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Shepherd Mpofu
Digital Humour in the
Covid-19 Pandemic
Perspectives from the Global
South
“Cast in the mould of the Shakespearean fool, Digital Humour in the Covid-19
Pandemic is a compendium deserving our critical and entertaining attention. From
the clown who exhibits a rustic and uneducated disposition thereby provoking
laughter with his/her ignorance, to the courtly fool or jester in whom wit and
pointed satire reposes, the volume demonstrates the numerous ways the global
pandemic has elicited humorous responses from the Global South. From WhatsApp
memes and Hashtags to subaltern humoring of political elites, the volume under-
scores the power of laughter as a music of the soul and a much-needed balm in the
age of digital social media.”
—Prof Olufemi Abodunrin, University of Limpopo
“‘Even the scary moment of Covid-19 pandemic which has caused panic across the
world could not inhibit the humorous trait and indeed laughter of coping mecha-
nisms, with disasters. This message is delivered meticulously by this groundbreak-
ing volume which takes the subjects of humour and laughter to higher level of
scholarship, drawing from the rich social media archive.’”
—Sabelo J.Ndlovu-Gatsheni, Professor and Chair of Epistemologies of the
Global South and member of the Africa Multiple Cluster of Excellence,
University of Bayreuth, Germany
“This is an impressive and timely collection. Like the coronavirus, the contributors
argue, jokes and memes related to the epidemic have infected our minds and trav-
elled between regions, creating a greater awareness of our globally connected
identities. Unique for its ambitiously broad geographical coverage, the collection
includes case studies from across the global South: including on India, Zimbabwe,
Brazil, Nigeria, Kenya and South Africa.
The authors draw on the protocols of a wide range of disciplines and approaches.
Some of these are familiar to humour discussions such as discourse analysis, but
there is a wealth of new interventions here too, including engaging with Bollywood,
the creeping virus-like infection of political misrule, dark humour as quotidian
coping mechanism, on COVID-19 and its similarity to Big Brother Naija, silly citi-
zenship that made everyone with a mobile phone a potential journalist, the chal-
lenges and affordances of doing digital ethnography during lockdown, and feminist
stand-up comics’ responses to the pandemic.
Digital Humour in the Covid-19 Pandemic
The scholarship contained in this collection will have a reach beyond this cur-
rent contagion, as the chapters bring fresh insights and new questions to the schol-
arship on humour and social media.”
—Carli Coetzee Editor, Journal of African Cultural Studies
Shepherd Mpofu
Editor
Digital Humour in the
Covid-19 Pandemic
Perspectives fromtheGlobal South
ISBN 978-3-030-79278-7 ISBN 978-3-030-79279-4 (eBook)
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-79279-4
© The Editor(s) (if applicable) and The Author(s), under exclusive licence to Springer
Nature Switzerland AG 2021
This work is subject to copyright. All rights are solely and exclusively licensed by the
Publisher, whether the whole or part of the material is concerned, specically the rights of
translation, reprinting, reuse of illustrations, recitation, broadcasting, reproduction on
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known or hereafter developed.
The use of general descriptive names, registered names, trademarks, service marks, etc. in this
publication does not imply, even in the absence of a specic statement, that such names are
exempt from the relevant protective laws and regulations and therefore free for general use.
The publisher, the authors and the editors are safe to assume that the advice and information
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This Palgrave Macmillan imprint is published by the registered company Springer Nature
Switzerland AG.
The registered company address is: Gewerbestrasse 11, 6330 Cham, Switzerland
Editor
Shepherd Mpofu
University of Limpopo
Polokwane, South Africa
v
About the book
This book project is a culmination of shared talks and dreams with some
academic colleagues from different parts of the world. I remain thankful
for their encouragement and seeing a possibly scholarly contribution in
this endeavour. This book project would not have been successful had it
not been for various contributors whose chapters make up this work. They
worked through tough times under restrictive circumstances as different
governments and institutions tried to contain and arrest the spread of the
COVID-19. Some authors were directly affected, as they suffered from
the virus or lost loved ones. Our sympathies go to them and, in the same
vein, would like to dedicate this work to all those who succumbed, sur-
vived and were in the frontline against the virus. I extend my gratitude to
the staff at Palgrave Macmillan, especially Mala Sanghera-Warren, Emily
Wood and Md Saif for working with me till the end of the project. Mala
was the rst person I contacted with the proposal and has been enor-
mously supportive and helpful since then until the competition of the
project. Thad Metz has been a generous mentor and adviser, and for that,
I remain thankful. I also thank Prof Olufemi Abodunrin, from whose
interactions some of my ideas were sharpened. Drs Tawanda Nyawasha,
Trust Matsilele and Metji Makgoba, and Profs Martin Ndlela and Sabelo
Ndlovu- Gatsheni have challenged me and pushed me to do better. Our
families as editor and contributors to this volume deserve some special
mention. I thank my wife Vera and our children Maka and Lelo for their
vi ABOUT THE BOOK
support and encouragement. Last but not least I thank the South African
National Research Foundation, University of Limpopo Research Director
and Vice Chancellor for research, my departmental colleagues and Ms.
Semang Mathobela for their assistance and support in this and other
projects.
vii
1 Social Media and COVID-19: Taking Humour During
Pandemics Seriously 1
Shepherd Mpofu
Part I Meme-making Practices and Making Sense of the
Pandemic 17
2 Social Media Memes as Commentary in Health Disasters
in South Africa and Zimbabwe 19
Shepherd Mpofu
3 Viral Jokes: Humour and Grace as Critical Devices in
Memes About the COVID-19 Pandemic in Brazil 47
Alexandre Werneck
4 ‘Coromentality’: Nigerians’ Use of Memetic Humour
During the COVID-19 Lockdowns 75
Aje-Ori Agbese and Edeanya Agbese
Contents
viii CONTENTS
5 An Analysis of Internet Memes and Discourses on
Traditional Medicines as Remedies for COVID-19 in
Zimbabwe 101
Mbongeni Jonny Msimanga, Lungile Augustine Tshuma,
and Mphathisi Ndlovu
6 “Can we Uninstall 2020 and Install It Again? This
Version Has a Virus!”: Humourous Pundemic and
Misinforming Infodemic about COVID-19 Pandemic
on Social Media 123
Adamkolo Mohammed Ibrahim, Nassir Mohammed Abba-
Aji, and Phuong Thi Vi
7 Social Media Audience’s Interpretation of Selected
Humor Memes on Coronavirus Pandemic in Nigeria 145
Gloria Chimeziem Ernest-Samuel
Part II Gender, Race and Family: Identity Politics in the
Pandemic 165
8 Coronavirus Satire: A Dissection of Feminist Politics
and Humour 167
Millie Phiri
9 ‘A Nation that Laughs Together, Stays Together’:
Deconstructing Humour on Twitter During the
National Lockdown in South Africa 191
Nonhlanhla Ndlovu
10 Fear and Loathing and Laughter: COVID-19 as an
Expression of Decolonial Love 213
Mvuzo Ponono
ix CONTENTS
Part III Weapons of the Masses: Humour, Ridicule and
Confronting Political Power 233
11 #VoetsekANC and COVID Corruption: A Foucauldian
Discourse Analysis of “A Song for the ANC” 235
Adelina Mbinjama
12 Humour in the Time of COVID-19 Pandemic: A Critical
Analysis of the Subversive Meanings of WhatsApp
Memes in Zimbabwe 259
Mphathisi Ndlovu
13 Humour in the Age of Contagion: Coronavirus, ‘Janata
Curfew’ Meme and India’s Digital Cultures of Virality 279
Imran Parray
14 The Use of Meme and Hashtags on Twitter Towards
Government Response During the COVID-19 Curfew
Announcement from 1 June to 14 June 2020 295
Keziah Wangui Githinji and Joyce Omwoha
15 Dark Humour, Ubuntu and the COVID-19
Pandemic: A Case of Subaltern Humouring
of Political Elite Deaths on Social Media 319
Shepherd Mpofu
Index 347
xi
Nassir Mohammed Abba-Aji is a senior lecturer and the incumbent
Head of Department at the Department of Mass Communication,
University of Maiduguri, Nigeria. He has a PhD in Mass Communication.
He has also published quite a number of articles in reputable journals
and books.
Aje-OriAgbese is an associate professor at the University of Texas Rio
Grande Valley’s Department of Communication. Her research focuses on
Nigerian media, media history, journalism and communication.
EdeanyaAgbese has a Master’s in Public Health and is a research project
manager in the Department of Public Health Sciences at the Penn State
College of Medicine. Her research interests include access to care, the
effects of healthcare nancing on service use for families of children with
autism, mental health research and treatment patterns for substance
use disorders.
GloriaChimeziemErnest-Samuel is a senior lecturer in the Department
of Theatre Arts, IMO State University, Owerri. She holds a PhD in Media
Studies from the University of the Witwatersrand, Johannesburg, South
Africa. She has published widely in many peer-reviewed journals and
books. Her most recent essay appeared in The Literature and the Arts of
Niger Delta (2021), edited by Tanure Ojaide and Enajite.
KeziahWanguiGithinji is a PhD scholar in Film Studies and a lm/
communication trainer. Keziah is the Executive Director of Gwira
Communications. She is an accomplished lmmaker and a mentor with
notes on Contributors
xii NOTES ON CONTRIBUTORS
Yanibes Mentorship Program in Stockholm, Sweden. She has spoken in
various forums such as African Women in Media Conference (AWiM-19)
and African Studies Association of Africa (ASAA) 2019. She is a member
of the Association of Media Women in Kenya (AMWIK), Kenya
Scriptwriters Guild, in which she is the Secretary, and the Kenya Film and
Television Professionals Association. She is a TED talk presenter on the
Art of Story Telling (2020).AdamkoloMohammedIbrahim is pursuing a
PhD in a Mass Communication programme at Bayero University, Kano,
Nigeria. He received his master’s degree in Development Communication
from Universiti Putra Malaysia (UPM) in 2017. In 2007, he received his
rst degree (BA Mass Communication) from the Department of Mass
Communication, University of Maiduguri, Nigeria.
AdelinaMbinjama is a lecturer in the Department of Media Studies at
the Cape Peninsula University of Technology in Cape Town, South Africa.
Her teaching and research interests are in social media communications,
cyber-ethics, black feminism and representation of women in the media.
She holds a doctoral degree in Media Studies from the Nelson Mandela
University.
ShepherdMpofu is Associate Professor in Media and Communications
at the University of Limpopo. He holds a PhD in Media Studies from the
University of the Witwatersrand. He is also an African Humanities
Programme fellow. His research interests include digital media; media,
elections, protests and democracy; new media, diaspora, race and identity;
media, violence and genocide. In 2020 he co-edited his latest book
Mediating Xenophobia in Africa (with Dumisani Moyo). He has pub-
lished several book chapters and journal articles in reputable local
and international publications on the above-mentioned areas. He has
also offered media commentary to local and international media
around issues that fall within his expertise.
Mbongeni Jonny Msimanga is a PhD candidate in the Department of
Communication at the University of Johannesburg. His research interests are
in digital cultures, satire, identity constructions and political communication.
MphathisiNdlovu is a research fellow in the Journalism department at
Stellenbosch University. He holds a PhD in Journalism from the same
university. He is concurrently a lecturer in the Department of Journalism
and Media Studies at the National University of Science and Technology
(Zimbabwe). His research interests include cultural studies, digital
xiii NOTES ON CONTRIBUTORS
cultures, collective memory, identity politics and critical discourse
analysis. He has published in peer-reviewed journals such as African
Journalism Studies, Nations and Nationalism, Critical Ar ts, Communicatio
and the Journal of African Cultural Studies.
NonhlanhlaNdlovu is a postdoctoral research fellow in Journalism and
Media Studies at Rhodes University. She has researched in the areas of
gender and the media, reception analysis and tabloidisation. Her research
interests are in critical textual analysis and issues of identity and social
belonging as related to online media.
JoyceOmwoha is a lecturer in the Department of Journalism and Media
Studies at the Technical University of Kenya. Through her research inter-
ests, Joyce has won international grants and fellowships which have enabled
her to carry out research on: media, citizenship and identity, media and
peacebuilding, gender studies, development communication (health and
advocacy) and the analysis of the social media culture in Kenya and beyond.
Joyce holds a fellowship by the Global Minds Fund at Ghent University,
working on a project titled “The Intricacy of Adolescent Contraception
Policy as Depicted and Portrayed in the Kenyan Media”. She is also explor-
ing digital citizenship and how using social media and technology can pro-
mote peace and sustainable development.
ImranParray is an assistant professor at the Department of Communication
and Journalism, Institute of Home Economics, University of Delhi, India.
He was the Indian Council of Social Science Research (ICSSR) doctoral
candidate at the Centre for Culture, Media and Governance, Jamia Millia
Islamia, New Delhi, India. A recipient of the International Committee of the
Red Cross–Press Institute of India Award (2013) for covering under-
reported issues, he has been a journalist in Kashmir. His research interests
include media history, media anthropology, postcolonial media theory and
new media.
MilliePhiri is a University of Johannesburg postdoctoral fellow. Her spe-
cialisation is in social media, digital technologies, media, journalism, free-
dom of expression, gender-based violence and health information focusing
on infodemics. She is also a Zimbabwean award-winning journalist who has
worked extensively in various media organisations in Southern Africa. She
also spearheaded the setting up of the Pan African Network of Women
Journalists under the auspices of the Graca Machel Trust and setting up its
publishing platform Swenga.org.
xiv NOTES ON CONTRIBUTORS
MvuzoPonono is a Xhosa man from the Eastern Cape. He is based at
the University of the Free State, where he is a lecturer in Communication
Science. His research interests include audience and postcolonial studies.
His MA examined the inuence of a township family context on the inter-
pretation of a health education television programme. His recently
completed PhD research is an ethnographic study of the interpreta-
tion of mainstream news by township youth. He will continue conducting
research focused on townships until practical application of theory benets
the lives of those involved, or he will die trying.
LungileAugustine Tshuma is a PhD candidate in the Department of
Journalism, Film and Television at the University of Johannesburg. His
research interests are in political communication, visual culture and collec-
tive memory.
PhuongThi Vi holds a master’s degree in Media Journalism from the
famous Vietnamese media training institute, the Institute of Journalism
and Communication, National University of Vietnam. She is Lecturer of
Journalism and Media Studies at the Thai Nguyen University of Science,
Vietnam. Her research interests include media culture, journalism history,
public press/media, online multimedia, electronic newspaper journalism,
public opinion, as well as journalism, media and public relations.
AlexandreWerneck is a professor at the Department of Sociology and
the Graduate Program in Sociology and Anthropology (PPGSA), both at
the Federal University of Rio de Janeiro (UFRJ). He is also a research
coordinator at the Centre for Studies on Citizenship, Conict, and Urban
Violence (Necvu). He was a postdoctoral fellow at UFRJ.He has a PhD
(2009) in Sociology from PPGSA/UFRJ (with stage doctoral at the École
des Hautes Études en Sciences Sociales, EHESS, Paris, France), produc-
ing a work that deserved an Honourable Mention in the 2010 Capes
National PhD Work Award and which resulted in the book The Excuse:
Circumstances and Morals of Social Relations (2012).
xv
Fig. 2.1 Emancipatory racial humor challenging race relations
in South Africa 29
Fig. 2.2 Laughing and contesting laughter in the face of health
disasters and death 32
Fig. 2.3 Appreciation of humor a few months after the pandemic
came to South Africa and few weeks after the commencement
of lockdown at level 5 34
Fig. 2.4 Ramaphosa has been accused of being slightly behind the news
and current affairs. Social media commentary suggesting his
snail-like pace also alludes to being not pro-active in terms of
having plans to curb corruption 37
Fig. 2.5 Zimbabwe’s dark humor revealed the violent state of affairs
during the pandemic 39
Fig. 3.1 ‘Brazilian scientists create a mask capable of saving millions
of lives.’ (All images are taken from the Internet) 48
Fig. 3.2 ‘Do you really think coronavirus will kill a people like
this? LOL’ 51
Fig. 3.3 ‘Shit, that’ll fuck up the economy!’ 53
Fig. 3.4 ‘The virus of Ipiranga’ 55
Fig. 3.5 ‘Let’s hold a rally to reopen the stores. The Myth said that
Brazil must not stop!’ ‘Fuck off!’ 55
Fig. 3.6 ‘Get inside, for fuck’s sake’ ‘Let me go, I need to walk’ 57
Fig. 3.7 ‘Friday 27 March 2020 at 7.30pm We’ll be holding a
collective yelling of mothers at their windows to relieve
stress and not go mad’ 58
Fig. 3.8 ‘2026 Mossoro [a city on the Brazilian semi-arid region]
Winter Olympic Games’ 62
List of figures
xvi LIST OF FIGURES
Fig. 3.9 ‘Excuse me, Mrs Emu, by chance have you heard about the
[I]niciative of the ChloroAvengers?’ 63
Fig. 4.1 Types of internet memes shared by Nigerians during the
COVID-19 lockdown 88
Fig. 4.2 Combination meme 88
Fig. 4.3 Written text meme 89
Fig. 4.4 Still image/animation example 90
Fig. 4.5 Woman using bowl for mask 91
Fig. 4.6 Man wearing mask covering forehead 91
Fig. 4.7 Husband rescue meme 93
Fig. 5.1 Illustration of ginger, garlic, honey and aloe vera that are
seen as immune boasters to counteract against COVID-19 110
Fig. 5.2 Traditional herbs such as umsuzwane that are regarded as
preventative measures against COVID-19 111
Fig. 5.3 A shrub that is seen as a cure for COVID-19 112
Fig. 5.4 is a collection of items that are supposedly known only by
the elderly. Such people are being encouraged to steam
as they are deemed more vulnerable to COVID-19 113
Fig. 5.5 People on medical aid who are using Zumbani 116
Fig. 5.6 A critique of the commercialisation of plants such as Zumbani 117
Fig. 5.7 A man pushing a trolley with umsuzwane which is being sold
for 10 South African rands 117
Fig. 5.8 The boom of umsuzwane sales in Zimbabwe 118
Fig. 6.1 A collage of memes shared in Nigerian social media platforms 132
Fig. 6.2 Themes of fake news. (Source: Wardle and Derakhshan
(2018, 46)) 136
Fig. 6.3 A comical illustration of young internet users sharing fake
news online. Their conversation (shown in the bubbles)
indicates the reasons they (and many of their like) share
false information. (Source: PTCIJ Dubawa (2020)) 137
Fig. 6.4 A Twitter hoax on the use of chloroquine as a medication
for COVID-19. (Source: David, 2020) 138
Fig. 7.1 A man distances himself from the society for self-quarantine 156
Fig. 7.2 The Child and China Wahala meme 159
Fig. 8.1 Showing total interactions regarding the coronavirus pandemic
on Mai Tt’s Facebook Fan page. (Source: CrowdTangle) 174
Fig. 8.2 Showing total interactions regarding coronavirus pandemic
conversations on Mai Tt’s, Madam Boss’s and Gonyeti aka
Samantha Kureya’s Facebook pages. (Source: CrowdTangle) 174
Fig. 8.3 CrowdTangle Intelligence report that compares account
performance of activities of the three female comedians on all
xvii LIST OF FIGURES
posts on their Facebook fan pages over a 12-month period
from January 2020. (Source: CrowdTangle) 181
Fig. 13.1 A matrix of COVID-19 cases in India. (Source: Data
repository for the 2019 Novel Coronavirus Visual Dashboard
operated by the Johns Hopkins University Center for Systems
Science and Engineering (JHU CSSE)) 282
Fig. 13.2 A matrix of COVID-19 deaths in India. (Source: Data
repository for the 2019 Novel Coronavirus Visual Dashboard
operated by the Johns Hopkins University Center for Systems
Science and Engineering (JHU CSSE)) 282
Fig. 13.3 In this edited image, Modi is shown as a soap opera character
(original picture is that of Bollywood lm actress Hema
Malini) confronting a third female character (coronavirus),
while China (handsome male) is seen consoling the virus after
a silly bashful by the Indian prime minister. (Source: Twitter) 286
Fig. 13.4 The picture shows Amitabh Bachchan on the sets of KBC, a
popular reality show, clapping and asking audience members
to keep clapping. It satirises the Modi government’s ineffective
plans to contain the virus. (Source: Twitter) 287
Fig. 14.1 @snnyamaoUhuruKenyatta right on the face of Kenyans...!
#wanjohi #CurfewinKenya’ 308
Fig. 14.2 Kelly Nivex @ndubinivex June 6. “Current Situation for slay
queens with curfew extension” #UhuruKenyatta #6thjune
#wanjohi 309
Fig. 15.1 A still from a video clip of Jackson Mthembu mistakenly
calling ventilators vibrators posted on Twitter in remembrance
of his funny and gaffe moments 334
Fig. 15.2 COVID turning the tables from attacking the West to
attacking Mnangagwa’s inner circle after a minister said it was
sent by God to kill the West for imposing sanctions on
Zimbabwe 337
Fig. 15.3 COVID-19 death wishlist 338
1© The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature
Switzerland AG 2021
S. Mpofu (ed.), Digital Humour in the Covid-19 Pandemic,
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-79279-4_1
CHAPTER 1
Social Media andCOVID-19: Taking
Humour During Pandemics Seriously
ShepherdMpofu
IntroductIon
At the end of 2019, the world was engulfed by the coronavirus disease
(COVID-19) that interrupted life as we had known it. The virus was
believed to have originated from a Chinese district of Wuhan in the Hubei
province. As the pandemic swept across the globe, people made different
readings of its spread, effects and control. An infodemic ensued whereby
some people discussed its cause, treatment and impact by sharing news,
disseminating fake news, conspiracy theories and humorous memes. Most
citizens in the Global South have experienced different kinds of crises such
as leadership, environmental issues due to climate change, electoral vio-
lence, economic crises and corruption, among others. To negotiate some
of these challenges gossip, fake news, conspiracy theories, ridicule and
humour in the form of jokes and satire have been critical. This humour
could be spread through cartoons in mainstream media or through alter-
native social media platforms (wo)maned by citizens now empowered to
S. Mpofu (*)
University of Limpopo, Polokwane, South Africa
e-mail: shepherd.mpofu@ul.ac.za
2
create, package and distribute content without the intervention of trained
media professionals but with the risk of political leaders pouncing on devi-
ants even in these clandestine public spheres.
‘Coronavirus ain’t no joke’ warned the Daily Show host, Trevor Noah,
a South African comedian based in the United States of America, repri-
manding young people whose images were shown on social media at some
American beaches as the numbers of infections rose in America and glob-
ally. But this statement by Noah was helping cast light on the gravity of the
pandemic across the globe, and not necessarily that people should not
make jokes about the pandemic. Besides, we should take humour seriously
as it is part of human communication and adaptation to our environment
(Palmer, 1994). Noah used his show to lampoon society’s behaviour and
attitudes towards the virus, critique governments and politicians’ manage-
ment of the pandemic.
Dark humour, jokes and laughter on and about illnesses and pandemics
are treated as grave, tasteless, offensive and therefore no laughing matter.
Dark humour and laughing during pandemics and making fun of those
who are affected, killed or deformed invites psychic censorship and is
treated as taboo in many societies that nd the reality of facing one’s death
or deformation unfathomable. Dark humour or morbid humour is that
type of comedy that makes light of events that are otherwise traumatic,
serious and painful to face and discuss. There have been jokes around
traumatic and deadly events and pandemics. Dundes (1989) has done
some work on humour around the HIV/AIDS pandemic. Smyth (1986)
has also discussed how people made jokes out of the Space Shuttle disaster
of 1986 where seven Americans died on a trip to space. Some scholars
have also looked at the humour surrounding terrorism and the French
(Nice) terrorist attacks (Dynel & Poppi, 2018; Kuipers, 2005). The
Cholera pandemic of 1831–1832 (Park & Park, 2010), the Spanish
Inuenza of 1918 and the Swine Flu scare of 2009–2010 (Rosa, 2012) are
among pandemics which, despite frowns from some quarters in society,
have elicited humour in the way they were represented and engaged with
by the media and everyday people. This humour served different pur-
poses. Not all dark humour should be seen in the negative as this type of
humour makes fun of a tragic situation ‘even if it is inspired by them and
relevant to them’ (Dynel & Poppi, 2018, 384). Dark humour during pan-
demics, illnesses and death has been essential in relieving tension and pain.
Dark humour, for Dundes (1989, 73), helps as a mental hygiene defence
mechanism ‘that allows people to cope with the most dire of disasters’.
S. MPOFU
3
Humour can alleviate poor health as some writers like Robert Frost,
Lord Byron, Charles Dickens and researchers such as Dillon and Totten
(1989), Carroll and Schmidt (1992), Abel (2002), Kuiper and Martin
(1993), among others, have argued. However, some scholars argue that
having a good sense of humour does not translate into being a healthy
person (Kuiper et al., 2004; McClelland & Cheriff, 1997; Martin &
Dobbin, 1988). They suggest it is one of the cheapest medicines in times
of illness. Added to that, humour ‘produces a spiritual equipoise’ critical
in the ‘management of psychological and instinctual forces that threaten
equilibrium…a form of ethological integration [that] aids social bonding’
(Palmer, 1994, 58). Humour also has an extended function of group iden-
tity preservation as joking ‘is a rule-bound activity, it has the characteristics
of ritual, the common acceptance of which is a means of forming group
identity’ (Palmer, 1994, 58). The coronavirus pandemic, in a way, created
a global group identity as it was a dener of human relations and experi-
ences as a shared common denominator.
Ridicule and humour, while helping reduce anxiety, making people
laugh and make sense of their circumstances and at times appreciating
their conditions of existence or even pushing them to make alterations—as
a capacitor for change—has been one of the accessible ways for coping or
bringing about change or understanding our predicaments in society. At
the same time, humour has proven to be a sophisticated avenue into
accessing people’s thoughts about crises or pandemics, interpretation of
the same and views on society in general. Social media has created alterna-
tive avenues where ordinary citizens, unbounded by time and geographic
boundaries, interact among themselves and the political elite where power
is differently negotiated, operationalized and imagined.
SocIal MedIa, coMMunIty andHuMour
That humour should be taken seriously cannot be overstated. The use of
social media to generate humorous reections on the COVID-19 pan-
demic should not be read as idleness or silly playfulness, but this has to be
seen as speaking to the current socio-political and economic factors and
fears. Chiodo etal. advised us to ‘Use technology to spread smiles’ (2020,
164) during the pandemic. Of course, with the world on lockdown and
social distancing a new normal for demonstrating a duty of care, social
media platforms such as Facebook, Twitter, Weibo (Chinese version of
Twitter that is highly censored by the state), YouTube, Instagram,
1 SOCIAL MEDIA AND COVID-19: TAKING HUMOUR DURING PANDEMICS…
4
MySpace, Telegraph, TikTok to mention the most common, ‘have
replaced witty dad jokes’ (Chiodo, 2020, 264) and been used to share
humour and laughter during the pandemic.
But what are social media? Social media cannot be well understood
outside the terms Web 2.0 and User Generated Content (UGC). Web 2.0
is a term rst introduced by Tim O’Reilly in 2005 to describe the novel
way in which software developer in the World Wide Web and internet
users used platforms in a communal and co-creative collaborative manner.
The term User Generated Content was propounded in 2005 and, as
Kaplan and Haenlein say, ‘can be seen as the sum of all ways in which
people make use of social media…describe(s) the various forms of media
content that are publicly available and created by end users’. UGC has to
full the following criteria to be referred to as such: ‘rst it needs to be
published either on a publicly accessible website or on a social networking
site accessible to a selected group of people; second, it needs to show a
certain amount of creative effort; and nally, it needs to have been created
outside of professional routines and practices’ (2010, 61). Web 2.0,
according to Kaplan and Haenlein, ‘represents that ideological and tech-
nological foundation’, while UGC ‘can be seen as the sum of all ways in
which people make use of Social Media’ (2010, 61). Therefore, social
media could be dened as ‘a group of internet-based applications that
build on the ideological and technological foundations of Web 2.0, and
that allow the creation and exchange of User Generated Content’ (Kaplan
& Haenlein, 2010, 61). Mpofu magnies this thus:
Social media are characterised by their broad reach, exibility in terms of
access, composition, editing, uploading and consumption of content, easy
accessibility where there is readily available internet, speedy communications
and allowing many people to interact at the same time especially on public-
facing platforms such as Facebook, blogs, listservs, WhatsApp, Twitter,
Instagram and the like. (2019, 110)
These social media platforms are a critical cog in the information eco-
system. These could be added to extend the denition of what is labelled
as pavement radio or radio trottoir by Stephen Ellis (1989). For Ellis pave-
ment radio was almost like the bush telegraph, even though he went on to
say about it: ‘this is unsatisfactory in that is an old-fashioned metaphor:
the telegraph superseded decades ago, whereas the radio has for some 30
years been Africa’s favorite news medium’ (1989, 321). Of course, the
S. MPOFU
5
radio remains predominant in Africa, especially in rural settings where the
penetration of the internet, mobile cellular phone connectivity, satellite
television, electrication, literacy and accessibility of other news media
such as newspapers remain low compared to urban areas. Social media, as
news gathering, editing, sharing and consumption sites, are riddled with
distrust because of ethical problems associated with the whole sociology of
news production and dissemination within these platforms. But this is not
enough to dismiss them easily as they are laden with socio-political and
economic meanings in the life of any society. Besides, as Ellis suggests, the
bush which was a platform for bush telegraph no longer exists and has
been replaced by the ‘urban pavement, bar, markets, living room or taxi-
park’ (1989, 321). New media technologies have added and altered,
rather than replaced these as sites of news and gossip sharing making them
an all-important aspect in the societal communicative regime. What is cru-
cial with pavement radio especially in the Global South, largely, is that it is
trusted and exists not because they are vaults of truths and veried infor-
mation but because:
Its subject matter are issues of public interest about which there has not
been an ofcial announcement, or where ofcial information cannot be
trusted. Widespread corruption in post-apartheid South Africa has not done
much to improve citizens’ respect for ofcial narratives. They know what it
feels like to be lied to (Wasserman, 2020)
Besides, social media platforms, just like tabloid newspapers whose con-
sumption is communal, help build sharing communities since communica-
tion and information sharing rituals happen within a context of community
and communalism in sharing and interpretation (Wasserman, 2020).
The digital media platforms have become spaces where people adopt
different persona, share information and co-exist as members of an imag-
ined community with humour as of the unifying rituals. Humour helps
unify people so they do not feel ‘isolated in a lonely time’ (Chiodo etal.,
2020, 164). In that existence, the sharing ‘practices illustrate how the
conviviality of … societies also inuence their media use. Similarly, joking
about the coronavirus may be a way for people to say “it is all very absurd,
but we’re in this together”’ (Wasserman, 2020).
Indeed, the COVID-19 pandemic brought people together through
driving them apart, social distancing. Thus, while social distancing became
the norm, humans shared fear, empathy, hope, hopelessness and
1 SOCIAL MEDIA AND COVID-19: TAKING HUMOUR DURING PANDEMICS…
6
aspirations for a better future when the virus would be eradicated, with
good health and economies. Fundraising campaigns were done where
people donated money and food to fellow citizens some of whom they did
not know. That people saw humorous side of things during this period is
instructive and worthy of intellectual interrogation. Humour serves vari-
ous socio-eco-political and pyscho-social purposes. The coverage of the
pandemic showed lack of leadership in some contexts, magnied the dan-
gers of the pandemic, instilled panic and fear in the hearts and minds of
citizens and laughter and humour to navigate life. Humour was variously
used to critique society, calm fear, spread fake news and perform invinci-
bility. In a context where most people do not trust authority, especially
politicians, pharmaceutical and technology companies, some people found
it helpful to share and trust social media posts, fake and authentic, than
mainstream media or ofcialdom. As Wasserman expounds, ‘political disil-
lusionment with the current government(s) and feelings of frustration
have also proven to be fertile ground for rumours and conspiracy theories
that provide more plausible explanations of people’s current circumstances
than political, economic or scientic authorities’ (2020). The colonization
of the Global South by new technologies has caused some tensions: politi-
cal, cultural, economic and social. For instance, when one looks at the
resistance towards the e-hailing transport services such as Taxify and Uber
by traditional transport operators and subsequent deadly ghts between
the two generations of transport operators, one gets a sense of what tech-
nology has done in terms of disrupting traditions. Politically, citizens can
ridicule, engage and insult their leaders, a transposition of how power and
big mannism have been understood in political spheres in some Global
South contexts where citizens respect, fear and do not challenge big men
in authority. Also, digital media, while making leaders accessible, have also
empowered them to share humour with their constituencies. In essence,
the ethics of communication that guide traditional media and even cul-
tural ways of communication between the ruled and the rulers or elders
and youngsters are disrupted and left to renegotiation.
Social media have been, before the COVID-19, central in human com-
munication. The dawn of the pandemic created a situation whereby peo-
ple relied more on digital connectivity for various socialization and
working appointments. In the process, to keep sane, social media were
used to share jokes. There has been a growing body of research on humour
in social media (Dynel & Poppi, 2020; Davis etal., 2018; Demjén, 2016,
Duerringer, 2016). Digital Humour in the Covid-19 Pandemic: Perspectives
S. MPOFU
7
from the Global South, as already intimated, makes that important and
unique intervention in that it deals with a novel issue—the world inlock-
down due to a pandemic, something a larger percentage of the citizens in
the globe are experiencing for the rst time—and breaks new ground in
researching an area and phenomenon that is relatively new: world of
COVID-19 pandemic and social media humour. The book project looks
at this pandemic through the lens of social media humour and in so doing
adds new dimensions in the discussion of humour and pandemics. These
include COVID-19 humour and pandemics; comparative analyses between
countries such as Ghana, Senegal, Pakistan and Ethiopia; gender, identity
humour and the pandemic humour; fear and loathing during the pan-
demic; humour, curfews and politics, among others. Online humour and
associated participatory rituals are ‘indicative of the polyvocality of partici-
patory culture which is the hallmark of social media’ (Dynel & Poppi,
2020, 3).
coVId-19, MedIatIzatIon anddatafIcatIon
ofSocIety
COVID-19 did not only become a health crisis, but also a political, social
and economic one of big proportions. The media were central in magnify-
ing the ramications of the pandemic. It is through the media that society
looks at itself. The media ‘serve for observing and inuencing develop-
ments and events from different viewpoints’ (Nguyen, 2020, 1). One
implication of the COVID-19 pandemic was that of mediatization and
datacation. When the world health experts were asked to come up with
possible solutions to the pandemic, lockdowns were suggested and imple-
mented across the globe. The media played an important role in inform-
ing and convincing the public to follow regulations so that the pandemic
could be contained. This had implications on how people performed work
(Microsoft Teams), dating and other social and family relations (Facebook,
Zoom, WhatsApp), schooling (Google Meet, Black Board Collaborate
and Skype) and other service provisions. The digital economy and tech-
nology companies’ dominance and centrality in these contexts were mag-
nied (Nguyen, 2020).
Digitization and mediatization accelerated datacation of society lead-
ing to, among other things, the spread of fake news, conspiracy theories
around human data corporate and government control. Governments in
1 SOCIAL MEDIA AND COVID-19: TAKING HUMOUR DURING PANDEMICS…
8
countries such as the Austria, Australia, Belgium, Brazil, Brunei, Canada,
South African, Singapore, South Korea, Germany, Dutch, Ecuador,
Britain, China and others made use of corona-apps which guided their
control of the spread of the virus. There were also fears that using technol-
ogy in the combating of the virus meant people had to give away their data
and bio-information to tech-companies, government and other systems,
and this led to questions of ‘privacy, data surveillance, data ownership,
which can inuence citizens’ willingness to use them’ (Nguyen, 2020, 2).
Not that citizens were not creating too much data and giving them to
corporates and the government already through using apps, walking in the
city streets with CCTV surveillance and volunteering information to
supermarkets and via shopping apps and medical information to the doc-
tors before, but there seems to be dangers associated with a situation
where data is demanded by the political elite for governance purposes
because we are under attack. This has given to fear which has led to a phe-
nomenon of data vigilantism whereby citizens collectively take offence,
outrage and take it upon themselves to photograph and distribute images
of fellow citizens who infringe on lockdown or any other rules, making
them subject to possible harm, public scorn, ridicule and shame.
Digital or data vigilantism, according to Trottier ‘is a process where
citizens are collectively offended by other citizen activity, and coordinate
retaliation on mobile devices and social platforms. The offending acts
range from mild breaches of social protocol to terrorist acts and participa-
tion in riots’ (2017, 55). Data vigilantism is justied by those who partici-
pate in it by arguing that they are trying to protect the legally constituted
order ‘so the appearance and diffusion of vigilantism in the Coronavirus
emergency seems inevitable’( Milan & Di Salvo, 2020). The net effect of
this self-righteous behaviour is that ‘a lasting and invasive impact on the
privacy of the accused, as well as inciting aggression and a desire for
revenge’ (Milan & Di Salvo, 2020). The breaking of coronavirus lock-
down rules was more observable than proven. In some instances, law
breakers are seen, and there is no proof they are breaking lockdown laws as
some might be going to hospital, or work in critical services or going to
get supplies from the shops. In some cases, digital vigilantism has potential
to demarcate society between the bad and good guys with devastating
consequences for social cohesion. Related to this is the idea of privacy and
normalization of surveillance.
That COVID-19 pandemic accelerated datacation, justied and nor-
malized citizen surveillance cannot be understated. A critical question to
S. MPOFU
9
be asked is: What role does privacy have in a pandemic and what’s more, a
dataed setting? In an attempt to curb the spread of the virus, dictatorial
countries such as South Korea, China and Singapore made advances
towards surveillance and digitally monitoring citizens. In South Africa, for
example, a visit to a restaurant, supermarket, bar, university or hotel meant
that you had to leave your details on some registration form or app, and in
most cases, there was no disclaimer or statement on how the information
could be used in future. Will the technologies of surveillance and accom-
panying infrastructure be creatively used and adapted to the post-
COVID- 19 world needs, or will they be destroyed? For Yuval Noah Harari
(2020), writing in the The NewYork Times, it is difcult to imagine the
latter as ‘short-term emergency measures will become a xture of life’. For
instance, Israel Security Agency was authorized to ‘deploy surveillance
technology normally reserved for battling terrorists to track coronavirus
patients’ (Harari, 2020) by Benjami Netanyahu, the Prime Minister who
forcibly gave orders after a parliamentary sub-committee shot down the
idea. In some countries there has been a rise in the use contact tracing
apps, and again, these lead us into question: What are the rights of the citi-
zens in such a context? Usually the debate leads to what Milan and Di
Salvo (2020) call a ‘false dichotomy between privacy and the defense of
public health, as if the former is an insurmountable challenge to the latter’.
WHy tHeGlobal SoutH?
What is the Global South and why does it matter? I seek to address this
question in this short section. According to Nour Dados and Raewyn
Connell, the term Global South functions as more than a metaphor for
underdevelopment. The term is used to reference ‘an entire history of
colonialism, neo-imperialism, and differential economic and social change
through which large inequalities in living standard, life expectancy, and
access to resources are maintained’ (2012, 130). The Global South is both
a political and geographic location, a collection of countries formerly
known as the Third World. In academic circles, the Global South has not
been looked at with the same lens as the West, the Global North: it has
been exoticized and has been part of the world where Euro-Americans or
Westerners ‘projected most forcefully and fancifully their own pride and
prejudice’ (Chabal, 2009, 20). This geographic and political location has
been in the Western gaze for a long time and comprises of countries and
continents once colonized by the West, in some cases, currently having a
1 SOCIAL MEDIA AND COVID-19: TAKING HUMOUR DURING PANDEMICS…
10
colonial hangover and yearning for decolonial exorcism (Ndlovu-Gatsheni,
2013; Quijano, 2000a, 2000b; Robins, 2013, Mbembe, 2017; Maldonado-
Torres, 2007).
It is no secret that in the Global North technology has been appropri-
ated to an extent that it is used in spaces that the Global South only cur-
rently dreams of. For example, electronic voting or vote counting is used
in a handful of Global South countries compared to the Global North. In
addition, the current Fourth Industrial Revolution seems more advanced
in the West than in the Global South where, in some cases, resistance to
these technologies have led to citizen-citizen violence and even violations
of human rights of citizens by the state still stuck in old technologies.
Resistance is partly informed by the fear that the benets of technology
will be accessed by a few members of the society, while more will be made
poorer and excluded (Juma, 2016). The Global South is not a homoge-
neous geographic, ideological, commercial or social space. There are hier-
archies even within this space where, for instance, the Chinese and Indians
are seen as ‘racist’ towards other members of this geographic region such
as Africans.
The focus on Global South does not mean that there are no shared
experiences with the West. They could well be, but this sub-region has not
been treated as a site of intellectual production (Hegel, 1956) and there-
fore we have to make deliberate efforts to do empirical studies and present
knowledge from the sub-region. In many instances, the region and its
peoples have been used as sites of data production and collection by
Western scholars and then the analyses are done in Western universities
and research centres. Katie Bryant helps us see the bigger picture here
when she says:
that editors and reviewers of international journals demand that ndings
from studies situated in the Global South and being done by Southern
researchers must have greater global generalizability than ndings coming
from studies situated in the Global North; and… that Southern researchers
doing research in particular geographic locations in the Global South strug-
gle more than their Northern counterparts to have their research questions
and ndings deemed important enough to contribute to the conversations
taking place in their international research communities. (2014, 230)
A journal article about Trump’s administration is accepted as global
enough in some global journals, while a similar one on Ian Khama is
S. MPOFU
11
rejected for lacking that global appeal, air and contribution to important
conversations. It is therefore important to write from experience and con-
text where there is no imagined superior other. The superior other is that
context whereby every form of knowledge production, theory and analysis
has to draw from, follow a certain template and suit the requirements set
therein. Not that we are arguing for sloppy scholarship. No! The argu-
ment here is that the Global South can have and has data, scholarship and
intellectual traditions and lenses, theories, methodologies, scholars and
analysts who can analyse and produce academic works without the need of
using Western theories, methods and so on as a nal and ultimate arbiter
of and for that particular scholarship for it to be acceptable as rigorous
intellectual work. The intellectual strength and contribution of this vol-
ume lies in that.
The Global South political space is admittedly one of worry and chal-
lenges. The aftermath of the pandemic and datacation of society cannot
make one hopeful of the future. This is so because in some contexts, the
pandemic found already fragile nation-states, economies characterized by
disease, violence, conict, maladministration, poverty and poor political
leadership in general. In most cases, during lockdown in the Global South,
especially in Africa, many cases were reported where governments used
the lockdown and weaponized COVID-19 as an excuse to curtail their
citizens’ rights. In others, security forces killed citizens for breaking
COVID-19 laws. Some of these countries switch off the internet during
protests and there will be nothing stopping them for using the biometric
surveillance systems beyond the COVID-19 pandemic. Given a choice
between privacy and health, ordinary people are likely going to choose
health, because, even though they can share jokes about death and pan-
demics on social media, health remains everyone’s ideal. After all data
inuences how ‘societies make sense of, try to overcome and behave in
crisis’ (Nguyen, 2020, 4). But in a context where data illiteracy levels are
high, especially in the Global South, abuse of bio-data by corporates and
governments remains higher and much more worrisome. But people
laugh and laughed while the pandemic lasted.
HuMour andPandeMIcS
There has been a considerable body of academic work done globally in the
area of humour in health communication (Wooten, 1993; Wanzer etal.,
2005; Hendriks & Janssen, 2018) and most of this has been academic
1 SOCIAL MEDIA AND COVID-19: TAKING HUMOUR DURING PANDEMICS…
12
journals. Interestingly, the COVID-19 pandemic is the rst of such a pan-
demic in the last 100years and has rightfully elicited a lot of interrogation
from academics focusing on varied aspects such as Black Twitter: coping
with the pandemic while black in America (Outley etal., 2020), coping
with stress (Savitsky etal. 2020), health and conspiracy theories (Ahmed,
2020). Few articles have focused on humour during the pandemic (Amici,
2020; Chiodo etal., 2020; Thelwall & Thelwall, 2020). Most of these
studies emanate from the Global North. Amici’s study found that humour
was used to spread positivity while distancing oneself from negativity. In
some instances, humour was used to enhance social cohesion. Chiodo
et al’s intervention advocates the use of gallows humour that ‘includes
jokes, irony and humorous remarks about frightening topics such as com-
bat or death’ because the COVID-19 pandemic ‘presents ample opportu-
nity for the use of this form of humour [as it could help others as a] coping
mechanism that may also boost camaraderie and morale’ (2020, 763–764).
Of course, they offer this advice with caution for joking responsibly as
‘Corona virus ain’t a joke’ . Elsewhere, Thelwall and Thelwall observed
that humour was used to ‘emphasize the threat or seriousness of the pan-
demic’, to express ‘fear’ and share ‘social distancing advice … in the form
of comic video messages’ (2020).
There is, however, a need to make sense of the pandemic as understood
by ordinary people and as engaged with and expressed, from below, using
various social media platforms. Besides Slavoj Žižek’s book Pandemic!
(2020), emerging research on the COVID-19 pandemic is in the form of
journal articles addressing economic, socio-political, health issues associ-
ated with the pandemic, religion and concerns around fake news and
moral panics in specic locales.
This volume therefore occupies a different and yet important space,
making a worthwhile intervention by exploring the negotiations of the
pandemic in the Global South through the use of humour and ridicule on
social media from various angles. There are different ways of engaging
with strife, stress and health scares in different contexts of the globe.
Diseases are not easily spoken about especially when they affect closer rela-
tives. In Africa, the HIV/AIDS pandemic is one such that has been given
nicknames in order to easily talk about. In some instances, a person with
HIV is said to have been ‘beaten by soldiers’ or to be suffering from the
‘disease of these days’. Disclosing one’s status takes courage and is usually
accompanied by exclusion and stereotyping. The meanings drawn from
making a mockery and nding humour in social media in connection with
COVID-19 raise culturally pertinent ethical questions.
S. MPOFU
13
The book project currently comprises 15 chapters addressing how
humour was used on social media to negotiate the COVID-19 pandemic
in the Global South. Citizens and politicians made various interventions in
this regard, among others, critiquing governments in how they handled
the matter, showing governmentality, attempting to desensitize and down-
play the effects and dangers of the pandemic and as therapy to manage
through the pandemic. These chapters are grouped into three sections.
The rst section focuses on meme-making practices and making sense of
the pandemic. Chapters in the section explore how memes were used as
socio-political commentary during health disasters and also as a form of
health communication (Mpofu and Werneck). Besides, other themes
explored are how memes were used for the purposes of stress relief as they
were shared for laughter and light-hearted therapeutic moments. In this
playfulness, Msimanga etal. suggest, was imbedded some forms of subver-
sion of science as conspiracy theories abound.
The second section largely focuses on gender, race and familial identi-
ties. Here feminist humour interrogated. Phiri specically demonstrates
how women owned their narrative and framed these within the broader
societal context. Ndlovu looks at how sharing of jokes and laughter
brought South Africans together as a nation. Ponono uses decolonial love
as lenses to highlight contradictory emotions of laughter and anger as
emblematic of structural issues in South Africa.
The third and nal s n ectioof the book focuses on humour as weapons
of the weak used to undermine political authority. Through a Foucauldian
discourses analysis, Mbinjama-Gamatham’s chapter casts light on how
people made sense of ANC’s corruption. Ndlovu, in the next chapter,
argues that WhatsApp memes were used as counter-public spheres largely
for subversive purposes by the disenfranchised members of society. In a
related chapter, Parray studies the use of humour during the pandemic in
India. Parray observes that the Janata Curfew memes circulated in India
and beyond were largely targeted at the Prime Minister, Modi, after he
urged countrymen and women to clap hands and bang plates in honour of
frontline workers. The humour that followed blurred the lines of humour,
ridicule, comedy, trolling, threats and violence in India’s emergent cul-
tures. Wangui and Omwoha’s chapter shines a spotlight on how Kenyans
used humour was used for communicative, entertainment and political
commentary. Mpofu concludes the section and volume with a critical
engagement of dark humour as used by politicians and citizens in South
Africa and Zimbabwe.
1 SOCIAL MEDIA AND COVID-19: TAKING HUMOUR DURING PANDEMICS…
14
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S. MPOFU
PART I
Meme-making Practices and Making
Sense of the Pandemic
19© The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature
Switzerland AG 2021
S. Mpofu (ed.), Digital Humour in the Covid-19 Pandemic,
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-79279-4_2
CHAPTER 2
Social Media Memes asCommentary
inHealth Disasters inSouth Africa
andZimbabwe
ShepherdMpofu
IntroductIon
Is it okay to meme and laugh during the pandemic? What does laughter
mean amidst a crisis? This research attempts to answer these questions by
exploring humor during health disasters and pandemics. New media is
increasingly shaping the communicative spheres in South African and
Zimbabwean communities further inuencing socio-political and eco-
nomic debates especially from below. This study is a comparative case
study of how South Africans and Zimbabweans humorously dealt with the
COVID-19 pandemic by engaging in meme composing, spreading and
consumption. The choice of Zimbabwe and South Africa is informed by
that the countries are neighbors and their economies are shared and in
some cases the pandemic was transferred across borders leading to a need
for cooperatively dealing with the pandemic. In addition, there are a lot of
S. Mpofu (*)
University of Limpopo, Polokwane, South Africa
e-mail: shepherd.mpofu@ul.ac.za
20
Zimbabweans based in South Africa leading to citizens sharing informa-
tion, fears and aspirations across the borders. Moreover, whenever
announcements like lockdown regulations were made by South African
authorities, these inuenced Zimbabwe vice versa. On the analysis of
humor and health crises in South Africa, I specically chose to use the lis-
teriosis case, a foodborne disease which started in late 2017 and was con-
tained around and declared over in September 2018, and COVID-19
pandemic.
Listeriosis caused some health scares, killed 218 people, with 1065
cases conrmed and left some with life-long medical conditions
(Whitworth, 2020). It started at a ready-to-eat processed polony meat
factory in one of South Africa’s provinces, Polokwane. The World Health
Organization declared the outbreak ‘the largest recorded globally to date’
(Grobler, 2020). Listeriosis was not declared a pandemic. At the begin-
ning of March in 2018, South Africa’s Minister of Health Aaron Motsoaledi
released what became breaking news that day: the nding by scientists that
two particular companies were responsible for releasing into the market
food that caused listeriosis leading to the death of 180 people and, later,
birth of disabled children. While this alarmed and scared a lot of people
when they realized that the processed foods they had hitherto been con-
suming were responsible for the outbreak, some people took to social
media to express their views about the health threat. Similarly, when the
COVID-19 started spreading across the globe, there were few cases in
South Africa and memes raptured the digital sphere where ordinary peo-
ple expressed their views, some of which were couched on invincibility
born out of the fact that they survived Listeriosis. Listeriosis did not affect
Zimbabwe, but COVID-19 affected both countries. At the time of writ-
ing this chapter, a Google search for ‘COVID-19 memes’ returned
1,780,000,000 hits in 0.59seconds.
The novel coronavirus of 2019, which became known as COVID-19,
is a respiratory disease caused by the coronavirus, transmitted via droplets
that are produced when infected people sneeze, cough or exhale. The
subsequent droplets, too heavy to remain oating in the air, land on sur-
faces and oors, and the virus survives for a considerable amount of time.
As of September 30, 2020, the COVID-19 pandemic had infected 34.1
million people with 23.7 million recoveries and 1.02 million fatalities
globally. These numbers rose to 107 million infected, 60 million recov-
ered and around three million deaths. A number of scientists are not
agreeing on the origin of the virus. Some claim the virus originated in bats
S. MPOFU
21
and later spread to pangolins and humans. The rst person to catch the
virus possibly from a pangolin was a ‘someone in the now world-famous
Huanan seafood market in Wuhan’ (Readfearn, 2020). Others argued that
‘samples from a Wuhan food market initially suspected as a path for the
virus’s spread to humans, failed to show links between animals being sold
there and the pathogen’ with one scientist declaring that ‘it now turns out
that the market was one of the victims’ (Areddy, 2020).
However, evidence suggests that Chinese authorities covered up the
outbreak, to an extent of silencing Li Wenliang, a medical doctor who rst
raised alarm about the virus in December 2019. He died of the virus in
February 2020. Prior, police targeted him, leading to his arrest for ‘dis-
turbing social order’ and ‘spreading rumors …after he posted a warning
on social media about a cluster of cases of u-like disease that had been
treated at his hospital [with] symptoms that reminded him of SARS’
(Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome). He was released after signing a
statement where he agreed ‘not to discuss his concerns in public again’
(Graham-Harrison etal., 2020). Li later broke that oath at his hospital
bed and said ‘If the ofcials had disclosed information about the epidemic
earlier… I think it would have been a lot better. There should be more
openness and transparency’ (Buckley & Lee Myers, 2020). This cast into
the spotlight the Chinese authoritarian regime’s control and suppression
of freedoms of expression and limited democratic rights extended to citi-
zens. This, later, caused a diplomatic spat between the USA and China,
with America’s then president Donald Trump threatening to punish China
for spreading what he called the ‘China virus’ to the rest of the world. On
the other hand, a Chinese ofcial tweeted that the virus was from America.
The pandemic did not only end with diplomatic spats as according to the
United Nations Secretary General, ‘the pandemic continues to unleash a
tsunami of hate and xenophobia, scapegoating and scare-mongering’
against Chinese, Asians and people of Asian extract (Human Rights
Watch, 2020).
In this chapter I pay focus on health communication via Internet memes
by examining the extent to which a national tragedy and an international
pandemic were turned mediated through jokes for different purposes.
Data for this study were gathered from three social media platforms:
WhatsApp, Twitter and Facebook. Data were gathered though digital eth-
nography whereby the author monitored and collected memes relating to
the two diseases and analyzed them using narrative analysis.
2 SOCIAL MEDIA MEMES AS COMMENTARY IN HEALTH DISASTERS…
22
Social media platforms are communicative spaces where ordinary peo-
ple interact without any inhibitions or editorializing as is the case with
mainstream media, enhancing freedoms of expression in the process.
These platforms become alternative sites of unbounded communication.
Central to participation in these platforms is access to the technological
hardware and software. Data made available by Statista suggests that of
South Africa’s 59 million people, 36.54 million are Internet users. Of
these, 34.93 million use the Internet on mobile devices (2020). Of these
22 million have access and use various social media platforms with 21.56
million said to be actively using social media. Of Zimbabwe’s 14.9 million
citizens, 8.4 million have access to the Internet (Internet World Stats,
2020). There were 4.8 million Internet users as of January 2020 in
Zimbabwe, an increase of 413,000 from the previous year. Around
980,000 used social media, a 6.6% social media penetration rate. According
to the ofcial statistics from the Posts and Telecommunications Regulatory
Authority of Zimbabwe (Potraz) in 2018, WhatsApp and Facebook are
said ‘to account for about 35% of internet usage in Zimbabwe … Mobile
telephony companies have intensied bundle offerings and promotions for
social media platforms in a bid to secure additional revenue’ (Karombo,
2018). A total of 92% of the people who accessed Facebook did so via
their mobile phones (72.2%), or both mobile and computers (18.9%) or
only via a computer (8.4%). A total of 41.2% of those on Facebook are
females; 168,500 are on Twitter and 78% of these are reportedly male
(Datareportal, 2020).
MeMes culture asPartIcIPatory culture
Memes are artifacts of participatory communications and cultures that are
‘rapidly spread by members of participatory digital culture for the purpose
of continuing a conversation’ (Wiggins & Bowers, 2015, 1886). Memes
in the current communicative ecology play a critical role as versatile multi-
contextualizable visual short-hand tools in communication. Sometimes
they function alone or, as in other cases, have to be accompanied by writ-
ten text. Memes are central to communication in the digital world because
they are relatable, people easily get attracted to images, they add a funny
avor to communication, they are dynamic and therefore attention grab-
bing, they can easily be adapted to different contexts without losing mean-
ing and as popular cultural fades, most people are familiar with them. They
are a universal language.
S. MPOFU
23
The concept of the meme was propounded by evolutionary biologist
Richard Dawkins (1976) in his seminal book The selsh gene. In this book
Dawkins dened a meme as similar to a gene in the biosphere, that is, ‘a
molecular unit of people’s bodies, a biological code holding important
information for building and maintaining cells and passing the invaluable
hereditary data to offspring. Memes are similar to the genes in that they
pass cultural information and ideas between individuals and generations’
(Donisova, 2019, 6) in the ideosphere. The word meme came up as a
result of Dawkins’s adulteration of the Greek word ‘mı mema’ because he
wanted ‘a monosyllable that sounds a bit like “gene”’ (Dawkins 1986,
192). For Dawkins memes are:
tunes, ideas, catch-phrases, clothes fashions, ways of making pots or build-
ing arches. Just as genes propagate themselves in the gene pool by leaping
from body to body via sperms or eggs, so memes propagate themselves in
the meme pool by leaping from brain to brain via a process which, in the
broad sense, can be called imitation. If a scientist hears, or reads about, a
good idea, he passes in on his colleagues and students. He mentions it in his
articles or lectures. If the idea catches on, it can be said to propagate itself,
spreading from brain to brain…. (1989, 1920)
In essence memes have a life of their own as they move from brain to
brain just like parasites of viruses which, when they get into host bodies
replicate and propagate. Imitation, for Dawkins, is the way memes repli-
cate, but, just like genes, some memes may be more successful than others.
This is because Dawkins viewed memes as selsh and virulent as they
‘sought replication for the purpose of its own survival…competing to
infect individual minds and use those minds for replication…’ (Wiggins &
Bowers, 2015, 1889). There are many ways to measure the popularity and
success of the replication of memes. For instance, when it comes to music,
the popularity will depend on how many people are heard and even seen
singing and dancing to a particular tune. For instance, in 2020, a South
African artist, Master KG, became a global sensation with his song
Jerusalema, which led to people watching and even doing the dance moves
copied from the song and posting these online. So popular was the song
that the South African president, Cyril Ramaphosa, encouraged South
Africans to do the dance challenge and post videos online as a way of cel-
ebrating cultural day. This, partly, was a meant as a coping mechanism
during the COVID-19 pandemic. A few years back, South Korean singer,
2 SOCIAL MEDIA MEMES AS COMMENTARY IN HEALTH DISASTERS…
24
PSY, released a song, Gangnam Style, that became a sensation too, becom-
ing the rst clip to surpass ‘the one billion-view mark’ (Shifman, 2014, 1).
In the media spaces, Hofstadter is probably one of the few scholars who
took memes literally and even suggested that they will compete for space
in traditional media such as ‘radio and television time, billboard space,
newspaper and magazine column inches and library shelf-space’
(Hofstadter, 1983, 18). Further, Hofstadter, to emphasize the variations
and somewhat malleability of memes, adds that ‘some memes will tend to
discredit others, and some groups of memes will tend to internally self-
reinforcing’ (1983, 18). Later, he claimed that by 1995 the meme had
become real and not metaphorical (Burman, 2012). In the academic cir-
cles, the term meme was rejected and dismissed but, as Shifman (2014, 1)
observes, it has come back through the Windows (and other operating
systems of course) and there is a respectable amount of scholarship around
memes to accentuate this fact (Brideau & Charles, 2014, Shifman, 2013,
Shifman & Thelwall, 2009, Denisova 2019, Blackmore, 2010).
Dawkins’s concept of memes was criticized for various reasons. First,
memes are much more complex than being ‘direct counterparts in pre-
serving and distributing culture…They are not reliable in delivering accu-
rate information yet are benecial for the development of ideas: people
can ll them with additional details and foster new meaning and style of
expression’ (Donisova, 2019, 7). Another criticism that has been leveled is
that there was no need to come up with a new word, meme, when you
have the word ‘idea’ already (Brown, 2014). Dawkins, according to
Disonova (2019, 7), revisited the denitional issues of the meme and sug-
gested that ‘users create memes to deliberately hijack the original cultural
text; thus, the choice and decisions of people drive memes forward’ (see
also Dawkins & Marshmallow, 2013). Denitionally, the word meme
remains unclear and ‘pinning down precise criteria for something count-
ing as a meme is close to impossible’ (Knobel & Lankshear, 2007, 205).
This includes the setting of boundaries or pinpointing what a meme is. Is
the whole video clip or song a meme or only the chorus is? First stanza or
any other part? Is the picture including the tag line or caption a complete
meme or only the picture alone or tag alone a meme? Memes are different
from ‘iconic images and viral texts that do not experience much alteration.
They are never xed symbols, stories or icons, but interactive aesthetic
artefacts that provide a snapshot of the immediate tendencies of culture
and public discourses’ which alter in appearance, size and modication
(Donisova, 2019, 8).
S. MPOFU
25
Some scholars have come to the rescue, suggesting that we need to look
at memes as a building blocks, units of cultural production and also ‘broader
modes of human knowledge and comprise names, relationship patterns,
principles of society, choices at a trafc light, information about other plan-
ets and solar systems’ (Donisova, 2019, 7–8). Netizens have made memes
ubiquitous, and academics in media, communication and sociology espe-
cially have paid attention to these leading to a growth of scholarship in this
regard. These scholars, especially digital media scholars, use the concept of
the meme as a metaphor (Shifman & Thelwall, 2009; Shifman, 2013, 2014;
Vickery, 2015; Milner, 2016; Wiggins, 2019). It is believed that the rst
Internet memes were emoticons created by a combination of different char-
acters using a keyboard of a computer or mobile phone [e.g. , ]. Internet
memes are polysemic and multi-owned as they are communally created and
their ownership is not settled to any particular province. As Denisova (2019,
3) expounds, memes are ‘empty conduits or layouts that anyone can ll with
meaning or commentary. This means that neither elites nor opposition own
memes; the autonomous and non-aligned character of memes make them
especially worth studying in political research. Memes can change sides and
connotation through their journey in the digital space’.
Internet memes are artifacts that anchor participatory digital cultures.
Human agency is central to virality of memes through ‘distribution, repli-
cation and propagation’ (Wiggins & Bowers 2015, 1890). As Jenkins sug-
gests, participatory cultures are easily accessible to ordinary people as they
have relatively low barriers ‘to artistic expression and civic engagement,
strong support for creating and sharing one’s creations and some type of
informal mentorship whereby what is known by the most experiences is
passed along to novices’ (2009, 3). Vickery is worried about the legal and
academic and cultural issues surrounding memes as ‘intellectual property
and copyright’ (2015, 1450). She argues that this needs to be addressed
because ‘memes are challenging current debates about copyright, sharing,
authorship/anonymity, and fair use’ (Wiggins & Bowers, 2015, 1451).
To this end, Denisova’s observation that ‘A meme does not belong to any
author…[it] belongs to the collective creativity, to the decisions and
benevolence of the Internet crowds. Like it or not, this is the memetic
logic of our days’ (2019, 30). Of critical concern is the skill-sets one has
to have in order to engage with the memes and be part of the popular
culture at production, circulation and consumption levels. As shown
above, technological knowhow, access to enabling technologies and asso-
ciated sundries are critical in the participation in this digital culture. These
2 SOCIAL MEDIA MEMES AS COMMENTARY IN HEALTH DISASTERS…
26
form the basis of a creation of an environment of participatory communi-
cation since memes, ‘as genre are akin to continued conversation between
and among members of participatory digital culture’ (Wiggins & Bowers,
2015, 1894).
Methodology
The colonization of people’s communicative, romantic, working, family
and other functions by the digital technologies has opened up new ave-
nues for data gathering. In this research I used digital ethnography to
gather data. Ethnography, as a research methodology, ‘is about telling
social stories’ (Murthy, 2008, 838). Ethnography is a research method
that is qualitative in nature and involves the researcher immersing herself/
himself in a community of interest that s/he may be interested in investi-
gating. This immersion allows for a rst-hand experience, observation and
interaction with the community’s cultures, relations and in-group dynam-
ics, leading to the production of a report thereafter. This report is known
as the ethnography. This commitment to understanding and documenting
people’s lives comes with ethical challenges.
The author used two different datasets, the listeriosis data and the
COVID-19 data. I used mainly images and not videos as the latter cannot
be reproduced and shared in academic writing. Listeriosis data were gath-
ered from the three above-mentioned social media platforms during the
outbreak. I randomly screen grabbed the memes and led them. About 70
memes were gathered throughout the duration of the disease. I also did the
same for the COVID-19 memes where, by way of sampling, I conveniently
chose some memes shared by South Africans relating to the pandemic in
South Africa and also those that related to Zimbabwe as circulated by
Zimbabweans. About 200 memes were obtained and analyzed. Convenience
sampling is a nonrandom technique whereby a researcher, without the con-
straints of theories or set number of items or participants, ‘decides what
needs to be known and sets out to nd people who can and are willing to
provide the information by virtue’ of having the characteristics and quali-
ties that the researcher is interested in (Etikan etal., 2015, 2). The memes
chosen speak to the humor deployed by South Africans and Zimbabweans
in their negotiation of the listeriosis (for South Africans only) and
COVID-19 for both countries. Usually there was an upsurge of COVID-19-
related memes before, during and after presidential announcements and
updates which were given by South Africa’s president, Cyril Ramaphosa.
S. MPOFU
27
Similarly, in Zimbabwe there was an upsurge after South Africa’s announce-
ment as Zimbabwe’s economy and livelihoods are dependent on South
Africa to an extent that some Zimbabweans joked that Zimbabwe was a
province of South Africa. What is more, Zimbabwe’s lackluster president,
Emmerson Mnangagwa, also issued statements soon after Ramaphosa had
done so, giving an impression of weak undecided leadership.
Digital ethnography, unlike ofine ethnography, is encumbered by
unique ethical concerns that are important to note. While some humorous
messages shared on social media cannot lead to damages to reputation or,
if used by researchers, could not lead to harm to those who post them, it
is important to note that the author is aware of possible damages that
could be caused through highlighting offensive posts or those that may, in
future, be used to identify and or trace subjects or interlocutors (Ferguson,
2017) by re-using them in an academic article. Some issues that I will
mention but not magnify are the fair usage policy that users accent to
when using these online platforms. In addition, where user accounts are
protected, there could be a suggestion of privacy, and therefore research-
ers might need to ask for consent. Added to that, there are certain ques-
tions that one has to ask before using the data they nd on these platforms.
For example, what does it mean when someone uploads data and later
deletes the same? May a researcher use the data?
theoretIcal andconcePtual FraMework
In most cases in South Africa one notices that black people are usually the
rst ones to see the humorous side of anything that happens in society, be it
disastrous or beautiful. Thus, most memes are manufactured in the Black
Social Media Factory. Meme creation is a highly participatory endeavor as in
most cases it is difcult to tell who the originator is. In some instances,
memes are edited, altered, gain new meanings and regain old meaning
depending on context and user identities (see Wiggins & Bowers, 2015).
The countries under study are largely dominated by blacks. These blacks are
not even homogeneous to an extent that they draw different meanings from
similar events, and even jokes. Social media offer citizens participatory plat-
forms. Social media are ‘web based or mobile based communication chan-
nels such as applications, blogs, wikis, social book-markings, social network
sites and online games that afford community based in-put in the form of
creating content, distributing and even co-authoring content for different
ends’ (Mpofu, 2019, 68). The idea of imagined community is here
2 SOCIAL MEDIA MEMES AS COMMENTARY IN HEALTH DISASTERS…
28
strengthened and brought to life as, in some cases, people interact with
people they imagine exist even though they would have not met them phys-
ically. Robots complicate this concept, but as it is beyond the ambit of this
study, I will not pursue the idea further.
Black Social Media is about black witnessing, black discourses, black
ways of being and black storytelling as expressed through social media
platforms such as Facebook, TikTok, Twitter, WhatsApp, among others.
In most cases this is done for identity creation, group identity formation
or solidication or the provocation of laughter or protests. Black Social
Media has been critical in the understanding of current events in most
African countries, especially South Africa where memes make part of the
staple news diet in mainstream media sites. I draw the concept of Black
Social Media from Black Twitter. The denition of Black Twitter dovetails
neatly with that of Black Social Media. According to Williams and
Domoszlai (2013), Black Twitter has one of the most formidable and uni-
ed identities to emerge on Twitter. Black Twitter, according to Mpofu
(2019, 68), ‘does not in any way suggest that it is only for blacks, nor is it
representative of all blacks…the main hallmark of Black Twitter is its
diversity as a community of users discussing issues concerning blacks,
sometimes in a coded language to which only they can relate’. This dem-
onstrates ‘cultural knowledge and insider access’ (Williams & Domoszlai,
2013) by way of signifyin’. Signifyin’ according to Florini (2014, 223) is
performance of ‘racial identity online … which deploys gurative lan-
guage, indirectness, doubleness, and wordplay as a means of conveying
multiple layers of meaning [serving] as a powerful resource for perfor-
mance of Black cultural identity on Twitter’. Signifyn’ is used for ‘social
critique … often [speaking] to shared experiences of Blacks … [it] can be
a response for encoding and expressing experiential knowledge about
Black identities’ (Florini, 2014, 227). In the South African and
Zimbabwean contexts which are part of this study, signifyn’ relates, among
other things, to the critique of the socio-economic and political environ-
ments of the two countries. In South Africa there are huge levels of
inequality between poor blacks and wealthy privileged whites. Many on
Black Social Media also lament the abuse of power and resources by the
ruling elite and connected members. In Zimbabwe, race is not a central
dener of social relations as is the case in South Africa, but the governing
party has visited so much harm to the country pushing many citizens to
the margins, and the experiences they then talk about are of those of trib-
alism and exclusion, neo-colonialism, subjugation and looting of state
S. MPOFU
29
resources by the ruling elite. In both South Africa and Zimbabwe, there
has been the looting of COVID-19 resources through irregular tendering
processes that benet members of the respective ruling parties (Gagné-
Acoulon, 2020; Maseko, 2020; Transparency International, 2020a, 2020b).
lIsterIosIs, IdentIty anddesensItIzatIon
Rossing argues that humor contributes on how we relate in society as it
‘constitutes a public pedagogy that teaches social norms, (re)produces ide-
ology, constructs public memory, manages group afliations and identity
boundaries, and much more’ (2015, 629). One thing that continues to
color relationships in South is the race issue. Hence during health disasters
and other moments of crises, commentaries on race abound. For instance,
the tweet in Fig.2.1 is a commentary on the socio-economic conditions
Fig. 2.1 Emancipatory racial humor challenging race relations in South Africa
2 SOCIAL MEDIA MEMES AS COMMENTARY IN HEALTH DISASTERS…
30
in South Africa. To be black in South Africa, and indeed in the whole
world, is to be a problem and in a state of rage. This rage can only be cre-
atively negotiated through getting by in life via emancipatory humor. The
discussant uses emancipatory racial humor as she complains that her post
was removed from Facebook. Racial humor can take two directions. It can
be retrogressive and advance white superiority and domination (Billig,
2005; Weaver, 2011; Mpofu, 2019). On the other hand, it could be pro-
gressive and upset or challenge white domination while advancing the
dignity and humanity of the people of color (Walker, 1998).
