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Turning Crisis into Opportunity: Unfolding Ukraine's Trade Potential with the Canada-Ukraine Free Trade Agreement

October 2021
East/West Journal of Ukrainian Studies VIII(2):151-191

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Universität Bern

To offset the devastating effects of the trade war waged by the Russian Federation, Ukraine has undertaken laudable efforts since 2014 to negotiate new trade agreements with other states. Against this background, the negotiations of the Canada-Ukraine Free Trade Agreement were finalized and the agreement came into force on 1 August 2017. This article explores the positive impact of this agreement on bilateral trade flow between the states and describes its potential contribution to unfolding Ukraine's trade potential.

Ukraine's performance in the category "Trading across Borders," Doing Business 2020.

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Volume VIII, No. 2 (2021) DOI: https://doi.org/10.21226/ewjus561

Turning Crisis into Opportunity: Unfolding

Ukraine’s Trade Potential with the Canada-

Ukraine Free Trade Agreement

Iryna Bogdanova

University of Bern

Abstract: To offset the devastating effects of the trade war waged by the Russian

Federation, Ukraine has undertaken laudable efforts since 2014 to negotiate new

trade agreements with other states. Against this background, the negotiations of the

Canada-Ukraine Free Trade Agreement were finalized and the agreement came into

force on 1 August 2017. This article explores the positive impact of this agreement

on bilateral trade flow between the states and describes its potential contribution to

unfolding Ukraine’s trade potential.

Keywords: Ukraine, Canada, trade, CUFTA, technical assistance.

INTRODUCTION

Canada has traditionally been one of the main strategic partners of

Ukraine. The recently signed Canada-Ukraine Free Trade Agreement

(CUFTA) reinforces the existing political and economic co-operation

between the countries. The agreement was signed and brought into force

against the background of a trade war waged by the Russian Federation

against Ukraine, an event that expedited the latter’s search for alternative

long-term trading partners. This article reviews Ukraine’s participation in

international trade and analyzes trade relations between Ukraine and

Canada against this backdrop. Potential implications of the recently signed

I am indebted to Alexander MacLaren for his insights on the negotiations of the

Canada-Ukraine Free Trade Agreement and to Mary-Catherine Speirs, Richard

Tarasofsky, Wafa Raslan, Peter Kapach, and Isabella Price for their valuable

comments on the implementation of the agreement for trade co-operation between

Canada and Ukraine. I thank Petro Petrenko from the Embassy of Ukraine in Canada

for providing information on trade relations between the countries. I am also grateful

to Dr. Zaker Ahmad for his valuable comments on earlier drafts. Finally, thanks are

due to the three anonymous reviewers. This research was made possible by financial

support provided by the Canadian Institute of Ukrainian Studies, University of

Alberta. In particular, I was honoured to receive the Kolasky Visiting Research

Fellowship. All errors that remain are my sole responsibility.

Iryna Bogdanova

Volume VIII, No. 2 (2021)

152

CUFTA on bilateral trade flows and on domestic reforms in Ukraine are

examined. The working hypothesis of this article is that the CUFTA would

marginally improve bilateral trade flow between the countries. However, it

might have a positive impact on domestic reforms in Ukraine, including

alignment of standards to curtail non-tariff barriers, lowering of trade costs

by reducing red tape, and preservation of environmental and labour

standards.

METHODOLOGY

This article employs the method of historical analysis to examine Ukraine’s

participation in international trade and to describe the unfolding of the trade

war between Ukraine and the Russian Federation. In addition, the method of

doctrinal (“black letter”) research is used to review the substantive

provisions of the CUFTA and their potential contributions to an

improvement in the regulatory environment in Ukraine. Furthermore,

secondary data analysis is applied in several parts of this paper. For example,

the available literature on the impact of the CUFTA on trade relations

between Ukraine and Canada is briefly summarized. To guide the analysis, a

number of interviews were conducted with Canadian government officials

responsible for the trade co-operation between Ukraine and Canada.

I. UKRAINE’S INTERNATIONAL TRADE RELATIONS

Before 2014 Ukraine was heavily dependent on trade with the Russian

Federation. Geographical proximity, lack of alternative sources of energy, as

well as similar standards, technical regulations, and associated conformity

assessment procedures were factors that determined this dependence. The

Revolution of Dignity in 2013-14 fundamentally turned Ukraine’s foreign

policy toward closer co-operation with the European Union (EU), resulting

in a military and diplomatic conflict with the Russian Federation. Access to

new markets and export-led growth compelled Ukraine to develop and

implement a new international trade policy, as outlined below.

1. UKRAINE’S PARTICIPATION IN INTERNATIONAL TRADE

After the breakup of the Soviet Union in 1991, Ukraine declared its

independence. Since then, Ukraine has maintained trade relations with both

the former Soviet republics and other trading partners. Trade relations with

Turning Crisis into Opportunity

Volume VIII, No. 2 (2021)

153

the post-Soviet states are regulated by either bilateral agreements

or by

Ukraine’s participation in various economic integration projects under the

aegis of the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS).

The main

principles of relations between Ukraine and the European Union (EU) were

agreed upon in 1994 and enshrined in the Partnership and Cooperation

Agreement between the European Communities and Ukraine that came into

force in 1998 (Partnership and Cooperation Agreement). With the launch of

the European Neighbourhood Policy in 2004 and against the background of

Ukraine’s demands for closer co-operation with the EU, the negotiation of a

new association agreement was initiated in 2007 (Van der Loo and Van

Elsuwege 422).

In 2008, by acceding to the World Trade Organization (WTO), Ukraine

assumed numerous obligations under agreements that regulate trade in

goods and services and protection of intellectual property rights.

Ukraine

also submitted to an institutionalized system of interstate trade dispute

settlement.

In addition, Ukraine signed the Trade and Investment

Cooperation Agreement with the United States in 2008 and continued to

negotiate an Association Agreement with the EU that was finalized in 2011.

In parallel to negotiations with the EU, the Ukrainian government was

Ukraine signed bilateral free trade agreements with Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus,

Georgia, Kazakhstan, the Kyrgyz Republic, the Republic of Moldova, the Russian

Federation, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan.

The Commonwealth of Independent States was created in December 1991. In the

early 1990s, the participating countries negotiated a number of official documents,

which mainly focused on the development of stronger economic relations and the

facilitation of further economic integration between the former Soviet republics. For

example, CIS members signed a free trade agreement on 15 April 1994. Due to

numerous obstacles, the free trade agreement was not ratified by the signatories. In

1999, CIS members negotiated additional amendments to the free trade agreement

signed in 1994. From the early 2000s till 2009, CIS members adopted numerous

declarations and programs of co-operation. The CIS Free Trade Agreement was

signed in 2011 and came into force on 20 September 2012. Member countries are

Ukraine, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Armenia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Moldova, the

Russian Federation, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan.

A state can become a WTO member only after accepting the whole package of legal

agreements, including trade in services, trade-related intellectual property rights,

and various non-tariff measure agreements.

Ukraine, as a WTO member, is obligated to decide all disputes arising under the

WTO covered agreements in accordance with the provisions of the Understanding on

rules and procedures governing the settlement of disputes.

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Volume VIII, No. 2 (2021)

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considering participation in Russian-led economic integration projects

(Dragneva and Wolczuk 689-93).

Until 2013, Ukraine cautiously balanced its economic integration

commitments to Russia with the desire to preserve its political

independence (Dragneva and Wolczuk 683-93; Svoboda 1688-93). The

reasons behind these policies were twofold: Ukraine’s strong dependence on

a supply of energy resources from Russia and the avoidance of commitments

that might threaten Ukraine’s sovereignty (Dragneva and Wolczuk 680).

Against this background, several studies were published discussing the

economic, legal, and political implications of Ukraine’s choice between the

two possible pathways—either closer economic integration with the EU or

further integration with the post-Soviet states through participation in

Russian-led economic integration endeavours. Some analyzed prospective

legal obligations under both integration plans and emphasized the

impossibility of pursuing both integration options (Van der Loo and Van

Elsuwege 443). Other surveys outlined the economic repercussions of both

integration options and concluded that closer economic co-operation with

the EU would be more beneficial to Ukraine (ECORYS; Institute for Economic

Research and Policy Consulting).

In late 2013 Ukraine was at a crossroads: the country had to choose

either closer economic and political integration with the EU or the Russian-

led Eurasian Customs Union (subsequently transformed into the Eurasian

Economic Union). While numerous economic studies emphasized the

benefits of deeper integration with the EU, the Ukrainian political leadership

was concerned with the short-term goals of securing access to cheap Russian

gas and preserving tariff-free access to the Russian market (Dragneva and

Wolczuk 692). Thus, the Ukrainian government suggested a middle ground

in the negotiations with Russia—a free trade agreement between Ukraine

and the members of the Eurasian Customs Union (Shumylo-Tapiola 20). This

offer was declined.

A Customs Union between Belarus, Kazakhstan, and Russia was established in

2011; it was programmed to evolve into a Single Economic Space (SES) in 2012 and,

ultimately, into the Eurasian Economic Union (EEU) by 2015. The Eurasian Economic

Union (EAEU) was created in 2015, initially by Russia, Belarus, and Kazakhstan, and

later joined by Armenia and Kyrgyzstan. The EAEU replaced the previous integration

initiatives—the Customs Union (2010-11) and the Single Economic Space (2012-

14)—that were in effect between the same states. The ambition behind this economic

integration was to move from the customs union toward further integration into a

single market with the “four freedoms”—goods, services, labour, and capital.

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2. DETERIORATING TRADE RELATIONS WITH THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION

In late 2013-early 2014, several events were unfolding with astonishing

speed. Ukrainian President Viktor Ianukovych made an infamous move to

postpone the signing of the Association Agreement between Ukraine and the

EU. This act was perceived as a shift toward closer economic co-operation

with the Russian Federation and, as a result, a partial loss of sovereignty.

