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Global Affairs
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The time for realism? Assessing US and Russian
foreign policy in the Syrian war from realist
perspectives
Elena Dück, Eva Rieger & Bernhard Stahl
To cite this article: Elena Dück, Eva Rieger & Bernhard Stahl (2021) The time for realism?
Assessing US and Russian foreign policy in the Syrian war from realist perspectives, Global Affairs,
7:2, 253-270, DOI: 10.1080/23340460.2021.1969670
To link to this article: https://doi.org/10.1080/23340460.2021.1969670
Published online: 21 Oct 2021.
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The time for realism? Assessing US and Russian foreign policy
in the Syrian war from realist perspectives
Elena Dück
a
, Eva Rieger
b
and Bernhard Stahl
c
a
Istanbul Policy Center, Sabanci Universitesi, Istanbul, Turkey;
b
Faculty of Arts and Humanities, Universitat
Passau Philosophische Fakultat, Passau, Germany;
c
Faculty of Arts and Humanities, Universitat Passau,
Passau, Germany
ABSTRACT
When the people from Tunis to Aleppo protested against
repression back in 2011, Fukuyama’s classic promise seemed to
materialize. Yet, rather than an extension of the liberal world
order, we were to witness its very demise in the region. Syria
became the prime example for the return of power politics and
proxy wars. Spiralling into chaos, it is now the arena of different
actors with great power ambitions. Realist approaches were
widely criticized for their seemingly limited explanatory power
and lack of analytical consistency. However, they seem to provide
the right analytical tool kit for the current situation in the Middle
East. Within the framework of this case study, we compare the
varying analytical perspectives and explanatory power provided
by realism’s branches. We discuss our findings in the light of the
ongoing debate about the consistency of realist theory and their
implications for studying international politics in times of crisis.
ARTICLE HISTORY
Received 15 April 2021
Accepted 13 August 2021
KEYWORDS
Neoclassical realism; Russian
foreign policy; US foreign
policy; Syrian War; foreign
policy; International
Relations theory; realism
1. Introduction
When the people from Tunis to Aleppo protested against corruption, repression and for
democratic reforms back in 2011, Fukuyama’s classic promise of ultimate transition to
democracy seemed to materialize. Yet, rather than an extension of the liberal world
order, we were to witness its very demise in the region. Syria became the prime
example of the return of power politics and proxy wars. Spiralling into chaos, it is
now the arena of different actors with great power ambitions, ranging from old
players re-entering the global scene, such as Russia, to new ones, such as super-power
backed Saudi Arabia. Prima facie, the events in Syria thus appear to be a clear-cut case
for explanations from a realist perspective.
We interpret the turn within the realist school from classical realism to (Waltz’) neore-
alism as an attempt to increase consistency and distinctiveness, allowing for causal analy-
sis. After the end of the Cold War, many realists seem to have been dissatisfied with the
abstract research design structural realism stands for. In order to enhance realism’s
explanatory power and to embrace “realisms’richness”(Gilpin, 1984), classical realism
came back in form of different “neoclassical”realist approaches (Rose, 1998).
© 2021 European International Studies Association
CONTACT Elena Dück elena.dueck@uni-passau.de
GLOBAL AFFAIRS
2021, VOL. 7, NO. 2, 253–270
https://doi.org/10.1080/23340460.2021.1969670
Against this background, we aim at testing said enhanced explanatory power in com-
parison to other realist branches, using the Syrian War as a case study. While it has been
asserted by Mearsheimer and Walt (2013) that “simplistic”theory and hypotheses testing
are not conducive to IR, we argue differently: First, a number of realist scholars promote
theory testing (i.e. Lobell, Taliaferro, & Ripsman, 2016; Reichwein, 2015), because as
Schweller has put it: “our confidence in an explanation rests on its fit with the actual
behavior of states under the conditions specified by the theory”(2003, p. 322). Thus,
the merit and explanatory power of a theory can only be determined via theory
testing, which also adds to the overall discussion of theories in International Relations.
And second, such empirical application and testing of theories can be viewed as a
kind of addition and supplement to the (numerous) publications debating the merits
and developing different frameworks of realist theory over the last years. Lastly, only
recently, Jørgensen and Jorgensen lamented “that realists have been unable to adjust
their research agenda to current challenges and produce relatively few comprehensive
empirical studies informed by one or more realist theories”(2021, p. 5). For those
reasons and the fact that even Mearsheimer and Walt grant that theory testing is an
important part of social sciences, as long as it does not lead to downgrading theory
(2013, p. 428), we contend that this article is of value to the discussion of realist
theory in International Relations, even though it does not entail creating new or amend-
ing old theoretical frameworks.
We chose to focus on Syria on the one hand because of its empirical relevance in global
affairs. On the other hand, it is the kind of conflict that realist approaches aim to explain
and hence fit to test their explanatory power. Our first thesis is that neoclassical realism
provides better explanatory power than classical realism and neorealism. Our second
thesis is that neoclassical realism while providing more explanatory power, loses theor-
etical consistency in comparison to neorealism. While similar arguments have been made
on a theoretical level (cf. Guzzini, 2004; Legro & Moravcsik, 1999; Narizny, 2017;
Vasquez, 1997), we chose a case study approach to be able to weigh the results that
can be gained by applying realist theories to empirical cases against possible conceptual
weakness. In order to do so, we use a “soft case”, that is, a case that should be easily
explained by any realist approach and a “hard case”, that is, a case which stretches the
explanatory power of realistic theories to their limit. Our soft case is the Russian inter-
vention in Syria and its support for the Assad regime. As a hard case, we opted for the
non-intervention of the US against the Syrian government (2011–2013) before the
Islamic State (ISIL) attacked Iraq in 2014. Thus, our guiding research question concerns
the degree to which those different realist approaches are able to present suitable explica-
tions of the US and Russian foreign policy in regard to the war in Syria.