When one reads the post, one is tickled to laugh, not that it is funny,
but at the truthfulness of the country’s economic situation and attempts
at muzzling commentary that exposes the country and leadership’s fail-
ures. South Africa has, in recent years, been unwelcoming to immigrants
doing business in the townships or menial jobs such as child minding,
gardening construction or hailer transport or truck driving. Many have
had their small shops vandalized, cars stoned, burnt and looted. The
Guptas are Indian brothers who allegedly used their proximity to Jacob
Zuma, while he was still president of the country to do business with state
departments. They allegedly inuenced the president in appointing minis-
ters and strategic personnel in parastatals for business expediency.
Emancipatory racial humor ‘functions as a vital participant in this struggle
over knowledge, identity, power relationships, and agency… [and] proves
“emancipatory” because it brings to the forefront perspectives and knowl-
edge that challenge dominant realities, and therefore it bears potential for
promoting critical questioning and reection about racial oppression’
(Rossing, 2015, 615). This type of humor fosters a ‘critical consciousness
about racial identity, racism, and privilege, such humor could help people
identify, criticize, and ultimately begin to transform hegemonic racism’
(ibid, 2015, 625). The suggestion here is that the case of listeriosis was
negligence on the part of Tiger Brands and that, as a white-owned or
white-dominated company, they were not punished because whites domi-
nate the South African economy. Thus, there is ‘deployment of humor and
creation of space where marginalized groups can speak outside of oppres-
sive discourse’ (Billingsley, 2013, 20).
The humor departs from the mainstream and ofcial imagining of
South Africa in the mainstream public sphere and attempts to offer an
alternative and counterhegemonic reading of society. Another meme
addressed the issue of class. There was a story in the news that supermar-
ket Woolworths had recalled its rice due to fears that it could have been
S. MPOFU
31
infected with listeriosis. One meme meant to address this suggested that it
was not a big problem if Woolworths’s shoppers got the disease as ‘all the
people who buy food at Woolworths got Medical Aid…So there is noth-
ing to worry about ’. Here some blacks use their digital leisure time and
spaces to confront systems of power and ‘inciting radical thought’ (Outley
etal., 2020, 3) through the ‘strategic use of humour to criticize powerful
institutions, to provoke self-reection and to raise awareness’ (Cameron,
2015, 285) about things that should matter in South African society. The
humor addresses class and other disparities in South African economy and
consumer market. Woolworths is deemed a supermarket where the privi-
leged shop and therefore inaccessible to the poor. The meme suggests also
that the poor were at the mercy of the pandemic. While others may argue
that joking about poverty is unethical, in this instance, I argue that it is risk
worth taking as this helps people nd common ground and have public
engagements about subjects that matter (Weinberger & Gulas, 1992;
Cameron, 2015).
Besides offering incisive commentary on race and class, humor on liste-
riosis bordered dark humor, that is, on the desensitization of death and
suffering. Figure 2.2 is a collection of memes addressing the issues of
desensitization to death and health pandemics and also commentary on
the citizens’ perceptions about the disease and life in general. The humor
and laughter prompted by these assists in the release of tension, as argued
by Freud who suggested that some humorous moments benet in the
release of energy that is not needed (see Martin, 2007). Death is deprived
of its sting and seriousness in the process and acts as a buffer for stress
among other health benets especially for those who are grieving.
The use of a condom as a protective measure employed when eating
sausages could be linked to protective measures used in the managing of
HIV/AIDS epidemic in South Africa which has killed a lot of black peo-
ple. Just like the irresistible lure of sex, which is dangerous especially when
recklessly practiced, the lure of the sausage seems equally tantalizing such
that there is a suggestion to nd creative ways of eating it and avoiding
contracting the disease. However, not all are agreed that it is ethical to
make fun of deathly circumstances as one interlocuter suggests through a
meme showing one of South Africa’s ministers ‘leaving’. The interlocuter
decries that despite the death of almost ‘200 black lives and we have the
audacity to nd humour in it through nonsensical memes and videos’. But
as Kozintsev suggests laughter allows us to engage with certain issues,
death included, in a certain way that discounts cultural boundedness and
2 SOCIAL MEDIA MEMES AS COMMENTARY IN HEALTH DISASTERS…
32
Fig. 2.2 Laughing and contesting laughter in the face of health disasters
and death
S. MPOFU
33
‘liberation from one’s own sufferings and the fear of death’ (Kozintsev,
2020, 144–145). Whatever the case could be, death, as Freud summarizes
human life, ‘is the necessary termination of life, that everyone of us owes
nature his death and must be prepared to pay his debt, in short, that death
was natural, undeniable, and inevitable’ (Freud, 1918, 7). Jokes on and
about death make death less scary, less powerful and, to a certain extent,
less nal. The humorous reactions to listeriosis were partly informed by
the fact that people have had to contend with HIV/AIDS and have found
ways to live with it through medication and using condoms and that
emboldened some to believe that listeriosis was also containable. The
management of these diseases informed attitudes and humorous
approaches towards the COVID-19 global pandemic in 2020.
COVID-19 inSouth Africa
There is no denying that during pandemics and other moments of crisis,
humor is critical in the release of humor and stress (Akinola, 2018). Some
memes and discussions shared especially on Twitter, while expressing fear
that ‘this could be virus to eradicate human kind’, also suggested the
importance of humor as people needed to laugh because ‘what else can we
do but laugh angusho bathi (translation: isn’t they say) laughter is the best
medicine’ (Fig.2.3).
As Levine (1977) observes, we tend to laugh at our predicament and
ourselves in moments of powerlessness and this is indicative of our power-
lessness to inuence our circumstances for the better. In South Africa
humor addressed corruption, signifyin’ around presidential announce-
ments and public failures, the excitement of the arrival of the disease in
South Africa and various lockdown stages, especially the banning and sub-
sequent permission for the sale of alcohol and cigarettes.
South Africa: Fellow South Africans,
Ramabillions, #Coronaviruschallenge
When the rst Level 5 total lockdown was announced and national state
of disaster declared on March 23, 2020, the president assured the nation
that it would last for 21days. This was in response to the spread of the
coronavirus, and the lockdown was ‘a decisive measure to save lives of
South Africans from infections and to save lives of hundreds of thousands
of our people’ (Anon, 2020). Lockdown measures were so strict that
2 SOCIAL MEDIA MEMES AS COMMENTARY IN HEALTH DISASTERS…
34
people had to leave their homes only to seek medical care, buy food, or if
they were health care or emergency workers. Soldiers were deployed to
reinforce the police in ensuring the public followed the orders. With of-
cial unemployment rate at 30%, the president was alive to the fact that the
measures announced would have ‘a considerable impact on people’s liveli-
hoods, on the life of our society and on our economy, the human cost of
delaying this action would be far, far greater’ (Anon, 2020). The govern-
ment promised some form of nancial cushion to those who lost their
livelihoods and the presidency and ministers took salary cuts. Two weeks
later, he extended the lockdown and announced that the country had seen
an exponential rise of infections from just less than 600 to 340,000 con-
rmed cases, with, at that time, 1.5 million people conrmed to be
COVID-19 positive and 90,000 dead globally. He extended the lockdown
by a further two weeks and appealed ‘Fellow South Africans. This evening,
I stand before you to ask you to endure even longer… I have to ask you to
Fig. 2.3 Appreciation of humor a few months after the pandemic came to South
Africa and few weeks after the commencement of lockdown at level 5
S. MPOFU
35
make even greater sacrices so that our country may survive this crisis and
so that tens of thousands of lives may be saved’ (Ramaphosa, 2020).
When lockdown started and the wearing of masks enforced, ordinary
citizens started a #CoronaVirusChallenge social media hashtag where they
‘mocked’ the virus by sharing various silly makes of protective masks such as
condoms, bras, shoes and so on. Again, we go back to the HIV/AIDS epi-
demic whereby people thought COVID-19 could be prevented by the same
means as HIV.Besides, the suggestion was that listeriosis was conquered,
and, since most people live with HIV for long, then COVID-19 was going
to be managed. In some instances, referring to it as ‘made in China’ sug-
gested that, just like cheap Chinese clothes, blankets and electric gadgets
that abound in the informal markets and accessed mostly by the poor, the
virus was not going to last. One meme that was shared across social media
platforms read: ‘The Chinese might have the smallest dicks in the world but
they managed to f*ck us all Anyway size doesn not matter’. Others had
women’s pads worn over their nose. These forms of self- deprecating humor
not only made fun of the actors but also showed unison in self-mockery.
However, these jokes, it would seem, demonstrated the fact that most peo-
ple had not realized the devastating effects of the COVID-19 pandemic. Of
course, some of the bravado was informed by the fact that South Africa
managed to eradicate listeriosis and the health sector was ‘managing’ HIV/
AIDS.As time went on, the bravado wore out, and memes became fewer
only to reappear around the times of presidential addresses.
During the speeches, South Africans drew some laughter with the
President’s mode of address such as ‘Fellow South Africans’ and his dem-
onstration on how to greet using an elbow and his failure to put on a mask
on national television. He ended up being referred as FellowSouthAfricans
and his addresses were code named ‘family meetings’. In addition, he
promised an economic stimulus of 500 billion Rand, some of which ended
up being ‘lost’ through corruption whose beneciaries were connected to
the ruling ANC.For that he was referred to as Ramabillion and this was
entertainment-cloaked critique of the possible corruption and mystery
surrounding the money as most were sure it was not going to serve its
purpose. He was also referred to as RaMask and this was a triple-play on
his name and parody on his failure to wear a mask and the corruption that
involved R500bn. It would seem that Ramaphosa was aware of some of
the fun poked at him by the public as he acted on them and started vary-
ing, for instance, how he opened his addresses to the nation and calling his
national addresses ‘family meetings’. He also mentioned some instances
where he was made fodder of parody. As Obadare says in disagreeing with
2 SOCIAL MEDIA MEMES AS COMMENTARY IN HEALTH DISASTERS…
36
Mbembe’s (1992, 2), assertion that humor and ridicule directed towards
the commandment ‘does not do violence to the commandment material
base’ ‘it seems plausible that humour actually does perturb the command-
ment’ (2009, 248). The memes that were later shared including these
formulated and playful names signifyin’ many different things showed an
understanding of power by ordinary citizens, the subaltern, to caricature
the president, ‘subvert authority, and in some cases empower themselves’
(Obadare, 2009, 245). Thus, ordinary people found creative ways of get-
ting around the curfews and banning of alcohol.
Corruption
As already indicated, citizens did not expect any transparency on the use and
allocation of COVID-19 funds, and the labels Ramabillion and RaMask,
among others, were prophetic. And this prophesy was based on how cor-
ruption has been banal, institutionalized and normalized (Ashforth &
Anand, 2003). When Ramaphosa announced the stimulus packages—the
billions—he assured the nation not even a cent will be lost through corrup-
tion. By April 2020 there were reports of corruption especially by political
leaders involving food parcels for the poor. Not long into the pandemic, the
president’s spokesperson and her husband were ngered in a R125 million
tender fraud for the provision of personal protective equipment (PPE)
(Moche, 2020). There were reports of alleged corruption throughout the
country, and in most cases some senior ruling party ofcials were involved.
This led to the sharing of memes not only mocking the president for ‘pull-
ing a mask over our eyes’ as he did on the fateful day when he failed to cover
his mouth and nose with a mask and instead got the mask caught over his
eyes. People started questioning the sincerity and the trust business, media
and ordinary people had shown towards him. This was done in comparison
to the former president, Jacob Zuma. One meme read ‘South African media
is very dangerous, it’s a #Propaganda machine on steroids they were very
vocal about R250MILLION #Nkandla upgrade now silent when
#Ramaphosa blew #R500BILLION while #PravinGordhan’s #Eskom blew
R4Bln & R149BILLION facilitated by #AndreDeRuyter #JanOberholzer’.
The R250 million the discussant refers to above is the money that was
used to upgrade Zuma’s rural home, at Inkandla, and this led to him
being accused of corruption and he had to pay part of that money to the
state. In addition, as one discussant notes, Zuma’s alleged handlers, the
Guptas, who contributed to what is currently known as State Capture
S. MPOFU
37
(Meirotti & Masterson, 2018), #Guptas stole almost R40bn over period
of 8years #Ramabillions ’. This comparison is telling it would seem.
The laughing emojis signal the comic nature of politics and laughs at
everyone across the board who thought Ramaphosa was a different breed
of a leader. Some blamed the president for being slow, hence the snail
meme. Previously there has been moments when the president has failed
to act on xenophobia, protests, violence and so on timeously despite his
campaign themed Thuma mina (Send me) (February, 2019). This
informed the following meme of him as a snail (Fig.2.4) and in a way sug-
gested that, even not corrupt himself, he was role modeling corruption by
acting slowly (Kelman, 1973; Ashforth & Anand, 2003).
Fig. 2.4 Ramaphosa has been accused of being slightly behind the news and cur-
rent affairs. Social media commentary suggesting his snail-like pace also alludes to
being not pro-active in terms of having plans to curb corruption
2 SOCIAL MEDIA MEMES AS COMMENTARY IN HEALTH DISASTERS…
38
Zimbabwe: Humorless State andProtest
When the COVID-19 pandemic started, to spread across the globe and
panic abound, Zimbabwe’s Defence Minister, among other conspiracy the-
orists, said the virus was God’s punishment of the USA and Europe for
imposing sanctions on Zimbabwe. Sanctions were imposed on selected indi-
viduals within the ruling Zanu-Pf, and these were as a response by the West
to the lack of democracy in Zimbabwe (Ndebele, 2020). However, while
some believed COVID-19 would not affect black people in areas where
there is hot weather, the coronavirus, it seems, was not limited to race or
weather as it affected Zimbabwe and claimed the lives of some political lead-
ers. With the criminalization of fake news around the pandemic, it seems the
state would not ‘see’ humor in citizens’ reactions to the pandemic. The
reaction to the pandemic, in some cases, especially where lamentations of
clueless and uninspiring leadership offered by President Mnangagwa were
concerned, bordered on comparing the leadership provided by Ramaphosa
to Mnangagwa’s. Even though not a meme, but to highlight this point,
when Ramaphosa extended lockdown days, one Zimbabwean, Lovemore
Zvokusekwa, published a communique to the nation which had the govern-
ment letterhead and President Mnangagwa’s signature purporting to have
extended the lockdown by a further 13days. The police claimed that the
‘Accused then disseminated the false press statement on different WhatsApp
platforms using his cellphone Huawei 6 Pro serial number 861855030065887
and 861855030082163 with Econet line number 0772103312, yet in
actual fact, the President of the Republic of Zimbabwe His Excellency
Emmerson Mnangagwa did not make or neither sign that press statement’
(Vinga, 2020). Instead of seeing the act as funny and mischievous,
Mnangagwa threated: ‘That is absolutely nonsense, I have never made such
a statement. If we catch this person, it must be exemplary and they must go
in for at least at level 14, which is 20 years’ imprisonment. That, I think we
need to demonstrate that we don’t want false news to be circulated’
(Aljazeera, 2020).
Zimbabwe’s state appears to be humorless and opposed to Thomas
Jefferson’s advice that a little rebellion by citizens now and then tends to
be a good thing. And Zimbabwe’s neighbors exercised a healthy dose of
this humor. Historically, it seems, poor and repressive states tend to be
humorless. Humor is part of freedom of expression and in these states this
freedom is curtailed. ‘Democracy and humour, as ponticated by Bruner,
tend to ‘develop when there is persistent and effective balance of powers’
S. MPOFU
39
(2005, 151). Conservative states with citizens restricted from humorously
engaging with the state that fail to handle ambiguity and dissensus and
have monolithic rather than turbulent public spheres are sick and humor-
less compared to healthy ones where leaders encourage and provide for
critical and engaged citizenry (see Bruner, 2005). In oppressive societies
like Zimbabwe, history demonstrates that carnivalesque protest can be
used to undermine, oppose, challenge, ‘or at least temporarily relieve,
various forms of oppressive political culture’ (Bruner, 2005, 138).
Besides fake news, Zimbabwe had less humorous approach to the pan-
demic compared to South Africa and reasons could be diverse. Part of the
social media memes shared expressed dark humor and violence. The
Zimbabwean state is excessively violent as leaders appropriate violence as
the only audible language of persuasion and consent. The militarization of
the state speaks largely to force rather than other forms of negotiation and
coercion. Figure 2.5 shows the reection of a violent state on society.
Fig. 2.5 Zimbabwe’s dark humor revealed the violent state of affairs during the
pandemic
2 SOCIAL MEDIA MEMES AS COMMENTARY IN HEALTH DISASTERS…
40
Violence has become so commonplace in the interaction between citizens
and the government of the day.
Zimbabweans also critiqued government’s lack of preparedness for
handling of the pandemic through poor infrastructural development. One
meme compared the tents pitched for Zanu-Pf’s congress meeting in
December to those pitched for the COVID-19 centers. It appears the
party’s infrastructure was well up to standard compared to the health facil-
ities for the patients suggesting the lack of priorities in the ruling party. In
addition, the meme spoke to issues of corruption. Also ridiculed was the
health of ministers who were claiming to be COVID-19 negative on social
media and some memeists composed memes showing the COVID-19 tests
and a host of many more ailments for these ministers. For instance, Rey
Gwisai Hungwe had his health report composed and shared on Twitter
with positive tests on HIV, Syphilis, ‘Genital Herps’, Gonorrhea, Pubic
Lice and others.
Critiques of poor leadership and corruption were also the subject of
memes. Interestingly, Mnangagwa seemed to take a cue on addressing the
nation from Ramaphosa to an extent that some memes and jokes shared
pointed that out and went on to declare Zimbabwe a province of South
Africa and Ramaphosa the country’s president. President Ramaphosa,
even though not a good model of leadership during a crisis compared to
others like Germany’s Angela Merkel, New Zealand’s Jacintha Ardern,
Finland’s Sana Marin and Taiwan’s Tsai Ing-wen, was better than
Mnangagwa’s clueless, uninspirational, directionless and ineloquent lead-
ership. It could also be true that since Zimbabwe’s economy is dependent
on South Africa, then citizens were not far off in their commentary and
seeing Ramaphosa as their leader. Humor, in this instance, was used to
highlight Mnangagwa’s shortcomings and drive home a message that
Zimbabweans were on their own, leaderless during a crisis. In addition, it
also worked as a stress reliever, making people cope with the pandemic and
effects of lockdown through laughter.
To highlight corruption at state level, one meme read ‘3 hours after the
World Health Organisation announces that all countries with conrmed
cases of COVID-19 will get assistance of 500 million USD from it,
Zimbabwe announces its rst case of Covid 19 ☺ ☺’. Thereafter there
were cases of corruption involving the Minister of Health who was later
red, some businessman and President Mnangagwa’s son. The journalists
who exposed the corruption were arrested and hunted down by the state
security agents. Tawanda Mucheiwa, the nephew of an online newspaper
journalist Mduduzi Mathuthu, was abducted and tortured by security
S. MPOFU
41
agents. The act was caught on camera and no arrests were made by the state
despite overwhelming evidence implicate state security agents. Mathuthu
went into hiding, while another journalist Hopwell Chino’no was arrested
spending a month in maximum prison without trial. This highlights the
levels of corruption in a state which has a rapacious appetite for treating the
state as a site of eating and self-aggrandizement and use of violence to silence
dissenters and those who shine light on the dark corners to expose corrup-
tion. In a way, while the memes signaled the coming corruption, when the
corruption started it could have been too much to fathom and there were
no further memes made and shared laughing at corruption, but protests
were organized and quashed by Zimbabwe’s military regime.
conclusIon
Internet memes and social media humor are a critical social phenomenon
in human conversation about politics, social issues, economy, politics, cri-
ses, pandemics and all issues concerning human life. This chapter has
touched on the use of humor, as a weapon of the powerless, in South
Africa and Zimbabwe during South Africa’s listeriosis times and both
countries’ experiences with the global COVID-19 pandemic. In dealing
with both listeriosis and COVID-19, South Africans had to engage with
the painful apartheid past and its consequences and corruption from the
current ruling elites. Thus, Black Social Media used its digital leisure,
spaces and resources to challenge the system, that is, white monopoly cap-
ital and industry by critiquing the system under the black government via
laughter and uncomfortable memes and commentary (Outley et al.,
2020). Besides, ordinary citizens appreciated humor as a way of manag-
ing, getting by and enduring their fear of the virus. Both the Zimbabwean
and South African citizens dealt with their fears, corruption and challenges
of leadership using memes and in some cases this signaled desensitization.
Desensitization leads to ordinary people engaging in immoral or violent
acts without thinking about their consequences and effects on their sub-
jects and even society. In addition, desensitization numbs moral and
humane responses to situations such as sympathy or empathy (Sanchez,
2020). Be that as it may, Internet memes remain a central language in the
digitally colonized space of human communication and interaction as it
helps society critique, question, desensitize, rebel and correct itself. It also
allows power to escape, play along or threaten the subjects and citizens,
depending on the depth of a particular citizenship in a given state.
2 SOCIAL MEDIA MEMES AS COMMENTARY IN HEALTH DISASTERS…
42
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2 SOCIAL MEDIA MEMES AS COMMENTARY IN HEALTH DISASTERS…
47© The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature
Switzerland AG 2021
S. Mpofu (ed.), Digital Humour in the Covid-19 Pandemic,
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-79279-4_3
CHAPTER 3
Viral Jokes: Humour andGrace asCritical
Devices inMemes About theCOVID-19
Pandemic inBrazil
AlexandreWerneck
IntroductIon
Images like the Fig.3.1 have become a regular part of Brazilian everyday
lives since the start of the COVID-19 pandemic, especially for those of us
on social media. The meme1 has become one of the most habitual signs in
contemporary communication (Mina, 2019), and its presence during a
period like the coronavirus pandemic would be expected. As I have shown
in other texts, even at moments of social commotion surrounding
tragedies—as in outbreaks of violence (Werneck, 2020b)—when some
A. Werneck (*)
Federal University of Rio de Janeiro (UFRJ), Rio de Janeiro, Brazil
e-mail: av.werneck@ifcs.ufrj.br
This chapter presents results of the project Ostentatious Moralism: A Study of the
Role of Accusatory Critics in Public and Private Worlds, nanced by the National
Council for Scientic and Technological Development (CNPQ), through its research
productivity grant, which I thank for the support.
48
kind of routine can be established, a space for humour also becomes pos-
sible. Equally, as I have also demonstrated elsewhere (Werneck, 2015,
2016, 2019; Werneck & Loretti, 2018), this deployment of humour is
more than just a proofof wit and cleverness: it is usually associated with
the circulation of critique—whether using the dynamic of critique to make
jokes, or using humour to make critiques. In the image, we see President
Jair Bolsonaro become the target of a ‘mocking’ (a zoação: Werneck,
2015) in which his ‘mouth’ is criticized—that is, his recurrent hapless
remarks concerning the health crisis, in a gallery that spans from denial of
the risk potential of the virus to prioritization of economic aspects over the
need to preserve life, accompanied by his proposal of controversial ‘alter-
native’ treatments. In the joke, the protective mask, an essential device in
the pandemic discourse—and in some public situations in which the politi-
cian proved unable to use them (Alfano, 19/03/2020)—is transformed
into stick tape, a form of preventing him from speaking, which in the
universe of the joke would be a public health measure.
The argument I have been exploring in the aforementioned previous
works is that the formal matrix (Werneck & Loretti 2018) of a humorous
critique—that is, the composition of its formal elements—plays a role in
its effectuation (Werneck, 2012),2 both in private situations or one-off
interactions (Werneck, 2015) and in public situations (Werneck & Loretti
2018; Werneck, 2016, 2019, 2020b). Furthermore, this involves the
Fig. 3.1 ‘Brazilian
scientists create a mask
capable of saving
millions of lives.’ (All
images are taken from
the Internet)
A. WERNECK
49
deployment of a specic process, the ridiculing (Billig, 2005) of the object
of the critique (whether this is a practised action or its practitioner): its
worth3 (Boltanski & Thévenot, 1991) is reduced to a condition of laugh-
able absurdity. When mobilized as a platform for critique, this joking reg-
ister provides the latter with the construction of a singular observer capable
of effectuating the critique employing this reduction to the ridiculous,
without needing to undergo the rationalist protocol of testing (épreuve)
(ibid), in which proofs and logical arguments are carefully evaluated. As
such, the process raties the idea of a transitory truth (Nielsen,
2019/04/01) to be accepted without any further evaluation. Consequently,
the deployment of the grace of inspiration (Boltanski & Thévenot, ibid)
proper of humour assumes a prominent role in the operationalization of
critiques. Grace is a competence rooted in inspiration—on creativity and
singularity, in other words—whose evaluation thereby replaces any evalu-
ation of the specic content of the critique.
The point I wish to highlight here is that in situations like that of the
pandemic in which there is a vast, monumental transformation of routine,
a threefold process becomes established: an investigation (Dewey, 1938),
indenition (Werneck, 2020a), and routinization, which is sustained to a
signicant extent by critique and benets remarkably from humour
towards this end. This process turns on the same fundamental social phe-
nomenon: the denition of the situation, that is, ‘a stage of examination
and deliberation […] preliminary to any self-determined act of behaviour’
(Thomas (1966[1923], 42) and that says what is happening there, allowing
humans to treat these situations as ‘real in their consequences’ (Thomas &
Thomas, 1938[1928], 572), that is, a denition capable of generating
effects, effectuating itself (Werneck, 2012). In each of these three stages,
a relation with this denition is established with the critique on the hori-
zon, the moral evaluation of things becoming a central element of the
equation.
To understand how memes expressed these different regimes for den-
ing the pandemic’s general situation in Brazil, I promoted a collection of
these circulating signs in the country in the period between March (when
our isolation experience began) and August 2020 and proceeded with a
semiotic analysis. The observations presented here are based on a sample
of around 350 unique memes (in this universe, there exist many versions
of the same sign) in a sample space of more than 500. The research showed
how different critical investments took place at each stage of the pandemic
and how the memes mirrored these phases.
3 VIRAL JOKES: HUMOUR AND GRACE AS CRITICAL DEVICES IN MEMES…
50
A series of humour formal variables can be identied in the memes cir-
culating during the pandemic.4 This chapter, though, concentrates on the
critical directions chosen by them and their political dimension. In so
doing, it dialogues with an expansive area of studies on the use of humour
in public protests—in which I include my recent work (T’Hart & Bos,
2008; Beckman, 2014; Yacintas, 2015; Werneck, 2015, 2016, 2019,
2020b; King, 2016; Trnka & Rehak, 2018; Werneck & Loretti, 2018).
However, this emphasis on critique seeks to understand this political
dimension rst and foremost as a morality game: the question is which
conceptions of good are deployed to support the critical discourse that
encounters a fertile soil in the transition between routines caused by the
pandemic and the health measures—made explicit in the critiques in the
way in which these goods are disrespected/disregarded. It was possible to
observe that these concepts of good took a metonymic form: the critical
targets have served as a form of this characterization.
The wave of memes on the pandemic in Brazil seems to have followed
three distinct movements (regimes) in four different temporal registers,
and the chapter structure follows this movement, each item focused on a
different phase or moment in time, with a focus on the critiques produced
in each moment/phase. The following table summarizes the matrix:
Moment in time Regime
Emergence(end of 2019–Mar
2020)
Investigative
(criticisms motivated by the initial estrangement
with the virus)Isolation(Mar 2020–May 2020)
Start of the plateau(May 2020–Aug
2020)
Routine
(in which the criticisms were consolidated)
Plateau’s consolidation
(Aug 2020–)
‘New normal’
(A new routine, new critiques)
the MeMes PandeMIc andIts dIfferent Phases
The rst stage of the ‘memes pandemic’ could be called, inspired by
Dewey (ibid), investigative in which the jokes represent attempts by actors
to deal with the upheaval in routine caused by the disease. In the rst
moment, this regime initially comprehended the infection as something
mysterious and distant, ‘coming from China’ and still yet to be under-
stood, and, mostly, as a future wave to be awaited. A survey published by
the Public Policy Analysis Directorate (Diretoria de Análise de Políticas
A. WERNECK
51
Públicas: DAPP) of the Getulio Vargas Foundation (FGV) on 28 February
2020 (updated on 9 March) showed that, at the end of the second month
of the year, around 34% of interactions on social media relating to
COVID-19in Brazil were good-humoured or ironic compared to 17%
worried (Camillo 13/03/2020). At that moment, the country had just
recorded the rst conrmed case of the disease. The memes followed a
more or less concentrated trend at the start of the epidemic, their more
typical form reected in the following example:
Figure 3.2 shows a man lying back in a toy oat in oodwaters. Another
example is a meme showing Zé Gotinha (Joe Droplet), a character created
by Brazil’s Ministry of Health in the 1980s as a mascot for its child vacci-
nation campaigns, with the caption: ‘Joe Droplet says in interview that
he’ll beat the hell out of Coronavirus.’ Coronavirus was considered a far-
away danger at the beginning of the year, and the essential information
contained in these jokes expresses some indifference to its risk. Never theless,
they also contained a second layer, self-critical of the country: the disease
originating from China is strong, but Brazil already lives with far too many
misfortunes on an everyday basis and even has its own diseases—for
instance, there are many comparisons with dengue, an endemic consoli-
dated in Brazilian health culture. Coronavirus would be no match, then,
for the country’s reality. Even the claim that Zé Gotinha would beat up
Fig. 3.2 ‘Do you really
think coronavirus will
kill a people like
this? LOL’
3 VIRAL JOKES: HUMOUR AND GRACE AS CRITICAL DEVICES IN MEMES…
52
the virus needs to be read in this context marked by ironic speech
(Herzfeld, 2001), referring here to Brazil’s capacity to deal with the immi-
nent epidemic: the character is repeatedly depicted in the images in a ridic-
ulous form, as a costume worn by an actor pretending to be a superhero
at a child’s birthday party.
For some analysts, this movement suggested that the disease’s closer
experience would adjust the proportion between humour and seriousness
(Camillo, 13/03/2020). They speculated that people would shift from
memes to informative interactions as soon as the situation became clear.
No update was made of the gures of web searches on the topic in Brazil,
partly because they were undoubtedly affected by the dizzying rise in the
total number of mentions of the pandemic on social networks as the year
progressed: on March 11 alone, for example, an international consultancy
rm reported 19 million references to the pandemic (Enberg,
18/03/2020). After all, the idea that the moment was critical simultane-
ously swept the ground from beneath people’s feet, exposing them to the
indeterminacy (Dewey, 1938) and impelling them to become informed
and, at the same time, to start an inquiry. That movement helped them
understand the world, aware by now that they were facing a pandemic of
global dimensions, something easy to comprehend, though still compli-
cated. Then came the government health and economic measures, fol-
lowed by, in the eye of the hurricane of a massive transformation in
people’s routines and behaviours, the physical distancing measures, and
the consequent home quarantine.5 This created a second inquiry move-
ment, thematically redirecting the humorous speech: while previously it
had concentrated on mocking the virus itself, downplaying its potency, as
well as other countries and cultures already affected by it (mostly the
Chinese and Italians), the start of a strange new routine of a lack of routine
imposed by distancing and self-isolation imperatives, situated somewhere
between voluntary and government-ordered, enabled a new zone of inde-
terminacy fed by a new set of critiques.
On the one hand, we nd a new kind of image, the apparent antithesis
of the (ironic) ‘courage’ expressed in the previous case. Now the indeter-
minacy of the future, associated with the hardship of the present, gener-
ates memes like the one in which we can see Hannibal Lecter (Anthony
Hopkins) from the Oscar-winning lm The Silence of the Lambs by Jonathan
Demme (1991) (and another three lms and a series, all based on the
books of the writer Thomas Harris featuring the character), with the cap-
tion: ‘When all the food is gone, we’ll still have each other.’ Famously, the
A. WERNECK
53
plot of the lms revolves around a psychiatrist who became a cannibalistic
killer. Hence the punchline—the part of the joke where the situation set
up previously undergoes a twist, revealing its comical nature—is that,
when spoken by Lecter, an initially optimistic phrase in fact announces an
apocalyptic future. In a second example, we can also observe a high level
of what I have previously described in the context of political demonstra-
tions as mocking the powerful (Werneck, 2019).
Figure 3.3 involves an international viral joke: the debate on life versus
economy—in Brazil, channelled through Jair Bolsonaro’s insistence on
rejecting the guidelines of the World Health Organization (WHO) on
self-isolation, wearing masks and physical distancing—had already become
established in various countries and global news reports as a result of the
denialism of the US President Donald Trump. In the scene with the dino-
saurs watching the giant meteor’s approach to cause their extinction, we
also see tyrannosaurus, a prehistoric reptile known for its colossal power,
saying that it would be bad for the economy. This reveals both the imbe-
cility of the predator (and whoever says the same in real life) and the deni-
alist politician’s character: he can only be a tyrantosaurus.
Generally speaking, the jokes circulating about the pandemic during
this second moment are concentrated on four types of critique, character-
ized by the following targets: government actions; ourselves’ (and others’)
behaviours; the new routine; and discourses about the pandemic them-
selves. Below I briey analyse each type.
Fig. 3.3 ‘Shit, that’ll fuck up the economy!’
3 VIRAL JOKES: HUMOUR AND GRACE AS CRITICAL DEVICES IN MEMES…
54
a GovernMent WIthout Grace andadIsGrace
ofGovernMent: thecoMMon Good Is state care
Critiques of governments, especially their executive branch, tend to be
based on what Boltanski and Thévenot (1991) call a civic world, in which
the common good is founded on the representation of many people by a
mandated representative (which may be a person, like a president, or a
non-human being, like a specialized category or an institution such as the
Ministry of Health). The logic of the authors’ model is grounded in an
‘economy of worth’ (ibid) according to which situations are dened with
the less worthy (the ‘decient’ in terms of worth) depositing their agency
in the hands of the more worthy.6 Thus, the pact that denes what the
authors call a collective polity (cité),7 characteristic of the functioning of the
State and originating from an agreement between the civic polity and the
industrial polity (centred on technical efciency), is based on the idea that
citizens hand over the greater worth to a representative that encompasses
them and promotes their well-being. This submission, in turn, is based on
the fact that the more worthy in the collective polity is to be a legitimate
(civic) representative after having been elected, for example, and, simulta-
neously, to provide proof of one’s executive (industrial) efciency with, for
instance, successful policy initiatives. The joking critiques circulating in
the Brazilian memes aimed at political power throw into question precisely
these two dimensions. Within the Brazilian government itself, a contro-
versy emerged between technical competence—represented by the
Minister of Health8 and state governors, generally following the WHO
guidelines—and political administration, represented primarily by the
president and by certain governors and mayors. Bolsonaro was criticized,
on the one hand, as egoistic (showing more concern with his re-election
than with the health situation, which puts into question the civic legiti-
macy of his power), and, on the other hand, as lacking policy sensitivity
(by showing, as we have seen, more concern with economic issues than
health issues, which questions the industrial legitimacy of the mandatary).
Thus, we see a large number of memes expressing criticism of the govern-
ment in the person of President Bolsonaro, as in the following examples
(Fig.3.4):
Both are examples of parodies (when an established sign is imitated,
altering its meaning). The rst case is a parody of the rst verse of the
Brazilian national anthem,9 using a pun to express a convergence between
the government and the problem it should be confronting. In the second
A. WERNECK
55
(Fig.3.5), we see the eponymous character from the classic Brazilian car-
toon strip Turma da Mônica (Monica’s Gang), highly popular in the
country. Mônica is standing in front of the window of Cascão (Smudge),
her friend, inviting him to go and do something, and he is replying to the
invitation. This specic cartoon became a meme for various jokes: as dis-
cussed in Note 6, on the formal dimension of the memes, all that is needed
Fig. 3.4 ‘The virus of
Ipiranga’
Fig. 3.5 ‘Let’s hold a
rally to reopen the
stores. The Myth said
that Brazil must not
stop!’ ‘Fuck off!’
3 VIRAL JOKES: HUMOUR AND GRACE AS CRITICAL DEVICES IN MEMES…
56
to produce the zoação (mocking effect) is to change the dialogue. In this
case, the structure involves presenting a ‘mockable’ invitation, followed by
a rude reply that conicts with the two children’s lively expressions. In this
meme, ‘Myth’ is how Bolsonaro’s followers refer to him, and the joke cites
the campaign promoted by his government (under the slogan ‘Brazil must
not stop’) against preventive self-isolation and in favour of a resumption of
economic activity.
Leave theStreet: TheCommon Good Is Citizen Care
The most widespread behavioural critique is the neglect of preventive
measures, whether the disregard for physical distancing or bad prophylac-
tic habits. For example:
The basis of this criticism is that the common good is founded on a
civic division of the ght against the virus—employing the logic of civic-
industrial commitment based on a strong engagement of the less worthy,
the citizens—focused on two behavioural changes: personal hygienic habits
(washing hands, sanitization with gel alcohol, use of masks) and voluntary
isolation (oriented by the government in various cities), along with dis-
tancing when it is necessary to leave home. In the rst case, the critiques
are based on the isolation-good, criticizing disbelievers and the disobedi-
ent. This is the case of the meme shown in Fig.3.6, in which we see a
photo of Dona Zica and Cartola, classical leading exponents of samba, the
Brazilian musical rhythm par excellence, with Cartola sitting in front of his
house, ‘pronouncing’ some of the existential lyrics to ‘Quero me encon-
trar’ [‘I Want to Find Myself’] by the composer Candeia, one of the sing-
er’s biggest hits, and Dona Zica, also his wife, replying to him, already
elderly, a member of the risk group, telling him in a rude way to get inside
and isolate. The same kind of criticism could be found in another frequent
internet hit, which is a critique of those disbelieving the effectiveness of
isolation measures. In another meme, no less than Charles Darwin (in a
black and white photo) appears to imply that the measures’ disobedience
exposes humans to natural selection, a central element in his Theory of
Evolution: ‘Anyone who doesn’t want to go into quarantine, ne by me.’
In another set, the critiques take the form of afrming hygiene-good,
expressed in the accusations against those who fail to follow such proce-
dures. This can be seen in a meme showing Skeletor, the supervillain of
the He-Man cartoon universe, an incarnation of evil, appearing at the
centre of a moral twist as someone who previously smelt of alcohol (i.e.,
A. WERNECK
57
was an alcoholic) and saying: ‘How things change… Now, if you smell of
alcohol, people look at you approvingly.’ In all these cases, the sanitary-
good manifests as a core element of the situation and the agency of the
actors is made explicit: the critiques hold every citizen responsible for the
population’s health as a whole, emphasizing the need for civic engagement.
Isolate! TheCommon Good Is toResist During theNew Routine
In this case, what is ridiculed are precisely the new routine elements, mak-
ing explicit the absurdity of a situation that messes up everyone’s lives.
The critique is not of isolation in itself (though it also surfaces) but more
especially the deroutinization and, in part, people’s low resilience at times.
This seems to follow the path of accepting inevitable suffering and a logic
of ‘laughing so as not to cry.’ Hence, we see memes emphasizing
Fig. 3.6 ‘Get inside,
for fuck’s sake’ ‘Let me
go, I need to walk’
3 VIRAL JOKES: HUMOUR AND GRACE AS CRITICAL DEVICES IN MEMES…
58
indeterminacy and the everyday inquiry necessary during this moment.
For example:
The meme showed in Fig.3.7 concentrates on the distinction between
people isolating with children and without children—a recurrent theme
among the jokes, which always highlight the tremendous suffering of par-
ents and, among this group, the difference between men and women
(mothers). Other examples were various. In one case, the reproduction of
a Twitter post says: ‘I’m trying to maintain my normal routine. For exam-
ple, I set up a mini-gym here at home and I’ve never gone there either.’ It
emphasizes how the routine has changed but not that much. In another,
the joke depicts the Dutch painter Vincent van Gogh to ridicule the new
habits, altering one of its classical self-portraits to make him try to wear a
protective mask forming part of the new routine, but with him saying
‘Merde!’ (shit, in French), given that he would be unable to use it since he
only had one ear. Moreover, the last example I want to present shows a
clever pun (which I adapted here to work in English): ‘To avoid transmit-
ting Coronavirus, avoid holding parties with more than 20 invitees. You
simply CONEED-19.’10 It mocks those who, during quarantine, insist on
holding parties at home.
Fig. 3.7 ‘Friday 27
March 2020 at 7.30pm
We’ll be holding a
collective yelling of
mothers at their
windows to relieve stress
and not go mad’
A. WERNECK
59
In each of these cases, like all those presented above, though here it
becomes more apparent, the critique exploits the routinization of the
debate on the health measures taken as a central element of the humour:
as I have shown elsewhere (Werneck, 2015), the joke-form, in which the
pair of setup (denition of the normal situation) and punchline (twist of
the situation through the revelation of the element of change that makes
it comic) works, reveals the presence of grace/inspiration showing how
the world changed with the advent of an absurd, unpredictable element.
Humorous Critique Focused onGrace andInspiration
The nal important category of the rst routinization is the one that con-
centrates on the humorous critique of discourses considered to be clichés,
banal repetitions, and platitudes, that is, sentences that fail to show them-
selves as touched by the grace of inspiration. Therefore, ridicule here
focuses on those discourses precisely vis-à-vis the inspired worth. For
instance, a pandemic special edition of the regular sketch “Phrases that
Deserve a Slap in the Face” from the comedy channel TV Quase, broad-
cast on YouTube.11 The sketch has a simple premise: the actor (Daniel
Furlan) appears in front of the camera and announces phrases that they
deem to be clichés and, after each, is interrupted by a heavy slap to the
face. In this special edition, which contained two videos, the sentences are
linked to the pandemic and the hand slapping the actor is gloved, as
though indicating prevention against COVID-19. Among the phrases, we
hear gems like: ‘Did you know that in the Mayan Calendar [suggesting
some apocalyptical prevision]…?’; ‘No, but we’re going to learn about
humanity with this virus’; ‘I’ll nally have time to study French’; and the
suggestive ‘One day, we’ll laugh about all this.’ They even repeat phrases
from Jair Bolsonaro, but within the same continuum of platitudes. The
same critique of cliché is contained in memes that reproduce tweets from
the social network Twitter, serving as a parody of the clichéd phrases, like
the one saying ‘A few months from now we’ll all sit down and laugh when
we remember Coronavirus … In hell.’
3 VIRAL JOKES: HUMOUR AND GRACE AS CRITICAL DEVICES IN MEMES…
60
a ‘neW norMal’: thesecond routInIzatIon
andthe‘endeMIcIzatIon’ ofthePandeMIc
The graph below (Graph 1) shows the mortality rate throughout the pan-
demic in Brazil, from the beginning of quarantine in March to the start of
August 2020. It presents the data in absolute gures, represented by the
bars, and the moving average (i.e., the average of the last seven days, reg-
istered day-to-day), shown by the line. This behaviour is almost unparal-
leled elsewhere in the world with the establishment of a lengthy plateau in
the number of deaths (from the last third of May to the end of this
sequence, at least, on 8 August, when the country surpassed the mark of
100,000 deaths and 3 million people infected), staying at a very high level
of around one thousand deaths per day:12
Source: Brazilian news pool, based on data from the states’ health departments
I introduce this statistical element into the discussion because it simul-
taneously reects and has played a role in forming a new interpretative
turn among actors, bringing up a new regime. The new situation is regis-
tered in those actors’ humour-based critiques, what I call an endemiciza-
tion of the pandemic, a moment in which the epidemic disease is treated as
an endemic one:13 the period during which the plateau became established
and consolidated was also when the isolation measures were relaxed and
physical distancing became more neglected, registered in numerous news
reports during this new stage. The sensation of a new routine seems to
have become established, in which the global situation of the epidemic in
the country became normalized: the daily number of deaths seems to have
generated a feeling that the real ‘new normal’ was to have this (high)
A. WERNECK
61
number of deaths every day and that public life would continue oblivious
to this gure. It is important to say that Brazil is accustomed to a high
number of deaths by homicide at 63,000 per year. At that moment, the
country was registering another ‘round’ number (100,000) of deaths
from COVID-19. It was a dramatic landmark. However, it was another
dramatic landmark as had been the rst thousand, then 5000, then 10,000,
the tens of thousands, a sequence that, nonetheless, was incapable of
reversing the tendency towards anaesthesia and routinization. For all prac-
tical purposes, in Brazil, the true ‘new normal’ seems to have become the
death of many from the disease and the life that continues—which in many
cities has meant the reopening of commerce and a rush to the beaches and
bars (Callegari & Magalhães 02/06/2020).14,15
How have the memes registered this weird Brazilian ‘new normal’? By
shifting to an anecdotal version of evaluating others’ behaviour, especially
the government: the critiques become concentrated on actions consid-
ered bizarre or ridiculous in themselves. This movement follows the
dynamic of what I have called ‘mocking the powerful’ (Werneck, 2019,
642), a form involving ‘direct attack on the powerful, concentrated on
mocking famous gures and/or those who represent power.’ We thus see
memes like these:
The rst meme (Fig.3.8) refers to a preposterous declaration of the
thenMinister of Health, Eduardo Pazuello. Pazuello is a general without
any medical training who served as acting minister for an extended period
after the second incumbent’s sacking in Bolsonaro’s government.16 In a
press conference, he stated that the virus’ behaviour in the Northeast of
Brazil, a region historically famous for its droughts, a vast area of semi-arid
climate with tourism centred on its many and beautiful beaches, was closer
to those in Northern Hemisphere countries with a cold climate. Hence,
the meme factories quickly produced images like the rst one of this series,
promoting the Winter Olympics in a famous city of the North-eastern
Sertão (depicting a landscape entirely different from the reality, lled with
snow and alps).
A second example marks one of the most prolic meme sources of this
period: after spending months saying that COVID-19 was ‘just a little u’
and adopting measures at odds with those recommended as preventive,
even encouraging crowds to form at demonstrations in support of his gov-
ernment and demanding the closure of Congress and the Federal Supreme
Court, Bolsonaro announced that he had tested positive for the disease on
7 July. Thereafter, an enormous number of memes were directed towards
3 VIRAL JOKES: HUMOUR AND GRACE AS CRITICAL DEVICES IN MEMES…
62
a kind of retaliation, something like an assertion that the infection was a
punishment for his declarations. One meme, therefore, promotes the
direct comparison between the president and the disease, indicating that
he would make the virus ill: [over a photo of Bolsonaro quarantined] ‘We
need to talk about the three weeks of suffering of Coronavirus in
Bolsonaro’s body #keepstrongcorona #chloroquine.’
A third example is shown in Fig.3.9:
The meme refers to an episode known as ‘the Antifa Emu’: following
his positive test, the president had to self-isolate and work from the
Alvorada Palace, his ofcial residence whose gardens contain various speci-
mens of the animal (emu). Like Trump, Bolsonaro is also an enthusiast of
hydroxychloroquine as a treatment of COVID-19—a medicine that not
only lacks any scientic demonstration of effectiveness against the disease
but also has proven harmful side effects. He even ordered that Army labo-
ratories should produce pills of the substance on a large scale. This was
done, leaving millions of units unused, given that governors and mayors
declined to include the medicine in their disease management policies.
When he became sick, he claimed that he had been treated with the medi-
cine and it was responsible for his recovery. So, during a walk through the
gardens while isolating, he approached an emu and tried to pet it. He was
Fig. 3.8 ‘2026 Mossoro [a city on the Brazilian semi-arid region] Winter
Olympic Games’
A. WERNECK
63
pecked, which generated a wave of memes claiming that the animal was
‘politicized,’ ‘left-wing,’ or ‘Antifa’ (an abbreviation of ‘anti-fascist,’ a
non-party movement against Bolsonaro). Days later, knowing he was
being lmed and photographed, Bolsonaro once again approached the
bird, this time showing it a box of chloroquine, suggesting to the rhea that
it would be protected by the medication.
The last example once again uses the ‘peculiar’ style (to say the least) of
Bolsonaro, combining his anti-preventive behaviour with both his ten-
dency for clumsy actions and rude declarations. In this case, curiously,
involving someone else’s: at the start of August, the mayor of a mid-sized
city in the interior of the country, who is a medic, suggested treating
COVID-19 with ‘ozone therapy,’ the rectal injection of ozone gas, a tech-
nique with no proven efcacy against the disease, but which the politician
claimed would increase immunity. Of course, the project was a source of
enormous controversy and a wave of memes, especially with witty puns
and sexual jokes (which the president, himself keen on this kind of anec-
dote, also ended up making). As an advocate of using chloroquine,
Bolsonaro not only ridiculed the plan but declared himself opposed to it.
Even so, he permitted for Pazuello to meet the medical mayor in question
to discuss the matter. In the meme, a series of references intersect, drawing
from the many photos of the president’s poor mask use to combine a cri-
tique of his neglect with his tendency for measures just as absurd as ozone
Fig. 3.9 ‘Excuse me, Mrs Emu, by chance have you heard about the [I]niciative
of the ChloroAvengers?’
3 VIRAL JOKES: HUMOUR AND GRACE AS CRITICAL DEVICES IN MEMES…
64
therapy: it shows a photo of Bolsonaro tapping his own nose, with the
caption: ‘I think I can smell Ozone coming after our haemorrhoid!’. These
combined with referencing his obsession both with projecting a macho
image (which had prompted him to say that he would never submit to that
kind of medical treatment) and with the idea that the political left perse-
cutes ‘our’ freedoms and that form part of a conspiracy of world domina-
tion—which he expressed in a ministerial meeting as ‘What these guys
want is our haemorrhoid’ (an unexplained expression, but it seems to con-
tain both a meaning similar to ‘fuck us’ and to use ass as a metonym for
individual freedom).17
This ‘new normal’ of the pandemic as a simple fact with which the
country lives—to some extent a rhetorical victory of Bolsonaro—made the
jokes about the country’s global situation rarer along with those about
people’s behaviours in response to the pandemic. Indeed, they even repre-
sented a relative acceptance of the critique involving COVID-19.18
conclusIon
The observation of the different moments of meme production related to
the COVID-19 pandemic in Brazil allows us to map a range of critiques
circulating about various actants (Callon & Latour, 1981; Latour,
1997[1987]; Boltanski, 1990) related to the health crisis but also about
the country’s political routine itself. As we have seen, this critique benets
from humour as a form of circulation and operationalization, although it
was able to encounter three different moments of routine: an investigative
phase, a rst routine phase of isolation, and a second routine phase of lib-
eration (here called a ‘new normal,’ in quote marks, since it involves a
normalization amid the ongoing health risk, utterly unrelated to the new
normal promised for life after the health crisis). The formal actants
observed in this scenario were (a) Brazil with its entrenched ills (which
may be extrapolated to the idea of a big problem that can never be solved);
(b) the government/State; (c) the other as a preventive character (whether
by acting correctly or by acting negligently); (d) the routine of isolation;
(e) the cliché discourses on the pandemic; and (f) the isolated anecdotal
actions of characters who became public.
My interpretation of this scenario led me to the model proposed by
Laurent Thévenot (2006) to think about the agential movements of the
actors towards social mobilizations—or, as he puts it, towards actions in
common in the plural: this process involves what he calls engagements, that
A. WERNECK
65
is, the logic through which the actors coordinate with each other. My
hypothesis here is that the second moment of the wave of memes, marked
by voluntary isolation and a new routine, was guided by two types of
engagement: the rst, called exploratory by Auray (2011), founded on the
kind of investigative processes outlined by Dewey (1938), seeking what
Thomas (1966[1923]) would call a denition of the situation. The second
is what in another text I referred to as a circumstantialist engagement
(Werneck, 2020a), founded on what I called, inspired precisely by Thomas,
an indenition of the situation, a movement of strategic avoidance, post-
poning denition, to maintain oneself in a hybrid situation and take advan-
tage of the same. In the ambient of this routine of indenition—which
might be a paradox—the actors experience what Stark (2009) called dis-
sonance, a productive friction between what, in principle, are competing
logics of action. Critique seems to perform a fundamental role at this
moment since it occupies the space produced by the aforementioned fric-
tion. During moments like the rst two phases of the pandemic, as I
argued, the transition between indenition and the emergence of a new
tentative routine to be experienced ‘one day at a time,’ responding to
‘whatever happens,’ at the whim of new events and circumstances, offers
actors an open-ended universe of meanings to ll with their questionings
(and, with them, their critiques). Furthermore, however much actors
attempt to nd a routine, the memes good-humouredly make explicit how
this movement is itself tentative, the circulating critiques still seeking to
comprehend the possible good from moment to moment, sometimes ben-
etting from a denition, sometimes benetting from indenition. This
mixed engagement (Werneck, 2020a) appears to unite everyone in a criti-
cal environment based on the fact that we are all immersed in a big problem
(in which the country and its ills always remain present as a question),
something to be experienced through its situated problematizations—that
is, something wide open to controversies in which critiques appear as a
central element.
Concerning the latest moment, the ‘new normal,’ my argument sets
out from an inversion of the idea of an engagement on the plan developed
by Thévenot (2006, 113–130): my idea is to approach the concept of the
plane in a broader sense, conceiving the future glimpsed by it as a horizon
rather than an objective—and thinking of a plane potentially as a map con-
templating a geography rather than simply ‘how to arrive’). This means
thinking of the plane as a vision of the future, an image of what we expect
and how we imagine it will be, and not just how we would wish it to be.
3 VIRAL JOKES: HUMOUR AND GRACE AS CRITICAL DEVICES IN MEMES…
66
With this interpretation, an engagement on the plane would imply a coor-
dination colonized by this vision. Based on this, I suggest, then, that when
they adopt the possibility of contracting COVID-19 as a ‘plane,’ as a
vision of the future, the actors develop a tentative activity through which
each moment in which one ‘confronts’ the world and does not contract
the disease, the plane, causes the horizon to gradually adjust, becoming an
increasingly failed plane in the eyes of these actors. This in part explains
this new ‘alternative’ normal: the sensation that the pandemic has become
absorbed into normality so that even the daily information on another
thousand deaths makes little difference to people’s routines as they adapt
to a critical environment in which only the anecdotal becomes
criticizable.
Humour, and the grace that it expresses, therefore, appears in all these
moments as an element facilitating these critiques, as I have demonstrated
and expressed before: the singular observer who occupies the place of the
humoristic speaker (just as the poetic speaker in poetry) of the discourses
enables the transitory truths circulating in them to ridicule the criticized
objects and realize their potency, reducing the worths (and in this sense
the agencies) of these objects and making the critique not only more capa-
ble of circulating but more potent in a simultaneously subtle and intense
form. It is not that the joke is more effective in making a critique potent,
but that critique made in a form that suggests presence of grace—littered
with elements that enable the humour to be recognized—inserts an
inspired logic (Boltanski & Thévenot, 1991) into the equation, replacing
the rationalist evaluation of the ‘serious’ critique with a leap over the test-
ing (épreuve) of the content that stabilizes the situation as a verication in
terms of grace/inspiration. The joke-form is thus converted into a form of
making the critique more effective as critique: by demonstrating that it is
funny, that is, ‘full of grace,’ that is, singular, creative, clever, the critique
constructs a singularized voice that completes this circle.
notes
1. As I have already written in Werneck (2019, p.614), ‘a meme is a sign that
spreads massively via the internet, originally in a peer-to-peer system, but
more recently in a model that we can call peer-to-all, more typical to social
networks, through repetitions and/or alterations. The term of everyday
use is inspired by the idea of the British biologist Richard Dawkins, who in
his book The Selsh Gene (Dawkins, 2016[1976]), suggests an explanatory
A. WERNECK
67
model for the diffusion of information within a culture […]. For more
about memes and their involvement in [critiques], see Mina (2019).’
2. The effectuation to which I refer concerns the effectiveness of the critical
collocation and the possibility of presenting a critical discourse (Werneck
& Loretti, 2018). Thus, it is not a question of evaluating the effectiveness
of the critiques nor humour’s role in this effectiveness. Due to its situated
character, an analysis of this type would be impossible with the material
available. For a discussion of critical effectiveness, see Boltanski (1990) and
Hirschman (1972).
3. All citations to this work considered the terminology established by the
book’s American edition, which was translated by Catherine Porter. I did
the Brazilian translation, published in 2020.
4. For instance, visual parodies are commonplace, using images of famous
people, especially celebrities, movie scenes, and images from comic strips,
changing the dialogues and thus generating a punchline through the semi-
otic friction between the original scenes and the meaning presented in the
meme. This creates a versatile set of signs, which can change the message
at the captions’ whim, as Barthes (1990[1982]) would say. Logical jokes,
puns, and plays of words are equally important, as seen in some of the cases
shown here.
5. Unlike in various other countries, a policy of governmentally oriented vol-
untary isolation was adopted in Brazil. Most of its state and local govern-
ments did not make home isolation compulsory. Instead, they left each
person to decide if they would stay at home or not, issuing guidelines only
on the motives for people to go out: they ordered the closure of those
activities considered non-essential, a reduction in the circulation of public
transport, and so on. Thus, I use the term governmentality here in the
sense given by Foucault (2007[1978]), as a form of making free people do
what one wants, or, in his terms, as ‘an administration of things that would
think before all else of men’s freedom, of what they want to do, of what
they have an interest in doing, and of what they think about doing […].
physics of power, or a power thought of as physical action in the element
of nature, and a power thought of as regulation that can only be carried
out through and by reliance on the freedom of each’ (p.49).
6. The idea of worth is opposed to that of size, which denes an intrinsic char-
acteristic of the actors. The model does not deal with domination founded
on intrinsic traits (e.g., as in class domination), although it does not deny
its existence. Instead, it seeks to take the actors’ critical capacity seriously
and to show how situations are dened through the situated recognition of
worths, which can only act if they are justied by them, that is, proven by
their capacity to produce the common good, and which exclusively dene
precedence in decision-making in the situation. These situations only
3 VIRAL JOKES: HUMOUR AND GRACE AS CRITICAL DEVICES IN MEMES…
68
obtain legitimacy in the justication, effected through the demonstration
that the well-being of the more worthy and the less worthy, though differ-
ent, are read as equivalent, distributing the good in question through a
common way.
7. The term cité refers to an ordering limited to a determined form of justice,
that is, the common good. In their research, Boltanski and Thévenot
(1991) initially mapped six polities (cités), six forms of justice, privileged in
the modern framework of controversies, namely: a civic polity; a domestic
polity (centred on generational hierarchy); a market polity (centred on the
value of exchange); an industrial polity (centred on efciency); an inspired
polity (centred on grace, that is, creativity and singularity); and a polity of
fame (centred on honoric recognition and reputation). Other polities
were proposed by themselves and by other authors, but I do not intend to
describe or debate them here.
8. From the beginning of the crisis and for a long period during the early
phase of the pandemic, a post occupied by the physician and deputy Luiz
Henrique Mandetta. In his last weeks of ofce, Mandetta entered into a
series of public clashes with the President, the latter being opposed to hori-
zontal isolation and in favour of treatments not yet fully tested for the
disease, while the minister declared himself in favour of following the
WHO guidelines, including horizontal isolation. Mandetta was dismissed
on 16 April.
9. The section in question is: ‘Ouviram do Ipiranga/as margens plácidas/de
um povo heroico/o brado retumbante.’ The verses of the Brazilian
National Anthem, composed in 1831, make frequent phrasal inversions as
in this initial section. Here the reference is to the resounding cry of the
Brazilian people heard ‘by’ the shores of the Ipiranga River, the location of
the declaration of the country’s independence. Note the acoustic overlap
between the sections in Portuguese: ‘Ouviram do Ipiranga’ [They heard
from Ipiranga] and ‘O vírus do Ipiranga.’
10. The original pun is based on the proximity in spoken Portuguese between
the imperative of the verb to invite, convide, and pronunciation of the word
COVID: ‘Para evitar a transmissão do Coronavírus, evite fazer festas com
mais de 20 convidados. Apenas COVID-19.’
11. Although this case is not a meme, I treat it as a paradigmatic example since
it contains all the elements of the viral logic of the former, as well as, at the
same time, having itself generated a series of memes, reproducing its
screens, especially the opening title.
12. On this last day of this series, the moving average was 990 deaths, 8% lower
than the moving average recorded 14days earlier, a comparison used by
epidemiologists to evaluate the behaviour of the pandemic: when the posi-
tive or negative variation is higher than 15%, a change is taken to have
A. WERNECK
69
taken place (rising or falling), and when the variation is smaller, the trend
is considered stable. This fall of 8%, though small, followed a trend that
indicated a sequence of reductions, but became diluted amid the news of
the global number of dead.
13. An inuence that Eugênia Motta and I discussed in another text, due to be
published in 2021 (Werneck & Motta, 2020).
14. Faced with the imminence of this landmark gure, Bolsonaro declared:
‘We lament all the dead, we’re going to reach 100,000, but we’re going to
get on with life and dodge this problem.’ This declaration formed part of
a long gallery of declarations of the president on the disease that would
merit a text by itself based around the humorous responses. When I nish
the draft of this chapter, on 27 October 2020, the conrmed COVID-19
number of deaths in Brazil is around 157,000. After that moment, the
number of deaths in Brazil went through a drop until the beginning of
November and then a sequence of high, reaching, on April 13, 2021, a
peak of 3,808 deaths in one day, with an average of 3,068 deaths in 7 days.
With the start of vaccination, the numbers dropped again, but remained
for months still at around a thousand daily deaths. From the beginning of
the pandemic until mid-August 2021, Covid-19 had claimed around
570,000 lives in Brazil.
15. Another element to be considered in this normalization was the use of
masks as a mass preventive measure established by the WHO in June.
While this is obviously an essential health policy of already proven effec-
tiveness, it seems to have had a deleterious side effect, contributing to the
‘new normal.’ I am not suggesting that the use of masks is not a necessary
measure. On the contrary, I consider it fundamental. The question was the
encouragement to leave home that it gave to those who wanted to disobey
isolation guidance.
16. Pazuello was appointed minister on 16 September, remaining as acting
minister for almost four months, longer than the period in ofce of his
predecessor, the oncologist Nelson Teich. He remained minister until
March 15, 2021, when he was replaced by a physician, Marcelo Queiroga—a
measure adpted because Bolsonaro’s popularity, high throughout the
entire pandemic until taht point, started to drop consistenly. In Pazuello’s
administration, several crises relating to Covid-19 took place and he
became one of the main targets of a parliamentary committee of inquiry
investigation for negligence on the federal responsibilities for the misman-
agement of the pandemic in the country. By mid August 2021, the disap-
proval level for Bolsonaro reached 54%.
17. Bolsonaro’s discourse as a president has concentrated not only on a denial
of the virus’s risk potential but also—and more intensely—on a dichotomy
between isolation and individual liberty, claiming that the virus is an excuse
3 VIRAL JOKES: HUMOUR AND GRACE AS CRITICAL DEVICES IN MEMES…
70
for ‘the left’ to curb ‘our freedom.’ Much of his presidential campaign was
based on intensifying an almost anecdotal association between equality as
a degenerative operation promoted by ‘communism’ and liberty as a
supreme value sought by the right, mobilizing a very peculiar mixture of
economic neoliberalism and behavioural liberation for ‘good people’ (the
conservatives, who, in Bolsonaro’s view, constitute the paradigmatic matrix
of the Brazilian). Indeed, the president left no doubt concerning his stance
on the matter, stating that for him, ‘there is something more important
than life: freedom’ (Caramuru, 21/05/2020). This tends to be the
Bolsonarist activists’ slogan, individual freedom for its own sake (Lima,
25/05/2020). Bolsonaro and his followers describe that asa ‘good free-
dom’, conceived along the lines of the American ‘pursuit of happiness’:
self-determination to decide one’s path and accumulate wealth without
interference from the State in one’s lives. This is represented by policies
such as the incentive towards entrepreneurship and an aversion to the State
and its agents and a deregulation policy that involves easing gun control,
loosening trafc laws, and valorizing order and security. The left, the ‘com-
munists,’ for their part, are described as people who advocate not liberty,
but ‘libertinism,’ promoting an agenda of complete liberation only in
hedonist behaviours, especially sexual—overthrowing traditional gender
roles, promoting ‘homosexualism’ and ‘pedophilia’—and chemical, for
instance, demanding the liberation of marijuana use. They would also be
against liberty by ‘taking our money’ (e.g., charging high taxes) to hand
over to ‘vagrants’ (civil servants or socially vulnerable people) and being
driven by a project of global cultural domination supposedly inspired by
Italian philosopher Antonio Gramsci. However, a more detailed analysis of
this conservative agenda and its labelling of opponents would go beyond
the scope of this text.
18. The gallery presented in this section has concentrated on Bolsonaro and
his minister Pazuello more because of the representativeness of the memes
and the cases’ anecdotal weight than because of any capacity to synthesize
a sample. In fact, at this moment, the critiques were directed at any gures
capable of being made public by actions worthy of mocking. Thus, both
the medical mayor of ozone therapy and celebrities or even anonymous
people who, through the social networks, may have seen their actions
reach the general public are included in this selection.
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Lima, V. (2020, May 25). ‘Povo quer liberdade e democracia’, arma Bolsonaro
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democracia- arma- bolsonaro- apos- manifestacao- 25052020
3 VIRAL JOKES: HUMOUR AND GRACE AS CRITICAL DEVICES IN MEMES…
75© The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature
Switzerland AG 2021
S. Mpofu (ed.), Digital Humour in the Covid-19 Pandemic,
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-79279-4_4
CHAPTER 4
‘Coromentality’: Nigerians’ Use ofMemetic
Humour During theCOVID-19 Lockdowns
Aje-OriAgbese andEdeanyaAgbese
IntroductIon
To prevent or atten the curve after the coronavirus (COVID-19) pan-
demic hit, many countries implemented social distancing guidelines and
lockdowns. Nigeria was no exception. When the pandemic hit Nigeria on
February 27, 2020, the country was unprepared because social media
posts claimed Africa’s climate was inconducive for its spread, and Black
people would not contract COVID-19 (Tangwa &Munug, 2020). Within
a month, however, Nigeria had 129 conrmed cases and one death
(Toromade, 2020). Therefore, lockdowns and other measures were neces-
sary, considering Nigeria’s 206 million population was at high risk of
severe effects if the pandemic spread (Wetsman, 2020). Several states
A.-O. Agbese (*)
Department of Communication, The University of Texas Rio Grande Valley,
Edinburg, TX, USA
E. Agbese
Department of Public Health Sciences, Penn State College of Medicine,
Hershey, PA, USA
76
announced lockdowns and stay-at-home orders to curb COVID-19’s
spread between March 23 and March 27 (Onu etal., 2020). On March
29, President Muhammadu Buhari announced a total lockdown in the
hardest-hit areas, Lagos and Ogun states, and the federal capital, Abuja
(Adoyi, 2020). He also closed international airports and suspended non-
essential services. These actions meant Nigerians had to stay at home, stop
businesses and, if possible, work from home. To cope with the change and
mitigate COVID-19’s psychological impact, Nigerians turned to the
internet and social media to cope.
According to Nigeria’s National Information Technology Development
agency, over 124 million of Nigeria’s 206 million population has access to
theinternet (Dangida, 2021). However, the National Bureau of Statistics
(NBS, 2020) determined that Nigeria’s more than 136 million mobile
subscribers actively use the internet. As of January 2020, 27 million
Nigerians were on social media, spending an average of 3 hours and
17minutes there daily (Tankovska, 2021, Udodiong, 2019). Nigerians
belong to multiple social media platforms, with WhatsApp (85%),
Facebook (78%) and Instagram (57%) having the highest users (Udodiong,
2019). The highest number of internet users are in the urban areas and
mostly in Lagos state (NBS, 2020). In addition, according to Johnson
(2021), 75.1% of Nigerians access the internet through mobile phones
and three-quarters of them use smartphones. Nigerians go online for a
variety of reasons, including seeking information, commentary and enter-
tainment, and the number of internet users grows yearly (Udodiong, 2019).
Despite the growing numbers, however, a digital divide exists in the
country that separates those with good internet from those with slowinter-
net, and millions are without internet. Though the federal government
met and exceeded its goal of closing the divide with broadband by 30% in
2018, several challenges remain (Olaoluwa, 2019). These include data
affordability, providing infrastructures in rural areas to close the urban-
rural divide, and encouraging Nigerians to use digital technology
(Iteumah, 2019). Nevertheless, that Nigerians are active internet users
who are creating content and interacting with people in and outside
Nigeria is noteworthy. A widespread tool they use in creating content,
which is important to this study, is internet memes.
Internet memes are the most popular way ‘to channel humour on the
internet and social media’ (Taecharungroj & Nueangjamnong, 2015,
289). A meme, according to Patrick Davison (2012, 122), is ‘a piece of
culture, typically a joke, which gains inuence through online
A.-O. AGBESE AND E. AGBESE
77
transmission.’ A meme can be ‘written text, a still image, brief animation
sequences, or combinations thereof’ (Rieger & Klimmt, 2019, 2202).
More importantly, memes represent an online participatory culture that
encourages discourse interpersonally or with mass audiences on matters of
socio-economic and political importance (Rieger & Klimmt, 2019).
Memes have allowed Nigerians to ‘become more innovative in their pat-
terns of communicating humor’ (Chimuanya & Ajiboye, 2016, 255).
Consequently, Nigerians’ active use of internet memes has garnered schol-
arly interest (Adegoju & Oyebode, 2015; Alfred, 2019; Tella 2018). Most
of these studies have focused on political humour in Nigerian memes.
Considering that ‘practically every socio-cultural and political event gen-
erates internet memes in Nigeria,’ there is room to explore how Nigerians
use memes and humour in other contexts (Chimuanya & Ajiboye,
2016, 254).
Therefore, this chapter investigated how Nigerians used memes to
communicate their positions and concerns during the 2020 COVID-19
pandemic. Specically, we analysed the humour Nigerians shared through
COVID-19 memes. The key questions answered here concerned the types
of memes created, the role memes played in the Nigerian context, and
how Nigerians made sense of the COVID-19 crisis. We argue that in times
of crisis and human suffering, people resort to humour. According to
Davis (2003, 19) ‘gruesome jokes’ have followed major disasters such as
famine, earthquakes, terrorist attacks and plane crashes, sometimes within
minutes, for decades. The internet, Davis (2003) adds, has accelerated and
normalized the spread and popularity of humour in tragic times, despite
social mores that forbid people from nding human tragedy funny.
Therefore, this chapter theorizes humour will emerge when crisis occurs
in Nigeria, and Nigerian memes will channel those feelings. After all,
beyond their humorous and discursive abilities, internet memes can ‘per-
form a soothing and uplifting role’ in times of tragedy and crises (Dynel,
2020, 2). This is because humour allows people in such situations to
reframe ‘negative experiences and/or emotions (such as suffering, anxiety
and fear)’ (Dynel, 2020, 2).
This chapter also contributes to a small but growing body of research
that has recognized social media, its actors and shareable content like
memes as inuential tools in health communication, advocacy and activ-
ism (Kostygina et al., 2020). In the following paragraphs, the chapter
highlights how humour is used in times of crisis and discusses humour in
4 ‘COROMENTALITY’: NIGERIANS’ USE OF MEMETIC HUMOUR…
78
the Nigerian context. We also detail how Nigerians used memes during
the COVID-19 lockdowns in 2020.
Humour IntImes ofcrIsIs
Silberman (1987, 102) dened humour as ‘the quality that makes some-
thing funny, amusing or ludicrous; comicality, also the ability to perceive,
appreciate, or express what is funny, amusing or ludicrous.’ Humour is
socioculturally dened and exists in different forms, including parody,
jokes, satire, sarcasm, pun, and ridicule (Cernerud & Olsson, 2004).
