bills with the textual justification of government spendings. The
level of detail with which the government has reported on these expenditures
has varied over the past three decades. Nevertheless, the below scathing
finding of the State Audit Oce of Hungary from 2009 is valid for the whole
thirty-year period: ‘there is no monitoring database available that would allow
us to determine the number, composition and quality changes of dwellings built,
renovated or purchased with the help of housing subsidies’.161
161 ÁSZ [State Audit Oce of Hungary] (2009). Jelentés a lakástámogatási rendszer hatékonyságának
ellenőrzéséről. Budapest: Állami Számvevőszék, 10.
The Housing subsidies budget line is relevant for a long-term assessment
of housing expenditures because, in principle, governments have added the
expenditures considered to be housing subsidies under the Housing subsidies
heading. The ‘Housing subsidies’ designation is broadly accurate because
spendings served housing purposes in some respects. However, these subsi-
dies were not always for building homes (they included subsidies for renovation
or purchase), nor was all expenditure allocated for broadening homeowner-
ship (they included some municipal subsidies as well). In general, once an
instrument was put under the Housing subsidies heading, it was consistently
kept there throughout its lifetime – this was also the case of instruments with
similar contents. For example, the current family housing benefit and the for-
mer social policy allowance (non-reimbursable cash grants for families with
children buying a dwelling) were consistently classified under this budget item,
regardless of changes of government. Thus, the dataset can be considered
relatively homogeneous.
The central budget has significant housing expenditures that do not appear in the
Housing subsidies budget line. This might be explained by scattered responsi-
bilities discussed above: dierent housing policy instruments belong to dif-
ferent ministries, and the expenditures are always in the budgetary chapter
of the respective governmental unit. The Housing subsidies budget line itself
has shifted across budget chapters several times. For most of the time, the
Ministry of Finance oversaw the spendings, but it was previously classified
under the ‘direct expenditures of the central government’ chapter. In the 2022
budget, it is part of the completely opaque Economic Recovery Fund under
which the government classified all expenditures considered to be related to
the economic recovery after the Covid-19 crisis under the jurisdiction of the
Minister of Finance (this also included many unrelated spendings).
Figure 11 shows Housing subsidies actual and projected spendings between
1990 and 2025. The figure mirrors real estate cycles, financial cycles as well
as cycles of housing policy instruments. The three peaks of housing subsidies
have been caused by the increased spendings on the social policy allowance (1990),
the interest-rate subsidies of mortgages (mid-2000s) and the family housing benefit
and building society top-up subsidies (since the mid-2010s). (The spike in 1995
was due to a one-o financial eect related to the phasing-out of ‘old’ housing

HOUSING POLICIES AND HOUSING AFFORDABILITY IN HUNGARY AFTER 
108
50
100
150
200
250
300
350
400
1991
1993
1995
1997
1999
2001
2003
2005
2007
2009
2011
2013
2015
2017
2019
2021
2023
2025
billion HUF
Actual Projected
loans dating back to the state socialist era.) All of these subsidies primarily
supported homeownership (either to buy or to build) but, for example, building
society top-up subsidies – which could be used for renovation – were also in-
cluded under this banner. No ne of these instruments are socially targeted; o n the
contrary, they are less accessi ble to the lower classes. For example, in the case of
the family housing benefit, an active social security number is required; sub-
sidised mortgage loans are unavailable for many households due to the lack
of creditworthiness; and poorer households only rarely have housing savings
accounts or receive top-up payments from the state. Thus, housing subsidies
do not directly contribute to alleviating housing poverty.
Housing subsidy spendings were cut back several times in the past three
decades. First, due to the economic crisis of the early 1990s, then after the
change of government in 2002, and later on the eve of the 2008 crisis. As
these austerity measures were introduced, governments changed the ac-
cessibility of the instruments and the amounts of subsidies. These changes
occurred mostly in response to a surge in public spendings and partly reaction
to the mismanagement of funds and a lack of strategic planning. The 2022
surge shown in the figure is due to the home renovation subsidy introduced in
late-2020. This instrument – included in a governmental stimulus package after
the Covid-19 recession – funds 50% of renovation expenditures of wealthier
households: the government hopes to spend 155 billion HUF for this instrument
alone in 2022. If government spendings are calculated at constant prices (of
2020), it is clear that the current policy mix is not the ‘biggest ever’ housing
programme as the government states: both the 1990 and the mid-2000s
spendings were above current levels.’Figure 11: ‘Housing subsidies’ budget expenditures (billion HUF, 1990–2025), at 2020 prices. Source of data:
Closing Accounts and Budget Acts, Hungarian State Treasury.162
162 For the years between 1990 and the early 2000s, the Closing Accounts Bills and Budget Bills are availa-
ble in the Hungarian Parliamentary Collection of the Library of the Hungarian Parliament, while those of
later years are available at the Hungarian National Assembly’s website. The Fiscal Responsibility Institute
Budapest has also compiled the links to the closing accounts and budgets –both the bills and the acts.
The graph shows actual data from the Closing Accounts Acts for the years bet ween 1990 and 2019. Data
source for 2020 is the Hungarian State Treasury (at the time of writing , in August 2021, the government had
not yet introduced the Closing Accounts Bill of the 2020 budget). For 2021–2025 planned expenditures
are shown, based on the 2021 and 2022 Budget Bills and their annexes. Current prices were deflated with
the Consumer Price In dex (1990–2020) of the Hungarian Central Statistical Oce . The long-term inflation
target of the central bank of Hungary, MNB (3%) was used as a deflator between 2021 and 2025.
Governments have included more than forty instruments under the housing subsidies
budget line item in the past th ree decades, and the availability and accessibility of
each instrument has also varied widely, as discussed previously. This shows
that governments have not had a comprehensive housing policy that would
have provided predictable and fiscally sustainable support for the housing of
dierent target groups. The type of subsidies with the longest and highest fiscal
impact in the past three decades have been the ones related to purchasing
homes: cash grants to households, interest-rate subsidies on housing loans
(including subsidies for banks covering their costs on loan disbursement) and

HOUSING POLICIES AND HOUSING AFFORDABILITY IN HUNGARY AFTER 
109
also some socially targeted subsidies such as renovation subsidies for persons
with reduced mobility
163
(the latter represented an expenditure of 3 billion HUF in
current prices in the early-2000s peak – a minor share of total expenditure). In-
terest-rate subsidies and guarantees linked to housing loans result in budget liabilities
that can last for several decades after the instrument has been phased out as subsi-
dies are paid throughout the long maturity of the housing loan contracts.164 For
example, the topping-up of building society savings has remained a dominant
expenditure even after the termination of new claims in 2018. The Fészekrakó
(Nesting) scheme of the second half of the 2000s generates budget expend-
iture until today. The social policy allowance and the interest-rate subsidy on
mortgage loans (phased out in 2009) account for government expenditures
until today, albeit in decreasing amounts (the interest-rate subsidy on mortgage
loans has a maximum length of 20 years). Although the ‘Housing subsidies’
budget line consisted mainly of longer-term instruments, one-time expenditures
were sometimes also included here, such as the costs of the reconstruction of
dwellings after the devastating floods of the Tisza river in 2001.
As mentioned earlier, the government claimed to have increased housing
subsidies more than twofold compared to 2010. This claim presumably re-
fers to the ‘Housing subsidies’ budget line. Technically-speaking, this amount
can easily be increased or decreased by merging various housing policy in-
struments under this budget line item or by taking them out and accounting
them elsewhere. If we compare the 2010 current price value (147.4 billion
HUF) with the 2022 projected spendings (381.8 billion HUF), we indeed see
a 2.5-fold increase (at constant prices, however, the increase ‘only’ amounts
to 1.9). The reason for the increase is partially due to a consistent overestimation
of the ‘Housing subsidies’ budget line during budget planning in recent years. For
example, the government projected to spend 106.2 billion HUF on the family
housing benefit in 2019, but the actual expenditure was only 73.5 billion HUF.
The overestimation is useful for communication purposes (e.g. announcing a
2.5-fold increase), but it also provides fiscal leeway for the government for
mid-year budget transfers from this line to other purposes. Overestimation,
163 On this form of support, see Gosztonyi, Á., Vankó, L. (eds.) (2020). Annual report on housing poverty in
Hungary 2020. English summary. Budapest: Habitat for Humanity Hungary.
164
In the early 1990s and mid-2000s, liabilities of earlier programmes accounted for three quarters of annual
housing expenditures. Hegedüs, J. (2006). Lakáspolitika és a lakáspiac – a közpolitika korlátai. Esély.
however, has not been a uniform feature of the last thirty years: the rapid
expansion of mortgage lending in the early- to mid-2000s was also due to budget
planning failure. Interest-rate subsidies on mortgages were tightened in 2003,
leading to front-loaded demand and a near doubling of budget expenditures
in 2004 (at current prices); the aggregated housing subsidies spendings were
1.5 times higher in 2004 than projected (see the steep rise on Figure 11). A
similar case occurred with the social policy allowance in the second half of
the 1990s, where expenditures ended up being two to three times higher than
the estimates of the budget planning.165
4.2. Housing expenditure by functional sector of
government expenditure
As a second estimation, we look at the housing expenditure based on the
functional spendings of government (COFOG methodology).166 This method-
ology adds up spendings of central government, local government and social
security funds (including state-owned enterprises and non-profit organisa-
tions) and divides them into broad thematic objectives linked governmental
activities. Expenditures of organisations with multiple activities are divided up
thematically (e.g. the expenditures of a municipality-owned real estate man-
agement company are considered as housing expenditures if they are spent
on dwellings and not accounted for if used for commercial real estate). The
long time series help us identify general trends, and data is also internationally
comparable (with some limitations).167
The COFOG classification aggregates not only central budget expenditure,
but the whole government sector: it is therefore broader than the Housing
subsidy budget line discussed earlier. A diculty in interpreting this data is that
its breakdown is not publicly available, making it unsuitable for evaluating the
impact of specific policy instruments.
165 Hegedüs, J. (2006). Lakáspolitika és a lakáspiac – a közpolitika korlátai. Esély.
166 For more details on the COFOG classification and statistical methodology, see the websites of the Hun-
garian Central Statistical Oce and the Hungarian State Treasury.
167 To give an example of the limitations of international comparisons in the housing sector: spendings are
attributed to a dierent category if housing subsidies are provided as tax rebates or as cash grants .