We proceed by shortly recalling the basic theoretical assumptions of the main realist
branches (classical realism, neorealism, neoclassical realism). We then deduct which
foreign policy behaviour one should expect from Russia and the US on this theoretical
basis. In the third part of this paper, we outline the development of the Syrian War
until 2015 and compare the foreign policy actions taken by Russia and the US with
the ideal-type behaviour outlined in our expectations in part 2. For Russia, the specific
explananda are the decision to support the Assad regime and the military intervention
in 2015. For the US, there are the non-intervention in 2011 and the military intervention
against ISIL in 2014. The empirical part is largely descriptive, which allows for diverse
254 E. DÜCK ET AL.
theoretical interpretations thereafter. In part 4, we evaluate the explanatory power of each
realist theory in the light of the empirical results. Finally, we turn back to our theses, eval-
uating the explanatory power of the neoclassical approach as well as its consistency in
comparison to the classical and the neorealist approach.
2. Theoretical framework and hypotheses
Generally, realism puts the analytical focus in international politics on the struggle for
power and its distribution in the international system. All streams of realism share the
assumption that states are the central actors in world politics. Hence, states are
exposed to the mechanisms of history, or, for neorealism, to the constraints of the inter-
national system, that is, anarchy. Additionally, power serves as the crucial explanatory
factor for the outcomes of politics.
1
Albeit, different currents of realism provide
different answer to the question why states are constantly struggling for power. Based
on these varying explanations for the inherently conflictual nature of international
relations, a distinction between various currents of realism is possible.
Classical realism, based on the works of the philosophers Machiavelli and Hobbes,
assumes that state behaviour is induced by the negative, power-driven nature of
human beings (cf. Lawson, 2015). The prudent statesman (or stateswoman) has thus
to properly assess the global distribution of power, improve the power position of
their own state (“national interest”), and manage the numerous conflicts so that they
do not end in war. For our cases, the classical realist approach is represented by Mor-
genthau (2006) and focuses on Putin and Russia’s national interest. However, in classical
realism, the conception of power remains vague, as power functions as a motive, instru-
ment and result of politics at the same time. Following the “scientific turn”in IR, the
demand for the development of research designs, which allow an objective testing of
hypotheses, emerged. Structural realism or neorealism developed in response to this
demand. Kenneth Waltz (1979) proposed the argument that the conflictual nature of
the international system does not stem from human flaws but is rather caused by the
anarchic system in which states operate. Depending on whether the power distribution
is multi-, uni- or bipolar, state behaviour is shaped by different constraints. Since
states operate in a self-help system, they are forced to assemble enough power –in the
form of military capabilities –to defend themselves in order to ensure their own survival.
After the end of the Cold War, and considering the huge differences regarding capabili-
ties, the international system would classify as a unipolar system despite the specific
feature of multipolar deterrence regarding the possession of nuclear weapons.
An alternative way to compensate for the power accumulation of particular states in
the system is by forming alliances, in order to achieve a balance of power. However,
Stephen Walt (1994) argues that states balance against threats rather than against
mere resources of power (balance of threat theory), which is why smaller, weaker
states “bandwagon”by joining existing alliances and strong states instead of building
their own alliances. By introducing threat perception to realism, Walt is able to
explain the bandwagoning-behaviour many states showed after the end of the East–
West conflict.
Both Waltz and Walt assume that the state’s struggle for power is not an end in itself
but serves the purpose of ensuring survival in the international system. This assumption,
GLOBAL AFFAIRS 255
referred to as defensive realism, is challenged by offensive realism. Its main representa-
tive, John Mearsheimer (2001), assumes that states continue to strive for power even if it
is no longer necessary for their immediate survival –therefore, international relations are
more conflict-charged than classical and defensive realism suppose.
While structural realism, according to Waltz, suggests that states behave fundamen-
tally similar in terms of foreign policy, neoclassical realists seek to explain differences
in the behaviour of states with social factors:
Its adherents argue that the scope and ambition of a country’s foreign policy is driven first
and foremost by its place in the international system and specifically by its relative material
power capabilities. This is why they are realist. They argue further, however, that the impact
of such power capabilities on foreign policy is indirect and complex, because systemic press-
ures must be translated through intervening variables at the unit level. This is why they are
neoclassical. (Rose, 1998, p. 146)
The representatives of neoclassical realism –for example, William C. Wohlforth
(1993), Fareed Zakaria (1998), Randall L. Schweller (2003), Nicholas Kitchen (2010),
Asle Toje and Kunz (2012) and Meibauer (2020)–thus focus mostly on foreign policy
analysis. By adding societal and administrational factors to the neorealist research
design, neoclassical realism is now able to explain phenomena such as neutrality or
different foreign policy behaviour of states with similar capabilities much better than
before. Zakaria emphasizes the importance of power as the central variable in his
version of neoclassical or state-centric realism and argues that:
By continuing to emphasize power as the critical variable, state-centric realism preserves the
overall logic of classical realism, but its greater sophistication regarding the measurement of
power creates a more accurate theory without any real loss of parsimony. (1998, 35)
In “From Wealth to Power”Zakaria develops the variant of neoclassical realism that is
similar to Mearsheimer’soffensive realism, but from a domestic perspective. Neoclassical
realism turns to second image explanations since “it is the domestic process that acts as a
final arbiter for state survival within the anarchic environment”(Schweller, 2003,p.