Humour also has therapeutic value that helps ‘maintain, enhance, or
improve physical and/or emotional well-being’ (Dziegielewski, 2003,
78). However, can people nd something to laugh about when a crisis or
traumatic event occurs?
According to Sarah Christopher (2015), traumatic events can actually
inspire humour and help people cope. Sigmund Freud (1905) theorized
that humour can be a defence mechanism that allows people to cope in
traumatic times. Telling jokes during trying times, for example, can ‘pro-
vide for the cathartic release of anxiety or anger while bringing people
together and reinforcing the boundaries between in- and out-group’
(Hernan, 2016, 58). Research also indicates that humour is an important
reason why people turn to social media when crisis or disaster occurs, and
alsoa reason why they ignore social media when disaster occurs (Liu etal.,
2011). Crises and disasters create black, dark, disaster or gallows humour,
‘a type of humour that arises from stressful, traumatic or life-threatening
situations’ (Christopher, 2015, 611). Dark humour is incongruous, mean-
ing it is out of place or inappropriate. According to Kuipers (2005, 71),
‘this incongruity can be between real and unreal (absurd humor), between
taboo and nontaboo (sexual humour, toilet humour, aggressive humour),
or between the gruesome and the innocent, the banal, or even the cheer-
ful (sick humour).’ The incident is humorously connected to an incompat-
ible topic. According to Davis (2003), dark humour connects with people’s
need to defy a system that sees such expressions as taboo. Dark humour is
simply ‘a way of playing with the forbidden for the sake of amusement’
(Davis, 2003, 32). When disaster strikes, dark humour could also be ‘a
symptom or litmus test of a general population’s feelings and anxieties’
(Sheftel, 2012, 147).
Scholars have examined tragedies and discovered that dark humour
played integral roles in how people responded to such events (Christopher,
A.-O. AGBESE AND E. AGBESE
79
2015). For example, Steve Lipman (1991) studied humour and laughter’s
importance during the Jewish Holocaust. He found that Jews used
humour during the Holocaust to stay hopeful. Humour was also a ‘psy-
chological weapon and a defense mechanism. It was a social bond among
trusted friends…a diversion, a shield, a morale booster, an equalizer, a
drop of truth in a world full of lies’ (Lipman, 1991, 10). In her work on
survivors of the Bosnia-Herzegovina war, Sheftel (2012, 147) also discov-
ered funny stories were a ‘way of expressing memories that otherwise seem
dangerous’ during and after the war. In a study on South African prisoners
of war (POWs), Karen Horn (2011) found that humour helped POWs
cope, recall and reconstruct memories, and acted as a defence mechanism
during captivity.
In another study, Smyth (1986) found Americans circulated jokes ve
weeks after the Challenger space shuttle exploded during takeoff, killing
everyone on board in 1986. Smyth (1986, 260) contends that joking
probably helped people deal with anxiety about death and attacked soci-
etal ‘taboos on talking about and describing death or disaster.’ Bill Ellis
(2003) also found people posted dark humour online immediately after
the September 11, 2001 attacks on the World Trade Center. Though
many people reacted ‘within seconds, with angry, violent, and obscene
attacks on the contributor’ of these jokes, six days later, others perceived
the jokes as ‘an inevitable, healthy response to disaster’ (Ellis, 2003, 44).
Apart from wars and attacks, scholars have examined the use of humour
in health crises. Marcus and Singer (2017) found that people spread digi-
tal humour using a female anime character called Ebola-chan during the
Ebola epidemic from 2014 to 2015. Users of 4chan, a message board, also
used the anime to spread misinformation, racial stereotypes and fear about
Ebola as pranks. In contrast, Chimuanya and Ajiboye (2016) examined
the semiotic patterns Nigerians used in Facebook memes when the Ebola
pandemic spread in West Africa in 2014. They found the memes raised
awareness on the disease and offered solutions. To date, studies indicate
that digital humour, especially memes, were also important tools for cop-
ing, reducing stress and commenting on COVID-19-related issues, such
as wearing face masks, social distancing and hoarding supplies (Ambrose
& Idegbekwe, 2020; Dynel, 2020).
Overall, these studies suggest humour plays a function in times of crisis.
However, Kuipers (2005, 72) warns that because traumatic events have
become more mass mediated, meaning the media cover these events, dark
humour may no longer be about coping with tragedy or venting about it.
4 ‘COROMENTALITY’: NIGERIANS’ USE OF MEMETIC HUMOUR…
80
She argues that media images of disasters evoke not only shock and grief,
‘but also less empathic emotions: fascination, gloating, or even outright
triumph. Explaining the appreciation of such disaster jokes with one spe-
cic emotion, such as coping with grief, seems unhelpful for such global
genres’ (Kuipers, 2005, 72). In addition, humour is ‘a system of rules and
expectations that every human being acquires simply by being a member
of a particular sociocultural system’ (Farb, 1981, 763). People interpret
humour negatively or positively depending on their ‘environment and the
people therein’ (Sprowl, 1987, 50). Therefore, to understand the humour
Nigerians reected in COVID-19 memes, it is important to understand
what humour means in the Nigerian context.
context
Humour appears in different forms in Africa and allows people to express
themselves. Africans largely express humour interpersonally, in groups,
through mass media, and live shows like stand-up comedy. Whatever the
form, a common thread in African humour is that it is ‘one of the most
important means by which the majority dene, “get even with,” and
“resist” the power elite and the dominant power relations’ (Obadare,
2009, 244). Contemporary African humour, Obadare (2016, 63) explains,
‘allows the put-upon postcolonial subject to imagine a place and reality
that is radically different from the current one of widespread abjection,
constant humiliation and desperation.’ In postcolonial Africa, where one
may wonder what there is to laugh about, Africans continuously nd
something to laugh about (Obadare, 2009). In the African context,
humour and laughter serve ‘a variety of functions for the oppressed African
subject– as vengeance, coping mechanism, a means of escape, subversion,
not to mention as a means of resistance’ (Obadare, 2009, 243–244). Yet,
African humour ‘remains relatively under-investigated and is still far from
seriously regarded’ (Obadare, 2009, 244). In response, several scholars
have studied African humour in different contexts. As this study’s focus is
Nigeria, this chapter discusses humour in the Nigerian context.
Nigerian humour could be dened as anything that causes laughter,
including jokes, puns, satire, caricature, mockery and ridicule, but also
expresses ‘cultural beliefs, attitudes and ideological dispositions’ (Filani,
2018, 1). Nigerians often use humour to:
A.-O. AGBESE AND E. AGBESE
81
express their expectations of and disappointments in the socio-political lead-
ership of the country. Common Nigerian jokes indicate the country’s tra-
vails with ethnicity and failed political leadership. They also enunciate
populist perspectives on nationhood, identity and the challenges of everyday
living. (Filani, 2018, 1)
Scholars have studied Nigerian humour in three categories—precolo-
nial/traditional humour, stand-up comedy (SUC), and online/digital
humour. According to Filani (2018, 3), the last two areas have ‘brought
about an increase in the sourcing and use of humour in Nigeria, and have
generated more sociocultural awareness, socio-political activism, and self-
consciousness among the country’s citizens.’ Nigerian humour predates
colonial times. Adeleke (2005) found that among the Yorubas in precolo-
nial times, humour was a communal discursive act for social and political
reform. The Yorubas also ridiculed or mocked antisocial behaviour using
comic songs. Likewise, the court jester (Wawan Sariki) performed for the
king and people in Hausa-Fulani societies and used puns, songs, satire and
jokes to ‘communicate serious messages…without creating any form of
embarrassment’ (Kofoworola, 2007, 105). Among the Igbos, jesting and
exchanging insults were common strategies for building relationships
(Nwankwo, 2019). These precolonial strategies are still used in Nigerian
societies. In the 1970s and 1980s, comedy became a popular genre on
Nigerian television, with shows such as The New Masquerade, Samanja
and Bassey and Company entertaining Nigerians and addressing ‘the social,
religious, cultural and political realities’ facing the country (Ajayi, 2020,
1). Then in the 1990s, the rebirth of the Nigerian movie industry pro-
vided new spaces for performing comedy. One of these spaces was SUC
(Adetunji, 2013). Much of the literature on Nigerian humour has focused
on SUC humour (Filani, 2020).
For example, Adetunji (2013) examined the pragmatic strategies in
Nigerian SUC and found it used pidgin English, ‘stereotyping, call-and-
response, formulaic response, self-deprecation and shared experiences’ to
reach audiences. Sesan’s (2018, 14) study of SUC also found performers
created humour with ‘topical issues such as politics and corruption to lam-
poon the system and the “culprits.”’ Filani (2020, 335) adds that Nigerian
SUC uses humour to ‘actively perpetuate and create a social conscious-
ness’ about Nigeria. Nwankwo (2019) also examined Nigerian SUC and
found it addressed poverty, bad leadership, religion, tribalism, ethnic ste-
reotypes and heterosexual relationships. Filani and Ajayi (2019, 142) sum
4 ‘COROMENTALITY’: NIGERIANS’ USE OF MEMETIC HUMOUR…
82
up Nigerian SUC as humour that provides ‘a comic dimension to the
country’s socio-political situation’ and helps people ‘strategically cope
with the sociocultural realities of Nigeria.’
The nal area of scholarship on Nigerian humour is digital humour.
Social media’s emergence in the 2000s revolutionized Nigerian humour
because it offered ‘more opportunities for the audience to access comedic
entertainment’ and provided new ‘avenues for comedians to propagate
their crafts’ (Filani, 2018, 6). Social media, unlike traditional media (tele-
vision, radio and newspapers), also provided an environment free of gov-
ernment censorship and control. This is a ‘carnival-like environment in
which laughter constitutes another kind of catharsis’ for Nigerians, one
that ‘occasions a collapsing of the barriers between writers and readers,
and through endless remixability, erases the distinctions between produc-
ers and consumers of data’ (Yékú, 2016, 248). Therefore, Nigerians who
were passive audiences on traditional media became active participants and
content creators on social media and the internet overall. According to
Awa-Kalu (2016), social media sites like Instagram, YouTube and Twitter
also created a ‘second wave of Nigerians comedians’ who ‘talk about any-
thing and laugh about everything, sparing no topic the caustic end of the
tongue.’ Examples of these new comedians include Falz the Bahd Guy,
Mr. Macaroni, K10, Taaooma and Maraji. Furthermore, social media cre-
ated a ‘laughing space’ where Nigerians ‘disillusioned with abuse of state
power, and the consequences of political hierarchies’, can laugh at them-
selves and people in power (Yékú, 2016, 249).
Nigerian online humour largely consists of short video skits, graphics/
animation, and texts that employ satire, jokes, music, exaggeration, mock-
ery, and ridicule as humour strategies. Scholars have examined digital
humour in the Nigerian context from different angles, with most focusing
on the pragmatic and linguistic strategies online humour contains
(Ajayi, 2020).
For example, Filani (2017) examined readers’ responses to Akpos nar-
rative jokes (jokes created about an imaginary character called Akpos) on
Facebook and found that an audience’s response to online jokes is still
dependent on knowing the language in which jokes are expressed and its
context. Otherwise, audiences may contest a joke’s funniness. Yékú (2016)
also studied Akpos jokes and determined that the jokes reinvented the
trickster hero found in traditional Nigerian folklore and mythologies.
Akpos, through jokes, also reected, among many things, Nigerians’ cop-
ing strategies, Nigerian youths’ pessimism about the future and the failure
A.-O. AGBESE AND E. AGBESE
83
of the political class. Scholars have also examined Nigerians’ use of inter-
net memes. Besides humour, memes can ‘raise very serious socio-political
issues, critique social ills and communicate messages’ (Taiwo, 2018, 320).
Alfred (2019) contends that for Nigerians, using memes is a ‘subtle and
more convenient way of expressing political ideologies, possibly because it
guarantees anonymity of the source of the meme.’ Memes can also shape
and reect the ‘collective actions and mindsets’ of specic cultures at a
given time (Shifman 2007, 189). Davis etal. (2018, 3900) found that
memes are tools of ‘silly citizenship’ that allow people to humorously par-
ticipate and comment on political events and politicians. To Milner (2012,
iii), the internet’s participatory nature also allows people to change any
meme they receive and share it with others. Recipients can create or alter
a meme with a meme-generating site and share with others through the
internet or social media. Each time a meme is shared and/or remixed, it is
‘re-appropriated in order to produce new iterations and variations of
broader ideas, mostly without signature or citation’ (Milner, 2012,12).
To determine the patterns of humour that exist in political discourse
online, Adegoju and Oyebode (2015) studied memes Nigerians shared on
Facebook, WhatsApp and Twitter regarding the 2015 presidential elec-
tion. The study found Nigerians discussed the elections and the candidates
with several humour strategies, including puns, satire, parody, hyperbole
and ironic sarcasm. In 2018, Akin Tella (2018) also examined memes
about the 2015 presidential election but focused on how Nigerians used
humour to frame the candidates. He found that the memes provided
humour and framed the candidates negatively and positively. Surprisingly,
he also found that though the internet ‘widened the scope’ of discourse
on the election, it had not ‘signicantly transformed the quality of cam-
paign discourses in Nigeria’ because the frames were very negative and
maintained that elections were ghts over scarce resources (Tella, 2018,
114). Bukola Alfred (2019) also found Nigerians criticized the ruling
political party and discussed Nigerians’ sufferings through memes.
Beyond politics, Ajayi (2020) examined humour-evoking memes to
determine the social realities they revealed about Nigerian society. He
found that through memes, Nigerians discussed several social realities and
ideologies, such as marital indelity, electricity and un/employment prob-
lems, religiosity, and exorbitant spending during festive seasons like
Christmas. Recently, Ambrose and Idegbekwe (2020) investigated the
deeper meanings available in COVID-19 memes from a Nigerian perspec-
tive. They found that Nigerians used memes to echo their concerns and
4 ‘COROMENTALITY’: NIGERIANS’ USE OF MEMETIC HUMOUR…
84
fears about the pandemic. However, the study focused on the echoic and
pragmatic relevance of the COVID-19 memes and did not examine the
humour angle. This chapter closes that gap. Considering the COVID-19
pandemic was a traumatic event that killed millions of people globally, cre-
ated fear and confusion, this chapter adds to a growing literature on digital
humour’s role in the COVID-19 pandemic. The study argues that the
pandemic, like other traumatic events examined so far, produced a dark
humour that co-existed ‘with daily reports on the death toll and infection
numbers’ (Dynel, 2020, 2). That such humour was prevalent at a tragic
time suggests its signicance in society. Therefore, this study is important
because it presents an opportunity to understand how Nigerians use
humour in times of crisis. An understanding of how Nigerians used memes
during the country’s COVID-19 lockdown is crucial to our understand-
ing of people’s coping mechanisms during a pandemic that required isola-
tion and social distancing to prevent/control transmission.
tHeoretIcal andconceptual framework
Humour is difcult to dene because it is personal and differs from culture
to culture. This, according to Meyer (2000), makes humour a seemingly
difcult subject to investigate. Still, scholars have studied humour because
it is a prevalent ‘social phenomenon’ that is popular and persuasive (Meyer,
2000, 311). Scholars want to know what makes people laugh, explain
humour’s roles and causes and have created theories for these reasons.
According to Cernerud and Olsson (2004), more than 100 humour theo-
ries exist. The dominant ones are classied as incongruity, superiority and
release/relief theories (Billig, 2005).
The incongruity theory of humour states that laughter can occur when
a joke violates expectations or uses a mishap or surprise. A play on words
like a pun is an example of incongruity humour because people do not
expect others to spell or pronounce words wrongly. Incongruity can
appear as ‘contradiction, understatement, exaggeration, surprise, reversal,
ludicrous, or the totally unreal’ (Shade, 1996,11). The superiority theory
suggests laughter results when people belittle others because they feel
superior to themin some way. For example, when someone makes a mis-
take or wears something unt for the context. It also means making fun of
people’s woes and incompetence. The release/relief theory proposes
humour can relieve people’s stress from ‘everyday reality, boredom or
even oppression’ (Plester, 2015, 22). In his overview of the theories,
A.-O. AGBESE AND E. AGBESE
85
Meyer also (2000) argued that humour plays four basic functions: identi-
cation, clarication, enforcement, and differentiation. Identication
means people use humour to connect and identify with others. Clarication
means a person uses a short humorous line or memorable phrase to clarify
a stand or topersuade (Meyer, 2000). Next is enforcement, whereby a
person can ‘enforce norms delicately by leveling criticism while maintain-
ing some degree of identication with an audience’ (Meyer, 2000, 320).
The enforcement function typically occurs when people are ridiculed
because they violated social norms or expectations. Humour’s fourth
function is differentiation and occurs when people use humour to differ-
entiate themselves from others.
Though studies have applied these theories individually, Meyer (2000)
argues that all three theories can appear in a joke because release jokes can
be used in incongruous or superiority situations. Robbins and Vandree
(2009, 58) add that ‘humor and laughter are also modulated by underly-
ing hostility or a sense of superiority over the target.’ As internet memes
are a popular form of humour online, scholars have applied these theories
to their study of memes.
In their work, Shifman and Blondheim (2010) found that people used
incongruity, superiority and relief to tell jokes about computers, its users
and creators. In another study, Shifman (2007) found that internet memes
used jokes that t in these theories and created six types of humour online.
These were ‘interactive humor, funny photos, maniphotos, phanimation,
celebrity soundboards and PowerPoint humor’ (Shifman, 2007, 196).
Interactive humour involves participating in a fun activity. A maniphoto is
a digitally manipulated picture, and a phanimation is an animated version
of a maniphoto. Celebrity soundboards are ‘digitized celebrity sound bites
taken from movies, radio and TV, which are presented on the Internet to
facilitate prank calls’ (Shifman, 2007, 198).
Meyer’s (2000) functions of humour suggest that communicative mes-
sages like memes do not only make people laugh. Rather, people can use
memes to comment on, criticize, question, dispute or acknowledge issues
and events in society. This way, they can share important information and
opinions indirectly. However, for readers to interpret humorous memes
correctly, they must have knowledge of current events or the culture in
which the memes originate (Grundlingh, 2018). Memes are therefore a
good source for examining people’s thoughts about issues like COVID-19
because humour is often ‘used to mask a more serious issue or problem or
to express a negative opinion about an individual in power (politicians,
4 ‘COROMENTALITY’: NIGERIANS’ USE OF MEMETIC HUMOUR…
86
religious gures, etc.)’ (Grundlingh, 2018, 163). This study applied the
three humour theories and asked:
RQ1: What types of internet memes did Nigerians create and/or share
during the COVID-19 lockdowns in Nigeria?
RQ2: What role did COVID-19 memes perform during the lockdowns
in Nigeria?
RQ3: How did Nigerians make sense of the virus and share their fears
through memes?
metHodology
To answer the research questions, we searched for user-generated memes
created and/or shared between March 23 (the start of the lockdown) and
June 30 (when most of it was lifted) in Nigeria on WhatsApp. WhatsApp
is a Facebook-owned messaging application that allows people to send text
and voice messages, make voice and video calls and share a variety of con-
tent, including images, videos and documents. Our rationale for using
WhatsApp to collect memes is that it is the most popular social medium
and messaging system in Nigeria (Udodiong, 2019). We also observed
that as a cross-platform application, people can download and share con-
tent gleaned from other social media networks on WhatsApp and were
more likely to save those they liked (pictures and videos are also automati-
cally saved in people’s phone galleries in a WhatsApp folder). Taylor
(2020) also reported that WhatsApp saw ‘the greatest gains in usage’ of all
social media when lockdowns began. Therefore, we asked 20 friends and
family members in Nigeria’s six geographical regions to send us any memes
they received during the lockdowns and assessed them for those on
COVID-19. We received 60 memes and 47 were on COVID-19. To avoid
researcher bias because humour is personal, all 47 memes on COVID-19
were analysed. The 47 memes were also only in English orPidgin English.
The memes were analysed using quantitative content analysis.
Quantitative content analysis is a systematic method for describing a text’s
contents (Ahuvia, 2001). It involves putting data into categories and
counting the frequency with which each category occurs in the data. This
method suited this study because it is a popular methodology in commu-
nication research. As there was no codebook we could replicate, we
selected 10% of the memes and examined them to nd common character-
istics we could use to create a codebook. Each meme was considered a unit
A.-O. AGBESE AND E. AGBESE
87
of analysis because internet memes use ‘textual and visual elements simul-
taneously in order to create humour, and as such, any attempt to separate
these properties would be unwise’ (Drakett etal., 2018, 115).
To address the research questions, we categorized the memes into type
of meme and type of humour used. Using Reiger and Klimmt’s (2019)
meme categories, the memes were classied as written text only (memes
that used only text to address the subject), still image (memes that used
only still images to address the subject), combination (memes that com-
bined text and images/animations to address the subject) and video.
Using Billig’s (2005) humour categories, the types of humour used in the
memes were grouped into three types: incongruity (e.g., memes that
employed puns or surprise elements), release/relief (e.g., memes that elic-
ited laughs or eased tensions) and superiority (e.g., memes that made fun
of others or elevated oneself). Once the categories and subcategories were
created, we independently assessed intercoder reliability using 10% of
the sample.
We compared our coding afterwards and any disagreements were dis-
cussed and resolved. Cohen Kappas on the categories ranged from 0.85
for type of humour to 0.98 for type of meme. According to Landis and
Koch (1977), a kappa above 0.80 indicates almost perfect agreement.
Following the pretest, we coded all 47 memes. For both categories, memes
were counted in each sub-type once. We also took notes regarding obser-
vations we made about the memes as quantitative content analysis exam-
ines mostly manifest information. Taking notes helped us determine the
latent content, which allows researchers to make ‘inferences about people’
because, presumably, the ‘behaviors, attitudes, meanings, and values found
in the text reect the behaviors, attitudes, and values of the people who
create the material’ (Keyton, 2011, 245).
data presentatIon andanalysIs
Results from the content analysis revealed that Nigerians shared different
types of memes during the lockdowns from March 23 to June 27, 2020.
Fifty-seven per cent of the 47 memes combined text and still image/ani-
mation and 34% used text only (Fig.4.1). We found one video meme and
three that used only still images. These ndings answered RQ1. The anal-
ysis also determined that the memes employed three types of humour—
incongruity (46.8%), relief/release (29.8%) and superiority (23.4%). The
memes provided important insight into how Nigerians use memes to
4 ‘COROMENTALITY’: NIGERIANS’ USE OF MEMETIC HUMOUR…
88
depict social realities and indirectly expressthe challenges people are fac-
ing at the time. In addition, the results supported Sprowl’s (1987) argu-
ment that humour is successful if the context is known. However, our
ndings suggest that some still image-only memes could be unfunny or
misunderstood without text and context.
For example, Fig.4.2 is a combination meme that needs text to inter-
pret the photo/still image. It shows people running and one would not
know why without the text. The text says they are running from church
Meme TypesFrequency (N=47) Percent
Written Text Only 16 34.0
Still Image3 6.4
Combination2757.5
Video1 2.1
Total47100
Fig. 4.1 Types of internet memes shared by Nigerians during the COVID-19
lockdown
Fig. 4.2 Combination meme
A.-O. AGBESE AND E. AGBESE
89
after a woman testied that she just returned from China. Considering
COVID-19 began in China, the meme implies the woman must be
avoided because she may have contracted coronavirus in China, causing
people to ee the church service. The laughing emojis at the bottom also
prime the reader to see the meme as funny. In contrast, Fig. 4.3 is an
example of a written text-only meme that does not need a picture. Yet,
context is required to understand the humour.
Money is essential in all societies and the meme incongruously twists
the social distancing rule to say what is safe and unsafe. The lockdowns
caused Nigerians nancial difculties. Therefore, the writer wants money
to know it can violate the distancing rule. In fact, it should come closer
because it is needed. The meme in Fig.4.4 is a picture of a fridge lled
with food during the lockdown. Unlike Fig.4.2, this meme has no text.
But someone who does not know about Nigeria’s electricity problems
could miss the joke or need text to prime him/her. Following years of cor-
ruption and inefciency, Nigeria has epileptic power supply. Yet, someone
lled a fridge with food that could spoil quickly (the freezer has no frost).
Nevertheless, one can conclude from these examples that humour is
successful when one knows the social realities that produce it (Obadare,
2009). The analysis also identied three thematic issues in the memes that
explained the roles the memes played during the lockdowns and how
Nigerians used memes to make sense of COVID-19 and share their fears
about it.
Fig. 4.3 Written
text meme
4 ‘COROMENTALITY’: NIGERIANS’ USE OF MEMETIC HUMOUR…
90
Need toPractise Safety Habits andHave Information
A majority of the memes addressed the new safety habits implemented
nationwide to curb the spread of the coronavirus with an undertone of
incorrect and wrong implementation. Wearing face masks and constantly
using hand sanitizers are not normal habits in Nigeria. Implementing such
new habits required time and understanding. Therefore, some memes
highlighted these changes and raised awareness about what was happening
by mocking people who wore masks incorrectly or used items like soap
dishes and lettuce leaves for masks. Such memes used a superiority
approach to differentiate and ridicule those they believed were doing
something wrong. Two examples are offered in Figs. 4.5 and 4.6.
Figure4.5 also used a stereotype of Ibadan people as backward.
Another meme addressed driver-provided face masks in public trans-
portation. While it was great that the driver in the meme had face masks
for his customers, the twist in the meme comes when we learn at the end
that the driver uses the same mask for different passengers. These memes,
while humorous, also raised questions about the amount and quality of
information Nigerians received concerning masks; whether masks were
available, affordable, what people could use as masks, and how to wear
them. If people were uninformed or the messages were ambiguous, it fol-
lows that there would be resultant misuse. Memes also drew attention to
handwashing, which was portrayed as excessive (e.g., a meme said a man
washed his hands so many times, he found answers to his eighth-grade
Fig. 4.4 Still image/
animation example
A.-O. AGBESE AND E. AGBESE
91
social studies test), and using hand sanitizers, which was framed as hands
drinking alcohol.
Two memes alsoaddressed discrepancies in the information states like
Kano provided on conrmed COVID cases. After the news reported the
number of conrmed and recovered cases, the memes highlighted the
discrepancies in what was reported. According to one meme, Kano
reported 840 conrmed COVID-19 cases, but then reported 970 recov-
ered COVID-19 cases. This ‘means COVID-19 is owing them extra 130
cases.’ These memes sarcastically suggested government/leaders in the
state exaggerated their numbers and hinted at corruption in the system.
The memes also hinted at the lack of good information and record keep-
ing on the virus in the country. If states could not provide accurate num-
bers, how would people know the virus’ true effect?
Fig. 4.5 Woman using
bowl for mask
Fig. 4.6 Man wearing
mask covering forehead
4 ‘COROMENTALITY’: NIGERIANS’ USE OF MEMETIC HUMOUR…
92
Overall, while these memes talked about the need to be safe and prac-
tise new safety habits, they made fun of the changes. This way, the memes
also served as release because they allowed people to laugh at the situation.
The memes also indirectly raised questions about the problems following
these practices caused in Nigeria and highlighted people’s concerns with
how the disease could spread if people were uninformed or using masks
wrongly. This supports Grundlingh’s (2018) and Taiwo’s (2018) view
that humour can express serious problems.
Consequences ofaProtracted Stay atHome
A second theme found in the data concerned the effects of staying at
home. Apart from the once-a-month environmental cleaning that required
Nigerians to remain home for three hours in the early 1980s, 2020 was
the rst time Nigeria implemented daily stay-at-home orders
(Olowoporoku, 2017). As a social country, Nigerians struggled with the
new normal. Some of the memes addressed people’s inability to go on
holidays. Instead, people were ‘travelling’ within their homes (one meme
was a passport that was stamped at the bathroom, bedroom, living room
and kitchen). Memes also addressed the impact staying at home for an
extended period could have on families, marriages and/or relationships.
These memes addressed thelack of privacy, extramarital affairs and how
spouses, being forced to stay at home together, would learn new and trou-
blesome information about each other. Oguntayo etal. (2020) found that
the lockdown caused ‘unprecedented stress’ that disrupted marriages and
increased rates of intimate partner violence. Understanding that this was
an issue, memes proffered suggestions for what spouses could do to sur-
vive the lockdown.
Figure 4.7 provides an example of such a solution. The meme offers
husbands a ‘rescue’ from their wives to a location of their choice. As peo-
ple could not go out, the meme creatively suggests husbands can hire
people disguised as members of the Nigerian Centre for Disease Control’s
COVID-19 taskforce. They would pretend the man had the virus and use
that excuse to take him away. Aside from providing entertainment on how
one could escape a spouse, the meme also points out Nigeria’s patriarchal
culture. Only men need rescuing, not women. Secondly, the meme cre-
atively presents Nigerians’ creative tendencies to make money and use
opportunities to their advantage. This meme features incongruity, release
and superiority humour because it used violations of social expectations
A.-O. AGBESE AND E. AGBESE
93
(obey the law, delity and family time), provokes laughter to relieve stress,
and ridicules men’s superiority (they need help to leave home).
In addition, ve memes featured the lockdown’s nancial impact. Some
businesses could not operate, and people were unable to work during the
lockdown. Therefore, lost income was a source of anxiety, especially as
Nigeria did not provide adequate relief for Nigerians. Palliatives that the
federal government created to help ‘vulnerable’ citizens, including food
and cash, were not distributed (Eranga, 2020, 222). To make money
some people started new businesses that t the context. One was hand-
washing stations. Figure4.8uses a photo of one such handwashing station
for a meme. The meme emphasizes that Igbo women, who are considered
industrious, thought of the new business. However, it is telling that
Fig. 4.7 Husband rescue meme
4 ‘COROMENTALITY’: NIGERIANS’ USE OF MEMETIC HUMOUR…
94
though socially distanced, none of the women in the picture are wearing
masks. It also highlights how no facilities for washing hands exist outside
homes and restaurants in Nigeria. Thematically, these memes also matched
Ajayi’s (2020) ndings about the social realities that humour-evoking
memes can expose. Yet, this study showed that the same realities he identi-
ed can occur during a crisis.
Need forEntertainment
The nal theme the analysis revealed was Nigerians’ need for entertain-
ment. The confusion and uncertainty COVID-19 created and the result-
ing lockdown meant Nigerians needed distractions. According to Tom
McTague (2020), COVID-19 was the ‘worst global health crisis,’ and the
resulting lockdowns created a ‘mass outpouring of gags, memes, funny
videos and general silliness.’ COVID-19 created what we called a ‘coro-
mentality’ in Nigeria; a mental state focused on COVID-19 because it
impacted people psychologically. Nigerian memes probably tapped into
people’s need for entertainment to deal with the lockdown’s psychological
impact. All 47 memes evoked humour to help people nd release and
remove their minds from the public health crisis and its present and future
impacts. For example, in the meme the creator makes fun and suggests
that wearing masks for extensive periods would alter ear shapes. People
would need to normalize their ears after the pandemic. Therefore, they
will wear masks in reverse to return ears to their original positions.
Another example is provided in a meme, through a superiority frame,
that gives Nigerians hope. The creator purports that Nigeria is going to
beat the coronavirus just as it did Ebola. The meme takes a superior tone
asking coronavirus if Ebola did not tell it about Nigeria. This suggests
Nigeria was the ‘wrong nation’ for COVID-19 to come to. The caption of
the meme, which features a child holding her chin reads, ‘corona, you
mean Ebola did not gist you? This is Nigeria oh! corona just landed in the
wrong nation, ask Ebola what eternal life and prayers did to it. I have seen
you crushed already.’ The creator is also insinuating that as a highly reli-
gious country, Nigerians will be denitely praying against the virus,
another source of superiority.
The seriousness of the pandemic also did not stop Nigerians from mak-
ing jokes about the safety practices they encouraged in the memes. For
example, a meme on social distancing said a man was asked what he would
do for his community if he won 80 million Naira. He replied that he
A.-O. AGBESE AND E. AGBESE
95
would ‘practice social distancing.’ A temperature meme also addressed
how COVID-19 was the great equalizer because it empowered people of
a lower class. It asked, ‘Did you ever think a time will come when a secu-
rity man will check the temperature of a doctor at a bank?’ A doctor is of
a higher social class than a security man (who mans the door or gate). But
in this scenario, because the security man determines who enters a bank
and who cannot, he has more power than the doctor. Two memes also
made fun of the irony that a disease discovered in China had such a lasting
effect. For example, one meme showed a sad looking chimpanzee and the
text points out that this is the longest something made in China has ever
lasted. It plays on the stereotype that things made in China do not last.
Overall, our ndings supported Kostygina etal.’s (2020) research that
memes can be used for activism to address issues in society. These memes
were also timely because they addressed issues Nigerians were experienc-
ing at the time. Our ndings further cement Moreno-Almeida’s (2020, 2)
position that no matter ‘how serious or humorous they are, all memes are
political because they speak to the ways people see themselves in terms of
race, class, gender, sexuality, ability and so forth.’
conclusIon
This study explored the memes Nigerians created and shared during the
COVID-19 lockdowns that began on March 23, 2020. The study found
that during the lockdowns, Nigerians created and shared 47 memes with
a COVID-19 theme. The analysis also determined that the memes were
primarily created to entertain but also comment on issues COVID-19
caused. Although this study used a small sample of internet memes, it
sheds light on how Nigerians use memes in times of crisis. Unlike previous
studies on dark humour that found humorous material when people died,
none of the Nigerian memes in this study talked about or made light of
death. This was probably because only four deaths were recorded during
the period of study. One could say these memes show Nigerians use dark
humour to laugh at themselves and the country, and not others’ suffering.
Overall, the study’s ndings are important for understanding how
Nigerians used humour during a global pandemic because these memes
were created in a period when people were forced to isolate and rely on
social media for information, companionship and entertainment. Further
studies on Nigerian memes could explore the other communicative acts
that Nigerian user-generated memes can perform. Though it was
4 ‘COROMENTALITY’: NIGERIANS’ USE OF MEMETIC HUMOUR…
96
challenging to nd Nigerian created memes for this study, future studies
could explore other social media networking sites for user-generated con-
tent from Nigeria on the coronavirus. The entertainment-themed memes
also raise questions about the emotions the memes raised and why they
were made. According to Kuipers (2005), dark humour in a mediated
society raises less empathic emotions beyond coping. Future studies could
explore why Nigerians make memes in times of crisis.
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A.-O. AGBESE AND E. AGBESE
101© The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature
Switzerland AG 2021
S. Mpofu (ed.), Digital Humour in the Covid-19 Pandemic,
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-79279-4_5
CHAPTER 5
An Analysis ofInternet Memes
andDiscourses onTraditional Medicines
asRemedies forCOVID-19 inZimbabwe
MbongeniJonnyMsimanga, LungileAugustineTshuma,
andMphathisiNdlovu
IntroductIon andcontext
The outbreak of the novel coronavirus disease (COVID-19) resulted in an
unprecedented global crisis. Given this public health crisis of multifaceted
dimensions, this chapter examines how memes produced and circulated by
Zimbabweans on social media demonstrated citizens’ sense of agency to
comment on the treatment for this pandemic. With the Zimbabwean gov-
ernment yet to avail plans for vaccination, traditional herbs such as umsu-
zwane/zumbani became sought after. Traditional means of curing u such
as steaming became popular during this pandemic. However, in the wake
of the second wave of infections, some members of the public turned to
traditional remedies and medicinal plants. However, this indigenous
M. J. Msimanga (*) • L. A. Tshuma
University of Johannesburg, Auckland Park, South Africa
M. Ndlovu
Stellenbosch University, Stellenbosch, South Africa
102
knowledge system is hotly contested as health experts warned the public
against the use of traditional herbs. Against the backdrop of the search for
COVID-19 cure, this study examines how social media memes reected
on people’s lived experiences and knowledge contestations.
Since the virus broke out in Wuhan (China) in December 2019,
COVID-19 has continued to wreak havoc across the globe. In March
2020, it was declared a pandemic by the World Health Organization
(WHO). More than 175 million people have contracted this virus across
the globe, with nearly four million fatalities recorded. The symptoms of
COVID-19 include dry cough, fever and shortness of breath. Prominent
debates have been centred on epidemiological responses to this global
disaster. Countries across the globe adopted sweeping measures such as
lockdowns, sealing of national borders and imposing other travel restric-
tions to curb the spread of this infectious disease. Health experts recom-
mended hand hygiene, social distancing and mask wearing as some of the
measures for mitigating and preventing the spread of the virus. With the
non-existence of a cure, measures such as “hand hygiene, social distancing
and quarantine” were said to help people to “protect themselves and oth-
ers” (Teti etal., 2020, 2).
Although countries are implementing measures such as social distanc-
ing, there was an urgent need for the development of a vaccine to curb the
spread of COVID-19. Thus, there is a race to “develop and deploy safe
and effective vaccines” (WHO, 2021). However, there are concerns about
the lack of equitable access to vaccines, or what the United Nations regards
as the problem of “vaccine nationalism” (EWN, 2021). Wealthy countries
are hogging COVID-19 vaccine doses, a situation that may lead to what
the WHO director-general Tedros Adhanom Ghebreyesus terming a “cat-
astrophic moral failure” (EWN, 2021). Given these structural inequalities
and the hoarding of COVID-19 vaccines by powerful nations, African
countries are being left behind in obtaining the vaccines. Besides the chal-
lenge of vaccine nationalism, there are myths about COVID-19 vaccines
that are circulating on social media, and some of the rumours include a
claim that the vaccines will alter people’s DNA. In March 2020,
Zimbabwe’s Minister of Defense claimed that COVID-19 was God’s pun-
ishment on the Western countries for imposing sanctions on Zimbabwe.
In Zimbabwe, COVID-19 fears were compounded by the lack of emer-
gency preparedness, poor healthcare system and the deepening economic
crisis. Given the fragile health system in the country and uncertainty sur-
rounding the COVID-19 pandemic, some Zimbabweans resorted to the
M. J. MSIMANGA ET AL.
103
use of herbal remedies such as umsuzwane/zumbani, concoctions and
steaming as preventive measures (CITE, 2021). At the time of writing this
chapter, the country was yet to receive doses of COVID-19 vaccines.
Health experts in the country have been warning citizens against the use
of steam inhalation and local herbs as COVID-19 remedies. Our chapter
considers how Internet memes gave citizens a voice and agency to com-
ment on prescribed treatments for the COVID-19 pandemic.
In January 2021, South Africa became one of the rst African countries
to receive doses of COVID-19 vaccine. Seychelles was the rst country in
sub-Saharan Africa to vaccinate its citizens against COVID-19 (McSweeney
& Chingono, 2021). As of February 3, 2021, Egypt, Algeria, Seychelles
and Morocco were the only African states that had begun vaccinating their
populations (McSweeney & Chingono, 2021). Tanzania’s head of state,
on the other hand, declared that his country will not accept COVID-19
vaccines (BBC, 2021). President Mugufuli had been urging Tanzanians to
use steam inhalation and herbal medicines to cure COVID-19. Earlier in
June 2020, he declared Tanzania “COVID-19 free” (BBC, 2021). Almost
a year later, in March 2021, he was killed by the virus. Social media reports
abound that a herbal concoction was launched and promoted in
Madagascar to cure COVID-19, despite warnings by the WHO against
the use of traditional herbal remedies (Ndlovu-Gatsheni, 2020). Against
the backdrop of the myths, complexities and politics surrounding
COVID-19 vaccines, this chapter examines the memes that circulated on
social media platforms such as Facebook, Twitter and WhatsApp as citi-
zens attempted to cope and make sense of the cure for COVID-19 pan-
demic. In the next section, we review literature on humour and health
communication.
LIterature revIew
Humour, since time immemorial, has been dedicated to exposing human
folly with its goal to inspire critical thinking and reasoned social engage-
ment (McClennen & Maisel, 2014, 108). It is mostly accompanied by
irony, parody and word play. It is critical in nature and has a didactic mean-
ing on issues expressed. By possessing such qualities, humour is sometimes
a critical mode of addressing those in power as the press is viewed too
timid and does not convey political and social events the way it does (Gray
etal., 2009). Highet (1962, 5) further suggests that humour is “topical;
It claims to be realistic (although it is usually exaggerated or distorted); It
5 AN ANALYSIS OF INTERNET MEMES AND DISCOURSES ON TRADITIONAL…
104
is shocking; It is informal; (and although often in a grotesque and painful
manner) it is funny”. Thus, satire ought not to be funny per se, although
it maintains its characteristic of scorning those who wield power. In the
process, humour is a means of speaking back to power, laws or institu-
tional policies in a given context or scenario (Critchley, 2002; Neale &
Krutnick, 2006; Gray etal., 2009). The attack of power by the genre also
enables deliberative discussions permitting unconscious reections
amongst audiences on socio-political and socio-economic issues. In this
way, satire has the power to “energize civic culture, engaging citizen-
audiences…inspiring public political discussions, and drawing citizens
enthusiastically into the realm of the political with deft and dazzling ease”
(Gray etal., 2009, 4). The genre’s calling card is the ability to produce
social scorn or damning indictments through playful means transforming
the aggressive act of ridicule into a more socially acceptable act of render-
ing something ridiculous.
However, most studies in the Global South have assessed how satire,
memes and humour are avenues for challenging and critiquing the ruling
elite (Willems, 2011; Siziba & Ncube, 2015; Mpofu, 2019). These studies
are in relation to how humour is oppositional and transgressive in nature
and is used as political weapons. Moreover, humour are weapons of the
weak used to expose self-aggrandisement, ineptness and nepotism of polit-
ical leaders, mishaps and inability to serve in positions of power (see
Nyamnjoh, 2009, 99). Thus, humour is a means of political communica-
tion that plays the role of an alternative public sphere and gives space for
postcolonial subjects to deliberate and think about issues presented to
them that affect them on a day-to-day basis (see Mbembe, 2001). In this
way, humour is a social and political construct arising from the society in
which we are embedded. Mbembe (2001, 142), drawing his examples
from Togo and Cameroon, comments on the signicance of humour and
aesthetised art in postcolonial Africa alluding that “as a gure of speech,
the image is always a conventional comment, the transcription of a reality,
a word, a vision, or an idea into a visible code that becomes, in turn, a
manner of speaking of the world and inhabiting it”. In the process,
humour is signicant in the deterritorialisation of political leaders and is
an attempt to delegitimise a particular person, idea or position circulating
within the wider social sphere or community (Eko, 2015). A recurring
theme amongst this corpus of literature shows how satire and humour
provides a space for communicating and venting out displeasure towards
government ofcials and policies.
M. J. MSIMANGA ET AL.
105
However, in this study we consider how memes were a means to com-
ment on indigenous herbs and as COVID-19 treatments. We consider
how memes then act as counter-hegemonic and countercultural weapons
regarded as signicant political actions (see Mina, 2014; Pearce &
Hajizada, 2014). As Goriunova (2012, 223) further states, memes are
forms of “aesthetic expression” created and circulated through social
media platforms. They are a means of silent resistance, take on forms of
manipulated videos, phrases images and words (see Siziba & Ncube, 2015,
517–518). They can be used to advertise or commercialise products on
social media platforms (Siziba & Ncube, 2015). This performance and
playfulness online, particularly through the creation of memes and viral
videos, gives individuals the capacity to create and express political and
cultural discontent. They also create subcultures that oppose dominant
discourses. The strong visual language embedded in Internet memes and
their culture, which consists of creative remixing and fosters communal
participation, provides a platform which allows for new forms of public
debate and community building to take place.
There is, however, a dearth of literature on the intersection of humour
and health communication in the Global South. Studies have shown how
humour has been used during health campaigns as a way of persuading
people to accept aversive information (see Hendricks & Jansen, 2017,
595). Some however examine people’s response to humour with ndings
showing that people including patients respond positively to life-
threatening information when communicated with humour (see Lee etal.,
2015). Referring to Malawi, Tavory (2014, 287) observes how people
make fun of HIV/AIDS stating, “where AIDS constantly hovers over
social life, it becomes both constant resource-for and the butt-of humour”.
There is a growing interest on the intersection of humour and health com-
munication on the COVID-19 pandemic because of citizens’ access to
social media and their inclination to debate issues online. Wasserman
(2020) contends that during the COVID-19 pandemic, humour has been
used as a coping mechanism that speaks to socio-cultural, political and
psychological reasons. Taking a leaf from this study, we argue that humour
plays an important role in communicating health-related information by
analysing memes that circulated on social media platforms during the
COVID-19 pandemic. Particularly, this chapter will assess how audiences
communicated information on indigenous ways of treating the COVID-19
pandemic. Thus, this chapter acts as a springboard for further research on
the intersection of health communication and humour as the effects will
5 AN ANALYSIS OF INTERNET MEMES AND DISCOURSES ON TRADITIONAL…
106
be felt for years to come. In the next section, we provide an outline of the
theoretical perspectives that the study will adopt.
theoretIcaL andconceptuaL Framework
The chapter adopts a Bakhtin’s theoretical lens so as to understand memes
that circulated on social media platforms. The carnivalesque is developed
from the term carnival, and these were common cultural activities in medi-
eval Europe and elsewhere. It is through an analysis of these that Bakhtin
developed a theory of the carnivalesque (Ngoshi, 2013, 54). The carni-
valesque denotes a rebellion of the social order against hierarchic author-
ity. This traditional institute or body legitimises specic rules and
regulations that are meant to be abided to by society. Stam (1989, 95)
further notes that the carnivalesque atmosphere “is more than a party or a
festival; it is the oppositional culture…a counter-model of cultural pro-
duction and desire”. Thus, a carnivalesque atmosphere suspends rules,
laws and any form of hierarchical institutions and rules that attempt to
hunker down society and its participants. In the process, “second life” is
imagined as a “world” where everyone on free and familiar contact is
established. We consider these aspects as social media platforms in
Zimbabwe were used to challenge the COVID-19 vaccines approved by
the World Health Organization (WHO) and the Zimbabwean govern-
ment. Instead, people preferred the traditional means of treating the virus.
We also consider how the new relationship espoused by a carnivalesque
atmosphere enables a “new mode of interrelationship between individuals,
counterpoised to the all-powerful socio-hierarchical relationships of non-
carnival life” (Stevens, 2009, 1).
Within this space, ordinary people have an opportunity to interact with
the “untouchables”, that is, those who wield institutional, political and
economic power in the non-carnival life. Stam (1989, 87) supports this
view stating that within a carnivalesque atmosphere, all hierarchical dis-
tinctions, all barriers, all norms and prohibitions are temporarily sus-
pended, while a qualitatively different kind of communication, based on
“free and familiar contact”, is established. The space enables the breaking
down of barriers, overcoming of power inequalities and hierarchies
through free interactions (see Rayner, 2010, 6). It challenges dominant
discourses, conquering power inequalities and societal hierarchies through
humour and mockery. Deveau (2012) submits the carnival is a form of
political weapon that seeks to undermine hierarchy and authority bringing
M. J. MSIMANGA ET AL.
107
together people in a “common discursive” body, this manifesting in the
form of social media platforms. Thus, Hess, for example, argue that social
media provides a platform for “parody and pastiche [which] are vital forms
of speaking out and resistance” (2009, 429). In the same vein, Burgess
and Green (2009, 103) state that social media platforms are characterised
by a “sense of playfulness and affect”. Papacharissi further states that social
media “provide irreverence, humour, unpredictability necessary for reju-
venating political conversation trapped in conventional formulas” (2010,
151). She further advances this view stating that social media platforms
elicit “sarcasm, humour or satire which are equally important forms of
political thought and expression” (Papacharissi, 2010, 151). Drawing on
social media platforms Twitter, Facebook and WhatsApp where these
humorous conversations are circulated, we consider how audiences appro-
priated social media platforms to communicate indigenous ways of boost-
ing the immune system and treating COVID-19. In the next section, we
outline the methodological premise underpinning this study.
methodoLogy
This qualitative study uses data drawn from three social media sites—
Twitter, Facebook and WhatsApp. The choice for selecting these sites is
based on our observation of many of memes on these platforms. Selected
social media memes were in various forms which include images, videos,
words and phrases. For this study we focus on images and words because
they were dominant. From the selected social media platforms, researchers
monitored memes from December to February and used thematic analysis
to derive thematic issues that arose from the memes. Thematic analysis is
a process of identifying and analysing various themes within a given data
set. Braun and Clarke (2006) note that themes are captured aspects about
data in relation to the research questions and objectives and represent a
certain level of patterned response or meaning within the data set. There
are two types of thematic levels explained by Braun and Clarke (2006) and
fall under semantic and latent themes. Semantic themes “exist within the
explicit or surface meanings of the data and the analyst is not looking for
anything beyond what a participant has said or what has been written”
(Braun & Clarke, 2006, 84). The latent level focuses on the deeper mean-
ings of the data and “examines the underlying ideas, assumptions, and
conceptualizations – and ideologies– that are theorized as shaping or
informing the semantic content of the data” (Braun & Clarke, 2006, 84).
5 AN ANALYSIS OF INTERNET MEMES AND DISCOURSES ON TRADITIONAL…
108
The research adopts the latter. As such, key themes identied for the study
showed how humour became a means to prescribe alternative treatment
for the COVID-19 vaccine prescribed by the World Health Organization,
the commercialisation of traditional medicines and how social media plat-
forms were used for social commentary during the COVID-19 indigenous
treatment. Resultantly, 17 memes were analysed as they directly spoke to
COVID-19-related memes and indigenous treatment that circulated on
social media platforms. These memes were circulated between March
2020 (when COVID-19 was declared a pandemic) and January 2021. For
further analysis, semiotic analysis was used for image-based memes. Major
issues accessed how meaning is layered: and the two layers are denotation
and connotation. The former looks at the descriptive features of an image,
while the latter responds to issues such as ideas and values that are expressed
through what is represented and the ways in which issues are reported
(Van Leeuwen, 2005).
data presentatIon andanaLysIs
COVID-19, Traditional Herbal Medicines
andEpistemic Struggles
In his decolonial reading of COVID-19, Ndlovu-Gatsheni (2020, 368)
regards this pandemic as multifaceted, with “ecological, existential, and
epistemic dimensions”. Although Africa has a “long history and experi-
ence of grappling with epidemics and pandemics”, Ndlovu-Gatsheni
(2020, 370) bemoans that there is a reluctance to “tap into this history,
experience, and knowledge about responding to the COVID-19 pan-
demic”. Ndlovu-Gatsheni (2020, 370) further posits that COVID-19
provides an opportunity for:
Africa in particular and the Global South in general not to look up to the
Global North for salvation but to shift the geopolitics of knowledge by
using African endogenous knowledge and the epistemologies of the
Global South.
Rather than “copy and paste” responses from the Global North, there
is need for Africans to draw on their rich history, experiences and knowl-
edge systems (Ndlovu-Gatsheni, 2020, 372). A herbal remedy called
“COVID Organics” was developed in Madagascar as an endogenous
M. J. MSIMANGA ET AL.
109
mitigation strategy (Ndlovu-Gatsheni, 2020, 373). WHO responded by
warning the public against using unproven medication. Whilst the point of
caution is “well taken”, the challenge, as noted by Ndlovu-Gatsheni
(2020, 373), is that the “geopolitics of power and knowledge are still
titled toward the Global North as the only site of credible science and only
space to look to as the world waits for the vaccine”. The initiative taken in
the Global North on the development of a vaccine are “not subjected to
the same dismissal as those being carried out by the African scientists”
(Ndlovu-Gatsheni, 2020, 273).
There are social media memes that constitute rallying calls for the use
of indigenous knowledge systems as mitigation strategies and alternative
remedies against COVID-19. Steam inhalation, or steam therapy, is popu-
larised in these memes that are reproduced and circulated in cyberspace.
In countries such as Zimbabwe, steam therapy is one of the common
home remedies for u. As such, one of the memes is a visual depiction of
three toddlers undergoing a steam therapy. A message, written in
Zimbabwe’s chiShona language, accompanies this image and reads:
Pamberi neku natira!!! Vanoseka hameno henyu #staysafe (translated:
Forward with steaming!!! It does not matter even if they laugh at you).
This meme depicts partially naked toddlers in a humorous manner as they
endure steam inhalation. Through this use of humour, this meme seeks to
promote African traditional medicine and endogenous knowledge by rei-
fying kunatira (steam inhalation). Although kunatira does not cure or
prevent COVID-19, this meme constructs and celebrates steaming as an
alternative episteme. Ndlovu-Gatsheni (2020, 366) examines the geopoli-
tics of power and knowledge and develops an argument that seeks solu-
tions to COVID-19 “based on the African knowledge and epistemologies
from the Global South”. We consider how, from a carnivalesque point of
view, memes from Zimbabwe and the Global South then became an oppo-
sitional culture and counter-model of production. This oppositional cul-
ture, as evidenced by the memes, undermines ofcial and legitimate
discourses (Bakhtin, 1984).
In addition, there are memes that celebrate local knowledge. For exam-
ple, in Fig.5.1, a visual text projects lemons, garlic and ginger as preven-
tive measures against COVID-19in a humorous manner. Although these
do not prevent or cure COVID-19, there is an additional message that
reads: “Dear COVID 19, you are in a wrong country”. Given the crum-
bling healthcare system in countries such as Zimbabwe, some members of
the public have resorted to traditional medicine. Other memes celebrate
5 AN ANALYSIS OF INTERNET MEMES AND DISCOURSES ON TRADITIONAL…
110
herbal medicine as a remedy for COVID-19. One meme depicts a man
wearing a mask and having a face covered with umsuzwane/zumbani. The
message attached to the image is a declaration against COVID-19:
“Corona for what! No chance here”. In this regard, traditional herbal
medicines are celebrated as a remedy for the pandemic. Through humour,
an image of traditional herbal medicine serves to invoke and reclaim sub-
jugated local knowledge. The dominant Western science that is associated
with pharmaceutical drugs and vaccines is being challenged and resisted
by endogenous knowledge systems. However, this reclaiming of indige-
nous knowledge systems by virtue of the memes shows how humour sus-
pends already known rules or knowledge, and any form of hierarchies that
attempt to lter alternative viewpoints (Thompson 2009). Thus, a “sec-
ond life” is imagined as a “world” where everyone is imagined to be
“equal” recapturing the public sphere and “reopening the discussion of
‘serious’ affairs…that signals that anyone can participate in it” (Thompson,
2009, 223).
In celebrating traditional herbs, some memes project vaccines as poi-
sonous. There are various anti-vaccine assumptions and myths that focus
on the toxic nature of immunisation. COVID-19 vaccines are denounced
as having adverse effects on the physical and mental wellbeing of the users.
There are claims that COVID-19 vaccines will supposedly alter DNA
(Goodman & Carmichael, 2020). Others add that tracking microchips
will supposedly be implanted in individuals who receive the coronavirus
Fig. 5.1 Illustration of
ginger, garlic, honey and
aloe vera that are seen as
immune boasters to
counteract against
COVID-19
M. J. MSIMANGA ET AL.
111
vaccines (Goodman & Carmichael, 2020). In Fig. 5.2, a meme with a
message: “Dear black people. Your Minister will not tell you to steam with
umhlonyane, umsuzwane and gum tree coz it will collapse his poison proj-
ect. Wake up guys”. An image of eucalyptus leaves serves to reinforce this
notion that traditional medicines are safer and effective as compared to
what is deemed as “poisonous” vaccines. In addition, another meme
explicitly represents a particular herb as a cure for COVID-19. The mes-
sage reads: “umuthi wokuvikela I Corona uyahlikihlela emhlane” (a medi-
cine to protect you from COVID-19. Rub it on your back”). As such,
there is an assumption that traditional herbal medicine is a treatment of
COVID-19 (Fig.5.3).
Another meme depicts a man in a bushy area seemingly full of umsuz-
wane. The avowal: “We still have umsuzwane, insangu,1 gumtree and
other. You won’t nish us. And we will never stop using those” constitutes
a resistance against the taking of COVID-19 vaccines. Evidently, steam
inhalation and traditional herbal medicines are celebrated as an African
endogenous knowledge that challenges the hegemony of Western science.
Thus, in the context of Zimbabwe, one would note the way social media
Fig. 5.2 Traditional
herbs such as
umsuzwane that are
regarded as preventative
measures against
COVID-19
5 AN ANALYSIS OF INTERNET MEMES AND DISCOURSES ON TRADITIONAL…
112
platforms are characterised by a “carnivalesque mode of expression”
(Karekwaivanane, 2018, 56) that then go on to challenge institutionalised
knowledge on topics with health-related issues. In the next theme, we
discuss how memes were used to comment on indigenous knowledge sys-
tems on COVID-19.
COVID-19 Vaccines andtheSocial Commentary
Humour comes in various formats and these include irony, satire, parody
and also sarcasm. Given that memes are easily created and manipulated by
audiences “they provide an ideal social media tool for responding to cur-
rent events through humour” (Ross & Rivers, 2018, 289). Debates that
centred on COVID-19 addressed the need to use indigenous knowledge
systems, although they were laced with social and everyday life commen-
tary offering comic relief. These everyday issues mostly touched on how
old people and the political elite should could use indigenous systems as
an alternative to the cure for COVID-19. Thus, humour serves as a key for
the understanding of social and cultural issues (see Shifman, 2014, 187).
It is, however, through various memes that one is able to understand how
memes reected on indigenous medicines and how audiences commented
on them. In Fig.5.5, the meme reads kana wakambopfeka maZico, gara
mumba, idya mafruits akawandisa, natira 4 times a day and usatendere
vayenzi pamba pako which when translated means (if you once had Zico
sandals, you should steam 4 times a day and don’t allow visitors at your
Fig. 5.3 A shrub that
is seen as a cure for
COVID-19
M. J. MSIMANGA ET AL.
113
house). Zico are sandals that were once popular in the early 1990s. As
such, the background of the meme suggests that people who wore the
sandals are now old and likely to be infected by the virus as statistics have
shown the majority of people who succumbed to COVID-19 are old peo-
ple. The meme captures discourse on the pandemic as humour is used to
comment and advise elderly people, likely to have ailments to use indige-
nous medicines as an alternative immune booster or treatment for
COVID-19. Therefore, memes play an important role in communicating
health information as humour, a component of Internet memes, “is easier
to relate to for most people” (Ross & Rivers, 2018, 288).
In Fig.5.4, the meme comments on the pandemic by highlighting a
collage of ve different images—Mazoe orange crush, Farino juice,
Chibuku opaque beer, green boxers commonly used for playing soccer
Fig. 5.4 is a collection of items that are supposedly known only by the elderly.
Such people are being encouraged to steam as they are deemed more vulnerable to
COVID-19
5 AN ANALYSIS OF INTERNET MEMES AND DISCOURSES ON TRADITIONAL…
114
and a pair of sandals for women. These were common in Zimbabwe’s early
years of independence in 1980. The message inscribed, in Zimbabwe’s
chiShona language, juxtaposed with the images reads; kana uchiri kuziva
izvi natira kashanu pazuva (if you still know these steam ve times a day).
Therefore, the meme suggests that people of the old age should take
measures that will protect them from the COVID-19 virus—preferably
using indigenous ways of treating a u such as steaming. In this case, the
meme serves as a way of reecting the views of audiences on how to com-
bat the COVID-19 virus. Furthermore, social media platforms play an
important role in sharing information in the wake of applications that give
audiences the power of autonomy to create messages that reect how soci-
ety understands issues related to treatment of COVID-19. They, however,
reect audiences’ opinions on important or topical issues, in this case
COVID-19 treatment.
However, another meme reads; umuntu wesifazane imbali, kodwa may-
enesishwapha umsuzwane (beautiful woman deserves roses but unattract-
ive ones should get umsuzwane). The message is accompanied by a rose
which supposedly should be given to a beautiful lady and umsuzwane for
less attractive women. The meme is derogatory in two ways; rst, it con-
stitutes body shaming as certain women are being devalued. Second, it
constructs umsuzwane as less appealing than roses. As such, this meme
undermines indigenous knowledge systems. The meme circulates at a time
when people have discovered that umsuzwane has long been used to cure
u-like diseases and can play a part in reducing the risk of being infected
by the COVID-19 virus. Such memes relate with what Burgess and Green
(2009, 103) view on social media platforms that are characterised by a
“sense of playfulness and affect”. In this case, memes give people avenue
where they poke fun at each other at the same time discussing issues of
importance. Thus, this brings out the carnivalesque atmosphere that
enables a “‘free’discussion…second life, a second world… a ‘world inside
out’” (Bakhtin, 1984, 11). In this “second life”, the “world” is imagined
where everyone is subjected to being “equal” despite their societal ranking.
Social commentary also extends to sexual-related issues where memes
are used to show indelity that people in society are involved in. Another
meme captures a conversation between a man and his wife. The message,
written in Shona language, reads: wife: ukuitei, its now 9 send pic repauri
when translated means: “what are you doing, it’s now 9 send a picture of
where you are”, hubby: ndichangopedza kunatira (I have just nished
steaming). The message is inscribed with a male individual sweating
M. J. MSIMANGA ET AL.
115
purporting to have nished steaming. The underlying message is that the
husband is having sex with someone, hence the sweat (steam) in the pic-
ture. The image captured in the meme attracts people’s attention, and this
shows the “secondary layer of language” imbedded in the meme which
constitute shared spheres of cultural knowledge allowing individuals to
convey ideas through the creation of images, symbols or short phrases
(Shifman, 2014). Furthermore, through social commentary, one is able to
understand that steaming (ukufutha/natira) is one of the ways that soci-
ety adopts to treat the virus. Memes, however, reveal the dominant dis-
courses or issues circulating in society to raise more awareness of the
pandemic that has changed people’s way of life. Thus, memes just like
other forms of communication are effective in communicating health-
related discourses because of their power in inuencing the general public
as well as opinion leaders on issues of public health (Evans & Ulasevich,
2005). Resultantly, memes have played a crucial role in educating, inform-
ing people on health and medical conditions.
Memes asaCritique oftheCommercialisation
ofIndigenous Medicines
Traditional medicines have always been used to address common illnesses
in the Global South. It is a common heritage that most African countries
share and have been used to since time immemorial. However, their value
is not recognised as practitioners are not placed at the centre of policy
formulation and implementation. Traditional medicines thus speak to the
practice of cultures. In this section, we consider how a vast number of
memes that circulated on social media platforms showed how traditional
medicines such as umsuzwane/zumbani were promoted and commer-
cialised on social media as an alternative treatment for COVID-19. We
identied four memes that critiqued the commercialisation of traditional
medicines in Zimbabwe. One of the memes that circulated pokes fun at
individuals with medical aid subscriptions (see Fig. 5.5). The meme,
accompanied by laughing emojis, reads: Nghlekiswa ukuth nalabo abanama
medical aid sikha nabo umsuzwane which means: “I nd it funny that
those on medical aid are the very same people who are going to use
Zumbani as well”. However, there are many possible meanings to this
meme. Its playfulness could be a way of rejecting medical aid subscrip-
tions—especially in a dire economic and a healthcare system that has been
described as a “silent genocide”.2 Subscribing to a medical aid is
5 AN ANALYSIS OF INTERNET MEMES AND DISCOURSES ON TRADITIONAL…
116
somewhat costly, considering how hospitals in Zimbabwe are facing drug
shortages or have poor medical facilities. Instead of using medical aid, the
meme is promoting and urging people to use traditional medicines that
are readily available as indigenous shrubs. In part, the meme could also be
“laughing” at elitists who can afford medical aid subscriptions especially
during a pandemic. It somehow shows how the powerful and untouchable
in society who can afford medical aid payments in developed countries
also resort to using traditional medicines in the face of an irresolvable
global pandemic. In relation to the Zimbabwean case, memes empower
citizens to contribute and critique the elite on important issues that they
are often excluded from. Social media platforms are characterised by
laughter that then becomes an arena for free expression and engagement.
The elite and those with institutional, economic power are mocked and
reduced to ordinary people, stripped of institutional or political control
they possess in the non-carnivalesque life.
Another meme (Fig.5.6) pokes fun at how commercial supermarkets
are now selling umsuzwane in Zimbabwe. The meme shows umsuzwane/
zumbani placed at a vegetable section with price tag. The meme questions
how a common plant is now sold in shops and being commercialised as an
alternative to treat and boost immune systems. Similarly, another one
(Fig.5.7) shows an individual pushing a trolley full of umsuzwane selling
the plant for 10 South African rands. Another meme (Fig.5.8), with the
Nigerian actor Osita Iheme also questions the boom of umsuzwane sales
in Zimbabwe. The meme written in isiNdebele language reads: Kanti
umsuzwane is now commercialised wona ugcwele egangeni?..sokusele ukuthi
sithengise iaki kuphela komgodoyi which means: “Zumbani is now
Fig. 5.5 People on
medical aid who are
using Zumbani
M. J. MSIMANGA ET AL.
117
Fig. 5.6 A critique of
the commercialisation of
plants such as Zumbani
Fig. 5.7 A man
pushing a trolley with
umsuzwane which is
being sold for 10 South
African rands
5 AN ANALYSIS OF INTERNET MEMES AND DISCOURSES ON TRADITIONAL…
118
commercialised yet it’s a common plant in the bush? The only thing left is
for us to sell our buttocks”. In part, the meme reects how people now
make a living in society by selling the indigenous herb. Overall perspec-
tive, as shown by these memes, humour is used by audiences to commu-
nicate and educate people about alternative immune boosters and
COVID-19 treatments such as Umsuzwane/Zumbani. Social media users
appropriated humour as a means for critiquing the commercialisation of
indigenous immune boosters or COVID-19 treatments such as
Umsuzwane/Zumbani. Memes are also used to communicate about a
subject that is frightening and they drive people to pay attention to what
is being communicated.
concLusIon
This study concludes by arguing that humour plays an integral part in
health communication. The ndings demonstrated that memes are used
to promote the use of indigenous knowledge to help ght the virus. Such
knowledge comes on the backdrop of scepticism on the use of WHO-
approved vaccines. Citizens are appropriating and utilising the Internet as
a means of voicing their opinions on prevention and treatment of
COVID-19. These memes constitute counter-hegemonic forms and prac-
tices as they challenge the dominant Western scientic knowledge systems.
Fig. 5.8 The boom of
umsuzwane sales in
Zimbabwe
M. J. MSIMANGA ET AL.
119
notes
1. Insangu or Insango is Cannabis, also known as marijuana, among other
names, and is a psychoactive drug from the Cannabis plant used primarily
for medical or recreational purposes.
2. https://www.dailymaverick.co.za/article/2019- 10- 22- zimbabwean-
healthcare- system- a- silent- genocide/
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5 AN ANALYSIS OF INTERNET MEMES AND DISCOURSES ON TRADITIONAL…
123© The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature
Switzerland AG 2021
S. Mpofu (ed.), Digital Humour in the Covid-19 Pandemic,
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-79279-4_6
CHAPTER 6
“Can weUninstall 2020 andInstall It Again?
This Version Has aVirus!”: Humourous
Pundemicand Misinforming
InfodemicaboutCOVID-19 Pandemic
onSocial Media
AdamkoloMohammedIbrahim, NassirMohammed
Abba- Aji, andPhuongThiVi
IntroductIon
Exponential development in the internet and social media have tremen-
dously inuenced online memes. A meme is a way of expressing one per-
son’s ideas, thoughts or behaviour to others. Whether in the form of
A. M. Ibrahim (*) • N. M. Abba-Aji
Department of Mass Communication, University of Maiduguri,
Maiduguri, Nigeria
e-mail: adamkolo@unimaid.edu.ng; click2nass@unimaid.edu.ng
P. T. Vi
Faculty of Journalism, Communications, and Literature, TNUS- Thai Nguyen
University of Science, Thai Nguyen, Vietnam
e-mail: phuong_vt@tnus.edu.vn
124
images, hyperlinks, videos, websites or hashtags, memes are shared on the
internet. Online memes are popular because they can be accessed by users
as jokes, satires and expression of feelings. The development of memes on
social media is inuenced by universal language (Juditha, 2015). To rein-
force some social media arguments, mass media often become references
and “weapons”. Social media memes are backgrounded by individual or
group business and people’s “understanding of meme denition based on
the subject of the meme, patterns or components, forms of discourse, and
language” (Fadly, 2020, 2; Hartini, 2017, 23; Msughter, 2020).
Virtual society has massively consumed the presence of this visual phe-
nomenon. Besides the case of COVID-19 is being discussed on social
media. In social media, many visualisations of images or memes associated
with COVID-19 are increasing. In general, COVID-19 memes contain
images or sentences informing society of quotations and satires. To pre-
vent the spread of the COVID-19 virus, these memes are aimed at educat-
ing society. As everyone knows, they are trying to stop the spread of the
COVID-19 virus all over the world, including Indonesia. The creators,
with all their creativity, try to create funny memes as a preventive step.
Hopefully, the community will understand the WFH (Work and Worship
from Home) policy and the government’s go-home ban (Msughter, 2020).
To be understood by society, the creators combine creativities, arts,
messages and humour intentionally. But, sometimes, the phrases do not
follow the standards. They use sarcastic language freely; they satirise a
certain group, without thinking about the effect. Most memes about
COVID-19 satirise societies that disobey the rules of the government. It
is not possible to change the cultures of society, such as going home, dis-
obeying physical distance, gathering at restaurants and inviting many peo-
ple to the party, immediately. The existence of COVID-19 memes could
draw the attention of social media users with satires to these problems. In
many social media, especially Facebook, Instagram and web blogs, it can
be shown from the numerous uses of COVID-19 memes that everyone
can read them, especially millennials. We should know, however, that the
COVID-19 memes tent with hyperbolic language to concentrate on paro-
dist aspects, so it needs to understand deep thinking. The languages used
in memes also vary from traditional languages to Indonesian. The chosen
construction of language has symbolic power. Intentionally, the creators
wrapped it in such a way that it can be criticised, not taken for granted
(Msughter, 2020). A meme is a cultural transmission that constructs cer-
tain cultural patterns in the form of thought, idea, inspiration, habit, song
A. M. IBRAHIM ET AL.
125
or fashion (Dawkins, 2006, 215 in Isnaniah & Augustina, 2020;
Msughter, 2020).
Within several disciplines, such as communication, linguistics, psychol-
ogy, sociology, philosophy and even medicine, the past few decades have
seen intensive development in humour research. Therefore, using a review
of relevant literature, this chapter explores how social media users use
humour about the COVID-19 pandemic and its related issues, say one
thing and mean another, and the pivotal role that context plays in explain-
ing the intended meaning. Several coronavirus-motivated humour, jokes,
memes (otherwise called “pundemic”) and fake news, misinformation and
hoaxes (otherwise known as “infodemic”(Richtel, 2020)) on social media
are pragmatically discussed in this chapter. Using Mey’s theory of prag-
matic acts as its theoretical framework, the chapter highlights the strate-
gies and practises used in the projection of reality by the memes and
humour in a period of, as Ogungbe and Omolobi (2020) and Pauliks
(2020) describe it, “sociological consensus among individuals”.
communIcatIon InaHumour
Communication is a tool for a targeted audience to convey specic inten-
tions. In conversations, such intentions can range from idle conversations
to injecting humour, to serious issues such as the coronavirus pandemic,
reports on certain issues, as well as to share compassion as shown in obitu-
aries. According to Ross (1998), humour is inuential and has a high
prole in our society; Ross further denes humour as “something that
makes a person laugh or smile” (p.3). While humour is “a universal phe-
nomenon”, Andrew (2012) argues that “it is also culturally dependent on
a particular time and place for its specic content”. Humour is also seen as
“a way for both the young and the old to exercise some control over our
anxieties about ageing and death” (Andrew, 2012, 11, 14; Williams, 2020).