Massive demonstrations in Ukraine were followed by the Russian

annexation of the Crimean Peninsula and a military conflict in the eastern

part of Ukraine. In the midst of the political and military turmoil, the bilateral

trade relations between Ukraine and the Russian Federation significantly

deteriorated. The Trade Policy Review Report prepared by the WTO in

March 2016 provides the following data: “Imports from the Russian

Federation fell from US$23.2 billion in 2013 to US$12.7 billion in 2014;

exports to the Russian Federation dropped from US$15.1 billion in 2013 to

US$9.8 billion in 2014” (15).

The decrease in bilateral trade was further augmented by economic

sanctions imposed by both sides. Some of these restrictive measures were

explicitly declared as economic sanctions,

while other restrictions were

hidden under a veil of sanitary/phytosanitary measures, technical

regulations, and customs procedures (Cenusa et al.; Svoboda 1695-98). For

example, in July 2013, the Russian Federal Service for Surveillance on

Consumer Rights Protection and Human Wellbeing (Rospotrebnadzor)

imposed a ban on the import of confectionery produced by the Ukrainian

Company Roshen

(Svoboda 1695). To exert additional pressure, in August

2013, when the Ukrainian president was still hesitant to sign the Association

Agreement with the EU, Russian customs officials started inspecting all

goods imported from Ukraine (Panin). This caused significant delays at the

border, and Ukrainian exporters incurred heavy losses (Olearchyk).

According to some estimations “around 1,000 Ukrainian trucks and railway

wagons remained backed up on the Russian-Ukrainian border” (Svoboda

1696).

In the midst of the military tension between the countries, both countries

introduced special laws to regulate (i) the imposition of unilateral economic

sanctions, (ii) the circumstances that justify such measures, and (iii) the forms that

such measures might take. Ukrainian law regarding sanctions—№ 1644-VII—is

effective from 14 August 2014. The Russian law regarding “measures of reaction

(counteraction) against unfriendly actions of the United States of America and (or)

other foreign states”—№441399-7—was adopted in May 2018.

This company is owned by Petro Poroshenko, who was actively engaged in

Ukrainian politics, including during the time of the Revolution of Dignity, and

subsequently became a Ukrainian president.

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Volume VIII, No. 2 (2021)

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Another illustrative example was the suspension of conformity

assessment certificates that had been issued to Ukrainian producers of

railway equipment from late 2013 (Cenusa et al. 2). This suspension was

followed by a refusal to issue new certificates after the Ukrainian exporters

filed new applications (WTO, Russia—Measures Affecting the Importation).

Ukraine filed a complaint with the WTO, questioning the legality of such

actions.

Yet the matter did not rest there. After Ukraine and the EU signed the

Association Agreement and started to apply it provisionally in January 2016,

Russia suspended the CIS Free Trade Agreement with respect to Ukraine

(“Russia Suspends”; “EC Says”). According to the Russian president, this

decision was justified because the economic interests of the Russian

Federation might be potentially threatened by an influx of cheap goods that

originated in the EU.

Moreover, starting from January 2016, Ukraine was

added to the Russian blacklist of countries subject to an import ban on

certain food and agricultural products (Resolution of the Government) and

severe transit restrictions applied not only to goods originating in Ukraine

but also to goods that were transported through its territory (Decree of the

President of the Russian Federation). Ukraine retaliated in kind and

prohibited imports from Russia (Oliphant). The Ukrainian import ban covers

various categories of goods originating from the Russian Federation

(Kabinet Ministriv Ukrainy, Postanova vid 30 hrudnia 2015).

The remaining trade between Ukraine and the Russian Federation

exemplifies Ukraine’s strong dependence on a supply of energy resources,

coal, and nuclear fuel from Russia (Antonenko et al.). Furthermore, the

increased dependence on coal from Russia reflects economic implications of

the conflict in the east of Ukraine, a region that traditionally supplied coal to

other parts of the country. However, Ukraine has diversified its supplies of

energy resources and nuclear fuel since 2014 (Antonenko et al.).

Ukraine and Russia both questioned the legality of each other’s trade-

restrictive measures before the WTO. There were five such trade disputes.

Two of these disputes were terminated at the stage of consultations.

In the

Both the WTO panel and the Appellate Body concluded that the Russian Federation

breached its obligations under WTO law.

Annex 6 of the CIS FTA allows a party to revert to less favourable tariffs if another

party concluded an agreement with a third party that resulted in higher volumes of

imports to an extent that caused harm or danger of harm to the industry.

DS525: Ukraine—Measures relating to Trade in Goods and Services (the Russian

Federation filed a request for consultations to discuss various trade-restrictive

measures introduced by Ukraine; this request was not followed by the formal

initiation of a dispute); DS532: Russia—Measures Concerning the Importation and

Transit of Certain Ukrainian Products (Ukraine submitted a request for consultations

Turning Crisis into Opportunity

Volume VIII, No. 2 (2021)

157

dispute wherein Ukraine questioned the legality of conformity assessment

procedures applicable to Ukrainian suppliers of rolling stock, railroad

switches, and other railroad equipment, some of the measures undertaken

by the Russian Federation were acknowledged to be inconsistent with WTO

law (WTO, Appellate Body Report, Russia). In the remaining two disputes

Ukraine was not successful. In the dispute initiated by Russia, both the panel

and the Appellate Body found that Ukraine had violated some of its WTO

commitments

(WTO, Appellate Body Report, Ukraine). In the dispute filed

by Ukraine, the panel ruled that Russian restrictions on transit were justified

on national security grounds

(Bogdanova).

3. UKRAINE’S TRADE POLICY SINCE 2014

The current state of Ukraine’s international trade reflects the long-term

absence of structural economic reforms. According to the World Bank

report, the following negative trends have dominated Ukrainian trade

relations:

• Primary goods comprised over 80 percent of total exports on

average over the last 10 years; as a result, exports have fluctuated

considerably in line with the volatility in global commodity prices

(World Bank, Ukraine—Systematic Country Diagnostic 17);

• Ukraine has made limited progress in diversifying its export base

and enhancing the sophistication of its exports (World Bank,

Ukraine—Systematic Country Diagnostic 18);

• The distribution of output and exports across oblasts

(administrative regions in Ukraine) suggests that Ukraine has not

made sufficient progress in moving beyond commodity exports and

leveraging its other comparative advantages (World Bank,

Ukraine—Systematic Country Diagnostic 19).

with respect to measures concerning trade in juice products, beer, beer-based

beverages, and other alcoholic beverages, confectionary products, wallpaper, and

similar wall coverings from Ukraine; this request was not followed by the formal

initiation of a dispute).

Both the WTO panel and the Appellate Body found that Ukraine breached a number

of substantive and procedural obligations under the WTO Anti‑Dumping Agreement.

DS512: Russia—Measures Concerning Traffic in Transit (a dispute initiated by

Ukraine to question restrictions on transit; the WTO panel found that these

restrictions breach WTO obligations, yet they were justified on national security

grounds because of a situation of “emergency in international relations” between

both states).

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158

Since 2012 Ukraine’s exports of iron and steel, which have traditionally

been Ukraine’s main export products, have declined (WTO, Trade Policy

Review Body, Trade Policy Review of Ukraine, Report 15). On the other hand,

exports of agricultural products have been booming, in particular, grains and

oilseeds (WTO, Trade Policy Review Body, Trade Policy Review of Ukraine,

Report 15).

In 2012-18, Ukrainian exports of railway and tramway locomotives,

nuclear reactors, boilers and machinery, mineral fuels and oils, articles of

iron and steel, and fertilizers have significantly decreased (Table 1).

Table 1. Top 10 categories of Ukrainian exports in 2012 and 2018.

(Source: Dabrowski et al.)

Exports

Trade ($mlns) 2012

Trade ($mlns) 2018

Iron and steel

15,328

9,937

Cereals

6,971

7,241

Animal or

vegetable fats

and oils

4,171

4,497

Railway and

tramway

locomotives

4,107

253

Nuclear

reactors, boilers,

and machinery

3,787

1,724

Mineral fuels

and oils

3,640

861

Ores, slag, and

ash

3,306

3,035

Electric

machinery and

equipment

3,231

2,930

Articles of iron

and steel

2,837

1,110

Fertilizers

1,786

Since 2013, Ukraine’s trade patterns have changed drastically: both imports

from and exports to the Russian Federation decreased, whereas trade with

the EU intensified. Graph 1 and Graph 2 illustrate these trade patterns.

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Volume VIII, No. 2 (2021)

159

Graph 1. Ukraine exports of goods by destination, 2013-18 (based on

data from the World Bank World Integrated Trade Solution [WITS]).

Graph 2. Ukraine imports of goods by origin, 2013-18 (based on data

from the World Bank World Integrated Trade Solution [WITS]).

0.0

5000.0

10000.0

15000.0

20000.0

25000.0

2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018

European Union (EU-28) Russian Federation

China India

Turkey

0.0

5000.0

10000.0

15000.0

20000.0

25000.0

30000.0

2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018

European Union (EU-28) Russian Federation

China India

Turkey

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Volume VIII, No. 2 (2021)

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Starting from 2014, Ukraine has been implementing a trade policy based

on the following premises: reap the benefits of the Association Agreement

with the EU,

negotiate new free trade agreements with other states in

order to secure preferential market access,

accede to new WTO

agreements,

and defend Ukrainian interests in trade disputes with the

Russian Federation at the WTO.

In 2014 Ukraine established an Office of

Trade Representative; the trade representative is appointed by the highest

executive body in Ukraine—the Cabinet of Ministers (Kabinet Ministriv

Ukrainy, Postanova vid 16 zhovtnia 2014).

