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Culture without copying or selection
Abstract
Typical examples of cultural phenomena all exhibit a degree of similarity across time and space at the level of the population. As such, a fundamental question for any science of culture is, what ensures this stability in the first place? Here we focus on the evolutionary and stabilising role of ‘convergent transformation’, in which one item causes the production of another item whose form tends to deviate from the original in a directed, non-random way. We present a series of stochastic models of cultural evolution investigating its effects. The results show that cultural stability can emerge and be maintained by virtue of convergent transformation alone, in the absence of any form of copying or selection process. We show how high-fidelity copying and convergent transformation need not be opposing forces, and can jointly contribute to cultural stability. We finally analyse how non-random transformation and high-fidelity copying can have different evolutionary signatures at population level, and hence how their distinct effects can be distinguished in empirical records. Collectively, these results supplement existing approaches to cultural evolution based on the Darwinian analogy, while also providing formal support for other frameworks – such as Cultural Attraction Theory – that entail its further loosening.
Social media summary
Culture can be produced and maintained by convergent transformation, without copying or selection involved.
... Copying is not all there is to cultural transmission, and the realm of culture is not neatly bounded by the presence or absence of one specific faculty for form copying. I applaud Sterelny and Hiscock for taking on board and defending so vigorously the arguments of Sperber and his colleagues regarding copying and its role in cultural transmission (Acerbi et al. 2021;Claidière, Scott-Phillips, and Sperber 2014;Miton 2022;Morin 2016a;Sperber 1996), which I will refer to as cultural attraction theory (CAT). How has Tennie responded to these arguments in the past? ...
... One-time highfidelity copying between two individuals is not sufficient for stable traditions to emerge (e.g., Enquist et al. 2010). Copying is not even necessary for stable transmission: if you are exposed to a cultural practice from a multiplicity of sources within a group, each of which influences your behavior in subtle and variable ways, none of which amount to copying, this can result in a close similarity between you and the members of the group (Acerbi et al. 2021;Morin 2016a). Thus, cultural transmission can be faithful at the macrolevel without being faithful at the microlevel. ...
Sterelny and Hiscock (S&H) argue against the centrality of high-fidelity copying in cumulative culture. I address one key strand of their case, the decoupling of expertise from precise imitation. This advances understanding of hominin skill acquisition, and underlines a puzzle about domain-specificity.
... Still, the selection and attraction approaches make distinct and testable predictions regarding interindividual processes of transmission and population-level processes of diffusion (Acerbi et al., 2021;Claidière & Sperber, 2007). It is therefore possible to distinguish the relative role of selection and attraction in the evolution of a variety of specific cultural phenomena. ...
... Research into watermelon cultivation has shown that different methods and techniques can lead to increased production and adaptation to changing market demands [34]. Convergent transformation, where one item causes the production of another item with directed deviations from the original, can contribute to cultural stability without copying or selection processes [35]. Like firms and markets, culture is an institution that evolves and changes in response to external shocks [36]. ...
This article delves into the intricate and multifaceted relationship between culture, discourse communities, and their profound entanglement within the rich tapestry of social and historical contexts. At its core, culture is not a monolithic entity but a dynamic amalgamation of myriad components, practices, and ideologies. These elements are not static but continually evolving, shaped by the interactions and exchanges within discourse communities. Discourse communities are fertile ground for nurturing, contesting, and disseminating cultural elements. Within these communities, language, beliefs, values, and norms are not merely transmitted but actively negotiated and transformed. This ongoing process contributes to the resilience and adaptability of culture, enabling it to respond to the ever-changing social and historical landscape. Central to our analysis is recognising culture as both "socially situated" and "historically situated”. The former underscores the embeddedness of discourse communities within broader socio-cultural contexts, highlighting their interconnectedness with power dynamics, social hierarchies, and institutional structures. The latter emphasises the dynamic nature of culture, acknowledging its responsiveness to historical events, cultural exchanges, and shifts in collective consciousness. Through this scholarly exploration, we seek to offer a comprehensive understanding of how culture evolves within the intricate web of discourse communities, reflecting and shaping the world around them. By unpacking the complex interplay between culture, discourse, and their socio-historical contexts, we aim to illuminate the profound implications of these dynamics on individuals, communities, and societies at large.