320).
2
Zakaria puts the neorealist core variable, capabilities, in perspective: “increased
resources give rise to greater ambitions. States are not resource-maximizers but
influence-maximizers”(1998, p.19). In contrast, while maintaining that “[n]o concept
is more central to international relations theory than power”(1993, p. 2), Wohlforth
stresses the importance of perceptions. According to him, the influence of power on
world politics is highly dependent on the perception of foreign policy elites (1993).
Like Zakaria, he draws the conclusion that “[i]f the leadership of a state perceives that
the capabilities at its disposal have increased, it will usually desire more control over
its external environment”(1998, p. 304). This notion of perceptions –which has been
introduced to realism by Walt’s theory on alliances –influencing foreign policy as a
sort of the intervening variable is shared by many neoclassical realists. Yet there is no
overall consensus on it and the composition of factors affecting the foreign policy
decisions within the transmission belt, that the domestic-level process is assumed to
be (cf. Donelly, 2019; Kitchen, 2010; Lobell et al., 2016; Meibauer, 2020; Meibauer
et al., 2021; Toje & Kunz, 2012).
Some theorists, such as Kitchen (2010), Lobell et al. (2016) as well as Meibauer (2020),
have focused their neoclassical realist approaches even more on ideational intervening
256 E. DÜCK ET AL.
variables in order to “explain how similarly structured states may respond in different
ways to similar threats by reference to differing prevailing ideas within the state”
(Kitchen, 2010, p. 132), thereby trying to reconcile material and ideational factors. As
summarized by Meibauer et al. in their article “Forum: Rethinking Neoclassical
Realism at Theory’s End”(2021), other variables considered to intervene in the
foreign policy decision-making process include strategic interaction, regime type, extrac-
tion and mobilization capacity, public opinion and media pressures, as well as culture
and identity.
In Schweller’s neoclassical variant, which deals with balancing behaviour, the willing-
ness and ability of state actors to balance are crucial (Schweller, 2004, p. 169). Like Wohl-
forth, Schweller assumes that the foreign policy elites’threat perception accounts for the
reaction of states to changing power dynamics in the international system. Schweller
points out that this concept takes into account “the intuitively understood but too
often ignored idea that the process of problem construction (or representation) is a sub-
jective one that is only partly determined by objective facts”(2004, p. 170). While the elite
consensus determines the willingness to balance, the degree of elite cohesion refers to the
state’s ability to extract resources from society for this task (cf. 2004, p. 169). Similar to
Zakaria, who argues that expansion is only possible if the state is strong enough to extract
the necessary resources, Schweller argues that
[…] incoherent, fragmented states are unwilling and unable to balance potentially danger-
ous threats because elites view the domestic risks as too high, and they are unable to mobilize
the required resources from a divided society (2004, p. 200)
Hence, the causal pathway can be depicted as follows (2004): Changes in relative power
→elite consensus about the nature of the threat →the degree of elite cohesion →mobil-
ization hurdles as a function of regime vulnerability→social cohesion →continuity or
change in foreign policy (i.e. balancing, bandwagoning, appeasement, half measures,
etc.).
This turn to the domestic level as well as to foreign policy analysis promises to bridge
the gap between the second image and the international system, without giving up causal
relations. Schweller’s approach integrates Wohlforth’s and Zarakaria’s ideas, while pro-
viding a clear analytical pathway. By doing so, his theory addresses balancing behaviour
by paying respect to the parsimony principle and not adding further intervening vari-
ables to the research design. Schweller’s version should therefore be less susceptible to
the criticism of eclecticism frequently put forward towards neoclassical realist expla-
nations. This is why we selected his concept for our analysis. In order to evaluate if neo-
classical realism can keep its promise of enhanced explanatory power in comparison to
neorealism without being as “fuzzy”about causalities as classical realism, we now turn to
the theoretical deductions of US and Russian behavior in the Syrian War.
2a. Expectations for Russia:
In a classical realist understanding, it is Putin who has gained insight into the current
mechanism of power politics. Russia’s national interest is to maintain and re-gain
influence in Russia’s near abroad, that is, to stop Western influence in the Ukraine as
well as NATO and EU expansion. The Arab Spring could have led to a democratic
wave to the benefit of the US and its European allies. Therefore, it was in Russia’s national
interest to hold Assad in power, to maintain a military presence in the Mediterranean
GLOBAL AFFAIRS 257
and pose a counterweight to the US allies, Israel and Turkey. “To keep Assad in power”
would mean delivering arms, finding allies, or to militarily intervene depending on “the
situation”, that is, the circumstances of Assad’s survival.
From a neorealist perspective, we find ourselves in a unipolar international system of
anarchy. Of course, this requires balancing behaviour against the remaining superpower,
the US. Increasing capabilities, finding allies for balancing and detaching former US part-
ners should be part of the expected behaviour of a great power. Hence, we expect Russia
to balance against the US and its allies in Syria and to try to expand its influence on the
Arab peninsula. In defensive realist terms, the Assad regime should be supported because
Russia would like to maintain its position in the system –Assad’s fall would have meant a
relative loss vis-à-vis the US and other great powers. For offensive realists, though, the
Syrian conflict provides an excellent opportunity for Russia to increase its influence in
Syria and to fill the power-vacuum that the conflict has created. As rebels such as the
Free Syrian Army (FSA) were likely to align themselves with pro-Western forces,
Russia would be expected to fight them. In an offensive neorealist understanding,
Russia would want to inhibit regional dominance of rival powers in the Middle East,
be it Turkey, Israel or Saudi Arabia.