HOUSING POLICIES AND HOUSING AFFORDABILITY IN HUNGARY AFTER 
110
Government expenditure on housing is covered by two COFOG groups, Housing
development (COFOG 6.1) and Housing (COFOG 10.6). The former includes gov-
ernment expenditure on housing construction, land acquisition for housing and
housing purchases; subsidies for the expansion, maintenance and renovation
of the housing stock (without social targeting); housing elements of settlement
rehabilitation programmes; expenditures on the administration, evaluation and
monitoring of housing. The latter group includes aordability subsidies (e.g.
utility allowances, rent supplement, socially targeted housing loan subsidies
for homeowners) and expenditures on social rental housing. Data for Hungary
is available in Eurostat’s database from 1995 onwards, but due to a one-time
eect in 1995, data is only examined from 1996 onwards.168
In many respects, Figure 12 is similar to Figure 11: housing expenditures declined
in the second half of the 1990s and peaked in the mid-2000s. But unlike in Fig-
ure 11, expenditures stabilised at a lower level than ever before in this period. An
important structural change is that while the bulk of the expenditures was in itially
classified under social housing, socially targeted expenditures became lower than
expenditures on housing development (without means-testing) from 2016 onwards.
The conversion of forex housing loans to HUF loans represented a one-time
expenditure of 48.7 billion HUF and 54.9 billion HUF in 2011 and 2012 at current
prices (0.2% of GDP in both years), and explains outliers in housing develop-
ment (COFOG 6.1).169 Compared to Figure 11, housing expenditures based on
the COFOG classification were higher than the Housing subsidies budget line
in the mid-2000s (this is probably due to the fact household energy price sub-
sidies were classified as a social expenditure – even though this instrument was
not means-tested until 2007). In the past years, however, government spending
on housing based on the COFOG methodology is lower than the total expend-
iture of the Housing subsidies budget line discussed in the previous section.
168
The one-time eect was due to the privatisation of the housing stock: in the municipal accounts, the
sold dwellings were recorded as negative gross fixed capital formation in the year of privatisation, while
instalment payments (by those households who did not pay upfront) appear as receipts on a cash flow
basis each year. This eect reduced the expenditure on Housing development (COFOG 6.1) by 2.5% of
GDP in 1995, i.e. by HUF 14 5.6 billion, resulting in a negative value. Eurostat (2019). Manual on sources
and methods for the compilation of COFOG statistics – Classification of the Functions of Government
(COFOG) – 2019 edition.
169 Eurostat (2019). Manual on sources and methods for the compilation of COFOG statistics – Classification
of the Functions of Government (COFOG) – 2019 edition.
Figure 12: Government expenditures on housing in Hungary, 1996–2019 (billion HUF, 2019 prices).
Data source: Eurostat.
500
400
300
200
100
0
1996
1997
1998
1999
2000
2001
2002
2003
2004
2005
2006
2007
2008
2009
2010
2011
2012
2013
2014
2015
2016
2017
2018
2019
billion HUF
Housing development (COFOG
6.1)
Housing (COFOG 10.6)

HOUSING POLICIES AND HOUSING AFFORDABILITY IN HUNGARY AFTER 
111
Expenditures devoted to housing over the last fifteen years decreased significantly
(i.e. the government has furthered housing policy objectives primarily through
family support instruments rather than housing expenditures in the statistical
sense) and socially targeted subsidies have also relatively decreased (i.e. housing
as a social policy has become secondary and housing problems have been –
partially – addressed through general social subsidies).
In terms of GDP percentage, the sum of the two housing expenditure groups fell
from over 1% of GDP in 1997 to 0.5% in 2001; it peaked at 1.2% in 2005 –2006, then
fell steadily to stabilise at 0.3% at the end of the 2010s. This figure is the lowest
share in Hungary in the time series since 1995, making the government’s current
housing spending the ‘smallest ever’ housing programme, rather than the ‘biggest
ever’ claimed by the government. Experts estimate housing subsidies to be 3% of
GDP in the early 1980s; this rose to an unsustainable level of 6% by 1989 (other
experts suggest that housing subsidies only accounted for 8% of GDP), and
then fell to 1.8% of GDP by the mid-1990s.170 However, these expert estimates
are not directly comparable with the COFOG classification data.
4.3. Detailed breakdown of government expenditure
on housing
As in previous editions of Habitat for Humanity Hungary’s annual report on
housing poverty, government expenditure on housing is also aggregated
from the detailed Budget Acts and Closing Accounts Acts and some oth-
er sources – such as from data by the Hungarian Central Statistical Oce
(Figure 13). An accurate compilation of expenditures is nearly impossible as there
is a lack of data transparency throughout the past three decades. The reasons
for this nontransparent data provision range from a lack of a unified mon-
itoring system or coherent housing policy to the level of detail the Budget
Acts and Closing Accounts Acts provide on housing expenditures – as well
170 Dániel, Zs. (1997). Lakástámogatás és társadalmi újraelosztás. Közgazdasági Szemle; Hegedüs, J., So-
mogyi, E. (2016). Moving from an authoritarian state system to an authoritarian market system: Housing
finance milestones in Hungary between 1979 and 2014. In: Lunde, J., Whitehead, C. (eds.). Milestones in
European housing finance. Oxford: Wiley-Blackwell.
2000
1500
1000
500
0
1990
1992
1994
1996
1998
2000
2002
2004
2006
2008
2010
2012
2014
2016
2018
2020
2022
billion HUF
Expansion, maintenance and
renovation of public housing
Homeownership subsidies –
socially targeted
Homeownership subsidies –
not socially targeted
Household energy price
subsidies
Housing costs subsidies –
socially targeted
Subsidies for financial
institutions related to housing
measures
Figure 13: Government expenditures on housing (1990–2022), at 2020 prices. Data source: Closing
Accounts Acts and Budget Acts, Hungarian State Treasury, Hungarian Central Statistical Oce.171
171 See Figure 11 for the detailed description of the sources.

HOUSING POLICIES AND HOUSING AFFORDABILITY IN HUNGARY AFTER 
112
as ministries hampering access to public data.
172
Thus, in many respects, our
compilation only includes what the budget and the government allow us to see,
leaving several expenditures hidden. However, the compiled data is useful for
showing longer trends and internal ratios. Limitations are described in detail
below, and we also highlight some housing expenditures not included in the
compilation (where time series could not be compiled for methodological or
data availability reasons).
Expenditures were divided into six thematic groups, covering most of the
housing policy toolkit of the last three decades. The classification was based
on two criteria: a) social targeting of the instruments (whether or not they
are socially targeted) and b) the target group of instruments (private owners,
tenants, renters, utility cost payers, municipalities, companies, financial insti-
tutions, etc.). In total, ninety (!) housing policy instruments were included in our
dataset covering the last three decades.173 The groups and the main instruments
in each group are as follows:
1. Expansion, maintenance and renovation of public housing. The main expendi-
tures in this category were: renovation of the municipal housing stock,174
central budget support for the state-subsidised rental housing expan-
sion programme in the early 2000s
175
(not including municipalities’ own
contribution), the National Asset Manager Programme (2010s) and the
municipal housing subsidy loan.176 A smaller item was the municipal slum
172 There are four main ways of hindering public data access by ministries: extending the deadline for the
response, not responding to a request (and hoping that the requestor will not sue), requiring reimbursement
for data (Hungarian law allows this since 2016), delaying access to data based on Covid-19 emergency
procedures (in 2020 and 2021). The Ministry of Finance, which is primarily responsible for housing policy,
has utilised all the above-mentioned methods to restrict access to public data when Habitat for Humanity
Hungary submitted data requests for its annual reports on housing poverty in recent years.
173 The full dataset with Hungarian and English labelling is publicly available online under: Czirfusz, M. (2021).
Public spendings on housing in Hungary, 1990–.
174
The source of the data series is the website of the Hungarian Central Statistical Oce and the Yearbook
of Housing Statistics; for the years 2020–2022; the 2019 data has been used as an estimate.
175
For the regulation, see §§ 12–25 of the Decree of the Council of Ministers of the Hungarian People’s
Republic 106/1988 (XII.26.), amended by the Government Decree 101/2000 (VI.27.); later §§ 2627 of
the Government Decree 12/2001 (I.31.).
176 The municipal housing subsidy loan (part of the Housing subsidies budget line) included two instru-
ments: interest-rate subsidies from the central budget for loans taken by municipalities for renovation of
public housing (Article 22 of Government Decree 12/2001 (I.31.), previously the Decree of the Council of
Ministers of the Hungarian People’s Republic 106/1988 (XII.26.), amended by the Government Decree
clearance programme supported by the central budget.
177
These subsidies
are regarded as socially targeted subsidies, as they primarily ensure that
public housing is available for poorer households.
2. Socially targeted subsidies linked to homeownership. These amounts are
almost invisible on Figure 13. Spendings correspond to three larger instru-
ments: grants for the purchase, construction or renovation of housing for
people with reduced mobility,178 the Child Protection Housing Fund and
its predecessors to support access to housing for those leaving foster
care,
179
and the consolidation of housing loans taken before 1990 and
available to people in need in the early 2000s.
180
The consolidation of old
housing loans and accessibility support were part of the Housing subsi-
dies budget line, whereas the Child Protection Housing Fund was not.
141/1994) and – until 2001 – central budget support for housing subsidies granted by local councils to
private households in the 1980s (interest-rate subsidies of the central government for loans taken by
local councils to provide this type of support to households – Decree of the Council of Ministers of the
Hungarian People’s Republic 106/1988 (XII.26.), § 10).
177 The budget of settlement rehabilitation programmes was negligible, with a peak year of 741 million H UF
in 2010 at current prices, see Varró, Sz . (2008). Az MSZP–SZDSZ-kormányok romapolitikája 2002 óta
– I. – Céltalanul. Magyar Narancs. From 2013 onwards, EU-funded programmes were undertaken for the
same purpose, but these expenditures are not included in the dataset.
178 A number of structural problems regarding the application and transparency of the scheme were iden-
tified by a participatory action research recently (Kovács, V. (ed.) (2018). Önállóan lakni – közösségben
élni. Kutatási beszámoló. Budapest: Közélet Iskolája Alapítvány). The subsidy has been devalued to one
seventh over the last three decades (the maximum subsidy of 150 thousand HUF in 1990 would be HUF
2.044 million at 2020 prices, compared to a mere 300 thousand HUF currently available). The subsidy
is technically misplaced, as it is part of the Housing subsidies budget line, and therefore the Ministry of
Finance is responsible for the scheme (i.e. not the ministr y responsible for social policy). The instrument
is subject to the logic of profiteering: the subsidy must be requested at two Hungarian bank’s oces,
applications are assessed by the banks, and the state pays a 8% reimbursement to financial institutions –
instead of using state institutions for administering the funds as it is done with other social policy benefits.
179
The fund – which ran under dierent names during the three decades – has been administered by the
ministry responsible for social policy. The rules for the support are set out in Chapter X of Government
Decree 149/1997 (IX.10.). The planned expenditure in the 2021 budget is 1.2 billion HUF.
180
This included two measures introduced in the early 2000s. Under the first measure (Government Decree
66/2001 (IV.20.)), households with housing loans taken before 1994 terminated by the bank were entitled
to interest relief, capital repayment and arrears reduction. With the second programme Government
Decree 11/2005 (I.26.), the state took over pre-1989 housing loans of certain debtors in need. The gov-
ernment spent 10 billion HUF at current prices on the two schemes. The number of beneficiaries is not
fully disclosed in the budget accounts; the second and third tranches of the second programme reached
roughly 4,000 people.