Export-led growth, a regulatory environment conducive to trade

facilitation, and more active participation in global value chains are areas of

significant importance in improving Ukraine’s terms of trade (Hoekman et

al.). In a similar vein, the World Bank recommends that quality and

standards be strengthened and harmonized to tap into the potential of

international trade agreements (World Bank, Ukraine—Systematic Country

Diagnostic 11).

Against this background, the reorientation of exports is a core priority

for Ukraine (Sardak et al.). Specifically, the country should improve its trade

relations with the EU and with other major economies (Sardak et al.). This

objective was reflected in the Export Strategy of Ukraine, 2017-21, and was

reinforced by the creation of the Export Promotion office in 2018.

To enable Ukraine’s participation in global value chains, priority should

be given to the alignment of standards, technical regulations, and associated

conformity assessment procedures, in addition to improvements in the

regulatory environment. Hence, it is important to analyze the potential of the

The Association Agreement with the EU entails not only lowering the tariff barriers

in trade between Ukraine and the EU, it also aligns Ukraine’s technical regulations

and standards with those of the EU. Furthermore, Ukraine is committed to

implementing the EU's acquis communautaire.

The Israel-Ukraine Free Trade Area Agreement was concluded on 21 January 2019

and is expected to come into force in 2021 (“Netanyahu: Israel to Complete

Ratification”). Ukraine and Turkey are at the final stage of concluding a bilateral Free

Trade Agreement (“Negotiations on FTA”). Ukraine and the United Kingdom signed

the Political, Free Trade and Strategic Partnership Agreement in October 2020. This

agreement delivers the same level of liberalization in trade, services, and public

procurement that was agreed upon under the existing EU-Ukraine Association

Agreement (“UK and Ukraine”). Some Ukrainian scholars argue that this

development could increase Ukrainian exports (Shvorak).

Ukraine joined the WTO Trade Facilitation Agreement in 2015 and the plurilateral

Agreement on Government Procurement in 2016.

For more details on trade disputes between Ukraine and Russia and their

outcomes, see the subsection “Deteriorating Trade Relations with the Russian

Federation.”

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Volume VIII, No. 2 (2021)

161

recently signed Canada-Ukraine Free Trade Agreement (CUFTA) in light of

the foregoing prescriptions for exports and trade relations and particularly

in view of the fact that despite strong diplomatic relations with Canada and

numerous, politically active Ukrainian diaspora in Canada, Ukraine trades

below its potential with Canada (Ministry of Economy of Ukraine). In section

III, the extents to which the CUFTA is conducive toward redirecting

Ukrainian exports to Canada and improving the regulatory environment in

Ukraine are examined.

II. TRADE RELATIONS BETWEEN UKRAINE AND CANADA

1. HISTORICAL BACKGROUND

In the late nineteenth century, Ukrainian immigrants, mostly from the

western part of the country, began to settle in Canada. Before the outbreak

of World War I, more than 170,000 Ukrainians had arrived in Canada

(Luciuk, Searching for Place 11). At that time the Canadian government

supported policies conducive to the promotion of such immigration. The

rationale behind those policies was well captured by Lubomyr Luciuk:

“Ukrainians and other Slavic immigrants were allowed in only because they

were deemed essential for populating Canada’s Northwest, to keep it from

remaining ‘sterile and unproductive for centuries to come’” (Searching for

Place 15).

During World War I, many Canadian settlers of Ukrainian descent were

incarcerated because they were former citizens of the Austro-Hungarian

Empire, i.e., “enemy aliens” (Luciuk, Searching for Place 16-25). Even after

the war, Ukrainian Canadians were treated in an unjust manner.

Despite

these injustices, failed attempts to establish an independent state (known as

“Those released, either during the war or just after, were never compensated for

the indignities they had suffered as internees, for the injustice of their incarceration,

for the lost years of their lives, or for their labour; nor were they refunded funds that

had been taken from them upon their arrest, wealth administered by the Custodian

of Enemy Alien Properties, some of which remains in Ottawa’s coffers to this day”

(Luciuk, Searching for Place 22).

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the Ukrainian War of Independence of 1917-21)

and World War II

sparked new waves of Ukrainian immigration to Canada.

Canadians of Ukrainian ancestry constitute more than 1.3 million of

present-day Canadians (Statistics Canada). It is no surprise that Canada was

the first country to officially recognize Ukraine as an independent state in

1991 (McDougall). Ukraine’s independence marked a new period of bilateral

co-operation between the countries (Kordan). It must be noted that Canada

was one of the first countries that responded to ongoing tensions between

Ukraine and the Russian Federation by imposing unilateral economic

sanctions against the latter (Government of Canada, “Canadian Sanctions”).

Furthermore, since 2014 Canada has provided assistance programs worth

more than 785 million Canadian dollars to Ukraine (Government of Canada,

“Canada’s Engagement”).

2. CANADA-UKRAINE FREE TRADE AGREEMENT: GENERAL OVERVIEW

The CUFTA was signed on 11 July 2016 and came into force on 1 August

2017.

The agreement consists of nineteen chapters and annexes. The

CUFTA covers trade in goods. Although new commitments for trade in

services were not negotiated, a review clause was incorporated in the

agreement, allowing parties to negotiate new rules for cross-border trade in

financial services, investment, telecommunications, temporary entry, and

other areas of interest to the parties (Government of Canada, CUFTA,

article 19.2). This clause allows parties to negotiate new commitments

within two years of the CUFTA’s entry into force. Although this time has

Dzyra mentions that the reasons behind such migration were diverse: economic,

social, and political. Myron Gulka-Tiechko assessed the impact of Canadian migration

policies, in particular, the Railways Agreement, on the economically-driven

migration from Ukraine in the interwar period.

Lubomyr Luciuk observed that “some 35,000-40,000 Ukrainian refugees would

relocate in Canada” (“Unintended Consequences in Refugee Resettlement”).

On 17 March 2014, the Special Economic Measures (Russia) Regulations came into

force. The Regulations were amended several times. The sanctions included an asset

freeze and a prohibition of dealings with designated individuals and entities;

restrictions on certain sectors, such as the financial and energy sectors; prohibition

of the export, sale, supply or shipping of certain (listed) goods to Russia or to any

person in Russia for their use in offshore oil (at a depth greater than 500 m), shale

oil, or Arctic oil exploration and production.

The negotiations between Canada and Ukraine were launched in 2010. After six

rounds of negotiations, they were concluded in July 2015.

All subsequent references will be cited as CUFTA.

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lapsed, each signatory has expressed a desire to initiate a new round of

negotiations to liberalize trade in services and to promote investment. In

July, 2019, Canadian Prime Minister Justin Trudeau and Ukrainian President

Volodymyr Zelens'kyi agreed to expand and modernize the CUFTA, and in

February 2020, Canada launched public consultations to this end (“Minister

Ng”). It is expected that future negotiations will liberalize investment, trade

in services and e-commerce, and temporary entry of persons, and promote

inclusive trade (“Consulting Canadians”).

When Ukraine joined the WTO in 2008, it had to liberalize its trade in

services more than the original members, such as Canada. In fact, Ukraine

undertook commitments in all the services sectors.

As a result, the country

has little to offer in terms of additional market access in services. This adds

to the disparity in bargaining powers between Ukraine and Canada. This

being said, the reforms announced by the new Ukrainian government are

expected to create new investment opportunities for Canada. For example,

privatization of Ukrainian state-owned enterprises is in process, with the

vested interests of rent-seeking elites being the major stumbling block

(Dabrowski et al.). Despite this opposition, the need for a post-Covid-19

economic recovery might inspire the Ukrainian government to accelerate

privatization. In view of this, new standards of investment protection that

might be potentially agreed upon by Ukraine and Canada can serve as

additional guarantees for Canadian investors and might encourage them to

invest in Ukraine.

The CUFTA prescribes asymmetrical tariff elimination commitments.

Thus, 98.1% of Canada’s goods became duty-free immediately, sixteen tariff

lines will become duty-free in 2024, and the remaining 111 tariff lines

(1.5%) will remain dutiable (WTO, Committee on Regional Trade

Agreements, Free Trade Agreement between Canada and Ukraine 9). Canada

excluded sensitive goods such as dairy, poultry, and eggs from its tariff

commitments.

For its part, Ukraine committed to a gradual tariff

elimination by 2024. Upon the CUFTA’s entry into force, 72.6% of Ukraine’s

The WTO Secretariat classification of services sectors is comprised of twelve

sectors and according to its accession documents, Ukraine undertook commitments

in all services sectors (WTO, Working Party on the Accession of Ukraine).

In 1994, Ukraine and Canada signed the Agreement between the Government of

Canada and the Government of Ukraine for the Promotion and Protection of

Investments, which came into force in 1995. This bilateral treaty prescribes a

number of obligations to protect investments; such obligations comprise the most-

favoured-nation (MFN) and national treatment clauses, fair and equitable treatment,

and the prohibition of expropriation.

Canada has implemented a supply management system for dairy, poultry, and eggs,

and avoids trade commitments for these products.

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goods became duty-free; the rest of the tariffs will be gradually eliminated

(WTO, Committee on Regional Trade Agreements, Free Trade Agreement

between Canada and Ukraine 11). Duties will continue to be levied for 101

tariff lines (WTO, Committee on Regional Trade Agreements, Free Trade

Agreement between Canada and Ukraine 11). It is noteworthy that the tariffs

levied on the goods for which there are no tariff elimination commitments

are significantly different in each country. In Canada, average tariffs range

between 218% and 228.9%, while in Ukraine they vary between 7.8% and

45.5% (WTO, Committee on Regional Trade Agreements, Free Trade

Agreement between Canada and Ukraine 10, 12). The CUFTA does not contain

Trade and Gender chapter as do other agreements recently signed by

Canada.

The substantive obligations of the CUFTA can be classified into three

categories: obligations that reinforce WTO commitments, WTO-minus

obligations (provisions that allow to deviate from standard WTO rules), and

WTO-plus obligations (obligations that expand existing WTO commitments).

