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Utility, Progress, and Technology
Proceedings of the 15th Conference of the
International Society for Utilitarian Studies
edited by
Michael Schefczyk & Christoph Schmidt-Petri
Print on Demand 2021 – Gedruckt auf FSC-zertifiziertem Papier
ISBN 978-3-7315-1108-3
DOI 10.5445/KSP/1000134479
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v
Contents
PREFACE .................................................................................................................................. i
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS ......................................................................................................... iii
Dieter Birnbacher
UTILITARIANISM AND RESPONSIBILITY FOR THE FUTURE ..................................................... 1
Thomas L. Carson
WAS ABRAHAM LINCOLN A UTILITARIAN? .......................................................................... 21
Gustavo H. Dalaqua
LIBERTY AS RESISTANCE AGAINST OPPRESSION AND EPISTEMIC
INJUSTICE IN J. S. MILL ......................................................................................................... 31
Stephen Engelmann
PROTAGORAS, POLITICAL ECONOMY, AND THE ART OF POLITICS:
J.S. MILL IN THE 1830S ......................................................................................................... 39
Don A. Habibi
J.S. MILL ON REBELLION, REVOLUTION AND REFORM ......................................................... 49
Martin Hähnel
THE PLACE OF GOOD, GOODNESS AND GOODS WITHIN
CONSEQUENTIALIST FRAMEWORKS .................................................................................... 59
Jonas Harney
ON PARFIT’S WIDE DUAL PERSON-AFFECTING PRINCIPLE ................................................... 69
Moritz Hildt
GIVING HEDONISM A SECOND (AND PROPER) CHANCE ...................................................... 79
Stefan Hofmann
BRANDT’S RULE UTILITARIANISM AND THE FUTURE. REPLIES TO
THE DEMANDINGNESS OBJECTION ...................................................................................... 91
Michihiro Kaino
BENTHAM’S THEORIES OF THE RULE OF LAW AND
THE UNIVERSAL INTEREST .................................................................................................. 103
Contents
vi
Emily Lanman
UTILITARIANISM AND THE ENGLISH POOR LAW REFORM ................................................. 111
Cheng Li
SAMUEL ROMILLY AND JEREMY BENTHAM’S DECISIONS OF PUBLICATION ...................... 123
Fayna Fuentes López
KILLING ANIMALS: THE BADNESS OF DEATH, VALUE AND REPLACEABILITY ...................... 131
Christoph Lumer
FROM UTILITARIANISM TO PRIORITARIANISM .................................................................. 139
Christoph Lumer
HOW TO DEFINE ‘PRIORITARIANISM’ AND DISTINGUISH IT
FROM (MODERATE) EGALITARIANISM ............................................................................... 153
Susanne Mantel
THE REASONS OF OBJECTIVE CONSEQUENTIALISM AND COLLECTIVE
ACTION PROBLEMS ............................................................................................................ 167
Vincent Emmanuel Mathon
A SHELL GAME THEORY – RECONNECT MANKIND WITH NATURE
TO CREATE WEALTH ........................................................................................................... 175
Ricardo Miguel
AGAINST ANIMAL REPLACEABILITY: A RESTRICTION ON CONSEQUENCES ........................ 183
Tim Mulgan
WHAT EXACTLY IS WRONG WITH HUMAN EXTINCTION? .................................................. 193
Ryu Okazaki
HEGELS BEGRIFF DER NÜTZLICHKEIT: ZUM ZUSAMMENHANG VON
RELIGIONSKRITIK UND TERROR .......................................................................................... 205
Filimon Peonidis
JAMES MILL ON OFFENCES COMMITTED BY THE PRESS .................................................... 213
Ingmar Persson
PARFIT’S REORIENTATION BETWEEN REASONS AND PERSONS
AND ON WHAT MATTERS ................................................................................................... 223
Ingmar Persson
PRIORITARIANISM AND THE MORAL NEGATIVITY BIAS ..................................................... 231
Contents
vii
Giuseppe Rocché
ABOUT THE BADNESS OF EXISTENCE AND THE PROSPECT OF EXTINCTION ...................... 239
Michael W. Schmidt
SIDGWICK, REFLECTIVE EQUILIBRIUM AND THE TRIVIALITY CHARGE ............................... 247
Shingo Segawa
IST DER PERSONENBEGRIFF WIRKLICH ÜBERFLÜSSIG