The literature shows that humour can be used through satirisation,
depending on the context (especially academic). It can be viewed as a
comedy on television, constructed in play or before a live audience (e.g.
sitcom). Humour can be evoked in family, interpersonal or group interac-
tions through jokes and sometimes puns, and so on. It can be inferred in
all the identied environments that humour is potentially an effective
instrument for maintaining any person or society’s peace, stability and
general well-being. Therefore, humour can be seen as a means of social
interaction (Chapman, 1983). Andrew identied the fundamental
6 “CAN WE UNINSTALL 2020 AND INSTALL IT AGAIN? THIS VERSION…
126
functions of humour by stating that “humour uses situations, characters,
speech, writing or images to create fun in the form of entertainment. He
added that it entertains the audience by making them “less pretentious,
make them politically and medically conscious, reduce stress hormone lev-
els, provide physical exercise, promote solidarity and serves as a coping
strategy from a pandemic” (p.13). Therefore, over the years, humour has
attracted scholarly attention as an established means of releasing stress and
tension and has been identied as an effective means of interaction. It is an
effective way to arouse and stimulate the interest of learners in teaching
and learning (Aboudan, 2009 cited in Akinola, 2018). “Humour is capa-
ble of creating an atmosphere of relief from anxiety (Williams, 2020),
anger and pain; its prole in society is high”, according to Ross (1998,
p. 2). In human society, humour plays many roles. Katayama (2009)
argues that “humour brings people together through shared laughter”
(p.25). This indicates that humour is a collective phenomenon as opposed
to being an individualised phenomenon. This implies that it functions as a
means to unite individuals.
Humour also has some sociological roles besides this (Campisano,
2016). Friedman and Kuipers (2013) argue that there is no complete soci-
ological consensus on the role of humour in sociology. Be that as it may,
humour performs the role of promoting social inclusion and exclusion
(p.181). As Alatalo and Poutiainen (2016) noted, humour also decreases
and strengthens differences in status and enhances the sense of connected-
ness. The problem of the coronavirus pandemic ravaging the world could
aptly be seen in these aforementioned functions. Despite the severity of
the pandemic, to douse the tension, people still tend to make humour
avour out of it, and maybe make people laugh consciously or uncon-
sciously. Furthermore, humour is caused by specic mechanisms that can
be grouped into three main categories: cognitive theory, the theory of
superiority and the theory of relief (Roux 2008, 89 cited in Ogungbe &
Omolobi, 2020). Campisano (2016) also denes cognitive theories of
humour, superiority and relief, similar to Roux’s assertion. The difference
is that Campisano calls them the main sociological theories of humour,
while Roux refers to them as mechanisms that trigger humour. The sub-
ject has been conceived as a complex multi-faceted phenomenon (Marin-
Arrese, 2005). Therefore, it is important to take from communications
and language and the function they perform in humour motivated by the
coronavirus situation. This is because communication and language are an
avenue for individuals, in a particular context, to perform several acts
A. M. IBRAHIM ET AL.
127
aimed at having intended perlocutionary effects on the audience, readers
or listeners (Ogungbe & Omolobi, 2020).
Pragmatics is a communication linguistic branch that focuses on how
words are used to perform different acts, how meaning is negotiated
between speaker and listener, and how the context plays a pivotal role in
interpreting an utterance, as well as explaining aspects of meaning that
cannot be found in the plain sense of words or structures. According to
Mey (2001, 6), “Pragmatics studies the use of language in human com-
munication as determined by the conditions of society”. It is generally
concerned with the way people convey meaning through the communica-
tion medium of language in any given social context. This meaning
includes both verbal and non-verbal meanings, and depending on the con-
text, the interlocutor relationship and many other social factors, it varies.
This means that what someone communicates may differ from what will
be interpreted by the other party. Therefore, before signicance is ade-
quately conveyed pragmatically, both the speaker (and writer) and the lis-
tener (or reader) must have a meeting point. Hence, before humour can
be successfully created, some components of pragmatics must be present.
This explains why it has been claimed that a speaker can only say a joke
when he or she knows that the addressees are conscious of the underlying
assumptions that are required for the joke’s interpretation. These back-
ground assumptions include the “belief that the addressees are not going
to take the joke at face value, and the belief that the interaction situation
allows them to tell a joke” (Filani, 2016, 8; Ogungbe & Omolobi, 2020).
tHe Bases ofmemes
Usually, we think of funny images and videos on the internet, not evolu-
tionary biology, if we hear the term “meme”. But this is where the term
originated, precisely. In 1976, decades before the World Wide Web, the
well-known atheist and evolutionary biologist Richard Dawkins intro-
duced the term “meme” in his book The Selsh Gene. What Dawkins
means by a meme is a cultural unit which is transmitted via imitation from
person to person. The evolutionary biologist uses “meme” by analogy
with genes to describe a new, cultural replicator driving human evolution.
Ideas, ideologies, religions, sayings, melodies, clothing styles and so on,
which evolve in the course of cultural history, are examples of such memes
(Dawkins 2006 in Pauliks, 2020). The title of one of his often-quoted
essays, Dawkins (2006), conceives memes as “viruses of the mind”. On
6 “CAN WE UNINSTALL 2020 AND INSTALL IT AGAIN? THIS VERSION…
128
one hand, what he means by this is that memes take on their own lives,
and on the other, memes are as infectious as real viruses. Thus, Dawkins
(2006, 192) understands memes as “living structures, not only metaphor-
ically, but technically”. In his view, to survive in the meme pool, memes
replicate spontaneously. Humans act solely as vehicles for memes to be
transported and spread. There is a competition between various memes in
the logic of evolutionary theory (e.g. between scientic theories, political
ideologies or religious dogmas). The meme that will survive, that is,
human needs and social circumstances, is the one that is best adapted to
its environment. The more infectious memes are, the greater their chances
of survival are, and the better they can stay in the human brain and be
transmitted to other individuals (Ogungbe & Omolobi, 2020;
Pauliks, 2020).
onlIne memes
Is it the same thing with memes and internet memes? The original concept
of the meme provides a very good description of what can be found on the
internet today, as far as Dawkins is concerned. Not that far away from the
original is the meaning, “It is anything that goes viral” (Dawkins 2006
cited in Solon, 2013). Memes, as he sees it, are viral content that spreads
on the internet by its own accord. This is not an unproblematic view.
Virality gives a false impression of how content circulates on the internet,
according to Jenkins, Ford and Green (2013, 16-23). The idea that users
are infected and then passively spread by viral content is, they argue, a
marketing myth. They see users as actively engaged in the process of
deciding what content they are going to share with other users instead.
No doubt the truth lies between these two arguments. Jenkins et al.
(2013, 195-228) acknowledge that content for better dissemination is
“designed”. Nevertheless, it must be emphasised that content such as
internet memes does not spread on its own, but depends on user creativity
and participation, which is incompatible with Dawkins’ original “self-
copying memes” concept (2006, 194; Pauliks, 2020). Another incompat-
ibility with the theory of Dawkins comes from the fact that the terms
“meme” and “viral” on the internet do not mean the same thing. A viral
is “a single cultural unit” (e.g. a music video, a political image or an adver-
tising slogan), according to the communication studies scholar Shifman
(2014, 56), whereas memes are “always a collection of texts” (e.g. image
macros with various captions). So, when content is copied and changed, a
A. M. IBRAHIM ET AL.
129
meme on the internet only becomes a meme. In contrast, virals consist
only of a single version, although this can form the basis for internet
memes (Pauliks, 2020).
Internet memes are not viruses, but they make it possible to communi-
cate about viruses, particularly if the virus is an omnipresent topic due to
a global pandemic. Memes are often used on the internet to comment on
current issues. Memes facilitate discursive exchanges about events within
society as a means of communication and a critique of these events. The
use of humour involves the latter, allowing critical distance from the sub-
ject. Thus, humorous memes allow users to address sensitive topics and
express criticism, which without an ironic undertone would not be possi-
ble. How internet memes critically comment on the coronavirus pandemic.
crIsIs-motIvated Humour
In addition to the fact that informal humour has been under-researched,
there is a shortage of literature on one aspect of informal humour, particu-
larly public health related. Crisis-motivated humour refers to socio-
economic or political jokes built to express the experience of the composers
of challenging situations in their environments(Arning, 2020). In other
words, a crisis motivated humour is any joke created as a coping strategy
for a person’s difcult social or health experiences(Williams, 2020). Such
problems include any problem that brings about some psychological crisis
in the individuals, and as a means of cushioning the effects, the individuals
experiencing the difculties resort to building humour (Arning, 2020;
Attardo, 2017). Alongside the various subjects that convey the experi-
ences, how this is carried out will be examined (Dawkins 2006 in Ogungbe
& Omolobi, 2020). Traditionally, the study of humour has been seen as a
sub-part of the study of aesthetics and has, therefore, been of primary
interest to philosophers. According to Jones (2005) and Shelley (2003),
humour has been studied since the times ofPlato and Aristotle. Plato was
the rst of the two Greek philosophers to consider the nature of humour
and laughter. He believed that the absurd was based on an unfortunate
lack of self-knowledge, claiming in Philebus that people experience a com-
bination of both delight and envy when they laugh at what is ridiculous in
others, that is, when people mix both pain and pleasure (Jones, 2005;
Shelley, 2003). In the second part of Poetics, Aristotle also considered the
character of Ludicrous. It is believed that he also considered the ridiculous
to be rather ugly and distorted. The studies of humour range from
6 “CAN WE UNINSTALL 2020 AND INSTALL IT AGAIN? THIS VERSION…
130
psychology, sociology, anthropology, literature, medicine, mathematics
and linguistics across academic disciplines (Ferrar, 1992; Attardo, 2017;
Ogungbe & Omolobi, 2020).
Humour studies are in harmony with the fact that jokes are generated
from incongruous social experiences, with many humour studies focusing
primarily on the rst two of the three possible humour variants: formal,
non-formal and informal humour. In a situation where the occasion is
strictly formal, humour is perceived as formal and the primary purpose of
the event is not just to evoke laughter. Examples include audiences, busi-
ness forums, political meetings, corporate meetings and many others at
national day celebrations. Any gathering organised for the main purpose
of being entertained can refer to non-formal humour. These include wed-
dings, birthdays, home movies, reality shows, comedy shows, TV drama
series and many others (Akinola, 2018; Ogungbe & Omolobi, 2020).
The person evoking such humour is aware of the audience here, and
he/she does this to full the overt objective of entertaining the audience.
Here, in terms of space and time, the performer and the viewer are lim-
ited. The motivation for this kind of humour is the entertainer’s compen-
sation or reward. For the sake of banter, the third form, informal humour,
is often spontaneously evoked (Ogungbe & Omolobi, 2020). This will
include jokes between friends, husband and wife, parents with their kids,
teachers in a classroom with students, just to name a few. There is no
direct incentive for the individual to evoke anything other than the satisfy-
ing feeling of having lightened the mood of others by evoking smiles or
laughter. In some other cases, as a result of unwanted social and environ-
mental experiences, it can be evoked to just release built-up emotions
(Holmes & Marra, 2002).
To survive tough times, humour is an essential coping tool. Shared
laughter gives us strength in adversity and, when the future looks uncer-
tain, can help us feel a little more in control. And laughter literally strength-
ens us(Williams, 2020). Recent research has found that a good laugh can
increase our levels of dopamine and even shore up our immune systems.
Most importantly, funny jokes bring us together and help us feel linked,
including coronavirus and quarantine jokes, one pandemic quarantine pod
to another (Kelleher, 2021). So, while we obviously need to take
COVID-19 very seriously and follow the CDC and WHO recommenda-
tions, we have to laugh as well. We could all use a few moments that feel
lighter in the day, and a well-timed pandemic joke could just take your
mind off the world’s apocalypse-adjacent state and serve as a reminder that
A. M. IBRAHIM ET AL.
131
there is always something to smile about, however small. Here are some of
the funniest quarantine, COVID-19, pandemic and virus jokes on the
internet, from convos with pets to lockdown spins on classic knock-knocks
(Kelleher, 2021).
Most of the humour and memes about COVID-19 that go viral on
social media and the internet sound like a comedy, which is described as “a
tragedy plus time”, according to an adage. This has been true for many
awful events, when humour and laughter are eventually restored after peri-
ods of shock and sadness (Allen, 1957). However, it seems the current
pandemic (COVID-19) is different. People have not stopped joking. Even
as an increasing number of people around the world get sick and die,
memes and funny videos are everywhere on social media. Why is this
occurring? Why is there no gap between the catastrophe and the humour
that has been created around it?
One thing that makes the current situation of the coronavirus unique is
that, in a particular place and time, it is not a single event. It is a rolling
and ongoing crisis, endlessly spreading across continents with no end in
sight. Therefore, the shock factor is reduced compared with, for instance,
a single terror attack. This allows individuals to adapt to what is happening
more easily, and humour may be one of the best ways to do just that. In
these dire times, of course, many individuals will feel uncomfortable
laughing, particularly if they know someone who has been directly affected.
However, for others, in the face of the pandemic, it is not only acceptable
to use humour, but it may also even be a necessity (Greengross, 2020). Of
course, people do not laugh at the tragedy itself, at the victims of the virus,
or at the people who suffer from it. Rather people can aim at the seem-
ingly absurd situation in which we all nd ourselves. This is because
humour is a great defence mechanism from a psychological point of view,
which helps us deal with emotionally challenging situations, especially
those that are overwhelming and unpredictable. In an attempt to cope and
distract themselves from the serious situation, many cancer patients and
their doctors, for instance, routinely tell jokes and laugh about the disease
(Beach & Erin, 2017).
Humour asastrategy ofcopIng tHepandemIc
On top of that, humour may become more prevalent, not less, in the
unique conditions surrounding the pandemic (see Fig.6.1). First, many
individuals now have an unusual amount of time on their hands. Being
6 “CAN WE UNINSTALL 2020 AND INSTALL IT AGAIN? THIS VERSION…
132
stuck with not much to do at home forces individuals to nd ways to be
more creative, and, while the situation is serious, we are mostly concerned
with more mundane tasks in our daily activities such as what to do all day,
how to entertain kids, how not to eat too much, and how to stay sane in
general. Second, being a little frightened, tense and in a state of alert is
actually a good thing to develop humour. In creating and enjoying
humour, these physiological and emotional arousal states serve as driving
forces. Usually, intermediate arousal levels are best. You are bored with
too little, and with too much—you are too excited to enjoy humour.
Perfect is right in the middle. After hearing a good joke, the laughter
serves as a release of all the physiological and emotional energy built-up,
and that is what makes us feel good about it (Roberts, 2017, 2019;
Greengross, 2020).
Fig. 6.1 A collage of memes shared in Nigerian social media platforms
A. M. IBRAHIM ET AL.
133
Another important element of humour that is prominent during the
pandemic is what is termed “incongruity” by humour researchers. There
needs to be something odd or surprising in the situation for something to
be funny. There are many such oddities revealed in the current situation.
Here is a joke that illustrates the point: “I thought the tumble dryer was
shrinking my clothes all this time. It turns out it was the refrigerator, actu-
ally”. The joke is built on the unusual conditions in which people live, of
being stuck at home. The setup is the common understanding that clothes
can shrink from the heat of a tumble dryer, but then, there is a surprise. It
is not a faulty dryer, but the fridge where we store our food. By realising
we are getting fatter from eating too much when we are at home, we
resolve this incongruity. This resolution provides for the “Aha!...”, which
makes the joke funny. And yes, analysing a joke ruins it, too (Greengross,
2020; Morreall, 2020).
Therefore, while humour might not get us out of this terrible crisis, it
can help us cope with it. We cannot alter the reality or the economic
impact of the disease, but we can try to change how we feel about it. We
can cope better and ease some of the tension due to the pandemic by cre-
ating and sharing humour. We can have at least some control of the situa-
tion in that way (Williams, 2020). And what better way than having a
good laugh to do that—especially on social media?
nIgerIan comedIans, covId-19 andsocIal
medIa Humour
Nigerian comedian Maryam Apaokagi has a sure-re way of getting peo-
ple to listen to her coronavirus health advice—she delivers it with a hard
slap in the face. The 21-year-old has joined a line-up of the nation’s top
performers working health tips into their routines to spread the word
about COVID-19. In one of her online videos, she plays the role on an
all-knowing, all-controlling Nigerian mother who watches in horror as a
young man sneezes into his hands. Within seconds, she grabs a bottle of
sanitiser from her bra (the bosom of her dress, typical of African women),
slathers it over her palms, then hits him hard in the face. “Ah, a sanitised
slap”, her companion gasps in mock horror, as the young man learns his
lesson the hard way. Apaokagi, who goes by the stage name Taaooma, says
she puts out the meme video to reach out to people who would usually
ignore or dismiss advice from ofcial sources about the risks of the
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134
virus—people like her own mother, as she puts it, “The main reason why
I did the coronavirus skit was because of my mom, because you cannot tell
her not to go and worship” (Ukomadu, 2020).
Authorities in Nigeria like in all parts of the world have issued a policy
on avoiding large gatherings and the importance of washing hands.
However, people’s trust in the government is low; hence conspiracies and
bogus health tips spread fast on social media. The comedian laments that
parents “are the ones that are ... the most difcult people to tell not to do
things… So, when they watch it and laugh, they will also remember the
message that they said we should not go to the mosque, they said we
should not go to the church for now”. In the skit, she advises anyone who
is about to cough to “do the dab” as she puts it (Ukomadu, 2020). The
dab is a dance movement involving raising and stretching one arm and
bending the other as if one is shooting with a rie, with one’s face getting
covered in the elbow of the bent arm.
Furthermore, a Nigerian male comic artiste, Osarenkhoe Lawrence,
conjures up a world where diseases have their own governing committee.
In the video, performers are made to act Ebola and cancer and lay ofcial
complaints to the government that the new kid in the block (i.e.
COVID-19) is stealing the show. The solution, the head of the govern-
ment rules, is to put COVID-19 in its place by maintaining personal
hygiene and social distance. “We are no longer joking, we are actually
affecting lives, and I think, this period we need more videos, we need
more funny content”, said the performer from Benin City, South-south of
Nigeria and who goes by the stage name MC Casino (Ukomadu, 2020).
Nigeria’s health ministry has spotted the trend and enlisted popular come-
dian Bright Okpocha, alias Basketmouth, to appear in a public service
video about the dangers and of spreading misinformation. The messages
are getting through, said Cyril Oto-Obong, a comedy fan who works as an
accountant in Lagos. “It is not everyone who understands the safety mea-
sures when it is spoken in English, but once a comedian makes it a laugh-
ing matter, one [sur]e thing is [that,] it will make people pay attention”,
says Mr. Oto-Obong.
fake news asHumour onsocIal medIa
Fake news can be interesting, and understanding it is increasingly becom-
ing imperative. This chapter’s focus on this phenomenon is, therefore,
crucial because it presents some of the features of the environment in
A. M. IBRAHIM ET AL.
135
which the Nigerian social media space is regarding rumours and conspir-
acy theories about COVID-19 which “have signicant consequences for
journalism” and news media (Siapera, 2018, 157). To understand these, it
is necessary to start with the quest to identify fake news and its varieties.
Cited in Ibrahim (2019: 62), Ojebode (2018: 3) denes fake news (which
includes misinformation and disinformation) as “the product of a person’s
imagination for the purposes that may or may not be mischievous”, “an
oxymoron since news is supposed to be factual (rather than based on
imagination or opinion)” and “any story presented as news, but which
does not reect what happened, or which reports what did not happen”.
Ojebode’s second denition focuses on the whimsical denition of what
constitutes misinformation, which the researcher describes as “the
Trumpian denition of fake news”.
From the media and journalism institutional/organisational perspec-
tive, Ethical Journalism Network (EJN) and the BBC have both dened
what constitutes fake news. According to EJN cited in Pate, Gambo and
Ibrahim (2019, 22), fake news is information deliberately fabricated and
published to deceive and mislead others into believing falsehood or doubt-
ful messages (EJN, 2017). Whereas the BBC denes fake news as “com-
pletely false information, photos or videos purposefully created and spread
to confuse or disinform; information, photos or videos manipulated to
deceive, or old photographs shared as new; satire or parody which means
no harm but can fool people” (BBC News, 2018). Moreover, as used in
this chapter, fake news is interchangeably used as disinformation, a term
that refers to “deliberately spreading [of] false or inaccurate information”,
as opposed to misinformation, which “is the spreading of inaccurate or
false information while mistakenly thinking one is sharing accurate infor-
mation (in reality, the person or organisation spreading it is misinformed)”
(Bunger etal., 2017; Harsin, 2018).
Furthermore, Wardle (2017), cited in Siapera (2018, 157), has formu-
lated a typology of fake news based on three main dimensions as follows:
(i) the type of content created and shared, (ii) the intentions of those
behind it and (iii) forms of publication. Wardle also offered seven different
categories of fake news, “which she places on a continuum”: satire/par-
ody, misleading content, imposter content, fabricated content, false con-
nection, false context, and manipulated content (Fig.6.2). However, she
argues that “The intentions of the communicators are crucial as satire has
no intention to deceive, while manipulated content has been developed to
manipulate and deceive” (157).
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Furthermore, fake news and disinformation about COVID-19 are rife
in the Nigerian social media space. In addition to creating confusion about
what is true and what is not regarding the virus, how it is contracted and
how to practise preventive measures, fake news and misinformation also
are capable of creating the worst scenario—that of deceiving individuals
into adopting harmful practices, attitudes, beliefs and behaviours espe-
cially when it involves false medication or preventive substances that could
lead to loss of lives or impairment. The factors that drive manipulated
information dissemination may vary, but the effect is the same—taking
advantage of the goal of the message. However, the remedy to this manip-
ulation is clear: “increasing the capacity of readers or audience to separate
the wheat from the chaff through exposure to media literacy, critical think-
ing, and fact-checking”. While humour could be useful health wise, mis-
information and fake news can worsen the situation. The internet especially
social media is a double-edged sword, with good and bad effects. Some
health-related humour spread on social media may be useful, but misinfor-
mation, which equally spread on social media, is rather harmful. The cul-
ture industry should seize this opportunity to enlighten people about
disease prevention measures using memes, jokes and humour. Since the
Fig. 6.2 Themes of fake news. (Source: Wardle and Derakhshan (2018, 46))
A. M. IBRAHIM ET AL.
137
COVID-19 pandemic is a global health crisis so is misinformation about
it. Given that in the reviewed literature in the preceding sections a lot has
been discussed about the pandemic in a global perspective, now it is worth
taking an inward view at the Nigerian context and examining how
Nigerians defy health crises (Fig.6.3).
The challenge to misinformation is that it can come from other credible
sources. For example, on March 20, 2020, the (then) US President,
Donald Trump, was televised saying that chloroquine showed very encour-
aging results in the treatment for COVID-19 infection. Since then, Nigeria
has seen an increase in the demand for chloroquine despite the US Food
and Drug Administration has quickly claried Trump’s statement that the
effects of the drug were still being tested. The popularity of chloroquine
as a treatment for COVID-19 may have been the result of many factors,
not conned to the knowledge of the treatment for Nigerians who had
previously used it as medication for malaria. The factors include the need
Fig. 6.3 A comical illustration of young internet users sharing fake news online.
Their conversation (shown in the bubbles) indicates the reasons they (and many of
their like) share false information. (Source: PTCIJ Dubawa (2020))
6 “CAN WE UNINSTALL 2020 AND INSTALL IT AGAIN? THIS VERSION…
138
to share an alleged life-saving treatment and the impact of the (then)
President Trump’s endorsement of the drug on television. One Twitter
user (see Fig. 6.4) says, “Chloroquine that was banned in Nigeria has
proved to be an anti-viral drug for Corona Virus after showing promising
results in trials across 10 hospitals. Who would’ve thought chloro-
quine…?” (PTCIJ Dubawa, 2020). An overview of the most popular false
stories on COVID-19 is outlined below with fact-checking comments.
Moreover, as the virus spreads and tests intensify, Nigeria will need to
address health misinformation (Cinelli etal., 2020).
The above memes demonstrate how Nigerians engaged with fake news
in a humorous manner. In some cases, some people, unaware that the
information being shared online was fake, fell victim. It seems those who
joked about fake news either they were knowledgeable enough to fact
check or simply knew what is true and false, hence witty and humorous
reactions to these instances of fake news.
Fig. 6.4 A Twitter hoax on the use of chloroquine as a medication for
COVID-19. (Source: David, 2020)
A. M. IBRAHIM ET AL.
139
conclusIon
The internet especially social media has been, for the most part, a liberat-
ing force during this prolonged time of connement for many people
worldwide. The fact is that apart from our immediate families or loved
ones, in the absence of our usual face-to-face interactions, from whom we
may now sometimes feel we need a break, online humour, absurdity and
wit, along with cartoons or memes revealing the nonsense and grotesque
on the part of our beloved leaders act as a source of minor, temporary,
salvation. We laugh when authoritarian bureaucrats and self-admiring pol-
iticians put themselves above us because, in their handling of this deadly
pandemic, they also put themselves above common sense. In terms of the
most important humour styles that are at play during the COVID-19 era
(success is measured by the degree to which any humorous discourse that
distracts us from the downside of the pandemic has an upside), this chap-
ter shows that the different psychological explanations of humour, relief,
release and catharsis, spliced on existential humour and the theory of
incongruity. The best coronavirus humour provides people with light-
hearted fun, brief interludes in otherwise virtually indistinguishable days.
This chapter captures and highlights how social networking sites serve
as an avenue that contributes to citizen engagement and the use of unhin-
dered freedom of expression through the use of images, as well as the
disappearance of authorship over the creation, distribution and consump-
tion of internet memes to raise awareness and lighten the tense mood of
people on COVID-19. As a measure to curb the spread of the virus, inter-
net memes can be used as a tool to transmit messages to the general pub-
lic. To attack, share sensitive information, pull a prank and derail a topic,
internet memes are used. Internet memes serve as an avenue for direct
communication that not only contributes to raising awareness of the coro-
navirus infection but also encourages individuals to adhere to non-clinical
preventive measures such as face mask-wearing, social distancing, hand
washing, testing and ultimately vaccination. Finally, a couple of research
questions have generated for future research to consider nding empirical
solution to. The questions are: People have not stopped joking. Despite
increasingly more people around the world are getting infected with
COVID-19 and dying, memes and funny videos are everywhere on social
media. Why is this occurring? Why is there no gap between the catastro-
phe and the humour that has been created around it?
6 “CAN WE UNINSTALL 2020 AND INSTALL IT AGAIN? THIS VERSION…
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guilty. The New York Times. https://www.nytimes.com/2020/04/22/style/
coronavirus- humor.html. Accessed 10 Feb 2021.
6 “CAN WE UNINSTALL 2020 AND INSTALL IT AGAIN? THIS VERSION…
145© The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature
Switzerland AG 2021
S. Mpofu (ed.), Digital Humour in the Covid-19 Pandemic,
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-79279-4_7
CHAPTER 7
Social Media Audience’s Interpretation
ofSelected Humor Memes onCoronavirus
Pandemic inNigeria
GloriaChimeziemErnest-Samuel
IntroductIon
In February, 2020, Nigerian Minister for Health reported that the coun-
try had had its rst case of COVID-19 infection. The announcement
brought Nigeria on the same pedestal with other nations in Asia, Europe
and America battling with the pandemic which claimed millions of lives.
The Centres for Disease Control and Prevention in its weekly report in
April, 2020, placed the incidence of coronavirus cases at above 890,000,
with about 45,000 deaths annually. The statistics includes 239,279 cases
and 5443 deaths in the United States at that period. Although COVID-19
was alleged to have originated from Wuhan, China, in late 2019, many
conspiracy theories and debates have generated controversies which raise
doubts and suspicion. However, one clear fact is that the coronavirus is
not new. Fielding (2020) reports that there have been earlier cases of
coronavirus in 2003 and 2012, respectively. The 2003 virus was known as
G. C. Ernest-Samuel (*)
Department of Theatre Arts, IMO State University, Owerri, Nigeria
146
the severe acute respiratory syndrome coronavirus (SARS-CoV) outbreak
which occurred in mainland China and Hong Kong. The 2012 outbreak
was in Saudi Arabia and in the United Arab Emirates and was known as
the Middle East respiratory syndrome coronavirus (MERS-CoV). While
the coronavirus of 2003 and 2012 took place in specic locations and
were easily contained by scientists and researchers, the 2019 coronavirus
was global, which informs why the World Health Organization labeled it
a pandemic. According to Sarah Bosely etal. (2020), COVID-19 is caused
by a member of the coronavirus family that has never been encountered
before and transferred to human from animals. Some of the symptoms
include fever, tiredness and cough. At other times, some patients may have
runny nose, sore throat, nasal congestion, aches and pains or diarrhea.
Report from the American Centers for Disease Control and Prevention
(CDC) says that some strains of the coronavirus are asymptomatic.
However, it does not prevent the patients from infecting others. The CDC
COVID-19 Response Team suggests that ‘Social distancing and everyday
preventive behaviour remain important for all age groups as patients with
less serious illness and those without symptoms likely play an important
role in disease transmission’ (2020, 1).
Recognized by world Poverty Clock, as the world capital of poverty,
with over 40% of its population living below the poverty line, Nigeria
needed a serious intervention to curb the spread of the coronavirus in the
country. Kalu (2020) reports that in response to the increasing cases of
coronavirus infection in Nigeria, on 18 March, 2020, the federal govern-
ment enforced an initial two-week lockdown on 30 March 2020, for three
of its 36 states (Lagos, Ogun and Abuja) and, on April 13, extended the
lockdown. The government approved the closure of all schools, both pri-
vate and public, and other institutions. By the directive, citizens were
urged to ‘stay-at-home,’ maintain social distancing, wash hands on a regu-
lar basis, avoid touching their faces or others and so on. Movements within
and outside the states were restricted. The citizens relied on the National
Centre on Disease Control (NCDC) to access information and tips of
surviving the coronavirus pandemic. Established in 2011 with a bill signed
into law in 2018, the NCDC, according to information on the institu-
tion’s website, is Nigeria’s public health institute, ‘with the mandate to
lead the preparedness, detection and response to infectious disease out-
breaks and public health emergencies’ (NCDC 2020). Under the lock-
down, although many receive text messages on a ve-hourly basis from
NCDC, the conned citizens learned to share their experiences, thoughts,
G. C. ERNEST-SAMUEL
147
anxieties and fears on the social media, which proved to be a veritable
voice and platform for expressing their frustrations and information shar-
ing, transmission and dissemination.
It was not surprising that there were noticeable increase in the presence
of memes on the social media, particularly, Facebook. Varis and Blommaert
(2015) credited the term, memes to Richard Dawkins, author of The Selsh
Gene (1976) who analyzed a meme as a gene because it serves ‘as small
cultural units of transmission…which are spread by copying or imitation.’
Memes are composed of images and texts on issues. The quality of copy-
ing and imitation is a feature common to memes on social media which
inform why they are liked and shared by social media users. Varis and
Blommaert rightly observe that ‘social media interaction patterns show an
amazing density of phatic interactions, in which signs are shared and cir-
culated without an a priori determination of the meaning’ (2015, 31). In
another development, Wang etal. (2015, 2378) observe that by ‘sharing
photos, users could also express opinions or sentiments, social media
images provide a potentially rich source for understanding public opin-
ions/sentiments.’ Memes voice the opinion of the generator and are
shared by people who identify with the opinions. Thus, logically, the
memes for this study voice people’s feelings on the coronavirus, social
distancing, the sit-at-home, quarantine, watching of hands and so on and
were selected based on the number of likes and shares they generated
among social media users afliated to this researcher. This study is inter-
ested in analyzing selected popular user-generated memes on Facebook
considered as humorous, to ascertain how the messages or information on
COVID-19 were interpreted by the social media users. The study will
attempt to substantiate if this class of communication actually serve the
functions attributed to humor. Finally, it attempts to theorize on its use by
social media users in Nigeria. The memes selected for this study are mainly
African. This implies that they contain images, icons and languages which
Africans can identify with, because as John Meyer (2000, 316) observes,
there is need for the symbols to be familiar to the user in assessing humor,
‘if the concepts that create the humor are so familiar as to be already
known, or not familiar at all, the audience cannot “get” a joke.’
Due to the newness of coronavirus, very few studies have been con-
ducted on coronavirus in the humanities. In fact, most of the available
studies are in the eld of medicine and microbiology. For instance, a study
by Bergmann etal. (2006) examines the effect of the coronavirus on the
central nervous system and attributes the disease to having devastating
7 SOCIAL MEDIA AUDIENCE’S INTERPRETATION OF SELECTED HUMOR…
148
consequences on T-cells and adversely affects non-lytic humoral immunity
which suppresses the disease. In another study by the CDC Response
Team on coronavirus infection in United States, the team found out that
children are less vulnerable than middle-aged adults and old people and
with respiratory problem. The study recommends that people with chil-
dren exposed to patients with coronavirus should maintain social distanc-
ing irrespective of signs or symptoms. Kalu (2020) argues that government’s
intervention in coronavirus infection is connected to poverty and hunger;
thus measures put in place to ght coronavirus must take cognizance of
providing palliatives for the citizens. Some studies have attempted to
examine online memes. Varis and Blommaert have analyzed phatic forms
of interactions on social media and focus on viral memes. Simmons etal.
(2011) in their study of online memes observe that the credibility of the
originator of an online meme may alter the content. In another study on
social media images, Wang etal. (2015) conduct a sentiment analysis of
social media memes and discovered that language and improper annota-
tion play challenging roles in the appreciation of such images. A couple of
studies have been done on humor. Meyer (2000) studies humor as a
double- edged sword and attempts reading the functions. In a study related
to this current study, Taecherungroj and Nueangjamnong (2015) exam-
ine humor in some viral memes from the Global South. In another study,
McCreadie and Wiggins (2007) investigate the use of humor in health
practice between physician and patients. Although there were positive
effects, they observe that there is dearth of studies on humor in health
practice and education. So far, there is currently no study on interpreta-
tions of social media-generated memes on coronavirus, particularly within
the African context. This makes this study very signicant and a contribu-
tion to knowledge.
objectIves ofthestudy
The coronavirus pandemic had generated lots of conversations and dis-
courses which affect humanity. The objectives of this study include the
following:
(a) To identify some popular African memes on aspects of coronavirus
pandemic circulating on the social media, particularly Facebook.
(b) To understand how social media audience interpret selected memes
on coronavirus pandemic.
G. C. ERNEST-SAMUEL
149
(c) To examine the classications of memes on coronavirus with the
view of understanding heuristic representations and interpretations
of such memes in Africa.
research QuestIons
Considering the interest of this study, some questions are very important
in this research investigation. The research questions include the following:
(a) How do social media audiences view selected COVID-19 memes
and what aspect of the pandemic does the memes reect?
(b) What satirical or humorous undertones are embedded in the memes?
(c) Are there other communicable messages attributable to the memes
as forms of communication?
research Methodology
This study is a socio-cultural investigation which examines the symbolic
construction of memes on aspects of coronavirus pandemic. Twelve social
media users who viewed and shared ideas on ten independent memes on
Facebook were drafted into a WhatsApp group, in order to extract their
opinions on the memes without the distraction of comments from the free
public. The themes of the memes fall under the following: education,
humor, satire and health concerns on the pandemic. The memes address
issues on corona virus such as social distancing, self-quarantine, coughing
in public, lockdown effects and so on. The memes were shared in the plat-
form for the participants to interpret.
Because the study focuses on mediated communication on the internet,
particularly on Facebook which is a social media, digital ethnography was
adopted. The adaptive nature of ethnography called for the use of digital
ethnography, also called ethnography of the internet (Hine, 2008).
Murthy (2008) recommends social media such as Facebook as a eld for
ethnographic investigations for many reasons among the fact that it acts as
a platform for social connections among people and allows for interaction
and many social activities. Especially, it provides opportunities for millions
of other social engagements which an ethnographic researcher can under-
study with its multi-million users globally. Digital ethnography is consid-
ered suitable because it is a new mode of engagement which will allow us
‘develop an in-depth understanding of the textures of social experience
7 SOCIAL MEDIA AUDIENCE’S INTERPRETATION OF SELECTED HUMOR…
150
that arise as people engage with various technologies that comprise the
contemporary internet’ as Hine (2008, 29) observes. Other methods like
observation, archiving documents and interviewing were also applied as
forms of data collection in order to enrich the research outcome. The
advantage of these methods is that it offered balanced result, instead of
myopic views or opinions based on one-sided information. The data col-
lected was analyzed through two methods: (a) thematic analysis and (b)
discourse analysis. Thematic analysis is a method of identifying, analyzing
and reporting patterns (themes) within data (Braun & Clarke, 2006) and
involves using a theme to capture research issues in relation to the research
question. Thematic analysis is deemed appropriate for analyzing the data
acquired from the WhatsApp chats on the memes. The memes were
selected because of their popularity on Facebook, and the data was orga-
nized according to themes to aid its analysis. The researcher communi-
cated with the participants on Messenger and WhatApp and sought their
permission to discuss the memes for the research. Of the 15 persons com-
municated initially, only 12 were nally chosen for the interview because
of their interest in the discourse. Moreover, all 12 participants are edu-
cated and knowledgeable to a good extent on COVID-19 as well as
humor. In the course of the documentation, the data was interpreted
according to the positioning of the memes. Concrete issues emanating
from the interviews were re-addressed to understand their relationship
with issues on the research subject. The chats were copied and the
responses were grouped according to themes in order to make meaning
out of the data. The thematic data analysis was predominant in this analysis.
Discourse analysis is the second method used in analyzing the data. It
involves ‘the organization of texts and talk in practices, and with the dis-
cursive resources that those practices draw on’ (Potter, 1996, 38); thus it
unveils the hidden meaning of a text, which may be written documents,
transcribed interviews, eld notes and so on. It provides a means of ana-
lyzing and interpreting the intent of language. The critical discourse analy-
sis was adopted in reading meaning to some of the texts generated in
conversation with the research participants who are the respondents in this
study. The adoption of discourse analysis thus enables the analyst-
researcher to focus on the role of language as a communicative agent.
G. C. ERNEST-SAMUEL
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theoretIcal andconceptual fraMework
As a major interest in the study, the concept of humor was used in analyz-
ing the subject, while the study is based on relief theory which involves
release or relaxation (also known as psychoanalytic theory) and has
Sigmund Freud as one of its most outstanding representatives (Krikmann,
2006). The theory focuses signicantly on humor recipient and its psy-
chological effects on them. Arvo Krikmann observes that Freud considers
humor as one of the so-called substitution mechanisms which enable the
conversion of one’s socially tabooed aggressive impulses to acceptable
ones and thus avoid wasting additional mental energy to suppress them
(see link). In examining the memes, this chapter argues that the memes
result from the originators’ desire to suppress the pains, disappoints and
predicaments of living through COVID-19 experience. Thus, the memes
were shared in order to provide alternative forms of appreciating and liv-
ing with the coronavirus without fear.
The Memes andRespondents’ Interpretations
The memes used in this study are varieties of public commentaries related
to COVID-19 issues which were considered humorous because they gen-
erated laughing emojis and likeability from the public and were shared by
many social media users on Facebook. The participants were requested to
interpret the memes with the view of investigating if the memes were
indeed considered by the participants to be humorous and to aid the pub-
lic assessment and understanding of the memes given its engagement on
COVID-19. The rst of the ten memes selected for this study is a cartoon
illustration of a discussion between two emojis: One of the emojis was
assigned a text ‘Hmm, the politicians are testing COVID-19 positive,
while their wives are testing negative. How come?’ The second emoji
replies: ‘I think they are testing the wrong ‘spouses’, they should check the
side chics!’ Humorously, the meme focuses on politicians and women.
According to one of the respondents, the meme suggests that ‘politicians
are usually “away” from their wives but available for their side chicks.’
Ultimately, as one of the respondents observes, ‘politicians are highly
exposed targets in this matter.’ The meme suggests that ‘the manner of
tracking potential COVID-positive contacts could be more challenging
than we already think.’ This is because ‘side chicks are rarely listed as con-
tacts by their politician friends and sugar-daddies.’ Moreover, as one of the
7 SOCIAL MEDIA AUDIENCE’S INTERPRETATION OF SELECTED HUMOR…
152
respondents rhetorically asked, ‘How many side chicks will they (politi-
cians) acknowledge? Are they keeping records?’ The meme highlights the
growing importance of side chicks (mistresses) over wives among African
political leaders. As another respondent observes, the meme suggests that
‘most of our politicians are not close to their spouses the same way they
are not close to the people… they are keeping mistresses whom they are
more intimate with than their spouses. It also tells how they marginalize
certain sections, groups – ethnic or geopolitical in the distribution of
developmental projects.’ The meme made health and social comments
which suggests that ‘efforts should be made to trace concubines of politi-
cians, and have them tested, isolated and managed to curb the spread of
the virus.’ The humor lies in the fact that spouses of politicians are distant
to them, while the side chicks (who are supposedly distant and outside
their homes) are closer to them than their spouses. This meme is a dis-
course on the challenge of tracking of infected or potentially exposed con-
tacts for isolation.
To further elaborate on the hidden communication, a respondent
reveals that ‘the two emojis are used here as derisive symbolic expressions
of abnormalities in the life of the political class.’ Another respondent
observes that:
The questions posed by the two symbols refer to the dominant issues of
gross indelity associated with the political class. The possibility of contract-
ing COVID-19 through a relationship of indelity might lead to a situation
where a politician might test positive and his or her partner tests negative.
The virus like HIV and Ebola, as a potent instrument of social disruption, is
likely to heighten the trend of mutual suspicion among couples.
Thus, the meme highlights part of the social revelation of the pandemic.
As another respondent observes, ‘Paradoxically, the legitimate spouses of
politicians do not share their infections; their mistresses instead do, sug-
gesting that the side chics are in reality closer to the erring and wealthy
politicians than their spouses and so share their afictions.’ It’s remarkable
to note that the meme ‘foregrounds the fact that initially, Coronavirus
aficted the afuent in the Nigerian context, as the disease came from
overseas and so struck politicians and other categories of the Rich who
travelled abroad or came into contact with foreigners or travelers.’
The second meme is the humorous picture of a child with folded hands
and gloomy face overtly expressing an abnormal situation. Accompanying
G. C. ERNEST-SAMUEL
153
the picture is the statement, ‘One cannot cough in peace again…every-
body will be looking at you coronically!’ The visual posture of the young
boy is humorous, and more so, with the accompanying text. Meyer
observes that humor involving children often serves enforcement function
(2000, 320). In other words, it helps to enforce social norms in a society.
As a respondent observes about the meme:
The fact is that the coronavirus pandemic or COVID-19 has created an
abnormal situation in every aspect of our social life. The subtle ways in
which the virus spreads through human contacts makes every person a sus-
pect. As a result of this, normal human acts of yawning, coughing and sneez-
ing are no longer taken as simple conditioned reex actions, but are now
regarded as the symptoms of infection from the virus. This has rendered
some of these involuntary acts of the human being quite problematic.
People are now afraid of yawning, coughing or sneezing in public; and this
will certainly affect the normal modes of social relation for years to come.
When one is symptomatic of COVID-19, coughing is one of the symp-
toms. Due to the panic concerning the pandemic, when one coughs, peo-
ple get suspicious. The unanimously acclaimed humorous meme passes on
the message of cough as a major symptom of COVID-19. In the commu-
nity, coughing effectively puts everyone on alert of a possible or potential
COVID-19 patient. As a respondent notes, it suggests that it’s ‘Better to
keep away from anyone with an “innocent” cough than to ignore and be
put at risk by someone with COVID-19 induced cough.’ Thus the meme
frowns at people’s inability to separate the two, so people can live their
normal lives.
As another respondent observes,
The meme makes an obvious reference to the belief that droplets set free
through coughing and sneezing can cause Coronavirus infections. This por-
tentous fact thus transforms coughing into a grave act deserving public
attention, if not condemnation. Humour is derived basically from the neol-
ogism “coronically” that deliberately puns on “Corona”.
Thus, ‘graphically, the complainant’s grave countenance—as though the
whole world was against him—equally elicits laughter.’ To another respon-
dent, the message suggests that the outbreak of Corona virus has ‘created
a level of hygiene consciousness. The social message is that personal
hygiene and decency is encouraged.’ In a way, it addresses stigmatization
7 SOCIAL MEDIA AUDIENCE’S INTERPRETATION OF SELECTED HUMOR…
154
of people with cough and reminds the public that not every cough is as a
result of coronavirus.
The third meme is picture of a child carried at the back of an adult with
a pouting tongue that is traditionally interpreted as an expression of joyful
acknowledgment of another person’s inclusion or sharing in one’s difcult
situation or misfortune. Accompanying the picture meme is the message:
‘GOD DON CATCH ALL DADDIES AND MUMMIES.All of you will
now understand how we children feel when you tell us to sit in one place…
You too, sit in one place….’ This meme expresses children’s perception of
their caging or restriction by adults, especially, by their parents. Thus, the
meme is one of the classic images of the COVID-19 period in the minds
of children. As a respondent in a chat observes:
Actually we know that the child was not the author of the sarcasm attributed
to the meme, but the parents who found themselves in the situation of their
children, were forced to reect and imagine what their kids have been going
through. Therefore, this might be seen as one of the positive effects of the
COVID 19– it has helped so many people to reect deeply over certain
issues of life, and mostly, it has helped parents to understand the conse-
quences of certain unnecessary rules and regulations they impose on
their children.
In other words, the respondents admit that ‘the lockdown has meant that
both parents and their children are conned at home.’ While this places a
greater burden on parents, most of who have to take a break from their
usual responsibilities but are still expected to provide food for the family;
for the children, the meme afrms that ‘it is indeed an opportunity for
parents to share the pain of the children’s routine connement.’ It
addresses children’s concerns with how they are treated. Arguably, one
may claim that the meme is not related to the virus; however, it ridicules
the new position of adults who are conned in various homes with chil-
dren due to COVID-19. Graphically, the meme in fact passes wrong mes-
sage with the infraction of social distancing. The child’s mischievous grin
is used as a social corrective, devised to ‘discipline parents,’ as Duncan
(1962, 187) opines. According to one of the respondents, ‘the meme sug-
gests that children have been in “bondage” and are now happy that their
parents who kept them in bondage are in bondage with them.’ It is there-
fore a play on isolation. Children are instructed to sit in a place forgetting
how active they are and should be. Ironically, COVID-19 has forced adults
G. C. ERNEST-SAMUEL
155
to take the ‘medicine’ they had forcefully made children to take. It ideally
endorses the sit-at-home message. It’s ironical that the meme uses a child
who has not obeyed social distancing to ridicule adults conned to staying
at home due to COVID-19.Signicantly, it applies humor in interpreting
children’s appreciation of the stay-at-home period, simply because it
restricts parents and adults.
The meme highlights some health and social lessons: It is not good to
conne children and restrict their plays because, if they don’t engage in
such activities, it will be difcult to tell when they are sick, especially with
those health issues without feverish symptoms. It may adversely affects
their social life in later years, especially, in expressing themselves. The grin
on the boy’s face may be suggestive of two things: that ‘what is good for
the goose is also good for the gander,’ and ‘the connement serves you
all well.’
The fourth meme is a picture of a man who built his house at the peak
of a very tall tree with a lengthy ladder to serve as a bridge to navigate the
distance. At the base of the picture is the inscription ‘self-quarantine!’
Critically examining the meme, a respondent observes that ‘the COVID-19
preventive injunction to observe social distancing in order to avoid
Coronavirus infection is taken to a rather ridiculous extreme!’ Another
respondent aptly observes that ‘Humans are social creatures and can
hardly take full leave of the earth to avoid infection. It is interesting that
the man seeking to take leave of the world has the wisdom to keep a lad-
der handy!’
The meme illustrates and may be compared to Diala (2019) narrative
of the posture of Stylites who sought to avoid the contamination of sin by
leaving the world (Fig. 7.1). The picture of a man isolating himself in a
house hanging on top of a tree is an ‘expression of abnormality,’ according
to a respondent because the picture is an expression of something highly
strange within the African context, because Africans do not build houses
on top of trees. It is a graphical discourse of extreme case of quarantine
and presents quarantine or self-isolation as the best option at the
COVID-19 era. The meme depicts that ‘the fear of coronavirus can drive
some Africans to the height of insanity, thus people are taking exaggerated
steps in observing the simple rules of social distancing.’ The imaginable
question raised by this is ‘how far can I go in order to escape this deadly
disease?’ As a respondent notes, this is the type of question that will be
bordering so many minds until this virus is comprehensively contained.
Undoubtedly, people are truly afraid of coronavirus and would do
7 SOCIAL MEDIA AUDIENCE’S INTERPRETATION OF SELECTED HUMOR…
156
anything to survive the pandemic; thus the social message is ‘the fear of
Corona virus is real,’ hence the effectively illustrated social distancing. The
picture breaks the ‘big’ phrase to a level nearly everyone can understand.
Equally, it best illustrates the self-isolation or quarantine scope of the gov-
ernment, which leaves everyone simply on one’s own. The humor embed-
ded in the picture shows the risk and strange measures taken by the man
in order to safeguard his life from the virus.
The next meme presented for this study is a picture of members of a
corporate organization standing far apart for a ‘staff meeting’ taking place
outside the ofce complex with the observance of social distancing. The
meme is a very captivating portrait of the present situation of abnormality.
The outbreak of COVID-19 has changed dramatically the dynamics of the
landscape of social humanity. The lesson of this is quite simple; the basic
patterns of our social life have been essentially disrupted and will never be
the same again for years to come. A respondent observes that ‘the unorth-
odox staff meeting highlights the impact of social distancing, although
what such a meeting can accomplish is doubtful.’ It acknowledges that
Fig. 7.1 A man
distances himself from
the society for
self-quarantine
G. C. ERNEST-SAMUEL
157
social relationship and interaction is important but requires to be revisited
if people must survive the pandemic. The meme highlights the rising chal-
lenge of meeting up with the need to contain the challenge of COVID-19
disease. In the opinion of another respondent, it is a ‘humorous way of
expressing social distancing, and social distancing tremendously reduces
the spread rate of the virus when it’s applied’; thus, the meme is consid-
ered by all to be ‘Humorous, apt and appropriate, and passes the message
well.’ However, another respondent observes that although there is humor
in how people implement safety standards, the meme may be ‘misleading
because there is no indication of how staff will behave after the meeting.’
One of the memes was a clear case of social distancing, the meme is a pic-
ture of a natural maize stalk with few undeveloped corns spaced out
between one another with the inscription, “Even maize is observing social
distancing. Please stay safe!” The meme is a classical use of a strange phe-
nomenon in nature to indicate the strangeness of the situation humanity
nds itself. All the respondents admit that ‘The image is quite apt as a
natural expression of what is now expected at the social level of human
existence.’ In fact, the scourge of the coronavirus pandemic has forced
human beings to look at the malformation of things in nature—as a per-
fect depiction of what humanity is going through with the outbreak of
coronavirus.
The rather malformed maize cob provides a graphic illustration of what
social distancing should mean for humans. Admittedly, the respondents
perceive humor as a consequence of a deliberate misapplication of a term
relevant for an infectious disease to an agricultural product. For maize as
for humans, the ideal is existence in communities rather than in isolation.
John Meyer observes that ‘humor in communication is a subject that
seems difcult to analyze. After all, if one has to explain a joke, it is prob-
ably no longer funny’ (Meyer, 2000, 310). The explanation applies to the
meme. A respondent observes that ‘the corn co-distancing shows aptly
how media forms keep expanding; and illustrates that the abstract com-
munication of social distancing is relatable for messages to rural audiences’
and exhibits humor by exploring the natural phenomenon. In another
meme, a man and a woman (apparently, his wife) were sternly staring at
each other with an expression of mutual suspicion and distrust. Below
them was an inscription: ‘Kizito, who is NCDC and why is she texting you
everyday asking you to wash your hands? Answer me now. Who is she?
Who is NCDC?’ The meme is a classic expression of what many families
are going through within the COVID era. COVID-19 brought couples
7 SOCIAL MEDIA AUDIENCE’S INTERPRETATION OF SELECTED HUMOR…
158
close to monitoring the doings and undoings of their spouses. Even
among the happily married couple enjoying a harmonious living, there is
always a possibility of mutual suspicion. Ironically, such ‘suspicion that lies
below the surface in the lives of happily married couples has been raised to
its highest level with the erroneous interpretations of the bombardments
of text messages brought about by the coronavirus pandemic.’ In this
meme, Kizito’s wife who did not know the meaning of NCDC was suspi-
cious of NCDC’s frequent text messages to her husband. She concludes
without prompting that NCDC is a ‘she,’ thus demanding to know why
she instructs Kizito to wash his hands daily. ‘This is a classic example of the
heightening of the case of mutual suspicion among couple.’ The meme
introduces jealousy, which is such ‘a goldmine for the humourist, because
it invariably beclouds one’s perception and consequently one’s interpreta-
tion of reality’ (Goldstein 1976: 108). Coupled with this fact is also the
woman’s basic illiteracy, ignorance and naivety. Consequently, ‘the ritual
hygienic washing of hands to stave off infection assumes a grave sexual
connotation. The woman’s countenance is truly hilarious!’ Goldstein
opines that humor is applied to encapsulate communicators’ view into
memorable phrases and short anecdotes, which results in clarication of
meaning. In the meme, ‘the Nigerian agency in charge of prevention and
control of COVID-19– (NCDC) is on top of the Corona virus matter,
with respect to its bombardment of text messages to Nigerians.’ While
giving NCDC an important mention for obviously communicating issues
of coronavirus to citizens, and creating humor out of Kizito’s wife’s igno-
rance, as all the respondents observe, the meme is wasted because the
message is empty because it assumes everyone knows who NCDC is. One
wonders why the messages kept were not addressed, for instance, disclos-
ing that the messages actually came as a preventative measures by NCDC
to protect the people from contacting and spreading the virus. A respon-
dent observes that ‘the meme addresses the issue of wrong conclusions
and also indelity in many homes/marriages today.’ Cases as the accusa-
tion of Kizito’s wife may not be ignored as the respondents observe
because some rural population may be ignorant as Kizito’s wife.
The next meme is a picture of a child in a thoughtful mood expressing
concern of being forced to share in something that was brought about by
the Chinese. Above the picture of the boy is the inscription, ‘Only China
chop lizard, frog, snake, and rat. I come dey wash hands for wetin I no
follow chop. I tire.’ The meme points expressively to the origin of the
coronavirus pandemic. In the maze of the pandemic, many people are
G. C. ERNEST-SAMUEL
159
concentrating on the reality of the virus and its effects without thinking
about the source of its emergence (Fig.7.2). As one of the respondents
observes, ‘the meme beckons people to have moments of sober reections
over the entire reality of COVID-19 and learn very good lessons from it,
especially, how some of our evil actions affect others in the social landscape
of humanity.’
A respondent notes that the meme is ‘Quite illustrative of the fact that
the world is a village now, and someone’s action nearly 5000kms away
becomes suffered by a person who has no passport and has never travelled
outside the locality.’ The weird assortment of assumed Chinese delicacies
of lizards, frog, snake and rat eaten as food by Chinese refers to an alleged
origin of the coronavirus through a Chinese bat meal in Wuhan. By the
indulgence, the world became infected although not partakers in the deli-
cacies. The meme however underscores the fact that ‘the global village has
a greater proclivity to share liabilities rather than assets.’ Another respon-
dent observes that ‘China has actually done unthinkable and unimaginable
experiments; whether with animals or biological weapons which has put
the global community in a “hand washing” paranoia-thus the world is
washing hands for the unwholesome deeds of China.’ The meme regrets
that ‘everyone should not be punished for the sins of others, and China
should suffer the nemesis of their own actions and habits.’ It generates
humor by attributing the cause of the corona virus to the uncommon food
eaten by the China people. While humor communication with children
Fig. 7.2 The Child
and China Wahala meme
7 SOCIAL MEDIA AUDIENCE’S INTERPRETATION OF SELECTED HUMOR…
160
informs norms delicately by leveling criticisms as Graham et al. (1992)
aver, this meme at the same time identies with the audience.
The ninth meme is on the caricature images of an obese couple who are
worried about how to get out of the room after the lockdown. ‘The meme
thematically focuses on the dire consequences of the coronavirus lock-
down.’ The respondents admit that the bloated images of the couple
results from the lockdown and makes normal life impossible. This is a
potent signal of the social difculties that will emerge as the aftermaths of
COVID-19. Indeed the socio-psychological problems created by the
coronavirus pandemic will continue to affect the dynamics of social
humanity for many years to come. The social message of the meme,
according to one respondent, is that ‘people should control their appetite
and food intake during this period.’ And as another respondent observes,
‘exercise is necessary.’ The humor is derived from the fact that the couple
has survived the coronavirus, but is battling with obesity, another health
challenge. Undoubtedly, the lockdown order has health implications
because it restricts people from going to gyms or workplaces which would
automatically serve as an exercise. As a respondent obser ves, the meme is
‘a reminder that if people are not careful with the appetite or eating habits,
gaining weight or being obese is imminent.’ The meme is explicit and easy
to understand. A respondent admits that the meme offers two lessons:
‘One is the anticipated self-quarantine as a recipe for staying safe; and
weight gain from excessive feeding and little or no physical activities as
measure for avoiding COVID-19 infection.’ All respondents admit that
the meme passes the messages graphically and appropriately.
In the last meme, a quote was written referring to the existence of quar-
antine in the Bible, with an extract from Isaiah 26 verse 20. It reads, ‘Go
home, my people, and lock your doors! Hide yourselves for a little while
until the Lord’s anger has passed.’ The quote ends with a smiling emoji.
The meme provides a ‘religious interpretation of the pandemic as a conse-
quence of God’s anger.’ According to a respondent, the meme suggests
that ‘God is aware of the virus.’ In another reading, a respondent afrms
that ‘The social message is that Divinity approves the lockdown.’ While a
respondent queries, ‘Please, who says this is funny? I can’t see why this is
considered humorous!’ and another observes that ‘the message is heavy
on exclusion,’ yet another respondent opines that ‘The humor is in the
fact that there is a biblical back up to everything that happens on this
planet, even Corona virus.’ COVID-19 symptoms of diseases, ailments
and so on are inadvertently signs of the Lord’s anger. This is linked to
G. C. ERNEST-SAMUEL
161
Africans’ deep connection to religious beliefs. The respondent links the
coincidence of the duration of the federal lockdown for 40 days and the
biblical 40 days and 40 night connotations. Another respondent observes
that ‘there are two sides to the meme– serious matter and a joke. For the
over religious, it makes quarantine biblical but I think in the most part it
is a joke playing on a Bible verse.’ The meme thus portrays Africans’ pen-
chant for attaching spiritual meaning to almost all human predicaments.
dIscussIon andconclusIon
In investigating humor in the memes, one needs to seek for what Reyes
etal. (2012) term, ‘the presence of amusing effects, such as laughter or
well-being sensation.’ However, many scholars believe that these effects
can only be traced to the humor types. Martins et al. (2003) identied
four styles which may be used to identify humor. These include self-
enhancing, afliative, self-defeating and aggressive humor. Afliative
humor involves the use of funny things, jokes and witty banter to devise
humor. The meme on malformed maize is a good example of afliative
humor including the one on politicians and their mistresses because they
involve the use of natural seed in making fun while addressing an impor-
tant COVID-19 issue. Self-enhancing humor, according to Taecharungroj
and Nueanjamnong (2015), involves amusing people through incongrui-
ties and maintaining a humorous perspective even in adversity.
Consequently, memes like those with children expressing their opinion on
COVID-19 predicaments aptly share self-enhancing humor, whereas the
memes on the obese couple and the politicians and their mistresses may be
classied as self-defeating humor. Catanescu and Tom (2001) however
listed seven types of humor often used in the broadcast and print media,
which aptly suits the social media. These include comparison, personica-
tion, exaggeration, pun, sarcasm, silliness and surprise. Taecharungroj and
Nueanjamnong observe that ‘silliness memes usually have funny faces or
behaivours on the subjects in the memes.’ Practically, most of the memes
used in this study fall within these types. For instance, the children’s
memes t into the silliness type of humor with the ridiculously funny
expressions on the faces of the young boys used in the memes. The memes
on self-quarantine on a house on top of a tree, staff meeting and mal-
formed maize are various forms of exaggeration designed to generate
laughter and fun while subtly opening conversation on COVID-19. The
Biblical quotation on social distance is surprising likewise the meme on
7 SOCIAL MEDIA AUDIENCE’S INTERPRETATION OF SELECTED HUMOR…
162
politicians and their mistresses. The use of ‘coronically’ in the meme about
coughing uses pun to share humor. By sharing various forms of humorous
attributes, one may argue that the memes are indeed humorous, although
still critical about the coronavirus pandemic and its effect within Africa.
However, by using humor in the discourse of coronavirus, the origina-
tors of the memes adopt relief theory in their communication by allowing
‘laughter operate like a safety valve in a steam pipe, (which) releases built
up nervous energy’ (Morreall, 2009). Consequently, what each partici-
pant reads from the memes are ideas designed to subtly control the fears,
pains and anxieties generated by the coronavirus pandemic. Those com-
munications thus provide opportunity for new meaning making out of
the memes.
The emergent memes circulating among African social media users
reect socio-cultural and environmental issues and ideologies facing
Africans. They are new and contemporary means of expression and com-
munication; thus they are used to share feelings which overwhelm the
originators. These memes share varieties of public emotions inuenced by
the COVID-19 pandemic. As social concepts and development, humor
and pains are related. People may feel pain without suffering (Lorena
Antonovici, 2015). The memes are mainly humorous because people need
to laugh in order to reduce physiological tension from time to time
(Berlyne, 1972). The humour memes are therefore new forms of com-
munication for controlling the pains and apprehensive feelings derived
from the coronavirus pandemic. Whereas coronavirus in Africa remains a
scary healthy challenge; the coronavirus-induced humor memes confront
public fears, apprehensions and difcult conditions induced by the disease
and provide the public with a window of relief. The disadvantage is in its
escapist role. The memes encourage Africans to see the health challenge
from another perspective and to adjust to fate, while accepting difcult life
situations as ‘fun’ and joke which come with lessons.
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G. C. ERNEST-SAMUEL
PART II
Gender, Race and Family: Identity
Politics in the Pandemic
167© The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature
Switzerland AG 2021
S. Mpofu (ed.), Digital Humour in the Covid-19 Pandemic,
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-79279-4_8
CHAPTER 8
Coronavirus Satire: ADissection ofFeminist
Politics andHumour
MilliePhiri
IntroductIon
What can we make of the humour that Felistas Chido Murata showcases
on her Facebook page, Mai Ts Diaries, under the coronavirus pandemic in
Zimbabwe? This chapter examines the period from March 2020 when the
hard lockdown measures to manage the COVID-19 were imposed in
Zimbabwe to December 2020, a time when African countries began to
worry about the second wave and variants of the disease. Feminist humour
is a recent phenomenon in this economically ravaged country of 14 mil-
lion people where the masculinisation of the coronavirus disease has
resulted in the feminisation of poverty. Felistas’ humour replaces the
notion that places women as only target of jokes and as receivers of male-
framed comedy. It is a counter to hegemonic masculinity media spaces
that fail to consider the needs of women in society. Her humour is also a
disruption to masculine ways of appropriating knowledge that we have
been accustomed to.
Murata, who is known as Mai Tt, is an award-winning comedian born
in Mufakose, a black township in Zimbabwe’s Harare capital. It is
M. Phiri (*)
University of Johannesburg, Johannesburg, South Africa
168
common to use Mai as an epithet for a woman with children and to accom-
pany it by the name of the rst-born child, which is why she is known as
Mai Tt, short for Mai Titi. This is commonly a sign of respect for women
in Zimbabwe cultures. Mai Tt also represents black township women who
are an alienated group because they undergo various levels of suffering
that include water and food shortages, lack of health access and unemploy-
ment (Kubatana, 2020); yet, their voices are often not heard in the media
or in the political space. She is also an epitome of women born and bred
in townships, many of whom have grown up without the hope of ever
making it given that Zimbabwe has been experiencing hardships since
2000 after its controversial land invasions that resulted in economic dam-
age. Some of these women have since emigrated where they mainly work
in agriculture, construction, domestic work and service industry (Forced
Migration Studies Programme, 2009). In her Facebook posts, Murata
often calls herself an “advocate”, ‘born-again Christian”, “preacher” and
“single mother”, although at the time of writing she had remarried, fur-
ther giving hope to single women that marriage is possible after divorce.
Social media journalists commenting on her page describe her as inspiring,
motivational, powerful, talented, fun, heavenly, teacher, multi-talented
and Zimbabwe’s Brenda Fassie, among other attributes. The late Brenda
Fassie was a South African musical icon.
Secondly, her humour shows us that the lines between the public and
the private realms, the social and the domestic, the personal and the politi-
cal and the visible and invisible are blurred. Mai Tt’s humour reveals how
intimacy is political and also raises taboo subjects such as division of house-
hold chores among married couples and the controversial subject of vio-
lence against women and religion. She touches on how Zimbabwean men
weaponise coronavirus to retain hold of patriarchal power in the house-
hold and perpetuates the concept of small houses, a Zimbabwean term
describing men who have secret or unofcial wives or girlfriends
(Muchabaiwa, 2018). The chapter further argues that humour and social
media in Zimbabwe are helping women to chart a new identity trajectory
that is shifting the representation of women and their issues in the media.
Mai Tt’s humour is not just comic but a discourse that helps women to
connect with other “real women with real problems” who use social media
as a place to air their views and get moral support, solidarity, help, counsel-
ling and advise on a wide array of issues that women would not ordinarily
speak in public. This is central to the articulation of black feminism. Black
feminism adds the black female voice into the dominant discourses. It
M. PHIRI
169
helps capture—in a nuanced way—the realities and cultures specic to
black women (Phiri, 2019).
Feminist humour portrays women as an empowered group. It pro-
motes the idea of black sisterhood which is important in healing fractures
and division. It is divide-and-rule tactics, after all, that exacerbate the
abuse of African/black women. Black feminism is by no means homoge-
nous, neither are black women’s experiences of oppression monolithic.
There is constant rewriting of feminism itself because it is never static or
xed. It is contextual and culturally specic. I chose it as a lens to frame
feminist humour in this chapter so that I have a theoretical starting point
and coherence without which the eld of feminism becomes a conceptual
jungle. The theory also serves to accommodate as much of the black
female experience as possible.
Findings reveal that if humour is a form of communication and a state-
ment about our surroundings, Mai Tt risks losing identity with her audi-
ence in the long run. She understands how women feel, and she is viewed
as a champion for women and children. She is an inspiration and symbol
for women who suffer adversity. Her ability to joke her pain away kindles
hope in many women who feel like giving up. It is cathartic for her as
much as to her dominant female audience who go through what she has
experienced, but in doing so she lets out her dark side that leads to misog-
yny and hate speech. Hate speech is one of the main reasons why some
women do not participate on social media.
The chapter will show that, sadly, this humour is also at times coloured
with misinformation that comes with infodemic common during pandem-
ics. The danger about falsehoods is that they are 70 percent more likely to
be shared than accurate news (Kincaid & Pattison, 2020). They outper-
form the truth on every subject and travel “further, faster, and deeper”.
This is a conundrum considering Mai Tt’s page has over 600,000 online
subscribers scattered globally, and as evidence shows, her posts are shared
more than other popular female comedians in the country who are also
using Facebook as a tool to disseminate humour.
theoretIcal andconceptual Framework
The terms humour, laughter and comedy are used interchangeably in this
chapter, although there is recognition that laughter is the physical action
that often, but not necessarily, arises in response to humour. According to
Lockyer and Pickering (2009) humour is one of the most pervasive
8 CORONAVIRUS SATIRE: A DISSECTION OF FEMINIST POLITICS…
170
elements of public culture and a central aspect of everyday life that is
“obligatory”, “ideological” and a “persistent desire” (Billig, 2009, 13).
Humour is under-investigated in Africa according to Källstig (2020)
who wrote about Zimbabwe stand-up comedy. This is a paradox consider-
ing that humour is a resistance tactic to elite and dominant power
(Obadare, 2016). The role of feminism is to help saturate society with
constructive feminist frames such as what this chapter attempts to do. Her
jokes are a social critique. For example, by being laughed at, institutions
lose their perceived power. Segal and Demos (2019) talk of agency-
afrming places which women use to “talk back” or express anger over
injustices they experience, and Mai Tt’s Facebook page can be classied as
such. Social media is one of those places where women have become free
to express their views about hard-to-discuss topics such as the ones which
Murata addresses in her humorous skits pertaining to coronavirus on her
Facebook Fan page. Segal and Demos (2019) also refer to overtly hostile
or agency-denying places that deny women free speech. Social media can
also be that place because of its misogynistic nature. Generally, it has been
extraordinarily difcult for women to construct their identities in the
mainstream media, for example, despite that it plays a critical role in infor-
mation dissemination and is inuential in shaping individual knowledge,
attitudes and behaviours. Despite its misogyny nature, social media, unlike
traditional media, helps to disrupt and reframe women’s issues as we shall
see with Mai Tt’s feminist humour during the COVID-19 pandemic.
Since 2016, female comedians in Zimbabwe have been gaining popu-
larity due to social media (Minjenjema & Mazvarirwofa, 2017). Whereas
statistics on social media usage in Africa are not readily available, Facebook
reports indicate that Facebook interactions increased up to 70 percent
more in the USA since the coronavirus pandemic started. Globally before
the crisis, billions spent most of their time on social media, with Facebook
alone getting 1.6 billion daily log ins, 134 million were spending time on
Twitter and a billion hours of video a day were being watched on YouTube
(Schultz & Parikh, 2020). Murata’s Facebook fan page was opened in
2016 and had over 600,000 subscribers at the time of writing.
Female comedians worth mentioning in Zimbabwe are Samantha
Kureya, popularly known as “Gonyeti”, and Tyra Chikocho, who is called
“Madam Boss” by her fans. Kureya is popular for stand-up comedy and is
acclaimed for focusing on topical political issues, while Chikocho special-
ises on online skits on trending issues in Zimbabwe on her Facebook page.
Källstig (2020) describes the female comedians in Zimbabwe as rebellious
M. PHIRI
171
artists taking up the comedy space to express themselves. This is despite
Zimbabwe’s perilous political space that wants to silence them. The fram-
ing of humour by female comedians now competes with the patriarchal
dominant frames that control the narratives in the Zimbabwean society.
Some of these frames are harmful to women. Ndlovu and Ngwenya
(2010), while reviewing public transport stickers for humour, discovered
that they depicted negative stereotypes about women and were more
derogatory towards them than towards men, which made women vulner-
able to violence against them. Female comedians in Zimbabwe have found
themselves in trouble for mocking the proviledge. In August 2019, Kureya
was beaten up and abducted for her critical skits of the police and the gov-
ernment (BBC, 2019). Social media is thus a meeting point of power,
agency and oppression (Davies & Ilott, 2018).