The agreement stipulates that in the event of an inconsistency between the

agreement between Canada and Ukraine and the WTO agreements, the

agreement between Canada and Ukraine prevails, except otherwise

explicitly provided in the CUFTA (CUFTA; article 1.2).

Table 2. Substantive provisions of the CUFTA.

Obligations that reinforce WTO commitments.

Article

2.3

National treatment in accordance with Article III of the General

Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) 1994.

Article

2.5

Prohibition of Quantitative Restrictions enshrined in Article XI of

the GATT 1994 is incorporated, with some exceptions.

Article

2.6

Article VIII of the GATT 1994 is incorporated.

Article

2.7

Balance-of-Payments rules are incorporated (the conditions

established under the GATT 1994, the Understanding on the

Balance-of-Payments Provisions of the GATT 1994, and the

Declaration on Trade Measures Taken for Balance of Payments

Purposes).

In its recent Trade Policy Review of Canada, the WTO pointed out: “Canada showed

leadership by expanding its internal impact assessment process to include labour

and gender, and by incorporating Trade and Gender chapters in its new or revised

FTAs” (9).

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Articles

2.8, 4.4

The Customs Valuation Agreement governs the customs valuation

rules.

Article

2.9

Parties may apply export duties in accordance with their rights and

obligations under WTO law.

Article

5.2

The rights of the parties under Article XIX of the GATT 1994 and the

Agreement on Safeguards are explicitly acknowledged.

Furthermore, disputes with respect to those matters are excluded

from the dispute settlement mechanism prescribed by the

agreement. Special bilateral emergency actions are also permitted

(as discussed in WTO-plus obligations).

Article

5.8

Anti-dumping and countervailing measures apply in accordance

with Article VI of the GATT 1994, the Anti-Dumping Agreement, and

the Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures (SCM

Agreement). Disputes with respect to those matters are excluded

from the dispute settlement mechanism prescribed by the

agreement.

Article

6.1

The Parties affirm their rights and obligations under the WTO

Agreement on the Application of Sanitary and Phytosanitary

Measures (SPS Agreement). Furthermore, the Parties shall use WTO

dispute settlement procedures for formal disputes regarding SPS

measures.

Article

7.2

The WTO Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade, excluding

Articles 10 through 12 (information and assistance), Article 13,

some of Article 14 (institutions, consultations, dispute settlement),

and Article 15 (final provisions) is incorporated.

Chapter

The parties’ commitments on government procurement replicate, to

a large extent, those made under the revised Government

Procurement Agreement, in which both parties participate.

Article

11.2

The Parties affirm their rights and obligations under the WTO

Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property

Rights. Additional commitments prescribed by this chapter are

discussed in WTO-plus obligations.

Articles

18.2,

18.3

Article XX of the GATT 1994 is incorporated for the purposes of

Chapters 2 (national treatment and market access), 3 (rules of origin

and origin procedures), 4 (trade facilitation), 5 (safeguard

measures), 6 (SPS measures), 7 (technical barriers to trade [TBT]),

and 8 (electronic commerce). A national security exception similar

to Article XXI of the GATT 1994 is also incorporated.

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WTO-minus obligations: commitments that allow measures that would

be WTO-inconsistent otherwise.

Article 1.3

Obligations under Multilateral Environment Agreements prevail

over the relevant trade commitments under this agreement and if

“the measure taken is necessary to comply with that obligation,

and is not applied in a manner that would constitute, where the

same conditions prevail, arbitrary or unjustifiable discrimination

or a disguised restriction on international trade.” The list of such

Multilateral Environment Agreements is incorporated in Annex 1-

Article 2.3,

Annex 2-A

The national treatment obligation does not apply to measures set

out in Annex 2-A. Annex 2-A contains a list of Canadian measures;

for example, the use of ships in the coasting trade of Canada and

the internal sale and distribution of wine and distilled spirits.

Article 2.5,

Annex 2-A

Additional exceptions to the rules on import and export

restrictions. These rules do not apply to a measure set out in

Annex 2-A. Exceptions to the prohibition on export restrictions,

listed in Annex 2-A, include measures in respect of exports of logs

of all species and exports of unprocessed fish.

WTO-plus obligations: commitments that impose either more

stringent requirements on a party or cover additional areas that are

not covered by the WTO agreements.

Article 2.10

Prohibition of agricultural export subsidies; such prohibition

applies to export subsidies on an agricultural good that is

exported or incorporated in a product that is exported, to the

territory of the other party after the other party has, immediately

or after the transition period, fully eliminated the tariff on that

agricultural good in accordance with Annex 2-B.

Article 2.11

Parties lifted their right to rely upon special safeguards on

agricultural goods (Article V of the WTO Agreement on

Agriculture) for goods that are subject to tariff elimination

according to their commitments under the agreement.

Chapter 3

Detailed disciplines on the rules of origin and origin procedures.

Chapter 4

Trade facilitation Chapter: some of the commitments go beyond

the provisions of the WTO Agreement on Trade Facilitation.

Articles

5.3-5.7

Bilateral emergency actions (i.e., bilateral safeguards): the parties

can suspend the reduction of a tariff or alternatively impose a

higher tariff if certain preconditions are met. Such measures may

be imposed only during the transition period.

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Articles

6.3-6.4

Additional cooperation on SPS matters: the parties designate

sanitary and phytosanitary contact points to facilitate

communication and agree to resolve SPS issues expeditiously

through discussion between regulatory officials.

Articles

7.6-7.8

In the technical barriers to trade (TBT) Chapter, the parties agree

to cooperate on conformity assessment and to recognize

conformity assessment bodies located in the territory of the other

party under certain conditions. Moreover, each party shall accept

the results of conformity assessment procedures conducted by

conformity assessment bodies located in the other party's

territory, which have been recognized by the other party, under

conditions no less favourable than those applied to the acceptance

of the results of conformity assessment procedures conducted by

recognized conformity assessment bodies in its territory. The

parties should designate contact points to facilitate

communication.

Article 8.2

The Chapter on electronic commerce has only one substantive

obligation: “a party shall not apply a customs duty, fee or charge

on a product delivered electronically.”

Chapter 9

The Chapter on competition policy, monopoly, and state

enterprises prescribes that the parties agree to adopt or maintain

measures to proscribe anticompetitive business conduct and take

appropriate actions with respect to such conduct; stipulates rules

on the functioning of a privately owned monopoly and a

government monopoly; obligates the parties to ensure that a state

enterprise it maintains or establishes acts in a manner that is not

inconsistent with the party’s obligations under the CUFTA when

it exercises delegated governmental authority.

Chapter 11

The Chapter on intellectual property contains additional

obligations. For example, parties agree to protect geographical

indications (GIs) of wines and spirits originating in the territory

of the other party. The Chapter contains specific provisions on

requirements related to border measures, criminal procedures,

and penalties, in particular in connection with unauthorized

copying of a cinematographic work from a performance in a

movie theatre (camcording) or with copyright infringement on

the Internet or other digital networks. Contact points to facilitate

communications on intellectual property should be designated.

Chapter 12

The Chapter on the environment.

Chapter 13

The Chapter on labour.

Chapter 14

The transparency Chapter consists of two subchapters: Section A

prescribes rules for publication, notification, and administration

of laws; Section B obligates the parties to tackle corruption.

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III. THE POTENTIAL OF THE CUFTA TO UNLEASH UKRAINE’S TRADE CAPACITY

The CUFTA can make a positive contribution to the growth of Ukraine’s trade

potential by increasing bilateral trade flow. Additionally, the CUFTA might

also promote Ukrainian domestic reforms. Both effects are considered in the

subsequent analysis.

1. IMPACT OF THE CUFTA ON EXISTING TRADE RELATIONS BETWEEN UKRAINE AND

CANADA

The elimination of tariffs by Canada could increase existing Ukrainian

exports by 3.5%; furthermore, the reduction of tariff barriers enables new

categories of goods to be exported from Ukraine to Canada (Ministerstvo

ekonomichnoho rozvytku i torhivli Ukrainy, Uhoda pro vil'nu torhivliu 16).

Data from Canada indicate that bilateral trade between the states increased

from $278 million in 2015 to $346 million in 2018 (“Minister Ng”). A gravity

model developed by researchers in the Kyiv School of Economics estimates

that the CUFTA increased total Ukrainian exports to Canada by 6.5% from

2016 to 2018 (Hamaniuk et al. 28). The impact of the CUFTA on Canadian

exports is more nuanced: the gravity model does not predict a significant

effect on the dynamics of Canadian exports to Ukraine; however, some

categories of Canadian goods benefitted from this new agreement, e.g., fish

(HS03), pharmaceutical products (HS30), electrical machinery (HS85)

(Hamaniuk et al. 28). As the effect of bilateral free trade agreements is

observed over time, benefits to Canadian exports might be observed in the

future (Hamaniuk et al. 29).

After the CUFTA came into force on 1 August 2017, Ukrainian exports to

Canada increased (Graph 3). However, Ukrainian exports have been growing

in general, including exports to Canada (Graph 4). Thus, the observed growth

in exports can be explained by economic recovery as well as by the

preferential market access granted under the CUFTA.

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Volume VIII, No. 2 (2021)

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Graph 3. Ukrainian exports to and imports from Canada, 2010-19

(based on data provided by the State Statistics Service of Ukraine).

Graph 4. Ukrainian exports, 2010-18 (based on data from the World

Bank World Integrated Trade Solution [WITS]).