FÜR DIE BIOMEDIZINISCHE ETHIK? .................................................................................... 259
Adam Shriver
IS HEDONISM A VERSION OF AXIOLOGICAL MONISM? ..................................................... 269
Koji Tachibana
NEUROFEEDBACK-BASED MORAL ENHANCEMENT AND MORAL REASON ........................ 283
Piero Tarantino
CREATING AN OBLIGATION: BENTHAM AND THE NORMATIVE QUESTION ....................... 293
Hiroki Ueno
DOES ADAM SMITH’S MORAL THEORY TRULY DIVERGE
FROM HUMEAN UTILITARIANISM? .................................................................................... 305
Satoshi Yamazaki
PIGOU’S THEORY ON WELFARE ECONOMICS IN THE NARROW AND BROADER
SENSES: BASED UPON THE INDIRECT UTILITARIAN STRATEGY .......................................... 315
Alexandra Zinke
TWO WAYS TO SATISFY (AND NO WAY TO SATISFY UTILITARIANS) .................................. 325
Panel Discussion
HARE’S UTILITARIANISM, VARNER’S ANIMALS .................................................................. 335
Gary Varner
OVERVIEW OF THE BOOK ................................................................................................... 336
Alastair Norcross
ON THE MORAL SIGNIFICANCE OF PERSONS, NEAR-PERSONS,
AND THE MERELY SENTIENT .............................................................................................. 339
Adam Shriver
COMMENTARY ON VARNER’S PERSONHOOD, ETHICS, AND ANIMAL COGNITION ............ 343
Contents
viii
Susana Monsó
TREATING ANIMALS AS THE SORT OF THING THEY ARE: COMMENTARY ON
GARY VARNER’S PERSONHOOD, ETHICS, AND ANIMAL COGNITION ................................. 347
Gary Comstock
VARNER ON ANIMALS: ROOM FOR FAR-PERSONS? ........................................................... 353
Gary Varner
REPLIES TO NORCROSS, SHRIVER, MONSÓ, AND COMSTOCK ........................................... 359
139
From Utilitarianism to Prioritarianism
An Empathy-Based Internalist Foundation of Welfare
Ethics
Christoph Lumer, University of Siena, Italy
Abstract
The article develops an internalist justification of welfare ethics based on empathy. It takes up Hume’s and Scho-
penhauer’s internalistic (but not consistently developed) justification approach via empathy, but tries to solve
three of their problems: 1. the varying strength of empathy depending on the proximity to the object of empathy,
2. the unclear metaethical foundation, 3. the absence of a quantitative model of empathy strength.
1. As a solution to the first problem, the article proposes to limit the foundation of welfare ethics to certain types
of empathy. 2. In response to the second problem, an internalistic metaethical conception of the justification of
moral principles is outlined, the result of which is: The moral value of the well-being of persons is identical to the
expected extent of (positive and negative) empathy arising from this well-being. 3. The contribution to the solution
of the third problem and focus of the article is an empirical model of the (subject’s) expected extent of empathy
depending on (an object’s) well-being. According to this model, the extent of empathy is not proportional to the
expected empathy, but follows a concave function and is therefore prioritarian. Accordingly, the article provides a
sketch of an internalist justification of prioritarianism.
I The Search for a Justification of Utilitarianism and
a New Proposal - With a Prioritarian Outcome
The justification of utilitarianism is not exactly a success story. Mill’s justifications (1998, ch.
4, par. 3-9), for example, are paradigmatic fallacies. Several justifications, in an intuitionistic,
question-begging way, already presuppose certain moral principles – Hare (disguised by se-
manticism) (1981, sects. 1.3; 1.6) and Singer (1993, 11-12; 2011, 91-93; 100-102; 113-14)
presuppose a certain form of universalization, Harsanyi (1953) presupposes ignorance of
one’s own identity (thereby operationalizing impartiality like Rawls) or the Pareto Principle
plus the application of Bayesian Rationality to moral decisions (Harsanyi 1955). Still others
build on – questionable – rationality-theoretical premises – in particular the equalization of
one’s own future time slices and the time slices of other persons (Sidgwick 1982, 381-82;
418-19; Parfit 1992, 281-82; 342; 346; Broome 1991, 231-37; 239-40). Most utilitarians do
not even give a reason and only rely on their intuitive acceptance of utilitarianism (e.g.