From a neoclassical realist perspective, the Russian elite consensus matters. The bal-
ancing incentive set by the structural constraints of the international system is reflected
in the Russian consensus to balance the US. The autocratic character of the regime and
mass loyalty to Putin put no hurdles for active balancing behaviour. Expectations, there-
fore, would meet neorealist prognoses (see above).
In the case of Russia, we can deduct from all variants of realism that Russia will
support Assad (see Table 1). Offensive Realism goes one step further by also predicting
that Russia will fill occurring power vacuums and hence not only balance the US but
expand its power as far as possible.
2b. Expectations for the US:
Through the prism of classical realism, President Obama served the national interest
of the US. In the Syrian case this would be most prudently done in the following way:
Maintaining and increasing power meant fighting “rogue states”(such as Syria)
without eliminating them, supporting allies in the region and avoiding the creation of
power vacuums from which other great powers might profit. In violent conflicts, the
US should support its allies and react in a flexible mode to the situation “on the ground”.
In a defensive realist mode, given the unipolar system with only one super-power left,
the US is expected to inhibit a formation of alliances against itself and make balancing
behaviour costly for other states (regarding the use of capabilities). In order to maintain
its position in the system and to secure survival, it would suffice to actively support allies
Table 1. Expectations for Russia.
Classical Realism Neorealism Neo-Classical Realism
Prudent statesman (Putin): Russia’s
national interest is to maintain
and re-gain influence by holding
Assad in power
Unipolar international system with US
hegemony →Balance against the US
Defensive: Offensive: Support Assad
to maintain Fill power vacuum, gain
position in the system regional
dominance, fight possible US allies
Elite consensus to balance against US,
regime form allows active balancing
behaviour →Same behavioural
expectations as Neorealism:
Balancing against US and support for
Assad
258 E. DÜCK ET AL.
in the region (Turkey, Israel, Saudi Arabia). Moreover, the US should balance against
Russia since Moscow is increasing its capabilities, forming alliances against the US,
and fighting potential US allies such as Ukraine. Thus, the US should also try to curb
Russian efforts to further establish itself as a regional power through alliances. Diplo-
matic solutions are desirable as long as they do not change the overall distribution of
power. While a Syria without Assad would likely be either neutral or pro-US, an
Assad-led Syria would be aligned with Russia. Consequently, an Assad-led post-war
Syria, possibly linked to Lebanon and Iran, would weaken the US position in the inter-
national system. Moreover, in an offensive neorealist take, we should even expect the US
to kill two birds with one stone by fighting Hezbollah in Syria: weakening Iran, the long-
term anti-American troublemaker in the region, while strengthening the most important
US ally in the region, Israel.
From a neoclassical realist perspective, we should expect under-balancing behaviour.
There is no elite consensus in the US that the Arabellion or even Russian intervention in
Syria constitutes a threat to the US. Large parts of the elite would reckon that an engage-
ment would be too risky and too costly. Moreover, this elite fragmentation is comple-
mented by a counter-administrative majority in Congress (hurdle for mobilization)
and a risk-averse population. In consequence, under-balancing would prevail including
a“wait and see attitude”.
As Table 2 shows, the expectations of the US case vary depending on which realist
variant we choose: In a nutshell, classical realism and neorealism suggest that the US
should support its allies and avoid (or even fill) power vacuums. In contrast, neoclassical
realism expects that elite fragmentation will hinder balancing behaviour and under-bal-
ancing will occur (Table 3).
3. The US and Russia in the Syrian conflict
Since the 1990s, the international community has regarded Syria as a “rogue state”and
international isolation became even stronger when UN-reports surfaced that attributed
responsibility for political assassinations of Lebanese politicians to the Assad regime
(UN Security Council, 2005,p.52ff.). During the years preceding the Arab Spring,
relations between the US and the regime improved, even though Syrian foreign policy
towards Israel and Lebanon had not changed (Hokayem, 2013, p. 149ff.). While the
West had high hopes after the success of the Arab Spring in Tunisia, almost 10 years
later, the events in Libya (civil war in spite of international intervention), Bahrain
Table 2. Expectations for the US.
Classical realism Neorealism Neo-classical realism
Prudent statesman (Obama):
Maintain power by supporting
allies in the region, avoid creation
of power vacuum, flexible
reactions to situation on the
ground
Unipolar international system with US
hegemony →Maintain position in the
System Defensive: Offensive: Make
alliances against US costly, Balance
against Russia, weaken support
regional allies Iran by fighting
Hezbollah, thus (Turkey, Israel, Saudi-
Arabia); strengthening US ally Israel
Balance against Russia
No Elite consensus if Russian
intervention is a threat to the US; risk
aversity of citizens; counter-
administrative majority in Congress
→Under-balancing
GLOBAL AFFAIRS 259
(repression of the protests through Saudi Arabian intervention) and Yemen (civil war
with intervention by Iran and Saudi Arabia), smashed liberal dreams. The Arab Spring
–peaceful protest for reforms –had become an “Arabellion”, in which political power
was brutally fought for and not only the survival of regimes but also that of states was
at stake.