HOUSING POLICIES AND HOUSING AFFORDABILITY IN HUNGARY AFTER 
113
3. Socially not targeted subsidies linked to homeownership. This group is the
backbone of public expenditure on housing in the past three decades,
with nearly fifty (!) dierent instruments.
• The first subset consists of various cash grants, the most important
of which are (in chronological order) the social policy allowance, the
tax refund subsidy (for self-built housing), the top-up payments for
contractual savings for housing (building societies), the renovation
scheme for socialist-era apartment blocks and the family housing
benefit.
•
The second subset consists of interest-rate subsidies for housing loans
of state-socialist times, for ‘new’ housing loans and mortgages after
1990, for measures for phasing out forex loans (e.g. the exchange rate
cap scheme and interest-rate subsidies), and – more recently – inter-
est-rate subsidies for housing loans taken together with the family
housing benefit cash grant. Smaller schemes existed as well (e.g.
interest-rate subsidies for youth savings deposits before 1997). The
subset also includes schemes ‘waiving’ loans, such as the reduction
of mortgage debt for families with three or more children from 2017.
Cash grants and interest-rate subsidies were combined in a series
of measures to phase out housing loans of state socialist times in
the early 1990s.181
• The next subset is the mid-2000s state guarantees for homeowner-
ship (e.g. for housing loans for public sector workers) and the guar-
antee provided for the Fészekrakó (Nesting) scheme.182
• Smaller grants for various ad hoc problems. These include cash grants
to homeowners after flood and inland water damage (these were gen-
erally administered by municipalities through funding by the Ministry
of Interior.) The best-known and longest-running programme is the
compensation of homeowners damaged by the use of open-hearth
slag as building material in the vicinity of Ózd, northeast Hungary
181
Almost all non -repayable and interest-rate subsidies were part of the Housing subsidies budget heading.
Main exceptions were the renovation of socialist-era apartment blocks and the phasing-out of housing
loans taken before 1990. The latter turned interest-rate subsidies into government bond repayments (see
earlier) and was therefore filed under the ‘government debts and claims’ chapter within the budget.
182
The guarantees were not part of the Housing subsidies budget line but were either included in the chapter
of Ministry of Finance or in the chapter of the government’s direct expenditures and revenues.
(open-hearth slag used in cement leads to cracks in concrete struc-
tures over time).183
• The state provided interest-rate subsidies for working capital loans for
companies and municipalities building housing for sale until the early
2000s (when interest rates were high). This was also a non-targeted
subsidy.184
• Finally, we included the baby expecting loan in this category which is
both an interest-rate subsidy and a waiver. Although these loans can
be used for other purposes than housing, in most cases they have
supported purchase or renovation of housing.185
4. Subsidies for household energy costs. Household energy costs have been
subsidised in dierent forms by dierent governments in the past three
decades. In the early 1990s, consumer price supplements contribut-
ed to lowering household energy prices for all residential consumers.
Later, annual programmes were launched for the same purpose with
ad hoc decisions in variable forms (some means-tested, others not).
186
These were replaced in 2003 by a price reduction for natural gas and
district heating, initially as a non-targeted subsidy, but transformed into
a socially-targeted one in 2007.
187
The scheme was phased out by the
Orbán government after 2010, and household energy prices have since
been ensured through direct price regulation (‘utility price deduction’
or ‘fight for utility prices’ in government communication), which does
183
The legal background for the subsidy is Government Resolution 1085/2001 (VII21..) and Government Reso-
lution 40/2003 (III.21.); regarding the case of houses built with open hearth slag see e.g. Kovács, I. (2014).
‘Leszakadt a plafon, elköltöztünk’ – Évtizede hagyják cserben a salakos családokat. Magyar Narancs.
184 In recent years, the direct budget support of housing construction loans was replaced by the Central Bank
of Hungary’s Funding for Growth Scheme Go! programme and the Bond Funding for Growth Scheme.
Both are unconventional monetary policy tools providing cheap financing (also available for construction
companies in the housing sector.)
185 According to a survey of the Central Bank of Hungary (MNB), three quarters of the applicants used the
baby expecting loan to buy and/or renovate. Fellner, Z., Marosi, A., Szabó, B. (2021). A babaváró kölcsön
hitelpiaci és reálgazdasági hatásai. Közgazdasági Szemle.
186
Between 1992 and 1997, these ad hoc subsidies were part of either the Ministry of Interior or the Ministry
of Welfare budget, depending on who distributed the subsidies to the population.
187
Consumers paid reduced prices, the government paid the dierence between market prices and consumer
prices for utility providers (by then, privatised companies in foreign ownership). The main legislation is the
Decree of the Minister of Economy and Transport 50/2003 (VIII.14.) and Government Decree 231/2006
(XI.22.).

HOUSING POLICIES AND HOUSING AFFORDABILITY IN HUNGARY AFTER 
114
not directly entail budgetary expenditure, as utility providers carry the
costs.
188
Housing energy costs have carried variable weight in housing
expenditures over the three decades, but in some years contributed to
a significant share of spendings.
5. Socially targeted support for housing costs. This group is almost invisible on
Figure 13. Tools included cash benefits used for housing purposes: rent
subsidies (early-1990s, 1996–2002 and 2005–2011), a short-lived housing
debt management programme (1998–2003),
189
and major benefits such as
temporary allowance, housing allowance, debt reducing assistance and
the municipal social benefit.190 Also included here is the social firewood
programme of the post-2010 Orbán governments.191
6. Financial institutions’ subsidies for housing. A recurring feature is that the
state reimbursed financial institutions for the additional costs they in
-
curred in disbursing loans and subsidies. In certain cases, financial insti-
tutions received advance payments for certain expenses, and the state
provided surety for certain non-performing housing loans.
192
However, it is
dicult to assess whether these expenditures have increased the profits
of financial institutions.193
188
At the same time, the reduction of utilit y costs did not solve structural problems regarding the energy
supply, see e.g. Weiner, Cs., Szép, T. (2022). The Hungarian utility cost reduction programme: An impact
assessment. Energy Strategy Reviews. In the largely renationalised energy sector after 2010, low house-
hold energy prices mean lost revenue for state-owned enterprises; costs have to be largely borne by the
state in the long run in the form of capital injections.
189
Government Decree 96/19 98 (V.13.). Municipalities could apply for additional support for a debt manage-
ment programme for households. This aid was introduced and subsequently phased out by socialist-liberal
coalition governments.
190
The expenditure data is taken from the Yearbook of Welfare Statistics of the Hungarian Central Statistical
Oce and its statistical tables (here and here). Between 2020 and 2022, the 2019 actual data is shown
as estimates in Figure 13.
191 For details on social firewood, see Bajomi, A. Zs. (2018). A szociális tüzelőanyag-támogatás Magyaror-
szágon. Budapest: Habitat for Humanity Magyarország.
192
The legislation on reimbursement to credit institutions are: Decree of the Council of Ministers of the Hun-
garian People’s Republic 106/1988 (XII.26.), followed by Government Decree 12/2001 (I.31.), Government
Decree 16/2016 (II.10.) and Government Decree 17/2016 (II.10.). The reimbursement rate for banks was
typically 1.5-8% of the amounts paid.
193 Hegedüs , J. (2006). Lakáspolitika és a lakáspiac – a közpolitika korlátai. Esély.
Based on Figure 13 and Table 3 (which summarises assets with a total expend-
iture of at least HUF 200 billion at 2020 prices) the share of socially not targeted
housing expenditure has made up at least two-thirds of total housing expenditure
over the past three decades. Within this category of expenditure, socially not
targeted homeownership subsidies prevail. In the early 1990s and mid-2000s,
subsidies for housing energy costs (which partly included socially targeted
instruments) were also of high importance. There was a clear roll-back of the
state in terms of housing financing after 1990, leaving behind a gap that could not
be filled by the various subsidies supporting homeownership. Expenditures fell
sharply in the 1990s, partly because of the devaluation of previous instruments
due to rapid inflation, partly because falling spendings linked to the privatisa-
tion of public housing, and partly because previous subsidies were financially
unsustainable. The expenditure peaks of the subsequent period were in the
mid-2000s and in the 2020s. Table 3 summarises the largest instruments
(those with an overall total of at least 200 billion HUF between 1990 and 2022,
at current prices in 2020.)
Data for 2020–2022 is partially uncertain. Since 2020, the Ministry of Finance
has not provided detailed spendings regarding the Housing subsidies budget
line in the annexes of the Budget Bills, as it had previously. Therefore, expendi-
tures of major policy tools (e.g. the phasing out of the top-up of contractual
savings for housing) are not included in Figure 13, – which means the actual
amount for 2020 was possibly higher than indicated. Projected spendings
have generally overestimated actual expenditures in recent years, but the
2021 Budget Act did not yet include the home renovation subsidy – which
was introduced after the budget bill was adopted by parliament (increasing
actual expenditures). Thus, the share of socially targeted subsidies is dicult
to estimate for 2021 and 2022. Newly introduced or modified subsidies (e.g.
the home renovation subsidy) are not means-tested. These new instruments
are expected to oset declining (e.g. family housing benefit) and phased-out
instruments (e.g. the topping-up of contractual savings for housing). Therefore,
we expect that the share of socially not targeted subsidies is either stagnating or
declining in 2021 and 2022.

HOUSING POLICIES AND HOUSING AFFORDABILITY IN HUNGARY AFTER 
115
Table 3: Main categories of total government expenditure on housing, with instruments totalling
above 200 billion HUF. Data source: Closing Accounts Acts and Budget Acts, Hungarian State Treasury,
Hungarian Central Statistical Oce.194
* The years in which Closing Accounts Acts included any expenditures related to that instrument. This does
not necessarily coincide with the years in which the instrument was in operation , because expenditures may
have occurred in subsequent years as well.
194 See Figure 11 on sources.
Table 4 shows the overall reach and budget expenditures of the most impor-
tant housing policy instruments in the ‘peak years’ of each instrument (reaching
the most people or generating the most expenditure). For some instruments,
only approximate figures are available. The table highlights dierences be-
tween broad-coverage and expensive instruments (e.g. top-up payments for
contractual savings for housing, gas price subsidies for households); popular
instruments supporting homeownership of the middle class (e.g. social policy
allowance, housing privatisation); and socially targeted instruments with small
budgets and reaching few people (e.g. debt reduction allowance).
Finally, we list some direct expenditures (either permanent or temporary)
which were not included in our compilation for methodological or data acces-
sibility reasons, as well as indirect subsidies provided by the state (mostly to
homeowners), without means-testing.
•
A socially targeted housing expenditure is the provision of permanent
and temporary accommodation in social care institutions. State spending
is relatively dicult to determine. One estimate calculates the running
costs of the institutions, which have risen from around 100 billion HUF in
the early 1990s to around 200 billion HUF in the early 2010s (2020 price
levels).195 Funding was provided under two dierent spending categories,
with separate tabs for institutions run by municipalities and for other or-
ganisations (the former has been managed by the ministry responsible
for local government, the latter by the ministry of social aairs). Budget
categories have changed regularly: there were periods when it was not
possible to tell apart institutions providing accommodation from those
providing only daycare. In the case of institutions run by local govern-
ments, a further diculty for comparison over time is that in the early
2000s a certain share of the personal income tax transferred to local
governments was earmarked as block grant for financing these institu-
tions. In many cases, municipalities supplemented block grants with their
own resources (which are not included in the central budgetspendings).
195
Operating costs exceed budget expenditures because institutions have revenues. For example, fees
have risen from 20 billion HUF to over 80 billion HUF in real terms over the three decades, meaning that
the state has increasingly withdrawn from providing institutional care. Church-, charity- and NGO-run
institutions are not only supported through earmarked block grants, but through ‘general’ support: i.e. it
is impossible to tell how much of the state subsidies to churches are spent to run social institutions. Data
source: KSH [Hungarian Central Statistical Oce] (2018). Yearbook of Welfare Statistics, 2017.
Years* Socially
targeted
Total
expenditure
(billion HUF,
1990–2022, 2020
prices )
1990– Yes 1695
Of whic h: Renovation of the municipal housing stock 1990– Yes 1024
Expenditures of the National Asset Manager 2012–2021 Yes 207
1990– Yes 856
Of whic h: Housing allowance 1993–2016 Yes 346
Tem porary al lowance 1993–2014 Yes 255
1991– Yes 159
1990– No 8709
Of whic h: Interest-rate subsidies on mortgages 2000– No 1288
Social policy (housing construction) allowance 1990– No 1283
Housing Fund (phasing-out state socialist housing loans) 1990–1991 No 1017
Top-up of contractual savings for housing (building societies) 1998– No 751
Repayment subsidy (interest-rate subsidy) 1990–2012 No 738
Family housing benefit 2015– No 668
Supplementary interest-rate subsidy 1994– No 604
Interest settl ements of housing-related government bonds (related
to the phasing-out of state socialist housing loans) 1992–2016 No 481
1990– No 283
1990– Partially 1424
Of whic h: Contri bution t o househol d energy c osts 2003–2019 Partially 893
Consumer price supplement for household energy costs 1990–1991 No 473
* The y ears in wh ich Clo sing A ccoun ts Acts inc luded any exp endi tures related to that ins trumen t. Th is does no t necess arily coin cide with
the years in whic h the ins trumen t was in op eration , becau se expen ditu res may hav e occurr ed in sub sequ ent years as w ell.
Subsidie s for house hold energy c osts
Expansi on, maint enance and r enovation of public housing
Socially targeted support for housing costs
Socially targeted subsidies linked t o homeownership
Socially not targeted subsidies linked to homeownership
Financia l instit utions’ subsidies for housing

HOUSING POLICIES AND HOUSING AFFORDABILITY IN HUNGARY AFTER 
116
Table 4: Reach and annual budget of main housing policy instruments in their peak years