From Utilitarianism to Prioritarianism
140
Smart 1973, 3-8). But the research on the rational foundations of utilitarianism also contains
unexploited potential, e.g. Hume’s reflections.
This article develops a justification of a welfarist moral value function based on empathy,
or, in Hume’s (1978, 317-19) terminology, on sympathy. Here I will use the terms "empa-
thy", "sympathy" and "compassion" interchangeably and with them mean: an emotion
evoked by considering some person’s or sentient being’s well-being, that leads to the com-
passionate emotion, which may be negative or positive, according to the object’s assumed
negative or positive well-being. My justification takes up Hume’s (1978, sects. III.2.2; 3.1-3)
and Schopenhauer’s (1977, §§15-6) internalistic (but not consistently developed and em-
pirically flawed) approaches, but tries to solve three of their problems. The first problem,
seen by Hume himself (but not satisfactorily solved), is: Morality formally requires univer-
sality and impartiality, while empathy varies with the temporal, spatial, social and personal
distance from the object of empathy (1978, 580-82; 603). The second problem is the unclear
metaethical basis of Hume’s and Schopenhauer’s approaches. The third problem, seen by
neither of them, is that empathy is not proportional to the well-being of the empathy ob-
ject:
1
An empirical study I conducted shows that compassion with negative well-being is
more intensive than happiness about others’ positive well-being.
My proposal for solving the first problem is that, in order to achieve universality and impar-
tiality, which are necessary for the purpose of morality, the moral justification should be
based only on certain universalistic forms of empathy: empathy that arises when consider-
ing the effects of one’s own actions on the well-being of others (and not, for example, the
empathy that arises from direct contact with others) (Lumer 1999). Unfortunately, this is
only a very weak component of our total empathy but the only one which is subject-univer-
salistic, i.e. leads to interpersonally identical valuations of the same objects (though there
will rarely be valuations of the same object by different persons). The problem of the emo-
tion’s and therefore also the appertaining motivation’s weaknesses may be resolved by tak-
ing the empathic emotion only as the signal which informs us about its object’s moral value.
This signal then has to be amplified by other motives which follow its lead. The most im-
portant such amplifiers are socially valid norms (Schopenhauer also suggested this (1977,
257-58)) and our feeling of moral self-worth. In the following I will not deal any further with
this problem but will focus on the first and third problems.
1
Hume, instead, seems to presuppose some proportionality between the pleasure of the persons affected and the
spectators’ sentiments: sympathy for the affected, love and hate for those changing their fate (1978, 591).
The Search for a Justification of Utilitarianism and a New Proposal - With a Prioritarian Outcome
141
The proposal for the solution of the third problem is to study empirically how the degree of
other persons’ well-being influences our empathy.
2
More precisely: In the following an em-
pirical model is developed, that calculates which extent of empathy (i.e. the integral of pos-
itive and negative empathy over time) occurs depending on the average well-being of an
object of empathy. The expected extent of empathy is then the hedonistic and internalist
moral reason for empathy-optimizing actions; and this empathy is also the basis and source
of the internalist morality: The proposal equates the expected extent of empathy – which
is identical to its expected hedonic desirability for the empathetic subject – with the moral
value of the object’s underlying well-being. The most important outcome of the model be-
low is: Because of the greater intensity of negative empathy, the resulting moral value func-
tion is not utilitarian (linear function from well-being to moral desirability) – as a Humean
may have guessed –, but prioritarian (concave function from well-being to moral desirabil-
ity). This means the model provides a justification
3
and quantitative specification of priori-
tarianism.
In the following I will first (II) briefly explain the metaethical basis of the justification devel-
oped here and thereby outline my solution of the second, metaethical problem; this is only
for understanding the approach, a further justification of this basis is not possible here. (III)
Subsequently, I will present the empirical model of expected empathy in order to (IV) draw
normative-ethical consequences.
2
I have developed the model set out below in my professorial dissertation from 1992, which, however, was
published only in 2000, 2nd edition 2009 (Lumer 2009). This paper is the first English presentation of the model.