... Further, consideration of how biases may operate differently within the distinct phases could help identify whether cultural change is being driven by cultural selection or biased (or convergent) transformation dynamics (see Acerbi, Charbonneau, Miton, & Scott-Phillips, 2021;Mesoudi, 2021). As recall can be a reconstructive process, biases in the encode-and-retrieve phase may produce biased transformation in cultural transmission, as seen in the negative transformation of ambiguous events in a transmission chain (Bebbington et al., 2017). ...
Cultural evolution theory proposes that information transmitted through social learning is not transmitted indiscriminately but is instead biased by heuristics and mechanisms which increase the likelihood that individuals will copy particular cultural traits based on their inherent properties (content biases) and copy the cultural traits of particular models, or under particular circumstances (context biases). Recent research suggests that content biases are as important, or more important, than context biases in the selection and faithful transmission of cultural traits. Here, evidence for biases for emotive, social, threat-related, stereotype consistent and counterintuitive content is reviewed, focusing on how these biases may operate across three phases of transmission: choose-to-receive, encode-and-retrieve, and choose-to-transmit. Support for some biases primarily functioning as biases of attention and memory, while others primarily function as biases of selection to share with others, and the implications for this in wider cultural evolution is discussed. Ultimately, a more consistent approach to examining content biases, and greater engagement with wider literature, is required for clear conclusions about their mechanism and potential differences across the three phases of transmission.
... Interestingly, our view predicts that the loss of technical knowledge along cultural transmission chains is not irreversible because participants with higher technical reasoning abilities and/or more elaborate causal understanding can reconstruct the technical knowledge that has been lost [86]. In other words, the phenomenon of high-fidelity transmission does not necessarily need to have a strict correspondence at the individual level but could be supported by a reconstruction process [6,[100][101][102] implemented through technical reasoning. New population-based experiments, computational modeling, and empirical research are needed to provide support for these cultural dynamics. ...
The dominant view of cumulative technological culture suggests that high-fidelity transmission rests upon a high-fidelity copying ability, which allows individuals to reproduce the tool-use actions performed by others without needing to understand them (i.e., without causal reasoning). The opposition between copying versus reasoning is well accepted but with little supporting evidence. In this article, we investigate this distinction by examining the cognitive science literature on tool use. Evidence indicates that the ability to reproduce others’ tool-use actions requires causal understanding, which questions the copying versus reasoning distinction and the cognitive reality of the so-called copying ability. We conclude that new insights might be gained by considering causal understanding as a key driver of cumulative technological culture.
... Such convergent transformation would include the guided variation (trial and error learning) of Boyd and Richerson 3 but is a more inclusive concept that need not involve psychological factors affecting individual learning nor lead to goal-directed enhancement. 54 CAT explicitly includes ecological (physical and social context) as well as psychological factors of attraction and theorizes culture change and stability as products of complex causal chains rather than biased information transmission. 53 As such it would seem to be well suited to accommodate evolutionary archaeology interest in topics such as the way that specific artifact production techniques, perceptual-motor constraints, social contexts, and ecological interactions can affect cultural evolution. ...
The cultural reproduction of lithic technology, long an implicit assumption of archaeological theories, has garnered increasing attention over the past decades. Major debates ranging from the origins of the human culture capacity to the interpretation of spatiotemporal patterning now make explicit reference to social learning mechanisms and cultural evolutionary dynamics. This burgeoning literature has produced important insights and methodological innovations. However, this rapid growth has sometimes led to confusion and controversy due to an under-examination of underlying theoretical and methodological assumptions. The time is thus ripe for a critical assessment of progress in the study of the cultural reproduction of lithic technology. Here we review recent work addressing the evolutionary origins of human culture and the meaning of artifact variation at both intrasite and intersite levels. We propose that further progress will require a more extended and context-specific evolutionary approach to address the complexity of real-world cultural reproduction.
The study of cultural evolution using ideas from population biology began about 50 y ago, with the work of L.L. Cavalli-Sforza, Marcus Feldman, and ourselves. It has grown from this small beginning into a vital field with many publications and its own scientific society. In this essay, we give our perspective on the origins of the field and current unanswered questions.