HOUSING POLICIES AND HOUSING AFFORDABILITY IN HUNGARY AFTER 
117
Therenovationof institutions has generally been financed through ear-
marked, individual grants from the central budget or from European
Union funds, but these measures and their budgets are not included in
the detailed breakdowns of the budget and the Closing Accounts Acts.
Therefore, amounts spent by the state on social institutions for capital
expenditure cannot be estimated.
•
A recurring theme in annual reports of housing poverty has been the
question of how much the state spends on helping homeless people (with
accommodation and other benefits). The government claims to have
spent 12 billion HUF on homeless people in 2020,196 but we do not
know which expenditures and benefits were included in this figure. A
2013 estimate suggested that the central government budget allocated
around 10 billion HUF on funding services for homeless people; for the
same year, the annual report on housing poverty reported 8 billion HUF,
based on ministry data.197 Block grants for temporary accommodation
for homeless people can be traced from the central government budget
(with the limitations described above), and regular (but very low) project
funding was also available through two public foundations and ad hoc
grants (an example of the latter is an 80 million HUF one-time grant to
the Municipality of Budapest in the winter of 2013/2014, provided by the
Ministry of Interior as a ‘compensation’ for additional demands stemming
from the legislation criminalising homelessness198). To give an example:
in 2005, earmarked government expenditure to tackle homelessness
was 4.4 billion HUF (7.2 billion HUF at 2020 prices), of which 3.8 billion
HUF were block grants for institutions, 500 million HUF was project
funding for capital goods, and a further 100 million HUF was available
for project funding through two public foundations. The lack of a long-
term government strategy on tackling homelessness means that funding
196 Életbe lépett a vörös kód szerda reggel. kormany.hu, 2021. július 7.
197
Győri, P. (2014). Hajléktalanügyi országjelentés.; Koltai, L. (ed.) (2014). Éves jelentés a lakhatási szegény-
ségről 2014. Budapest: Habitat for Humanity Magyarország.
198 For details see Koltai , L. (ed.) (2014). Éves jelentés a lakhatási szegénységről 2014. Budapest: Habitat for
Humanity Magyarország.
is not aligned with real needs and objectives, and the impact of budget
spending cannot be monitored.199
•
Dormitories in the secondary and tertiary education are another type of
institution providing housing. For university students who do not get
accommodation in a dormitory, housing allowance has been provided
since 1998 as block grants for universities who distribute these funds
in their own jurisdiction. Data is dicult to compile because the Budget
Acts separated block grants for dormitories for state and non-state in-
stitutions, and the block grants for housing allowance were reported in
the Closing Accounts Acts combined with other block grants for several
years. In secondary education, block grants for dormitories were initially
classified within municipal block grants, but this changed with the cen-
tralisation of public education and the increase in the number of non-
state institutions (such as schools run by church organisations). As in the
case of social institutions, it is dicult to compile data on investments.
For example, expenditures on public-private-partnership contracts for
the construction and maintenance of dormitories in higher education are
disclosed neither by universities nor the responsible ministry.200 In 2 007,
the state spent over 15 billion HUF (at 2020 prices) on block grants for
higher education dormitories and housing allowances, but this amount
has been roughly halved since then. The housing issues of young people
were discussed in more detail in the 2019 edition of the annual report
on housing poverty, which highlighted the importance of dormitories in
alleviating housing diculties of students coming from poorer families
in higher education.201
199 This was already noted in a 2006 report by the State Audit Oce of Hungary: ÁSZ [State Audit Oce of
Hungary] (2006). Jelentés – A hajléktalanokat ellátó intézményrendszer ellenőrzése. Budapest: Állami
Számvevőszék.
200
For more, see Bucsky, P. (2019). Egy hasznosnak tűnő állami program, a részleteket mégis rejtegetik.
G7.hu. The outsourcing of higher education to public trust funds in recent years also undermined the
transparency of spendings. On this legal and political move see the information note by the Hungarian
Helsinki Committee.
201
Ámon , K. et al. (2019). Annual Report on Housing Poverty in Hungary 2019. Executive Summary. Budapest:
Habitat for Humanity Hungary.

HOUSING POLICIES AND HOUSING AFFORDABILITY IN HUNGARY AFTER 
118
•
EU-funded programmes with housing elements are also not included in our
compilation of budget expenditures on housing. These programmes are
discussed in a separate chapter of this publication.202
•
Tax or fee reductions and rebates related to homeownership have been in
-
direct subsidies, as they are not direct expenditures of the budget, but
represent losses in government revenues. The existence of these benefits
illustrates well the anomalies of the homeownership-dominated housing
regime. Private property and a functioning housing market are not able to
solve the housing crisis, reduce housing inequalities and increase hous-
ing mobility. Tax and fee reductions related to homeownership red uce public
sector resources that could be used for housing – particularly the funding avail-
able for non-homeowners. They favour homeowners and provide discounts for
investors buying homes.203 The annexes of Budget Bills estimate revenue
losses, but the time series are not covering all three decades, nor is the
methodology of the estimates provided. The Orbán governments after
2010 provide more detailed information on these revenue losses than
previous governments did. According to expert estimates, the share of
tax and fee rebates and other indirect rebates amounted to one third of
total housing expenditure in the early-1990s (although the largest share of
this amount consisted of the dierence between market rents and rents
in social housing204). The personal income tax credit for housing savings
was introduced as part of the 1987 tax reform (which also introduced
personal income tax) and phased out in 1997 (the credit was available
until 2001). The personal income tax credit for housing loan repayments
was available from 1994 to 2007 (the budgetary impact lasted until the
early 2010s). These two tax reliefs caused a total loss of tax revenue of
355 billion HUF (2020 prices) for the central budget. The phasing-out of
the personal income tax relief can be justified given the social targeting of
the subsidies (as tax reductions were generally accessible to people with
higher incomes.205) Further losses in government revenue have occurred
202 Bajomi, A . Zs. (2021). The EU framework for reducing housing poverty. In: in this volume.
203 In the early 2000s, experts estimated that 10–15% of homebuyers receiving tax benefits bought homes
as investments. ÁSZ [State Audit Oce of Hungary] (2009). Jelentés a lakástámogatási rendszer haté-
konyságának ellenőrzéséről. Budapest: Állami Számvevőszék.
204 Dániel, Zs. (1997). Lakástámogatás és társadalmi újraelosztás. Közgazdasági Szemle.
205 For details see Hegedüs, J. (2006): Lakáspolitika és a lakáspiac – a közpolitika korlátai. Esély.
because of reductions in transfer taxes and fees on transfer of residential
property, on the purchase of land (if used later for residential construc-
tion), on the purchase of newly-built homes of less than 30 million HUF,
on the purchase of housing with the help of the family housing benefit and
on inheriting residential property. The 2022 budget estimates these reliefs
to amount to 129.6 billion HUF (at current prices); half of this relief is linked to
transfer tax and a third to houses bought with the family housing benefit.
Between 2012 and 2022, the Ministry of Finance estimated the total loss
of tax revenue related to homeownership tax reliefs at 639 billion HUF
(2020 prices). Although the government does not disclose data on the
distribution of the tax rebates among social or income groups, it is likely
that better-o taxpayers profited more from these measures.

HOUSING POLICIES AND HOUSING AFFORDABILITY IN HUNGARY AFTER 
119
5. Housing aordability
The extent of housing poverty is often assessed in terms of housing aordability.
Housing poverty can be eectively reduced through public policy interven-
tions if the aordability of housing is improved. Methodologically, however,
it is dicult to find aordability indicators that are relevant and comparable
over time – and which could also possibly allow for comparisons between
dierent housing regimes in dierent countries. For example, the definition of
aordability includes the ability of households to aord the cost of a ‘socially
acceptable’ dwelling206; but what Hungarian society considers to be ‘accept-
able’ standards (in terms of amenities, overcrowding, etc.) has also changed
over the three decades under review.207
Housing aordability in previous years’ annual reports on housing poverty was
analysed with a mixture of dierent thematic approaches.
•
Aordability of home-buying. Given the dominance of homeownership in
Hungary, the aordability to buy is a key determinant of housing aorda-
bility in general. According to this approach, household income relative to
house prices can be a good indicator. The analysis can be complement-
ed by the examination of terms and costs of housing loans; and houses
bought as investments can also be considered. From this perspective,
housing poverty levels dip when it becomes ‘cheaper’ to buy a dwelling or
if homeownership becomes aordable for a wider range of households.
•
Aordability of housing costs. This approach has been a prominent consid-
eration in previous annual reports on housing poverty. A methodological
choice must be made in regards to what counts as housing costs. Eurostat
defines housing as aordable if a household spends less than 40% of its
206 See for example Koltai, L. (ed.) (2014). Éves jelentés a lakhatási szegénységről 2014. Budapest: Habitat
for Humanity Magyarország.
207
For example, an analysis of the 1993 Hungarian Household Panel found that half of Hungarian households
lived in substandard housing (which meant a lack of amenities – running water, bathroom, indoor toilet –
and/or a dilapidated and/or overcrowded dwelling). Hegedüs , J., Kovács, R., Tosics, I. (1994). Lakáshelyzet
az 1990-es években. In: Andorka, R., Kolosi, T., Vukovich, Gy. (eds.). Társadalmi Riport 1994. Budapest:
TÁR K I .
disposable income on housing,208 but other expert assessments may use
other values. An advantage of this approach is that aordability can be
calculated separately for each income group of the population. Thereby,
it is possible to show how much poorer households spend on housing
compared to richer households. The analysis can be complemented by
an analysis of households’ subjective judgements of aordability, when
households are asked, for example, whether they have regular problems
paying their housing costs.
•
Energy poverty. A narrower understanding than the previous point, this
approach approximates the aordability of housing with the aordability
of household energy costs. This understanding can be complemented
by analysing housing quality indicators (proportion and characteristics of
housing with poor building energy ratings) or by subjective perceptions
of households (e.g. whether they have diculties in heating their home
properly.) Previous annual reports on housing poverty discussed energy
poverty either within the aordability chapter or as a separate topic.
•
Rental costs (both in private rental and municipal rental housing). This ap-
proach looks only at renters. The conceptual backbone of this approach
is the idea that renters experience housing poverty dierently than home-
owners. The private rental market is unaordable or dicult to aord for
many – which means increasing rents (relative to the increase of incomes)
may indicate exacerbating housing poverty, with households forced out of
the private rental market. As municipal rental housing is primarily aimed to
be allocated to the socially deprived population, the situation of municipal
rents may also be a good indicator of housing aordability.
•
Household indebtedness. According to this approach, aordability prob-
lems are reflected in the accumulation of household arrears. Arrears can
take dierent financial forms, such as non-performing housing loans, ar-
rears in rent or utility bills. Aggregating data from these dierent forms is
methodologically dicult (there are dierent data sources, from household
208 Details of the calculation are available on the Eurostat website.