3
If prioritarianism is justified at all, exceptions aside, it is justified only intuitionistically, in particular as a middle
way between utilitarianism, which is economic but does not intrinsically care about distributive justice, and
maximin or leximin, which cares about distributive justice by giving priority to those who are worst off but in an
extremist way. An exception is Hurley’s (1989, 360-82) idea to introduce a risk-averse, concave weighting of
prospects into a Rawlsian/Harsanyian framework of rational decision under uncertainty about one’s identity. The
result would be a concave, today we would say: prioritarian, moral value function. But Hurley did not elaborate
this idea nor bring it together with the critique of utilitarianism and Rawls’ difference principle; she envisioned her
idea as something egalitarian – prioritarianism at that time was not yet a theoretical movement.
From Utilitarianism to Prioritarianism
142
II Metaethical Foundations of the Justification of
Morals
4
What is a valid justification of morals at all? Justifications of morals, firstly, contain an epis-
temically rational component: By justifying these morals, one gains insights which distin-
guish them as something special. Secondly, valid justifications of morality contain a practical
component: they are to have the consequence that the addressee of the justification adopts
the justified morality as his own and, if possible, also acts on this basis.
The simplest and clearest way to bring the epistemic and the practical requirements to-
gether is to design moral justifications as arguments for a thesis about the object of justifi-
cation, i.e. about the moral principle, etc. However, this cannot be any thesis; but the justi-
fication for this thesis must meet certain conditions. A thesis which fulfils these conditions
is the justification thesis for moral principles. In this way, the epistemic requirement can be
met by the fact that the justification still consists in an argumentatively valid and adequate
argument which leads to a justified belief; and the practical and moral requirements can be
met by selecting a particular thesis about the object to be justified, i.e. the justification the-
sis that this object has a certain justificatory quality F. I have developed several adequacy
conditions for selecting this property F:
Adequacy Condition 1 (AC1): Motivation or practical requirement: Moral justification theses
about moral principles are motivating in the sense that if a prudent addressee (i.e.: an ep-
istemically and practically rational addressee with certain relevant information) is justifiedly
convinced of the justification thesis (i.e. that the moral principle in question is F), he is mo-
tivated, at least to some extent, to adopt and observe the moral principle.
The motivation requirement is the specifically practical component of the conception for
justifying moral principles. It makes the justification internalistic.
Adequacy Condition 2 (AC2): The motivating effect’s stability with respect to new infor-
mation: The motivating effect of a justified conviction of a justification thesis is stable with
respect to new information, i.e. it is not lost as a consequence of acquiring additional true
information.
Stability with respect to new information is the rational component of the concept of justi-
fying moral principles. The only thing we can rationalize (in the sense of making it rational)
4
Unfortunately, for reasons of space, this section is rather apodictic. A detailed explanation and justification of the
presented metaethical approach can be found in: Lumer 2009, 30-127; 577-632; 2015.
Metaethical Foundations of the Justification of Morals
143
directly are beliefs, indirectly also actions and other things. And the two main directions of
that rationalization are: first, to make our beliefs true, i.e. to acquire possibly only true be-
liefs (or to correct false beliefs) by observing epistemological rules and, second, to increase
the number of true beliefs. The requirement of the motivation’s stability with respect to
new information introduces the practically relevant maximum of epistemic rationality into
the conception of practical justification.
Adequacy condition 3 (AC3): Moral instrumentality: Principles for which the justification the-
sis is true fulfill the function of moral principles, they meet the instrumental requirements
for such principles and for morals in general.
Moral instrumentality is the specifically moral component of the conception of justification.
If the “justified” moral principles do not fulfill the function of morality we are no longer
dealing with a justification of a morality.
What is the function of morality? One can facilitate answering this question by distinguish-
ing the structural components of morality. Normative morality consists mainly of a moral
desirability function and moral norms, institutions and virtues. Once the moral desirability
function has been established, it can be used to justify the other components of morality as
more or less good means for realizing moral values. So, proceeding in this way, only the
practical function of the moral value order has to be determined.