50000

100000

150000

200000

250000

300000

350000

2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019

Exports from Ukraine, thousand dollars USD

Imports to Ukraine, thousand dollars USD

0.0

10000.0

20000.0

30000.0

40000.0

50000.0

60000.0

70000.0

80000.0

2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018

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The impact of the CUFTA on bilateral trade relations between Ukraine

and Canada has been discussed by several scholars. Sidorov contends that

the positive contribution of the CUFTA to Ukraine’s economic prosperity

should be evaluated against the background of the Association Agreement

signed between the EU and Ukraine and the recently signed Comprehensive

Economic and Trade Agreement between Canada and the EU (CETA). In a

similar vein, Brovko points out the possibility of creating a Ukraine-EU-

Canada trade triangle, a point to which I return later in this subsection.

Vodop''ianova emphasizes that easier access to foreign markets, including

the Canadian market, might boost export-oriented development in Ukraine.

Her argument is that the Ukrainian domestic market is constrained by low

population and low purchasing power, while preferential access to other

markets might encourage Ukrainian producers to increase their production

(Vodop''ianova). A study by Serpukhov demonstrates a slight increase in

Ukraine’s exports to Canada which, according to the author, might be

attributed to the CUFTA. Yet, raw materials and semi-finished goods with

low added value dominate these exports (Serpukhov). Among the negative

repercussions of the CUFTA, scholars point out the potential increase in

Ukraine’s trade deficit with Canada, which has existed since 2007 (Zhurba).

A recent study noted that: “Ukraine’s exports to Canada have been

steadily growing and expanding much faster compared to other trade

partners—up by 70% in 2017, 55% in 2018 and 9.4% in 2019 vs Ukraine’s

total export growth up by 19% in 2017, 9.42% in 2018, and 5.8% in 2019”

(Hamaniuk et al. 17). Canadian exports also increased “from USD 90 million

in 2016 to USD 115 million in 2019 or by 28%”; however, decreasing coal

supplies from Canada resulted in a significant drop in Canadian exports in

2018-19 (Hamaniuk et al. 17-18). It was also reported that Ukraine’s export

of the following product groups expanded more in 2019 than in 2016: iron

and steel (HS72), copper and articles (HS74), preparations of vegetables

(HS20), machinery and mechanical appliances (HS84), vehicles (HS87)

(Hamaniuk et al. 7).

Research was conducted to identify groups of goods for which export to

Canada should be prioritized by Ukraine (Koval'ov et al., Vyznachennia).

Analysis therein focused on particular categories of goods belonging to

machine-building and food industries. The analysis revealed that 18

categories of goods have considerable potential to increase Ukrainian

exports to Canada (Table 3).

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Table 3. Prospective commodity items for the development of exports

to Canada (Koval'ov et al., Vyznachennia 7-9).

Code

Category of goods

0811

Fruits and nuts, raw or cooked, frozen

1517

Margarine

1704

Sugar confectionery without cocoa content

1806

Chocolate

1902

Yeast-free dough products; couscous

1905

Bakery products, rice paper

2001

Vegetables, cooked or canned with vinegar

2002

Tomatoes, cooked or canned without vinegar

2009

Fruit juices or vegetables, unfermented, without alcohol

2208

Ethyl alcohol, undenatured, less than 80% vol.

7322

Radiators for central heating, non-electric air heaters, made

with black metals

8432

Machines and agricultural, garden, or forestry equipment to

prepare or process soil; road rollers for sports playgrounds

8450

Washing machines

8474

Equipment to work with soil, stones, ores, and other mineral

materials

8516

Electric heating devices and apparatus; electric irons

8544

Wires isolated; cables and other isolated electric conductors;

fibre-optic cables

8545

Carbon electrodes, carbon brushes, carbon for lamps or

galvanic elements

8607

Parts of railway locomotives or tram motor cars or rolling

stock

Six groups of services (computer, research and development,

professional and consulting, scientific and technical, audio-visual and

related, cultural and recreational) were identified as bearing high export

potential (Koval'ov et al., Vyznachennia 13).

One more positive contribution of the CUFTA to unleashing Ukrainian

trade potential deserves attention. The Comprehensive Economic and Trade

Agreement negotiated between Canada and the EU (CETA) might be

beneficial for Ukraine. The EU-Ukraine Association Agreement, the CUFTA,

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Volume VIII, No. 2 (2021)

172

and the CETA have each had a positive impact on Ukraine’s trade, in

particular on Ukraine’s participation in value chains (Koval'ov et al., Tovary

ukrains'koho eksportu). Specifically, 9 commodity items produced in

Ukraine—plastic articles for use in construction (3925), new pneumatic

tyres of rubber (4011), men’s or boys’ suits, overalls, and shorts (6203),

women’s or girls’ suits, dresses, and skirts (6204), refrigerators, freezers,

and heat pumps (8418), machine tools for working stone, ceramics,

concrete, asbestos cement or for cold working glass (8464), parts to rail

locomotives or motor tram cars or rolling stock (8607), apparatus based on

the use of X-rays, and apparatus based on the use of alpha, beta or gamma

radiation (9022), instruments for measuring electrical quantities and

instruments for measuring or detecting ionising radiations (9030)—with

the intermediary goods imported from the EU and then exported to Canada

can benefit from the reduced tariffs under the EU-Ukraine Association

Agreement and the CUFTA (Koval'ov et al., Tovary ukrains'koho eksportu 12-

13). 28 intermediary commodity items (Table 4) exported from Ukraine to

the EU and then exported to Canada as a component of EU-produced goods

benefit from the reduced tariffs (Koval'ov et al., Tovary ukrains'koho

eksportu 19-24). 5 commodity items produced in Ukraine—ammonia,

anhydrous or in aqueous solution (2814), sulphonated, nitrated or

nitrosated derivatives of hydrocarbons (2904), detonators, capsules, fuses,

fire-conducting cords (3603), parts of footwear, gaiters, leggings (6406),

yachts and other vessels for leisure or sports; rowing boats and canoes

(8903)—with the intermediary goods imported from Canada and then

exported to the EU enjoy the benefits of the preferential treatment granted

under these agreements (Koval'ov et al., Tovary ukrains'koho eksportu 29).

This assessment of existing trade patterns between Ukraine, the EU, and

Canada reveals positive contributions to the existing goods-producing value

chains. Additionally, closer trade co-operation between the EU and Canada

that entails an alignment of various standards (non-tariff measures) might

enable Ukrainian exporters to comply with either EU or Canadian standards,

acquiring preferential market access to both markets (Guitton and Martin).

Table 4. Intermediary goods from the value chain Ukraine-EU-Canada

that enjoy benefits under the EU-Ukraine Association Agreement and

the CETA (Koval'ov et al., Tovary ukrains'koho eksportu 19-24).

HS Code

Category of goods

2501

Salt and pure sodium chloride, sea water

2601

Iron ores and concentrates

2602

Manganese ores and concentrates

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Table 4 cont.

HS Code

Category of goods

2803

Carbon

2833

Sulphates; alums; peroxosulphates

2902

Cyclic hydrocarbons

2904

Sulphonated, nitrated or nitrosated derivatives of

hydrocarbons

2923

Quaternary ammonium salts and hydroxide; lecithins

3206

Other colouring matter (dye materials)

3823

Industrial fatty acids; acid oils; industrial fatty alcohols

4104

Tanned hides and skins of bovine or equine animals, but not

further prepared

4106

Tanned hides and skins of other animals, but not further

prepared

4107

Leather further prepared after tanning, skin of bovine or

equine animals

7201

Cast iron

7202

Ferroalloys

7206

Carbon steel

7207

Semi-finished products of carbon steel

7208

Flat-rolled products of non-alloy steel, of a width of 600 mm

or more, hot-rolled, not clad, plated or coated

7209

Flat-rolled products of non-alloy steel, of a width of 600 mm

or more, cold-rolled, not clad, plated or coated

7222

Other bars and rods of stainless steel; angles, shapes and

sections of stainless steel

7228

Other bars and rods of other alloy steel; hollow drill bars

and rods, of alloy or non-alloy steel

7507

Nickel tubes, pipes and tube or pipe fittings

7603

Aluminium powders and flakes

7801

Unwrought lead

8482

Ball or roller bearings

8517

Electrical apparatus for line telephony or line telegraphy;

Videophones

8544

Insulate wires, cables and other insulated electric

conductor; optical fibre cables

9401

Seats and parts thereof

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Volume VIII, No. 2 (2021)

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2. CONTRIBUTION OF THE CUFTA IN PROMOTING DOMESTIC REFORMS IN UKRAINE

To focus on trade in goods and services with high value-added content,

Ukraine’s economy would require significant structural changes. This is

viable only as a long-term strategy. At the moment, Ukraine can reap the

benefits of an abundance of skilled labour and relatively low wages. The

economic attractiveness of these factors is further enhanced by the

geographic proximity of the EU market and by the recently signed EU-

Ukraine Association Agreement. This agreement grants not only preferential

market access but also invites gradual alignment of standards and technical

regulations (WTO, Committee on Regional Trade Agreements, Deep and

Comprehensive Free Trade Area).

Furthermore, preferential access to the Canadian market might increase

Ukraine’s chances to promote itself as a potential participant in global value

chains. To follow this path, Ukraine should improve its infrastructure (such

as roads and railways), significantly reduce trade costs, and simplify

customs procedures.

2.1 Reduction of Trade Costs and Red Tape

Ukraine has high trade costs (Hoekman et al.). Furthermore, inefficient

customs procedures remain an impediment to developing Ukrainian exports

(Ministry of Economy of Ukraine 53). Additionally, Ukrainian customs

valuation procedures have been a substantial barrier to the country’s active

engagement in international trade. During a meeting of the Trade Policy

Review Body in April, 2016, several WTO members expressed concerns

about the application of customs valuation methods by Ukrainian customs

officials (WTO, Trade Policy Review Body, Trade Policy Review of Ukraine,

Minutes).

To illustrate the need for a reduction in trade costs and red tape, data

from the World Bank publication Doing Business 2020 are presented in Table

5. Documentary compliance is evidently burdensome to Ukrainian exporters

and importers.