HOUSING POLICIES AND HOUSING AFFORDABILITY IN HUNGARY AFTER 
120
questionnaire surveys to data on arrears recorded by utility companies)
and there are limitations of comparing aordability over time.
• Evictions. This approach defines evictions as a consequence of a wider
aordability problem. For example, more evictions occur if proportionally
more households cannot aord paying their housing costs – which leads
to the termination of their rental/housing loan contracts, and ultimately,
often to evictions as well. Additionally, a rise in the number of squatters
can also be a viable indicator of an aordability crisis.
•
Availability of policy tools improving housing aordability. This approach looks
at aordability from the perspective of public policy instruments (e.g.
beneficiaries of the housing allowance or the debt management allow-
ance), and combines the analysis of aordability and accessibility. (This
approach was followed earlier when we discussed dierent Hungarian
housing policy instruments.)
Dierent indicators can indicate housing aordability issues over dierent
time horizons. For example, changes in house prices or rental prices due to
booms and busts in the housing market can rapidly reflect improvement or
deterioration of aordability. Housing cost aordability follows with a small lag:
after an economic downturn, arrears and debts start to increase a few years
later; they eventually start to decrease again when an economic upturn occurs.
Evictions indicate aordability on even longer periods because an eviction is
a longer legal process that can take up several years after one has stopped
being able to pay housing costs. Policy instruments reflect aordability issues
over very dierent time horizons. For example, debt management programmes
of the past decades for those with housing loans have been able to reach many
people on a time horizon of up to a year. Price caps on utility costs can also
be implemented quickly and with quick gains in households’ monthly budgets.
In contrast, investments in energy eciency of buildings improve aordabil-
ity over the long-term with less rapid investment costs returns. Interest rate
subsidies on housing loans combine short-term and long-term eects: they
improve aordability and accessibility in the short term, but their costs for the
central government budget might be dispersed over several decades.
5.1. The aordability of buying a home
The literature discussing the aordability of housing primarily measures it
by comparing house prices with per capita incomes on real terms (Figure
14). Real house prices in Hungary fell by 60% in the 1990s compared to the
1990 baseline, while incomes fell ‘only’ by 15%. This suggests that housing
aordability improved in the 1990s. In the late 1990s and early 2000s, hous-
ing aordability deteriorated because real house prices rose faster than real
incomes. After a period of stagnation in house prices, both house prices and
real incomes declined as a result of the 2008 crisis. Since 2014, house prices
have been rising considerably faster than incomes. The real house price index
reached the 1990 price level in 2020. Overall – compared to 1990 levels – housing
aordability in Hungary has improved in crisis periods and deteriorated in times of
economic upswing. However, because of the emphasis on the financial logic of
Hungarian housing policies, it was precisely in these prosperous periods that
the government spent more money on subsidising housing (which suggests
a poor utilisation of public money). It is also important to stress that if housing
aordability improves in periods of crisis, when real incomes are falling, fewer
households are able to buy.
The time series of Figure 14 are not homogeneous,209 and thus can only ap-
proximate housing aordability. House prices show prices of dwellings bought
– i.e. there is a significant composition eect in the evolution of prices. Over
the last three decades, dwellings of dierent quality, geographical location and
physical characteristics have changed hands in the housing market;
210
and the
number of housing transactions has also fluctuated. Moreover, the relationship
209 Real income time series are compiled from national accounts by the Hungarian Central Statistical Oce,
where, due to the change to ESA2010 methodology from 1995, the time series are only comparable to
a limited extent. The housing price index was compiled by MNB researchers from sales tax data of the
National Tax and Customs Administration, where there was a major change in the records in 2008. Banai,
Á., Vágó, N ., Winkler, S. (2017). The MNB’s house price index methodology. Budapest: Magyar Nemzeti
Bank.
210
The composition eect is not constant over time, see detailed data from the Hungarian Central Statistical
Oce’s house price index for the last half decade: KSH [Hungarian Central Statistical Oce] (2021). Hou-
sing prices, housing price index, Quarter 1 2021. In addition, a 1999 survey pointed out that housing market
transactions only provide information on prices in a sub-market of dwellings, and only a survey-based
method would provide more refined data on dierences in prices and their causes. Székely, G.-né. (2000).
A lakásárak társadalomstatisztikai összefüggései. Statisztikai Szemle.

HOUSING POLICIES AND HOUSING AFFORDABILITY IN HUNGARY AFTER 
121
between average incomes and average house prices does not capture the particular
problems faced by those living in housing poverty: indeed, this segment of the
population has lower than average incomes and can only aord lower priced,
poorer quality homes in worse geographical locations (if at all).
In addition to a ‘simple’ comparison of house prices and incomes, research
has also analysed the aordability of housing prices in detail. The specula-
tive demand for housing in the 1980s (investing in real estate was attractive
at the time) disappeared after 1990; in the 1990s, financial investments had
higher returns than real estate investments, with housing subsidies unable to
compensate for the dierence. Demand for housing declined and due to high
real interest rates, high inflation, high instalments and insecure incomes during
the economic crisis, housing loans made access to housing less aordable
for those with lower incomes. In addition, income dierences were more pro
-
nounced in the 1990s than the price dierences between dwellings.2 11 In the
1990s, the price of an average dwelling equalled 4–6 years of total income
of an average household; the figure was around 6 years in the mid-2000s.212
In the lowest income quintile, an average dwelling in Budapest would have cost 24
years of total income in 1993.
213
In the years before the 2008 crisis, incomes
rose and house prices stagnated in real terms, and there was no housing price
bubble just yet.
214
In the 2010s, house price growth outpaced income growth.
House price growth has been dierent depending on the dwelling size: for
example, in the case of dwellings advertised on jofogas.hu (one of the largest
Hungarian online marketplaces) prices of larger dwellings have risen faster
than those of smaller dwellings. The MNB house price index showed signifi-
cant geographical dierences: house prices rose more steeply in Budapest
(partly due to the prevalence of investment property).215 Similar trends were
laid out by the Takarék House Price Index: the aordability of a 60 square -meter
211 Hegedüs, J., Várhegyi, É. (2000). The crisis in housing financing in the 1990s in Hungary. Urban Studies.
212
Hegedüs, J. (2006): Lakáspolitika és a lakáspiac – a közpolitika korlátai. Esély; Lakner, Z. (2003). Versengő
célok, versengő elvek. Lakáspolitika és politikai motivációk 1990–2003, Esély.
213
Hegedüs, J., Kovács, R., Tosics, I. (1994). Lakáshelyzet az 1990-es években. In: Andorka, R., Kolosi, T.,
Vukovich, Gy. (eds.). Társadalmi Riport 1994. Budapest: TÁRKI.
214 Hegedüs, J., Somogyi, E., Teller, N. (2019). Housing market and housing indicators. In. Tóth. I. Gy. (ed.)
Social Report 2019. Budapest: TÁRKI Social Research Institute.
215 See e.g. Ámon, K. et al. (2019). Annual Report on Housing Poverty in Hungary 2019. Executive Summary.
Budapest: Habitat for Humanity Hungary; Gosztonyi, Á., Vankó, L. (eds.) (2020). Annual report on housing
poverty in Hungary 2020. English summary. Budapest: Habitat for Humanity Hungary.
Figure 14: Indices of real per capita incomes and real house prices in Hungary (1990=100).
Source: own calculations based on KSH [Hungarian Central Statistical Oce] and MNB [ The Central Bank
of Hungary] data. House price indices show first quarter data for each year.
0
20
40
60
80
100
120
140
1991
1993
1995
1997
1999
2001
2003
2005
2007
2009
2011
2013
2015
2017
2019
2021
Real house prices
Real incomes

HOUSING POLICIES AND HOUSING AFFORDABILITY IN HUNGARY AFTER 
122
dwelling deteriorated across the country between 2014 and 2020. Compared to
other regions in the country, housing aordability is worse in Budapest and
its surroundings, the western border, around Lake Balaton and some other
cities.216 Trends in the 2010s were particularly unfavourable for people living
in housing poverty. The Covid-19 crisis also shaped housing aordability: early
data suggests that the price of a second-hand housing stagnated in 2020,217
while average incomes have continued to rise.
The trends of house price aordability also contradict the common belief that lower
house prices and more aordable housing can be achieved through construction.
In the late 1990s and early 2000s, housing construction doubled, property
transactions increased,218 housing subsidies expanded, all the while aordabil-
ity deteriorated. A similar trend emerged in the second half of the 2010s and
in the 2020s: housing subsidies and incomes have increased and the Orbán
governments have used various means to stimulate construction – but housing
aordability has continuously deteriorated.
5.2. The aordability of housing costs
Housing aordability is a measure showing the burden of various housing-re-
lated expenses on households relative to their income.
Housing expenditures of households increased significantly as a share of their total
expenditures, leaping from 10% in the 1980s to its double in the mid-1990s.
For the poorest decile of the population, the share of income spent on housing
almost tripled in the early-1990s.
219
This was due to the increase in rents for
those living in municipally-owned housing and the rise in utility costs (which
216 Takarék’s methodology is not directly comparable with the similar dataset discussed earlier, as it uses
income data and median house prices instead of average prices . Takarék Index (2021). Budapesten
majdnem ötször annyi ideig kell dolgozni egy lakásért, mint Nógrádban.
217 KSH [Hungarian Central Statistical Oce] (2021). Housing prices, housing price index, Quarter 1 2021.
218 Hegedüs , J., Somogyi, E., Teller, N. (2019). Housing market and housing indicators. In. Tóth. I. Gy. (ed.)
Social Report 2019. Budapest: TÁRKI Social Research Institute.
219
Kőnig, É. (2006). Adósságkezelés: sikerek és kudarcok. Esély; ill. Misetics, B. (2018). Sosem volt elég:
Lakásfenntartási támogatás 2015 előtt, Esély.
accounted for 85% of their overall housing-related expenditures).
220
Consumer
price supplements for utility bills were terminated by the government, and the
price increase was compensated by various ad hoc (and later permanent)
utility subsidies by governments in the 1990s. Even so, the price of house-
hold energy increased fourteen-fold in nominal terms over a ten-year period
between 1987 and 1997.221 Inflation and falling real wages have increased the
housing cost burden on households relative to their income.222 In 1993, a third
of the population spent more than 30% of household income on housing-re-
lated expenditure. In the bottom quintile of the population, utility costs, rents and
repayments accounted for 42% of household income in 1993.
223
Housing cost
aordability was also dierentiated across housing tenure type: around 1990,
owner occupiers’ housing expenditure as a share of their income was roughly
1.5-times higher than that of those living in publicly owned rentals. Although
privatisation gave a ‘national gift’ to new tenant-owners, the high running costs
related to housing led to the paradoxical situation of most people remaining
dissatisfied with their housing situation.2 24
Housing costs accounted for roughly 20% of household income in the 2000s,
rising above 25% in the years following the 2008 crisis and falling to just
under 20% in the late 2010s.
225
The basic indicator of housing aordability
(the share of the population paying more than 40% of household income on
housing) has become a less informative variable over the past 15 years. The
ratio was above 18% in 2005, declined to around 10% before the 2008 crisis,
and after a temporary increase due to a methodological change, the figure is
only 4–5% in 2019 (slightly increasing in 2020 due to the Covid-19 pandemic,
as seen in Figure 15). Values by income quintiles have also improved: while in
the early-2000s, 40% of households in the poorest quintile spent more than 40%
of their income on housing, by the end of the 2010s this was true only for 20% of
220
Hegedüs, J., Kovács, R., Tosics, I. (1994). Lakáshelyzet az 1990-es években. In: Andorka, R., Kolosi, T.,
Vukovich, Gy. (eds.). Társadalmi Riport 1994. Budapest: TÁRKI.
221 Misetics, B. (2018). Sosem volt elég: Lakásfenntartási támogatás 2015 előtt, Esély.
222 Lakner, Z. (2003). Versengő célok, versengő elvek. Lakáspolitika és politikai motivációk 1990–2003,
Esély.
223
Hegedüs, J., Kovács, R., Tosics, I. (1994). Lakáshelyzet az 1990-es években. In: Andorka, R., Kolosi, T.,
Vukovich, Gy. (eds.). Társadalmi Riport 1994. Budapest: TÁRKI.
224 Dániel, Zs. (1997). Lakástámogatás és társadalmi újraelosztás. Közgazdasági Szemle.
225 https://www.ksh.hu/thm/2/indi2_7_4.html