One can distinguish an individual and a socially binding morality, where the latter is de-
signed to regulate social relations in an intersubjectively binding way. Here I will mainly deal
with the second type. The sense of a socially binding moral desirability function could be
prudential-consensualistic:
1. Consensualistic requirement: Socially binding moral evaluation criteria constitute a com-
mon moral value system that provides the intersubjectively shared standard (i) for assessing
socially relevant measures, (ii) for planning social projects and (iii) for consensual arbitration
of interpersonal conflicts of interest. In addition, for individuals the purpose or sense of
such an intersubjectively shared value system could be to procure a benchmark for self-
transcendent ego ideals and actions. I call this quality of the desired moral value functions
“subject universalism”, i.e. the value of all value objects (or more precisely the value relation
of every two value objects p and q (= U(p)/U(q)) of this value function is roughly identical
for all (or nearly all – except e.g. for psychopaths) moral subjects of the moral community.
2. Prudential requirement: The prudential requirement is that the subjective value functions
to be compared according to subject universalism be parts or components of the subjects’
prudential desirability functions. Prudential desirability functions express what is good for
From Utilitarianism to Prioritarianism
144
the respective subject and hence, rationally or from a prudential point of view, should be
the guideline of the subject’s decision. Prudential desirability functions are constructed sim-
ilarly to the utility functions of rational decision theory but with much stricter, philosophi-
cally developed standards, which also permit the criticism and correction of the subject’s
present instrumental or even intrinsic preferences (cf. e.g. Brandt 1979, part I; Lumer 2009,
241-428; 521-48). Prudential desirability functions are intersubjectively different – that I
have a headache is mainly bad for me and neutral for you, and the reverse holds for your
headache –; otherwise they could not express the personal good. Therefore, the subject-
universalistic requirement is not intended to refer to complete prudential desirability func-
tions but only to components thereof, i.e. parts of the total value which derives from par-
ticular types of consequences of the value object.
This concludes the metaethical considerations regarding the justification of morals; now the
exposed conception has to be applied. The next step is empirical, viz. to enquire empirically,
with the help of empirical decision theory and moral psychology, which component V of the
prudential desirability function U is subject-universal and hence can be adopted as the
moral desirability function. The result of a respective scrutiny is that interpersonally (nearly)
identical components of our prudential desirability functions arise from our expected com-
passion and our expected feelings of respect. Of these two subject-universal feelings and
motives, however, compassion is much better suited as the basis of the moral desirability
function. For unlike compassion, one can hardly specifically optimize one’s feelings of re-
spect; respect is rather passive, it evokes motives for defending the respected object, but
not motives for creating or improving respected objects. Therefore, in the following I will
develop a model of a prudential desirability function based on empathy, or more precisely:
a model of expected empathy depending on the well-being of other people. This expected
empathy, in turn, corresponds to its hedonic desirability for the empathic subject. Ulti-
mately, desirability procured through empathy is the sought-after subject-universal compo-
nent of the prudential desirability function, which defines moral desirability. In short: The
extent of expected empathy (according to the empirical model) is equated with moral de-
sirability.
III An Empirical Model of the Expected Extent of
Empathy
So the present task is to develop a – simplified – quantitative model of how the well-being
of other persons whom we neither particularly like nor dislike is reflected in our expected
An Empirical Model of the Expected Extent of Empathy
145
sympathy, i.e. the expected amount of our feelings of positive and negative sympathy. In
short the model informs about the (expected) extent of our sympathy depending on other
persons’ well-being. The model’s most important simplifying assumptions are these: 1. The
object of our sympathy is the assumed well-being of the person(s) for whom we feel sym-
pathy. 2. Errors in our assumptions about other persons’ well-being statistically offset each
other. 3. The model deals with universal sympathy only, i.e. a kind of sympathy we feel for
strangers whom we neither like nor dislike in a particular way and whose behavior we do
not judge in a moral way. 4. In a very flexible society like ours, the chances to be confronted
with the lot of other people are equal for all objects of sympathy. And the salience of the
fate of other people is equally distributed statistically. 5. The intensity of our compassion
depends on the intensity and duration of considering it. But again, the expected values of
these two quantities are intersubjectively equal for all objects of sympathy. 6. Prudent sub-
jects have feelings of sympathy and do not try to avoid them.