Historically, humour in Zimbabwe has been used to test the openness,
accessibility and riskiness of sensitive issues, as described by Lang and Lee
(2010). The study of humour and particularly of how women are reected
is underexplored generally. This is where black feminism becomes mean-
ingful because it considers how black women see the world. This is impor-
tant because it is not enough to imagine empowerment for black women
in isolation from deepseated changes in the overall social structure (Hill
Collins, 2004). In this chapter we explore how humour represents black
women’s experiences and issues that affected them during the coronavirus
pandemic. Subjecting humour to a feminist analysis helps to view humour
from a unique and different perspective from that of the traditional
male gaze.
We know through the theory of Superiority founded by Thomas
Hubbes that humour is generated when there is a sudden realisation of
supremacy with respect to another person or situation. Humour is a site of
ridicule that serves to reafrm existing structures of power and ways of
being (Holm, 2017). Humour styles associated with the Superiority
Theory are, among others, ridicule, teasing and sarcasm. Representation
in comedy thus matters because that is where power relations are con-
rmed, negotiated or undermined (Szutenberg, 2012). How characters
are represented structures the audiences’ responses—to laugh with or
laugh at them (Davies & Ilott, 2018). This theory taps on our emotional
side. Mai Tt’s humour touches on the masculinisation and weaponisation
of coronavirus that resulted in feminised poverty and worsened the small
house problem in Zimbabwe. It also portrays sexual feminist humour as
8 CORONAVIRUS SATIRE: A DISSECTION OF FEMINIST POLITICS…
172
an important part of feminist politics that is essential and that can no lon-
ger remain a taboo topic which cannot be discussed.
Historically, humour in Zimbabwe objecties women as sex tools, evil,
liars, gold diggers, own worst enemies, talkative, cheats, troublesome, stu-
pid, jealous, gossipers, among other negative stereotypes (Ncube, 2020).
According to Chambers (2005), feminist discourse is a system of represen-
tation that challenges these sexual objectications and subordination of
women which is what this chapter is about.
For its part, the incongruity theory views humour as a substitute of an
unexpected event or remark because it is something that they are not
accustomed to in their world, and so it fails to match their expectations
(Davies & Ilott, 2018). The incongruity touches on the cognition side
because you need to have the capacity to understand the differences and
what part makes the joke. This includes the fact that rumour is also cul-
tural and contextual. For example, knowing the language and culture is
critical to understanding a joke (Davies & Ilott, 2018). Humour is a way
of thinking which impinges upon representation. The coronavirus came at
a time when Zimbabwe was experiencing harsh sociopolitical and eco-
nomic problems. Humour as politics is concerned with understanding of
contemporary society. It often exposes “foolishness” or “hypocrisy” of
politicians and powerful public gures or highlights serious social issues
such as religion and crime, and we see this on Mai Tt’s Facebook fan page.
It offers an effective way to critique entrenched values about identity poli-
tics and social power inequalities as we shall see when we analyse Mai Tt’s
sexual humour.
Then there is the relief or release theory which is laughter released as a
form of nervous energy.
According to Freud (1960, 103), laughter at taboo subjects matter
because it reveals a lot about a particular society’s “constructs, its bound-
aries, rules and taboos”. Davies and Ilott (2018) also let us know that
when it comes to comedy and humour, “the political becomes personal”.
For example, the many issues that Mai Tt raises in her comedy such as
husbands who use coronavirus as a tool for indelity; sexual complications
that couples face and which are exacerbated by the fact that under the
lockdown, couples were forced to stay under one roof; and the issue of
poverty. These are real issues that women in Zimbabwe faced as a result of
the political decisions taken under the COVID-19 regulations. Lockdown
regulations did not take into consideration that not all homes are safe for
women; challenges such as access to reproductive health services; lack of
M. PHIRI
173
water services; the informal sector in which many Zimbabwean women
draw their livelihood from; and shortages of basic commodities
(Kubatana, 2020).
Although humour in comedy reects a society’s norms and values, it
has the potential to reconstruct social identities as Mai Tt’s humour does.
That is why women’s comedy plays a crucial role in paying attention to the
ideologies being perpetuated by the humour we laugh at. Humour is also
contagious because it has the capacity to spread, especially via social media.
methodology
I used a Facebook tool called CrowdTangle to gather data and analysed
Mai Tt’s humour on coronavirus. I searched for the words coronavirus,
corona, COVID19, COVID, quarantine, lockdown, pandemic and
“mbutu”. According to the Shona dictionary, mbutu is a pet name for a
cat, also an endearing name for a girl, but in this case this word refers to
“pussy” or the female sex organ (vagina). It is included in the search as
part of Mai Tt’s coronavirus humour because what starts as humour by
Mai Tt on whether or not people should have sex during the COVID-19
pandemic results in women opening up about marriage and sex relation-
ship problems.
I decided on reviewing a 12-month period, although the actual period
analysed is from March when Zimbabwe recorded its rst COVID-19 case
to December 2020. The 12–month period is chosen because CrowdTangle
search options are 60minutes, 3hours, 12 hours, 24 hours, three days,
one month, last 12months and custom. I opted for the longest period so
I may have more information. I searched photos, links, statuses, Facebook
videos, Facebook live sessions, other videos including those shared on
YouTube and a host of mixed bag messages that included talks on
coronavirus.
CrowdTangle is a Facebook public insights tool that helps to show
activities happening across social media. It makes content from public
pages “more discoverable” and engagement data on that content—shares,
views, comments and reactions—easy to sort through (Fraser, 2020). It is
used to track all public Facebook pages, veried proles and groups with
more than 100k likes. Mai Ts Diaries is a veried public page which had
344,753 likes by December 05, 2020. The CrowdTangle tool helps one
to see how much a post has been commented on, the shares and clicks on
Facebook's reaction buttons such as love, wow, haha, said, angry, care.
8 CORONAVIRUS SATIRE: A DISSECTION OF FEMINIST POLITICS…
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However, the limitation of CrowdTangle is that it does not show the
content from followers due to privacy reasons. To deal with this shortcom-
ing, I used posts generated by CrowdTangle to go on the actual Mai Ts
Diaries to conduct a qualitative netnography exercise, manually scrolling
for public comments about the posts in question. The other limitation is
the fact that certain classes of women often miss out on conversations on
Facebook platforms such as Mai Tt’s because of lack of access to the
Internet and high cost of data packs and smart devices in a country where
unemployment is almost 90 percent, with food shortages and lack of med-
icines (Kubatana, 2020).
reconstructIng FemInIst polItIcs humour
InZImbabwe
Total interactions about coronavirus-related humour on Mai Tt’s
Facebook fan page on topics mentioned in the methodology were
394,464in 87 posts over a 12-month period, although coronavirus pan-
demic started to peak in mid-March 2020. This is when Zimbabwe
recorded its rst COVID-19 case and announced its rst hard lockdown
measures to manage the pandemic. There was again a peak in April after
which the lockdown measures were extended, followed by another peak in
June when Zimbabwe tightened the coronavirus lockdown regulations as
the number of cases increased. We saw the peak again in July after which
another curfew was imposed (Moyo, 2020) (Figs.8.1 and 8.2).
Fig. 8.1 Showing total interactions regarding the coronavirus pandemic on Mai
Tt’s Facebook Fan page. (Source: CrowdTangle)
Fig. 8.2 Showing total interactions regarding coronavirus pandemic conversa-
tions on Mai Tt’s, Madam Boss’s and Gonyeti aka Samantha Kureya’s Facebook
pages. (Source: CrowdTangle)
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I also conducted a combined search that included Mai Tt’s Facebook
page and female comedians, Chikocho and Kureya, using the same search
words mentioned earlier, but taking out the word “mbutu” which is
unique only to Mai Tt. The results reveal there were 579,961 interactions
for 113 coronavirus-related posts in the same period. This indicates that
Mai Tt commands by far more following and interactions. It was Mai Tt
who seemed to directly address women’s issues, particularly about sex,
female singlehood and small houses. Not many results appeared for Kureya
who is a stand-up comedian; Mai Tt and Madam Boss concentrate on
online comedy. Mai Tt’s humour is laced with dance, fashion, song, live
talk shows, prayer and acting. Dancing and laughing at struggles is consid-
ered a feminised way of coping with adversity. Her acting makes her
appealing to people who do not understand the Shona language she fre-
quently uses in her jokes. For example, one commenter says, “I love this
lady”, referring to Mai Tt, then she puts the love emoji. The commenter
further praises Mai Tt, highlighting that although she does not under-
stand Shona, “the messages is there for everyone”. Another one remarks
that without Mai Tt, Facebook is “boring”. Mai Tt’s use of the Shona
language and sometimes broken Ndebele, spoken north of the country,
seem to help convey meanings to a wider audience and promote more
dialogue.
In addition, I also conducted an intelligence research looking at all
Facebook posts for the three female comedians including Mai Tt’s over a
12-month period. The statistic conrms that Mai Tt by far out-performs
other female comedians as she accounts for over 11 million interactions
out of a combined total of 17.13 million.
Generally, Mai Tt draws a lot of content from her own experience,
which makes her humour relatable, believable and a mirror of reality. She
uses humour to either convey hard truth to the authorities or make fun of
them. She uses the imaginary phone call talk, perhaps a suggestion that
authorities should establish a way to communicate with ordinary women
about issues that affect them before making decisions that impact them.
Her Facebook page is a place where her audience discuss sensitive taboo
subjects and where they nd their own solutions, adding to indigenous
feminist knowledge. Mai Tt’s audience is mostly women, at least judging
from the responses she gets, and most of her butts are cheating husbands
and occasionally political gures. A butt is the focus of the joke, that is, the
8 CORONAVIRUS SATIRE: A DISSECTION OF FEMINIST POLITICS…
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person who is made fun of (Davies & Ilott, 2018). Mai Tt’s jokes fall into
various forms such as narrative, satire and comic monologues. She focuses
more on sexual humour and single women. Humour regarding coronavi-
rus on Mai Ts Diaries can thus be thematised into the political and socio-
economic issue groups; these include failings of political leaders; social
issues and taboos such as sex, single women and small houses; the eco-
nomic impact of the disease; and the health messaging and misinformation
theme in which the jokes contain misinformation about the disease.
what Is personal Is polItIcal
By far the post that got the most comments (4670) and shares (10387)
focused on Mai Tt joking on how coronavirus creates family time, which
was previously almost nonexistent in most homes, resulting in couples
having to share household chores. Household chores are femininised in
Zimbabwe, and Mai Tt challenges this status quo by portraying household
chores as gender-neutral. The home is part of the private realm. Feminist
politics argues that the public realm is characterised by activities such as
paid work and travel. In a broader framework, it includes enjoying rights
of full citizenship and exercising political and democratic rights (Phiri,
2019). On the other hand, the private realm consists of anything that man
demarcates as woman’s natural space. This includes child-bearing, satisfy-
ing male conjugal needs, motherhood and domestic labour. Here the
feminine is perceived as private and removed from politics (Pateman,
1989). Sharing of household chores is a controversial subject in Zimbabwe’s
culture where masculinity places emphasis on the public realm where men
are viewed as breadwinners and heads of the homes. Mai Tt laughs at this
patriarchal system that is blamed for the “small houses” syndrome in
Zimbabwe. The following humorous prayer is politically loaded. It depicts
Zimbabwe’s failed political patriarchal system responsible for the short-
ages the country experiences and how this permeates into homes. She
laments:
We know that quarantine is not good but we know that it is to our advan-
tage the main houses. We know our husbands are not happy, they are very
angry…but father you did it for a reason so that we can spend time together.
Even if we are not talking, we want to thank you…no more small houses, no
more excuses, lies, no more fuel queues.
M. PHIRI
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Even though the husband is just sitting on the sofa like a “bulldog”,
Mai Tt says, “we are at least happy our husbands are home”. Phiri (2019)
notes that the bull is the manifestation of masculinity par excellence. As a
symbol, it expresses the display of blind male machismo and masculine
virility. Bulls do not see or care when they hurt females, and at the same
time, they justify it as being part of their nature. In the skit, Mai Tt demys-
ties the notion that the home is not personal or private, but is political
and public. She ends the skit by instructing the husband to help with the
laundry and the ironing. Mai Tt is deconstructing gender roles and mak-
ing culturally taboo subjects that are deemed private, public. Her humour
conrms (Davies & Ilott, 2018) assertions that humour brings out what is
personal into the public realm.
sexual humour andsInglehood
Mai Tt reshapes the lives of single women through comedy by addressing
taboo topics such as sex, dating and single parenthood. Issues of indepen-
dence and sexuality of single women are hardly talked about in Zimbabwe
except in dirty jokes. Chambers (2005), who addresses comedies of sexual
morality and female singlehood, notes that single women are generally
targeted in comedies as a “source of profound pleasure for audiences”
(p.162). Being single and having sexual independence is synonymous to
being a “slut” (Chambers, 2005, p.171). Mai Tt is changing the narrative
of single women to “carve out an identity that transcends the conventional
married, domestic role”, as Chambers put it. As Mai Tt rightly points out
in her humour, traditionally, single divorced women in Zimbabwe are stig-
matised and often blamed for marriage breakdowns and for a variety of
reasons such as miscarriages, failure to bear children, failure to satisfy her
partner in bed, lack of cooking skills, not able to perform household
chores to the satisfaction of men and failure to treat the husband’s relatives
well because when a woman is married, she marries her husband’s whole
community. While there is a lot of focus on single women, the single status
of men is largely uncontested unless it is in the context of post-divorce or
mid-life crisis.
Singleness is frowned in the Zimbabwe culture where marriage is asso-
ciated with stableness. Mai Tt helps to remove the anxieties and uneasiness
associated with the state of being unmarried. Her jokes are a challenge to
patriarchal discourses that portray single women as deviances who break
social rules and transgress cultural boundaries according to Chambers
8 CORONAVIRUS SATIRE: A DISSECTION OF FEMINIST POLITICS…
178
(2005). Single women are often portrayed by society as sad, lonely and
socially subordinated. Mai Tt, who lived a single life for a long time before
her December 2020 marriage, has been criticised before for being in a
relationship with a younger man and mocked for her HIV status she pub-
licly speaks about.
To address the matter of singlehood and sex, she started a live show
which she calls “mbutu station” that in a funny way tackles topics which
are often not talked about publicly in the Zimbabwe culture, such as small
houses, sex problems, sex styles, oral sex, premature ejaculation, three-
some, how women can seduce their own husbands/partners so that they
do not go to small houses and how to coexist with small houses. The sta-
tion also discussed whether one can contract the coronavirus if they have
sex. Naming it “mbutu” instead of “vagina” as that is what the show is
about would be culturally incorrect and offend her audience. When she
started the show, she announced on her Facebook page status:
So, I noticed a lot of couples are in a lot of disagreements in their relation-
ships. Especially sex wise. These issues are very hard for a lot to discuss even
in churches, sexual guidance is not given properly There is absolutely noth-
ing wrong in discussing such topics because a lot of people are breaking up.
So, I decided to do a program called Mbutu FM where couples come
through and we all participate.
Although mbutu itself sounds stereotypical because it means “pussy”,
“cat” and “girl”, Mai Tt uses it to address sexual taboos in a way that is
not explicitly offending. Comedians strive to use humour that is culturally
acceptable and appropriate.
Not only is Mai Tt’s humour a form of resistance to male oppression
but it helps in the construction of new feminist identities in both empow-
ering and weakening ways. It is empowering because sexual humour is
part of feminist politics that promotes free will for women which helps
them make informed choices about their sexual and reproductive health
and saves lives. Mai Tt uses the stereotyped notion that women are sex
tools to their favour. For example, Mai Tt shares tips on how to sexually
satisfy men, for example, what to wear and trending sex positions. This is
important because the inability to negotiate safe sex results in women tra-
ditionally contracting sexually transmitted diseases such as HIV at higher
rates than men. This humour is didactic because it imparts what may be
considered by many women as life lessons. Mai Tt pursues a narrative that
M. PHIRI
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sex must be a terrain for negotiation, not a site for struggle. To illustrate
the popularity of Mbutu station, she boasted on her Facebook status:
I must say since we started this live stream it has received overwhelming
reviews, sometimes we reach up to 3k viewers on live meaning it’s a very
interesting topic.
Her Facebook page serves as a townhall where women lay their fears
and anxieties, to be empowered not only through Mai Tt but through
others on the forum. For example, a married woman shares that her hus-
band is demanding a threesome, which is when a man has sex with two
women, or vice versa. Although the advice from the audience on the plat-
form is an overwhelmingly a “no, no”, it is also made clear to the woman
in question that after weighing the advice she receives, the nal say on
whether or not to keep the marriage lies with her. This just goes to prove
how black feminism is evolving and cutting through cultural barriers to
empower black women. Social media is helping women by showing them
that feminism can break what is considered culturally sensitive and taboo
and that they have choices and rights. Her humour delves into real-life
issues of women, and by doing so Mai Tt’s Facebook page takes the place
of the social places that were traditionally used to crack jokes in Zimbabwe
such as the time when women planted or harvested crops in the elds, at
the well when fetching water or gathering rewood for cooking and at
traditional ceremonies or other places where women gathered. But with
modernisation and migration into cities, these traditional spaces are dwin-
dling for black women, only to be revived by social media. Even with
social media there is the problem of access to data and affordability of
smart devices, so a majority of black women are still left out of online
conversations.
However, Mai Tt’s narrative is weakened through the trepidation of
culture she often advances in her live humour shows that expects women
to be the ones to put more work to prove their sex skills to their partners
and keep their marriages working. The sex skills are viewed as a strategy to
stop the so-called small houses, but do they? Writing from a sociological
point of view, Muchabaiwa (2018) discovers that small house households
are part of deeply entrenched patriarchal hegemony and are mired in
problems that include GBV and nancial constraints, among others. While
Mai Tt teaches women self-respect and to exercise open-mindedness
towards some unconventional methods of sex such as oral sex, these are
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180
not a panacea until hegemonic masculinity is eradicated. The skit in which
Mai Tt uses a ruler to measure social distance in bed with her husband is
an illustration of the patriarch/masculinity power relations that still exist
between men and women. Controlling women’s sexuality and reproduc-
tion is actually the heart of the patriarchy (Jaenes & Marques, 2019,
0:38:16–0:38:22) in the Netix documentary about feminism called What
the f*is going on?. Men have never accepted women setting limits for them.
Their mentality is: “You don’t want to sleep with me? l will nd a whore”
(Jaenes & Marques, 2019, 0:38:37). Mai Tt’s skit is also mirroring the
marital realities of couples who are distanced in real life and hardly have
intimacy.
As Davies and Ilott (2018) say, it is not only the personal which is
political when it comes to humour but the private runs the risk of becom-
ing public as well. We see Mai Tt opening her personal life to her fans and
vice versa. She uses confession humour where she discloses on some of her
mistakes, highs and lows in her love life in a hilarious way. According to
Chambers (2005), places such as Mai Ts Diaries do not only become
spaces of women’s hystericalisation but they are also spaces of feminist
politics because they expose taboos, confer solidarity between women and
debunk traditional narratives of sex and intimacy narratives such as the
ones Mai Tt raises.
On the other hand, her jokes may be viewed as problematic by those
who consider prostitution as their right, in that she castigates women who
have sex with married men and advocates abstinence which is easier said
than done. Singlehood has no easy answers but is an ever-changing terrain
that women would need to constantly negotiate with. After all, feminism
is not homogenous. While Mai Tt’s humour is liberating for women, it
also poses complications for sexual independence. It, however, disrupts
traditional patriarchal discourses on femininity and singleness. This
humour would be impossible were it not for social media that allows peo-
ple to listen or watch it in their own privacy using their smart phones or
other devices. The number of shares and comments attests to the atten-
tion the humour attracts (see Fig.8.3).
rIdIculIng polItIcal power
On the political front, Mai Tt uses skits to mock the privilege or those in
the position of power. She utilises euphemistic humour where she exposes
the truth that would not otherwise be discussed out there. For example,
M. PHIRI
181
she mocks or laughs at politicians, and in one skit she addresses them as
“stupid people” where she questions why the disease is named after a
“crown”, which means corona in the Shona language. Names of disasters
such as cyclones are usually femininised. Mai Tt laughs off at world politi-
cal gures for feminising disasters. She rejects this representation of
women and makes fun of the coronavirus describing it as “evil corona”. In
a phone call to a politician, she demands to know why the disease is known
by that name and orders that person to advise the president to change it.
Fig. 8.3 CrowdTangle Intelligence report that compares account performance
of activities of the three female comedians on all posts on their Facebook fan pages
over a 12-month period from January 2020. (Source: CrowdTangle)
8 CORONAVIRUS SATIRE: A DISSECTION OF FEMINIST POLITICS…
182
How can you crown an evil thing. You cannot just wake up to crown some-
thing so terrible, tell the president I’m not happy. You will look into it. Look
into it if you don’t we will do it ourselves.
She also calls the president regarding the serious gender-based violence.
“You are a man of wisdom and integrity but I just saw that you banned
alcohol. You want us to be sober?”, she asks. She continues:
We cannot be sober, we are stressed. We are staying with people whom we
don’t want to see every day. If we drink alcohol we just look at them and we
see nothing. It’s a wrong decision. Enemies are quarantined in one room.
Make me your advisor. You will consider, thank you.
Although alcohol is ironically considered an instigator of GBV, Mai Tt
hints at the problematic position of women who have to stay in the same
home with their abusers. Perhaps out of desperation, they would rather
drink their problems away. She mocks the lack of consideration of wom-
en’s views, and by calling the authorities, she is demonstrating the dire
need to provide a platform for women to be heard. Statistics say one in
three women aged 15 to 49 have experienced physical violence in
Zimbabwe and about one in four women have experienced sexual violence
since the age of 15years (UNFPA, 2020).
In yet another call, she asks president of Zimbabwe, Emmerson
Mnangagwa, to consider sending a plane to pick her up from UK where
she was stuck during the rst lockdown regulations in March and bring
her back home to Zimbabwe. This was in reference to other nations who
were evacuating their nationals from countries around the world during
COVID-19. She pokes fun at the president for being insensitive to the
needs of ordinary people, especially women, in a nation that is rife with
corruption.
coVId-19 humour: economIc Impact onwomen
She also uses humour to show how coronavirus affects women and men
differently. This humour serves a psychological function whereby Mai Tt
provides laughter amid the closing of businesses and people losing their
sources of livelihood. In this kind of humour, she portrays women as care-
givers and as burden lifters to those who are in state of panic and anxiety
caused by the many unknowns of the disease, although this is considered
M. PHIRI
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unpaid work. Some women view her as a “sanitiser”. A commenter likens
her jokes to how a sanitiser kills COVID-19. She metaphorises Mai Tt’s
audience as the “covids” who need to be sanitised by her jokes. She raises
issues that have an economic impact on women, such as homelessness in
the pandemic, child-headed homes, failure to pay rentals and challenges of
working from home. She therefore ridicules government policies that are
insensitive to women. In one of the skits Mai Tt accuses her landlady of
breaching the COVID-19 regulations by coming to her house to ask for
rent and by not observing social distance. This was after the government
directive at the height of the lockdown in April imploring landlords to
stop collecting rentals until the COVID-19 lockdown has been lifted.
Her humour, however, gave birth to a number of online philanthropic
activities where her audience would participate in helping to donate cash
and goods to orphans, single female-headed homes and women in prisons
and providing water to women in black townships. She uses her page to
offer free promotions to boost female-headed businesses.
She also pokes fun at pastors who take advantage of the coronavirus
situation. By pretending to be a prophetess, her humour is directed
towards fellow women who normally ll church pews and who are viewed
as gullible when it comes to giving money to church and who often want
to be prayed for. In the skit, she advises givers not to put the money in the
church account, but in her personal account. In a similar skit, she says,
“don’t forget that if you don’t want this coronavirus to come to you, pay
your tithe and offering”.
mIsogyny
Mai Tt feels she is often misjudged and misunderstood, but unfortunately
at times she ghts the misogyny with more hate speech. Confession about
her lived experiences exposes Mai Tt to humiliation and misogyny,
although her strategy to deal with misogyny is often to block offensive
comments as they come and to answer back. “Showbiz is like politics it’s a
dirty game. I don’t offend people, all I do is ght for my rights”, she says.
“Been abused for long and misunderstood because people start me then I
end up retaliating”, she once pointed out on one of her Facebook page
statuses. At one point her page was hacked. She has been attacked for her
relationship with a younger man and for her HIV positive status. In turn,
she has used her platform to attack those who cross her path. “I am a
single mum who works for her children effortlessly”, she remarks in one
8 CORONAVIRUS SATIRE: A DISSECTION OF FEMINIST POLITICS…
184
of her videos as defence to an attack by a male pastor. She calls the pastor
“junk” and says she is ready for a “st” ght with him. She has on several
occasions called other women “whores”, “nobodies”, “rats”. Yet she
claims to ght for women and that she is not a person of violence. In
October 2020 she was slapped with a half a million US dollar defamation
lawsuit after labelling a Harare businesswoman a “prostitute”
(Machakaire, 2020).
There is also risk that her fame may alienate her from the very same
women who look up to her. Although she continues to say she is not rich
and not a politician, she does exhibit amboyancy and opulence that cre-
ates a gap between her and the women she purports to be a voice for. For
example, she recently underwent a liposuction and skin-enhancing proce-
dures worth thousands of US dollars in neighbouring South Africa. At
times, she wines and dines with the very politicians who are part of the
system she mocks in her humour.
comedy andmIsInFormatIon
Sadly, Mai Tt’s humour is also littered with falsehoods and conspiracy
theories, which is dangerous especially when it applies to a health pan-
demic such as the coronavirus. Misinformation is common with health
pandemics or epidemics. It involves unknowingly spreading false informa-
tion, while conspiracy theories are false stories repeated over time (Senft,
2020). During a cholera outbreak in Zimbabwe in 2018, people made
humour out of the situation as a means to cope with the disease at a time
when there was a shortage of water and other basic commodities (WHO,
2020). Research shows that there were rumours in 1918 during the
Spanish u, but now with social media, rumours spread faster, according
to Barry (2020) during a presentation at the 2020 WHO Infodemic
Management Training course. Barry is the author of the Great Inuenza,
that chronicles the history of the Spanish u. New diseases are scar y when
there are still many unknowns, which is why people need humour to laugh
it off. In 1796 when polio vaccine was invented, rumours started that cow
heads would erupt from the bodies of people who received the vaccine
(Wilson & Wysonge, 2020). Wasserman and Frost (2020)) postulate that
people are drawn to conspiracy theories when there is a lot of uncertainty
and lack of trust, and as a result they turn to humour, gossip and pavement
radio. Mare (2019) alerts us to the fact that the Zimbabwe context, where
M. PHIRI
185
public communication is generally constrained, popular art such as com-
edy is performing journalistic functions.
Jokingly Mai Tt tells her female audience during a live-in phone show
to spray or apply disinfectants such as Dettol, anti-bacterial soap and other
bleaches to the vagina to protect themselves from contracting the corona-
virus during sex. When others asked if they should dilute the disinfectants,
she repeatedly tells them to use the disinfectants undiluted. It is only at the
end of the Facebook live comedy show that she informs her audience that
it is just a joke. Although some of her audience point out that it is wrong
information, from the onset, it is not clear how many could have been
fooled by such jokes and how many listened to the show till the end to
understand that she was joking. The particular video had been shared 31
times at the time of writing and had 60k views and 3200 likes.
Mai Tt also posted anti-vaccination clips, one of which had been shared
307 times by the time of writing. “Amen he is telling the truth, say no to
vaccine”, one commenter says. “Amen, I stand with you…no unless they
test it on them rst (meaning the West). The pastor in that particular video
vows to “die than being vaccinated”. This was coming at a time when
World Health Organization and nations globally were and are still ghting
misinformation that is preventing people to protect themselves against the
disease and promoting vaccination hesitancy. In her skit in which she
laments how COVID-19 is preventing women’s gossip, she remarks:
“When they put you that chip you can’t gossip anymore”. She was refer-
ring to the misinformation that the proposed COVID-19 vaccinations
come with chips that allow governments to remote-control individuals
(Goodman & Carmichael, 2020).
In Zimbabwe, conspiracy theories around COVID-19 include that the
disease was created in a lab in Wuhan and being spread by 5G networks
and vaccination myths. What is more dangerous is that Mai Tt is viewed as
an inuencer and role model to women in Zimbabwe. Senft (2020) speaks
of the ideological spiral model which explains how information reception,
circulation and trust work. Basically, people join Facebook because of per-
sonal identity which basically says: here’s how I determine right and
wrong; or these are issues/values that are important to me. They are inu-
enced by social identities that say: I feel included in what I understand as
my group; I know how to distinguish my group from others, or social
media preferences such as in my group nobody follows/supports/believes
this; this topic is something I should know about or this platform/channel
is what everyone uses. So, there is a great deal of danger for Facebook
8 CORONAVIRUS SATIRE: A DISSECTION OF FEMINIST POLITICS…
186
platforms such as Mai Tt to convey humour that carries misinformation. It
is the same danger that arises when patriarchal discourses carry humour
that is false about women. So as an inuencer, what Mai Tt says has the
potential to be believed, and if it is misinformation, it is likely to lead to
confusion, risk-taking and harmful attitudes and behaviours (Purnat &
Wilhelm, 2020). It can also increase stigma, hate speech and violence.
conclusIon
Mai Tt plays a role in shaping the women’s worldview and by so doing
creates a new feminist politics that is helping to change the narrative of
women. Her humour mocks patriarchal myths and provides an emancipa-
tory strategy to women. It mirrors everyday lives of women in Zimbabwe.
Mai Tt is turning this male-dominated arts culture into a site of meaning,
politics and life itself for women. Women are no longer just recipients of
jokes but are also creating humorous texts embedded with feminist ideol-
ogy, enabling women to participate in the construction of socially shared
systems of interpretation. Women are able to articulate, negotiate and
challenge matters that concern them. Mai Tt addresses marital conun-
drums such as “small houses” and taboo subjects such as sex, single women
as well as controversial subjects such as sharing of household chores,
gender- based-violence and false prophets and pastors. She demonises and
rebukes the disease but more so the government for causing untold hard-
ships to women. She laughs at politicians for failing to be sensitive to
women’s needs and to provide basic necessities such as clean water, food
and sanitary products which would help to relieve stress and demonstrate
government’s commitment to cushion the poor and needy. Her humour
is misogynistic sometimes, and her association with the political system
that she mocks is contradictory and smacks of double standards.
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COVID-19. Paper presented at the WHO Infodemic Management
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Billig, M. (2009). Comic racism and violence. In S. Lockyer & M.Pickering
(Eds.), Beyond a Joke: The limits of humour (pp.25–44). Palgrave Macmillan.
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Chambers, D. (2005). Comedies of sexual morality and female singlehood. In
S. Lockyer & M. Pickering (Eds.), Beyond a Joke: The limits of humour
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Davies, H., & Ilott, S. (2018). Mocking the weak: Contexts, theories, politics. In
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191© The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature
Switzerland AG 2021
S. Mpofu (ed.), Digital Humour in the Covid-19 Pandemic,
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-79279-4_9
CHAPTER 9
‘A Nation that Laughs Together, Stays
Together’: Deconstructing Humour
onTwitter During theNational Lockdown
inSouth Africa
NonhlanhlaNdlovu
IntroductIon
No need for Big Brother Naija this year, we’re all housemates already #lockd-
ownextension (Tweet, 23 April 2020).
This humorous tweet was posted in response to the announcement of
an extension to the rst lockdown period in South Africa in order to cap-
ture the exasperation that people felt at that time. The president had just
announced a phased-in approach to easing the regulations characterized
by 5 levels of lockdown after a much-anticipated end to the initial hard
lockdown (see next section). The allegorical representation of the popular
Big Brother reality show pronounced by the equally humorous responses
to this tweet depicts how different elements of the show were being played
N. Ndlovu (*)
Rhodes University, Grahamstown, South Africa
192
out in reality under lockdown. Users discuss how, just like the housemates
on the show, people had lost track of the order of days. The “big brother
voice behind the scenes” is attributed to the coronavirus and so “anyone
that goes out will be eliminated”, whilst the “isolation centre” is said to be
signied by the actual eviction from the house. Interestingly, the person
who would claim the grand prize in the end, as suggested somewhat sar-
donically, is none other than the president himself, never mind the fact
that the meme accompanying the tweet paradoxically captures his dejected
expression. I have chosen this particular tweet as an entry point into my
discussion because it reminds me of Jeremy Bentham’s panopticon in its
metaphorical representation of disciplinary power (Foucault, 1977a,
1977b), a conception I nd useful in framing my approach to critically
deconstructing humour on Twitter during lockdown. The aim of disci-
plinary power is to produce bodies that are useful and docile, productive
and subjected (Rabinow, 1984; Sarup, 1993). Therefore, construing
themselves as housemates in the Big Brother Nigeria house, I argue, South
Africans are constituted as ‘willing’ subjects of the rules pertaining to the
house rules (lockdown regulations) and as the ‘winner’, Ramaphosa, rep-
resenting the state, wields power over the housemates who, in essence,
participate willingly in their own subjection. This instance demonstrates
the fact that we are often constituted by the very power relations against
which we struggle.
Taking a critical humour studies approach, this chapter provides a car-
tography of humour on Twitter between March and June 2020in South
Africa. A critical approach to humour means establishing a concern with
how power relations are produced and reproduced in and through
humour. I therefore employ critical discourse analysis perspectives to
explore some of the humorous moments through selected tweets and
hashtags that were trending during this period. The high level of engage-
ment with humorous tweets and memes as demonstrated by an equally
high level of retweets, likes and comments arguably demonstrates a sense
of unity and camaraderie which, in turn, fosters an unrivalled sense of
community. Their humorous take on social and political institutions as
well as political leaders, not least among them the president himself, is tell-
ing of how South Africans understood themselves at this critical juncture.
I therefore attempt an intersectional analysis that acknowledges that
Twitter was used as a tool for negotiating identity across the social catego-
ries of gender, race and class during the national lockdown, and my discus-
sion is limited to these discursive parameters. The chapter concludes by
N. NDLOVU
193
making inferences about how analyses of humour in this context destabi-
lize the notion of the ‘rainbow nation’ and implications for social belong-
ing and knowledge production within these discursive parameters.
context
As the global spread of the COVID-19 pandemic became apparent in sub-
Saharan Africa, South Africa emerged as the hotspot with the country
reporting more than 2.6 million cases (South African Government, 2021)
at the time of writing. South Africa recorded its rst case of COVID-19 on
5 March 2020, and within two weeks, as local transmission started being
recorded, government announced measures to combat the pandemic and
subsequently declared a national state of disaster in terms of the Disaster
Management Act (Ramaphosa, 2020a). This Act is provided for in Section
37.1 of the current constitution and partly provides for the suspension of
the normative order when there is a threat to state security; COVID-19
represented the rst real enemy since apartheid against which a national
campaign could be launched (Kotzé, 2020). Accordingly, President Cyril
Ramaphosa initially announced a raft of regulations including social dis-
tancing, closure of schools, limited social gatherings and suspension of
travel to and from identied high-risk countries as well as quarantine pro-
cedures, among other measures. These regulations were amended on 25
March which saw an introduction of a strict national lockdown phase
beginning on 27 March for a period of 21 days (Ramaphosa, 2020b).
During this phase, all businesses were closed except for those identied as
producing and providing essential goods and services. There was to be no
movement between provinces, metropolitan areas and districts; hence,
people were to be conned to their residential areas except when seeking
essential goods and services.
The national lockdown was extended again on 16 April for a further
period of 14days, but the revised regulations allowed the operation of
reneries and mining at reduced capacity in preparation for the gradual
reopening of the economy. On 23 April, the president announced a
phased-in approach of easing lockdown consisting of 5 levels in which
“the National Coronavirus Command Council (NCCC) will determine
the alert level based on an assessment of the infection rate and the capacity
of our health system to provide care to those who need it” (Ramaphosa,
2020c). The country consequently moved on to level 4 on 1 May, level 3
on 1 June, level 2 on 18 August and level 1 on 21 September, with the
9 ‘A NATION THAT LAUGHS TOGETHER, STAYS TOGETHER…
194
president announcing amended regulations applicable in each phase.
However, with the onset of a second wave, South Africa moved back to
alert level 3 on 29 December 2020. South Africa’s response has been
lauded as swift and extensive as compared to other countries on the conti-
nent (Carlitz & Makhura, 2020). However, critical evaluations have also
noted how the state has assumed its power over the citizenry by taking
away their freedoms, then giving the citizens back their freedom piecemeal
in a manner that depicts the functioning of disciplinary power (see Kotzé,
2020). In this scenario, the state effectively absolves itself of responsibility
by shifting the responsibility of dealing with the threat of the pandemic on
individuals. Individuals are forced to self-discipline (by adhering to all
regulations) in order to redeem their freedoms or bear with the conse-
quences of refusal. As such,
In its disciplining, the state organizes and classies; it establishes standards
to which both ruler and ruled must be obliged. Both sides of the power rela-
tion have a determined behaviour to demonstrate. This correct behaviour is
always known to the other and visible in space and time. Herein power is
accountable in both directions. (Kotzé, 2020, 401–402)
Twitter constitutes this space mentioned above in which citizens dis-
cuss various issues related to lockdown. This argument is consistent with
the emphasis of ‘conduct of conduct’ in Foucault’s governmentality
approach which is useful in unpacking the operation of disciplinary power
on Twitter during the rst three months of lockdown in South Africa, as
users deployed humour which ultimately served to police each other’s
behaviour.
Humour andIdentIty InSoutH afrIca
Studies on humour in South Africa have tended to focus on stand-up com-
edy and the role it plays in critiquing dominant norms and discourses
(Kallstig & Death, 2020; Musila, 2014; Parker, 2002). Recently, research-
ers have shown an interest in the role of humour in cinematic representa-
tions (Crigler, 2018). Crigler also attempts a historical overview of humour
studies in South Africa, noting that the deployment of humour as social
commentary dates back to precolonial indigenous cultures through apart-
heid to the present. Attempts to link humour explicitly to the nation-
building project were common just after the end of apartheid when the
N. NDLOVU
195
ruling party, African National Congress (ANC), had the pressure of devel-
oping a sense of a ‘national culture’ (see Roome, 2002; Parker, 2002).
Whilst acknowledging that there is scant literature that contextualizes
laughter and community in South Africa, Crigler argues that humour has
often been employed as a “means of representing and performing ‘South
African-ness’” (2018, 156).
Of course, the very meaning of ‘nation’ is highly contested (Anderson,
2006; Billig, 1995), and the ambiguities associated with its derivative
terms—nationhood, national identity and national culture—are well doc-
umented in literature (see Ahluwalia, 2008; Hall, 1992; Schirato & Webb,
2003). I therefore employ these terms loosely, recognizing that South
African identities are various and multifaceted and cannot be reduced to
essences assumed in the constitution of national culture. For instance, in
her discussion of race relations as represented in stand-up comedy, Musila
(2014, 148) notes that “the rainbow project remains fractured along racial
fault lines by contestations over the social, cultural, economic and political
landscape of the country”. The concern here is with how meaning and
identity are negotiated discursively; I therefore consider humour as a dis-
ciplinary practice through which assumptions about gender, race and class
are not only discursively produced and reproduced but also negotiated
and contested with a view to change these hegemonic power relations.
Understanding that the world is shaped by interlinked power relations, an
intersectional critique of identity at this critical juncture is pertinent for a
formulation of how these facets of South Africans’ identity intersect to
construct their social positionings.
Taking a cue from Obadare’s (2009) view that ordinary people have
harnessed the power of humour to construct and deconstruct meaning
out of a reality that is decidedly surreal, I argue that lockdown and the
associated restrictions present such a reality. The analysis of the deploy-
ment of humour during lockdown allows us to think critically about the
contours of that moment when the future was uncertain. As such this
chapter presents a momentous intervention as it grapples with the domi-
nant discourses on Twitter emerging within the precarious context of
COVID-19. Allowing that discourses ‘speak us’ (Foucault, 1978; Hall,
1997), I argue that discourses on Twitter during the lockdown in all their
complexity, not least through humour, signify the point when South
Africans became self-reexive. They started questioning not only their
social and political institutions, but also their identity. Crucially, at this
moment of acute vulnerability, Twitter presented an agonistic sphere
9 ‘A NATION THAT LAUGHS TOGETHER, STAYS TOGETHER…
196
where not only a sense of community was cultivated through jest, but
where identities were performed, contested and negotiated.
reSIStance, Power anddIScourSe
This chapter builds upon critical approaches to the study of humour that
conceptualize humour as resistance (Mbembe, 2001; Obadare, 2009;
Musila, 2014; Odysseos etal., 2016), to argue that jabs thrown at political
gures and institutions functioned as subversive ways of engaging with the
state. Notably, Twitter users did not only take aim at politicians during the
lockdown, they also critiqued dominant social discourses relating to gen-
der, race and class and even mocked themselves in the process.
Understanding that discourses not only shape but also enable social reality
(Jäger & Maier, 2009), my approach also takes into account Foucauldian
insights on power and resistance. Foucault contends that any society has
its own set of discourses that it makes function as true, and hence “there
can be no possible exercise of power without a certain economy of dis-
courses of truth which operates through and on the basis of this associa-
tion” (1980, 93). Individuals therefore are in constant struggle to conform
to or resist the ‘truth’ of their society in the form of counter-discourses.
By seeking to resist dominant discourses, members of a society engage in
acts of counter-conduct in the form of “laughing at or about ‘serious’
issues such as race, disease and poverty” (Kallstig & Death, 2020, 5).
Counter-conduct is an important element of governmentality in which
individuals constantly struggle against being governed, against the very
processes that constitute them as subjects of certain discourses. I therefore
harness the possibilities offered by these concepts to probe how the use of
humour within the precarious context of lockdown serves a disciplinary
function given that critical discourse analysis is “not only about the retro-
spective analysis of meaning, but also about the analysis of the ongoing
production of reality through discourse, as conveyed by active subjects”
(Jäger & Maier, 2009, 37). This critical perspective enables an examina-
tion of the experiences of South Africans as shaped by taken-for-granted
social assumptions and expressed through the discursive parameters of
humour. I show how they are constituted by the very discourses and struc-
tures which they struggle against. I argue that while humour brought
much needed relief, a discursive interrogation of this humour unveils
underlying social tensions and contradictions in South Africa’s young
democracy. Humour has the potential to illuminate not only the persistent
N. NDLOVU
197
conditions of inequality but also the emergent relations of power and pre-
carity exacerbated by a global pandemic.
Consequently, the question to ask pertains to how engaging in every-
day cultural practices such as tweeting has the power to contest and/or
reinforce certain relations of power. As Foucault puts it:
Let us not, therefore, ask why certain people want to dominate, what they
seek, what is their overall strategy. Let us ask, instead, how things work at
the level of subjugation, at the level of those continuous and uninterrupted
processes which subject our bodies, govern our gestures, dictate our behav-
iours etc. (Foucault, 1980, 97)
Accordingly, in this chapter I pay attention to those utterances and
memes generated on Twitter during lockdown to probe the resistances
and the subjectivities that they enable. In order to illuminate the discursive
aspects of social inequalities, this study employs critical discourse analysis
perspectives (Wodak & Meyer, 2009; Fairclough, 1995; Van Dijk, 2001).
The eclectic approach that I adopt combines methods of textual analysis
that complements both critical linguistics and media studies (Janks, 1997;
Dewa & Prinsloo, 2012). I therefore pay attention to transitivity choices
and narrative analysis, including rhetorical analysis. In the sections that
follow I discuss the analytical process in detail in an analysis-cum- discussion
of these tweets that have been categorized and presented under identied
themes. Given the sheer volume of tweets on a single day, I purposively
selected those tweets that attracted conicting views in order to capture
the different positionings related to different social and political issues,
particularly when new lockdown levels were announced.
There are ethical considerations to be taken into account when con-
ducting Internet research, which are related to privacy and obtaining con-
sent from research subjects. As a public platform, there was no obligation
to obtain consent to conduct this research on Twitter as users of the plat-
form agree to the terms and service agreement when signing up. These
terms state that users consent to their information being collected and
used by third parties (Williams etal., 2017). Twitter’s terms of service and
privacy policy also allow for the reuse of data. However, in the spirit of
‘doing no harm’ I sought to depersonalize data by not using actual names
and Twitter handles (Fiesler and Proferes, 2017; Markham &
Buchanan, 2012).
9 ‘A NATION THAT LAUGHS TOGETHER, STAYS TOGETHER…
198
cyrIl ramaPHoSa: frIend or foe
As the president of the country and inevitably the face of lockdown, Cyril
Ramaphosa frequently bore the brunt of citizens’ frustrations regarding
the various stringent measures associated with the implementation of lock-
down. This is demonstrated by him being the butt of jokes, most often
coupled with nicknaming, which in turn arguably demonstrates the uneasy
relationship between the president and the citizens of South Africa. Of
course, these jokes were not all negative, as there are some people who
constantly showed him their unwavering support. Perhaps the relationship
between the president and the citizens during this time can best be
described as turbulent, as it uctuated with every new announcement
made. People took to Twitter to debate new measures and to try to make
sense of the president himself by using humorous memes and engaging in
light banter to give perceptions on his governance.
Understandably, at different phases of the lockdown Ramaphosa had
different epithets attached to him as responses to particular events. At the
beginning of lockdown, he was endeared by the nation as he was perceived
to have responded positively to calls to #LockdownSA.He was therefore
referred to as “Uncle Cyril” as a sign of respect, and “Rammy” and “cup-
cake” as a sign of affection. However, as he came to be known for being
late for national addresses—at what has come to be metaphorically known
as the “family meetings” and Ramaphosa signifying the “breadwinner”—
the monikers came to be laced with biting sarcasm to signify growing
resentment. He therefore earned himself the nickname “Ramapunctual”,
while some comments suggested “if there was an award for late coming,
this man deserves it”. To express displeasure at being kept waiting, some
suggested that being president was actually his “side hustle”. Notably,
there is an implicit reference to Ramaphosa’s personal wealth which sug-
gests that he did not prioritize the general well-being of South Africans at
a time when they were agitated against the background of massive job
losses. This stands in stark contrast with the construction of a metaphori-
cal father gure and breadwinner mentioned above who unites South
Africa as a family and commands respect.
In the same week that the president announced a R500 billion relief
package, he also announced a phased-in approach to easing lockdown,
two incidents which naturally ignited sustained interest. In the rst
instance, he was nicknamed “RamaBillion” after he announced the break-
down of how the relief package would be allocated. Notably, this was a
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199
light-hearted appreciative name at rst, which a few months later assimi-
lated negative connotations when there was massive corruption reported
around its allocation. However, in response to the phased-in approach
there was a lot of praise and admiration:
Thank you very much Mr President for your leadership. Your announcement
shows that you’re taking care of South Africans
What a move by our president…that was absolutely fantastic. Not many of
us expected that! All I knew was that a coin only has two sides, but he proved me
wrong…there is another side. Many believed it is either end or extend, but he
precisely balanced them all…thank you CMR
We are well and truly led!
He’s a leader among leaders and put his country rst.
And of course, there was no shortage of humour:
Am I the only one seeing that level 4 lockdown is just a continuation of lock-
down and our President is using levels to make us think that nothing has
changed #lockdownextension #CyrilRambillion.
A lexical analysis of this tweet and responses to it shows the importance
of linking texts to the wider social practices in meaning-making. The sug-
gestion that “we’re still inlockdown but this one is educated” not only
plays on the infamous joke about different levels of education and the
opportunities enabled and/or disabled by such, but also makes implicit
reference to the president’s educated background. Ramaphosa is often
‘teased’ for his good command of English which is usually construed as a
sign of superiority, particularly in a country in which the apartheid system
disadvantaged the majority of black people in terms of access to education.
In this instance, the comments suggest that they have seen through him
and therefore remark “he’s tricking us”, he is using a “strategic approach”
and “dealing with us levelically”. Note the intentional conversion of levels
into an adverb by deliberately breaking the English grammatical rules. The
effect of these rhetorical devices is to add emphasis and elicit humour but
also within this context, it is a silent play of power. As Fairclough (1995)
argues, it is important to consider the opaque relationship between lan-
guage, power and discourse because these linkages often go unnoticed.
Coincidentally, it was the very same day that Ramaphosa also struggled
to put on his mask at the end of his address, initially covering his eyes
9 ‘A NATION THAT LAUGHS TOGETHER, STAYS TOGETHER…
200
instead of his nose and mouth. By the end of the day, viral memes and
videos circulated under the #MaskChallenge, and he had several nick-
names attached to him. Of note was “RamaMzekezeke” deriving from a
popular South African artist who had managed to hide his identity from
the public for a long time by always wearing a mask and “RamaBirdbox”
in intertextual reference to the Netix lm BirdBox. Some comments cap-
tured the funny episode thus: “kahle kahle (in actual fact) you’re not sup-
posed to see the virus, once you see it you catch it”, and employing
hyperbole: “President trying to warn us about level 7 of Corona”. So
humorous was the incident that Ramaphosa responded equally jokingly
the next day, saying those who were laughing at him should sign up for his
new TV channel where he would be teaching people how to wear a mask.
What is striking about this incident, besides the humour, is that it
served as an apparent uniting force considering the difcult circumstances
people were under. Ramaphosa was lauded for laughing at himself, and
interestingly, this was immediately equated to “good leadership”:
Shows he’s human like the rest of us #RamaphosaMyPresident.
I like the fact that he doesn’t take things personal. His humour is what we
need as a nation.
What should be noted here is how humour is deployed to construct a
particular image of the president. It functioned ideologically as a symbol-
ization of unity. Ramaphosa is lauded by his supporters for responding
casually to ridicule, a characteristic that rubber-stamps his leadership in
their eyes. Furthermore, as suggested by the aforementioned comments,
he is seen as unifying the nation by his mere act of being able to laugh at
himself and acknowledge his vulnerability. However, considering the deli-
cate situation that existed, I argue that in responding to this incident,
Ramaphosa was performing goodwill in order to reinforce the relations of
power. His response functioned as a reminder that he is still in charge, and
in these particular responses people enacted deference to his rule. He is
therefore deied as demonstrated by the quoted tweets.
If at the beginning of lockdown the relationship between the president
and the citizens was irtatious, the relationship turned sour when, eventu-
ally, deep in the throes of a seemingly never-ending lockdown, reality
began to set in with most citizens as they dealt with massive job losses. The
relationship became confrontational such that hashtags moved from
#CyrilFridays (to celebrate the president) to #VoetsekCyril and more
N. NDLOVU
201
broadly #VoetsekANC to poke holes at the leadership. It gave people a
chance to criticize his presidency, the policies of the ANC and corrupt
ministers and therefore narrate alternative ‘truths’. Humour in this
instance became an avenue to resist and critique state power
(Obadare, 2009).
Clearly, the seeds of resentment were slowly taking root. However,
what I want to draw attention to is that even when people were demand-
ing accountability from ANC, Ramaphosa seemed to be absolved from
accountability by his supporters. This tweet sums up this argument
succinctly:
I’m no ANC fan. In fact, I despise it. BUT when Pres Zuma was wreaking
havoc, YOU said #ZumaMustFall, not #ANCMustFall. This Pres is wreaking
havoc with the economy. YOU spout #VoetsekANC? No. If you’re honest, you’ll
use the same sword that fell on his predecessor. #VoetsekCyril.
His supporters emphasized his good characteristics and juxtaposed
them with the former president Jacob Zuma who was linked to numerous
corruption scandals. The argument was that it was the system that was
corrupt and not Cyril Ramaphosa, which arguably served to reinforce his
sainthood. For example, they argued: “Ramaphosa is sabotaged by the
same cadres he is advocating…The man is working hard, but the so-called
cadres are milking him down, instead of being used as a pawn in the game
of factions. I think we should have empathy towards the President”.
Whilst one cannot draw clear conclusions on whether Cyril Ramaphosa
was perceived as a friend or foe during this period, what I have attempted
to capture in this section are the different constructions of Ramaphosa and
the growing resentment towards the ANC. My argument is that the lock-
down has illuminated the wrongdoings of the ANC and the citizens are
beginning to see Ramaphosa in a different light and to critique his poli-
cies. Whereas at the beginning of lockdown there was a certain docility
and acceptance of government-imposed restrictions, it later changed when
citizens demanded individual agency. Two divergent and often conicting
discourses emerged regarding community which entailed obligation to
government on the one hand and recourse to neoliberal principles on the
other hand which emphasizes individual rights. Navigating between these
two discourses is what, in many cases, caused the discursive
contestations.
9 ‘A NATION THAT LAUGHS TOGETHER, STAYS TOGETHER…
202
a female PreSIdent?
When the nation was becoming highly agitated against Ramaphosa and
calls for #CyrilMustGo were gaining momentum on Twitter, a few indi-
viduals toyed with the idea of having a female president. Naturally, a few
female leaders were suggested but dismissed on (largely) sexist grounds.
This is demonstrated most clearly through Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma, the
Minister of Corporate Governance and Traditional Affairs, who bore the
brunt of criticism.
In his national address announcing the phased-in approach to lock-
down, the president had announced that tobacco products would be sold
at level 4. Having been banned at level 5 along with alcohol sales, this was
a welcome news to most people. Yet a few days later, Minister Dlamini-
Zuma announced that after consultations, the government had decided to
continue with both the alcohol and cigarette ban under level 4.
Understandably, this sparked a lot of criticism from the general public and
the minister suffered scathing attacks. She was accused of making unilat-
eral decisions and undermining the president. So controversial was the
issue that the president was forced to make a statement clarifying that it
had been a cabinet decision and not an independent decision. This did
little to salvage the hatred spewed towards the minister as observed in the
constant ippant references to her being the actual president behind the
scenes, such that in the national addresses that followed, it was argued that
the president was simply reading the speeches that she had prepared.
Several expletives were thrown her way and she was variously character-
ized as “witch”, “devil” “wicked”, “devious” and “swine”. These predica-
tional strategies employed here bear the imprint of value judgements by
linguistically assigning qualities to their referent (Richardson, 2007). Such
labels are often deployed as symbolic sanctions against women who per-
form non-mainstream femininities (Abedinifard, 2016). Disguised as light
banter, gender humour functions to police the patriarchal gender norms
currently operating within the South African gender order. In this case
Minister Dlamini-Zuma is assigned all the negative characteristics of a
witch and a devil in order to undermine and vilify her so as to ‘erase’ her
from the public sphere reserved for men in a patriarchal society. Consider
these comments:
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So tired of #NDZ ‘jokes’ that are mostly racist and misogynistic. She may be dull
and hate smoking but she’s stepped up and is trying to address this pandemic
unlike @DDMabuza
The same vicious #NDZ whose ally & ex-husband deliberately sow hate in
SA through Bell Pottinger? An #NDZ who is causing untold harm through
illicit cigarette sales? Collecting a salary from the black market & tax payers.
You have a heart of Jesus
A problem when you’re led by a woman who thinks that she controls everyone
because she controls her husband at home
Maybe she should lose weight because she’s a health risk @DlaminiZuma
What a devious disgusting useless woman- this while thousands go hungry?
The tenor of the language in these tweets is hostile and suggests an
unforgiving attitude towards Dlamini-Zuma. While the rst comment is
laudable for calling out racist and misogynistic attitudes using a logical
argument, it fails to achieve its purpose by labelling her “dull”, thereby
endorsing Dlamini-Zuma’s criticism. She is elevated only so that she can
be simultaneously brought down. The next two responses draw upon a
patriarchal discourse by making a connection to her ex-husband as if to
suggest that she is only relevant in reference to him. This reference serves
to strip her of agency and is further emphasized by the sexist stereotype
that a woman who is in a position of power is often accused of being in
‘control’ of her husband. Typically, most gender humour draws on hege-
monic gender norms in order to be effective. As if this is not enough,
Minister Dlamini-Zuma is also trolled for her weight and the way she
dresses, of which she earns the nickname “Kopdoek”. To emphasize this
point, several memes of the president wearing her doek also made the
rounds much to the amusement of many. In this instance, the president is
effectively emasculated while the ridiculousness of the images serves to
underline the fact that Dlamini-Zuma should not be in public ofce.
As argued by Shifman and Lemish (2010), sexist humour tends to ridi-
cule women for the purpose of emphasizing their inferiority to men. It
also employs traditional stereotypes in which women are constructed as
stupid and illogical, and also describedaccording to their physical charac-
teristics so as to emphasize a hierarchical difference between men and
women. Language, as a site for the cultural production of gender identity,
therefore becomes a central site of struggle (Talbot, 2010; Weedon,
1997). The supporters of Dlamini-Zuma therefore crucially defended her,
pointing out that “we can disagree with people but body shaming and all
9 ‘A NATION THAT LAUGHS TOGETHER, STAYS TOGETHER…
204
the insults are lame” and exclaiming “it’s almost like people want to
believe that CR does not lead NCCC or cabinet”. Clearly invoking a femi-
nist discourse, some argue that Dlamini-Zuma is a powerful woman who
has achieved a lot by herself and should be recognized in her own right.
Feminist discourses continue to struggle for visibility, and platforms such
as this are critical for illuminating discourses that challenge and denatural-
ize social realities. To conclude this brief section, it is notable that what is
made discursively salient here is the constant disavowal of women in power
based on their sex, which is why the criticism levelled against Dlamini-
Zuma is much harsher than that levelled against the president discussed in
the previous section. Laughter is often deployed as a tool of punishment
for women who embody pariah femininities in order to vociferously
‘guard’ hegemonic gender norms (Abedinifard, 2016).
Humour aSdIScIPlInary PractIce
On 1 May when South Africa moved to level 4, several restrictions were
eased and part of these included restrictions on exercise. Exercise was per-
mitted for 3hours between 6–9am. It is quite striking that this ‘simple’
allowance became a trigger of much robust debate and served to illumi-
nate the division of South Africa along class and racial lines.
A variety of perspectives were expressed in terms of the inequalities that
were wrought by the lockdown. Briey, to provide context, the South
African National Defence Forces (SANDF) was deployed at the beginning
of lockdown to ensure compliance with the stay-at-home rules. The fact
that there was heavy presence of the SANDF in the townships was identi-
ed as a pointer to the class stratications in South Africa captured in vari-
ous news reports. Contained within this decidedly brutal deployment of
the army and the forced adjustment to the stringent stay-at-home rules
was a particular normalization of precarity by the state with little regard
for the uncertainties that were brought by the pandemic, especially for
those who could not just adjust considering that their survival was depen-
dent on the informal sector. The army was accused of heavy-handedness in
dealing with people who were found moving around, and various videos
containing punishment of such people breaking lockdown rules made the
rounds. What quickly became apparent was that the heavy-handedness of
the army was attributed to a racial issue and a discursive contestation
between blacks and whites ensued. For example, someone tweeted:
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Since this #21daysLockdownSouthAfrica started, I have never seen whites being
treated the way we as blacks have been treated. But I stand to be corrected if
I am wrong.
Others disputed the racial aspect, arguing that it elided the bullying
instead which should be the focal point. Already, there were suggestions
that those who were better off were managing the lockdown better,
because they did not have to go out and look for food as they were privi-
leged enough to have stocked enough supplies before lockdown began.
Arguably, things came to a head when Sea Point residents in Cape Town
were captured in droves going to exercise along the beach, an overwhelm-
ing majority of them being white people. Immediately a contrast was
drawn between them and black people and the hashtags #whiteprivilege
and #SeaPoint began to trend.
A tweet accompanied by an imagecontrasting white people and black
people under lockdown captioned “Spot the difference” was posted by a
user. Frame 1 captured Sea Point residents, while frame 2 showed black
people queueing for social grants. In response to the major criticism that
emerged for the image, although it was explained that the image was used
to prove the point that neither black people nor white people were practis-
ing social distancing, many pointed out the inequalities that differentiated
the two races. They pointed out that a line had been drawn between the
haves and the have-nots. It was argued that white people had the luxury
to exercise, whilst black people did not have that luxury as they had to
queue for the R350 COVID-19 relief fund offered by the government
which they needed for their survival. Exercising, the argument went, was
not an essential part of living, and hence the two scenarios could not be
juxtaposed fairly. The white people, despite trying to justify that exercise is
important, were accused of being “ignorant” because “privilege is never
more important than safety”. Furthermore, because of their reckless
behaviour and “their weak immune systems”, they were going to go home
and spread the virus to “innocent our mothers and grandmothers” whom
they employ as domestic workers who in turn would take it to the town-
ships. Clearly the arguments demonstrated the class differences that exist
in South Africa which have the tendency of being pronounced in times of
crises such as these. These concerns are captured in this tweet:
The sad thing about this whole Sea Point mass gathering of joggers is that these
people will take the virus to the shops & infect everyone; incl. those who do not
9 ‘A NATION THAT LAUGHS TOGETHER, STAYS TOGETHER…
206
have access to better health care facilities. At the end of the day, the poor will
suffer the most.
Note the lexical choices “mass gathering”, “these people” and the
modal truth claims signied by the repeated word “will”. Taken together,
these rhetorical devices function to create a pathotic argument that appeals
to the decoder’s emotions (Richardson, 2007) to make its full impact. In
this case it is to persuade the black reader that the white people constitute
the villain in this scenario and should be vilied for the sake of “everyone”
(read poor black people). An interesting moment I want to emphasize
pertains to when it had seemingly been established that indeed it was only
white people who had been found exercising, someone posted a picture of
a black man posing for a picture in the crowd, captioned “There’s always
that one person”. In response to this tweet, a range of humorous responses
were elicited:
We are disappointed in him
I am Lukhanyo but you can call me ‘Luke’
Coconut
Ra mo tseba (We know him) his kids only know English
Afrikaans yona? (what about Afrikaans)
Such a disgrace
The black sheep
He is the #StrongerTogether brigade
Boet (bro)
With the Springbok shirt just so they know he’s ok
I speak for abo darkie (blacks), we disowned this guy. We don’t know him…we
never signed off on this
This one is a mpimpi (sellout)
That one is a dangerous one. He does racism and suppresses the black man more
than the white man so that he can be included in the white group. But they will
never admit him in the white group. Use him yes. [sic]
Taken holistically this thread presents a discursive contestation against
the dominant discourse of white superiority. There is a clear demarcation
of us versus them (black vs white), with the aim of constructing a ‘proudly
black’ counter-discourse. Construed thus, this young man is therefore a
signier of deviance from the ‘normal’, and therefore it is justiable that
he should be ridiculed. He is discursively expurgated as ‘other’ through
the use of referential strategies that demonstrate that they do not identify
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him as black, and hence the metaphors “coconut” and “black sheep” to
signify that he constitutes an ‘epidermalized’ subjectivity (Fanon, 2008)
that construes white as superior. It is within this context that he is there-
fore constructed as a sell-out but will never be fully admitted in white
circles. The implicit suggestion in these comments is that to identify as
black, one’s children should speak their native language as opposed to
English and Afrikaans, one must not change their vernacular name to a
similar sounding English name in order to t in and one’s favourite
national team cannot be rugby because it has historically been a racial
sport in South Africa. This stereotypical image constructed in this instance
and in its justied confrontation of white superiority operates as a hege-
monic discourse that proposes particular ‘truths’ relating to blackness,
which serves to expurgate those who are not its subjects. This is problem-
atic because, in speaking for abo darkie, there is a universalization of black
experiences implied within that ultimately serves to police the behaviour
of other blacks in a manner of ‘conduct of conduct’ (Foucault, 1982:
220–221). In confronting the power of the discourse of white privilege,
there is the very real possibility that black people are constrained in the
process by compartmentalizing what being black means in certain con-
texts and essentially disregarding cultural differences. To this end, I con-
cur with Musila’s (2014) argument that race relations remain the biggest
threat to the rainbow nation which, she argues, remains ‘mythically cohe-
sive.’ Indeed, barely a decade later, the illusion of a rainbow nation persists
and is illuminated in instances such as these showing that racial (and gen-
dered) identities are critical and nuanced and are contained in everyday
utterances as they jostle for dominance.
twItter aSanagonIStIc PublIc SPHere
One of the most signicant ndings that emerged pertains to how Twitter
is perceived by its users. There has been growing interest in this area of
research, and while I do not go into detail here, the results are consistent
with studies concerned with the social use of technology. As depicted by
the popular meme of a young man seemingly typing on a cellphone while
his gaze is xed elsewhere, Twitter is so central to South Africans’ inter-
pretations of Ramaphosa’s televised speeches that they engage with both
simultaneously, which equates to ‘watching’ the national address speeches
on Twitter. Whilst some depend on Twitter for the breakdown of the
speeches, others enjoy capturing the instant (humorous) reactions to the
9 ‘A NATION THAT LAUGHS TOGETHER, STAYS TOGETHER…
208
national addresses. These real-time contributions enhance meaning-
making and the social use of television (D’heer & Verdegen, 2015).
Twitter therefore offers a mediated social space where they can relax and
have fun. This corroborates Duffy and Ling’s (2000) argument that the
sharing of news on social media helps to maintain social cohesion and
users often share news for many reasons including entertainment, sharing
information, helping and to elicit a strong emotional response. South
Africans, in this context, found a space they conceive as a platform for
critical social commentary that impacts on decisions made by the govern-
ment. An example sufces:
Fikile Mbalula is actually responding to the comments he sees on Twitter
[laughing emojis] the power of Twitter #Level4Regulations
At least he is bringing concerns of normal South Africans to the fore, unlike
being ignored by the government which some of you will cry about.
Various responses in this thread concur “he is responding”, and one
comments, “funny you say that coz I picked up the same vibe from #angi-
emotshekga (Basic Education minister) yesterday, she was responding to
Twitter comments…Lol Twitter is Power!” This condence exuded of the
perceived impact of Twitter serves to demonstrate the central role that the
platform plays in not only shaping reality but also producing knowledge as
well. If the two ministers in their speeches implicitly responded to com-
ments on Twitter, this means that Twitter discourses shaped their policy
responses in tremendous ways. Surveying the discourses on Twitter meant
that ministers could read the pulse of society and respond appropriately. In
the two instances mentioned, there was public outcry regarding how the
transport sector was going to operate and how schools were going to
reopen under COVID-19 regulations respectively. This is contrary to the
argument that “Twitter users call for criticism without consequence as they
feel the need to utter their discontents but do not expect or call for par-
ticular changes based upon their utterances” (D’heer & Verdegen, 2015,
232, emphasis in original). South African Twitter users see themselves as
‘speaking truth to power’, hence the conceptualization of Twitter as an
agonistic public sphere.
The agonistic public sphere (Mouffe 1999)should be understood as a
place of struggle which supports not only the reproduction of dominant
social relations but also their contestations by subordinate groups. As such
Twitter provides “a means for the formation of counter-publics, the
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209
articulation of identities and oppositional discourses, and the contestation
of the discursive boundaries of the mainstream public sphere” (Dahlberg,
2007, 60). In this case, it also shapes the discursive terrain of the main-
stream public sphere such that when the president addressed corruption
claims relating to the R500 billion, Twitter users insisted he was directly
responding to their concerns. Against this background, one can conclude
that Twitter users harnessed the allowances afforded by the platform to set
the agenda for public discourse during the lockdown, and these discourses
function as forms of resistance.
concluSIon
Placing the jokes within a wider societal context, it is my conclusion that
laughter is productive (in the Foucauldian sense); it is productive of rela-
tions of power as demonstrated by the discourses which we inhabit and
the performances we enact thereof. In enacting these performances of
power, we reinforce and challenge existing discourses in platforms such as
Twitter which serve as agonistic spheres. In the same space that behaviours
are policed, whether by those in power or by other users, dominant dis-
courses pertaining to gender race and class are challenged and negotiated.
The global pandemic has emphasized how identities are consistently con-
tested in conversations that cut across race, gender and class and lockdown
served to illuminate the complex intersection of these discourses. This
study provides important insights into how South African-ness was per-
formed amidst the discursive contestations that often resulted in chaos.
However, amidst this chaos South Africans predominantly enunciated a
discourse of togetherness. Lockdown presented a situation in which South
Africans were trying to make emotional sense of drastic changes. What is
made textually salient is that while Twitter constituted a place to relax and
navigate this precarity through laughing together, in what I consider as
‘performing togetherness’; this textually performed togetherness was
compromised by deep inequalities which leave South Africa vulnerable as
a nation. This vulnerability, in turn, has devastating effects for social
belonging in the long term and should inform larger debates over identity
and social change.
Considering the pandemic as a social and cultural phenomenon neces-
sitates that we consider the material human effects the virus has left in its
wake. This is an important issue for future research.
9 ‘A NATION THAT LAUGHS TOGETHER, STAYS TOGETHER…
210
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Switzerland AG 2021
S. Mpofu (ed.), Digital Humour in the Covid-19 Pandemic,
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-79279-4_10
CHAPTER 10
Fear andLoathing andLaughter: COVID-19
asanExpression ofDecolonial Love
MvuzoPonono
Decolonial love is political struggle against structures of
dehumanisation and self-hate
—Glenda Daniels, 2021
IntroductIon
After making a plea to the government for help, fellow South Africans
were ultimately repatriated from Wuhan, China. However, prior to that
successful mission, when the plan was rst announced, a litany of jokes
doing the rounds on social media made light of the situation. One user
teased: “Stay there coz we’ve temporarily moved to Zim you won’t nd
anyone”. Another posted: “Stay there shuuuu, we can’t build a hospital in
48 hours here”. When considered deeply, those jokes revealed the anxiety
and the fear South Africans had as the world braced for what was to come.
Worse came to worse in March 2020, when the rst case of the coronavi-
rus was reported in South Africa. The mood shifted swiftly to anger as
pictures of white people ‘panic-buying’ at Makro did the rounds. “So
M. Ponono (*)
University of the Free State, Bloemfontein, South Africa
e-mail: pononom@ufs.ac.za
214
grand gran abelungu (white people) abaphangeli (do not work) or what?
How did they get time off to go clean the shops empty while we’re forced
to be at work and service them?”– a Twitter user observed. The proposed
chapter will make the argument that, on the one hand, the coexistence of
the laughter and outrage on social media shows a deep love for the coun-
try that is expressed through humour and appreciation for social media
sites that provide such relief. And on the other hand, a deep hate or ani-
mosity that expresses a despair borne out of centuries of social divides. The
point is that these extremes nd a way to somehow coexist online, and this
provides an avenue for an expression of deep trauma.
The best way to describe it is that people enjoy or love being South
African and laugh at all sorts of peculiarities but also hate certain aspects
of being South African. When making fun of the repatriation one user on
Facebook wrote: “I love my country! Guys plzz I’m tired of laughing your
comments makes me laugh”. A month later a response to the spate of
panic-buying noted: “Check who has the luxury of ‘panic buying’. They
will then get in their big ass cars and go self-quarantine in their comfy
homes. My people are packed up at Noord taxi rank to get to their shacks,
make plans to feed their families just for today”. This is an intense love that
lives next to intense hate. This is what can be termed a decolonial love.