HOUSING POLICIES AND HOUSING AFFORDABILITY IN HUNGARY AFTER 
123
the same income group.226 However, the proportion of people living in housing
poverty and their housing cost overburden is less well represented by this
indicator – other indicators highlight more permanent problems.
The aordability of housing costs also varies by household type, type of dwell-
ing and settlement type. For example, according to a 2015 survey by the Hun-
garian Central Statistical Oce, the aordability problem based on the hous-
ing-income ratio was more pronounced among people living in family houses,
those living in municipal rental housing and those living in smaller settlements.227
5.3. Energy poverty and aordability
Energy poverty also overlaps with the question of housing aordability: if
households cannot aord to pay energy costs or cannot heat their homes
properly, it is often due to energy aordability.228
Hungarian households faced severe problems in terms of energy cost aordability
during the early 1990s: according to survey data, nearly a third of the popu-
lation only partially heated their dwelling in 1993 (Figure 16). The same was
true for half of the poorest social group (those with less than 40% of average
income).229 There were significant fluctuations in the time series, reflecting
volatile household incomes in the 1990s.
230
Household energy prices rose more
steeply than both consumer prices and incomes: between 1987 and 1997, en-
ergy prices rose 14-fold in current prices, consumer prices 8-fold, while in-
comes rose only 5-fold (and only 4-fold for the poorest decile).231 Governments
226 Eurostat (n.d.). Housing cost overburden rate by age, sex and poverty status – EU-SILC survey. Eurostat
(n.d.). Housing cost overburden rate by income quintile – EU-SILC survey.
227 Hegedüs, J., Somogyi, E. (2018). A lakások megfizethetősége és a társadalmi egyenlőtlenségek – a KSH
2015- ös lakásfelvétele alapján. In: Miben élünk? A 2015. évi lakásfelmérés részletes eredményei. Budapest:
Központi Statisztikai Hivatal.
228
There are a number of other indicators of energy poverty, which were reviewed in detail in last year’s
report: G osztonyi, Á., Vankó, L. (eds.) (2020). Annual report on housing poverty in Hungary 2020. English
summary. Budapest: Habitat for Humanity Hungary.
229 Andorka, R., Spéder, Zs. (1994). Szegénység a 90-es évek elején. In: Andorka, R ., Kolosi, T., Vukovich, Gy.
(eds.). Társadalmi Riport 1994. Budapest: TÁRKI.
230
Kolosi, T., Sági, M. (1998). A háztartások demográfiai, foglalkozásszerkezeti és anyagi helyzetének válto-
zása. In: Kolosi, T., Tóth, I. Gy., Vukovich, Gy. (eds.). Társadalmi Riport 1998. Budapest: TÁRKI.
231 Misetics, B. (2018). Sosem volt elég: Lakásfenntartási támogatás 2015 előtt, Esély.
Figure 15: Proportion of households with aordability problems (proportion of households spending
morethan 40% of their income on housing, 2005–2020) Source: Eurostat (n.d.). Housing cost overburden
rate by age, sex and poverty status – EU-SILC survey. Eurostat (n.d.). Housing cost overburden rate
by income quintile – EU-SILC survey.
40%
30%
20%
10%
0
2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020
Poorest quintile
Total population
Richest quintile

HOUSING POLICIES AND HOUSING AFFORDABILITY IN HUNGARY AFTER 
124
have tried to alleviate the burden on households by subsidising heating costs
in various ways, but these measures have not necessarily and adequately
reached households in need; additionally, most subsidies have remained ad
hoc measures.
0
10%
20%
30%
40%
1992
1993
1994
1995
1996
1997
1998
2005
2006
2007
2008
2009
2010
2011
2012
2013
2014
2015
2016
2017
2018
2019
2020
Population living below the poverty line
Total population
Figure 16: Percentage of households unable to keep their home adequately warm.232
Source: Eurostat (n.d.). Inability to keep home adequately warm – EUSILC survey; Kolosi, T.,
Sági, M. (1998). A háztartások demográfiai, foglalkozásszerkezeti és anyagi helyzetének változása.
In: Kolosi, T., Tóth, I. Gy., Vukovich, Gy. (eds.). Társadalmi Riport 1998. Budapest: TÁRKI.
232 Data from 1993–1997 and data from 2005 onwards are not directly comparable. People living below the
poverty line are those with less than 60% of median income.
The aordability of heating prices improved in the second half of the 2000s:
energy poverty decreased, before rising sharply again after the 2008 crisis
– especially among people living below the poverty line. In the second half of
the 2010s, some energy poverty indicators improved for all income groups,
mainly due to the utility price reduction. However, energy poverty dierences
by demographics, settlement type and dwelling type (family house or apart-
ment buildings) remained significant throughout the late-2010s.
233
Over the
past decade, the only government programme specifically designed to reduce
heating costs for the poorest households has been the social firewood sub-
sidy (for which municipalities must apply from the Ministry of Interior). The
scheme is not easily accessible, is not well designed and has been allocated
a very small budget, therefore it has not been able to significantly contribute
to alleviating energy poverty.234
Over the past three decades, renovation subsidies with a focus on energy
eciency have failed to make a breakthrough in reducing energy poverty. Sub-
sidies (partly funded by the EU and partly by domestic sources) have largely
been available to better-o households, making housing more aordable for
those faced with less housing-related challenges. Governm ents have favou red
simpler, shortsighted interventions linked to energy prices (with the associated
short-term political gains) rather than schemes that would have contributed to en-
ergy savings in the longer term. Programmes have also failed to pave the way
towards a large-scale modernisation of the Hungarian housing stock and the
deep renovation of buildings – which would have improved energy aordability
and reduced energy poverty.
233 For more on this, see last year’s housing report: Gosztonyi, Á., Vankó, L. (eds.) (2020). Annual report on
housing poverty in Hungary 2020. English summary. Budapest: Habitat for Humanity Hungary.
234
For details see Bajomi, A. Zs. (2018). A szociális tüzelőanyag-támogatás Magyarországon. Budapest:
Habitat for Humanity Magyarország.

HOUSING POLICIES AND HOUSING AFFORDABILITY IN HUNGARY AFTER 
125
The policy instruments of the last three decades related to energy poverty will
be unsustainable or insucient in the next years and decades, as the energy
transition will proceed. Meeting the climate targets of both the European Union
(and Hungary itself) is dicult to reconcile with the policy of utility price reduction
through governmental price caps. In the medium-term, cheap energy prices can
only be secured by financing losses of state-owned energy companies with
public money. In doing so, the government intervenes in household energy
prices yet again in a socially not targeted manner.
5.4. Rental aordability
In addition to the aordability of homeownership, rental aordability is an indi-
cator of housing aordability. The importance of rentals in housing tenure has
considerably changed over the last three decades. In 1990, 685,000 of the
3.6 million Hungarian dwellings were owned by local authorities and 936,000
dwellings were rented (private and municipal rental combined). By 2016, only
48 thousand inhabited dwellings out of 3.85 million were owned by municipal-
ities, and 322 thousand dwellings were rented (the latter figure was up by 50
thousand compared to 2001).
235
While the rents of municipally owned dwellings
had a large role in shaping overall aordability in the early 90s, private rentals have
a much bigger impact today.
Measuring rent levels over three decades is not easy methodologically. The
Yearbook of Housing Statistics of the Hungarian Central Statistical Oce
provides information on rents in municipally owned housing, broken down by
the prevalence of amenities (WC, bathroom, central heating) and by rent type
(social rent, cost-based rent, market rent
236
). Rents have been regulated by
municipal ordinances since the early 1990s, when municipalities were given
ownership of state-owned housing and the task of housing management.
There is no complete record of the number and cost of private rentals, but
larger surveys of the population covering housing issues have most often
235 Data from censuses and the 2016 microcensus; see the respective table on the microcensus website.
236 In Hungary, there are three basic rent categories in municipal rental housing. Local governments define
rent levels as well as which household falls into which category.
asked about rent levels. The level of rents can also be assessed by evaluating
rental prices of housing advertisements.
Long-term trends in rents in municipal housing can be approximated using
data from the Hungarian Central Statistical Oce’s price indices, as municipal
rents are part of the basket of goods and services from which inflation is cal-
culated (Figure 17). Between 1995 and 2016, rents in munic ipal housing increased
2.3-fold in real terms, i.e. rents increased more than twice as fast as consumer prices.
Meanwhile, the population living in municipal housing has shifted increasingly
towards poorer households. In the 2010s, the real price increase of rents in
municipal housing stopped.
There are significant regional dierences in municipal housing rent levels.
In Budapest, rents have risen by an average of three times in nominal terms
in the 1990s, lagging behind average income growth rate. There were also
dierences in the extent of rent increases between Budapest districts (which
are independent municipalities) and depending on the amenities of the dwell
-
ings. The aordability of municipal rental housing presumably deteriorated in
the 1990s, because of the socially selective nature of housing privatisation.
This meant that better-o households were able to profit from privatisation,
while the share of lower quality housing occupied by poorer households grew
within the residual municipal rental housing.237 Rent subsidies by the central
government in the 1990s failed to address aordability problems in a systemic
way. The imprecise rent regulations of the Housing Act have remained unchanged
since its adoption in 1993. According to most experts, the Housing Act needs to be
fundamentally rethought to ensure aordable rents for tenants, while also allowing
municipalities to maintain their housing stock in both economic and socially just
ways.
238
Rent dierences between municipalities have persisted throughout
the 2000s and 2010s – with dierences up to four or eight times between
largest cities in the mid-2010s (depending on the amenities of the dwelling).
237 Győri, P. (2011). Csak csendben, csak halkan, hogy senki meg ne hallja… A budapesti bérlakás-szektor
teljes szétesése. Népszabadság, november 11.
238 See for example Darvas, Á., Farkas, Zs., Győri, P., Kósa, E., Mózer, P., Zolnay, J. (2013). A szociálpolitika
egyes területeire vonatkozó szakpolitikai javaslatok. Esély.

HOUSING POLICIES AND HOUSING AFFORDABILITY IN HUNGARY AFTER 
126
Most municipalities have not taken into account the social need of the local in-
habitants and the question of aordability when setting rents.240 In the majority
of municipalities, it is dicult to reconcile the fiscal logic of preserving the value
of the housing stock with the social logic of providing aordable municipal
housing primarily for poorer and vulnerable families. At current rent levels, the
municipal housing stock is depreciating, there are insucient local financial
resources for renovation – but there is also very little room for manoeuvre
to increase rents without compromising aordability. This contradiction can
only be resolved, according to most experts, by a significant increase in the
publicly owned housing stock and by block grants for municipal housing from
the central budget.
There is little quantitative and reliable data or sociological research on the
private rental market (and thus also regarding aordability problems of people
living in private rentals); this is particularly true for the period running from
the 1990s to the 2000s. Rapidly increasing rental prices and the increasing
share of private rentals in the 2010s, however, led to increased research on
this subject.
Surveys by the empirical social science research centre TÁRKI and by the
Hungarian Central Statistical Oce explored aordability from many angles in
the 1990s and 2000s but put less emphasis on the population living in private
rentals. However, it can be assumed that private rentals became less aordable
for households for whom homeownership was not accessible – while simulta-
neously the availability of municipal rental housing also deteriorated. Sporadic
data over the last three decades show that price dierences per square meter
between the private rental market and the municipal rental market have been
roughly three- to four-fold. These values have also varied significantly by set-
tlement size, with the highest dierences in Budapest.241
240
Koltai, L. (ed.) (2015). Éves jelentés a lakhatási szegénységről 2015. Budapest: Habitat for Humanity
Magyarország.
241 For data of the 2003 and 2015 surveys see: KSH [Hungarian Central Statistical Oce] (2003). Lakás-
viszonyok az ezredfordulón. Budapest: Központi Statisztikai Hivatal; KSH [Hungarian Central Statistical
Oce] (2016). Miben élünk? A 2015. évi lakásfelmérés főbb eredményei. Budapest: Központi Statisztikai
Hivatal.
0
100
200
300
400
1996
1998
2000
2002
2004
2006
2008
2010
2012
2014
2016
2018
2020
HUF / sqm
Figure 17: Monthly rent per square meter of a municipal dwelling with all amenities23 9 (HUF, at 2019 prices).
Source: own calculations based on Hungarian Central Statistical Oce data.
239 A dwelling with all amenities, according to Hungarian law, is a dwelling with a room of at least 12 square
meters, cooking facilities, bathroom and WC, utilities (electricity, water and sewage), hot water and central
heating.