The first step in developing this model is to determine the intensity of our sympathy de-
pending on the assumed condition of the object. Consider figure 1.
The x-axis represents the object’s well-being; positive values represent pleasant feelings,
negative values represent unpleasant feelings. The y-axis represents the appertaining sym-
pathy, negative values representing pity and positive values representing pleasant feelings
of sharing joy or the other person’s flourishing. The other person’s well-being as well as the
sympathy are normalized into the interval [-1;1] with 0 being the point of indifference. Plau-
sible assumptions about the function from well-being to sympathy are: The sympathy func-
tion ascends monotonously. To neutral well-being we are sympathetically indifferent; i.e.
the function includes the point (0;0). Negative sympathy, i.e. pity, is much more intense
Fig. 1: Sympathy S(x) depending on assumed well-
being x
Fig. 2: Distribution PD(x) of well-being x
for xµ=0
From Utilitarianism to Prioritarianism
146
than positive sympathy. At the time when I developed this model I conducted interviews
for testing the willingness to exchange packages of such feelings with different durations.
This kind of willingness was then hedonistically reinterpreted as the subject’s comparative
judgement of the respective extents of sympathy. According to these calculations, pity for
the most extreme sort of suffering was 4 to 10 times more intensive than positive sympathy
with the most extreme form of joy. Conservatively I have taken 4 to be the right relation.
The most extreme points of the function of figure 1 then are (-1; -1) and (1;0.25). Empirically
our normal well-being ranges between 0 and 0.4; our sympathetic reaction to this kind of
normal well-being is minimal. Outside of this region of normalcy sympathy’s intensity in-
creases rapidly, though much more rapidly versus negative than versus positive. When ap-
proaching extreme states of well-being sympathy will be satiated. – From these assump-
tions one gets the sympathy function designed in figure 1.
The most important feature of this function is that it is not linear: Pity is much more intense
than positive sympathy; and normal states of well-being (between 0 and 0.4) are nearly
neglected by our sympathy.
The second step of the model is to find out the intrasubjective distribution of well-being for
different objects of sympathy over their life-time. For establishing the extent of sympathy,
we need not know the exact course of the object’s well-being but only the proportional
duration of the single levels of well-being during the whole life. Again simplifying, I assume
that these well-being levels are distributed normally. The open parameters of such a normal
distribution are, first, the mean µ and, second, the spread σ. Empirical research on well-
being has revealed that the intersubjectively most extreme long-term means of well-being
of the unhappiest and the happiest people, positively-linearly transformed in our scale (-
1;1), lie between 0 and 0.4 (0≤µ≤0.4), so that the happiest people in the long run arrive at
a mean of 0.4. Continuing the simplification, I assume that the mean levels of well-being of
happy and unhappy people are intersubjectively different, but that the spread remains the
same. Relying on some plausible assumptions about the absolute duration of very extreme
feelings, the spread can be calculated as being equal to σ=0.16. The resulting curve for µ=0
is shown in figure 2. In this way one gets a bundle of curves of normal distributions each
representing the distribution of different well-being levels for typical more or less happy
individuals; all these curves are equally shaped but their means range from 0 to 0.4 – ac-
cording to the individual happiness –; i.e. the curves are shifted to the left or to the right
with the top of the curves ranging between 0 and 0.4.
The third step is to multiply the probabilities given by the normal distribution of well-being
with the sympathy function and to calculate the integral from -1 to 1 over this product func-
tion. The result of this operation is the expected extent of sympathy, i.e. the sum of all
An Empirical Model of the Expected Extent of Empathy
147
feelings of sympathy which one expects to feel for a given person depending on the mean
well-being µ of this person. This operation can be repeated for all the long-term means µ of
well-being from the empirically expected range of such means, i.e. the interval from 0 to
0.4. The result is the function of the extent of sympathy depending on the long-term mean
level µ of well-being. Normalizing the mean levels of well-being as well as the resulting ex-
tents of sympathy by a positive-linear transformation into the interval [0;1] one gets the
normalized function of the extent of sympathy: ESN(m). This function is represented in fig-
ure 3.
In this function the x-axis represents the normalized lifetime mean-levels of well-being; and
the y-axis represents the normalized expected extent of sympathy resulting from facing per-
sons having the respective mean-level of well-being.