Mass protests in Syria started in spring 2011, demanding reforms from the Assad
regime. When on 16 February students were arrested in the southern city of Dara’a
for spraying walls with anti-Assad messages, protests expanded to the whole country
and the number of protesters rose. The Assad regime reacted with a threefold strategy:
It announced reforms and amnesties while at the same time, increasing pressure on
members of the opposition. Hundreds were arrested, tortured and killed. Furthermore,
peaceful protesters were met with snipers, war vessels, tanks and artillery fire, and
barrel bombs dropped from helicopters (Besant, 2013; Marsh, Taylor, & Siddique,
2011). These military measures against the Syrian people –often supported by the
Shabiha, armed militia in support of the Ba’ath Party –especially targeted Sunni neigh-
bourhoods in big cities. In reaction to this violence, many soldiers of the Syrian army
defected and started protecting the protesters with their guns. When even this could
not stop massacres (15 April 2011 in Damascus “bloody Friday”, 3 June and 1 July
2011 in Hama, 12 August 2011 in Idlib, Dara’a and Deirez-Zor; 14 August 2011 in
Latakia), opposition forces formed the “Free Syrian Army”(FSA) ordered to fight the
government’s forces.
The violent repression of the protest shocked the international community. However,
appeals by Western governments, the European Union, the UN Human Rights Council
and symbolic sanctions (for instance the withdrawal of the Tunisian ambassador, the visit
of western ambassadors to Hama and the suspension of the membership in the Arab
League) did not yield any results. The same holds true for sanctions against the Assad
regime (since 30 April 2011) and the EU arms embargo (since 9 May 2011). While
mass-protests on the 9 September were held under the slogan “The People demand inter-
national protection”, US Foreign Secretary Clinton had already declared in March that an
US intervention was unlikely, as the US Congress would oppose it. Russia’s Foreign Min-
ister Lavrov insisted that Assad cannot be called Russia’s friend and Russia would follow
a policy of non-intervention (MacFarquhar, 2012). He underlined that Assad “reacted
wrongly to the first appearances of peaceful protests”and made many mistakes (Gutter-
man, 2012).
Table 3. Explanatory power in each case.
Classical Realism Neorealism Neoclassical Realism
Russian Support
for Assad Good Good Good
Russian military
intervention
Difficult: One does not
have to win wars
Defensive: problematic
Offensive: good
Problematic: Change in elite consensus?
(Use of different version with other
variables might be useful)
US non-
intervention
2011–2013
Problematic: Obama did
not act as prudent
statesman
Weak US should have
balanced!
Good
US intervention
2015–2018
Problematic:
Intervention against IS
→“wrong enemy”!
Weak: IS is not a reasonable
actor to fight against, no
threat to the US
Problematic: Case of overbalancing?
Elite consensus given, but what about
structural non-constraint?
260 E. DÜCK ET AL.
In October 2011, Russia and China blocked UN sanctions against Syria in the Security
Council for the first time and have since continued to do so. To this date, Russia has used
its veto fourteen times to block sanctions against the Assad regime, including resolutions
that would have allowed further investigation into the use of chemical weapons
(New York Times, 2019; UN News, 2018).
While the US, France and the United Kingdom were reluctant to support the FSA even
with non-lethal supplies in 2011, the US announced the delivery of non-lethal weapons in
March 2012 but suspended them in December 2013. When Congress suggested to
actively support Syrian rebels President Obama remained reluctant to do so. ISIL’s
attack on Iraq changed this and the Obama administration approved a plan to generate
and train a rebel force of up to 5.000 men in September 2014. However, the program
never took offthe ground and in summer 2015, the recruits and the US equipment
were taken over by the Al-Nusra Front (affiliated to Al Qaida). Consequently, the
“train-and-equip program”in Syria was stopped (Mc Cleary, 2016; McKelvey, 2015).
Saudi Arabia and the Gulf States, as well as Turkey slightly later, started to arm Islamist
and Jihadist rebel groups. As these groups were now better equipped, efficiently orga-
nized and highly motivated, more and more rebels joined them, thus weakening the
FSA. Russia condemned this arms supply by “foreign powers”(Reuters, 2012). Yet, as
early as January 2012, Russia sold Jak-130 fighter jets (light attack aircraft) to the
Assad regime (The Times, 2012). In summer 2012, there were indications that Russia
also provided the regime with helicopters (Sherlock, Oliphant, & Freeman, 2012).
Putin declared that Russia would not protect Assad (BBC, 2012) nor did it rule out his
defeat (Harding et al. 2012), and made Russian civilians leave the country (Morris, 2013).
In order to avert Assad’s military defeat, Iranian weapons and fighters were trans-
ported to Syria in summer 2012 (Vela, 2012). Hezbollah’s intervention in early 2013
gave the regime some breathing space and 200 unofficial Russian soldiers (the
“Wagner”irregulars) fought together with Syrian troops (Quinn, 2016). When the
Western powers speculated on an air raid to stop the atrocities in Syria’s cities and
Israel started bombing Hezbollah’s and Syrian military convoys, the Kremlin announced
it would deliver air-raid defense systems to Assad (BBC, 2013).
The brutalization of the war, which was marked by the continuous employment of
barrel bombs on civilian targets (Human Rights Watch, 2013; Spencer & Samaan,
2013), reached a climax with the use of poisonous gas by the Assad regime on 21
August 2013. Following the attack with the warfare agent Sarin in Ghouta, a suburb of
Damascus, approximately 1500 people died (Warrick, 2013). The international commu-
nity univocally condemned the attack. However, while US intelligence said that evidence
pointed to the Assad regime’s responsibility for the attack, Putin told journalists that he
was convinced that the attack was carried out by opposition forces who wanted to
provoke a military intervention in Syria (Putin, 2013). Obama intended to launch a “tar-
geted strike […] to achieve a clear objective: deterring the use of chemical weapons and
degrading Assad’s capabilities”(Obama, 2013). Meanwhile, in an open letter to the
American people, Putin claimed that a strike against Syria would “result in more inno-
cent victims and escalation, potentially spreading the conflict far beyond Syria’s borders”
(Putin, 2013) and would further destabilize the region. The Russian president also
warned against taking action without the approval of the UN Security Council and
stressed the importance of international law. He advocated to “stop the language of
GLOBAL AFFAIRS 261
force, and return to the path of civilized diplomatic and political settlement”(Putin,
2013). Yet, as the chorus of critics in the US grew, the US president decided to ask Con-
gress to approve military strikes (CNN, 2013). Skepticism in Congress, though, was huge
and so Obama turned to Lavrov’s proposal to dismantle the Syrian arsenal of chemical
weapons under the surveillance of the OPCW. While chemical weapons were brought
out of the country and destroyed, there have been several attacks using nerve agents
since then. In April 2017, after another gas attack took place in the Idlib province, Pre-
sident Trump ordered a cruise missile attack targeting airfields of the Assad forces
(Gordon, Cooper, & Shear, 2017).