Trade in primary commodities is particularly vulnerable to external factors, such

as world prices. Furthermore, Ukraine has had significant trade deficits since 2005,

and a heavy reliance on commodity trade makes the country sensitive to external

shocks.

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Table 5. Ukraine’s performance in the category “Trading across

Borders,” Doing Business 2020.

Indicator

Ukraine

Europe

and

Central

Asia

OECD

High

Income

Best

Regulatory

Performance

Time to export:

Border compliance

(hours)

16.1

12.7

1 (19

economies)

Cost to export:

Border compliance

(USD)

150.0

136.8

0 (19

economies)

Time to export:

Documentary

compliance (hours)

25.1

2.3

1 (26

economies)

Cost to export:

Documentary

compliance (USD)

192

87.6

33.4

0 (20

economies)

Time to import:

Border compliance

(hours)

20.4

8.5

1 (25

economies)

Cost to import:

Border compliance

(USD)

100

158.8

98.1

0 (28

economies)

Time to import:

Documentary

compliance (hours)

23.4

3.4

1 (30

economies)

Cost to import:

Documentary

compliance (USD)

162

85.9

23.5

0 (30

economies)

An in-depth analysis undertaken by the Institute for Economic Research

and Policy Consulting states that the reform of Ukrainian customs and the

transparency and efficiency of its operations are essential steps in a

reduction of Ukraine’s trade costs (Instytut ekonomichnykh doslidzhen' ta

politychnykh konsul'tatsii). A survey of Ukrainian importers and exporters

noted that customs procedures could be shortened by implementing

automated customs procedures, by minimizing the human factor, by

submitting all documents in electronic form, and by establishing the

personal liability of customs officers for damages caused (Instytut

ekonomichnykh doslidzhen' ta politychnykh konsul'tatsii 21). Elimination of

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Volume VIII, No. 2 (2021)

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the abovementioned obstacles to international trade would contribute to

export-led growth, lower the price of imports, and might have a positive

effect on integrating Ukraine into international or regional value chains. In

this regard, obligations undertaken by Ukraine according to the trade

facilitation chapter of the CUFTA might be helpful.

The commitments imposed on the parties by the trade facilitation

chapter of the CUFTA are more stringent than the relevant provisions of the

WTO’s Trade Facilitation Agreement (TFA). First, in the CUFTA, each party

agrees to use “existing international trade and customs instruments and

standards as a basis for its import, export and transit requirements and

procedures, unless they would be an inappropriate or ineffective means for

the fulfilment of the legitimate objective pursued” (CUFTA; par. 5, article

4.1). The comparable provision in the TFA uses “best endeavour” language.

Second, in the CUFTA, to facilitate trade, the parties agree to adopt and

maintain simplified customs procedures for the efficient release of goods

(CUFTA; article 4.3). This obligation entails a number of commitments on the

fast release of goods (CUFTA; par. 1, article 4.3), and express shipments are

subject to even more simplified procedures (CUFTA; par. 2, article 4.3).

Third, the CUFTA obligates the parties to use information technology

solutions that expedite their domestic procedures for the release of goods

(CUFTA; article 4.7). The TFA does not entail such obligation.

The commitments under the trade facilitation chapter of the CUFTA

establish an additional set of international obligations for Ukraine that, along

with the relevant obligations under the TFA and the Association Agreement

with the EU, urge Ukraine to make progress with the reform of customs

authorities and to enhance the transparency and efficiency of their work.

Furthermore, the parties confirmed their mutual desire to improve their

bilateral co-operation in customs matters. Toward this end, the relevant part

of article 4.12 of the CUFTA states: “The Parties shall develop a technical

cooperation program in customs matters under jointly decided terms as to

the scope, timing and cost of cooperative measures.” Along with this, the

parties are committed to engaging in the development of further co-

operation on trade facilitation matters (CUFTA; article 4.13). At the time of

writing, there is no information about a program to increase technical

cooperation in customs matters or in trade facilitation.

TFA, Article 10.3.1. reads as follows: “Members are encouraged to use relevant

international standards or parts thereof as a basis for their import, export, or transit

formalities and procedures, except as otherwise provided for in this Agreement.”

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2.2 Alignment of Standards to Curtail Non-tariff Barriers

A formidable barrier for Ukrainian exporters is the lack of recognition of

national conformity assessments abroad, which urges exporters to seek

competent international expertise that is costly (Ministry of Economy of

Ukraine 55). Ukraine inherited the Soviet Union system of burdensome and

compulsory technical regulations. Such regulations were neither consistent

with the WTO Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade (TBT Agreement),

nor were they compatible with similar standards prepared by more

developed WTO members, such as the EU. Before acceding to the WTO,

Ukraine amended its domestic standards regulations to align them with the

requirements enshrined in the TBT Agreement (WTO, Trade Policy Review

Body, Trade Policy Review of Ukraine, Report 63). The recently signed

Association Agreement with the EU paved the way for a new wave of

standards modification. This development has been described as follows:

“The revision of Ukraine’s basic legal framework during 2014 and 2015

forms part of a progressive adaptation of Ukraine’s TBT regime to the EU

principles of market supervision and consumer rights protection, including

an overhaul of the technical regulations framework” (WTO, Trade Policy

Review Body, Trade Policy Review of Ukraine, Report 65).

The CUFTA does not prescribe commitments with respect to the

alignment of standards. Despite this, a number of important obligations

were agreed upon. First, the parties agreed to appoint special contact points

to facilitate bilateral co-operation on the technical barriers to trade (CUFTA;

article 7.8) and sanitary and phytosanitary measures (CUFTA; article 6.3).

Additionally, the parties consented to co-operate on prevention and

resolution of sanitary and phytosanitary issues through discussion between

regulatory officials (CUFTA; article 6.4). Regarding technical barriers to

trade, Ukraine and Canada confirmed their intention “to identify, develop

and promote bilateral initiatives regarding standards, technical regulations,

accreditation, conformity assessment procedures and metrology that are

appropriate for particular issues or sectors” (CUFTA; article 7.4). Notably,

the parties committed to recognizing each other’s conformity assessment

bodies on conditions no less favourable than the conditions applied to

conformity assessment bodies located in their respective territories

(CUFTA; article 7.6). Such recognition entails that the results of the

conformity assessment procedures conducted by recognized conformity

assessment bodies should be accepted (CUFTA; article 7.6).

Although the abovementioned provisions do not imply significant

alignment of standards or automatic recognition of their equality, these

undertakings can provide a foundation for close co-operation between

regulatory agencies. Ukrainian exporters are in dire need of this. As Denys

Krasnikov, the vice president of the Ukrainian League of Industrialists and

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Entrepreneurs, points out, “the Canadian market in general is much more

closed to foreign goods and services than some other countries, because of

non-tariff barrier regulations” (Timtchenko). Given this, effective

communication and co-operation through designated contact points can

enable Ukrainian exporters to access more accurate information about

Canadian non-tariff barriers.

2.3 Improvements in the Regulatory Environment in Ukraine

The CUFTA chapters on environment and labour reflect the values of

Canadian society and, as a result, the demands of Canadian consumers. Thus,

Ukrainian exporters might promote their goods to the Canadian market by

emphasizing that they are produced in an environmentally-friendly way and

in compliance with international labour standards. The following

subsections discuss the impacts of environment, labour, and transparency

chapters on domestic regulations and practices in Ukraine.

2.3.1 Environment Chapter of the CUFTA

Environmental policies play a significant role in Canada’s trade policy (WTO,

Trade Policy Review Body, Trade Policy Review of Canada 30-31). Thus,

Canada customarily incorporates environment chapters in its free trade

agreements (WTO, Trade Policy Review Body, Trade Policy Review of Canada

34).

The environment chapter of the CUFTA outlines the following broad

principles of environmental protection: (i) the parties have sovereign rights

to conserve and protect their environment and sustainably manage their

natural resources (CUFTA; article 12.2); (ii) each party has a right to

establish its own level of environmental protection and shall strive to

gradually promote higher levels of environmental protection (CUFTA; article

12.3); (iii) each party has a duty to effectively enforce environmental laws

and to remedy violations through judicial, quasi-judicial, or administrative

proceedings (CUFTA; article 12.4); (iv) the parties agree to avoid lowering

their environmental standards in order to encourage trade and investment

activities (CUFTA; article 12.5).

The following obligations could have a significant impact on improving

compliance with environmental laws in Ukraine:

• The parties are obliged to conduct an environmental impact

assessment of proposed projects that might cause significant

adverse effects on the environment, to make information about

environmental impact assessment publicly available, and to

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promote public awareness of environmental legislation (CUFTA;

article 12.6, article 12.7). Additionally, there is a duty to provide

environmental information upon the request of any interested

person, even if such person resides in the other contracting party

(CUFTA; article 12.13).

• The parties should enable domestic private actors to request an

investigation of any alleged violation of environmental laws and, in

particular, to enforce environmental laws through the private

parties’ access to administrative, quasi-judicial, or judicial

proceedings (CUFTA; article 12.8). Such proceedings are subject to

the procedural guarantees enumerated in Article 12.9 of the CUFTA.

• The parties agreed to monitor the implementation of the

environment chapter through the establishment of a Committee on

the Environment (CUFTA; article 12.16); this committee will

undertake a review of the implementation of the environment

chapter (CUFTA; article 12.17). A dispute resolution mechanism

was also established (CUFTA; article 12.21).

The provisions of the CUFTA that entail (i) an obligation to conduct an

environmental impact assessment and (ii) a duty to provide environmental

information upon a request of any interested person, came at an appropriate

moment for Ukraine. In May 2017, the Ukrainian Parliament adopted the

Law of Ukraine “On Environmental Impact Assessment” No. 2059-VIII,

which came into force in December of the same year (Verkhovna Rada

Ukrainy). This law replaced the Law of Ukraine “On Ecological Expertise” No.

45/95-ВР enacted in February 1995.