HOUSING POLICIES AND HOUSING AFFORDABILITY IN HUNGARY AFTER 
127
In the 2010s, rents in the private rental market roughly doubled, and halted
only temporarily during the Covid-19 crisis. In 2021, rents started to rise again,
but have not yet reached the peak of the first months of 2020.242 According
to data from the Hungarian Central Statistical Oce, the aordability of the
private rental market varies significantly by region and settlement size. Aorda-
bility was supported by the fact that one tenth of those renting privately paid
below-market-price rents in 2018 and there was a significant proportion of
tenants who rented through acquaintances.
243
Prices on advertising websites
are therefore generally higher than rents measured throughout the whole
sector. Due to the unregulated nature of the private rental market, data on
rents only give a partial picture of the rental sector. For example, the lower
end of the private rental market, i.e. sub-standard, aordable housing for lower
income households, expanded in the 2010s, both in Budapest and in peripheral
villages. Demand has been created by the increase in the number of people for
whom homeownership is inaccessible because of rising social inequalities.244
The regulation of the private rental market (like many other areas of housing)
needs to be thoroughly rethought: by now, it has become obvious that the legal
framework established in the early 1990s is not suitable to stop the increase
in rental prices or to provide legal security – and thus, ultimately, to reduce
housing poverty.245
5.5. Household indebtedness and aordability
Issues around housing aordability often lead to household indebtedness.
Households accumulate arrears in housing costs or can only cover housing
costs by taking credits. On the one hand, arrears and indebtedness point to
the structural problems of the housing regime (e.g. many households can
242 HCSO –ingatlan.com-rent index, July 2021.
243
KSH (2019). Magánlakásbérlés, bérleti díjak – a 2018. évi lakbérfelmérés főbb eredményei. Budapest:
Központi Statisztikai Hivatal.
244
Pósfai, Zs. (2018). Annual Report on Housing Poverty in Hungary 2018. English Summary, Habitat for
Humanit y Hungary; Hegedüs, J., Somogyi, E ., Teller, N. (2019). Housing market and housing indicators.
In. Tóth. I. Gy. (ed.) Social Report 2019. Budapest: TÁRKI Social Research Institute.
245 For a possible outline of the reform of the private rental sector see Szabó, N. (ed.) (2020). Feketelakás
3.0. Budapest: Habitat for Humanity Hungary.
access adequate housing only through housing loans). On the other hand,
housing aordability issues also emerge cyclically, leading to arrears and
indebtedness in times of economic crisis. The level of indebtedness is also
a result of the regulatory environment, as well as the business practices of
credit institutions and utility providers. Households with arrears are not a ho-
mogeneous social group, which means policy instruments seeking to tackle
this issue should also dier.246 At the same time – as we have shown earlier –
public policy instruments used to address arrears since 1990 have been less
successful in providing appropriate responses to the aordability problems
of those in housing poverty.
In the 1990s, most of the housing loans of state socialist times were phased
out in a complex series of measures, and the credit market was in contraction.
Arrears, nevertheless, persisted. At the end of the 1990s, 650,000 households
(out of approximately 3.9 million Hungarian households) had diculties paying
their housing loans: this represented one fifth of loan contracts at the time.
247
Non-payment of rent was also on the rise in the 1990s. In 1989, for example,
6% of living in municipal rental housing in Budapest (25,000 households) did
not pay their rent on time, and arrears of longer duration increased in the fol-
lowing years.248 Non-payment of rent was primarily an urban problem, as the
vast majority of rental housing was in cities.
The number of people with arrears rose in the 2000s, partly because of a
housing loans market boom until the 2008 economic crisis. After the 2008 cri-
sis, some measures were also targeted at those with non-performing housing
loans, but most instruments were targeted at households without arrears.249
At the peak of overall indebtedness in 2014, one in fourteen Hungarian households
246 Dierent social groups with arrears and possible policy interventions are described in: Győri, P., Tausz,
K. (1999). A díjhátralék-probléma szociálpolitikai nézőpontból. In: Péteri, G. Tausz, K . (eds.). Megelőzés
és együttműködés: a díjhátralék-probléma megoldási lehetőségei helyi szinten. Nagykovácsi: Pontes Kft.
247
Győri, P., Tausz, K . (1999). A díjhátralék-probléma szociálpolitikai nézőpontból. In: Péteri, G. Tausz, K. (eds.).
Megelőzés és együttműködés: a díjhátralék-probléma megoldási lehetőségei helyi szinten. Nagykovácsi:
Pontes Kft.
248 Győri, P. (1990). Adósságok kicsinyben. Valóság.; Győri, P. (1995). Eladósodott társadalom. Esély.
249
Pósfai, Zs. (2018). Annual Report on Housing Poverty in Hungary 2018. English Summary, Habitat for
Humanity Hungary.

HOUSING POLICIES AND HOUSING AFFORDABILITY IN HUNGARY AFTER 
128
had a mortgage or rent arrears (Figure 18), which meant that hundreds of thou-
sands of households were unable to pay their mortgages. The statistics on
non-performing loans were improved by write-os by credit institutions and the
sale of non-performing loans to claims management companies – but these
interventions did not solve the aordability crisis.
250
The economic boom in
the second half of the 2010s and the tighter regulatory environment for credit
institutions in borrowing practices led to a situation where only 2% of the Hun-
garian population had loan and rent arrears by the end of the 2010s. Mortgage
and rent arrears aected one in six poorer households (those earning less
than 60% of median income) in the peak year of 2013.
In the 1990s, the rise in utility costs was accompanied by an increase in arrears
(utility costs rose faster than rents): according to a 1993 survey, 12% of house
-
holds were unable to pay their utility costs. In the early 1990s, the increase
in utility costs led to many households falling into arrears or reducing their
consumption.251 Those living in rental housing in cities (especially those living
in socialist-era apartment blocks with district heating) had less opportunities
to cut consumption, while in villages, those living in larger family houses were
facing diculties in payment of utility bills (especially heating). At the end of
the 1990s, 800–900 thousand households had overdue bills, 13% of house-
holds for electricity, 6% for gas and 21% for district heating.252 Utility arrears
aected more households than mortgage and rent arrears: in the peak year of
2013, a quarter of the popu lation had utility arrears. Today, one in ten households
are aected, despite the utility price reductions by the government. Among
poorer households (those earning less than 60% of median income), 60% of
households were aected by rent arrears in 2013, falling to 25% by the end
of the 2010s (Figure 18). In other words, poorer households’ indebtedness is
aected by business cycles to a larger extent than society as a whole.
250 For more details see Bródy, L. S, Pósfai, Zs. (2020). Household debt on the peripheries of Europe. New
constellations since 2008. Budapest: Periféria Policy and Research Center.
251 Győri, P. (1995). Eladósodott társadalom. Esély.
252
Győri, P., Tausz, K. (1999). A díjhátralék-probléma szociálpolitikai nézőpontból. In: Péteri, G . Tausz, K. (eds.).
Megelőzés és együttműködés: a díjhátralék-probléma megoldási lehetőségei helyi szinten. Nagykovácsi:
Pontes Kft.
Figure 18: Share of households with arrears on mortgage or rent payments and utility bills in Hungary (%).
Source: Eurostat, Eurostat.
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
70
2005
2006
2007
2008
2009
2010
2011
2012
2013
2014
2015
2016
2017
2018
2019
2020
Arrears on mortgage or rent
payments - all households
Arrears on mortgage or rent
payments - below 60% of
median equivalised income
Arrears on utility bills - all
households
Arrears on utility bills - below
60% of median equivalised
income

HOUSING POLICIES AND HOUSING AFFORDABILITY IN HUNGARY AFTER 
129
In the most acute cases related to aordability, utility arrears can lead to a
disconnection of service, enforcement and loss of housing. Disconnection
from the water supply is more limited due to legal reasons, more common for
gas and electricity, and rarely feasible for district heating for technical reasons.
With the spread of prepayment meters in the 2010s (13,000 gas consumers
and 135,000 electricity consumers had prepaid meters in 2020),253 statistics
on disconnection are less representative of how many households are cur-
rently living without a utility service due to aordability problems. Furthermore,
ocial data on disconnected customers sometimes also includes business
consumers.
Data on disconnected consumers have sporadically appeared in the annu-
al reports of the Hungarian Energy Oce (currently Hungarian Energy and
Public Utility Regulatory Authority, MEKH) and in various surveys. The number
of disconnected consumers was also covered by previous annual reports
on housing poverty, based on data provided by MEKH in response to public
data requests submitted by Habitat for Humanity Hungary. In 2003, 13% of
electricity consumers and 6.5% of gas consumers were disconnected, but
this share decreased to 5–6% for electricity and gas after the 2008 crisis,
mainly due to regulatory changes (the non-payment period before discon-
nection was extended and certain vulnerable consumer groups were more
protected than earlier).
254
The number of disconnected consumers increased
to 102,000 gas consumers and 37,000 electricity consumers in 2012.
255
In the
second half of the 2010s, the figures decreased steadily: at the end of 2020,
33,000 residential gas consumers (out of approximately 3.3 million), 8,500
electricity consumers (out of approximately 4.9 million), 3,700 district heating
consumers (out of approximately 0.7 million) and 43,000 water consumers
(out of approximately 4.2 million) were disconnected.256
253 The Hungarian Energy and Public Utility Regulatory Authority (MEKH)’s data release for Habitat for Hu-
manity Hungary’s 2021 data request.
254 Herpai, B. (2010). A lakossági díjhátralékok alakulása egy felmérés tükrében. Esély.
255 Herpai, B. (2010). A lakossági díjhátralékok alakulása egy felmérés tükrében. Esély.
256 The Hungarian Energy and Public Utility Regulatory Authority (MEKH)’s data, responding for Habitat for
Humanit y Hungary’s public data request in 2021.
5.6. Evictions
Problems with housing aordability may be indirectly reflected in the number
of evictions. If more and more households fall behind with rent and utility bills,
it is likely that more and more households will be subject to enforcement – a
fraction of whom will eventually lose their housing. Evictions due to squatting
also highlight general housing aordability problems, as those who are forced
into squatting are those who cannot otherwise find acceptable and aorda-
ble housing. Measuring evictions is methodologically dicult. Detailed data
on evictions from municipal housing is provided by the Hungarian Central
Statistical Oce (not covering evictions from private rental), while data on
evictions due to foreclosure has recently been published by the National Order
of Judicial Ocers of Hungary (MBVK) on its website. 257
The rise in homelessness after 1990 was partially due to the increasing number
of evictions. The number of evictions in the inner city of Budapest increased with
the launch of urban renewal programmes and housing privatisation in the 1990s.
In Budapest, evictions were mainly taking place due to unlawful occupation.258
Municipal debt management programmes in the first half of the 1990s were
seen by experts as having reduced the risk of evictions to some extent, but
without lasting results.259 The legal procedure of evictions was codified in the
early 1990s as well.260 Around the turn of the millennium, municipalities often
evicted families in order to displace the poor (especially poor Roma families).
Eviction methods became more brutal (e.g. the use of private security compa-
nies, municipalities making dwellings uninhabitable after the evictions); the legal
security of squatters steadily deteriorated and, from 2000, the privatisation of
municipal housing with its occupants (i.e. without relocating tenants into another
dwelling in municipal housing) was also made possible.261
The rise in evictions following the 2008 crisis showed an increase of aorda-
bility problems. The number of evictions from municipal housing rose to over
257 https://www.mbvk.hu/info.php
258 Balogh, K. (1999). Hol tart a budapesti önkormányzati lakások privatizációja? Területi Statisztika .
259 Kőnig, É. (2006). Adósságkezelés: sikerek és kudarcok, Esély.
260
Udvarhelyi, É . T. (2015). A hajléktalanság kezelése 1989 után: osztálypolitika és növekvő egyenlőtlenségek.
Ezredvég.
261 Ferge, Zs. (2001). A költségvetés szíve. Az ezredforduló vibráló szociálpolitikája. Beszélő.