Sandoval (2000) argues that this is not a romantic love, but rather it is
‘invented love, or love as a political technology’. It is, she explained, a
body of knowledge, arts, practices and procedures for re-forming the self
and the world (Sandoval, 2000, 4). Decolonial love is political struggle
against structures of dehumanisation and self-hate (Daniels, 2021). What
we often see on social media sites is that right next to the jokes that pro-
vide relaxation and a lessening of anxiety are proclamations of deep disap-
pointment with the lack of transformation in the country. The lashing out
by black people who are desperate to love a country and a partner that
often does not love them back is interesting to note. The following chap-
ter will investigate the coexistence of online humour and animosity and
make the argument that social media provides a platforms for airing of
views that speak to the heart of decoloniality.
democratIc racIsm andBlack twItter
The relationship between races in South Africa is a fraught one. Any phe-
nomenon, including laughter, takes place in social life that suffers from a
long history of race-based oppression. Tomaselli (1997) provides a useful
M. PONONO
215
context, stating that even with the disappearance of overt racism from
ofcial discourse in South Africa post-1990, the racist structure of society
remained the same. Critics argue that grand declarations such as South
Africa’s much lauded constitution belie the material reality of ‘white’
political and economic control (Tomaselli, 1997). This has been evident in
the history of post-democratic South Africa, where the economy and
wealth are concentrated in the hands of a few. To this point, Ramokhele
(2018) asks: “Why is it that 24 years after democracy we (blacks) are still
on the periphery? In six years time a child who was born in 1994 will be
turning 30– and if they have their rst child on the anniversary of democ-
racy, that child will be born into a country where they will still be a minor-
ity in the economic participation landscape, 30 years in”.
Carr (2016, 65) contends that this state of being can be explained as a
form of democratic racism, in which racist behaviour, actions and out-
comes (including the poor remaining black) are codied in society. Carr
(2016, 59) further explains that this is a reality where laws, courts, eco-
nomic systems, institutions and legislative bodies, among others, “were
developed by Whites from a distinctly White vantage-point”. These parti-
san social institutions create a “normative, hegemonic underpinning of
society, which is essentially White-based”, and thus normalise unequal
favour (Carr, 2016, 59). Furthermore, in such instances of institution-
alised racism, where race is a central organising principle, its inuence is
felt in every aspect of a black person’s life, including the economy and
media representation (Hall, 1997). Media scholars qualify the critique by
arguing that the problem is not the media system per se; it is more about
the racial structure of the society, which continues to have white people or
whiteness at the centre of attention and blackness relegated to the margins
(Schutte, 2015; Duncan, 2013).
Larson (2006) argues that the moral guidelines followed by popular
narratives may not be explicitly racist, but it can be argued that social dis-
course reinforces anti-black messaging. This is done through denying the
extent to which racial inequality is prevalent and by offering discourses
that maintain the inequality of the social structure (Larson, 2006). One
good example of the aforementioned point and the complexity of the
duality is the Marikana massacre that took place in 2012. Critics have
pointed out that the mainstream representation of the conict was clearly
and unashamedly biased towards business, and pushed a narrative that
delegitimised the legitimate, but legally unprotected, actions taken by the
miners (Duncan, 2013). In the immediate aftermath of Marikana, the
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media were criticised for relying on police accounts to report on the inci-
dent, which were bent towards portraying the striking miners as the
aggressors and instigators of the massacre (Hlongwane, 2016). South
African media scholars and civil society activists have argued that the mas-
sacre showed that the colonial trope of the immoral or “primitive and
savage black male” is not foreign to South African mainstream media rep-
resentation and has been used in contemporary media reportage (Schutte,
2015, 8). What the reportage of the massacre demonstrated, in its dis-
torted representation of the miners, is that the mainstream media auto-
matically assumed fault with the marginalised.
Gray (1997, 92) adds that anti-black cultural, social, political and moral
discourses continue to have “purchase in the collective common sense,
because they continue to frame, reiterate, and make available a store house
of meanings”. These negative meanings, Gray (1997) continues, are still
sharply focused on and animated in popular culture and media around
race and sexuality. Copious academic research has revealed a consistent
media bias against black people, both in the coverage of crime and more
generally (Entman & Gross, 2008). Media representations are thus
selected and constructed in ways that consistently promote the racial sta-
tus quo of inequality and the subsequent injustices are construed as “com-
mon sense” (Larson 2006, 2). The result of this prejudicial gatekeeping is
a systematic bias againstyoung people, women, minority groups and sub-
altern groupings (Larson 2006). Furthermore, as Gray (1997) points out,
this marginalisation also tends to favour the domination of most organs of
media and television by the outlook of the upper-income whites and those
who have been assimilated into this ideology.
The result is often distrust between races or black people distrusting
white people in South Africa (in Ponono, 2019).
Black people are frustrated in South Africa, and on top of that we are still
carrying anger from the past. White people have not owned up to their mis-
takes. They have not so much as apologised. Black people still have a hang-
over from the past because some really horrible things happened. The
psychological damage that has been done by white people on black people
is immense. I have worked for white people at Just Property Group. White
people will always remain the same, they will always see you as subhuman.
So I don’t have trust for a white person when it comes to developing a black
person. I trust a black person to do that. A black person may have their
mistakes, but they know what to do because they come from the same situ-
M. PONONO
217
ation. Helen Zille can dance for black people. The DA can install a black
leader but we know that that is just a façade. We are not stupid; we can see
what is happening. So while they think that they can play those mind games,
that is what makes me distrust them even more. (*Bongani)
The problem with South Africa starts with the fact that black people have
long been discriminated against. Racism is something that affected me back
then, but it doesn’t any longer because it happens day in and day out. In the
main we are poor and unemployed because we are black. Being unemployed
has a big effect on our lives because you are implicated in many things in the
community. It’s not nice not to work because you nd that if something
goes missing or something bad happens, people say it is those dogs that
aren’t working. Sometimes, you cannot blame the poor for doing what is
necessary to survive. People do things they never thought they would do
only because they are poor. (*Wayne)
Due to the fact that South African mainstream media and political dis-
course is constructed through a lens of whiteness (Schutte, 2015), Black
Twitter or collectivising online to push a positive narrative about black
experience has gained popularity. Although dening Black Twitter is a dif-
cult task, sufce to say the term refers to a particular collective of black
identities and voices on Twitter taking part in collective, culturally specic
jokes and dialogues that affect the community– “from discussing colorism
to dishing out jokes about common ‘black mom’ phrases” (Wheeler,
2019). The term is used to describe a large network of black Twitter users
and their loosely coordinated interactions, many of which accumulate into
trending topics due to the network’s size, interconnectedness and unique
activity (Ramsey, 2015). Furthermore, Black Twitter can be seen as a tem-
porally linked group of people, throughout the diaspora, who share cul-
ture, language and interest for specic issues, and who talk about specic
topics with a black frame of reference (Clark, 2014).
The sensitivity those involved in online communities felt with media’s
representation of black life—which is negative or simplistic—lead to these
collective engagements. Black Twitter and the humour we see are a reac-
tion against the systems that encourage self-hate. Black Twitter communi-
cators use the platform specically to nd redress or an avenue to eld
concerns about marginalisation amongst other things. This process, being
part of this online community, starts with rst identifying as a black person
who is interested in the topic that is being discussed. This is followed by
self-selection, which is deciding to participate in the conversation (Clark,
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2014). Through that participation there’s afrmation. The result is back
and forth conversation between people about various topics. This constant
engagement lets communicators know that they are not alone, and that
there are others paying attention and engaged (Clark, 2014). This nally
leads to “re-afrmation and vindication; the stage where participants are
looking for some kind of change in the physical world”. Clark (2014)
argues this is where you often see online conversations reected in ofine
spaces—when you see them being covered by certain news media person-
alities. This iswhen people lose jobs, people make public apologies for
things that they have said that have been brought to light via Twitter
(Clark, 2014).
racIsm anddecolonIal love
This process of reafrmation online can be understood as a way to love self
in a world that encourages you to do otherwise—to self-hate. This is made
necessary by the fact that colonialisation created a classicatory system
that was used to classify subgroups of human types and to break up the
diversity of society into distinct types according to essentialised character-
istics (Hall, 1997). As much as classication is a fundamental aspect of
human culture, as it allows the generation of meaning divisions according
to race represent the negative aspect of classication because the systems
can become a tool in the dispossession of power (Hall, 1997). The cultural
function of colonial knowledge, in its drive to dominate for extraction,
was to organise people based on their differences into hierarchicalsocial
groups (Hall, 1997). Racism is thus the use of classication as a system of
power, where the markings of difference across populations become the
reason for groups of people to be treated differently (Hall, 1997). The
power of racism thus is to ascribe positive values to one group and nega-
tive values to another, and then to establish a system which becomes the
basis of how to treat these various groups unequally (Hall, 1997).
Desai (2001) argues that racism was thus the legitimising force of colo-
nial authority because the discourse of race and its subsequent power rela-
tions was such that whites gave orders and blacks obeyed (Desai, 2001).
This was to rule by creating a dominant order, where the prevailing dis-
courses relied on the representation of a savage ‘other’. Mudimbe (1977)
writes that the African was presented in European Enlightenment thought
as an ‘other’; with abnormal differences when compared to the white
M. PONONO
219
male, and, as such, race served to distinguish between savage and civilised.
This secured adominant positionforthe white race by assuring the con-
trol and exploitation of the subaltern population (Reddy, 2000). With the
negative classication achieved, the dominant Western culture was free to
pursue the project of colonialism which was billed an effort to save the
dominated African culture from savagery (Desai, 2001).
Fanon (1952) observes that the black man (person) is black in relation
to the white man (person). This point is similar to the one made by
Mudimbe (1977) that Africa was formed as a series of oppositions in order
to distinguish between the savage and the civilised. Fanon’s (1952, 84)
point is that the elements a black person uses to construct their being are
provided for them by the other, the white man, who has “woven me out
of a thousand details, anecdotes, stories”. The crucial point highlighted by
Fanon (1952) is that racism is effective because it operates on two levels:
rst on the “bodily and corporeal schema”, which is physical domination,
and second, below the surface, on the “schema composed of the stories
and anecdotes and metaphors and images, which construct the relation-
ship between the individual and the cultural space” (Fanon, 1952, 84).
The big takeaway from Fanon’s (1952) conception of race is not just
the negative understanding of stereotypes but also the perceived effects
these have on the psyche of black people. Fanon (1952, 85) argues that
the negative representations that the black person ‘knows so well’ enable
a dislocation from his inherited sense of being. This dislocation then
removes the self from the self, and imprisons the black individual in the
world of whiteness, making them an object. Thus, when a black person is
faced with the weight of representations that are placed on him, Fanon
(1952) writes that it is possible that he ceases to be a person but becomes
the subhuman and the construction the white world intends for him to be.
This can be understood to mean that black people will suffer an inferiority
complex caused by their skin colour, which might affect the way they
engage in mainstream discourse. In addition, another possibility is of a
deep-seated resistance to such depictions or oppression (see Bobo, 2004).
The argument made is that, although the preceding might be true, it may
also be true that, whether consciously or unconsciously, black South
Africans who coalesce online are also engaged in a constant struggle to
resist domination.
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contestatIon andresIstance
Even though colonial expansion was legitimated and largely accepted by
both dominated and dominant people, there have always been undercur-
rents of ambivalence and anxiety (Desai, 2001). During the course of
colonialisation, despite the evaporation of liberties and self-reliance, a
critical awareness of colonial domination and the use of tropes for the
purpose of legitimation was attained by the dominated (Prakash, 1991). It
is in this respect that this chapter is intended to make the point that the
process of domination and subordination is always a fracture and thus a
point of friction between social formations. This is to say that dominated
people have the possibility to accept, resist and reform the prevailing order.
Magubane (1971) argues that because colonialism is economic, political
and cultural domination, a process of acculturation—or of adopting the
cultural traits or social patterns of another group—must be considered. In
his regard, the process of domination is not solely about one culture being
dominated by another. As such, any investigation into thebehaviour of
indigenous populations must take into account the ‘total situation’, which
is to say domination and itsinevitable counter point—resistance.
Such an analysis is to note that, although constructed in dominant dis-
courses as essentialised objects of European history and exploitation, the
subaltern refused the role of passive objects without a history (Reddy,
2000). Marginalised groups organised and articulated counter-discourses
or an alternative tradition that constructed a history of resistance which
reversed the narrativesof the dominant group (Reddy, 2000). For exam-
ple, nationalist organisations countered European domination by claiming
a history of resistance that was traced back to the many wars fought
between indigenous people and colonial forces (Reddy, 2000). This claim
functioned as a way of positioning the counter-tradition of resistance, next
to the dominant tradition of colonialism, as equal (Reddy, 2000). Like the
dominant, the subordinate wished to secure a ‘counter-identity’ and
appropriate as much control over social existence as possible (Reddy,
2000). These counter-discourses, therefore, produced an alternative ‘tra-
dition of struggle’ and history, a tradition that also constituted a subaltern
identity (Reddy, 2000).
Therefore, to acknowledge a history of resistance is to see colonialism
as a mixture of two conicting ideals rather than complete dominance. It
is to see a tentative balance and to acknowledge that Africans have engaged
with the discourses of the coloniser to produce their own inventions of
M. PONONO
221
Africa (Magubane, 1971). Prakash (1991) argues that the subordinated
can incorporate the principles and values of the social hierarchy, which
continues to dominate them. They can do so while also, inadvertently,
expanding its limits by resisting certain aspects of it. Therefore, Africa is
not only invented in the negative or in the way suitable to the dominant.
The concept of resistance allows us to see that people counter dominant
discourses, and thus Africa, and any other situation of dominance, can be
reinvented and turned into a positive conception (Desai, 2001, 7). This is
to understand that colonial representations or stereotypes are a terrain of
struggle and that the dominated have always sought and fought to repre-
sent themselves. The usefulness of this view to understanding black South
Africans using social media to push back against negative representation is
quite plain: through humour and anger people use available platforms to
reimagine the bounds of social discourse.
Additionally, the theory of resistance is useful here because it points to
the fact that it is unhealthy to assume or maintain easy binaries, such as
domination and resistance. Reddy (2000) argues that the common
assumption is that colonialism was about absolute dominance by the
empire and the postcolonial period was about the triumph of revolution-
ary causes that fought on behalf of the subaltern. Such binaries allow
themselves to easily fall into the tendency to think of resistance as the
negation of domination, as something conceived and mounted in opposi-
tion and external to, if not autonomous (Haynes & Prakash, 1991). This
is a tendency to delink the two moments as if there is rst a period of
domination, which is then followed by an independent time of resistance
(Haynes & Prakash, 1991). The point of this account is to show that such
a binary cannot be retained and to point out that there is often a concep-
tual divide between the colonial and postcolonial moments.
In this regard, Haynes and Prakash (1991) argue that the tendency to
separate domination and resistance allows two assumptions to assert them-
selves. First, that relations of power enjoy an uncomplicated and unchal-
lenged existence until moments of societal upheaval; and, second, that in
‘normal’ times, the cultural practices and identities of the dominated
remain rmly grounded in a terrain mapped by the dominant. Such an
understanding allows us to investigate power relations, whether colonial,
postcolonial or post-authoritarian, not as singular or monolithic but rather
as a practice fraught with contradictions and tensions (Reddy, 2000).
Work done on the subject of resistance has argued that power must be
seen as a tenuous exercise because it is constantly fractured by the
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everyday struggles of the subordinate because resistance is constantly pres-
ent in the behaviours, traditions and consciousness of the subordinate
(Haynes & Prakash, 1991). The online space, in the collectivisation of
black people online to challenge ongoing subjugation through laughter
and polemic, is an example of such struggles.
multIposItIonalIty andrace
In light of the earlier discussion, Hall (1997) argues that the tendency for
racial frameworks to allow appearance or an essence to stand in the place
of what is, in fact, a deeply complex cultural system is the trap of racism. It
is to seek the impossible: a guarantee of an essence from genetic features
in a context of complex subaltern agency. Hall (1997) goes on to theorise
that in the end racism cannot perform the function it is purposed, which
is to x a constructed ‘truth’ beyond any doubt. Therefore, a more ade-
quate reading of race relations maintains that the challenges imposed on
the subordinate by a racist gaze need equal consideration because, through
responsive action, subaltern groups reform such boundaries (Guha, 1983).
Social media has proven this to be the case with Black Twitter holding
court on issues that affect black people—from the funny to the upsetting.
In the preceding sections, race has been discussed in reference to domi-
nation and resistance. The concept is again under discussion; however, this
time it is in relation to its openness, which is due to the fact that domineer-
ing structures are often resisted. In this respect, Hall argues (Hall, 1997)
that race can be likened to language because of the ideas it can signify.
Similarly, Winter (2008, 18) writes that race is a “metalanguage because it
serves as a global sign, since it speaks about and lends meaning to a host
of terms and expressions”. Therefore, since language is human in con-
struction, race then is not a xed concept but is socially and historically
grounded (Hall, 1997). As an instance of trans-historic signication, race
is only a sign that can be made to mean different things, in different cul-
tures and at different times (Hall, 1997). Lewis (2008) emphasises that
the meaning of all signs, including race, is relational because it is never
xed but subject to variation and thus multiple interpretations.
This discursive denition of race is important because it allowed the
theoretical shift from an outdated understanding based on physical differ-
ence to an understanding of how ideas and knowledge of difference orga-
nise human practice (Hall, 1997). After initially subscribing to the science
of race, Du Bois (1903) abandoned the scientic denitions that were
M. PONONO
223
prevalent at the time. He went on to favour more socio-historical
approaches—writing that Africans and people of African descent share a
common history, have suffered a common disaster and have one long
memory of that misfortune (Du Bois, 1903). As such, Du Bois insisted
that colour matters because its sense of meaning for black people is as a
badge of social pain. It is important to arrive at this juncture because it
adds to the earlier discussion that pointed to people of colour collecting
around their historical tie to black pain and degradation. This is to say that
by acknowledging openness of race, individuals have multiple realities and
frameworks to draw from, including a shared black history. This shared
black pain could then draw black people together and drive them to laugh
at their countries’ shortcomings or, equally, to express rage at the unequal
systems that continue to benet the white people the most.
Writing on the subject of domination and multipositionality, Biko
(2004, 113) contends that in order to accommodate the problems they
face, black people often develop a Janus face or an ontological split. This
split is explained as, on one hand, being dominated or made to believe you
are inferior, while on the other, resisting the domination by realising
humanness.
One of the consequences of living life as both a person and a problem
is a ‘double consciousness’—“two souls in one dark body” (Du Bois,
1903). It is in light of this realisation that Du Bois (1903) postulates that
black people are gifted at birth with a second sight, which is a way to see
themselves using the lens of the dominant culture and their own: a life
lived in a very complex manner (Du Bois, 1903). “It is a peculiar sensa-
tion, this double-consciousness, this sense of always looking at one’s self
through the eyes of others, of measuring one’s soul by the tape of a world
that looks on in amused contempt and pity. In other words, society makes
difculties for him because of his color, which thus means that the black
man ever feels his two-ness, an American, a Negro; two souls, two
thoughts, two unreconciled strivings; two warring ideals in one dark body,
whose dogged strength alone keeps it from being torn asunder” (Du Bois,
1903, 8). With this sense of double consciousness, seeing the world from
two states of mind, “the black man is always ghting to then understand
his own self or attain a sense of self-consciousness. The life and history of
the black man is the struggle to merge the two selves into one, into a “bet-
ter and truer self” (Du Bois, 1903, 8).
Fanon (1952) furthers this analysis towards multipositionality in stating
that the black person is a human being who knows himself to be complete
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because he inherits such understandings. However, he is convinced other-
wise when dominated, and therefore he has to strive to reconcile these
warring perceptions of self in order to nd the “possibility of existence”
(Fanon, 1952, 74). Fanon (1952, 84) goes on to call this the “triple per-
son”, which is to be in three places at once: subhuman, human and con-
icted. The reason this insight is important is that it places emphasis on
the fact that what takes place in the individual is not a simple merger of
two cultures but different conceptions. The strength of such a view, to
move beyond a double consciousness, is that it enables us to understand
that black people occupy multiple positions. This could mean being totally
dominated, being oppositional and negotiating through conict, indiffer-
ence or complete unawareness (Lewis 2008).
multIple realItIes ofthepostcolony
Bhabha (1993) has remarked that the importance of multipositionality, or
this idea of multiplicity of the colonial subject, is not about getting lost in
plurality but rather about acknowledging a ‘third space’. In his under-
standing of multipositionality, Bhabha (1993) follows Fanon’s (1952)
conception of the uidity of blackness. The point is that the meaning of
race is not singular but a constant and unending production of contested
and contradictory meanings (Bhabha, 1993). Bhabha (1993) states that
the in-between nature of blackness can be seen as a third space or a new-
ness. What the framework articulates is a cultural difference that is dened
as in-between space, a space in which areas of difference may overlap and
thus create something unique (Bhabha, 1993).
The value of this discussion on multipositionality is not that a colonial
subject draws from all available discourses simultaneously; it is that in hav-
ing the option to do so, they create anew (Bhabha 1993). When applied
here, the understanding is that the marginalised, those existing in the
political society and those benetting directly from the state through
active negotiation outside the formal rules of citizenship might converse
with power in many ways. They might, in one instance, engage in riots or
rebellion, and in the next assume a language of deliberation rather than
direct contestation. This is to move closer to what Chatterjee (2012) has
called the need for a new conceptual framework in the analysis of postco-
lonial societies. Chatterjee (2012) argues that it is inappropriate to analyse
political action in postcolonial settings as simply an uprising against the
government or capital. Such has been the case in South Africa where many
M. PONONO
225
have falsely argued that the service delivery protests (or admonishment of
the ruling party online) will result in a great loss of electoral power for the
ANC (Friedman, 2015). This counter-view, which supports Chatterjee’s
(2012) position, argues that service delivery strikes in South Africa are
launched by staunch supporters of the ANC, who have no intention of
switching parties, but take to the streets in an effort to air their grievances
(Friedman, 2015).
Chatterjee (2012) writes that since welfare and developmental func-
tions are now widely recognised to be necessary tasks for the governments
to provide for the poor, these functions are legitimately claimed by the
poor. “This means that government ofcials and political representatives
in rural areas are constantly besieged by demands for various forms of
welfare and development benets. It also means that poor citizens learn to
operate the levers of the government system, to apply pressure at the right
places or negotiate for better terms. This is where the everyday operations
of democratic politics, organisation and leadership come into play”
(Chatterjee, 2012, 132). This process of acquiescence and rebellion is
more a play on the dominant power structure, and a way of manoeuvring,
rather than attempts to revolutionise the system.
In this regard, Chatterjee (2012) argues that the power struggles that
we see in postcolonial societies cannot simply be reduced to a dramatic
confrontation between those in power and the ‘contradictory conscious-
ness’ of subaltern classes who acquiesce to the power but also violently
oppose it. It is when such a stance is taken that one can see that this pro-
cess is more about the relation of people to power, in environments where
inequality is prevalent and enduring. To comprehend such a context,
Chatterjee (2012) maintains that critical scholars have to apply a new
framework, one that is able to account for multipositionality of those that
have to bear the brunt of an old history and a new history in the present
world. In responding to Chatterjee’s call, the framework that has been
developed here is novel because it considers the varying types of online
engagement (the laughter next to the rage) by black people not contradic-
tory or passive but multifaceted and unique.
As a way towards a conclusion, the work done by Mbembe (2001)
offers a further way forward. Mbembe (2001, 103) highlights the histori-
cal continuity, arguing that postcolonial African regimes did not invent
government systems from scratch after independence. Rather, these states
gained their social knowledge from several cultures, heritages and tradi-
tions, whose “features have become entangled over time” (Mbembe,
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2001, 103). As such, Mbembe (2001) further argues that the postcolony
is chaotically pluralistic. Although it has its own internal coherence, it has
developed unique systems in re-forming the old systems. Building on the
point of uniqueness caused by the mixture of several traditions, Mbembe
(2001, 102) writes that the “postcolony is thus characterised by a distinc-
tive style of political improvisation, a tendency to excess and a lack of
proportion, as well as by distinctive ways identities are multiplied, trans-
formed, and put into circulation”.
Mbembe (2001) forwards the argument that has been drawn out in
this chapter by writing that in order to understand and to account for
postcolonial relations of power, “we need to go beyond the binary catego-
ries used in standard interpretations of domination, such as resistance vs
passivity, autonomy vs subjection, state vs civil society, hegemony vs coun-
ter hegemony…” (Mbembe, 2001, 103). Doing so is to realise that what
you have in postcolonial societies today is something “akin to a custom,
which fronts as modernity but without being fully included in it”
(Mbembe, 2001, 103). Therefore, although the colonial state model and
its repressive tendencies have always lived side by side with a liberal civic
order, the state has often practised the exact opposite of the liberal model
of debate and discussion. Mbembe (2001) argues that this sense of uneasy
split is more pronounced in the postcolony because its sense of divide
between ruler and subjects is inated to despotic levels.
It is in this regard that Mbembe (2001) argues that maintaining a
framework of oppositions is unhelpful and instead clouds the nature of
postcolonial relations. This is because, although postcolonial systems are
characterised by extremes, these extremes still live side by side. It is thus
better to recognise the postcolonial nationalist orders that were instituted
after independence wereoperated within a mixture of systems and main-
tained hegemony in such a cacophonous environment by producing ‘over-
blown’ symbols (Mbembe, 2001, 103). Therefore, in thepostcolony the
‘overblown’ and ‘grotesque’ are essential features of the society. Inuenced
by colonial structuring, the dominant power is obscene in using violence
in its display of power. The subject population is also obscene and gro-
tesque in voicing displeasure. Obscenity and grotesque are thus part and
parcel of the space because they can be used for repression and as ways to
undermine those in power and to show vulnerability of ofcialdom
(through laughter and through protest). It is only through such a shift in
perspective that we can understand that the postcolonial relationship is
M. PONONO
227
not primarily a relationship of resistance or collaboration but of newness
and reformation (Mbembe, 2001).
This means that in order to understand online engagement by subal-
tern citizens and subjects in a postcolonial setting, we have to understand
the multiplicity of their subject positions. This is “Because Africa is mov-
ing in several directions at once, this is a period that, at the same time, has
been, is not yet, is, at once, in front and behind, inside and outside, above
and below” (Mbembe, 2001, 241). With these insights in mind, Mbembe
(2001) urges that we must realise that the postcolony and its subjects are
far from being uniform and cannot be reduced to simpletons or contradic-
tion. Therefore, what has to be understood is that although the margin-
alised making sense of the world might appear to be contradictory, the
overlapping nature of systems in this society requires such a study to rec-
ognise that a person pulls from various frameworks in order to make
unique sense of a changed and rapidly changing society. In order to under-
stand this pendulum swing between fear, laughter and loathing, it is
important we understand the multiposition of a black person. They are at
once in love with the country of their birth, and in another instance loathe
the very same country that is structured to oppress them.
conclusIon
The point that is drawn out is one comprehensively argued by Lewis
(2008), who states that in the context of cultural conict and social divi-
sions, we have to understand that a black person is one person and many
people, and this speaks to a ‘multipositionality’. This means that we have
to also realise that when we talk of a racialised subjectivity it means being
aware of the textured nature of black subjectivity, and we thus have to
reject simple constructions of black people as ‘uni-dimensional’ individu-
als capable of only a single and uniform consciousness (Lewis 2008). What
the Mbembe (2001) and Chatterjee (2012) insights illuminate is that
when examining black social life, it is important to keep in mind that it is
rather a complex mixture of standpoints affected by history, oppression,
culture, conquest and many other variables. It is an attempt to grant the
oppressed agency, the ability to convert forms of oppression to ways of
living. Everyday reality is an expression of deconial love—it is a daily
attempt to love self in a world that encourages one to hate themselves.
10 FEAR AND LOATHING AND LAUGHTER: COVID-19 AS AN EXPRESSION…
228
Selected User Responses: Laughter
In an article titled, “I Just Want to Come Home”, published by TimesLive,
one of the people stuck in China said: “We are now completely stranded …
I just want to come home, I just want to go back to my mom and give her
a big hug”.
1. One of the rst responses to the article joked: Your mom gave me the
message, she says you not worry about the hug, just stay there and be
a big girl, she will send kisses with Instagram.
2. Your mother is also mothering all of us in your absence here, so we
just can’t risk her, we love u sis.
3. Nana listen we love you but don’t come here, asseblief. We will send
you whatever you need, OK? Biltong, magewu and inkomazi. Just let
us know what it is you need. And don’t write to us either because
you’ve probably sneezed all over that paper and envelope. Please dar-
ling, we can’t risk you coming here and making the vulnerable sick.
Sending you love.
4. Stay there dear, we are busy xing the problems that made you leave
in the rst place…So give us the opportunity to better ourselves
like you did.
5. Just hang in there a bit longer, not easy at all Mzantsi is not ready for
that Corona now,but always remember not just momy but the whole
of South Africa loves you a lot, keep well.
6. South Africa is on holiday pls come when we back.
7. Just spoke to ur mom, well she said everything is ne so stay there
until everything is cleared.
8. No need to stress about coming here my dear…we will transport your
mother to you.
9. If only you knew that we are dealing with loadshedding you wouldn’t
come this side. You have a better chance of survival that side. Are you
not excited about the new hospital? Go and take pictures. Don’t for-
get to share please because sharing is caring. Enjoy.
10. Just buy a mask. You are safe with a mask.
11. Hai stay there, do you know how many tenders it takes to build a
toilet here? Never shem.
12. Don’t worry my darling. It was made in China,It won’t last long.
13. They must stay there shuuuuu we cant build a hospital in 48hrs here.
14. Stay there coz we’ve temporarily moved to Zim you won’t nd any-
one here even mom has moved .
M. PONONO
229
15. Plz Nana. We love you and don’t come back. We have enough
PROBLEMS and I don’t think we can deal with Corona virus. We
can’t even manage Eskom; then what abt corona.
Selected User Responses: Rage
The supermarket Makro trended number one in South Africa in late
March as when the rst case of the coronavirus was reported in South
Africa, it sparked panic buying.
1. The same people that brought the virus to our shores are now panic
buying in bulk and emptying all the shelves in stores and leaving
nothing for the rest of us. This is bullshit behavior.
2. When it whites it called ‘Panic buying’ when it black it called ‘break-
ing the rules’ by the way there is still queue at Makro even now.
3. Check who has the luxury of “panic buying”. They will then
get in their big ass cars and go self quarantine in their comfy homes.
My people are packed up ko Noord taxi rank to get to their
shacks, make plans to feed their families just for today #Makro
#Coronavirussouthafrica
4. She is not talking sense when she lies this has nothing to do with black
an whiteFace with tears of joyFace with tears of joyblack pple shop at
makro I have a makro 4km away from me an that’s the shop I use a
lot and they reported on makro lines during the panic buying what
sense are u speaking off?
5. This is going to get increasingly annoying during this lockdown so let
me say this. 1. Most low income people were not given time off to
prep for #SouthAfricanLockdown. 2. Those same people cannot bulk
buy so stores will see them more often.
6. While abo Piet was panic buying out the whole Makro at 11:15 on a
random Tuesday, the people in this picture were working in CNA, as
domestic workers, in a Fish and Chips shop not able to get more than
30minutes for lunch.
7. Basically people with money are cleaning out shops- even big outlets
like Makro- to ll their houses? What are you doing with 10 bags of
10kg rice? I hope you’re donating to different families in need cos
this panic buying is too much
8. Corona is not gonna kill us… Starvation will….we will die of hunger
because of panic buying #Makro
10 FEAR AND LOATHING AND LAUGHTER: COVID-19 AS AN EXPRESSION…
230
9. Who was shooting when white people crowded @Makro_SA Alberton
panic buying few days before the announcement of the of-
cial shutdown
10. The difference in reporting now that some black people are paid and
are panic buying vs when the whites clogged up Makro. Why are
these reporters at townships telling us about people not abiding by
the law? Suka
11. Why were you not at Makro when white people were panic buying
like the world is coming to an end. Where was this fake concern? FYI
we don’t have cars, we live far from supermarkets. You are annoying.
12. By excusing criminals and criminality as part and parcel of “township
life”. Face with rolling eyes. Nothing has been more racist than the
current governments low expectations about black folk. They don’t
take law enforcement and the rule-of-law seriously in poor, mostly
black communities.
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M. PONONO
PART III
Weapons of the Masses: Humour,
Ridicule and Confronting Political
Power
235© The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature
Switzerland AG 2021
S. Mpofu (ed.), Digital Humour in the Covid-19 Pandemic,
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-79279-4_11
CHAPTER 11
#VoetsekANC and COVID Corruption:
A Foucauldian Discourse Analysis of
“A Song for the ANC”
AdelinaMbinjama
IntroductIon
In August 2020, many South Africans were alarmed by the extent to
which the African National Congress (ANC) had deviated from the values
of its veterans, asrevealed by the number of corruption cases levied against
its members. The party experienced a backlash in response to their mis-
dealings when they were exposed for giving state tenders to deliver per-
sonal protective equipment (PPE), intended to assist those engaged in
combatting the coronavirus (COVID-19) pandemic, to individuals within
the ANC social circles. Columnist Bishop Sithembele Sipuka’s (2020)
Corruption Has Become SA’s Other ‘Pandemic’briey explains how people
expressed their discontent at a government and political party whose
unscrupulous nature seemingly knew no bounds.
A. Mbinjama (*)
Department of Media Studies, Cape Peninsula University of Technology,
Cape Town, South Africa
236
Citizens reacted across various social media platforms, shunning and
mocking with the hashtag #VoetsekANC, signifying that the ruling gov-
ernment had lost credibility. ‘Voetsek’, a South African slang term for ‘go
away’, is a combination of Afrikaans and tsotsitaal (a township colloquial
tongue) (see Bhana, 2016; Adjepong, 2020). The word is often used to
shout at stray dogs and is considered a derogative term that is discouraged
when interpolating a human being, especially in public. As mentioned ear-
lier, at the apex of the COVID PPE corruption by ANC members, the
#VoetsekANC hashtag started trending on social media, including on
TikTok, among a population of Internet users (such as Generation Z and
Generation Alpha) who typically do not comment on ANC actions.
Ridicule and humour, using memes, parodies, songs and videos, were
increasingly being associated with the ANC during August–September
2020. Wasserman (2020) notes that, almost immediately after the national
lockdown was announced in March 2020, South Africans took to social
media, with memes featuring prominent politicians and negative puns,
using TikTok (www.tiktok.com) video clips, Twitter (www.twitter.com),
WhatsApp (www.whatsapp.com) and Facebook (www.facebook.com) sta-
tuses to make fun of the virus.
More recently, news of corruption by the ANC during COVID-19
resulted in social media users vetting #VoetsekANC online. To further
mock and ridicule the ruling government in respectof its series of corrup-
tion cases that keep mounting, The Kiffness musician, Dave Scott, made a
parody, called “A Song for the ANC”, of English band Pink Floyd’s
“Another Brick in the Wall” (see The Kiffness, 2020). This chapter offers
a Foucauldian discourse analysis (FDA) of the song as “an innovative qual-
itative methodology” (Sam, 2019). While Foucault himself never explored
the relationship his work had with online movements, the chapter argues
that the song and #VoetsekANC movement are manifestations of
Foucault’s ‘governmentality’ and of inuencer culture. Theoretical debates
on the usefulness of Foucault’s notion of governmentality for online
movements are in relatively short supply. Thus, governmentality as a theo-
retical tool in analysing the power relations that have manifested them-
selves on social media at micro- and macro-levels bridges the gap in
literature on online movements.
A. MBINJAMA
237
LIterature revIew
Social Media andPolitics inSouth Africa (2015–2020)
The convergence of social media and politics in South Africa is not new.
Notably, it became prevalent during the 2015 and 2016 #RhodesMustFall
and #FeesMustFall protests on university campuses (Baragwanath, 2016;
Mpofu, 2017). Students had staged protests on campuses to lament the
institutional racism they experienced and, later, the fee increases, both of
which would continue to render universities a space that is only accessible
to the privileged few (Baragwanath, 2016). Students used social media as
a tool to mobilise themselves, which proved to be an effective form of
political communication. Baragwanath (2016) further notes that although
students used social media as a form of mobilisation, it did not replace
physical participation. It merely supplemented it.
Another noteworthy intersection between social media and politics in
South Africa has to be the Bell Pottinger disinformation campaign in
2017. This campaign was coordinated by the UK public relations rm,
Bell Pottinger, at the behest of the then beleaguered South African
President Jacob Zuma (Tannous et al., 2019). According to Tannous
etal. (2019), the campaign was designed to exploit the racial divisions that
exist in South Africa, on behalf of the Gupta family, who were associates of
Jacob Zuma. The campaign made use of terms such as “white monopoly
capital” and “radical economic transformation” as a way of drawing atten-
tion away from the Gupta family’s nefarious business dealings with the
state (Tannous etal., 2019).
Research conducted by Malila etal. (2013) reveals that young people
in South Africa are distrustful of politicians and political institutions.
Political cynicism and frustration with the performance of the current gov-
ernment provides an abundant space for elaboration of scandals and
ofconspiracy theories that provide more believable “explanations for peo-
ple’s current circumstances than political, economic, or scientic authori-
ties” (Wasserman, 2020). Therefore, it is not surprising that (especially)
young people take to social media to air their frustrations and to share
their opinions about politics. Wasserman (2020) maintains that the
increased ubiquity of the growing range of social media platforms exposes
users to multiple editing tools which, in turn, enable media users to create
and engage with news topics in more creative ways. Perhaps more cogent
is the recognition on Wasserman’s (2020) part of the various psychosocial,
11 #VOETSEKANC AND COVID CORRUPTION: A FOUCAULDIAN DISCOURSE…
238
political and psychological reasons as to why South Africans choose to
express themselves through humour—as opposed to despair—despite the
many challenges that they face.
In Ellis’s (1989) ground-breaking article “Tuning in to pavement
radio”, he denes an African phenomenon that has no ofcial English
term but can best be described in French as “radio trottoir”, which directly
translates to “pavement radio”. Pavement radio, according to Ellis (1989,
321), “can be dened as the popular and unofcial discussion of current
affairs in Africa”. Unlike traditional media, such as press, television and
radio, there is “no identiable individual, institution or group of people”
that controls it (Ellis, 1989, 321). Ellis (1989, 322) maintains that the
“social role and pedigree of pavement radio” is qualitatively different to
rumour and gossip and plays a different social and political function. It is
also different to rumour in its choice of subject, as pavement radio usually
discusses issues of public interest or importance (Ellis, 1989).
This latter point is pivotal to this study, as the root cause of the discon-
tent towards the ANC is endemic corruption, which in and of itself is a
matter of public interest and importance. Pavement radio, opines Ellis
(1989, 329), should therefore “be seen in the same light as oral tradition
and treated as a descendent of the more formal oral histories that are
linked with ruling dynasties and national rituals”. Wasserman (2020)
argues that “these practises”— referring to the oral traditions of socio-
political commentary—illustrate how the conviviality of African societies
also inuences their media use. At a political level, pavement radio often
thrives when mainstream media are strictly controlled by authorities or
where the distrust of ofcial narratives is commonplace (Wasserman,
2020). In the South African context, media ownership and control are a
contested matter and, while there is a signicant number of South Africans
who still trust mainstream media, there are factions, particularly amongst
young people, who distrust it (Wasserman, 2020). Hence, social media
has become an alternate means of communicating and receiving political
information.
Foucault has been used in other academic texts to discuss digital media
inuencers, making his philosophical underpinnings suitable for this chap-
ter (see Maples-Yap, 2020). Olivier (2010, 294) states that, by using
Foucault, multiple subject positions can be constructed through media
representation. Therefore, these contexts provide a basis for the discus-
sions around online movements and their implications for what Michel
Foucault calls ‘governmentality’ (which will be discussed later in the
chapter).
A. MBINJAMA
239
Social Media andInuencer Culture inSouth Africa
Social media have provided accessible platforms to a new generation of
political inuencers, especially those individuals not coming from tradi-
tional political backgrounds or actors such as politicians, lobbyists or full-
time journalists. The Kiffness song has made an impact on the way their
audiences, and the broader social audience, think about politics. The
Kiffness is a live electronic act from Cape Town, South Africa, founded by
Dave Scott in 2011. Dave Scott, who is now a reputable producer, is
important in the political sphere because of the inuence he has on pre-
dominantly younger, more afuent users on social media. These individu-
als are, in their own right, particularly engaged and active online, with a
moderate number of followers.
Wellman, Stoldt, Tully and Ekdale (2020, 68) describe social media
inuencers as individuals who seek to “leverage their social and cultural
capital on social media to shape the opinions and purchasing decisions of
others”. Most of the literature relating to social media inuencers and
inuencer marketing relates to the commercial aspects of this phenome-
non. For example, consideration is given to the ways in which brands
make use of social media inuencers, as part of the marketing mix, to
acquire more customers and to grow their market share. From a commer-
cial perspective, scholars have come to question the value and impact of
social media inuencers on brand equity and positioning (van Staden &
van Niekerk, 2018; Abratt, 2019).
However, literature on inuencer marketing as it relates to politics in
the Global South points to the existence of political parties who use social
media inuencers to garner votes during elections. Although there may be
blurred lines in this regard—especially if one considers Singh’s (2019)
assertion that the modern science of politics sees voters as consumers who
ostensibly have to “purchase” politicians and public servants in elections—
they still serve as an apt point of departure from which to analyse inu-
encer marketing. In 2016, South African celebrity inuencers were
implicated in an ANC-sponsored covert social media campaign that
attempted to besmirch opposition parties and garner support for the gov-
erning party, the ANC, during the 2016 Local Government Elections
(Comrie, 2017). Those who participated in the campaign were dubbed as
members of “the war room”, which was led by ANC member and activist,
Shaka Sisulu, and public relations professional, Sihle Bolani (Comrie,
2017). The campaign, according to Comrie (2017), raised the ire of
11 #VOETSEKANC AND COVID CORRUPTION: A FOUCAULDIAN DISCOURSE…
240
members of the ANC leadership and proved to be unsuccessful as the
ANC lost the support in key metros during that election. This gives cre-
dence to questions raised by van Staden and van Niekerk (2018) and by
Abratt (2019) relating to the efcacy of inuencer marketing in achieving
the desired objectives of its organisation.
The questionable results are attributed to the perceived lack of authen-
ticity associated with inuencer marketing; Wellman etal. (2020) hold
that inuencers have a tendency to operate outside of ethical frameworks
and thus tend to skirt certain legal considerations. In contrast, political
activists who have used social media to garner support for their move-
ments have also garnered inuencer status, but without their ethical
frameworks being questioned. The social media activism demonstrated by
TikTok users in South Africa as a means of expressing their discontent
towards the ANC is an example of how ordinary South Africans have used
social media inuencer principles as a means of capturing the imagination
of their audiences. Furthermore, because #VoetsekANC gained popularity
through the organic sharing of content on TikTok and then, later, on
other social media platforms, one can thus deduce that there was no alter-
native political force that was inuencing this anti-ANC sentiment. This
gives this movement a sense of authenticity that is not readily afforded to
ordinary social media inuencers who post content at the behest of a
brand or political organisation.
TikTok Amongst Generation X andGeneration Alpha
We can extrapolate from the #VoetsekANC movement that TikTok and
other social media platforms in South Africa were used collectively for
galvanising protests about political circumstances that citizens were dis-
pleased about. Experts say that TikTok is a place where individuals can
share their thoughts, ideas, passions and humour online and where others
can comment about it (Keeton, 2020). TikTok is a video-sharing platform
that allows users to create fun, positive, humorous and joyful micro-vid-
eos, ranging from “several seconds to several minutes and then share it
with the wider TikTok community” (Zhu etal., 2020, 2). The platform,
now available in over 150 countries, was founded in 2017 and is believed
to be the fastest growing social media application in the world, topping
the list of “the most downloaded” applications in 2018 (Zhu etal., 2020,
2). According to We Are Social (2019), TikTok claims to have 500 million
active users and over a billion downloads. A 2019 study suggests that
A. MBINJAMA
241
TikTok added 188 million new users in the rst three months of 2019
(Yeh, 2019). This speaks to the growing popularity of the platform in
South Africa, where the TikTok trend—in terms of popularity—is follow-
ing a similar path.
World Wide Worx MD, Arthur Goldstuck, has stated, “TikTok has its
own rules, and the rst one is that all the rules of social media have
changed” (Mzekandaba, 2020). He said this in light of the way TikTok
gained traction faster than any other platform. The surge in TikTok usage
was seen after the COVID-19-induced lockdown at the end of March
2020. The increased usage can also be attributed to people’s need for
home entertainment during this period (Keeton, 2020). This type of plat-
form is something, according to McCoubrey (2020) (cited in Keeton,
2020), teenagers have always loved. Users as young as 13 have an oppor-
tunity to engage on the platform (Keeton, 2020).
A recent study conducted by World Wide Worx and Ornico states that
TikTok in South Africa gained notoriety in 2019 and gained momentum
amongst the youth in 2020 (Mzekandaba, 2020). In South Africa, TikTok
was the biggest social media sensation of 2019, and in 2020 had the big-
gest youth market, with the majority of its subscribers being young people
who were born post the apartheid regime andwho make up what is known
as Generations Z and Alpha. According to DeIuliis and Saylor (2021),
Generation Z are those born after 2001 and Generation Alpha are those
born after 2009. Both these population groups participated and were
exposed to #VoetsekANC due to inuencer culture.
One of the key associations that can be made is that TikTok users
mobilised their social and cultural capital to shape the opinions of others
about the political discourses in South Africa. Generation Z and Generation
Alpha were politicising their views and those of their social networks—
which include family, friends, inuencers and politicians—by creating
video content that included #VoetsekANC memes, parodies and songs
such as “A Song for the ANC”, all of which aimed to express their dissat-
isfaction with the ANC.The movement #VoetsekANC and song “A Song
for the ANC” are manifestations of inuencer culture and what Foucault
calls ‘governmentality’—a concept used by Wellman etal. (2020) when
dening social media inuencers. In the light of the evident distrust of
political institution by young people in South Africa and their use of social
media as a platform to express their discontent, the authors have elected
to focus on the political reasons for“A Song for the ANC”, providing a
discourse analysis that aims to discuss the different types of language used
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in the song, and the purposes and effects of cultural rules and conventions
used in the lyrics.
This chapter is signicant because, historically, online movements in
South Africa have been centred around gender-based violence, university
fees and other social issues, but not against the governing political party—
that is, until the recent #VoetsekANC. Whilst the chapter does not fully
unearth all South Africa’s sociopolitical discourses prevailing on social
media, including in their humorous forms, it nonetheless provides analysis
of reection on the current government and its politics, as authored by
The Kiffness musician and social media inuencer, Dave Scott, and users
of #VoetsekANC. This chapter contributes to the existing literature on
online movements and argues that #VoetsekANC and the song by The
Kiffness are manifestation of governmentality and of inuencer culture, as
what has transpired in the real world of politics has translated to the online
environment. Thus, the focus of this chapter is the analysis of the
#VoetsekANC movement that bridges social media and politics.
theoretIcaL Framework andmethodoLogy
Foucauldian Philosophies andHumour inSouth Africa
What makes Foucault’s ideas complimentary to this chapter is the fact that
his major works [A History of Madness (1961), The Birth of the Clinic: An
Archaeology of Medical Perception (1963), The Order of Things: An
Archaeology of the Human Sciences (1966) and Discipline and Punish: The
Birth of the Prison (1975)] represent an attempt to produce a historical
account of the formation of ideas, including those that are philosophical.
As a cultural theorist and philosopher, Foucault attempted to show how
there have been shifts in our understandings from one epoch to another,
separating our thinking in the modern age from that of earlier ages
(Buckingham etal., 2011, 302). Thus, for example, the ideas of Generation
X and Generation Alpha are very different from the ideas of those who are
much older. Ideas are constitutive of the historical contexts. In modern
societies, for example, salient aspects of context that inuence idea forma-
tion are the greater division of labour, greater urbanisation, organic soli-
darity and greater growth of individualism (Buckingham et al., 2011,
303). Foucault’s interest in psychoanalysis underpinned his concern for
crime, the body, madness and sexuality. He analysed the emergence of
modern institutions, such as prisons, hospitals and schools, that have
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played an increasing role in controlling and monitoring the social popula-
tion. He wanted to show that there was another side to Enlightenment
ideas about individual liberty—namely, the concern with discipline and
surveillance. Foucault advanced important ideas about the relationship
between power, ideology and discourse in relation to modern organisa-
tional systems. As a result, Foucault has been used in academic discourses
to critique governments, systems of institutions and discursive practices
(see Macleod & Durrheim, 2002).
Foucault’s work has also been used to discuss the use of humour in vari-
ous contexts (see Dolan, 1993). According to Wasserman (2020), the use
of laughter to deal with the virus may also be a form of catharsis for African
people. Humour is not a foreign concept to South Africans, particularly
during times of crisis. Events such as the corruption characteristic of the
Jacob Zuma era, later termed “state capture”, and the ongoing power
blackouts as a result of an inept national power utility, Eskom, are exam-
ples of crises where South Africans have chosen humour as opposed to
despair (Wasserman, 2020).
Since discourses of humour and power may be approached by many
avenues, this chapter focuses on Dave Scott’s (The Kiffness) lyrics of “A
Song for the ANC” and on #VoetsekANC to argue that they are manifes-
tations of ‘governmentality’ and inuencer culture. Poststructuralist
thinkers like Foucault make it possible to critique some of the ideologies
underlying these two social media phenomena. The “A Song for the
ANC” contains meta discourses—it philosophically denotes discussion
about a discussion.
‘Governmentality’ andDiscourse inSocial Media
Foucauldian discourse analysis allows for an interpretivist approach to how
social media platforms provide a certain level of autonomy to individuals
on these platforms. Olivier (2009, 2) states that Foucault’s notion of dis-
course “seems to suggest that, because human subjects are discursively
constituted, their actions can only be grasped in terms and on the basis of
the (historical) discourses that comprise subjects’ subjectivity exhaustively”.
Olivier (2010, 294) states that “human identity is structured by lan-
guage in the sense of discourse”. He denes discourse as:
language insofar as meaning and power-relations come together in it. In other
words, talking about discourse as that which makes humans distinctive, is an
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acknowledgement that the language we use is not innocent, but carries the
imprint of power-relations, and the discourse that rst structures our psyche
congures it one way or another as far as these unavoidable (albeit revisable)
interests or relations of power are concerned. (Olivier, 2010, 294–295)
According to Olivier (2010, 295) “Wherever discourse operates, a
counter-discourse can be activated which means that dominant discourses
can be discursively opposed from the position of the speaking subject, as
opposed to that of the one that is ‘spoken’ or constructed” (Olivier,
2003, 2005).
Discourse, as dened by Foucault, refers to ways of creating knowl-
edge, along with the communal practices, forms of bias and power rela-
tions which are inherent in such knowledges and relations between them
(see Foucault, 1990; Foucault, 1995). Baumgarten and Ullrich (2016,
14) explain:
Discourses are more than ways of thinking about producing meaning. Discourses
dene the boundaries of what can be thought of and communicated at a given
time in a given society. The suffragettes of the late 19th and early 20th centu-
ries, for example, did not demand equal distribution of childcare between men
and women, because at that time it was still generally unthinkable. They did,
however, call for equal political rights, e.g. the right to vote. These claims t well
into the historical context of institutional reforms that extend the franchise.
As Lemke (2002, 12) asserts, “Discourses and other practices in power
regulation, such as practices of government and the government of the
self, shape the subjectivity of the people”. According to Lemke (2002,
10), Foucault often denes governmentality as the “art of government”.
Lemke explains that
Foucault coins the concept of “governmentality” as a “guideline” for the analy-
sis he offers by way of historical reconstructions embracing a period starting
from Ancient Greece through to modern neo-liberalism (Foucault, 1997, 67).
The semantic linking of governing (“gouverner”) and modes of thought (“men-
talité”) indicates that it is not possible to study the technologies of power without
an analysis of the political rationality underpinning them”. (Lemke, 2002, 2)
Baumgarten and Ullrich (2016, 15) explain that, in Foucauldian terms,
discourses “shape the individual’s relations to her/himself and thus affect
the mobilization potential of social movements” (see also Rabinow, 1994;
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Foucault & Ewald, 2003). Foucault’s approach to subjectivity is correla-
tive with a study of “techniques of the self” (Kelly, 2013, 517; Lemke,
2002, 4). The enquiry of technique was already prominent in Foucault’s
reections of the 1970s on power—of all his works, he uses the term
“technique” most recurrently in Discipline and Punish (1975) (Kelly,
2013, 511). In Foucault’s trajectory of thinking, this idea is now applied
to the self—that is, to what we do to ourselves rather than to others (Kelly,
2013). Examples would be obsession with oneself, andprioritsing oneself.
This stance is openly evident on TikTok, where users make quick videos of
themselves to convey personal, sociopolitical and cultural issues that they
want their followers to grasp and be entertained by.
Neoliberal governments are a dominant form of government in which
the understanding is that the market is the fairest mechanism in so far as it
gives the most to those who achieve the most through self-promotion.
Although there are dominant discourses that exist in such a system, people
have a choice whether to question power. According to Foucault (1990,
p.84) this is so “whether it is the discourse of patriarchy, or that of capital-
ism”. In effect, “we are not exclusively ‘spoken’ or ‘constructed’ by it
[discourse], which is another way of saying that we are not slaves to it”
(Olivier, 2010, 295).
Instead of being captives to and victims of the dominant ideologies,
#VoetsekANC demonstrated that the mass population in South Africa
were fed-up and against the ways in which the ANC government was gov-
erning. The government’s ideas and behaviours shaped Dave Scott (The
Kiffness) and the societies he represents. Attached to being a young, white
male South African—as Dave Scott is—are a specic set of discourses. The
commonplace negative discourses about his demographic convey that
some of them are entitled, spoilt, racist and oblivious to the privileges they
enjoy from being born ‘white’. To make a valid assessment, one would
have to unravel the individual’s human identity to recognise and under-
stand layers of discourses.
For centuries, whites (especially men) have controlled South Africa
through slavery and colonial rule and then through the apartheid regime.
After 1994, a black majority ruling party (ANC) took over the administra-
tion of the country and has since been in power. While subjectivation was
used in the past to control and dominate people (including through tech-
nologies), many South Africans feel that the current government is taking
advantage of the power bestowed on them (Malinga, 2021). Of note,
Foucault (1978, 95) opines that “Where there is power, there is
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resistance”. Through the hashtag, citizens publicly shared their political
discourses against the ANC more widely online than via traditional media.
This got the attention of leaders of the ANC, indicating that its supporters
had made paradigm shifts and wanted more sovereignty and for govern-
ment to be more responsible with the power the people had given them
over the years through votes.
Foucault theorises the interwoven relationship of online movements
and the ANC and helps comprehend “A Song for the ANC” as a form of
resistance and as a manifestation of inuencer culture and ‘governmental-
ity’. Foucault is concerned with the practices and tactics of power which
are the foundation of social structures and organisations. Governmentality
consequently permits us to observe the authenticated forms of knowledge
and power complexes. In order to understand the #VoetsekANC and “A
Song for the ANC” as manifestations of inuencer culture and Foucault’s
‘governmentality’, it is appropriate to turn to Foucault’s ideas of discourse.
This chapter focuses specically on the value of Foucault’s work for criti-
cising sociopolitical ideologies prevalent in the digital sphere. The remain-
ing section of the chapter provides discussion of the discourse of the song,
“A Song for the ANC”, in which the power relations in South Africa are
expressed through language. Using Foucauldian tools, the sociopolitical
and cultural contexts are briey discussed through the analysis of the lyrics.
FIndIngs anddIscussIon
Song asaForm ofResistance
Foucault uses the term ‘power/knowledge’ to signify that power is consti-
tuted through accepted forms of knowledge, scientic understanding and
‘truth’ (Olivier, 2009). ‘Truth’ is a thing of this world: it is produced only
by virtue of multiple forms of constraint. Further, it induces regular effects
of power. Olivier (2009: 3) states that “Foucault expressed the discursive
link between actions and knowledge”. Olivier (2009, 6) reports that “As
Foucault puts it (1990, 84): ‘There is no power without potential refusal
or revolt’”. South Africans have a history of using song as a form of resis-
tance to those they deem oppressors. In particular, struggle songs, which
emanate from the South African Apartheid past, are the point of reference
here. Nkoala (2013, 51) states that struggle songs are an integral part of
political past, present and future. While “A Song for the ANC” does not
qualify as a struggle song per se, it echoes sentiments of a disgruntled
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population who have chosen to express their disdain through song. Pring-
Mill (1987, as cited by Nkoala, 2013, 51) explains that “the sound of song
is described as a blow at the invader, a rampart in defense, a weapon against
injustice”. The following are the complete lyrics of “A Song for the ANC”:
[LISTEN PROPERLY]
We don’t need your administration.
We don’t need your drug control.
You’ve left a chasm in the country.
Leeches leave those funds alone.
Hey! Voetsek.
Leave those funds alone.
All in all Mzansi, is just sick of it all.
All in all Mzansi is just sick of it all.
Tsek.
While the song is not a struggle song, Foucault’s discourse analysis
explores it as a form of resistance, especially in light of the #voetsekanc
movement.
“A Song fortheANC” Is Not aStruggle Song
Jokingly, fans of The Kiffness have remarked that the song should be the
country’s national anthem since it is a form of resistance against the
ANC.Others have taken the song as a struggle song. However, Nkoala
(2013, 52) notes that the efcacy of struggle songs is dependent on their
ability to persuade. They achieve this by being “functional, inspirational,
educational, instructional, ideological and political” (Nkoala, 2013, 52).
According to Nkoala (2013, 52–54), when conducting an analysis on a
liberation or struggle song, one must consider whether all three (orator,
audience and text) of the modes of persuasion are present. Nkoala (2013,
53) cites Aristotle (1994) when dening the salient aspects of the modes
of persuasion—anorator reecting the personal character of the speaker,
in this case The Kiffness; the audience which hasto be in a certain frame
of mind; and the text as the actual speech or song itself.
In the context of the “A Song for the ANC”, the orator is the singer,
Dave Scott (The Kiffness). Unlike struggle songs, which are usually sung
within group settings so as to evoke certain emotions and thus be effective
(Nkoala, 2013, 53), “A Song for the ANC” is sung by one person. This
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therefore makes it less likely to be persuasive. In addition to this, the per-
sonal character of the orator must be considered (Nkoala, 2013, 53). It
must therefore be noted that The Kiffness was also embroiled in an online
racism debacle in 2020 and is known to harbour views that favour “white
privilege” (IOL, 2020). This makes the prospect of the song being persua-
sive more unlikely, unless it is possible to segment the audience with which
Dave Scott is mostly communicating.
When it comes to struggle songs, the audience is most likely to be
members of the sociopolitical group that would be singing the songs
(Nkoala, 2013, 53). This creates an interesting dynamic because, accord-
ing to Nkoala (2013), the orator(s) would be at once both the orator and
the audience. And they would be charged with the responsibility of per-
suading both themselves and others, unless they were directing their songs
against the authorities (Nkoala, 2013, 53). In the case of “A Song for the
ANC”, one can certainly deduce that the intended audience are the lead-
ers of the ANC and the government. However, owing to the complex
nature of race antagonism in South Africa, it would be worthwhile to
consider that the audience that Dave Scott/The Kiffness was also target-
ing with his song included his majority white followers on social media.
While disdain for the ANC is shared across the racial divide, it is neces-
sary in this analysis to consider the nuances in the context of The Kiffness’s
ideological inclination. The text of struggle songs was often unwritten and
was modied to capture the emotions and conditions of the time (Nkoala,
2013, 54). As a result, the lyrics and structure of the songs changed so
much that they would also alter the meaning of the song (Nkoala, 2013,
53). Because the text in this caseis written and not performed, the possi-
bility of being able to analyse it as a struggle song is limited. However, it
is best analysed as one would a normal speech, as the persuasive intent is
embedded within it (Nkoala, 2013, 53).
As opined by Nkoala (2013, 54) previously, in order for a text to be
persuasive, it must be “functional, inspirational, educational, instructional,
ideological and political”. Of these criteria, “A Song for the ANC” satises
the instructional, ideological and political requirements. The song is
instructional in that it clearly rebukes the current administration and
instructs the leaders to “leave those funds alone”. It is ideological as it
denounces the need for “your administration… and …your drug control”.
These are usually sentiments shared by libertarian conservatives who
believe in a society that has less government control which, in this case,
speaks to the orator’s ideological inclination. The song is also political
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249
because it is directed at political actors who have the power to change the
status quo and speak to sociopolitical issues that the country faces.
Political History ofCorruption
In reference to the rst two lines of the song, “We don’t need your admin-
istration…We don’t need your drug control”, Foucault challenges the idea
that power is wielded by people or groups by way of ‘episodic’ or ‘sover-
eign’ acts of domination or coercion, seeing it instead as dispersed and
pervasive. ‘Power is everywhere’ and ‘comes from everywhere’, so, in this
sense, it is neither an agency nor a structure (Foucault, 1998, 63). Instead,
power is a kind of ‘metapower’ or ‘regime of truth’ that pervades society
and is in constant ux and negotiation. A key point about Foucault’s
approach to power is that it transcends politics and sees power as an every-
day, socialised and embodied phenomenon. For this reason, state-centric
power struggles, including revolutions, do not always lead to change in
the social order.
For some, Foucault’s concept of power is so elusive and removed from
agency or structure that there seems to be little scope for practical action
(Foucault, 1998). Nonetheless, Foucault’s work has been hugely inuen-
tial in pointing to the ways that norms can be so embedded as to be
beyond our perception, causing us to discipline ourselves without any wil-
ful coercion from other actors. Prior to the lockdown, President Cyril
Ramaphosa’s ‘new dawn’ was being questioned by political pundits
(Graham, 2020). Four million jobs were lost, and Eskom, the country’s
power utility, was experiencing power load-shedding due to equipment
breakdowns. The country was downgraded by all three rating agencies.
The derailment of the ANC, according to Graham (2020), continued to
point to the party’s links to corruption. In the course of the response to
COVID-19, government corruption by ANC members and their allies
was associated with resources that were meant to assist in the battle against
COVID-19. The movement #VoetsekANC has been associated with the
political ideology that the ANC is merely corrupt due to its failings to
administer proper services to its citizens. “Foucault’s work of governmen-
tality extends this repertoire by augmenting the analysis of power at a
micro-level to the myriad of ways in which power operates at a macro-
level” (Macleod & Durrheim, 2002, 43). Foucault indicates that modern
government is exercised through an “ensemble formed by institutions,
procedures, analyses, reections, calculations and tactics” (Macleod &
Durrheim, 2002, 43). At local and national levels, these disciplinarian
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forms of power by the ANC have been openly rebuked and mocked
through the online movement and “The Song for the ANC”. The internal
politics of the ANC inltrated into various external structures within
the state.
Election ofZuma asPresident andtheDisbanding ofTheScorpions
Derailment of the ANC became more obvious immediately before and
after the Polokwane conference in 2007 (Malinga, 2021). At the confer-
ence the ANC elected Jacob Zuma as president of theANC, following
which he was appointed president of the country. Factions within the
ANC used state intelligence services to spy on each other and create fake
reports to discredit opposing factions, ultimately leading to the disband-
ing of the Scorpions (organised crime investigation unit) and the enforced
resignation of Thabo Mbeki as president. In-ghting within the ANC had
resulted in the misuse of budgets, resources and government agencies
(Malinga, 2021). The Kiffness song implied a mocking of Zuma directly
with the words, [LISTEN PROPERLY]. This is what Zuma had said while
struggling to pronounce a large number written in his closing speech at an
ANC party conference in 2015. Many South Africans found this equally
embarrassing and amusing as Zumawas the president of the country and
could not read out aloud the number of ANC party members. This inci-
dent magnied the notion of Zuma as incompetent. By using the words in
the song, it subliminally extends the same message to the whole ANC.The
song also suggests that #VoetsekANC is a manifestation of the many prob-
lems that citizens have been facing with the government since it elected
Zuma as president. Online the song is accompanying hashtags
#ANCMustFall #CorruptionMustFall. Foucault’s governmentality is gen-
erally associated with the willing participation of the governed, but in this
case the song and the movement represented citizens’ unwillingness to be
governed by the ANC.
In all the historical cases, such as the Kapembe Commission, State
Capture and the Zondo Commission, a certain type of power is exercised,
using certain methods mobilised by certain groups of people over others.
Importantly, all of this was not the exercising of the juridical power. It was
not simply the power of the law, but was what Foucault calls ‘biopower’—
that is, having power over people’s bodies. For Foucault, biopower is a
technology of power for governing over people in large groups, and the
distinctive quality of this political technology is that it allows for the con-
trol of entire populations (Baumgarten & Ullrich, 2016).
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251
The power to produce subjects that would operate in favour of the
ANC is indicativeof criticism that was implied during the #VoetsekANC
movement. The lyrics to the song says We don’t need your drug control. It
can refer to the historical moment when the Scorpions (upon which South
African citizens depended to arrest politicians and other superpowers for
wrongdoing) were targeting mostly ANC members, as a result of which
the party put pressure on President Mbeki to address the issue. In response,
he appointed a Commission headed by Judge Sici Kapembe, who recom-
mended that the Scorpions be under the administration of either the
Minister of Justice or the police. As soon as Mbeki was forced to resign as
president, the Scorpions was disbanded. Through the online movement
and the lyrics to the song, it was obvious that peoplewere not only resist-
ing the ANC but also showing how the government’s dealings had to be
exposed ona more widespread, non-traditional platform. This was done
by subjectifying individuals (i.e. through the lyrics: LISTEN PROPERLY)
and posting humorous memes about ANC with #VoetsekANC, which
then turned the once respected organisation into an object—through the
use of technology.
According to Macleod and Durrheim (2002, 44) “governmentality is
simultaneously individualising and totalising. On the one hand, govern-
mentality is simultaneously subjectivising (i.e. it concerns itself with the
constitution of individualised subjectivity) and objectivising (i.e. through
the operation of bio-power the individual is transformed into an object or
docile body). On the other hand, the individual is implicated in large-scale
normalising structures and regulatory controls”. The use of the song and
the widespread use of #VoetsekANC are manifestations of ‘governmental-
ity’ as there is an interlink between “the micro-effects of power (e.g. self-
technologies) with the macro strategies of power without privileging one
or the other” (Macleod and Durrheim, 2002, 44). The #VoetsekANC
manifested the climate of the state and its resistance to the ANC through
the power of technology. Adversely, one could also argue that the use of
the various technological platforms and structures in themselves carry
micro and macro forms of control and power. In accordance with Foucault,
governmentality occurs on multiple, interwoven levels. On Twitter, the
nature of the movement was more detailed and intertextualised with cor-
responding links to news articles about the ANCs mishaps, whereas on
TikTok the corruption cases were merely mocked through humorous vid-
eos, which appeared on other social media platforms for a much older
population to consume. This also indicates that young people’s
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252
“disrespectful” views about the ANC are considered and shared across
generations and their inuence in political discourse might have to be
taken in a more serious light. Technology has impacted the way that intu-
itions wield power upon other people and how power has an effect on
those people.
COVID Corruption and“Tsek” Movement onTikTok
Dave Scott’s “A Song for the ANC” was created from the #VoetsekANC
movement that emerged from citizens gaining knowledge of the corrup-
tion centred around the funding and resources earmarked to control the
global pandemic. About R500 billion for food parcels and social services
was squandered by some ANC members and their counterparts (Sipuka,
2020). Scott’s song becomes more humorous when he sings, “Leeches
leave those funds alone…“Hey! Voetsek”. The lyrics suggest that the ANC is
not worthy of being respected as a political party. This is signicant in that
many young and old social media users from various backgrounds (but
most especially Caucasians) endorsed the song. While a few expressed
their shock and disbelief that the ANC was openly being ‘outed’ and ridi-
culed for stealing money meant for the poor, others encouraged the young
man for using his artistry to covey the distasteful way in which the party
was conducting itself. Before this, citizens had to accept that South Africa
has been under the management of the Guptas, a wealthy foreign family.
In addition, evidence presented to the Zondo Commission revealed that
underhand dealings inltrated the judicial system—in so far as specially
selected judges were adjudicating in favour of Zuma and the ANC (Martin
and Solomon, 2016, 24). Therefore, the song was a form of resistance to
the government’s agendas and a call for the ANC to be responsible and
serious about crime, corruption and fraud issues in the country.
The lyrics “All in all Mzansi, is just sick of it all” reect citizens’ feelings
of being disappointed and frustrated with the ANC for its powerlessness
to address many of the important socioeconomic issues affecting the
country. The political party’s inability to not misrepresent and misuse
funds and resources needed to prevent COVID-19 is viewed as the most
demoralising action of the ANC, leading to the breakdown of citizens’
condence in political institutions. The song’s ending, “Tsek”, an abbre-
viation of ‘voetsek’, links to #VoetsekANC as a symbolic portrayal of the
low level of respect that citizens have towards the ANC and is also an
indication of how the ANC leaders are interpellated and viewed as none
caring corrupt individuals.
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253
Foucault (1997, 73) explains that biopower does not have an effect on
people physically, but on possible future actions—that is, their possibility
and choices that are available. He says this power is an action upon action.
It constrains and encourages. Judicial power is subtractive and, in a way,
repressive, while biopower is productive. Institutions, such as the govern-
ment, can also exert biopower by disciplining and training, which can
result in rewards and can be achieved through cumulative measures. These
actions have an effect on others (such as citizens) and their possible actions.
Prediction of behaviours, Foucault asserts, can only be done by analys-
ing groups of people, where a set of norms and standards exist as a basis
for analysis (Foucault, 1997). This can be done with reference to a popula-
tion, where what people are doing and how they behave in certain con-
texts can be quantied. Subjects may be created through the exertion of
power and knowledge on a specic population. In South Africa, citizens
are forced to wear face masks and to adhere to lockdown regulations.
However, citizens became tired of the discipline exercised on the bodies of
individuals and security exercised over the population, so that when news
broke out of the ways in which the ANC were misusing COVID-19 relief
aids, citizens “rebelled” against the government through the hashtag. The
political use of the hashtag #VoetsekANC demonstrated the resistance to
and shifting of power against the ruling government. Although some con-
tent was represented in humorous ways across different social media plat-
forms, points of resistance in the network of power relations were vocalised.
concLusIon
Foucault’s theoretical ideas have been shown to be effective in analysis of
“A song for the ANC” by referring to the brief political history of corrup-
tion by the ANC, which evoked the #VoetsekANC movement. By analys-
ing the song lyrics, the chapter has shown how institutional power is
afrmed not only by juridical means of the state but also through indi-
vidual subjects. The chapter has shown that if these ambivalent forms of
power are neglected, the specic power formations which have stabilised
online movements and informed inuencer culture may not be resolved.
Inuencer culture impacts the way that political power is shared across
social media platforms. Inuencers have political power to drive others
into being informed about sociocultural issues that affect human beings.
TikTok, in particular, has taught South African users to view politics more
humorously and creatively on social media. TikTok is now seen as a
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254
technology associated with power (Fung, 2020). The more followers one
has, the more inuence one has and the more one is considered credible
or knowledgeable. Although individuals and their networks share similar
thoughts about the government, such as in the case of the ANC, the
#VoetsekANC movement went from a micro level of power to a macro
level through the interconnectedness of technological systems that make it
possible for various individuals and technologies to exchange knowledge.