The new law makes environmental impact assessment compulsory, not

only for legal entities engaged in certain activities but also for public

authorities and local government bodies (Verkhovna Rada Ukrainy). Among

the obvious positive contributions of the law are enhanced public

participation in an environmental impact assessment and tightened

sanctions for failure to comply with the prescribed environmental impact

assessment procedures (Verkhovna Rada Ukrainy).

Despite Ukraine’s ratification of the Convention on Access to

Information, Public Participation in Decision-Making and Access to Justice in

Environmental Matters (Aarhus Convention) in 1999 and the adoption of the

Law “On Access to Public Information” in 2011, access to information,

including information about the protection of the environment, is not always

guaranteed. In particular, the World Bank, in its Environmental Analysis of

Ukraine in 2016, drew attention to the following:

Over the past years, civil society organizations noted some challenges in

receiving information, which include absence of responses from the state

authority or just partial answers; failure to comply with the terms of

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Volume VIII, No. 2 (2021)

180

replying; scrambling ecological information by the state bodies and using a

“classified information” stamp; restrictions on receiving information about

draft strategies, programs, and plans (Ukraine Country Environmental

Analysis 67).

A study by the DiXi Group emphasizes that certain information about

projects that might have a significant impact on the environment was not

provided by Ukrainian government agencies (40).

The CUFTA reinforces the ongoing regulatory changes in Ukraine by

adding an additional layer of binding international obligations. In particular,

the abovementioned commitments impose additional duties on Ukraine and

empower both domestic and foreign private actors, thus contributing to a

better implementation and enforcement of existing environmental laws in

Ukraine.

2.3.2 Labour Chapter of the CUFTA

The labour chapter is comprised of four sections: obligations, institutional

mechanisms, procedures for labour consultations and dispute settlement,

and general provisions. Obligations to protect labour rights reflect the basic

principles embedded in the core conventions of the International Labour

Organization (CUFTA; article 13.3). The labour chapter prohibits derogation

from the labour law in order to encourage trade and investment (CUFTA;

article 13.4).

The labour chapter obligates parties to undertake various government

enforcement actions (CUFTA; article 13.5) and prescribes an obligation to

guarantee a right of access to administrative or tribunal proceedings to any

interested person if such person intends to enforce and give effect to the

rights protected by the labour laws (CUFTA; article 13.6). Both of these

obligations are subject to guarantees of fair, equitable, and transparent

proceedings (CUFTA; article 13.7).

The parties introduced the following institutional mechanisms to

monitor the enforcement of labour commitments: a Labour Ministerial

Council (CUFTA; article 13.9), a National Administrative Office that serves as

“Officially, however, the public was unable to have access to up-to-date texts of the

signed PSAs [Production Sharing Agreements], in which Environment-People-Law,

an international charitable organization saw a violation of the Aarhus Convention

and sent a relevant communication to the International Secretariat of the said

Convention. This communication was preceded by a number of requests for

information from Environment People-Law ICO, placed with the Secretariat of the

Cabinet of Ministers, the Ministry for Environmental Protection and the State Service

for Geology and Subsoil, and lawsuits complaining about the refusal by these

government agencies to provide the texts of the PSAs” (DiXi Group 40).

Turning Crisis into Opportunity

Volume VIII, No. 2 (2021)

181

a point of contact for labour affairs (CUFTA; article 13.10), co-operative

activities for the promotion of the objectives of the chapter (CUFTA; article

13.11, annex 13-A), an obligation to engage in public communications on

labour matters (CUFTA; article 13.12), and general consultations on labour

issues between the parties (CUFTA; article 13.13).

In addition, special dispute settlement rules were entrenched in the

agreement (CUFTA; articles 13.14-13.16). These rules prescribe that a

review panel may be established only if the subject matter is trade-related

(CUFTA; article 13.15). If one of the parties neglects to comply with its

obligations and does not comply with an action plan prepared by the review

panel to remedy the non-compliance, the other party is entitled to a

monetary assessment that should be paid to it (CUFTA; annex 13-C).

Labour relations in Ukraine are regulated by the Labour Code of

Ukraine, adopted in 1971 when the country was a part of the Soviet Union.

The law is outdated, and attempts to modernize the regulation of labour

relations and bring the law into conformity with the new reality have been

unsuccessful. In this regard, the International Labour Organization reports:

“After several unsuccessful attempts to adopt the new legislation in 2003,

2009 and 2016, the Ukrainian Government initiated an entirely new draft

law in late 2019.” Current efforts to update the relevant regulations are

closely followed by the international organizations present in Ukraine.

Among other things, these organizations have emphasized that the

preservation of the fundamental rights of workers should be a key priority

in the ongoing reforms (United Nations Ukraine, “UN Position Paper”).

Undeclared work, which is estimated to be equivalent to 15-21 percent

of total employment, is among the recent challenges that Ukraine is facing

(International Labour Organization). A report released in 2021 by the United

Nations describes the scale of this problem: “Less than half of working age

people (12.8 million out of 28.5 million) worked with protection guarantees

of their labour rights in 2019. Another 15.7 million (65% of the total) worked

unprotected, without employment contracts” (United Nations Ukraine,

“Ukraine Common Country Analysis” 41). The ongoing reform should

address this problem among other pressing issues.

The provisions of the CUFTA do not prescribe stand-alone norms of

protection guaranteed to Ukrainian workers, and any such pronouncement

would go beyond a bilateral trade agreement that does not establish a

common economic area. However, the basic principles embedded in the

CUFTA create a “safety net” by declaring the lowest standards of treatment

that Ukraine cannot infringe, thus, adding to the relevant international

obligations of Ukraine.

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Volume VIII, No. 2 (2021)

182

2.3.3 Transparency Chapter of the CUFTA (Section B—Anti-Corruption)

This section designates certain conduct to be a criminal offence under

domestic law and provides a list of such offences (CUFTA; article 14.9).

Moreover, parties are obligated “to provide protection against any

unjustified treatment of a person who reports, in good faith and on

reasonable grounds, facts to the competent authorities concerning offences

referred” (CUFTA; article 14.9). Alexander MacLaren, a former Canadian

diplomat who was engaged in the CUFTA negotiations, emphasized the

following: “The obligations that were eventually incorporated in the

agreement reflect the maximum extent of commitments that might be

prescribed by such type of provisions in trade agreements. Anything that

would go beyond is a violation of the principle of non-intervention and

impedes national sovereignty.”

To enforce their anti-corruption commitments, the parties established

rules for dispute settlement proceedings (CUFTA; annex 17-B). These rules

prescribe two types of consultations that can take place between parties in

dispute (CUFTA; annex 17-B, pars. 1-2). If consultations fail, parties can refer

the matter to a review panel (CUFTA; annex 17-B, par. 3). The review panel

provides a report that contains: (a) findings of fact; (b) the review panel’s

determination as to whether there has been a violation of an obligation; and

resolution of the matter (CUFTA; annex 17-B, par. 14).

In various global rankings on corruption, Ukraine scores high (World

Bank, Ukraine—Systematic Country Diagnostic). In the last few years, new

anti-corruption institutions, including the High Anti-corruption Court of

Ukraine, have been established (Lough and Dubrovskiy; Kuz and

Stephenson). Additional obligations under the CUFTA, which are subject to

compulsory dispute settlement provisions, can also contribute to the fight

against corruption in Ukraine.

IV. TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE PROGRAMS PROVIDED BY CANADA TO UKRAINE

In the CUFTA, Canada and Ukraine have endorsed future trade co-operation

and have agreed to a list of areas in which trade-related co-operation could

be increased: 1. Support for small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs); 2.

Agriculture; 3. Standard-setting (CUFTA; annex 15-A). To promote closer

trade co-operation, the Canada-Ukraine Trade and Investment Support

(CUTIS) project was developed. The CUTIS aims to promote Ukraine’s

sustainable economic growth through exports to Canada and Canadian

investments in Ukraine. This project is a five-year development assistance

initiative financed by the Canadian government.

Turning Crisis into Opportunity

Volume VIII, No. 2 (2021)

183

Since its launch in 2016, the CUTIS has initiated educational campaigns

for Ukrainian exporters interested in exploring the potential of the Canadian

market. To this end, numerous publications were prepared. For instance, “I

Can Export” is a publication specially prepared for Ukrainian small and

medium enterprises that are interested in exporting goods and services to

Canada. It includes a general overview of the benefits of the CUFTA,

instructions for small and medium enterprises on how to evaluate their

readiness to export to Canada, step-by-step guidelines for the process of

exportation, and examples of business entities that successfully export to

Canada. Subsequent publications have focused on more narrow areas: rules

of origin under the CUFTA; guides on how to export certain categories of

goods such as confectionery, apparel, footwear, furniture; and guidelines for

exporting information and communication technology services (CUTIS,

“Export Guides and Reports”).

The export support program U CAN Export was created to provide

support for Ukrainian small and medium businesses in the priority sectors.

Among recent projects sponsored by the CUTIS was a trade mission

organized for representatives of the Ukrainian information technology (IT)

industry, which included participation in a Canada-Ukraine business forum,

B2B meetings, and visits to Canadian IT companies (Ofis z prosuvannia

eksportu).

Furthermore, under the aegis of the CUTIS project, various activities

were undertaken to promote gender equality. In particular, the project

supports a new SheExports Platform and examines the barriers that

constrain women from engaging in exporting (CUTIS).

MacLaren pointed out that the technical assistance programmes

supported by the Canadian government are driven by self-interest and

internal political pressure. Canada protects its interests in Ukraine by

establishing rules and legal guarantees equivalent to those in Canada.

Simple, clear, and transparent rules that can be enforced by Ukrainian courts

are a desirable outcome of such programs. Canadian domestic pressure is

explained by the fact that there are 1.3 million Canadian Ukrainians who are

not only members of the diaspora that has strong connections with its

historical motherland but who also have voting power inside Canada.