HOUSING POLICIES AND HOUSING AFFORDABILITY IN HUNGARY AFTER 
130
1,000 per year in 2013, as the economic crisis reached many households – with
evictions almost exclusively due to arrears. During the crisis, at the request of
the government, most banks stopped evictions, just as tools were developed
to help households with non-performing forex housing loans. A moratorium
on evictions of debtors was also introduced at that time; this instrument was
repeatedly used by the Orbán government until the public policy tools of ‘res-
cuing’ forex housing loan borrowers were developed.262
There were significant dierences between eviction practices of municipalities
in the 2010s,263 varying by the party aliation of the mayor and the composi-
tion of the local council. In the late 2010s, several municipalities adopted local
ordinances which prohibited eviction from municipal housing without providing
adequate accommodation elsewhere. In the second half of the 2010s, the
number of evictions due to enforcement (not only from municipal properties)
was 3,000–3,500 per year, which was halved in 2020 because of the mora-
torium on enforcement announced at the start of Covid-19.264
Providing adequate housing for evicted people has been essentially unresolved since
1990.
265
The welfare system and the legal environment do not currently provide
comprehensive solutions to provide housing for households who were evicted
due to aordability problems or for other reasons. Housing movements have
repeatedly led the fight against evictions over the last three decades.266 The
single recurring (but by no means systemic) intervention has been the institu-
tionalisation of a moratorium on evictions during winter months. This practice
was also followed during the last two years of the Covid-19 pandemic.
262
For a more detailed history of events see the earlier section and also: Prugberger, T. (2011). A lakossági és
az előállítói ‘fogyasztással’ összefüggő jogügyletek társadalompolitikai és jogi problémái. Sectio Juridica
et Politica, Miskolc.
263 For a detailed analysis see Czirfusz, M., Pósfai, Zs. (2015). Kritikus ponton? Önkormányzati lakásgazdál-
kodás a gazdasági világválság után. Területi Statisztika.
264 See the data by the National Order of Judicial Ocers of Hungary on their website, currently the most
recent data set is for the first quarter of 2021.
265 Győri, P. (1990). Gyorsjelentés a hajléktalanságról, Magyarországon, 1990. In: Andorka , R., Kolosi, T.,
Vukovich, Gy. (ed.). Társadalmi Riport 1990. Budapest: TÁRKI.
266 See Bernadett Sebály’s chapter and Péter Győri’s essay on evictions.
6. Summary
In the early 1990s, housing policy experts warned that the political elite will
shift the housing regime towards the dominance of private homeownership.
The mass privatisation was not only due to pressures from the majority of the
society but also to a lack of progressive housing policy ideas among policy-
makers. Even during the more technocratic governments of the 1990s and
2000s, proposals from housing experts have failed to systematically influence
central governments’ housing policies. In the past three decades, housing has
been weightless or subordinated to other policies within government policy
almost throughout the entire period.
No government has had a comprehensive housing strategy since 1990 that would
have set out long-term goals of housing policy and would have provided a
framework for government action on housing. The proposals for a housing
strategy failed in government consultations due to weak political representa-
tion of the field. For most of the last three d ecades, there has been no pol itical will to
develop a housing strategy which would set out a long-term framework for political
action. Housing expert Péter Győri’s 1992 observation is still true today: when
parties and political decision-makers had no vision in the field of housing, in-
stead of starting with writing concepts, they rather concentrated their eorts
in writing legislation (without any broader considerations about the general
directions of housing policy whatsoever).
267
Legislation – whether the Housing
Act of 1993, constantly shifting and modified government decrees, as well as
municipal ordinances – served as a substitute for meaningful action. Although
legislation introduced housing policy instruments which were communicated
broadly by governments, these have hardly provided comprehensive solu-
tions to housing poverty in Hungary. The poor quality of legislation and policy
is illustrated by the fact that legislation on main housing policy instruments has
changed frequently over the years: the Decree of the Council of Ministers of
the Hungarian People’s Republic 106/1988 (XII.26.) outlining housing subsi-
dies was amended 18 times in 12 years. The subsequent framework legisla-
tion, Government Decree 12/2001. (I.31.) was amended 75 times in 20 years.
267 Győri, P. (1992). ‘Lakástörvény’ – koncepció nélkül. Beszélő.

HOUSING POLICIES AND HOUSING AFFORDABILITY IN HUNGARY AFTER 
131
Government Decrees 16/2016. (II.10.) and 17/2016. (II.10.) which launched the
family housing benefit and some other instruments have changed respectively
17 and 20 times over 5 and a half years. In other words, the basic legislation
of housing policy instruments has changed on average every three to four months,
making subsidies unpredictable and unmanageable for stakeholders.268
Housing policy has operated under the squeeze of momentary political inter-
ests over the last three decades. This has mostly meant that housing policy
has been subordinated to financial interests. Social considerations have not
been a dominant factor in shaping housing policy – which resulted in failures to
considerably reduce housing poverty in Hungary.
Apart from a brief period, housing policy has had no considerable representation
in government for the past three decades. A government commissioner was in
charge of the field for two years (but a cabinet reshue abolished the posi-
tion and no substantial change in housing policy was achieved); there was no
representation of housing at a state secretary level ever (i.e. a state secretary
whose only task would have been housing), and housing was allocated a sep-
arate unit of the responsible ministry only in less than a third of the period under
review. This fact is striking, because in the meantime, governments spent hundreds
of billions of HUF on housing every year (in nominal terms).
After 1990, the privatisation of the state-owned housing stock essentially re-
moved the housing regime from democratic control. Publicly-owned housing
stock is not controlled democratically either.
269
Public property was trans-
formed into private ownership by way of a ‘national gift’ (privatisation prices
268
This fact had already been reported by the State Audit Oce of Hungary in 2009: ÁSZ [State Audit Oce
of Hungary] (2009). Jelentés a lakástámogatási rendszer hatékonyságának ellenőrzéséről. Budapest:
Állami Számvevőszék. Since then, Orbán governments have only ‘succeeded’ in eliminating the State
Audit Oce’s responsibilities in terms of overviewing governmental action; they have failed to introduce
a stable legal environment regulating housing subsidies.
269
Democratic control of public housing would include giving decision-making rights to sitting tenants in
municipally owned companies managing the public housing sector, and stronger public control of these
companies than at present. Such a restructuring of municipal companies has recently been proposed in
Germany, primarily in Berlin: see e.g. taz (2021). Berlins landeseigene Wohnungsunternehmen: Aus 6 mach
1. taz.de; Bündnis ‘kommunal & selbst verwaltet Wohnen’ (2018). Kommunal & selbstverwaltet Wohnen.
Mieter*innen für die Demokratisierung der Wohnraumversorgung.
well below market prices), due to sitting tenants’ lack of capital.
270
Compared to
the loss of public wealth i ncurred through the privatisation of housing , programmes
of the past three decades expanding the public housing stock were minimal, in-
cluding the State Supported Rental Housing Programme in the early 2000s and
the operation of the National Asset Manager in the 2010s. Yet even these small-
budget programmes provided tens of thousands of aordable housing units.
(The housing stock of the National Asset Manager was reprivatised, and to a
small extent, handed over to charity organisations in the 2020s.)
At the same time, the homeownership-dominated housing regime led to a
path-dependence of housing policies, in which the system of housing subsidies
inherited from the state socialist period has been maintained to support home-
ownership. The most persistent housing policy instruments of the last fifty years
(with the largest budgets) have been non-refundable cash grants and interest-rate
subsidies for housing loans which were accessible for families to buy property.
After 1990, households’ general lack of capital meant that governments had
to develop new forms of credit-based solutions of homeownership, which led
to acute crises of household indebtedness because of global credit market
fluctuations. The lack of any coherent framework of housing subsidies is illustrated
by the fact that, over three decades, more than fifty dierent types of socially not
targeted subsidies of homeownership have existed.
A comprehensive solution to the aordability of utility costs has not been devised.
A system guaranteeing accessibility of these public services to all – includ-
ing securing the long-term renewal of material infrastructure and providing
a comprehensive and stable support system for those in need – is lacking.
Utility companies (water, sewage, electricity, gas, district heating) were largely
privatised in the 1990s, but were renationalised over the last decade. Com-
bined with the price cap on residential utility costs, re-nationalisation has led
to eliminating the profits of private utility companies and ensured the aorda-
bility of housing costs. However, democratic control of these state-owned
utility companies is non-existent, and the renewal of material infrastructure
(water, sewage, electricity, gas and district heating networks) is not secured
270
On the broader context of ownership change in Hungary see Böröcz, J. (1992). Dual dependency and the
property vacuum: Social change on the state socialist semiperiphery. Theory and Society.

HOUSING POLICIES AND HOUSING AFFORDABILITY IN HUNGARY AFTER 
132
by current utility prices: this inevitably leads to a deterioration of services in
the long term.271
Over the past three decades, governments have allocated more than ten thou-
sand billion HUF (at current prices) to socially not targeted housing subsidies,
while much less has been allocated to socially targeted support. It is thus little
wonder that housing aordability has not improved substantially over the
three decades.
In the absence of a housing strategy, it is not surprising that the only criterion
measuring housing policy instruments’ success is how much money the govern-
ment has spent on supporting citizens’ housing. The 2009 finding of the State
Audit Oce of Hungary on housing subsidies is still valid today: ‘the financing
approach prevailed, and the sole indicator measuring the performance of
the subsidies was the amount of budget expenditure’.
272
As of date, there is
no monitoring system, no overarching database on the expenditures, results and
eects of housing policy instruments. And even if there were any – the objectives
the government would remain unknown, making it impossible to benchmark the
policies’ successes. This is particularly worrying for two reasons. Firstly, our
analysis shows that the hou sing policy mix cyclically into major falls crises every ten
to fifteen years, when the expenditures cannot be covered by the government
due to the macroeconomic environment. None of the governments has paid
attention to preventing such crises, nor has any government committed itself
politically to abolish the homeownership-focused housing instrument mix or to
fundamentally rethink expenditures on housing. The current macroeconomic
environment of rising interest rates, – along with rising construction and build-
ing material prices – pinpoint to a looming crisis, with budget expenditures
skyrocketing. Secondly, since the current narrative measures the success of
housing policy depending on the amount of money spent on it, any compre-
hensive change to the current system (such as redistribution for those in need or the
reduction or phasing-out of subsidies favouring the middle classes) would inevitably
271
For an example of the serious lack of investment in the Hungarian water utilities sector, see KPMG (2015).
A magyar víziközmű ágazat bemutatása – átfogó tanulmány. For the newest debates, see: nepszava.hu
(2021). Forrásra szomjaznak a víziközműcégek.
272
ÁSZ [State Audit Oce of Hungary] (2009). Jelentés a lakástámogatási rendszer hatékonyságának
ellenőrzéséről. Budapest: Állami Számvevőszék. The quoted passage is on page 16.
be framed as austerity measures: this inevitably narrows the political acceptance
of progressive, socially just housing policies.
Overall, our comprehensive analysis of housing policy over three decades
clearly shows that fundamental changes are needed in terms of housing to reduce
housing poverty, aecting 2–3 million people. In the longer term, a progres-
sive, socially just ho using policy should work towards a substantial reducti on of the
homeownership rate. There is thus a need for an increase and renewal of the
publicly owned housing sector, a radical expansion of the non-profit rental
housing sector, and a reduction of public money going towards homeowner-
ship and buying property as investment. Various forms of non-profit housing
(such as housing associations, social rental agencies and cooperative forms
of rental housing) have been proposed by dierent expert groups in recent
decades. Yet, pilot projects of this kind have been sporadic.
The state has essentially withdrawn from substantively engaging with the housing
crisis. In eect, housing policy has been captured by lobby groups within the gov-
ernment linked to the construction industry, finance and family-issues. Housing that
is accessible, aordable to all, and less homeownership-dominated than at present
has disappeared from the horizon of the elite and the wider public as a fundamental
political goal.

HABITAT FOR HUMANITY HUNGARY 