According to Macleod and Durrheim (2002, 46), disciplinary technol-
ogy has as its aim the regulation and normalisation of subjects. Although
the individual ostensibly has more formal rights than before, taking into
consideration South Africa’s oppressive past, there is less room for devi-
ance and disorder. Disciplinary technology operates through hierarchical
observation and normalising judgement. What governmentality adds to
this is the possibility of identifying and resisting concentrations of power.
This is reected in the actions of current Generations Z and Alpha, who
have used TikTok as a form of expressing their discontent with the corrup-
tion related to COVID-19. The older generation, however, has used social
media to sow divisions and further polarise societies (Fung, 2020) and
further entrench Foucault’s governmentality. This is true for both South
Africa and the United States of America (USA) with regard to the
Cambridge Analytica scandal. The USA is also at the epicentre of the cur-
rent geopolitical battle with TikTok, as the former president of the USA
Donald Trump’s rhetoric continues to be anti-China.
Sufce it to say that a platform like TikTok gives leeway for political
commentary by its creators, as seen during South Africa’s national lock-
down. The disdain for TikTok shown by former President Donald Trump
led him to announce earlier in 2020 that he intended to ban the social
media platform by September 2020 (Fung, 2020). Trump laments that
US citizens’ personal user data from the platform might end up in the
hands of the Chinese government (Fung, 2020). This forms part of a
wider trade war with the Chinese government, which is currently at its
zenith. Fung (2020) also states that Trump’s attempt at banning TikTok
has been rejected by a federal judge and therefore has not come into effect.
This is an example of the ramications of the conuence between politics
and social media. The issue of control is, however, contestable in the con-
text of social media platforms as the control that platforms such as
Facebook have has been widely reported following the Cambridge
Analytica scandal of 2018 (Confessore, 2018).
A. MBINJAMA
255
It has recently become commonplace for social media platforms to use
personal data as a form of control over audiences. These platforms have
access to users’ personal data and can infer psychological personas that can
be used for both political and commercial purposes. This political insensi-
tivity, as it pertains to platforms such as Facebook, can also be used to
understand the current political quagmire within which TikTok nds
itself. These examples illustrate that governmentality “links technologies
of the self with technologies of domination” (Lemke, 2002, 3), an area
that can be explored for future research with regards to online move-
ments, especially in the wake of COVID-19.
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S. Mpofu (ed.), Digital Humour in the Covid-19 Pandemic,
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-79279-4_12
CHAPTER 12
Humour intheTime ofCOVID-19
Pandemic: ACritical Analysis
oftheSubversive Meanings ofWhatsApp
Memes inZimbabwe
MphathisiNdlovu
IntroductIon
This chapter examines the subversive nature of Internet memes that are
produced and circulated by ordinary Zimbabweans as a form of political
communication within a repressive environment. Drawing upon memes
circulated via WhatsApp during the period of the novel coronavirus dis-
ease (COVID-19), this chapter examines the political discourses that are
expressed, reproduced and contested as Zimbabweans sought to cope
with the new realities. Given the repressive nature of the Zimbabwean
political environment that manifests through draconian laws (Moyo,
2009a; Mpofu, 2014), this chapter explores the creative ways in which
citizens appropriated digital tools to create and circulate WhatsApp memes
in counter-hegemonic fashion. Memes are reproduced and circulated not
M. Ndlovu (*)
Stellenbosch University, Stellenbosch, South Africa
260
only for humorous purposes, but they also serve “some degree of social,
cultural, or political critique” (Wiggins, 2019, 59). Jokes are circulated by
ordinary Zimbabweans via mobile phones “to construct their counter-
publics” by subverting “state power and media censorship” (Manganga,
2012, 243). Thus, Zimbabweans are using jokes to “express dissatisfac-
tion with the deteriorating economic and political situation in the coun-
try” (Manganga, 2012, 243).
COVID-19 is a novel coronavirus that broke out in Wuhan, China, in
December 2019 (Teti etal., 2020). This infectious disease was declared a
pandemic by the World Health Organization (WHO) in March 2020. Its
symptoms include dry cough, fever and shortness of breath. Hand hygiene
and social distancing are some of the ways of curbing the spread of this
virus (Teti etal., 2020, 2). As the pandemic spread across the globe caus-
ing death, illness and social disruption (Teti etal., 2020, 2), governments
responded by sealing national borders and announcing lockdowns as pre-
ventive and containment measures. As of the end of November 2020, the
death toll across the globe had exceeded 1.4 million, with over 63 million
people having tested positive for COVID-19. The rst COVID-19 case in
Zimbabwe was recorded in March 2020. By the end of November, 277
people had lost their lives due to the pandemic. The COVID-19 cases had
exceeded 10,000.
COVID-19 broke out at a time when Zimbabweans were grappling
with socio-political and economic crises such as corruption, ination,
human rights abuses, and a deteriorating healthcare system (Chingono,
2020; Muronzi, 2020). With the outbreak of the COVID-19 pandemic,
there were fears that the Zimbabwean government was not prepared to
tackle this emergency health crisis (Makurumidze, 2020; Muronzi, 2020).
The health system was paralysed as doctors and nurses were engaging in
an industrial action over poor remuneration and lack of protective cloth-
ing (Chingono, 2020). Furthermore, the water crisis and food shortages
in major cities like Harare and Bulawayo compounded fears about the
spread of COVID-19, as citizens contravened lockdown regulations to
queue for water at boreholes and for basic commodities at supermarkets.
Against this background of the national lockdown, economic turmoil,
political crisis and poor health care system, this chapter examines the use
and appropriation of WhatsApp memes as a tool for communicating polit-
ical satire. Internet memes have a subversive nature as they can be cre-
atively appropriated and utilised as a tool against authoritarianism.
M. NDLOVU
261
context
The ruling party, Zimbabwe African National Union Patriotic Front
(ZANU PF), has over the years relied on the state media like The Herald
and the Zimbabwe Broadcasting Corporation (ZBC) to reproduce its
nationalist discourses and sustain its legitimacy (Mpofu, 2016; Ranger,
2005). The private press, or the “independent” media, tends to propagate
anti-government or counter-hegemonic discourses (Moyo, 2005, 112).
Within these “competing journalisms” (Chuma, 2008, 21), there is, on
the one hand, the “patriotic journalism” performed by the state media
that serves to propagate ZANU PF’s renditions of history and national
identity (Ranger, 2005, 13). On the other hand, there is the “oppositional
press” (Moyo, 2005, 11), or “opposition journalism” (Chuma, 2008,
27), that serves to “delegitimize ZANU PF and the state” (Chuma, 2008,
27). In the early 2000s, the Daily News embodied the “opposition press”
(Moyo, 2005, 114) as it was deemed the “voice of the voiceless”. After the
persecution that included the bombing of its ofces, the newspaper was
shut down in 2003 (Moyo, 2005). Draconian laws such as the Public
Order and Security Act (POSA) and the Access to Information and
Protection of Privacy Act (AIPPA) had adverse effects on the operations
and performance of the media in Zimbabwe by curtailing free speech and
restricting the democratic space (Mpofu, 2014, 119).
Given the repressive environment in Zimbabwe, the Internet has
emerged as a space for counter-hegemonic discourses. Marginalised com-
munities are relying on new digital technologies to express themselves
freely and articulate discourses that are tabooed in public spaces, such as
the Gukurahundi genocide (Mpofu, 2015; Ndlovu, 2018). Thus, the
Internet has a subversive potential as news websites (Mpofu, 2015;
Ndlovu, 2018), the Forum social networking mailing list (Mhlanga &
Mpofu, 2014) and Inkundla online platform (Moyo, 2009b) were appro-
priated by users to construct Ndebele historical memories such as the
Gukurahundi genocide. Studies have examined the role of diasporic media
as alternative public spheres that played a role in mediating the Zimbabwean
crises (Moyo, 2007; Mano & Willems, 2008). Zimbabwean activists in the
diaspora are using humour not “merely to mock or ridicule but to consci-
entize people, and to raise attention for and awareness of the situation” in
the homeland (Kuhlmann, 2012, 295). Drawing upon data from cartoons
and satirical messages disseminated through the Internet, Kuhlmann
(2012, 295) argues that political humour in the Zimbabwean diaspora has
12 HUMOUR IN THE TIME OF COVID-19 PANDEMIC: A CRITICAL ANALYSIS…
262
a “counter-discursive function and serves as a ‘medium of communicating
dissent’”. Clandestine radio stations emerged as alternative spaces that
challenge “state authoritarianism” (Moyo, 2012, 485).
Social media platforms such as Twitter and Facebook have been at the
centre of Zimbabwe’s protest movements as they are creatively appropri-
ated and used by activists to challenge state authoritarianism (Gukurume,
2017; Chitanana, 2020; Mpofu & Mare, 2020). Protest movements such
as #ThisFlag, #ThisGown and #Tajamuka demonstrate the potency of
digital activism in Zimbabwe (Gukurume, 2017; Chitanana, 2020). As
such, social media tools are utilised by citizens to “reclaim their political
voices and spaces” (Gukurume, 2017, 49). Thus, social media tools enable
citizens to circumvent the surveillance and strategies of repressive govern-
ments (Gukurume, 2017, 51). However, Internet shutdowns that
occurred in 2016 and 2019in Zimbabwe demonstrate the manifestation
of “digital authoritarianism” (Mare, 2020, 4244). Most Zimbabweans
utilise their mobile phones for Internet connectivity (Mare, 2020, 4251).
There is a growth in the Internet penetration rates in Zimbabwe as they
rose from 9.8 percent in 2008 to around 50 percent in 2016 (Mare, 2018,
96). As of December 2019, the Internet penetration rate in the country is
at 56.5 percent (MISA, 2020, 16). The most popular social networking
site used by Zimbabweans is WhatsApp and is followed by Facebook
(Mare, 2018, 96). WhatsApp contributes to “over 44 percent of all mobile
internet usage in the country” (MISA, 2020, 19). The market share of
mobile service providers is dominated by the privately owned Econet
Wireless Zimbabwe (69.7 percent) and two state-enterprises, Telecel (8.9
percent) and NetOne (21.4 percent) (Mare, 2020, 4251).
Political Satire, Internet Memes andProtest Cultures
Laughter has “subversive effects” (Okawa, 2013, 16) as humour has
always been used as a “tool against oppression since ages” (Kulkarni,
2017, 13). Satire plays a key role in “contesting the state-centric rendition
of life in Zimbabwe” (Siziba & Ncube, 2015, 516). The late former
President Robert Mugabe tended to be constructed by the state media as
a “superhuman”, who was invincible and “unscathed by the ravages of
age” (Siziba & Ncube, 2015, 516). However, Mugabe’s tumble and fall
at the Harare International Airport in 2015 subverted and thwarted this
narrative (Siziba & Ncube, 2015, 516). Satirical memes were produced
and circulated via WhatsApp, Facebook and Twitter, which sought to
M. NDLOVU
263
ridicule and resist the myths around the “fetishization” of the former pres-
ident’s power (Siziba & Ncube, 2015, 516). These memes or “ctional
constructions” served to depict Mugabe as the “architect of Zimbabwe’s
fall” and to dispel the “myth of him as a god who is immune from human
weaknesses” (Siziba & Ncube, 2015, 517).
Källstig and Death (2020, 1) examine the “ambivalent mockery” evi-
dent in stand-up comedy as Trevor Noah’s performances subvert “white,
western and Eurocentric discourses of global politics”. In repressive soci-
eties such as Zimbabwe, stand-up comedy acts as a form of resistance
against the hegemonic forces (Källstig & Death, 2020, 1). Drawing upon
data from the Zimbabwean comic strip Chikwama, which appeared on the
privately owned Daily News in the early 2000s, Willems (2011) argues
that laughter can enable ordinary people to negotiate and cope with the
sociopolitical and economic crises unfolding in their country. The strip
Chikwama demonstrates that postcolonial laughter cannot “always be
treated as a form of resistance” as it “does not always address those in
power” (Willems, 2011, 141). Instead, laughter can have a self-reexive
mode as the oppressed “mock their own powerlessness and lack of agency
in the face of a system that they perceive as immutable” (Willems,
2011, 141).
Memes communicate information “through humour and satire”
(Kulkarni, 2017, 13). The key feature of memes is their “ability to rapidly
spread on social media” (Siziba & Ncube, 2015, 518). As such, Internet
memes denote popular forms of humour (Ngwira & Lipenga, 2018).
More importantly, memes constitute sites of struggle between hegemonic
and alternative discourses (Denisova, 2019, 10). The growth of memes in
the digital sphere is linked with the “rise of emoticons” (Denisova,2019,
9). Dominant scholarship examines the role of memes as forms of political
communication (Makhortykh & Aguilar, 2020). The focus on memes and
politics tends to be on marginalised groups (Wiggins, 2019, 59). The
concept of a meme was propounded by Dawkins (1976) to describe “cul-
tural units… disseminating virally” (Makhortykh & Aguilar, 2020, 343),
or the “viral spread of an idea” (Ngwira & Lipenga, 2018, 25). A meme
denotes something that “spreads throughout a culture” (Wells, 2018,
241). As such, Internet memes can be dened as “context-bound viral
texts that proliferate on mutation and replication” (Denisova, 2019, 10).
In this vein, Internet memes denote digital content units which combine
“visual and verbal elements to steer affective reactions” (Makhortykh &
Aguilar, 2020, 343). A meme is, thus, a cultural unit that can be imitated,
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264
mimicked, remixed and repackaged (Ngwira & Lipenga, 2018, 25). It
constitutes an “imitable text” that can be appropriated, adjusted and cir-
culated by Internet users (Denisova, 2019, 10). As cultural commodities,
memes express people’s lived practices (Wiggins, 2019, 7).
The idea of “meme” has “mutated” since its introduction due to the
advent of the Internet (Wiggins, 2019, 1). The Internet has created a
conducive environment for people to generate and circulate memes (Wells
2018, 241). Technological affordances of the Internet enable users to
“take photos, augment both image and video, quickly edit and upload”
(Wiggins, 2019, 58). Thus, new digital technologies enable an “unparal-
leled ease of creating and remixing digital content” and the viral distribu-
tion of memes (Makhortykh & Aguilar, 2020, 343). Given their affective
potential, Internet memes emerge as a form of “political commentary”
that provokes “high-arousal emotions” (Makhortykh & Aguilar, 2020,
344). Internet memes can “catch the attention of a reader in a way that an
article cannot” (Wells, 2018, 241). Given their potential of articulating
“emotionally charged messages”, memes are intertwined with protest cul-
tures (Makhortykh & Aguilar, 2020, 344). Thus, Internet memes are
deployed, discursively, to serve political purposes (Wiggins, 2019, 57).
The Obama Joker meme and the “remixing of the Batman villain for
Trump in 2016” are some of the examples of the deployment of Internet
memes for political agendas (Wiggins, 2019, 57). Other studies examine
Internet memes as “lived religion” in that they express and communicate
about religious identities (Aguilar etal., 2017, 1498).
The advent of the Internet has reinvigorated the potency of political
humour such as memes (Pearce & Hajizada, 2014). New digital technolo-
gies are enabling oppositional forces to disseminate memes as a form of
dissent in authoritarian Azerbaijan (Pearce & Hajizada, 2014, 67). At the
same time, memes can express toxic populist and extremist messages
(DeCook, 2018) with the purpose of “stigmatising political opponents
and scapegoating minorities” (Makhortykh & Aguilar, 2020, 344).
Drawing upon anti-government protests in Ukraine and Venezuela,
Makhortykh and Aguilar (2020) explore how pro- and anti-government
communities utilised Internet memes for their political agendas. Jenkins
(2014) develops a framework for a rhetorical analysis of Internet memes
by focusing on modes as collective expressions. A visual rhetorical study
analyses “image-texts in context” (Jenkins, 2014, 442). Although Internet
memes help people to cope with hardships, Ngwira and Lipenga (2018,
21), in their study of Malawian humour in the digital age, observe that
M. NDLOVU
265
Internet memes promote inferiority complex as these everyday jokes
“demean, devalue and underrate anything Malawian”. Thus, Malawian
humour is “self-directed” as it represents a “country laughing at itself”
(Ngwira & Lipenga, 2018, 21).
theoretIcal andconceptual Framework
This study analyses Internet humour through the lens of Bakhtin’s carni-
valesque (Tembo, 2011; MacMillan, 2020). Bakhtin’s theorisation of the
carnivalesque is derived from his seminal work Rabelais and His World
(Tembo, 2011, 344). It provides a framework for making sense of the
transgressions and subversive nature of WhatsApp memes. The carni-
valesque is associated with the medieval carnival that was intertwined with
the lived experiences of ordinary people (MacMillan, 2020, 259). Carnivals
were associated with laughter as dominant elites and ofcial hierarchies
were mocked, challenged and “inverted” (Badarneh, 2011, 308). The
carnivals were related to the “feast of fools” in which “social hierarchies of
everyday lives” could be “overturned” (MacMillan, 2020, 260). Thus, the
carnivalesque is centred on the “themes of the carnival twist, mutate, and
invert social conventions” (Tembo, 2011, 344). The carnival rituals
involved the ridiculing of elites and attacks on the status quo (MacMillan,
2020). Thus, Bakhtin’s understanding of the carnivalesque involved a
“temporary suspension of the normal order, breaking down barriers,
norms, prohibitions and etiquettes as well as reversing the existing hierar-
chical distinctions” (MacMillan, 2020, 260). Political jokes circulated via
WhatsApp can be considered as carnivalesque texts that challenge the sta-
tus quo as mockery and ridicule are used.
The concept of counter-publics also provides a framework for analysing
the subversive potential of WhatsApp memes in authoritarian contexts. By
counter-publics, I mean the “parallel discursive arenas” used by members
of the subaltern to construct and circulate alternative discourses (Fraser,
1992). These counter-publics articulate the views that are excluded in the
mainstream public spheres (Fraser, 1992; Asen, 2000). Asen (2000) pro-
vides a comprehensive engagement on the idea of “counter” in “counter-
publics”. He argues that the “counter” is not about places, people or
topics (Asen, 2000). Instead, counter-publics denote “participants’ recog-
nition of exclusion from wider public spheres and its articulation through
alternative discourse practices and norms” (Asen, 2000, 427). Thus, they
constitute the collectives that “emerge in the recognition of various
12 HUMOUR IN THE TIME OF COVID-19 PANDEMIC: A CRITICAL ANALYSIS…
266
exclusions from wider publics of potential participants, discourse topics,
and speaking styles and the resolve that builds to overcome these exclu-
sions” (Asen, 2000, 438). As such, this chapter considers Internet spaces
like WhatsApp as counter-publics that challenge the hegemonic ZANU
PF narratives. However, this research does not consider all WhatsApp plat-
forms as counter-publics. Rather, WhatsApp sites can be considered as
counter-publics only if there is a recognition by participants of exclusion
from the dominant spaces (Asen, 2000). Asen’s (2000) conceptualisation
suits this research as some of the WhatsApp memes that are selected for
analysis are challenging the hegemonic discourses.
methodology
Data were drawn from memes that were shared via WhatsApp groups and
individual statuses. The researcher is a member of some of these WhatsApp
groups where memes were circulated. Through a process of online eth-
nography (Mpofu, 2019, 113), the researcher was able to monitor
WhatsApp groups and individual statuses in order to select memes on
COVID-19. The scope of study is 7months (April to November 2020).
Purposive sampling was employed to select WhatsApp memes for analysis
from over 100 texts related to COVID-19. These memes were categorised
according to thematic issues. Fourteen memes were selected for analysis as
they reect the lived experiences of Zimbabweans during the COVID-19
era. The focus of the analysis was on image-texts that mediated the pan-
demic. Critical discourse analysis (CDA) was used to analyse the image-
texts. CDA provides theories and methods that enable researchers to
examine the intersection of language, meaning and power (Jorgensen &
Phillips, 2002; Richardson, 2007). It provides analytical tools to examine
how language is used to reproduce, sustain and challenge asymmetrical
power relations (Jorgensen & Phillips, 2002; Richardson, 2007). From
the various models of CDA, Fairclough’s (1995) three-dimensional model
was employed to analyse the intersection of texts, discursive practice and
social practice. WhatsApp messages are private conversations, and hence
permission was sought from participants to use the memes for research
purposes. Furthermore, the identities of WhatsApp users who circulated
the memes are protected.
M. NDLOVU
267
WhatsApp Memes andtheEveryday Lives
Memes express people’s ways of life as these imaginations and meaning-
making practices are generated by social groups in situated contexts.
Cultural artefacts not only “articulate the meanings of particular social
practices and events”, but also “dene the ways we make sense of them,
how they are experienced and lived” (Grossberg, 2005, 158). WhatsApp
memes, as cultural artefacts, reect the fears, hopes and prejudices of
Zimbabweans during the COVID-19 era. Zimbabweans used humour to
cope with the uncertainties brought about by COVID-19. In this vein,
there are memes that articulate the socio-economic dynamics in Zimbabwe.
With the outbreak of COVID-19, there were discourses on the “new nor-
mal” and the changes brought about by the pandemic. However, some
memes show that these changes did not really affect the unemployed.
First, there are memes that highlight that the stay-at-home orders affected
the daily routines of privileged communities and the working class, rather
than the unemployed. The humorous text—“when you nd out your nor-
mal daily lifestyle is called quarantine”—serves to highlight the struggles
of the unemployed in Zimbabwe.
Second, other memes depict the locals’ views on return migration:
Gone are the days when people show off with “I just came back from UK or
USA”. Show Brag now and get quarantined.
Some social commentators attributed the spike in the country’s
COVID-19 cases to citizens returning home from countries such as South
Africa and the United Kingdom. An analysis of expressions “show off”
and “brag” demonstrates that Zimbabweans in the diaspora are depicted
as pompous. The fear of being “quarantined” is represented as a way of
subduing the so-called gloating returning citizens.
Other memes reinforce stereotypes and prejudices against social groups
such as women and Muslims. Laughter does not always serve counter-
hegemonic purposes (Willems, 2011), and as such, humour may perpetu-
ate the widely held preconceived assumptions about certain groups. One
of the memes is derogatory as a black woman’s hairstyle is disparaged as
the novel coronavirus. In using the image of COVID-19 to depict a
female’s hairstyle, this meme serves to demean and devalue a black wom-
an’s worth. It further reinforces the patriarchal and racist discourses that
demean black women’s bodies. The concept of intersectionality describes
12 HUMOUR IN THE TIME OF COVID-19 PANDEMIC: A CRITICAL ANALYSIS…
268
the experiences and suffering of black women by highlighting the multidi-
mensional forms of oppression and discrimination such as race and gender
that are intertwined (Rodgers, 2017, 36). In degrading a black woman’s
beauty as a pandemic, such memes promote and reinforce “coloniality of
being” (Ndlovu-Gatsheni, 2013, 11). Whiteness is reproduced as it gains
an “ontological density far above blackness” (Ndlovu-Gatsheni, 2013,
11). Ngwira and Lipenga (2018, 21) concur that self-derogatory jokes in
the digital age may serve to perpetuate an “inferiority complex which reit-
erates colonial matrices of meaning”. In spite of memes being reied as
forms of dissent and protest culture, in this context, they may serve to
reinforce gendered and racial stereotypes. Black women’s hair constitute a
site of political struggle as female bodies tend to be mocked, regulated and
controlled. Another meme depicts Muslim women covering their head
and body with hijabs or garments. The expression “they knew all along and
never told us” is an assumption that hijabs are meant to be used as face-
masks to limit the spread of COVID-19. Thus, such stereotypical state-
ments undermine religious identities.
WhatsApp Memes as“Silent Resistance”
The rapid spread of the COVID-19 pandemic has left over a million peo-
ple dead and resulted in drastic changes in people’s daily routines across
the globe. The socio-economic impacts of COVID-19 have been huge.
The household income for the majority was severely affected by the stay-
at- home orders as industries and informal markets had to be closed. There
were disruptions in people’s daily sources of income. Given the lockdown
regulations, the poor communities such as informal traders had to come
to terms with the realities of losing their sources of income. Against this
backdrop, Internet users reproduced and circulated COVID-19 memes
via WhatsApp to express the struggles of these marginalised, excluded and
poor communities. Thus, memes articulate the socio-economic plight of
the poor by depicting lockdown regulations and other COVID-19-
induced measures as elitist. The following WhatsApp memes express the
socio-economic plight of the subordinated groups in Zimbabwe. First,
there are memes that articulate the challenges of online learning in the
midst of the novel coronavirus:
I’m not against online teaching, but what about us?
Data for her online learning, or bread to feed her?
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In this regard, online learning is represented as elitist as it excludes low-
income students. The rst meme on online learning depicts two female
learners who appear to be in a rural setting. The image of the female rural
learners symbolises disenfranchised and subordinated communities. It
expresses the plight of low-income students during the COVID-19 pan-
demic. The rhetorical question “what about us?” is a cry for inclusion as
learners from low-income families usually do not have Internet access at
home. The second meme represents the realities of the experiences of low-
income learners and their families during the COVID-19 pandemic. With
schools closed, low-income students struggled to partake in online lessons
due to lack of resources. The disadvantaged learners do not have access to
computers and Internet. For these low-income families, food is a priority
than Internet data for online learning.
Given the digital divide and socio-economic disparities, the margin-
alised groups tend to be left out in the Information Society. As such,
Nyamnjoh posits that the Information Superhighway is “yet to be trav-
elled by enough Africans” (1996, 8). Moreover, the Internet “remains
largely an urban phenomenon” (Moyo, 2007, 85). Thus, the meme
depicts a struggle between the afuent groups in the urban setting and the
subordinated communities in rural areas. The marginalised communities
are using digital tools such as WhatsApp for everyday resistances against
the power bloc. Through the memes, the weak and subordinated are chal-
lenging the dominant system. Memes are creatively appropriated and used
for counter-hegemonic purposes. Through the process of “excorpora-
tion” (Fiske, 1989, 15), the downtrodden are using the resources
(Internet) associated with the privileged groups to construct their own
subcultures. Fiske (1989, 15) uses the term “excorporation” to describe
the process by which the “subordinate make their own culture out of the
resources and commodities provided by the dominant system”. In this
vein, the meme is not only a critique of the elitist education system in
Zimbabwe, but also repudiates the dominant capitalist system. Rather
than a public good, education is depicted as having been commodied
and driven by market forces. The memes, hence, constitute subversive
tools that enable the subordinated groups to engage in a “guerrilla war-
fare” without challenging the “powerful in open warfare” (Fiske,
1989, 19).
Other memes depict the plight of vulnerable communities conned to
their homes. Given that most of the people in Zimbabwe’s urban areas
rely on informal economic activities, the lockdown measures threatened
12 HUMOUR IN THE TIME OF COVID-19 PANDEMIC: A CRITICAL ANALYSIS…
270
the livelihoods of these citizens. Thus, the lockdown regulations meant to
curb the spread of the novel coronavirus may have adverse effects on the
vulnerable communities who live from hand to mouth.
The WhatsApp memes depict the predicament of the vulnerable com-
munities as they are caught between a rock and a hard place. One meme
depicts COVID-19 and hunger as the two forces that have put low-income
families in a predicament. Another meme represents a family inside a
house, with children seemingly hungry and begging their mother for
food: “mama we are hungry”. A police ofcer is patrolling the streets to
enforce the lockdown regulations. Using a loudspeaker, the male police
ofcer orders the family to remain indoors. This meme depicts the plight
of the poor communities as they have to deal with COVID-19, hunger
and law enforcement authorities. The impoverished communities are con-
ned to their homes, as contravening lockdown regulations will expose
them to the deadly COVID-19. At the same time, these starving families
have to deal with the wrath of law enforcement agents. Furthermore, the
stay-at-home order means the vulnerable communities who survive on
informal trade are unable to put food on the table. As such, memes con-
stitute a form of “silent resistance” (Siziba & Ncube, 2015, 517) as they
articulate the plight and predicament of the subordinated groups during
the time of COVID-19. Through WhatsApp memes, the counter-publics
are formed and solidied as the subordinated groups articulate “recog-
nised exclusions” (Asen, 2000, 437). Counter-publics are formed when
there is a recognition by participants of “exclusion from wider public
spheres” (Asen, 2000, 427). Thus, WhatsApp memes provide a platform
for the disenfranchised communities to articulate “alternative discourses,
practices and norms” (Asen, 2000, 427). In depicting the lockdown mea-
sures as anti-poor, there is a recognition by the subaltern of the power
imbalances and socio-economic disparities in the country.
In addition, there are memes that rely on humour to depict the plight
of the poor:
Kungcono ubaba afe nge ue esebenzela imuli ukuthi inga ngendlala kulo-
kuthi imuli ife ngendlala ubaba ecatshele I u.
This meme is written in isiNdebele and loosely translates, “It is better
for a man to succumb to inuenza whilst working for his family so that
they do not starve, than for his family to perish due to starvation whilst he
is hiding from the u”. In this meme, COVID-19 is depicted as a
M. NDLOVU
271
non-lethal inuenza. Discourses of masculinity are mobilised to project an
ideal man as a provider and protector. Men are being encouraged to the
contravene lockdown regulations and provide food for their families.
Within this hunger/COVID-19 dichotomy, a “real man” is depicted as
the one who risks contracting the virus in order to provide for his family.
As such, discourses on masculinity are summoned and reproduced in a
way that challenges the status quo.
Memes asaForm ofPolitical Commentary
Humour has a subversive potential as alienated and marginalised groups
share memes and jokes to mock the political elites and other privi-
leged groups:
What if CORONA VIRUS is a LATIN word meaning ZANU PF?
Orphaned Zimbabweans waiting for President Cyril Ramaphosa’s
address like
These memes depict ZANU PF as a pandemic that has caused hardships
and untold suffering on Zimbabweans. By pandemic, the meme denotes
ZANU PF as a disease, plague or scourge to Zimbabweans. Thus, the
subalterns are engaged in a subversive practice of “semiotic guerrilla war-
fare” (Eco, 1986) as WhatsApp memes are used to ridicule and resist
ZANU PF’s hegemony. Furthermore, the meme mocks the government
by lamenting that Zimbabweans are “orphaned”. In representing
“orphaned” Zimbabweans as waiting for guidance from South Africa’s
president, the meme is challenging ZANU PF’s leadership and legitimacy.
In authoritarian societies, political jokes have the “common feature of call-
ing into question the legitimacy of the political system” (Badarneh, 2011,
307). Zimbabweans are depicted as parentless and having been adopted
by the government of South Africa. Thus, laughter serves as a way to
“puncture the pomposity of the powerful” (Källstig & Death, 2020, 1).
ZANU PF ofcials like Patrick Chinamasa have tended to mobilise the
rhetoric of “Zimbabwe is not a province of South Africa” (Kwaramba and
Madzimure, 2020) as a discursive shield against criticism from their neigh-
bours concerning human rights violations. Political humour targets repres-
sive regimes by venting “social, economic, and other frustrations”
(Badarneh, 2011, 307). Thus, these political jokes enable individuals to
12 HUMOUR IN THE TIME OF COVID-19 PANDEMIC: A CRITICAL ANALYSIS…
272
release their “constrained and suppressed desires and freedoms” (Badarneh,
2011, 397).
Other memes are ridiculing President Mnangagwa and his predeces-
sor, Mugabe:
If you could end COVID-19 by sacricing one African president, which one
would you choose and why Mnangagwa?
It’s likely that if he was alive, he would have named himself The Commander
of Corona.
In authoritarian regimes, the disempowered and aggrieved communi-
ties celebrate COVID-19 as the “great equaliser” or an omnipotent force
meting out justice on the seemingly invincible politicians. ZANU PF of-
cials such as Mnangagwa are implicated in the Gukurahundi genocide and
other human rights crimes in the country. As such, there is a meme that
depicts COVID-19 as a weapon that can be wielded against the oppres-
sors. Siziba and Ncube (2015, 523) posit that humour constitutes a
“source of cynical critique” when the oppressed are “confronted by an
insurmountable crisis” where their oppressors “cannot be dislodged”.
Furthermore, humour serves as a “needed distraction for liveability in a
gloomy context” (Siziba & Ncube, 2015, 523).
The meme is a mockery of the late and former President Mugabe’s
obsession with titles and power. As the head of state, Mugabe recreated
himself as a “god, chief and king” (Siziba & Ncube, 2015, 523). He held
numerous titles such as “the Commander in Chief of Zimbabwe’s armed
forces, the Chancellor of the University of Zimbabwe and all state
Universities and the President and First Secretary of ZANU PF” (Siziba &
Ncube, 2015, 522). The referential strategy “commander of corona”
serves to highlight Mugabe’s thirst for and obsession with power. Thus,
the meme serves to ridicule and scorn the powerful for their obsession
with titles.
Furthermore, there are memes that challenge the global order rooted
in Western modernity. Through these memes, the idea of using Africans as
guinea pigs to test COVID-19 vaccines is rejected. Remarks by French
doctors that trials for COVID-19 vaccines should be conducted in Africa
sparked outrage (BBC, 2020). Viewing Africa as a testing ground for
COVID-19 vaccines was denounced as racist by Didier Drogba and other
M. NDLOVU
273
prominent gures. A meme was circulated that represents a black woman
holding a knife on a white male doctor who seemingly was about to con-
duct vaccine testing on a black man. Within this narrative, the heroine
(black woman) saves the victim (black man) from the villain (white male
doctor). The message “no vaccine testing on us” reinforces this pan-
Africanist narrative. This Afrocentric discourse serves to unmask and dis-
mantle the dark history of Western modernity. It is a critique of Western
scientic advancements that are entrenched in coloniality.
conclusIon
This chapter sought to explore the role of Internet memes as forms of
political jokes. Memes not only provide humour but also reect the lived
experiences of citizens. Drawing upon WhatsApp memes on COVID-19,
the chapter examined the intersection of humour and the everyday life in
the context of a pandemic. Bakhtin’s theory of the carnivalesque and the
concept of counter-publics were employed to analyse the subversive nature
of memes in authoritarian environments such as Zimbabwe. Findings
demonstrate the complex nature of Internet memes as forms of political
satire. First, memes constitute sites of resistance as humour is used to ridi-
cule and challenge ZANU PF party. Second, some memes draw upon
Afrocentric discourses to challenge the hegemonic Western perspectives.
As forms of dissent, WhatsApp memes reinforce the decolonial perspec-
tives that critique the dominant Eurocentric modernity and coloniality.
Third, memes express the socio-economic predicaments of the disadvan-
taged communities who are excluded from online learning. However,
WhatsApp memes also serve to reinforce stereotypical depictions of social
groups such as black women. Patriarchal and racist are perpetuated
through WhatsApp memes that ridicule and disparage the bodies of
black women.
This chapter builds upon scholarship on digital humour by focusing on
how WhatsApp memes mediate the lived experiences of ordinary citizens
in Zimbabwe. In times of pandemics, Internet humour plays a pivotal role
in enabling communities to cope and come to terms with the public health
crisis. Despite the multifaceted nature of COVID-19, dominant debates
have focused on epidemiological responses. As such, this chapter draws
our attention to the subversive nature of digital humour in helping citi-
zens to cope with the impacts of the coronavirus pandemic.
12 HUMOUR IN THE TIME OF COVID-19 PANDEMIC: A CRITICAL ANALYSIS…
274
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12 HUMOUR IN THE TIME OF COVID-19 PANDEMIC: A CRITICAL ANALYSIS…
279© The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature
Switzerland AG 2021
S. Mpofu (ed.), Digital Humour in the Covid-19 Pandemic,
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-79279-4_13
CHAPTER 13
Humour intheAge ofContagion:
Coronavirus, ‘Janata Curfew’ Meme
andIndia’s Digital Cultures ofVirality
ImranParray
IntroductIon
The proliferation of social media networks and microblogging platforms
powered by Web 2.0 has transformed the way citizens around the world
express opinions and engage in larger political events and conversations.
An undercurrent of this newfound and unltered mode of expression is
exchange of humour, which is embedded in text, talk and visuals, often
directed at political leaders and aimed at criticising and mocking their poli-
cies and actions at moments of sociopolitical, economic or health crises.
This chapter undertakes a critical analysis of the ‘Janata Curfew’ meme,1 a
collection of images and videos circulated on social media platforms in
India and beyond, which mocked Prime Minister Narendra Modi after he
advised his fellow Indians to clap hands and bang plates as a sign of respect
I. Parray (*)
Department of Communication and Journalism, Institute of Home Economics,
University of Delhi, New Delhi, India
e-mail: imran.parray@ihe.du.ac.in
280
for medical workers ghting coronavirus. Because of the multiplicity and
interactivity of communication patterns in India’s digital cultures with an
ever-growing presence of citizens on the Internet,2 Modi’s message
became an instant satirical hit among users on Twitter, Facebook,
WhatsApp and TikTok at the time when medical experts had warned that
Indian government was short of necessary medical infrastructure,
resources, strategies and skills to ght the deadly pandemic (Sharma, 2020).
As it turned out, Modi’s public address was viewed by many online
users as political rhetoric to hide his government’s inefciencies. What fol-
lowed was a barrage of visuals mocking the prime minister and his right-
wing Bharatiya Janata Party government, giving rise to a new popular
meme and a site of huge political contestation. The chapter seeks to study
the ‘Janata Curfew’ meme as a symbolic totality that crystallised a number
of connotative meanings foregrounded in humour, ridicule, satire and
irony. It will analyse signs and codes employed in the visual content, argu-
ing that online users in India derive humour and satire from cultural
industries such as the nation’s lm industry, Bollywood, and the existing
socio-economic and political tensions. Besides humour, however, the
‘Janata Curfew’ meme offered a moment of reection for digitally con-
nected citizens on the state of governance in India and the archaic, rhe-
torical, superstitious and irrational political communication deployed by
high-level political leaders. Furthermore, it will be demonstrated how
armies of users—humans as well as bots—seek to engage with such memes
and indulge in both symbolic resistance and violence. As a consequence,
it’s argued, the lines between humour, ridicule, comedy, trolling and
threats blur in India’s emergent digital cultures.
Humour IntHetImes ofcoVId: metalIsIng
PolItIcal Protest
Apart from ushering in fear and anxiety, which is symbolic of the ‘risk
society’ (Beck, 1992) we live in, the COVID-19 pandemic has also given
rise to humour and laughter, expressed via a multimedia display of visuals
and written text (Nicholls, 2020). The place of humour at the time of a
global grieving—1.64 million deaths have been recorded so far—at once
invokes the impulses of Superiority theory and Release release theory
(Carr, 2020; Fessell, 2020; Nicholls, 2020). In both circumstances,
humour has become a vital communicative act, a catharsis for those who
I. PARRAY
281
are caught in an endless cycle of quarantine and enforced lockdown but
connected with others through the technology of the Internet. However,
a deeper explanation in the overall rise of humour in both the West and
the developing world is the demonstration of ‘gross political ineptitude’
by political leaders and citizens’ distrust of the system (Nicholls, 2020).
Humour has been also directed at government-mandated initiatives to
promote behavioural change, a sense of inclusion and solidarity
(Carr, 2020).
As Boss and t-Hart (2008) show, humour possesses a unique power to
frame social and political protest. Humour acts as a political expression
that helps people cope up with their political struggles (Rehak & Trnka,
2019). It is thus a method through which people resist power.
In the context of India, much of the humour circulated online sur-
rounding the ‘Janata Curfew’ meme took recourse to satire, offering citi-
zens a moment of psychological release by mocking leaders (in this case
Modi). Added to this practice of satire for the sake of satire was the pro-
duction of cartoons and memes that sought to speak “truth to power” in
many different ways (Nicholls, 2020). In fact, the process of production,
reproduction and recirculation of humour serves as, what Philipose (2020)
calls, a “counter-power”, the deployment of which tends to momentarily
‘destabilise’ structures of power and deepen democratic deliberation. Such
expressions of humour online can land artists in trouble as is the case in
India where the government has initiated contempt proceedings against
those mocking the system and its utilities.
announcIng ‘Janata curfew’: coronaVIrus InIndIa
andoffIcIal resPonse
The rst COVID case in India was detected on 27 January 2020 in the
southern state of Kerala, when a 20-year-old woman, who had a travel his-
tory to Wuhan, China, complained of dry cough and sore throat at General
Hospital in Thrissur. Shortly after identifying the symptoms, authorities
admitted the woman to an isolated ward where samples for examination
were collected. After three days, a government laboratory conrmed that
the woman had contracted the virus. After undergoing treatment for over
20 days in a COVID facility, she was discharged from the hospital on
February 20 (Andrews etal., 2020). Despite this initial success story, the
cases of contagion and death were already on the rise, as shown in
Figs.13.1 and 13.2.
13 HUMOUR IN THE AGE OF CONTAGION: CORONAVIRUS
282
According to ofcial estimates, more than 10 million people contracted
coronavirus in India while more than 140,000 have died so far (Ministry
of Health and Family Welfare, 2020). India ranks second worst-affected
country in the world after the USA (Asrar, 2020). Critics of Modi
Fig. 13.1 A matrix of COVID-19 cases in India. (Source: Data repository for
the 2019 Novel Coronavirus Visual Dashboard operated by the Johns Hopkins
University Center for Systems Science and Engineering (JHU CSSE))
Fig. 13.2 A matrix of COVID-19 deaths in India. (Source: Data repository for
the 2019 Novel Coronavirus Visual Dashboard operated by the Johns Hopkins
University Center for Systems Science and Engineering (JHU CSSE))
I. PARRAY
283
including opposition parties slammed the BJP-led government for mis-
handling the crisis while expressing irony that the state was busy hosting
the US President Donald J. Trump when hundreds of thousands of
migrant labourers were facing widespread suffering and death in the wake
of the rising number of cases. Critics suspected that the government was
using the pandemic ‘to convert democracy into autocracy’. A member of
the parliament from All India Trinamool Congress Derek O’Brien thus
remarked, “you need humility ... This government needs humility” (PTI,
2020). O′ Brien’s comment alludes to a certain liminality in moral gover-
nance where the government is expected to at once possess humility and
reason (Button, 2005). The Indian government was criticised for lacking
both. While its citizens were confronted by a broken and inadequate
healthcare system, politicians of the nationalist party continued to invoke
religious mantras for the containment of the virus like drinking cow urine
(Singh, 2020). It was this callous and unscientic approach of the govern-
ment towards COVID-19 that—to turn India’s Chief of Defence Staff
Bipin Rawat’s expression on its head—taught India a ‘lesson’ (Hindustan
Times, 2020). On the economic front, Modi’s ‘irrational’ steps were
widely criticised, with the leaders of opposition saying the country was
plunging into recession while unemployment was increasing (Press Trust
of India, 2019). The rst national lockdown in India was imposed by
Modi for 21days on 24 March. At that point, 600 cases of COVID were
identied while 10 had died. Since the imposition of lockdown, the Indian
economy has plunged into a deep economic crisis with the gross domestic
product shrinking by a record 23.8 per cent as per the Reserve Bank of
India assessment (Wallen, 2020). This situation has pushed an estimated
400 million Indians into poverty. Among India’s 500 million workforce,
around 90 per cent are employed in the informal sector such as construc-
tion. The work of this workforce suddenly came to a grinding halt. As
Wallen (2020) reports, small and medium enterprises were forced to close
their ventures. Sundar and Nilsen (2020) write that Modi’s “callous indif-
ference to the travails of ordinary Indians and preference for symbolic
gestures over a sustained and substantive public health response trans-
formed the pandemic into a humanitarian crisis”.
Instead of delivering, Modi has “exploited the pandemic for repression,
political gain, and corporate proteering” (Sundar & Nilsen, 2020). This
kind of a political performance is seen to t well with “decades of neolib-
eral economic policy” that the BJP has combined with its “politics of
Hindu majoritarian nationalism to distribute vulnerabilities along
13 HUMOUR IN THE AGE OF CONTAGION: CORONAVIRUS
284
hierarchies of class, caste, and regional and religious identity” (Sundar &
Nilsen, 2020). For instance, as Sundar and Nilsen point out, the imposi-
tion of the lockdown helped the government to quell the protest move-
ment against the anti-Muslim Citizenship Amendment Act.
By March 2020, the fast spread of the coronavirus had already assumed
the character of a pandemic. In response, the majority of world leaders
started imposing lockdowns to contain the contagion from spreading. On
19 March 2020, India’s Prime Minister Narendra Modi announced what
he called ‘Janata Curfew’, asking citizens to stay indoors at a later date,
that is, March 22. Modi’s announcement on national television was just a
case of world leaders making themselves politically relevant at a time when
bodies politic of modern nation-states were under enormous challenges to
tackle the microbial onslaught on the human populations. However, what
was interesting in Modi’s message was his plea to citizens to “stand in the
balconies of their houses for ve minutes … and clap as a sign of thanks for
emergency workers” (Indian Express, 2020). This suggestion by the head
of the government, as critics later commented, was a joke in the face of the
predicament, which was about to overwhelm India given the country’s
huge population and citizens’ deep sense of socialisation. To this end,
Modi and his government were found not only inefcient but also indif-
ferent to deal with an impending healthcare crisis, while his initiative, PM
Cares, has been seen by critics as a ‘murky venture,’ nothing short of a
‘black hole’ (Newslaundry, 2020) and ‘a scheme to pad the BJP’s war
chest’ (Sundar & Nilsen, 2020). Modi’s message—which his supporters
from across the country would follow as a duty and in particular celebrities
from the worlds of cinema and cricket would appear on balconies and post
pictures with their families clapping and banging plates—thus became an
instant attraction for meme-hungry users in India’s digital landscape.
The prime minister’s words—like other revelations of “nonsense and
grotesquery on part of our Dear Leaders” (Nicholls, 2020, 313)—pro-
pelled a multimedia storm with memes of different kinds beginning to
appear and circulate on multiple channels. Taken together, this collection
of pictures, graphics and videos assumed the character of a master meme
that carried a common theme and target: Modi’s irrational self. What fol-
lowed the appearance of this meme, apart from its fast spread like a conta-
gion, was its continued repackaging with newer humour congurations in
text and visuals emerging from different vantage points. It is argued that
this totalising meme can be viewed as a political comment at a historical
I. PARRAY
285
moment in India that has been dened by massive citizens’ protests against
the populist policies of the Modi government marked by the controversial
Citizenship Amendment Act and the proposed National Register of
Citizens. On the other hand, what was explicit in this collection of memes
was references to Bollywood lms and soap operas in conveying underly-
ing meaning, which signied the similarity of melodrama in Indian politics
and lm industry. The overall meme can thus be said to contain, following
Terry Eagleton, the shades of both the comic and the serious, creating an
incongruity effect.
InVokIng Bollywood: fIndIng resonance InPoPular
cInema andsoaP oPeras
The totalising meme—that brought to the fore multiple ironies evinced in
photographs, graphics, cartoons, videos and so on—mainly derived its
voice from Bollywood and the soap opera industry of the country. Since
laughter and comedy have played a signicant role in shaping Bollywood
(Ganjoo, 2020), much of the humour employed in the meme was derived
from popular Bollywood lms. Thus, in the recirculated photographs and
graphics, lm and soap opera characters were likened to Modi in order to
emphasise the rhetoric and melodrama that he is accused of often employ-
ing in his speeches. Figure13.3 shows a satirical image in which Modi is
compared with a female character of a soap opera. Modi is shown humili-
ating coronavirus (embodied by another female actor) with his speech,
while China (embodied by a male actor) is seen consoling the heart- broken
female (the virus). After breaking coronavirus’s heart through his clapping
antidote, the male actor (China) turns to Modi embodying a female char-
acter and expresses, “Rula diya na bechari ko” (Made this poor soul cry).
The edited image, widely circulated on the Internet, is signicant in at
least two ways: First, it establishes a spatial relationship between China and
coronavirus as if the two share the same future together. Secondly, it links
Modi’s speech to melodrama because Indian soap operas are often melo-
dramatic and full of exaggeration.
A widely circulated visual that was part of the overall meme drew on a
Bollywood lm, Singham, directed by Rohit Shetty and starring Ajay
Devgan. In the edited image, where the entire meaning is reconstructed
through the addition of text on an original image grab, the main villain
(coronavirus) is seen crying before the protagonist Inspector Bajirao
13 HUMOUR IN THE AGE OF CONTAGION: CORONAVIRUS
286
Singham (reference is to Modi) who seems to have nabbed the politician-
criminal (coronavirus). If this individual meme is humanised, it simply
goes like this: after hearing Modi’s strategy to counter it, coronavirus
cries, saying, “cheating karta hai tu” (you are cheating). This mockery of
the prime minister’s plan is further expanded through the invocation of a
reality television show, ‘Kaun Banega Crorepati,’ hosted by famous Indian
lm actor Amitabh Bachchan who keeps clapping hands and asking mem-
bers of the audience to do so (See Fig.13.4).
Taken together, this collection of pictures seems to mock and satirise
Modi’s suggestion of clapping. To this end, Twitter users compared
Modi’s speech with the popular kids cartoon show “If You’re Happy and
You Know It”, in which the main character suggests children to “clap”
their hands. The invocation of this show has an uncanny resemblance with
Modi’s suggestion to clap and bang plates.
This slice of the totalising meme portrays Modi as a charmer at the time
when the country was underequipped to handle the COVID-19 crisis and
Fig. 13.3 In this edited image, Modi is shown as a soap opera character (original
picture is that of Bollywood lm actress Hema Malini) confronting a third female
character (coronavirus), while China (handsome male) is seen consoling the virus
after a silly bashful by the Indian prime minister. (Source: Twitter)
I. PARRAY
287
when the head of the government was supposed to offer concrete solu-
tions like ensuring optimum healthcare facilities. Instead, Modi’s speeches
appeared theatrical and lmy where he appealed to multiple topics of sen-
timent, thereby moving the situation away from critical treatment. In
response to this, the Internet users sought to ridicule the prime minister
while taking recourse to humour, which allowed citizens to resurrect an
old and complex relationship between humour and ridicule (Billig, 2005).
‘aPne BaaP ko mat sIkHa’: PolItIcal comment
wraPPed InHumour
Apart from individual-specic references to Modi and his politico- scientic
rationality as a leader of the so-called world’s largest democracy, various
parts of the master meme drew on the existing sociopolitical tensions in
Fig. 13.4 The picture
shows Amitabh
Bachchan on the sets of
KBC, a popular reality
show, clapping and
asking audience
members to keep
clapping. It satirises the
Modi government’s
ineffective plans to
contain the virus.
(Source: Twitter)
13 HUMOUR IN THE AGE OF CONTAGION: CORONAVIRUS
288
the country. The term ‘curfew’ in Modi’s announcement of the ‘Janata
Curfew’ struck a familiar chord with users from Indian-administered
Kashmir where the Indian state often imposes long and harsh curfews to
tackle the indigenous struggle for freedom.3 In one widely shared visual
from a lm in which the popular Indian actor Akshay Kumar utters to
someone an oft-repeated phrase “apne baap ko mat sikha”, which is a desi
way to assert one’s superiority in terms of age and wisdom over the other.
It loosely translates as “Don’t teach your dad”.
Through this lm dialogue, online users from the conict region sought
to not only mock the prime minister about what they felt was a worn-out
exercise for them but also highlighted that curfews were commonplace in
the disputed Himalayan territory. Such an engagement, constructed on
humour, satire and parody, catapults users to a position of both as critics
of political power and as creators of popular artwork in the digital realm.
As such this meme has purely political overtones because the political rela-
tionship between Kashmiris and the Indian state has been rather complex.
This complexity has torn down the place. Local journalists, activists and
members of the public in Kashmir are often targeted for their journalistic
work or activism. Therefore, recourse to humour on the Internet is ideal.
Announcements like ‘Janata Curfew’ thus propel their desire to engage in
humour not only as passive participants in recirculating memes but also as
creating newer and remodelling the existing ones, thereby exercising their
agency as active agents in the wider processes of production and transfor-
mation of viral ideas.
gIVIng coronaVIrus aVoIce: ‘I can’t surVIVe tHIs;
IwIll dIe’
Another dimension of the ‘Janata Curfew’ meme was its constant pursuit
to give voice to coronavirus in order to imagine and frame its possible
reactions to Modi’s plan. A viral visual showed popular actor Nawazuddin
Siddique (metaphoric of coronavirus) stuck in an unfriendly place with
danger lurking ahead. The danger referred to in this picture is the clapping
and banging of plates, a component of the prime minister’s plan.
Coronavirus, embodied by Siddique in this image, is shown to fear for his
life because it might not survive the clapping. This predicament facing
COVID is further reected in other visuals in which coronavirus is seen to
surrender to the noise of banging plates. Together, these visuals ridicule
I. PARRAY
289
Modi and express irony over his political leadership that sought to hide in
rhetoric, superstition and irrationality.
Humour as‘counter-Power’: confrontIng tHestate
wItHlaugHter
Memes have been identied as a powerful tool to counter the state and
initiate a political protest (Mina, 2019). Humour and laughter serve as a
powerful tool in social protest (t’Hart, 2007). Responding to Modi’s call
for Janata Curfew, India’s most popular and controversial stand-up come-
dian, Kunal Kamra, tweeted a picture of himself showing his middle nger
to the prime minister’s plan. He captioned the image: “Prepping for
tomorrow”. Kamra has been a ercest critique of the BJP-led government.
In his Janata Curfew satire post, he tweeted on 21 March: “I’m showing
a middle nger to the PM’s marketing stunt at a time like this, epidemic
seems to be unreported & our economy in anyway in state of panic… He
should realise that there is no election around the corner & propose poli-
cies instead of these stunts.” Such kind of humour laced with serious com-
ment has its limits in India. In November 2020, the government of India
initiated a series of contempt proceedings against Kamra, who, according
to the nation’s Attorney General K.K. Venugopal, had insulted the
Supreme Court of India and its chief justice (The Wire Staff, 2020).
Kamra, in his satirical tweets, had posted images that showed the Supreme
Court painted in saffron, the colour symbolic of the ruling right-wing
Bharatiya Janata Party. In the edited image, Kamra had inserted the BJP
ag atop the court.
These images and captions accompanying them were viewed by the
government as an assault on the federal court’s independence. Kamra’s
criticism of the federal court came in the wake of the grant of bail to the
television anchor, Arnab Goswami, who was arrested by the police in the
southern state of Maharashtra for his abetment in the suicide of an archi-
tect and his mother in 2018. Kamra and many others in India raised ques-
tions over the special legal treatment accorded to Goswami—who is
considered a BJP mouthpiece—by the Supreme Court, while the court
uses a different yardstick for those who are languishing in Indian jails with-
out trial.
13 HUMOUR IN THE AGE OF CONTAGION: CORONAVIRUS
290
crossIng lInes: ontHelImIts ofHumour
A core argument of this chapter is that the lines between humour, ridicule,
comedy, trolling and threats are blurring in India’s emergent digital cul-
tures. It is in this context that emphasis is placed on recent memes directed
against Kamra. A viral visual showed a tweet by a user, Divyanshu Saxena,
abusing the artist after the Supreme Court issued another contempt notice
on December 18 against the comedian.
Although such tweets apparently violate community standards, social
media platforms themselves (e.g., Facebook) have been accused of being
complicit in allowing such communicative acts in extreme speech, which
serve Modi’s populist politics (Thakurta & Sam, 2019; Purnell &
Horwitz, 2020).
Apart from abuses on general occasions, the Janata Curfew meme also
gave rise to a few memes on Twitter in which a particular identity of movie
characters was likened to coronavirus. Another viral post showed an elderly
Muslim man being used as a metaphor for coronavirus. Since all others in
the scene are silent in observance of the curfew call, it is the Muslim body
which is at once vilied as virus and non-observant of Modi’s programme.
Such memes, it is argued, can deepen the existing prejudices against
minority communities in India because of the reach of social media. This
meme acted as a prequel to an upcoming action movie. The vilication of
the Muslim body took a more serious turn when in May 2020 leaders of
the BJP claimed that Tablighi Jamaat, a Muslim organisation, was respon-
sible for the spread of the virus. Such claims provided members of the
right-wing BJP “yet another excuse to viciously scapegoat Muslims”
(Sundar & Nilsen, 2020). It has been observed that this scapegoating is
part of the state apparatus of oppressing the Muslim community in the
country.
conclusIon
The chapter explored the Janata Curfew meme as a symbolic totality in
which multiple narratives emerged as a consequence of users’ engagement
with circulation, production and reproduction of humour. The humour
that followed was directed at both Modi’s rationality and his government’s
policies. The Bollywood and soap opera industry offered a great cushion
within which the meme was located. Furthermore, existing political issues
also foregrounded the production of humour and its consumption.
I. PARRAY
291
However, this production of humour carries with itself the danger of tres-
passing other zones which are detrimental not only for democracy but for
humanity itself.
notes
1. A meme, following Richard Dawkins’ conceptualisation, is referred to as the
viral spread of an idea (Dawkins, 2006). At the heart of the term is the
Greek concept ‘minema’, which translates as imitation. Thus, meme as an
idea “transforms from a single event to a shared social phenomenon through
the process of imitation, copying, mimicking, remixing or repackaging”
(Taecharungroj & Nueangjamnong, 2015). The Internet is viewed as a
great site where memes carrying contagious cultural ideas undergo this
process.
2. India, with a population of around 1.4 billion, has been described as a ‘cell
phone nation’ (Jeffrey & Doron, 2013). The mobile telephony is viewed to
have led to a signicant transformation in politics, business and the ordinary
life. The sheer numbers are bafing. Towards the end of 2019, there were
687.62 million Internet users in the country (TRAI, 2020). This number,
according to certain estimates, is expected to further increase to one billion
users by 2025 (Statista, 2020).
3. After the revocation of Article 370 of the nation’s Constitution, which
granted the state of Jammu and Kashmir a semi-autonomous status with the
Indian Union, the Government of India, fearing widespread protests,
imposed months of curfew and a communication blockade, which was
described as the world’s longest ever communications shutdown.
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13 HUMOUR IN THE AGE OF CONTAGION: CORONAVIRUS
295© The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature
Switzerland AG 2021
S. Mpofu (ed.), Digital Humour in the Covid-19 Pandemic,
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-79279-4_14
CHAPTER 14
The Use ofMeme andHashtags onTwitter
Towards Government Response During
theCOVID-19 Curfew Announcement
from1 June to14 June 2020
KeziahWanguiGithinji andJoyceOmwoha
IntroductIon
The Coronavirus Disease (COVID-19) is a respiratory illness which easily
spreads from one person to another. It spreads through contact with drop-
lets produced through the coughing or sneezing of a person or a contami-
nated object or surface. Recent studies indicate that some people infected
with COVID-19 don’t have symptoms and are likely to play a role in its
spread (World Health Organization, 2020). Wuhan, China, reported the
K. W. Githinji (*)
United States International University Africa, Nairobi, Kenya
e-mail: kwangui@usiu.ac.ke
J. Omwoha
Department of Journalism and Media Studies, The Technical University
of Kenya, Nairobi, Kenya
e-mail: joyce.omwoha@tukenya.ac.ke
296
rst case of COVID-19 in the late 2019, leading to a global spread
(KEMRI, 2020). The outbreak of COVID-19 created a global health cri-
sis with a deep impact on how humanity perceives their everyday lives and
the world. The safety measures put in place to contain the spread of the
virus require social distancing by refraining from doing what is human,
which is to nd solace in the company of others. Since 31 December 2019
and as of February 2020, 103,448,210 cases of COVID-19 infections (in
accordance with the applied case denitions and testing strategies in the
affected countries) have been reported, including 2,236,453 deaths
(WHO, 2021).According to the World Health Organization, asof 25th
August 2021, there are 230,794 positivecases and 4564 deaths reported
in Kenya.
The rst COVID-19 case in Kenya was reported on 12 March 2020in
Nairobi, a case of a Kenyan citizen who travelled back to Nairobi from the
United States via London, United Kingdom, on 5 March 2020. Conrming
this was the National Inuenza Centre Laboratory at the National Public
Health Laboratories of the Ministry of Health (KEMRI, 2020). Since the
rst case was reported, the Kenyan government imposed quarantines and
movement restriction around and into the country. The measures contrib-
uted to a slow virus spread, though it led to a near-collapse of Kenya’s
economy. Odhiambo et al. (2020) note that since the rst case of
COVID-19 was reported in Kenya on 13 March 2020, the country, just
like other countries in the world, has been experiencing massive destruc-
tion of the economy in terms of GDP decline and job losses.
Since the outbreak, the Kenyan authorities had been conducting ran-
dom temperature screenings in spaces frequented by the public. Once an
individual displays signs or symptoms of coronavirus, he can self-isolate or
expect to receive such a directive from a health worker. The Kenyan
authorities take such individuals into a State health facility, when they can-
not self-isolate. According to the Government of Kenya, anyone testing
positive for COVID-19, presenting mild symptoms, should self-isolate at
home. To contain the COVID-19 outbreak, Kenya’s President Uhuru
Kenyatta set up a curfew and restricting public gatherings. On 25 March
2020, the government closed schools, airports, mosques and churches;
public gathering restricted, tightening of border controls and imposing of
curfew in urban areas. This may have helped in slowing the spread of the
virus. While the livelihoods of millions of Kenyans who live in urban and
rural areas, depending on face-to-face interaction, were interfered with,
many moved to social media, not only to communicate with the world but
K. W. GITHINJI AND J. OMWOHA
297
also to denounce the chaotic and harsh police enforcement of public
health directives (Chiba, 2020).
According to the new Kenya Economic Update, COVID-19 damaged
the livelihoods of Kenyans, especially youth, women and refugees. One in
three Kenyan workers were working in rms facing risks of permanent or
temporary closure and reduced revenues, thus impacting the vulnerability
of household incomes. COVID-19 pandemic induced social and eco-
nomic disruptions, eroding progress in poverty reduction in Kenya, forc-
ing an estimated 2 million Kenyans into poverty. The World Bank country
director Keith Hansen reported that “COVID-19 poses an unprecedented
shock to the economy, disrupting economic activity”. He continues: “the
government, with the help of partners, needs to ensure that the shock
remains temporary, by targeting support to the most vulnerable affected
households” (World Bank, 2021).
After the initial curfew, the government added more days but extend-
ing the curfew hours from 4am to 9pm effective from 7 June 2020. It
was a week before the announcement that Kenyans on social media showed
different memes trying to convince the president not to extend the curfew
period and hours. The most popular hashtag being #FreedomDay. In his
speech on 6 June 2020 to announce the extension of the curfew, President
Kenyatta mentioned the trending meme on Twitter #FreedomDay. This
brought humour to his speech and to the internet too. According to a
BBC report, published on 9 June 2020, about 1.2 million Kenyans had
lost their jobs since the pandemic hit the country, with many more having
to take pay cuts. The BBC report noted too that many businesses closed
down and families were struggling to make ends meet. With these,
Kenyans anticipated for a day of freedom from lockdown so that they can
go back to their work stations and improve the economy as they make a
livelihood; therefore, the hashtag #FreedomDay was coined to bring
attention to government and to build conversations on Twitter around
the socio-economic impacts of the lockdown and curfew to the citizens.
Humour, depicted in the hashtags and memes around freedom day,
included one of the most shared video clip in Swahili compiled by come-
dian Mtume Orroson, showing him in conversation with the president,
using old sound bites of Mr. Kenyatta completely out of context.
Below is an excerpt (BBC, 2020):
Comedian: Uhuru, when will you set us free?
President: After three weeks …
14 THE USE OF MEME AND HASHTAGS ON TWITTER…
298
Comedian: This is so wrong … you’ve placed us under curfew then
sent police to beat us up.
President: It’s not me … I have not sent anyone …
Comedian: Could you at least open up the clubs only—just for a single
day so I can sanitise (my throat) with one beer. What do I
do when all clubs are shut?
President: Use the back door …
Comedian: Heeey! What if your cops arrest me?
President: You’ll have to defend yourself … and these guys don’t
mess around!
In the same context, a famous tweet by a tweeter user The Impeccable @
RealDerrow, followed by a meme in the form of a video read, “Tomorrow
issa day that the Lord has made … we shall rejoice and be glad in it. Happy
friday. #WorldEnvironmentDay2020 #BlackLivesMatter #CurferKenya
#mutaikagwe #FreedomOfExpression.”
The video contained the song “Freedom Is Coming Tomorrow”, a
soundtrack from the movie Sarana. The content of the video was various
dace moves from the movie, funny dance moves by children politician and
comedians, plus a compilation of sound bites from President Kenyatta’s
previous speeches.
Humour, especially in African context, has often been analysed as a
source of political resistance and social commentary. Comedians and social
commentators use different avenues—memes, impromptu everyday
humour, cartoons, televised satire shows and stand-up comedy—in chal-
lenging the subvert status quo and politicians. For instance, Nigerian car-
toonists, in the midst of coronavirus, have used cartoons specically to
comment on the irony of politicians seeking medical help abroad instead
of using their own local healthcare services (Mwambari & Martin, 2020).
Countries in Africa frequently feature in media for outbreaks and health
crises, the most recent one being the Ebola epidemic in the Democratic
Republic of Congo and West Africa. Both explicit and implicit narratives
framed these epidemics, often pointing to “traditional” social practices
contributing to transmission, hence making it “their own fault”. Europe
narratives about COVID transmissions have pointed the blame on gov-
ernmental and structural issues (Mwambari & Martin, 2020). Mwambari
K. W. GITHINJI AND J. OMWOHA
299
and Martin (2020) continue by asserting that during the West African
Ebola outbreak, many countries in the global North imposed restrictions
and, in some cases, full bans from Ebola-affected areas. Memes, act as
asocial commentary during COVID-19 pandemic, pointing to the dis-
ease’s prominence yet it seems more of a problem in the global North
(Mwambari & Martin, 2020).
A study conducted by Pearce and Hajizada (2014) reveals that humour
involved in a meme can be a tool or a means of protest, containing a state-
ment of disagreement to the government (Pearce & Hajizada, 2014).
Hatab (2016) echoes by noting that memes are used in conveying mes-
sages of disagreement, disseminated through the internet. The spread of
memes containing disapproval is also used as messages for reaching a wider
audience. Hatab (2016) further illustrates that the humour used during
the Tunisia revolution between 2010 and 2011 was a mobilization through
social media, in which political satire was widely used in starting up a con-
versation or discourse in social media through humour in languages that
contain puns, synonyms, antonyms, lexical ambiguity and rhyme.
Meme involves the perspective of social groups; memes shape the mind-
set and forms of behaviour (Gal et al., 2016). A study conducted by
Boxman-Shabtai and Shifman (2016) showed that memes tend to show
global content rather than pure local content. Memes using themes of
animals, sex and gender tend to dominate digital humour in the form of
memes. Hashtags on the other hand are used to highlight keywords,
phrases and tweets, with the intention of categorizing tweets so that they
can be searched easily.
Hashtags are used as symbols of dark humour; humour representing a
horrible situation or a shocking phenomenon, which is said to illuminate
the dark areas of society but includes satire.
In this study, we looked at the use of memes and hashtags on Twitter
towards government response during the COVID curfew announcement
from 1 June to 14 June 2020. The research answered the following
questions:
Q1 Why are memes and hashtags used as forms of communication
on Twitter?
Q2 How did Kenyans on Twitter use hashtags and memes to communi-
cate to the government before the president’s curfew announcement on
6 June 2020?
14 THE USE OF MEME AND HASHTAGS ON TWITTER…
300
Q3 In what way were memes and hashtags used to express Kenyans’ per-
ception towards the president’s curfew extension?
MeMe concept
Memes come from an ancient Greek word meaning “something imitated”.
Speech acts are studied in the pragmatics eld research, which describes
pragmatics as the study of “what speakers mean” and emphasizes that
communication depends on “not only recognizing the meaning of words
in an utterance, but recognizing what speakers mean by their utterances”
Yule (2006, 112). The meme concept is an academic concept coined by
Richard Dawkins in 1976. It is a gene-centred approach to cultural evolu-
tion dened as a “unit of cultural transmission”. The meme concept is
everywhere on the internet; it relates to certain kinds of jokes, images or
trends (Castaño Díaz, 2020). Memes are a common way for people to
communicate online. Internet users frequently use memes to respond to
each other on social networking sites or other online forums. When creat-
ing memes with specic semiotic resources used, the internet community
interprets the resources to facilitate between the internet community and
the meme creator.
Internet memes are a ubiquity of social media across different techno-
logical devices such as mobile phones, tablets, computers, mobile phones
and ordinary devices, re-shaped by internet mobile technology. Due to
new media, a meme can take the form of audio-visual material through
animations and videos, and still-images. Examples of audio-visual memes
include Downfall of “Hitler reacts to …”, a modied video sequence from
the German drama, Constantine Film, German 2004. The lm section
features Adolf Hitler losing his temper and scolding his commanders, who
all become the focus of the parodies. For instance, “Ben Afeck cast as
Batman” and “Twilight the Movie” (2009) are some of the examples of
video memes that individuals use and are also on social media.
Memes are a shorthand for humour; they are created with the aware-
ness of each other and are circulated through the internet by many users.
When memes are created, they can easily be retweeted and circulate on
social media (cf. Huntington, 2016: 78; Shifman, 2013: 41). Memes are
used as online humour and typically regarded as involving constant trans-
formation, which is what distinguishes them from virals, which spread
across digital media in a form that is unchanged (e.g. Dynel, 2016a;
Shifman, 2013; Wiggins, 2019).
K. W. GITHINJI AND J. OMWOHA
301
Educational establishments and banks use memes for marketing pur-
poses; thus, the trend invites a systematic media scrutiny and poses as a
mature cultural phenomenon (Bury, 2016). Despite the enshrined legiti-
macy, internet memes are still in infancy. Electronic ephemera and online
sources have the most dynamic and comprehensive sources of information
on internet memes as opposed to academic publications. Websites present
a rich source of primary data on internet memes; however, Davison (2012)
recognizes there are many notable online meme sources. The internet
memes lack an accurate denition, especially as a cultural device proving to
be inconsistent (Cannizzaro, 2020).
Studies argue that humour is a crucial method of communication quite
important for emotional and mental well-being. There are other studies
linking the notion of the internet and humour therapy (Louie & Kost,
2010; Dionigi & Canestrari, 2018; Cropley & Galloway, 2001).
twItter
Twitter is a social media tool allowing users to receive and send messages
of no more than 140 characters in length, called “tweets”. In August 2014
Twitter had 271 million users, and as it grows in popularity, it has become
a tool for disseminating research and teaching among college professors
(Priem etal., 2012), and as of 2021, Twitter has 330 million users (Sehl,
2021). Twitter users follow other users so as to subscribe to their content
(thought tweets). As a Twitter user one can create their own tweets or
retweet the information tweeted by other users. Retweeting means infor-
mation is efciently shared with many people. Many people initially won-
dered how they could use it, but it has now become the social media
platform of choice for many. The nature of tweets is mostly for smart-
phone users who are not interested in reading long content items on
screen. The tweets can be disseminated by either an individual, group or
organization. Insights into non-academic aspects of one’s life can help
make one an interesting person to follow. If one is tweeting on behalf of
an organization, project or group, then they may choose only to send
research-related tweets. ESRC (2020) says that Twitter is an informal
communications tool and encourages people to embrace a personal,
friendly, and humorous approach to tweeting (ESRC, 2021). Twitter
presents new research sites providing billions of data points to research.