Strong support from the Ukrainian diaspora in Canada is channelled

through political advocacy and through the willingness of Ukrainian

Canadians to buy goods that originate in Ukraine. Indeed, Ukrainian

exporters emphasize that the Ukrainian diaspora formed the core of their

consumers at the initial stages of exporting to Canada. Tetiana Abramova, a

co-founder of the Ukrainian clothing manufacturer “RITO,” emphasized this

fact in her interview for the brochure I Can Export (Ministerstvo

ekonomichnoho rozvytku i torhivli Ukrainy 18-19). Orest Rozhankivsky, the

export director of “Chumak,” one of Ukraine’s largest food producers, stated:

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Volume VIII, No. 2 (2021)

184

“The core business is around what is called ‘ethnic distribution,’ as there are

a lot of people in Canada of Ukrainian origin” (Timtchenko). Yet,

Rozhankivsky pointed out that the diaspora market might not be large

enough for a producer as big as “Chumak” (Timtchenko).

V. CONCLUSION

The military and political conflict with the Russian Federation in 2014 had

detrimental effects on an already weakened Ukrainian economy. In

particular, bilateral trade relations between the states significantly

deteriorated, and Ukraine began to search for new markets for its goods and

services. As Ukraine perceives Canada to be a reliable partner and a friendly

political ally due to a large Ukrainian diaspora, the Canada-Ukraine Free

Trade Agreement (CUFTA) was a welcome initiative, especially when

relations between Ukraine and Russia deteriorated. Canada and Ukraine are

now engaged in a number of initiatives to promote bilateral trade and

Canada has become one of Ukraine’s priority trading partners.

As this article demonstrated, the positive impacts of the CUFTA could be

observed in an increased bilateral trade flow between the countries, in a

reduction of trade costs and red tape, and in improvements in Ukraine’s

regulatory environment. Commitments made in the trade facilitation

chapter urge Ukraine to make progress with regard to its reform of the state

customs service while obligations under environment and labour chapters

might help further the current domestic reforms in Ukraine. Furthermore,

enhanced co-operation between the regulatory authorities on the technical

barriers to trade and on prevention and resolution of sanitary and

phytosanitary issues supply the Ukrainian exporters with access to more

accurate information about Canadian non-tariff barriers, which could reduce

the time necessary to resolve disagreements.

Turning Crisis into Opportunity 
© 2021 East/West: Journal of Ukrainian Studies (ewjus.com) ISSN 2292-7956 
Volume VIII, No. 2 (2021) 
185 
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Unilateral Sanctions in International Law and the Enforcement of Human Rights

Book

Full-text available

Jul 2022

Iryna Bogdanova

Are unilateral economic sanctions legal under public international law? How do they relate to the existing international legal principles and norms? Can unilateral economic sanctions imposed to redress grave human rights violations be subjected to the same legal contestations as other unilateral sanctions? What potential contribution can the recently formulated doctrine of Common Concern of Humankind make by introducing substantive and procedural prerequisites to legitimise unilateral human rights sanctions? Unilateral Sanctions in International Law and the Enforcement of Human Rights by Iryna Bogdanova addresses these complex questions while taking account of the burgeoning state practice of employing unilateral economic sanctions.

Six years after Ukraine’s Euromaidan: reforms and challenges ahead

Article

Full-text available

Jun 2020

Since the Euromaidan protests (2013-2014), Ukraine has had two presidents and four governments. In a difficult environment of external aggression, they have initiated various reforms aimed at bringing the country closer to the European Union and boosting growth. Progress has been partial and relies on international backing, with limited domestic appetite for reform.

Are Ukraine's Anti-corruption Reforms Working?

Article

Full-text available

Nov 2018

Summary Starting in 2014, Ukraine has undertaken significant reforms to address corruption in public life. So far, there has been greater success in restricting the opportunities for corruption than in bringing corrupt officials to justice. Corruption is a symptom of the poor system of governance in the country, not the cause of it. A decisive breakthrough will require opening the political system to more actors, creating greater competition and developing credible institutions to support the rule of law. Anti-corruption successes include the cleaning up of Naftogaz and reforms in administrative services, banking, the patrol police, procurement and taxation. Decentralization is also creating new opportunities for citizens to hold local authorities accountable for managing local public resources. Progress is lacking in priority areas such as customs, deregulation, privatization, demonopolization and the reform of public administration. Defence spending is particularly opaque. Corruption schemes remain untouched in some parts of the energy sector. An overhaul of the civil service is also essential. Reforms of the law enforcement agencies are proceeding slowly, if at all. It is too early to say whether judicial reform will lead to improvements in the functioning of the courts because of the deep underlying culture of corruption in the judicial system. The newly created National Anti-Corruption Bureau has yet to achieve a high-level prosecution because of the influence of vested interests over the judiciary. This situation should change for the better after the formation of the High Anti-Corruption Court, but there is likely to be a risk of selective justice. Punitive measures on their own can only have a limited effect on reducing corruption. They must be part of a sustained and comprehensive strategy to reduce the space for corrupt practices and open the political and economic system to greater competition. This requires demonopolizing politics, and encouraging Ukraine’s power groups to accept new rules of the game. Citizens condemn high-level corruption but regard petty corruption as a justifiable evil. This perception needs to change, and citizens must accept their responsibilities for limiting the scope of corruption.

The WTO Panel Ruling on the National Security Exception: Has the Panel 'Cut' the Baby in Half?

Article

Full-text available

Apr 2019

Iryna Bogdanova

This post is an attempt to briefly reflect upon the WTO panel’s ruling in Russia - Traffic in Transit (DS 512) on the contentious issue of the national security exception. I begin by outlining the historical context of the recent transit dispute. The post then summarizes the legal claims brought by Ukraine and the justifications raised by the Russian Federation. Subsequently, the findings of the panel are discussed. The conclusion delves into the potential implications of the present decision.

Unintended Consequences in Refugee Resettlement: Post-War Ukrainian Refugee Immigration to Canada

Article

Jun 1986

Lubomyr Luciuk

This article examines the resettlement of Ukrainian Displaced Persons (DPs) in Canada during the immediate post-World War II period (1945–1951). Allowed to emigrate from Western Europe to Canada, partially as a result of the lobbying efforts of various voluntary agencies established by Ukrainian Canadians, these DPs soon became embroiled in acrimonious debates with representatives of the previously established Ukrainian Canadian population. The DPs’ creation of a number of new organizations both alienated the receiving Ukrainian society and had deleterious effect on the latter's overseas refugee relief and resettlement operations, which lasted only until 1951.

A Vision for Ukraine in the World Economy Defining a Trade Policy Strategy that Leverages Global Opportunities

Article

Aug 2014
J World Trade

Tivo regional trade agreements have been at the centre of attention in Ukraine: the Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Agreement (DCFTA) with the EU and the Russia-led Eurasian Customs Union (ECU). Arguably they were the source of the fall of the Yanukovych government and the hostilities in Eastern Ukraine in the spring and summer of 2014. This article argues that a trade policy that is global in perspective and the lowering of trade costs are critical for Ukraine, and that efforts should centre on addressing specific policy areas that negatively eject trade with both customs unions. Ukraine could propose the creation of a number of 'supply chain councils' organized around the major export sectors for Ukraine, the ECU countries as well as the EU. The councils would have a mandate to identify the most important sources of supply chain inefficiencies as well as actions to resolve them. Such an approach would help to rebuild trust between Ukraine and Russia after the cessation of hostilities and help to assure Russia that the DCFTA is not an anti-Russian agreement.

Reforming Ukraine's Energy Sector: Critical Unfinished Business

Anton Antonenko

Antonenko, Anton, et al. "Reforming Ukraine's Energy Sector: Critical Unfinished Business." Carnegie Europe, 6

Trykutnyk vil'noi torhivli. Shcho dast' Ukraini ZVT iz Kanadoiu

Nov 2016

Oleksandra Brovko

Brovko, Oleksandra. "Trykutnyk vil'noi torhivli. Shcho dast' Ukraini ZVT iz Kanadoiu." Ievropeis'ka pravda, 16 Nov. 2016, www.eurointegration.com.ua/articles/2016/11/16/7057420/. Accessed 5 July 2021.

Russia's Punitive Trade Policy Measures towards Ukraine, Moldova and Georgia. Centre for European Policy Studies

Jul 2014

Denis Cenusa

Cenusa, Denis, et al. Russia's Punitive Trade Policy Measures towards Ukraine, Moldova and Georgia. Centre for European Policy Studies, Sept. 2014, www.ceps.eu/cepspublications/russias-punitive-trade-policy-measures-towards-ukrainemoldova-and-georgia/. Accessed 5 July 2021.

CUTIS-Canada-Ukraine Trade Investment Support Project

Jun 2017

Cutis-Canada

CUTIS-Canada-Ukraine Trade Investment Support Project. cutisproject.org/en/. Accessed 5 July 2021. ---. "Export Guides and Reports." CUTIS-Canada-Ukraine Trade Investment Support Project, cutisproject.org/en/guides/. Accessed 5 July 2021. ---. "Export Support Program U CAN Export." CUTIS-Canada-Ukraine Trade Investment Support Project, 20 June 2017, https://www.cutisproject.org/en/news/export/. Accessed 5 July 2021.

Environmental Impact Assessment (EIA) in the Extractive Sector. Practice and Problematic Aspects of Application

Jul 2021

Dixi Group

DiXi Group. Environmental Impact Assessment (EIA) in the Extractive Sector. Practice and Problematic Aspects of Application. DiXi Group, 2020. dixigroup.org/wpcontent/uploads/2020/10/dixi-ovd-eng-4.pdf. Accessed 5 July 2021.

Turning Crisis into Opportunity: Unfolding Ukraine's Trade Potential with the Canada-Ukraine Free Trade Agreement

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