In summer 2014, ISIL-troops crossed the Syrian-Iraqi border, conquered Mosul and
its leader Al-Baghdadi announced a transnational “caliphate”. When Kirkuk, Erbil and
the Kurdish provinces were threatened by the invading ISIL, the US decided to militarily
intervene. In September 2014, President Obama called to “destroy the ISIL”(The White
House, 2014) and the US and its allies (i.e. Australia, Belgium, Denmark, France, Jordan,
Canada, the Netherlands, the UK) participated in the following bombing campaign. In
addition, the US chose the Kurdish militias (YPG) as allies in Syria, supported their mili-
tary operations against ISIL on the ground and initiated to train FSA forces in
cooperation with Turkey (Sciutto, Starr, & Rizzo, 2015).
On the battlefield, the situation for Assad worsened again after ISIL had invaded Iraq,
and in the North-West, rebel troops attacked Assad’s home region near Latakia (Bal-
anche, 2015; Black, 2015). Iran’s troops as well as the Shiite volunteers from Iraq with-
drew from Syria to protect the holy sites of the Shia against ISIL in Iraq.
Diplomatically, Russia tried to form a broader alliance against ISIL and other “terrorists”
among Arab leaders (Stuster, 2015). Moreover, Moscow agreed with Iran sending
additional troops (the revolutionary guards) to assist Hezbollah’s forces in their oper-
ations close to the Lebanon border and supported those operations via air strikes
(Bassam & Perry, 2015). In September 2015, rumors grew that Russia was sending its
own troops and military hardware to Syria adding to the “experts on the ground”(Bac-
zynska, Perry, Bassam, & Stewart, 2015). Heavy Russian bombing campaigns followed
suit, targeting the FSA and rebels in the West of the country while ignoring ISIL by
and large (Dearden, 2015). The systematic bombing of hospitals, bakeries and kindergar-
tens as well as the merciless sieges of rebel-held cities and quarters frustrated many rebel
troops, which surrendered or agreed to go to the last rebel resort, Idlib. Human rights
organizations as well as Turkey lamented the Russian use of cluster bombs and
vacuum bombs, which primarily target civilians and are banned by international law
(The Guardian, 2015). Moreover, Russian warplanes allegedly deliberately attacked an
UN convoy with food and medical aid close to Aleppo (Borger & Ackerman, 2016).
Because of the latent conflict with Israel regarding the control of the Syrian airspace,
Russia and Israel found a gentlemen’s agreement not to interfere with each other’s
bombing campaigns (Beaumont, 2017). When Russian jets repeatedly violated Turkish
airspace, Turkey decided to shoot down one airplane in November 2015. Consequently,
Russia placed heavy economic sanctions on Turkey. After a bilateral summit between
Erdoğan and Putin in summer 2016, a détente between the states prevailed.
In June 2016, more than 50 US-diplomats called for a radical change in the US foreign
policy vis-à-vis Syria but to no avail (Landler, 2016). Obama addressed the Russian gov-
ernment by demanding a halt of military assistance to the Assad regime (Obama, 2016).
262 E. DÜCK ET AL.
The US then backed Kurdish YPG attacks on Syrian troops in the Northeast of the
country (Hawramy, 2016).
The Russian government eventually announced a withdrawal of its troops from Syria
on several occasions (e.g. in March 2016 and December 2017), but whether this was ever
put into practice remained unclear. In July 2017, the Trump administration ceased a
secret program to deliver arms to the rebels which had been in force since 2014
(Sanger, Schmitt, & Hubbard, 2017). What is more, the Russian government initiated
the “Astana process”with Turkey and Iran mapping so-called de-escalation zones in
Syria (Asseburg & Oweis, 2017). Yet, evidently, these zones turned out to be the
coming target zones for military operations, thus experiencing an escalation of
fighting on a massive scale. Most recently, the three countries failed to achieve an agree-
ment on the last remaining target zone, Idlib (Pinchuk, 2018). President Trump has
warned the Assad regime not to attack Idlib while the French president re-announced
his “red line”regarding the use of chemical weapons. Remarkably, earlier in the same
year, the US and Russia were involved in direct combat close to Deir-al-Zor for the
first time when up to 100 “Wagner”soldiers were killed by heavy US artillery fire
(Taylor, 2018).