Although anthropology was the first academic discipline to investigate cultural change, many other disciplines have made noteworthy contributions to understanding what influences the adoption of new behaviors. Drawing on a broad, interdisciplinary literature covering both humans and nonhumans, we examine (a) which features of behavioral traits make them more transmissible, (b) which individual characteristics of inventors promote copying of their inventions, (c) which characteristics of individuals make them more prone to adopting new behaviors, (d) which characteristics of dyadic relationships promote cultural transmission, (e) which properties of groups (e.g., network structures) promote transmission of traits, and (f) which characteristics of groups promote retention, rather than extinction, of cultural traits. One of anthropology's strengths is its readiness to adopt and improve theories and methods from other disciplines, integrating them into a more holistic approach; hence, we identify approaches that might be particularly useful to biological and cultural anthropologists, and knowledge gaps that should be filled.
The ability to transmit information between individuals through social learning is a foundational component of cultural evolution. However, how this transmission occurs is still debated. On the one hand, the copying account draws parallels with biological mechanisms for genetic inheritance, arguing that learners copy what they observe and novel variations occur through random copying errors. On the other hand, the reconstruction account claims that, rather than directly copying behaviour, learners reconstruct the information that they believe to be most relevant on the basis of pragmatic inference, environmental and contextual cues. Distinguishing these two accounts empirically is difficult based on data from typical transmission chain studies because the predictions they generate frequently overlap. In this study we present a methodological approach that generates different predictions of these accounts by manipulating the task context between model and learner in a transmission episode. We then report an empirical proof-of-concept that applies this approach. The results show that, when a model introduces context-dependent embedded signals to their actions that are not intended to be transmitted, it is possible to empirically distinguish between competing predictions made by these two accounts. Our approach can therefore serve to understand the underlying cognitive mechanisms at play in cultural transmission and can make important contributions to the debate between preservative and reconstructive schools of thought.
Here, I discuss two broad versions of human cultural evolution which currently exist in the literature and which emphasize different underlying dynamics. One, which originates in population-genetic-style modelling, emphasizes how cultural selection causes some cultural variants to be favoured and gradually increase in frequency over others. The other, which draws more from cognitive science, holds that cultural change is driven by the biased transformation of cultural variants by individuals in non-random and consistent directions. Despite claims that cultural evolution is characterized by one or the other of these dynamics, these are neither mutually exclusive nor a dichotomy. Different domains of human culture are likely to be more or less strongly weighted towards cultural selection or biased transformation. Identifying cultural dynamics in real-world cultural data is challenging given that they can generate the same population-level patterns, such as directional change or cross-cultural stability, and the same cognitive and emotional mechanisms may underlie both cultural selection and biased transformation. Nevertheless, fine-grained historical analysis and laboratory experiments, combined with formal models to generate quantitative predictions, offer the best way of distinguishing them.
This article is part of the theme issue ‘Foundations of cultural evolution’.
High-fidelity cultural transmission, rather than brute intelligence, is the secret of our species’ success, or so many cultural evolutionists claim. It has been selected because it ensures the spread, stability and longevity of beneficial cultural traditions, and it supports cumulative cultural change. To play these roles, however, fidelity must be a causally-efficient property of cultural transmission. This is where the grain problem comes in and challenges the explanatory potency of fidelity. Assessing the degree of fidelity of any episode or mechanism of cultural transmission always depends upon an investigator’s choice of grain of analysis at which cultural traditions are being studied. The fidelity of cultural transmission then appears to be relative to the granularity at which one approaches cultural variation, and since there is a multiplicity of grains of description by which the same tradition can be studied, there results a multiplicity of measures of fidelity for a same event or mechanism of cultural transmission. If this is correct, because fidelity is always relative to the grain of analysis dictated by the local and specific research interests of the investigator, then there seems to be no fact of the matter as to whether cultural transmission is faithful or not, independently from a researcher’s framework of analysis. The aims of this paper are to offer a conceptual clarification of the grain problem in cultural evolution, to assess its causes, to unpack its epistemological implications, and to examine its reach and consequences for a science of cultural evolution.