Twitter is a great avenue for consideration for public data due to its promi-
nence in social computing research (Fiesler & Proferes, 2018). It’s
14 THE USE OF MEME AND HASHTAGS ON TWITTER…
302
popular due to its availability. Compared to Twitter, Facebook has more
users, though it has more strict limits in its application programming
interface (API; Fiesler etal., 2017).
Twitter is a successful platform for research, resulting in knowledge and
studies on topics such as disease tracking (Lamb etal., 2013; Signorini etal.,
2011), disaster events (Kogan et al., 2016; Sakaki et al., 2010; Palen &
Starbird, 2011), election prediction and stock market (Bollen etal., 2011;
Tumasjan etal., 2010), hence classied as elitist. It has resulted in scholars
and researchers using Twitter content (prole information and tweets) in
examining all sorts of aspects of human interaction. Prior research shows
Twitter users have restricted understandings of how the public content
might be used (Felt, 2016; Zimmer & Proferes, 2014). As compared to
other social media platforms, Twitter users imagine many people are reading
their tweets and that may not be the reality (Bernstein et al., 2013; Litt,
2012; Marwick & boyd, 2011). According to Proferes (2017), some
Twitter users may not realize that what they tweet is viewable. The users
that have under-protected accounts, meaning their tweets are only viewed
by their followers, though, may endure privacy violations through retweets
(Meeder etal., 2010). Unfortunately, Twitter privacy is an issue, as informa-
tion may leak accidentally through users, such as tweeting under the inu-
ence (Mao etal., 2011).
Background andcontext
Twitter Users inKenya
The social media statistics highlight that social media takes the following
percentage of users: Facebook 37.84%, Twitter 24.85%, Pinterest 23.74%.
The above statistics are social media statistics as of November 2020.
Studies show that Kenya has the second most active Twitter users in Africa
(Stats, 2020), with active users famously known as Kenyans of Twitter
(KOT). When it comes to Twitter usage, South Africans are the most
prolic with 5,939,226 tweets, considering it is the continent’s biggest
economy. Kenya is the second most active country with 2,476,800 tweets.
Nigeria has only 1,646,212 tweets from its 160 million people, followed
by 1,214,062 and Morocco with 745,620 tweets. About 20–40years is
the age of Twitter users in Africa, while 57% of the tweets are from mobile
phones. Kenya’s politician Raila Odinga and President Paul Kagame of
Rwanda are Twitter users, including President Uhuru Kenyatta from
K. W. GITHINJI AND J. OMWOHA
303
Kenya. Kagame got into an infamous Twitter spat in 2012 with journalist
Ian Birrell of The Guardian of London, with the two trading tweets about
human rights and repression in the central African nation. Kagame’s for-
eign minister initiated the cyber-conversation that went global. The fact
that politicians use social media allows Twitter users to engage with them.
There is a lack of hierarchy and Twitter users can ask their leaders ques-
tions and comment without any form of fear. In relation to this study, the
Twitter users used memes concerning the curfew, hoping the information
would reach the president and the government leaders concerning not
extending the curfew. Kenyan ghters and soldiers of an extremist Somali
Islamist group have been at loggerheads with each other. Representatives
from both parties have taken the battle onto Twitter, with insults, taunts
and accusations being directly traded in an infrequent engagement on the
internet. “How Africa Tweets” is a research done that found Twitter is
helping in joining new links within Africa. Beatrice Karanja, head of
Portland Nairobi, said: “We saw the pivotal role of Twitter in the events in
North Africa last year, but it is clear that Africa’s Twitter revolution is
really just beginning” (Joe etal., 2020).
Kenyan politicians are using Twitter as a means of communication to the
public, especially the youth, and have realized the power of social media.
According to a Kenyan news article published on 20 April 2020, it shows
that William Ruto, the deputy president in Kenya, has 2.9 million followers.
He is the second most popular person on Twitter after President Kenyatta.
Dr. Ruto built his base by interacting with Kenyans on his day- to- day activi-
ties, he has been using social media to attack his perceived and real political
enemies. President Kenyatta had many followers, but after being bullied, he
deactivated his account. According to the East African Standard publication
on 22 March 2019, President Kenyatta’s account was closed after communi-
cation from State House stating that the president’s social media accounts
had been hacked. Being the most followed African leader on Twitter, the
blackout sparked speculation that his handle, @UKenyatta with 3.62 million
followers, may have been debarred by the microblogging site. This is after a
tweet on corruption from @UKenyatta handle that, according to Kenyans
online, was seen as targeting his deputy William Ruto. The last tweet from
President Kenyatta’s account before it was suspended read:
If you are corrupt we will ght you. You can be my brother or my sister or my
closest political ally but if you are corrupt we will ght you. I won’t be clouded
14 THE USE OF MEME AND HASHTAGS ON TWITTER…
304
by ethnicity or status in my quest to leave behind a united nation and I will
continue championing for Kenya’s unity.
Raila Odinga, an active politician for about three decades, accompanied
with his parable peppered speeches as a means of communication. He has
2.5 million followers and has transferred his popularity “on the ground”
on Twitter. As much as he communicates in parables, he has not changed
this style on social media. The embattled Nairobi governor Mike Sonko
has 1 million followers. He has managed to divert trafc to his Twitter
pages through interacting with his followers in simple Sheng and Swahili
languages, posting controversial or exciting videos, or basing his critics.
Former senate’s majority leader Kipchumba Murkomen has 1 million fol-
lowers. He is a close ally of DP Ruto and a government critic, earning
popularity on Twitter. He has often used the platform to invite his follow-
ers into his farm and living room. Hassan Joho, the charismatic Mombasa
governor, has 896,000 followers. He has endeared his followers with his
opulence, class and rened taste of fashion (Joe etal., 2020). Hence, this
becomes clear that politicians and leaders are active on Twitter and can
communicate easily with their followers.
theoretIcal andconceptual FraMework
This research is predicated upon the social exchange theory, which is
dened by George Homans (1961) as being inuenced by sociological per-
spective and social psychology. The theory states that a relationship between
two people is created through a process of cost-and-benet. This means for
each individual the effort is poured into a person-to-person relationship.
The theory views exchange as a social behaviour that may result in both
social and economic outcomes. Online social networking is an ideal appli-
cation of social networking theory. Researchers nd that a positive social
inuence to use an online community increases online community self-
disclosure; reciprocity increases self-disclosure; online community trust
increases self-disclosure; privacy risk beliefs decrease self-disclosure.
Social media reects the opinions and beliefs of the users; the Twitter
users in Kenya reect their opinions and beliefs concerning the lockdown.
The theory helps in explaining how the political and non-political memes
on Twitter are used to reect the perception of Twitter users concerning
the lockdown. The study examined the specic impacts of memes’ visual/
textual form and political nature on affect and perceptions of memes’
K. W. GITHINJI AND J. OMWOHA
305
persuasiveness. In doing so, this study also examined the role of humour
through memes reecting their political opinions concerning the lock-
down extension.
Methodology
COVID-19 case was rst reported in Kenya in March 2020, and it was at
this time that the government declared a curfew of 21days up to 6 June
2020 from 5am to 7pm. After the curfew the government added more
days, but extended the time from 4 am to 9 pm effective from 7 June
2020. It was a week before the announcement that Kenyans on social
media created and shared different memes in order to convince the
President of Kenya to postpone the curfew. President Kenyatta on 6 June
2020, during the announcement of the extension of the curfew, men-
tioned a trending meme on social media, to be specic, Twitter
#FreedomDay. Hence, the researcher will look at the memes on social
media, to be specic, Twitter #FreedomDay, focusing on one week before
the announcement of the extension of the curfew and one week after the
announcement on 6 June 2020.
Purposive sampling (also known as judgement, selective or subjective
sampling) is a sampling technique in which a researcher relies on his or her
own judgement when choosing members of a population to participate in
the study (Black, 2010). It was done for the study from 1 June 2020 to 14
June 2020, the research covered tweets and retweets of memes seven days
after the announcements, which portrayed the response of the Kenyans
concerning the government’s response and the comments towards the
memes. The researcher looked at the Twitter comments and highlighted
several hashtags with regard to the announcement. The researcher used
random sampling for data collection to analyse memes and attached
hashtags. On Twitter, hashtags and memes can reach many people through
retweets and tweets. The researcher interpreted the meaning of the users
through memes concerning the president’s decision towards the curfew
and a reaction seven days after the extension of the curfew.
data presentatIon andanalysIs
The amount of memes currently circulating on the internet and social
media is enormous. Meme creation platforms such as Memegenerator.net
make it possible for anyone to create a meme. However, while the
14 THE USE OF MEME AND HASHTAGS ON TWITTER…
306
numbers of possible meme types are unlimited, the number of standard
meme types is actually quite small (Shifman, 2013, 342). A standard meme
refers to a meme that becomes well known and is frequently used by the
internet community as a whole. This chapter looked at the use of memes
and hashtags on Twitter towards government response during the
COVID-19 announcement from 1 June to 14 June 2020.
The intention of the speaker is described as what the speaker wants the
reader or hearer to recognize in a communication. The politicians in
Kenya have resorted to Twitter because they realized the power of com-
municating to the masses on Twitter. As opposed to speaking to the public
openly during, for instance, rallies, Twitter helps the politician reach a
large number of people with any form of geographical boundary. The
other advantage is a politician is able to get direct feedback from his or her
followers, which may assist in knowing the mentality of individuals per-
taining to certain issues.
Memes as a voice clearly show that they represent the opinions of the
user. The intention of a speaker can be described as that which the speaker
wants the hearer or reader to recognize in a communication. For instance,
when we interpret the meaning of a text (written or spoken) of a Twitter
user, we do not only consider the words or utterances used to communi-
cate the message, but also rely on what we think the writer or the speaker
intended to communicate.
Therefore, social exchange theory proposes that social behaviour is
usually as a result of an exchange process. The aim of the exchange is to
either minimize costs or maximize benets. People aim in weighing the
potential risks and benets of social relationships. Focusing on the theory
that grounds this research, the aim of the different memes and hashtags
used on Twitter was to get President Kenyatta’s attention, to convince
him not to extend the curfew, on the one hand, and, on the other hand,
to air the citizen’s grievances and frustrations. Therefore, the users used
these memes with his photo attached to get his attention. Below are exam-
ples of some of the memes used with President Kenyatta’s face before 7
June 2020.
In one meme President Uhuru was called His excellency, Their daddy,
Commander-in-Chief, Uhuru mwenyewe, msee wa mashati (a man with
beautiful shirts), Chancellor wa Ma-Uni (chancellor of universities), and
it ends by stating he should not disappoint the citizens. Humour is used
in the form of praising the president’s appearance and intellect, urging
him not to disappoint Kenyans by extending the curfew. In another meme
K. W. GITHINJI AND J. OMWOHA
307
he was shown looking at his watch, interpreted as him waiting for the right
time to make the dreaded announcement. The rst meme illustrates the
need to pamper the president so that he would relax the restrictions on
movement and curfew. Here, Kenyans are hoping that he there will be no
curfew extension. The anxiety of the Kenyans on Twitter (KOT) was
based on the fact that they were expecting the president not to extend
the curfew.
A tweet by Arap Liwliw (@arap_liwliw). His Excellency president Uhuru
Kenyatta was expected to address the nation at 3pm, State House Time.
The hashtags that followed this meme were: #UhuruDontLiftLockdown
#UhuruDONTOpen #CurfewinKenya. Part of the curfew instruction was
restriction to public places, including bars, and there was a meme showing
President Kenyatta drinking beer and this was a way of asking him to open
taverns. The president himself is known for allegedly loving his alcoholic
drinks and this is an outcry for the opening of social places so that people
like him can enjoy themselves.
Here, the authors use the social exchange theory that views exchange
as a social behaviour that may result in both social and economic out-
comes. The theory helps to explain how online social networking is an
ideal application of the social networking theory. A positive social inu-
ence to use an online community increases online community self-
disclosure; reciprocity increases self-disclosure; online community trust
increases self-disclosure; privacy risk beliefs decrease self-disclosure.
Humour onTwitter
Humour is known as a universal phenomenon exhibited by most cultures.
Humour primarily consists of jokes that are either written or spoken words
and actions which generate mirth and elicit laughter; the actions can be
described in words (Critchley, 2002; Ritchie, 2004). Given that qualitative
research is characterized by a heavy dependence on data that are word
based (interviews, observer notes, documents, manuscripts etc.), this
therefore posits that humour analysis has potential as an investigative qual-
itative research tool. There are dozens of different denitions of humour.
Romero and Cruthirds (2006, 59) dene humour as “amusing communi-
cations that produce positive emotions and cognitions in the individual,
group, or organization”, and Crawford (1994, 57) denes humour as any
communication generating an effective response or positive cognitive
from listeners. Just as.
14 THE USE OF MEME AND HASHTAGS ON TWITTER…
308
After the infamous 6th June announcement, many Kenyans on Twitter
showed their disappointment concerning the curfew extension.
“Fellow Kenyans” was the president’s famous statement while address-
ing the nation. Registering their disappointment to the president, Kenyans
created the meme of a boy who seems to be crying bitterly, telling the
president not to refer to Kenyans as “fellow Kenyans” anymore because
his act of extending the curfew indicates that Kenyans and the president
are no longer on friendly terms.
Figure 14.1 shows a meme shared by @snnyamao on his Twitter account
with an image of kick boxers ghting, captioned, “#UhuruKenyatta right
on the face of Kenyans...! #wanjohi #CurfewinKenya”, magnifying the
betrayal and pain of curfew extension by President Uhuru on 6 June 2020.
It was likened to a kick on the citizens’ face. As the meme went viral, this
was a clear indication that the announcement that President Uhuru gave
was received with disappointment.
Figure 14.2 is a meme referencing slay queens. Humour is made using
slay queens as an example. A slay queen is a girl who lives a lavish life at the
Fig. 14.1 @snnyamaoUhuruKenyatta right on the face of Kenyans...! #wanjohi
#CurfewinKenya’
K. W. GITHINJI AND J. OMWOHA
309
cost of an older man, mostly a married man. With the lockdown and cur-
few, their movement have been restricted; hence, they are not in a position
to sustain their lifestyles. The meme illustrates displeasure on the presi-
dent’s unfavourable announcement, which affected the economic lives of
some citizens.
COVID-19 humour exists too with daily reports on the infection num-
bers and the death toll, which may be considered as dark humour (Bischetti
etal., 2020); the humour is about—or at least, produced or inspired by
the context of—grave topics, illness and deaths (Dynel & Poppi, 2018).
Even though the appreciation, that is, funniness versus aversiveness, of
COVID-19 humour must rely on various factors, some of them being the
distance from the epicentre (Bischetti etal., 2020) and the very nature of
a given specimen (e.g. whether or not it addresses the topic of death or
disease per se), the prevalence of this humour on social media indicates its
social signicance.
People resisted lockdown through memes and blamed experts for ill
advising the president. In a tweet with a man carrying stones ready to
ght, Fidel Castro @I_amdel tweeted, “Another 30 days of premium
tears. Wanjohi has acknowledged the meme industry #wanjohi #Another30
#UhuruDontLiftLockdown #UhuruKenyatta #6thjune.” The comment
Fig. 14.2 Kelly Nivex @ndubinivex June 6. “Current Situation for slay queens
with curfew extension” #UhuruKenyatta #6thjune #wanjohi
14 THE USE OF MEME AND HASHTAGS ON TWITTER…
310
here is that people were at war against experts who advised the president
to extend the lockdown. The meme is accompanied by hashtags just show-
ing the disappointment Kenyans have on Twitter—for instance,
#Another30, which in a humorous way depicts another 30days of what
Kenyans termed as suffering.
The meme that attracted the hashtag #premiumtears, a clear indication
that the decision made by the president is a disappointment to the Kenyans
on Twitter, showed a jean button on which was written “it will end in
tears”. The disappointment of Kenyans on Twitter concerning the curfew
extension is represented by tears (Omondi, 2020); premium tears, experi-
enced after the memes failed to sway the president to lift the lockdown
and curfew. What is worth noting is that all the memes on Twitter were
used to contain aspects of humour; the messages are clearly highlighted so
that the communication process takes place.
Hashtags onSocial Media
A hashtag is symbolized by the sign (#) and is usually used on Twitter to
call attention to social media users for multi-participation in certain topics
so as to mobilise those interested to join the conversation. On Twitter,
“#” is used at the beginning of an unbroken word or phrase, creating a
hashtag. The use of hashtags in a tweet often is linked to all other tweets
that include it. Inclusion of a hashtag gives a tweet conversation longevity
and a tweet context. Therefore, hashtags are used for the purpose of the
tweet conversation longevity and a tweet context. Hashtags are important
on Twitter for helping users organize and sort their tweets. They indicate
that the content is relevant to a certain topic, with the aiming of getting
the tweet in front of an interested audience.
According to the social exchange theory, dened by George Homans,
a relationship between two people is created through a process of cost-
and- benet. The theory views exchange as a social behaviour that may
result in both social and economic outcomes. Online social networking is
an ideal application of the social networking theory. Researchers nd that
a positive social inuence to use an online community increases online
community self-disclosure; reciprocity increases self-disclosure; online
community trust increases self-disclosure; privacy risk beliefs decrease self-
disclosure. In Kenya, the ofcial government communication on Twitter
is @StateHouseKenya with 1.2 million followers. The author of this
K. W. GITHINJI AND J. OMWOHA
311
chapter selected the #FreedomDay in order to narrow down on the memes
and hashtags used between 1 June and 14 June 2020. President Uhuru, in
his speech on 7 June 2020, said: “I have seen your ‘freedom day’ memes,
let us have patience.” This was proof that the president was able to see the
memes on Twitter, making reference to them in his address Other hashtags
that came up related to #FreedomDay are as follows:
#June6th #StaySafe #CurfewinKenya #tuwabebe #wabebe #UhuruAddress
#UhuruDontLiftLockdown #wanjohi #lockdownextension #UhuruDONT-
Open #UhuruKenyatta right on the face of Kenyans...!
Also the institutions or individuals that were tagged during this
#FreedomDay are:
@UhuruKenyatta, @ministry of education, @magoha. Magoha served as
the Minister of Education at this time. This chapter analysed memes portray-
ing the attitude of Kenya on Twitters regarding the curfew. The majority of
the memes do not want President Kenyatta to extend the curfew. The main
reason most Kenyans on Twitter did not want President Kenyatta to extend
the curfew was mostly because most of them wanted to stay late in social
gatherings. Hence, that became a problem to many Kenyans on Twitter.
Before the president’s statement concerning COVID-19, the majority of the
Kenyans on Twitter used memes to communicate to the president not to
extend the curfew through using hashtags such as #June6th#StaySafe
#CurfewinKenya #tuwabebe #wabebe #UhuruDontLiftLockdown #wan-
johi #lockdownextension #UhuruDONTOpen #UhuruKenyatta right on
the face of Kenyans...!
Minimal memes leaned towards telling the president to extend the cur-
few and lockdown. Below are some of the tweets that the Twitters in
Kenyan sent. An account known as Kenyans On Twitter retweeted a mes-
sage from Uhuru Kenyatta concerning 6th June as a response to the
memes of Twitter users in Kenya before he made an announcement:
Kenyans On Twitter Retweeted
Uhuru Kenyatta Commentary
@UhuruKE
Morning Kenyans, I am aware today is #June6th even without all the
reminders :). For the love of God, relax. Please remember, my number one
responsibility is keeping all Kenyans alive. I will address the nation later
in the day. Again, relax and #StaySafe
14 THE USE OF MEME AND HASHTAGS ON TWITTER…
312
conclusIon
Per COVID statistics on 7 June 2020, Kenya has recorded a high of 167
positive cases out of the 2833 samples tested in the last 24hours. The total
number of positive cases while this study was carried out stood at 2767. At
that point, the government had tested 97, 340 samples. Out of the 167
cases 125 were males and 42 females, where the youngest was 11months
old and the oldest was 75 years. About 21 days later, 29 June 2020, out of
the 41 counties that have reported COVID-19 positive cases, Nairobi still
led with 3031, followed by Mombasa with 1445, Busia 407, Kajiado 242
and Kiambu 222. Most of the remaining 36 counties reported cases below
100 (Ministry of Health, 2020). The COVID cases continued increasing
but based on the statistics given, the lockdown and curfew prevented the
cases from going as high as was expected. Hence, as much as Kenyans
complained on Twitter about the president’s curfew extension to observe
COVID measures and restrictions, it was instrumental towards reducing
the number of infections. Modern memes are perceived as a humorous
image that is copied, with slight variations, and quickly shared across the
internet. Funny pictures and jokes are enjoyed by all, but are they actually
important in social media communication? This study revealed that memes
provide a unique snapshot into the cultural events of a moment in time.
Some memes rotate for years, while others live a short, but often explosive
life. Memes offer users the opportunity to make a reference to an estab-
lished inside joke that the entire internet is a part of. Memes carr y more
power than meets the eye. Contemporary popular culture has chosen to
baptize the phenomenon which sees certain digital media texts going
“viral” and being collectively remixed as “internet memes”. This choice of
term is indebted to Dawkins’ theory of culture-as-memes as proposed in
his book The Selsh Gene, and later supported by scholars of emetics.
This chapter has highlighted how Kenyans on Twitter have used memes
and hashtags on Twitter towards government response during the
COVID-19 curfew announcement from 1 June to 14 June 2020. Most
Kenyans before 6 June 2020 did not want the president to extend the
curfew and were not afraid to show it through memes. After the curfew
extension, many Kenyans on Twitter were disappointed, and it reected
on the memes they used. Disappointment notwithstanding, memes and
hashtags offered comic relief that helped the society to heal and cope with
the negative effects of the pandemic, which include deepened inequalities,
loss of jobs, ill health, domestic violence and death.
K. W. GITHINJI AND J. OMWOHA
313
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14 THE USE OF MEME AND HASHTAGS ON TWITTER…
319© The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature
Switzerland AG 2021
S. Mpofu (ed.), Digital Humour in the Covid-19 Pandemic,
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-79279-4_15
CHAPTER 15
Dark Humour, Ubuntu andtheCOVID-19
Pandemic: ACase ofSubaltern Humouring
ofPolitical Elite Deaths onSocial Media
ShepherdMpofu
IntroductIon
The COVID-19 pandemic, as expressed in almost all chapters in this vol-
ume, saw world economies show decline, many people losing their lives or
loved ones, and environments being changed from normal to the ‘new
normal’. In the process, the spread of fake news about the virus and sub-
sequent vaccines, and humorous celebration of the death of those consid-
ered public enemies found fertile ground on social media and other
alternative public spheres. COVID-19 affected most countries around the
globe, especially at the start of 2020, and in the process, they went on
lockdown, whereby people’s livelihoods, economies and educational and
social lives were impacted as some lost their means of income (Matsilele,
2021). In the process some companies, especially technology companies
and courier companies, made booming prots as people’s homes became
S. Mpofu (*)
University of Limpopo, Polokwane, South Africa
e-mail: shepherd.mpofu@ul.ac.za
320
ofces and ‘working from home’ became an oft-repeated phrase and rit-
ual. Citizen creativity, or as Hartley (2010) prefers to call it, silly citizen-
ship, as most chapters here demonstrate, became the order of the day as
people tried to cope with the pandemic, to critique government and polit-
ical leaders, and to share thoughts, news and fears about the pandemic
and, later on, about the vaccine. In some cases Global South citizens made
jokes about the global order to the effect that the pandemic was an equal-
izer and therefore the vaccine was going to be created quicker than that of
Ebola since it affected the Global North as well. In fact, many lives were
lost in many Western countries due to the pandemic and the vaccine was
created within a year. This was in comparison to the lack of urgency by
especially the Global North in nding a cure for Ebola, which affected
mostly West African countries (Mwambari & Martin, 2020). As Mwambari
and Martin observe: ‘[D]uring the West African Ebola epidemic too, peo-
ple were victimized on a global scale. The outbreak led to a mass hysteria
in the global North, leading many countries to impose restrictions and, in
some cases, full bans from Ebola-affected areas’ (2020). The humorous
engagements with the pandemic offered truthful critiques to the global
order, demonstrating an understanding and keen observation of the func-
tioning of the world by ordinary Africans.
The COVID-19 pandemic, according to the World Health Organization
(WHO) (2020), is the rst pandemic globally to take place in a digital age
and therefore making the distribution of information problematic in a con-
text where even citizens are in a position to act as journalists and spread
information. Thus, as citizen journalists, citizens are able to use hand-held
technological gadgets such as cameras and cell phones, or y drones enabled
with video capturing, storage and other software to gather, edit and dissemi-
nate news. Citizen journalism, even though a slippery term to dene
(Mpofu, 2015; De Burgh, 2005; Deuze, 2005; Steensen, 2011; De Beer,
2004), is seen as a participatory culture that has redened the profession
and practice of journalism (Mpofu, 2019a, b, c; Mutsvairo, 2016). Citizen
digital storytelling and expression saw the rise of fake news, conspiracy theo-
ries and humorous engagement with each other and the political leaders.
This spread of conspiracy theories and fake news was not limited to the
Global South; neither was it an isolated event. The then US President
Donald Trump was accused of peddling false information and conspiracy
theories (Mahdawi, 2020; Bomey, 2020). Trump was against the wearing of
masks, did not promote social distancing and had a negative attitude towards
lockdown for political motives. However, he was vocal in announcing the
S. MPOFU
321
soon coming of the COVID-19 vaccine. In Zambia the government
embarked ‘on a crackdown against people spreading false information con-
cerning the COVID-19’ (Anon, 2020); in Mauritius the Information and
Communication Technology Act was used to punish those who spread false
news. In South Africa those who spread false news were also arrested under
the laws promulgated to contain the spread of the virus by controlling
human behaviour and economic activity through various stages of lock-
down. Elijah Muthui Kitonyo, a Kenyan man was arrested after he
published the fake news on a fabricated Twitter account. A tweet said the
Kenyan health ministry lied about the rst conrmed case in the country
coming from the US via London. It said the patient was coming from Rome.
The directorate of criminal investigations conrmed the arrest, adding that
contravention of Kenya’s cyber laws could result in a ne of R830,000, a
10-year jail sentence, or both. (Senne, 2020)
The spread of fake news and governments’ reactions cast into sharp
light the debates on freedom of expression and the role of citizens in mod-
erating their conversations without the heavy-handed interventions from
authorities. Amnesty International (2020) reports that two bloggers were
arrested in Tunisia as they faced
several criminal charges of ‘insulting state ofcials’, ‘causing disturbances to
the public’ and defamation. They have been charged for posting videos on
social media alleging that the government has failed to provide adequate
compensation to people struggling nancially and address shortage of basic
food supplies in the market amid COVID-19 pandemic. (2020)
In some cases, people shared sarcastic or comic posts on social media
and were arrested for spreading fake news (Sophie, 2020). The attacks on
freedom of expression by the state also extended to professional journalists
in countries such as Zimbabwe, Nigeria, Egypt and Somalia. The pan-
demic led to the weaponization of the pandemic and undermining of
human rights in some countries.
Besides the sharing of fake news and disinformation, social media were
used by politicians and everyday citizens to share commentary about
COVID-19 in serious or humorous ways. Social media, as Davis et al.
argue, ‘have fostered new forms of … communication and participation.
These communicative forms take on the conventions of internet culture,
15 DARK HUMOUR, UBUNTU AND THE COVID-19 PANDEMIC: A CASE…
322
which include wit, parody, sarcasm, co-optation, and playful memication
as “economics of laughter have become inextricably entangled with civic
processes”’ (2018, 3900). This chapter asks and answers the following
questions: How were the good and bad leaders humorously mourned?
What readings, in the context of ubuntu, of dark humour can be made on
the way South African and Zimbabwean politicians were mourned? Next
I explore the practice of citizen journalism and effects thereof in relation
to humour and COVID-19 pandemic.
SubalterneIty, cItIzen dISSIdence andubuntu
Social media have played different roles in politics, including as a space for
resistance against the government atrocities and memory suppression
(Ndlovu, 2017a, b; Ndlovu, 2018; Theocharis etal., 2015; Mpofu, 2014,
2015, 2019a, b, c), as sites for resistance and protest planning (Shirky, 2011;
Mpofu, 2017), and as citizens’ sites for critiquing the government of the
day and expressing themselves during elections (Stein, 2013; Poell, 2014;
Jungherr etal., 2016; Mpofu, 2019b) and undermining or rebelling against
governments (Matsilele & Ruhanya, 2020; Guobin, 2009; Cross, 2016;
Matsilele, 2019). Dissidents are seen as traitors and enemies of the state
especially if they depart from the political elite authored script of what it
means to be a citizen. These alternative media platforms have provided ave-
nues for the subaltern, ‘those groups in society who are lacking autonomous
political power’ (Smith, 2010, 39), ‘leading to their alienation’ (Mpofu,
2015, 83). Ordinary citizens are alienated in most countries, especially in
the Global South, leading to them creating subaltern communicative ave-
nues, the subaltern public spheres (Fraser, 1992), to undermine the author-
ity’s use of mainstream media to communicate biased viewpoints, creating,
in the process, narratives that rail against the grain. In some cases govern-
ments’ control and laws during the COVID-19 lockdowns were considered
unreasonable, suppressing people’s voices and rights—hence the use of
alternative spheres to undermine the laws. Mpofu adds:
The process of acquiring a voice where there is ofcial silencing by the state
could be empowering, therapeutic and humanizing. Silencing not only
demarcates discursive boundaries but also delegitimizes the actions, aspira-
tions and voices of the subaltern. In cyberspace these ostracized communities
have found an avenue for self-expression through unique voices produced
with the help of technology.
S. MPOFU
323
This chapter deals with death and dark humour, something inimical to
some aspects of ubuntu that some leaders, especially in Zimbabwe, tried
to forcibly instil in the mourning of the bodies that political elite deemed
to matter (Agamben, 1998), those of politicians who died of the
COVID-19 pandemic. Ubuntu is an ‘African moral view binding Africans
together in a way of living a life of humanity and empathy towards other
people, especially outsiders’ (Zondi & Makhoba, 2018). The humane and
dignied treatment of other people cuts across the board, but in Africa, it
seems, ubuntu has to apply to ordinary people amongst themselves, as
political leaders seem to exempt themselves from demanding, from them-
selves, treatment of ordinary people in an ubuntuistic fashion. For instance,
one may be curious of the South African government’s 1997 White Paper
on Social Welfare dening ubuntu as:
The principle of caring for each other’s well-being will be promoted, and a
spirit of mutual support fostered. Each individual’s humanity is ideally
expressed through his or her relationship with others and theirs in turn
through a recognition of the individual’s humanity. Ubuntu means that
people are people through other people. It also acknowledges both the
rights and the responsibilities of every citizen in promoting individual and
societal well-being. (Koma, 2020)
Contrast this with the denition, if you may, of this term by Biko, who
said that ubuntu is married to economic liberalization and ghting against
poverty. He added: ‘It is only through the active engagement of all South
Africa’s citizens in this war on poverty that we can rediscover the spirit of
ubuntu. South Africans have to embrace people centricity as a guiding
principle for a national battle for shared prosperity’ (2013, 27). Ubuntu,
to eradicate poverty and marginalization, has to reside, rst and foremost,
in those in political leadership, as they make life-impacting decisions. Be
that as it may, the crux of my argument here is the brand of ubuntu that
politicians demand be extended to them in the event that they die or when
people share rumours of their death in celebration and mockery should be
equal to the one they afford their subjects. Politicians, in some contexts,
are hated by ordinary people because they abrogate their political duties
by indulging in corruption and looting state resources, as happened in
Zimbabwe and South Africa, as funds to help during COVID-19 were
misused. Citizen mockery of the politicians stem from this. The question
therefore becomes: who are worthy humans to be extended the dignity
15 DARK HUMOUR, UBUNTU AND THE COVID-19 PANDEMIC: A CASE…
324
and treatment of ubuntu. The political elite and the subaltern clash on this
in some contexts. It is this contest and context that deploys ubuntu, sub-
alterneity and dark humour in the time of the COVID-19 pandemic.
JournalISm aSStorytellIng
For a long time ‘journalism has hitherto been viewed as a lecture, online
news media have upset this ‘status quo’ and introduced citizen journalism,
which has shown that journalism can be a conversation as well where audi-
ences interact both with journalists and amongst themselves’ (Mpofu,
2016, 89). Journalism, just like citizen journalism, has no established
boundaries in terms of denition (Mpofu, 2019a, b, c). Deuze (2005,
446) says that there are possibly ve key ‘ideal-typical values’ that charac-
terize journalism and these are public service, objectivity, autonomy,
immediacy and ethics. Further, Mpofu says of Deuze’s characterizations:
[T]hese dene ‘real journalism’ and locate power of denition and authen-
ticity in the occupational ideologies and values of journalism in a straight-
jacketed manner. But then there is need to critique the extent of this power
bestowed upon ‘real’ journalism in relation to ownership, commerce, poli-
tics, social pressures and technology … The myth of public service as a
measure of ‘real’ journalism is problematic when it excludes ‘other’ forms of
journalism that are not considered mainstream especially coming from those
Stuart Allan has called accidental journalists or just citizen witnesses, mean-
ing citizen journalists.
Rutigliano (2008, 45) denes citizen journalism using four critical
points: ‘1) it is not produced by a traditional news organization; 2) it is
produced by a group; 3) it is open to audience contributions and partici-
pation; 4) it strives to cover marginalized communities through recruit-
ment of members of these communities and coverage of these communities.’
Key to citizen journalism is the communal culture and rituals followed in
covering those in the margins.
For Mpofu (2015, 87) and for the purposes of this research, ‘citizen
journalism is that form of storytelling which moves from seeing journal-
ism … as a conversation … where “everyday people”.. assume power to take
charge and be inuential in telling their stories from their own perspectives,
through blogs, reader comments, e-mail listservs, etc.’ This concept is not
without criticisms. Lindner (2015, 555) argue that ‘certainly has the
S. MPOFU
325
potential to contribute to a democratized public sphere, much of the popu-
lar commentary and scholarship on the subject has veered toward the hyper-
bolic and romantic’. There are many themes that drive the relevance of
citizen journalism in different and specic contexts (Mutsvairo & Salgado,
2020) and in playing different roles (Mutsvairo and Muneri, 2019), includ-
ing dissidence and whistleblowing (Matsilele, 2019, Matsilele & Ruhanya,
2020; Mpofu & Matsilele, 2020). These accidental journalists, the citizens,
were born largely due to the rise of and advances in new information and
communication technologies (Mpofu & Barnabas, 2016; Banda, 2010;
El-Nawawy & Khamis, 2013; Goode, 2009; Mpofu, 2015). There are criti-
cisms of citizen journalism bordering on ethics, truthfulness and the poten-
tial to spread hate speech (Mutsvairo et al., 2014). Mpofu magnies the
issue of ethics by saying: ‘While citizen journalism has dismantled gatekeep-
ing and other ethics-enhancing codes used by traditional media to protect
audiences, this has left audiences exposed to unethical journalistic practices
which infringe on people’s security and privacy’ (2016, 91).
Fake news can pose a danger of an ill-informed citizenry. There was
news spread via social media platforms such as blogs, Twitter, WhatsApp
and Facebook suggesting that the virus came from 5G internet network.
This led to the destruction of 5G towers in South Africa. A ruling party
councillor, Siso Mngadi, circulated a voice note via WhatsApp to locals in
the KwaZulu-Natal province where he said: ‘As leaders of eThekwini we
need to take action against this disease. It is not Covid. We are getting this
thing from 5G towers, [some] installed during this period in preparation
of the second wave’ (cited in Pitt, 2021). Fake news was spread about the
deaths of some ministers in Zimbabwe, sparking debates on ubuntu and
ethical leadership.
methodology
Data for this qualitative study were gathered from social media platforms
such as Facebook and Twitter, and also from newspaper archives through
digital ethnography. Digital ethnography was born out of the ubiquity of
the internet and related technologies that have acted as extensions of orga-
nizations and people’s lives. This trend makes it difcult for social scien-
tists to ignore digital methods in research (Murthy, 2008). As this chapter
is written during lockdown necessitated by the COVID-19 pandemic,
digital ethnography and other online data gathering methods such as
online videos, online questionnaires, online interviews and analyses of
15 DARK HUMOUR, UBUNTU AND THE COVID-19 PANDEMIC: A CASE…
326
weblogs and social media networking sites have become all the more
important. Digital ethnography can be covet, that is, stealth and invisible
(Ebo, 1998), or overt, that is visible, depending on the research design
and aims of the researcher. In this instance, I collected data without par-
ticipating in any of the debates taking place on social media sites that I
used. My lurking was unobtrusive and passive (Mare, 2018; Denzin,
1999; Kozinets, 2002). This does not in any way suggest that there was
neutral engagement, nor does it suggest that there are neutral engage-
ments in digital ethnography bereft of any power relations between the
researcher and the subjects or the researched members of society. My data
gathering and analyses, however I may try to be methodologically astute,
remain biased, subjective and informed by personal histories, biases, per-
ceptions and agendas. Data used were conveniently sampled to t the
theme of this chapter, as there were many different reactions to the deaths
of the political elite than black humour, the central focus here. The digital
divide, that is the disparity between those communities with access and
without access to the internet and enabling technologies, affects the glo-
bality of researches carried out using digital ethnography. Therefore, the
views and data gathered may not be representative of every member of the
community, even though we argue that textual engagements are part of
human interaction and culture and have integrity, and therefore could be
studied on their own. On the other hand, as Murthy (2008) observes,
digital ethnography allows for the inclusion of the disabled and even those
not condent to speak in public or participate on ofine forums and focus
group interviews.
This chapter uses a narrative analysis of the jokes about the deaths of
politicians in Zimbabwe and South Africa. Narrative analysis helps us gain
an understanding of the world and processes of production of data in that
context. Most importantly this allows us to engage and know what reali-
ties people make of their world through telling their own stories.
Storytelling helps in sharing world views and in the construction of identi-
ties (Rosenwald & Ochberg, 1992). As a researcher, I am in a dilemma
whereby I have to make sense of the people’s narratives while they are
making sense of their own world. To this end, meaning can be considered
ambiguous because it is born out of a process on multi-interactionism
between many parties to meaning-making. To this end Reissman says:
‘Meaning is uid and contextual, not xed and universal. All we have is
talk and texts that represent reality partially, selectively, and imperfectly’
(1993, 15).
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327
Humour inPandemics
Humour serves different purposes in life and society (Abel, 2002; Berlyne,
1972; Boyd, 2004; Brown, 2013; Davis etal., 2018; Dionigi & Canestrari,
2018). COVID-19 humour leads one to reecting on the role and use of
humour in pandemics. Park and Park (2010), in an article titled ‘Fear and
Humour in the Art of Cholera’, recall: ‘[It] has long been recognized that
in times of such adversity humour can play a signicant role in aiding com-
munities to cope with the fear of disease and death’ (2010, 481). They
observe that, in the context of art, which focused on the cholera pandemic
of the nineteenth century, fear and humour work in tandem. The humour,
mainly carried through newspaper cartoons, served different purposes,
including highlighting ‘the disagreement between doctors on the diagno-
sis and treatment of cholera, public mistrust of the medical profession and
their ineffective treatment, and political attacks on government policies’
(2010, 481). The authors conclude with a futuristic outlook to pandemics
in the age of technology and say: ‘[As] future pandemics appear, even in
this era of multimedia, there remains an important role for art in docu-
menting not only the physical suffering but also the use of humour as a
coping mechanism to alleviate fear of disease and death’ (483).
Rosa (2012, 735) explores the use of humour in Portugal during the
swine u pandemics in 2009–2010, where she argues that ‘humour is a
valuable resource to study social trends and shared meanings, while pro-
viding information about the way social meaning is attached to specic
risk events’. Newspapers used humour to ‘stress the cyclic nature of health
risks, reducing the impact of dramatic information on the audience’ (2012,
735). Newspapers use editorial humour such as cartoons to engage with
the public, providing ‘cognitive maps to decode everyday life’ (Rosa,
2012, 738). Mainstream media are different from social media, which are
the focus of the present study, and Rosa demonstrates that there is an
establishment of authority on ponticating on the pandemic in a formal
mainstream newspaper. In addition, editorial gatekeeping processes allow
for credible information to be shared, something that is not present in
social media and citizen journalists’ engagements with the world.
Mainstream media also propose the way an issue has to be approached,
‘suggesting an interpretation and a course of action’ and they go further
to dene normative agenda that allows readers to evaluate’ media content
leading to the promotion of a ‘desire for action, capitalizing symbolic
15 DARK HUMOUR, UBUNTU AND THE COVID-19 PANDEMIC: A CASE…
328
resources to a particular cause’ (Rosa, 2012, 737). This humorous engage-
ment with a pandemic is socially responsible and building, since the one
who is a comedian, especially a cartoonist in the newspaper, is similar to a
columnist.
A similar study to Rosa’s (2012) was done by Lobanov (2021), who
looked at humour in newspapers during the Spanish u of 1918–1919.
Lobanov’s archival research unravelled how ‘the Spanish u generated
humour as a tool to explore the social world in conditions of heightened
disgust and wide-spread political instability’. Lobanov concludes that
humour is important in society and helps us understand human capabili-
ties in tragic moments.
In contrast to Rosa, who studied humour regarding the swine u in
newspapers, Cynthia Chew and Gunther Eysenbach did an infodemiologi-
cal study, whereby they looked at the swine u, spread of information and
also some aspects of humour from the perspective of Twitter. The research-
ers realized that among the tweets containing the words ‘swine u’,
‘swineu’ and ‘H1N1’ shared during 1 May–12 December 2013, 12.7%
were humorous. Accompanying this were cases of disinformation owing
to lack of gatekeeping measures in social media applications such as
Twitter.
Nwabueze etal. (2017) has also written on newspaper cartoons focus-
ing on the Ebola virus in Nigeria. They preface their argument by noting
that cartoons satirize and tell stories at the same time and are ‘effective
channels for the formation of public opinion on salient social issues’
(2017, 1). Cartoons and cartoonists are important players in the newspa-
per industry, as they act as the soul of society in those democratic spaces
or independent newspapers where freedom of expression is constrained by
those in power. Cartoons become ‘effective tools for criticizing wrong
actions in the society and calling the attention of the public and their lead-
ers to burning national issues of national interest and development’ in
those contexts (Nwabueze et al., 2017, 1). Respondents to the study
observed that the cartoons were informative and funny at the same time.
In addition, they also observed that some cartoons were too technical,
their interpretation becoming inaccessible to audiences. Besides, the
authors conclude that the cartoons also had a fear frame and horric ele-
ments which ‘brought about heightened fear among Nigerians on the
devastating effect of the Ebola virus’ (Nwabueze etal., 2017, 4).
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329
COVID-19 andDark Humour
There is inchoate literature on humour on the COVID-19 pandemic of
which this book project forms a seminal part. Some aspects of academic
research on humour have been addressed in chapters written by Mpofu in
this volume, and these will not be worth reiterating. However, it is impor-
tant to make a few observations and also to engage with people’s under-
standings of humour during the pandemic. Most importantly, humour in
pandemics served as political critique as well as for healing purposes.
Saricali etal. conclude in their research that ‘the effect of fear of COVID-19
on hopelessness was partly mediated by mindfulness and humor, and
which was supported by bootstrapping. Therefore, higher fear of
COVID-19 was associated with lower mindfulness and humor. In turn,
lower mindfulness and humor were related with higher hopelessness’
(2020, 1). Those who feel hopeless during pandemics are highly suicidal
(Bhuiyan etal., 2020; Beck etal., 2006). This humour comes mostly from
ordinary people, where they demonstrate their understanding of a multi-
ple facets of global and world orders, power, politics, social relations and
identities. Ordinary people and politicians used social media to share
humorous moments during the pandemic. On its Facebook page, a South
African radio station, Cape Talk, ran a story where they solicited reader
and listener comments where they asked: ‘Should we laugh about and
spread jokey memes about COVID-19?’ A number of participants on the
page responded in all manners: humorously, seriously and everything in
between.
Below I reproduce some of the comments from the readers:
A. Sometimes the best way to deal with scary things is to joke about
them. As they say. Laughter is the best medicine. Let’s not take that
away too. If you don’t like the memes don’t look at them.
B. Don’t worr y … The virus won’t last long … After all. It was made
in China …
C. The more dramatic/sensational the reporting/the impact, the more
jokes are made. Whether crude or not, laughing is a very human way
to get rid of stress. Necessary, though not always sensitive.
D. They are not laughing at people who are sick. Stop being petty.
E. This is how we deal with shit
F. It’s stupidity too make jokes about it … They won’t joke and laughs
if the virus hit them … Too me it’s so common
15 DARK HUMOUR, UBUNTU AND THE COVID-19 PANDEMIC: A CASE…
330
G. Great, we need some humour to ease the crazy hysteria surrounding
this virus that’s blown out of proportion.
H. People will always joke about tragedies. It’s a coping mechanism. It
makes the enormity of the situation easier to deal with. It is also the
mechanism by which the ego ‘insists that it cannot be affected by
the traumas of the external world’ (Freud).
I. Humour is a way to deal with stress, risk, uncertainty. Especially in
SA.Quite natural. Sometimes quite clever actually.
These demonstrate an understanding of humour and its role during the
pandemic that is not contrary to ndings in researches on the role of
humour during moments of crises. While some cringe at the idea of shar-
ing humour during pandemics, some nd it unproblematic, as this assists
in advancing the well-being of society in the face of adversity. The follow-
ing sections discuss dark humour in relation to political deaths.
Death humour is dark humour relating to both dark humour, whereby
people make light death news, or joke about death in a way that is irrever-
ent. Added to that it is humour in memory of the dead, good or bad. This
is the humour that is crude and meant to attack the dead, especially if they
held power in society and were deemed to be working for an evil system.
For the purposes of this study I use the deaths and rumours of death of
ministers and political leaders in Zimbabwe and South Africa. These coun-
tries are deliberately chosen because of the author’s familiarity with the
political contexts. I have been following news and political events around
COVID-19 and politics in Zimbabwe.
Zimbabwe’s President asaJoker
At the beginning of March, Zimbabwe’s President Emerson Mnangagwa,
while attending a national clean-up campaign, gave a speech in which he
seemed to boast about building a mortuary which he considered the
coldest:
When I was a member of parliament for Kwekwe, I constructed a state-of-
the-art mortuary with 12 bays, very cool inside. I told people in Mbizo that
there is a prize for the family that brings its dead rst. At that time, there was
already someone who had passed on at the hospital and that family won the
prize (Newzimbabwe.com, 2020)
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331
The statement, made when the country was in the middle of a pan-
demic, was read as disturbing and unbecoming of a president, for he took
death lightly. The following were reader reactions to a video posted on the
NewZimbabwe.com Facebook page:
A: Madness x the economy how many jokes will u make before u die
your self
B: I know an idiot when I see one … this man is a natural one!!!
C: The guy actually too well upstairs … his stupid jokes are disgusting
D: He builds a cool mortuar y and set a race for people to die by not let-
ting the doctors having enough apparatus and a good working envi-
ronment. Shame and sorry maningi (trans. Too much)
E: You have said it all, your interest is on death of people only with no
constructive idea. Shame on you. You don’t deserve to be a presi-
dent, not even a chief.
F: I have a problem with media give us a full video with its content then
we can judge the no matter how bad the man is but give us a full
content not small clips that you show people for your personal gain
In defence of Mnangagwa’s pronouncement, the country’s Secretar y
for Information, Publicity and Broadcasting Services Nick Mangwana
(2020) argued, in a state-controlled public but Zanu-Pf mouthpiece
newspaper article, that people did not understand the president’s dark
humour, which was meant to be taken lightly; hence, they were trying to
silence him. Silencing the president, Mangwana argued, was tantamount
to dehumanizing him, as ‘[r]epressing laughter is dehumanizing the
human race. Laughter is one thing that separates us from animals in that
most animals do all that human beings do except to laugh. Not even a
hyena. It just makes a laughing sound but that is not a laugh. So those
who want to repress the President’s humour, are you not trying to dehu-
manize him?’ (Mangwana, 2020). Mangwana further argued: ‘None of
the jokes made by President Mnangagwa was transgressive. The President
tackles taboo subjects with humour, thought-provoking ideas and laugh-
ter.’ He faulted those accusing the president of being insensitive in his
joke, of having lower cognitive capabilities, for ‘if you are cognitively
gifted, you won’t need to employ a lot of effort to get a dark joke. This is
when you hear those less gifted using pejorative terms like “morbid, nasty,
twisted, sick or grotesque”. But humour processing depends very much
15 DARK HUMOUR, UBUNTU AND THE COVID-19 PANDEMIC: A CASE…
332
on one’s cognitive ability’ (Mangwana, 2020). Mangwana (2020) went
on to argue: ‘Dark humour empowers people to speak about sensitive,
serious and unsettling subjects by according oneself permission to be neg-
ative in a healthy way.’ For Mangwana, Mnangagwa’s joke about death
and rewarding the rst person to die with some money meant that the
president was human too, as leaders need not to be too serious all the
time. This made Mnangagwa appear folksy, and
[j]ocularity humanizes those at the top making them approachable. It makes
the ‘servant leadership’ genre of leadership a reality. After all the word,
‘humour’ itself is derived from the Latin word, which meant uid and ex-
ible. So to suggest that the President should stop joking is probably proffer-
ing fools’ wisdom. He should continue to enjoy the sagacity of humour
even in the face of his phenomenal responsibility of turning this country
around. If the President was to ask for my advice, I would suggest that he
keeps dancing and keeps joking and if he feels like singing, by all means sing.
That’s just what humans do and in Zimbabwe, he is the rst among equals.
Someone once said, ‘dark humour is like food, not everyone gets it’.
(Mangwana, 2020)
In response in the comment sections some readers maintained that the
president’s joke was not welcome. One respondent wrote: ‘Mangwana,
the electorate did not vote for a comedian. The president’s job is a very
serious position and as such is no place for clowning around. The econ-
omy and society is suffering while you defend such nonsense. Please be
serious for a change.’ Another responded: ‘Making jokes at the expense of
the suffering masses? It just tells you how out of touch this guy is. He’s
not t even to be chairman of a burial society let alone a country.’
Mnangagwa’s political opponents decried the president’s remarks, with
the Movement for Democratic Change Alliance leader, Nelson Chamisa,
arguing: ‘In other countries, Mnangagwa’s talk on mortuaries would have
gotten him impeached a long time ago. When you see a president talk like
that, celebrating things like that, it shows you he is out of touch with real-
ity and that his days are numbered.’ If political leaders use dark humour,
can citizens do the same when it’s the politicians on the other side of the
audience? I discuss this below.
S. MPOFU
333
Jackson Mthembu: TheDeath ofaGood Man
The aim here is to demonstrate the relevance and accessibility of the
humour shared in grieving the loss of good men. It is a moment, as Erica
Buist says in her article in the Guardian newspaper, to ‘fuck death … it
doesn’t need our respect’ (2018). Jackson Mthembu was a senior member
of the South African ruling African National Congress. He was also a min-
ister in the presidency and had been at the forefront of the government’s
COVID-19 communications campaign. At one time he mistakenly called
the ventilators used in intensive care units (ICU) as vibrators, sex toys. He
later realized the joke, and humorously corrected himself. He died of
COVID-19 on 21 January 2021. Mourners from across the political spec-
trum celebrated Mthembu as a giant who worked tirelessly for the country
(see South African Government, 2021; Gottschalk, 2021). Speaking
directly to the concept of ubuntu resident in politicians, or as it is sup-
posed to be resident in politicians, President Cyril Ramaphosa said:
He laughed like someone who really loved to laugh. He laughed at many
things, some of which he probably shouldn’t have … Mthembu was a kind
and gentle soul, but when it came to corruption, self-serving leadership,
brazen abuse of power, you would see another side of him. He was never
deceived by the false smiles and empty promises of those who sought to
enrich themselves at the expense of the poor. He called them out and did
not care if they were more powerful than he was. (McCain, 2021)
A fellow minister added, appealing to the humorous side of Mthembu,
‘we will miss his jokes, we will miss his laughter. He lived a life bigger than
any person is required to live’ (du Plessis, 2021). This was further attested
to by the nurse who helped nurse him at the hospital, who said: ‘We didn’t
nurse a “do you know who I am” person’. Humour shared during his
memorial included criticizing the government for incompetence, for
example. One Noma Bolani, who was trying to log onto a Zoom platform
titled Minister Jackson Mthembu’s Memorila Service, shared a screenshot of
the misspelling of memorial and commented: ‘This was the rst indication
it wasn’t going to go well.’ Besides, different people shared images of
Mthembu dancing outside parliament and other places, demonstrating his
jovial mood. A nurse at the hospital where Mthembu died shared how he
called her to come and watch Minister of Police, Bheki Cele, dancing in a
video saved in Mthembu’s mobile phone and later said that Cele cannot
dance and ‘I show him how to when I get out’ of hospital. His jovial
15 DARK HUMOUR, UBUNTU AND THE COVID-19 PANDEMIC: A CASE…
334
mood was the centrepiece of the celebrations of his life. Another inter-
locutor on Twitter, shown in Fig.15.1, mourned Mthembu, calling him
‘our vibrator’. The post is humorous, and ts into dark humour, making
us laugh during sombre times. Thus, the reliving of the dead’s life through
their funny moments and actions is important in dark humour and also
makes mourning these people palatable (Lund etal., 2008).
The sharing of humour at the death of Mthembu serves two purposes,
to strengthen people in the face of death, a natural thing that, even though
feared, will befall anyone, and secondly, to prepare people to face the pan-
demic with some form of resolve and hope of winning the war set by many
global governments against the pandemic. To this end Eleanor Haley says
of the goodness of this humour in her essay ‘The Utility of Laughter in
Times of Grief’:
Fig. 15.1 A still from a video clip of Jackson Mthembu mistakenly calling venti-
lators vibrators posted on Twitter in remembrance of his funny and gaffe moments
S. MPOFU
335
Not only is this type of humor good for the individual morale, but it’s good
for morale of larger groups as well as it makes the enemy or the challenge
seem less intimidating, eases tension, makes suffering in the moment seem
far more tolerable, and strengthens social bonds. (2014)
The sombre mood that accompanies most deaths is because of death’s
power to rob us ‘of our self-esteem, our individuality … when we die,
we’re demoted. We become like everyone who ever died, every beast,
every insect, every perished germ. This is why we don’t speak ill of the
dead; it’s like kicking them while they’re six feet down’ (Buist, 2018). In
the following section, those politicians who die are celebrated by the polit-
ical elites from the ruling party while citizens celebrate and mock their
deaths through dark humour for political purposes.
Dark Humour andUnmourning theMournables
The case of Zimbabwe demonstrates how dark humour was used in a con-
text where politicians are seen as not serving the public and therefore their
demise is worth celebrating as comic relief. Three ministers had died of
COVID-19 by the end January 2021, the same month most African gov-
ernments were making plans to acquire the vaccines. Most Zimbabweans
believed that the politicians in the ruling party would acquire vaccines for
themselves before everyone else. The three ministers who faced their
demise are the coup face and spokesperson, Sibusiso Moyo. Moyo was at
the forefront of the communications between the public and a group of
Zanu-Pf and the military men involved in the 2017 unconstitutional coup
which overthrew the country’s founding leader and dictator Robert
Mugabe. After the coup Moyo was appointed foreign affairs and interna-
tional trade minister. The coup was presented as an opportunity to restore
Zimbabwe’s legacy, which, even today, remains a myth, and establish a
New Dispensation. However, it seems Zimbabwe is worse off than when
Mugabe was leader due to the continuation of toxic leadership under his
successor, Mnangagwa and his militarized regime. The other minister who
died three days after Moyo is Joel Biggie Matiza, the Minister of Transport.
Before then, Parrance Shiri, a man heavily involved in Zimbabwe’s geno-
cide, died in July 2020, sparking celebrations from the victims of the
genocide and some Zimbabweans who felt let down by the current regime.
Government takes deaths of the political leaders seriously, as these are
routinely declared national heroes and buried at a shrine preserved for the
15 DARK HUMOUR, UBUNTU AND THE COVID-19 PANDEMIC: A CASE…
336
heroes for nation-building purposes. However, the declaration of a hero
status and the space for burial are sites of contention between the ruling
party, opposition parties and citizens in general (Mpofu, 2016). When
Mnangagwa announced Shiri’s death on Twitter one respondent wrote:
‘Is the cold mortuary still available?’ Another posted a quote from one of
the country’s rulers during colonialism, Ian Smith, with the statement: ‘if
blacks are to rule themselves ppl in towns will walk on sewage until they
believe its normal, all the gains from colonization will vanish, infrastruc-
ture will collapse, roads will be impassable, trains will kill people until
they’re abandoned as an unsafe mode of transport.’ Another interlocutor
quoted Muchinguri’s statement that COVID-19 was God’s punishment
of the West and yet the pandemic, funny enough struck Zimbabwe, as
shown in the meme in Fig.15.2.
Further responses to Mnangagwa’s tweet wished that he also caught
the virus. These are illustrative, ‘I hope you went to see him without
PPE …’ and ‘When was the last time you two were physically close? You
know it can take 3 weeks or more for symptoms to develop. Then
whammo! (trans. You will soil your pants).’ Most comments expressed
relief at Shiri’s death and wished Mnangagwa also caught COVID-19.
The reactions to these comments were laughing emojis or words like lol
and hahahahaha. Some people simply posted insults. There was suspen-
sion of ubuntu in this case, as politicians would later argue, where the
predicament of Shiri was celebrated instead of mourned.
When Moyo died, Mnangagwa also posted an announcement on his
Twitter page where he declared Moyo as a ‘dedicated public servant and a
true hero, and … a friend..[who] fought his entire life so that Zimbabwe
could be free’. Almost similar to the responses to Shiri’s death, one citizen
asked if the coldest mortuary has been opened for Moyo. Another
responded with an emoji of former US president Donald Trump dancing
in happiness, with a caption ‘winning’. Another comment from a discus-
sant based in the diaspora said: ‘Removing criminals surrounding children
of Zimbabwe. We are scattered all over the world because of you. Minus
1. Covid uri gandanga. Hosiah Chipanga. Covid 19 uri ndururani
(COVID-19 you are mischievous).’ Some people played around some
statements from his speeches he used during the coup such as ‘the situa-
tion has reached another level’ and used this to mock and laugh at the
level of panic within the corridors of power as the reality of the pandemic
and vulnerability of the politicians became palpable.
S. MPOFU
337
Some citizens posted what they called COVID-19 wishlist, with names
and boxes to tick if those they wished dead died, as shown in Fig.15.3.
This partly led to the spread of fake news, as those ministers some wished
dead were subject of fake news posts and the government had to issue
statements and the state-controlled broadcaster Zimbabwe Broadcasting
Television had to interview the so-called dead ministers to prove that they
were alive. The spread of fake news was called inhumane by Zanu-Pf, as
they deemed such as against ubuntu.
Fig. 15.2 COVID turning the tables from attacking the West to attacking
Mnangagwa’s inner circle after a minister said it was sent by God to kill the West
for imposing sanctions on Zimbabwe
15 DARK HUMOUR, UBUNTU AND THE COVID-19 PANDEMIC: A CASE…
338
J.B. Matiza’s death was not mentioned on the presidential Twitter
account, but Nick Mangwana shared the news of Matiza’s death. One citi-
zen shared a tweet on how J.B. Matiza, while campaigning for political
ofce, went with a ‘donation’ of computers to a constituency, did the
political speech and handover, and then left with the computers and per-
formed the same stunt at the next constituency. This highlighted the self-
ish and untrustworthiness of politicians. When J.B. Matiza was declared a
national hero some wondered why, because, in Zimbabwe, there is a per-
ception that one has to have been involved in the war to be a hero.
However, one respondent wrote on Twitter: ‘JB Matiza is a Genetically
Modied Hero’.
Fig. 15.3 COVID-19
death wishlist
S. MPOFU
339
dIScuSSIon andconcluSIon
The deaths of politicians due to COVID-19 elicited dark humour to differ-
ent effects. In the South African example, Mthembu was celebrated as a hero
who served the people, eschewed corruption and unied different politi-
cians. His death served as a loss to many but at the same time to celebrate the
values he might have taught South Africans. In the Zimbabwean context,
however, death was used differently by opposing sides, that is, some ruling
party ofcials and citizens opposed to them. Death symbolizes a disruption
of a certain order (Harper, 2010), and for the powerful, death becomes a
point of defeat and shame, especially after living lives of invincibility—hence
the reprimands that are directed at citizens celebrating, mocking and spread-
ing fake news about the deaths of politicians. A dead body is laden with
meanings: ‘Concrete and protean, sacred and profane, the corpse is a com-
plex, ambiguous and enigmatic object. It is thus a source of no small amount
of ambivalence that energizes human and political imagination, evoking
multi-vocal meaning and inspiring diverse, if conicting, political visions and
uses among political rulers and their subjects’ (Kalusa, 2017, 1138–1139).
In the context of COVID-19, it seems both opposing sides needed
corpses for various political points. Ordinary citizens who celebrated the
deaths of politicians due to COVID-19 used social media to celebrate that
we are all equal before death and this was a moment for politicians to
learn. Political leadership needed dead bodies of fellow politicians to dem-
onstrate power during burial rituals, where the president becomes the one
at the apex of national identity denition and policy announcement, giv-
ing hope and demonstrating power to command the state security appara-
tus to intimidate foes. Social media have enabled citizens to take advantage
of existent socio-political and economic issues to engage in the economy
of humour and laughter that exists in civic rituals. The following tweets
from citizens are illustrative:
With all due respect Hon, I think it’s high time for leaders to reect on their
attitude toward the masses. Obviously they are doing something wrong for
the masses to be excited about their deaths. Zambia mourned Mwanawansa
openly in the streets. This doesn’t dene us let’s x it.
Have you ever NOTICED why there is so much hatred of the ruling class,
to the extent that people celebrate their death? It’s not part of Ubuntu to
celebrate someone’s demise, but please guys correct all the mistakes starting
with the justice system which is so selective to M.O.H (Ministry of Health).
15 DARK HUMOUR, UBUNTU AND THE COVID-19 PANDEMIC: A CASE…
340
Thus while the ruling elite may think the deaths of colleagues are
mournable (in contrast to the thousands of ordinary citizens who die
unnoticed), citizens believe otherwise, even if it means defying the pre-
cepts of ubuntu. This tension led to Mangwana accusing Zimbabwean
doctors of being political assassins, that is, killing ministers. This suggests
that there are lives that matter and those that do not, especially in the eyes
of those in power (Butler, 2009). The heroes acre burials are used as sites
for demonstrating power and commandment of the nation (Marschall,
2006) by the presidium as they make speeches and policy announcements,
outsmart opposition and internal enemies or factions, threaten opponents
and reprimand citizens in their burial speeches. These speeches are critical
tools at governing, meant to build a sense of community and strengthen
bonds between government and citizens (Zarefsky, 2008). Silly citizen-
ship, demonstrated through robust irreverence, mockery and dark humour
directed at politicians, attempts to undermine power and ridicule main
actors while at the same time empowering citizens who feel fully human
for their ability to throw punches at their leaders, who have for a long time
suppressed them (Hartley, 2010; Vis, 2013; Higheld, 2016). Humour
shared in reaction to politicians’ deaths in both contexts helps with iden-
tication, that is, the construction of political subjectivity (Davis et al.,
2018) and assertion of patriotism to one’s nation regardless of political
leadership. Most of the frustrations and contests online between
Zimbabwean politicians and citizens are basically a battle for the nation,
where politicians are seen as having looted the resources and citizens are
ghting for the restoration of a dignied and functional economy.
From the forgoing, one may conclude that dark humour was used espe-
cially by citizens and politicians in a duplicitous way. Firstly, the
Zimbabwean president joked about the cold mortuary and citizens pro-
tested online and labelled him callous, and yet when political leaders died
some citizens proffered commentary via dark humour and did not repri-
mand each other as much as they shared the humour. Interestingly it was
political leaders who reprimanded them, bringing into question when is it
right to engage with COVID-19 deaths humorously and who has the
right to do the same. One may argue that dark humour is accessed and
read differently depending on which side of death and bereavement one
stands. If it is the ordinary, homo sacer and bare life dying, politicians do
not care and would laugh, but when citizens mock and laugh at politi-
cians’ deaths, it becomes problematic. This demonstrates that ‘black
humour processing is seemingly a complex information processing task
S. MPOFU
341
that depends on cognitive and emotional aspects’ (Willinger etal. 2017,
167). And death humour is a highly emotive subject that could be nar-
rated in different ways and, in the process, unravels a lot about a given
society and context.
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Index1
1 Note: Page numbers followed by ‘n’ refer to notes.
A
Africa, 103, 104, 108
African National Congress (ANC),
195, 201
Agonistic public sphere, 207–209
Asen, R., 265, 266, 270
B
Bharatiya Janata Party, 280, 289
Black Twitter, 214–218, 222
Bollywood, 280, 285–287, 290
Bolsonaro, Jair, 48, 53, 54, 56, 59,
61–64, 69n14, 69–70n17, 70n18
Boltanski, Luc, 49, 54, 64, 66,
67n2, 68n7
grace (worth), 49, 66
worth, 49
Brazil, 47–66
C
Chamisa, Nelson, 332
China, 102
Comedy, 167, 169–173, 175,
177, 184–186
Coronavirus, 47, 51, 58, 59, 62,
145–162, 167–186, 279–291
disease, 1
in Nigeria, 137, 138
Corruption, 1, 5, 13, 33, 35–37, 40,
41, 199, 201, 209
Counter-publics, 260–266, 270, 273
Coup, 335, 336
348 INDEX
COVID-19, 1–13, 19, 20, 23, 26, 29,
33–36, 38, 40, 41, 75–96,
101–118, 145–147, 149,
151–154, 156, 159–162, 167,
170, 173, 174, 182, 183, 185,
193, 195, 205, 208, 235, 236,
241, 249, 252, 253, 255,
259–273, 295–312, 319–341
fake news, 135–137
humour, 123–139
infodemic, 125
lockdown, 241
pandemic, 47–66, 123–139
pandemic in Nigeria, 137, 138
Critique/criticism(s)
critical capacity (see Boltanski, Luc;
Thévenot, Laurent)
behaviour (s) (to), 53, 61, 64
government (to), 52–54, 61
routine (to), 49, 50, 53, 57, 64, 65
CrowdTangle, 173, 174
Curfew, 295–312
D
Dark humour, 2, 13, 319–341
Datacation, 7–9, 11
Deaths, 319–341
Decolonial love, 213–230
Denition of the situation, 49, 65
Denisova, 263, 264
Desensitization, 29–41
Dewey, John, 49, 50, 52, 65
indeterminacy, 52
inquiry, 52
Digital, 238, 246
ethnography, 21, 26, 27
humour, 273
Discourse analysis, 192, 196, 197
E
Economy of worth, 54
Ebola, 298, 299
Engagement
circumstantialist, 65
civic, 56, 57
exploratory, 65
mixed, 65
on the plan, 65, 66
See also Thévenot, Laurent
Entertainment, 76, 82, 92, 94–96
F
Facebook, 147–151, 167–170,
172–175, 178, 179, 181,
183, 185
Fake news, 125, 134–138
Fanon, 219, 223, 224
Feminism, 168–171, 179, 180
Foucault, M., 192, 194–197, 207, 236,
238, 241–247, 249–251, 253, 254
Freedom Day, 297, 305, 311
G
Global South, 1, 5–7, 9–13
Governmentality, 194, 196
Grace, see Boltanski, Luc;
Thévenot, Laurent
Gum tree, 111
H
Hashtag, 295–312
Hausa-Fulani, 81
Health communication, 21,
103–106, 118
Hubei, 1
Humour, 47–66, 145–162, 167–186,
279–291, 319–341
Humour in times of crisis, 78–80, 84
I
Identity, 27–41
Indenition, 49, 65
349 INDEX
India, 279–291
Internet, 48, 56, 66n1
Irony, 280, 283, 289
J
Joke/joking
devices, 47–66
-form, 59, 66
Journalism, 320, 322, 324–325
K
Kenya, 296, 297, 302–306, 310–312
Kenyans, 296, 297, 300, 303,
305–308, 310, 312
Kenyans on Twitter (KOT), 299, 302,
307, 308, 310–312
Kenyatta, Uhuru, 296, 302, 307, 311
Kulkarni, A., 262, 263
L
Listeriosis, 20, 26, 29–41
Lockdown, 146, 149, 154,
160, 161, 167, 172–174,
182, 183, 297, 304,
305, 309–312
M
Mangwana, Nick, 331, 332, 338, 340
Marikana, 215
Matiza, Biggie Joel, 335, 338
Media, 76
Medical aid, 115, 116
Meme(s), 19–41, 47–66, 76–81,
83–96, 279–291, 295–312
Mnangagwa, Emmerson, 27, 38, 40,
330–332, 335–337
Modi, Narendra, 280–290
Moyo, Sibusiso, 335, 336
Mpofu, Shepherd, 259, 261, 262, 266
Mthembu, Jackson, 333–339
Mugabe, Robert, 335
Multipositionality, 222–225, 227
N
Narendra Modi, 279, 284
New normal, see Regime
Nielsen, Morten, 49
transitory truth(s), 49
Nigeria, 75–77, 81–83, 86, 89, 90,
92–94, 96, 134, 137, 138
O
Odinga, Raila, 302, 304
Online community, 217
P
Pandemic, 1–13, 319–341
See also COVID-19
Panic buying, 213, 214, 229, 230
Participatory culture, 22–29
Playfulness, 105, 107, 114, 115
Postcolony, 224–227
Protest, 28, 37–41
R
Ramaphosa, Cyril, 23, 26, 27,
35–38, 40, 249
Regime(s)
investigative, 50
new normal, 60, 61
routine, 50, 60
Remedies, 101–118
Ridicule, 58, 59, 66, 280, 287, 288, 290
S
Sarana, 298
Satire, 260, 262–265, 273, 280, 281,
288, 289
Shiri, Parrance, 335, 336
350 INDEX
Singular observer, 49, 66
Soap Opera, 285–287, 290
Social media, 1–13, 75–78, 82, 83,
86, 95, 96, 147–149, 151, 161,
162, 168–171, 173, 179, 180,
184, 185, 208
South Africa, 19–41, 237–243, 245,
246, 248, 252–254
critical discourse analysis, 241
StaySafe, 311
Subaltern, 216, 219–222, 225,
227, 319–341
Subalterneity, 322–330
Surveillance, 8, 9, 11
Seychelles, 103
T
Thévenot, Laurent, 49, 54,
64–66, 68n7
grace (worth), 49, 66
worth, 49
Thomas, William I., see Denition of
the situation
Traditional herbal medicines, 108–112
Trump, Donald, 320, 336
Twitter, 236, 251, 295–312, 336, 338
U
Umhlonyane, 111
Umsuzwane, 111, 114–118
V
Vaccines, 102, 103, 106,
108–115, 118
Voetsek, 200, 201
W
Web 2.0, 279
WhatsApp memes, 259–273
World Health Organisation (WHO),
102, 103, 106, 108, 109, 118
Worth, see Economy of worth
Wuhan, 1
Z
Zimbabwe, 19–41, 101–118,
167–179, 182, 184–186,
259–273, 321, 323, 325, 326,
330–332, 335–338
Zumbani/Umsuzwane, 101, 103,
110, 115–118