4. Theoretical interpretation
The classical realist (CR) take on the Syrian war reveals the overall strengths and weak-
nesses of realist analyses. On the one hand, a lot of the observed behavior can be under-
stood with the help of realist terms: balancing, national interest, power-seeking,
influence, proxy war, etc. For the Russian behavior, CR explanations look promising
at first glance. “Non-intervention –arms sales –veto in the security council –seeking
allies –military intervention”reflects Russia’s national interest depending on the circum-
stances, that is, the likelihood of Assad’s survival. However, when further examining the
explanation, it boils down to Putin’s–respectively Obama’s–ability to analyse the crisis
correctly and take appropriate action. The meagre analytical result is thus that Putin is a
prudent statesman (in the sense of CR) and Obama is not. The two decisive variables
here, the situation on the battlefield and its perception by the statesmen, remain
under-theorized. In the second case, the non-intervention by the US, this problem
becomes even more obvious. For realists, in hindsight, we see that non-intervention in
2011 or 2012 was a huge mistake. In power terms, all US rivals such as Russia and
Iran benefitted from US ignorance, while all allies lost ground (Israel, Saudi-Arabia,
Turkey). Even NATO suffered based on the strains with Turkey; not to speak of the
entire migration crisis which weakened the EU, the US’most solid partner. It becomes
apparent that the “national interest”is indeterminate. It needs the wisdom of the states-
man to work. Moreover, considering that all realist-minded US-advisors at the time had
recommended withstanding the temptation of intervention a well-known ontological
problem of decision-making comes to the fore. If future political scenarios are vague
and even their number unknown (not to say anything on their probability of occurrence),
how can the proper national interest materialize? Hence, in this case, the smart statesman
should have acted against all realist-inspired policy recommendations of the historical
situation in 2011.
GLOBAL AFFAIRS 263
Turning to the structural branches of realism, defensive neorealism works well to
explain Russia’s overall behaviour in the Syrian war. The unipolar system requires balan-
cing behaviour against the US and that is exactly what Russia did. By so doing, it played
its cards carefully, employing all kinds of capabilities to avoid Assad’s fall. Yet, it seems
that Russia changed from maintaining its position in the system to maximizing power
over the course of events. For instance, as a great power, a stalemate on the battlefield
would have sufficed to stay in the game making sure that Russia could not be ignored
in any up-coming peace conference. Instead, in 2015, Russia decided to intervene with
proper troops and is now maximizing power at the expense of the US and its allies.
This change in Russia’s goals is hard to explain using classical and defensive realism.
Offensive neorealism predicts the Russian behaviour quite well (see Table 1), but it
fails to explain the US behaviour.
Regarding the second case, the explanatory power of neorealism looks less promising.
Considering its overwhelming capabilities, neither defensive neorealism nor offensive
neorealism can explain why the US failed to effectively balance against Russia and Iran
in the conflict. Syria may turn out to be the straw that breaks the camel’s back when it
comes to US influence in the Middle East. By accepting a constant loss of relative
power, the US has given up its hegemonic position in the region and will be “punished”
by being just one of multiple players in a future multi-polar system in which Russia and
China will have far more power. Even if we assume that in 2011 and in 2012, there was no
point in intervening, since the US position in the system was not weakening, the situation
changed with Hezbollah’s and Iran’s entry into the war. Considering Israel’s, Saudi-
Arabia’s, and Turkey’s pleas, the US should have demonstrated force. The gas attacks
in 2013 would have provided the perfect occasion for intervening by closing ranks
with Israel in the South and Turkey in the North of Syria. Yet, no such actions took
place, which is hard to understand for neorealists.
True, in accordance with the balance of threat theory (Walt), we could argue that the
US perceived ISIL as a bigger threat than Russia. Hence, while it did not seem necessary
to curb Russian influence, given the US trauma of 9/11 and the experience of the failed
intervention in Afghanistan, radical Islamism was perceived as a much more dangerous
threat than orthodox Russia and the seemingly secular Assad regime. However, this
explanation raises more substantial questions: Firstly, if radical Islam is the central US
fear, why is Sunni Islam perceived as highly dangerous in the form of ISIL, but not in
the form of US ally Saudi Arabia –in Huntington’s(1997, p. 178) understanding a poss-
ible core state of Sunni Islam –the most pro-active global disseminator of Wahhabism
and Salafism and breeding ground for the 9/11 terrorists who supported the jihadists
in Syria? Moreover, why is Sunni Islam more dangerous than Shiite Islam in the form
of Iran (and consequently Hezbollah), in spite of the fact that Iran is much more
likely to be able to develop weapons of mass destruction than ISIL? Secondly, if we
assume that threat perception is at the core of state behaviour, what is this perception
based on? If we leave the basic assumption that military capabilities determine an
actor’s power, we would enter the “muddy waters”of ideational phenomena. If the US
perceives ISIL as more threatening to itself and the international system based on histori-
cal traumata, we give up the realist premise that material factors provide explanations for
international politics. Instead, we have to embrace the social-constructivist notion that
264 E. DÜCK ET AL.
perceptions determine foreign policy actions. From a realist point of view, this shift in
ontology is rather undesirable.
Does neoclassical realism fare better? As for this approach, the overall prediction for
Russia’s behaviour works fine and the Russian support for the Assad regime was
expected, same as with both classical and structural realism. But following our argument
from above, how can we explain Russia’s change in intervention policy? According to the
proclamations of many neoclassical realists (Brooks, 1997; Kitchen, 2010; Lobell et al.,
2016; Rose, 1998; Schweller, 2003; Toje & Kunz, 2012), the added intervening variables
on the domestic level should allow this approach to be more apt in explaining such
change in foreign policy behaviour. However, it is unclear whether Russia’s change
towards intervention was triggered by the systemic causal pathway (anarchy) or the dom-
estic one (foreign policy), which brings us back to the consistency and parsimony
problem of neoclassical realism. If we assume that it has to do with domestic politics,
we must look for changes regarding elite consensus and mobilization. Maybe one can
point to the change from Medvedev to Putin here, but in any case, this pathway does
not look very plausible –also considering that most analysts put the Russian foreign
policy turn in Putin’s second term. To explain this change then, one might have to fall
back on other neoclassical variants, which include different intervening variables at the
unit-level. If one seeks to resort to another NC version with different domestic factors,
it would only give rise to the charge of eclecticism. The more so since the neoclassical
variant used here fared well in explaining Russian foreign policy before its military
intervention.