Conformist transmission is a cognitively simple decision-making process by which observers are disproportionately likely to follow the majority. It has been studied in multiple species because theory suggests it can create stable cultural variation. However, the current theory assumes that while conformist transmission favours the majority, it is otherwise unbiased and does not systematically transform information, even though such biases are widely documented. Here, we relax this assumption, requiring conformist observers to infer the size of the majority from finite observations of their group mates. Because such inference can be subject to bias, it can lead to the biased transformation of transmitted information. We find that when individuals are biased (even weakly) the capacity of conformist transmission to sustain traditions is reduced and, in many cases, removed entirely. This suggests that the emphasis on conformist transmission as a source of stable cultural variation may be misplaced.
While widely acknowledged in the cultural evolution literature, ecological factors—aspects of the physical environment that affect the way in which cultural productions evolve—have not been investigated experimentally. Here, we present an experimental investigation of this type of factor by using a transmission chain (iterated learning) experiment. We predicted that differences in the distance between identical tools (drums) and in the order in which they are to be used would cause the evolution of different rhythms. The evidence confirms our predictions and thus provides a proof of concept that ecological factors—here a motor constraint—can influence cultural productions and that their effects can be experimentally isolated and measured. One noteworthy finding is that ecological factors can on their own lead to more complex rhythms.
The zone of latent solutions (ZLS) hypothesis provides an alternative approach to explaining cultural patterns in primates and many other animals. According to the ZLS hypothesis, non-human great ape (henceforth: ape) cultures consist largely or solely of latent solutions. The current competing (and predominant) hypothesis for ape culture argues instead that at least some of their behavioural or artefact forms are copied through specific social learning mechanisms (“copying social learning hypothesis”) and that their forms may depend on copying (copying-dependent forms). In contrast, the ape ZLS hypothesis does not require these forms to be copied. Instead, it suggests that several (non-form-copying) social learning mechanisms help determine the frequency (but typically not the form) of these behaviours and artefacts within connected individuals. The ZLS hypothesis thus suggests that increases and stabilisations of a particular behaviour’s or artefact’s frequency can derive from socially-mediated (cued) form reinnovations. Therefore, and while genes and ecology play important roles as well, according to the ape ZLS hypothesis, apes typically acquire the forms of their behaviours and artefacts individually, but are usually socially induced to do so (provided sufficient opportunity, necessity, motivation and timing). The ZLS approach is often criticized—perhaps also because it challenges the current null hypothesis, which instead assumes a requirement of form-copying social learning mechanisms to explain many ape behavioural (and/or artefact) forms. However, as the ZLS hypothesis is a new approach, with less accumulated literature compared to the current null hypothesis, some confusion is to be expected. Here, we clarify the ZLS approach—also in relation to other competing hypotheses—and address misconceptions and objections. We believe that these clarifications will provide researchers with a coherent theoretical approach and an experimental methodology to examine the necessity of form-copying variants of social learning in apes, humans and other species.
For decades, parts of the literature on human culture have been gripped by an analogy: culture changes in a way that is substantially isomorphic to genetic evolution. This leads to a number of sub-claims: that design-like properties in cultural traditions should be explained in a parallel way to the design-like features of organisms, namely with reference to selection; that culture is a system of inheritance; and that cultural evolutionary processes can produce adaptation in the genetic sense. The Price equation provides a minimal description of any evolutionary system, and a method for identifying the action of selection. As such, it helps clarify some of these claims about culture conceptually. Looking closely through the lens of the Price equation, the differences between genes and culture come into sharp relief. Culture is only a system of inheritance metaphorically, or as an idealization, and the idealization may lead us to overlook causally important features of how cultural influence works. Design-like properties in cultural systems may owe more to transmission biases than to cultural selection. Where culture enhances genetic fitness, it is ambiguous whether what is doing the work is cultural transmission, or just the genetically evolved properties of the mind. I conclude that there are costs to trying to press culture into a template based on Darwinian evolution, even if one broadens the definition of ‘Darwinian’.
This article is part of the theme issue ‘Fifty years of the Price equation’.
These linguistics articles were commissioned by an editorial board as part of our former online-only review article series. We are offering them here as a freely available collection.