If somebody wants to value some social order from a purely sympathetic perspective he can
assess the various mean levels of well-being of the people living in this society, find out the
appertaining extent of sympathy and, finally, sum up these extents of sympathy. This, of
course, is the same procedure which a hedonist prioritarian has to use to assess the priori-
tarian value of this social order. The only difference is that the prioritarian uses the priori-
tarian welfare function instead of the function of the extent of sympathy.
For formal mathematical reasons, but above all for metaethical reasons, one would like to
have functions with certain properties as prioritarian weighting functions: They should be
concave throughout, i.e. have a constantly decreasing gradient, rise monotonously, etc. For
Fig. 3: Normalized extent of sympathy ESN(u)
depending on the long-term mean level u of well-
being
Fig. 4: Comparison of the normalized extent of
sympathy ESN(u) with utilex VPe19
∙
0.95 (exponential
value function)
From Utilitarianism to Prioritarianism
148
this purpose I have discussed several mathematical curve families (Lumer 2005, sect. 3.1).
The most suitable of these curve families are exponential curves:
for e > 1: VPee(u) = e/(e-1)) ‧ (1-e-u); and
for e = 1: VPe1(u)=u; this is identical to the right-hand limes of VPee(u) for e→1 (see figure 5).
VPee(u) is the family of exponential Prioritarian Value functions with the parameter e, where
"e" within the function is a parameter equal to or larger than 1 (and does not mean Euler’s
number), which expresses the degree of priorioritarianism: the higher the number e, the
stronger the prioritarian inclination. With e=1 the prioritarian inclination does not exist; the
curve coincides with utilitarianism. With extremely high values for e the function creates
leximin preferences. e-values between these extremes represent more or less radical forms
of prioritarianism.
One can now compare the empirically established function of the extent of empathy with
these ideal prioritarian curves. The one that fits best is the curve for e=19. The two curves
are compared in Figure 4. (The prioritarian function has been compressed by the factor 0.95
in order to facilitate the comparison.) One can easily see that, for a big stretch the two
functions are more or less identical. That is why I have proposed the exponential prioritarian
curve with e=19 (VPe19(u)) as the internalistically justified prioritarian weighting function.
The function of the extent of sympathy just presented is based on some rather provisional
measurements. But its general prioritarian shape is rather stable with respect to changes of
Fig. 5a: Exponential functions: VPe1, VPe7, VPe19, VPe500
Fig. 5b: First derivations VPee’ of exponential functions
Conclusion
149
these assumptions and measurement results. So the exact function may be changed by re-
measuring but the prioritarian shape will remain, because it depends only on the stronger
intensity of pity as compared to positive sympathy.
IV Conclusion
On the basis of all these considerations we can now draw the conclusion: The internalist
justification strategy for value ethics based on the adequacy conditions presented in section
2 and the prudential-consequentialistic determination of the function of socially binding
morals, via an empirical scrutiny of possible subject-universal components of the prudential
desirability functions has led to identifying empathy with others whom we neither like nor
dislike in a particular manner as the sought source of the moral desirability function. On the
basis of prudential hedonism, the empirical model of the expected extent of sympathy de-
pending on other persons' (mean life-time) well-being provides the quantitative specifica-
tion of this prudential desirability function. This function is mathematically simplified as
VPe19(u), so that this function is therefore proposed here as the internalistically justified
moral value function. This value function is universalistic, welfaristic and prioritarian. In the
next parts of the theory, on the basis of this value function, certain moral norms, institu-
tions, virtues, etc. can be justified as good means of realizing moral values.
What has been achieved with the study presented here? 1) If one tries to justify welfare
ethics internalistically in the manner outlined above through compassion, the result is a
version of prioritarianism, not utilitarianism (i.e. a concave not a linear moral value func-
tion). 2) In this way, prioritarianism has been justified internalistically, i.e. with recourse to
(pre-moral) motives. This goes far beyond a merely intuitive acceptance of prioritarianism.
3) Prioritarianism has been quantitatively specified, beyond a vague comparative intuition,
in a way that is needed for complex moral assessments with the comparison of many dif-
ferent consequences for different persons. From an infinite spectrum of more or less radical
forms of prioritarianism, a specific one is distinguished as internalistically justified.
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