For the US puzzle of non-intervention, the neoclassical realist prediction fares much
better than the ones of the other realist theories. It is exactly under-balancing due to the
elite fragmentation in the US what Schweller would have expected. In this case, the
improved explanatory power (as well as determinacy) becomes evident when we
include domestic factors in the causal argument. Yet, neoclassical realism borrows
from other theories stressing domestic factors (cf. Guzzini, 2004). In a social-constructi-
vist vein, neoclassical realism stops where things start to become instructive: When and
how do we experience elite fragmentation? How does this come about? For US foreign
policy, we might ask to what extent does the bipartisan consensus on foreign policy
still exist? For which issues has it already eroded or no longer prevails? The change by
the US towards intervention in Syria in 2015 then constitutes a harder case to explain
for the neoclassical approach. While there seems to be an elite consensus perceiving
ISIL and other terrorist groups as a threat justifying US intervention, the theory can
give no reason as to why this is the case. According to Schweller, the causal pathway
starts with changes in relative power as the independent variable. Since most NC assump-
tions about the international structure are shared with neorealism, the emergence and
growth of ISIL, as a non-state actor, should have no influence on that structure. If any-
thing, the Assad regime as a state actor was weakened by ISIL’s expansion, which should
let the threat become less important. So, in this case, the assumption that structural com-
posure acts as the independent variable to explain foreign policy outcomes, and domestic
processes (such as elite consensus here) only act as a transmission belt for those systemic
pressures diminishes their explanatory power. Therefore, employing another variant of
the neoclassical current based more on threat perceptions (and maybe even adding his-
torical-intervening variables) while moving structure to the background looks more
GLOBAL AFFAIRS 265
promising. Lobell, Taliaferro and Ripsman’s book “Neoclassical Realist Theory of Inter-
national Relations”(2016) can be seen as an example of this “broad (or deep) form of
neoclassical realism”(Donelly, 2019, p. 28). They view structure more like a frame for
action, while the processes on the domestic level to interpret and react to the structural
context are determining foreign policy outcome.
5. Conclusion
Our analysis thus points to several problems that the realist research programme needs to
address to provide a better understanding of foreign policy: The Syrian case clearly shows
that non-state actors are not less important than state actors and need to be theorized.
Admittedly, there are other realist approaches dealing with second image arguments
(Posen, 1993; Snyder, 2013) but they remain in the niche of realist theorizing.
Both neo-approaches provided inspiring insights when it comes to theoretical stringency
and explanatory power. Due to its parsimony, Waltz’s neorealism fares better than neoclas-
sical realism regarding consistency by offering a more transparent causal pathway. None-
theless, when it comes to its explanatory power, neoclassical realism was able to provide
more and better explanations, but admittedly, the causal pathway remains vague. In sum,
the analysis shows that neoclassical realism does fare a little better than neorealism does.
Albeit this comes at the price of theoretical inconsistency. In order to maintain theoretical
consistency, “[d]omestic factors must be integrated into realism as components of struc-
ture, like capabilities. They cannot shape actor preferences”(Narizny, 2017, p. 163). By inte-
grating liberal and social-constructivist elements, neoclassical realism creates conceptual
difficulties, which need to be sorted out. However, the overall proliferation of different neo-
classical realist versions over the last decades and their non-consensus regarding possible
intervening variables makes general testing of this approach difficult. Thus, since we
used Schweller’s version as an example here, we can only make statements about its expla-
natory power, not that of neoclassical realism as a whole. While this is true for all three
tested realist approaches here, it carries the most weight for this youngest development
in this theory tradition. Therefore, we would suggest using the case of the Syrian war and
the different foreign policies employed regarding it to further test other realist, especially
neoclassical approaches. Having said this, we hold that our findings demonstrate that the
essential theoretical critique on realism (Guzzini, 2004; Legro & Moravscik, 1999;
Vasquez, 1997) remains empirically relevant. Dilemmas of explanatory power v consistency
(for one) are likely to accompany any future neoclassical theorizing. However, our insights
regarding the explanatory power ofdifferent realist theories in the Syrian case could be seen
as an inspiration to engage in the theoretical debate for other researchers, thus partaking in
such a theory-improving process.
Notes
1. Admittedly, these three attributes do not suffice to denote the realist school considering that
other approaches (such as the English School) would also subscribe to them without calling
themselves “realist”. Guzzini (cf. 2004: 536), therefore, prefers to call them the “classical tra-
dition”, a term coined by Holsti (1985).
266 E. DÜCK ET AL.
2. In a way, neoclassical realism can be conceived of as a “theory of mistakes”dealing with the
anomalies of classical and neorealism: How to explain why a state does not follow the his-
torical logic (CR) or the systemic constraints (NR)?
Disclosure statement
No potential conflict of interest was reported by the author(s).
Notes on contributors
Elena Dück is a Mercator IPC Fellow at the Sabanci University 2020/21 and adjunct lecturer at the
University of Passau.
Eva Rieger is a research associate at the Professorship of International Politics at the University of
Passau.
Bernhard Stahl is Professor of International Politics at the University of Passau.
ORCID
Elena Dück http://orcid.org/0000-0002-2624-0083
Eva Rieger http://orcid.org/0000-0002-9218-7620
Bernhard Stahl http://orcid.org/0000-0002-2523-0000
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