Rethinking Proxy War Theory in IR: A Critical Analysis of Principal–Agent Theory

Abstract

This paper explores the question of what drives proxy alignment in war and argues that current proxy war scholarship needs further thinking to go beyond focusing on the principal–agent theory and individual actors’ motivation analysis. Rather, there is a need to look at the generative mechanisms of proxy alignment as a process that constitutes patterns of friend–enemy relations. The paper argues securitization patterns from domestic to regional and international levels drive actors to re-evaluate their positions and define their enemies and friends. This is a process of securitization alignment and confluence, which serves as a generative mechanism for proxy alignment in a conflict. Securitization alignment is based on a convergence of securitizations by different actors that create a friend–enemy dynamic and convergence of security interests between actors. The confluence of securitizations from the domestic level to regional and beyond also connects actors across different levels to be in alignment and impact the conflict.

Full text

International Studies Review (2021) 23, 1835–1858
ANALYTICAL ESSAY
Rethinking Proxy War Theory in IR: A
Critical Analysis of Principal–Agent Theory
ABBAS FARASOO
Deakin University
This paper explores the question of what drives proxy alignment in war
and argues that current proxy war scholarship needs further thinking to
go beyond focusing on the principal–agent theory and individual actors’
motivation analysis. Rather, there is a need to look at the generative mech-
anisms of proxy alignment as a process that constitutes patterns of friend–
enemy relations. The paper argues securitization patterns from domestic
to regional and international levels drive actors to re-evaluate their posi-
tions and define their enemies and friends. This is a process of securitiza-
tion alignment and confluence, which serves as a generative mechanism
for proxy alignment in a conflict. Securitization alignment is based on a con-
vergence of securitizations by different actors that create a friend–enemy
dynamic and convergence of security interests between actors. The con-
fluence of securitizations from the domestic level to regional and beyond
also connects actors across different levels to be in alignment and impact
the conflict.
En este artículo se explora la interrogante de qué es lo que impulsa la
alineación de poderes en la guerra y se argumenta que la investigación
actual de la guerra por poderes requiere más reflexiones para ir más allá
de centrarse en la teoría de mandante-mandatario y el análisis de la mo-
tivación de los actores individuales. Más bien, es necesario considerar los
mecanismos generativos de la alineación de poderes como un proceso que
constituye patrones de relaciones amigo-enemigo. En el artículo se argu-
menta que los patrones de securitización, desde el nivel nacional hasta el
regional e internacional, impulsan a los actores a reevaluar sus posiciones
y definir a sus enemigos y amigos. Se trata de un proceso de alineación y
confluencia de securitización, que sirve como mecanismo generativo para
la alineación de poderes en un conflicto. La alineación de securitizaciones
se basa en una convergencia de securitizaciones por parte de diferentes ac-
tores que crean una dinámica amigo-enemigo y la convergencia de garan-
tías prendarias entre los actores. La confluencia de securitizaciones a nivel
nacional, regional y superiores también permite conectar a los actores en
diferentes niveles para que estén alineados e incidan en el conflicto.
Cet article explore la question de ce qui motive l’alignement de factions
interposées dans une guerre et soutient que les recherches actuelles
sur les guerres par factions interposées devraient être approfondies
pour aller au-delà de la théorie du principal-agent et de l’analyse de la
motivation des acteurs individuels. Il serait plutôt nécessaire d’examiner
les mécanismes génératifs d’alignement de factions interposées en tant
que processus constituant des schémas de relations amis/ennemis.
Farasoo, Abbas. (2021) Rethinking Proxy War Theory in IR: A Critical Analysis of Principal–Agent Theory. International Studies
Review,https://doi.org/10.1093/isr/viab050
© The Author(s) (2021). Published by Oxford University Press on behalf of the International Studies Association.
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1836 Rethinking Proxy War Theory in IR
Cet article soutient que les modèles de sécuritisation, du niveau national
au niveau régional en passant par le niveau international, poussent les
acteurs à réévaluer leurs positions et à définir qui sont leurs ennemis et
leurs amis. Il s’agit d’un processus d’alignement et de confluence des
sécuritisations qui sert de mécanisme génératif d’alignement des factions
interposées dans un conflit. L’alignement des sécuritisations repose sur
une convergence des sécuritisations établies par différents acteurs qui
créent une dynamique amis/ennemis et une convergence des intérêts de
sécurité entre les acteurs. La confluence des sécuritisations, du niveau
national au niveau régional et au-delà, permet également aux acteurs de
différents niveaux de s’aligner et d’avoir un impact sur le conflit.
Keywords: proxy alignment, principal–agent, securitization align-
ment, and generative mechanism
Palabras clave: alineación de poderes, mandante-mandatario, alin-
eación de securitizaciones y mecanismo generativo
Mots clés: alignement des factions interposées, principal-agent,
alignement des sécuritisations et mécanisme génératif
Introduction
In its collection titled The Future Conflict Operating Environment Out to 2030, the Royal
United Services Institute (RUSI) classified proxy war as one of the “contemporary
schools of war” (Roberts 2019, 4), and this is not a baseless claim. Proxy dimen-
sions have shaped the Afghan war from 1978 till today, civil wars in Laos from 1955
to 1975, Angola from 1975 to 2002, and Sri Lanka from 1983 to 2009, to name
just a few (Hughes 2012;Groh 2019;Akbarzadeh and Ibrahimi 2020). According
to Rauta, seven of the “10 Conflicts to Watch in 2020” in the International Cri-
sis Group list have proxy dimensions: Afghanistan; Burkina Faso; Libya; Kashmir;
Syria; Ukraine; and Yemen (Malley 2019;Rauta 2020b). According to one estimate,
over 20 million people died in the “Third World” in the second half of the twenti-
eth century due to superpowers’ proxy wars (Griffiths, Callaghan, and Roach 2008,
19). Scholars such as Mumford concluded that “proxy war has been a perpetual el-
ement of modern warfare” (2013a, 1). For a long time, the question was: What is a
proxy war and why actors deploy it? These questions mainly focus on the nature of
proxy warfare and actors’ motivation behind it. However, going beyond proxy war
as a type of military activity and intervention, a more fundamental question is: what
drives proxy wars? This is a theoretical question to explore the generative mecha-
nisms of alignment in proxy wars. Examining the generative mechanism of proxy
war offers a robust perspective of the dynamics of international security, which helps
to go beyond focusing on individual motivations among actors.
Proxy war refers to an indirect intervention in another country through
alignment with local actors to impact that country’s politics. The proliferation
of proxy wars has led researchers to look at it as a separate type of war-
fare and interaction that impacts human, national, and international securities
(Hughes 2012;Mumford 2013a;Groh 2019;Fox 2019b;Rauta 2020b). Schol-
ars such as Mumford have made a significant effort to introduce proxy war-
fare as an “identifiable strand of future war studies” (Mumford 2013a, 9). Sim-
ilarly, Rauta talks about “generations of proxy war research” (Rauta 2020a)
and “proxy war studies” as a subfield of international security and strategic
studies (Rauta 2021, 3). Although proxy wars have been studied mainly from the
prisms of the Cold War and civil war studies in the past (Salehyan 2007;Gleditsch
and Salehyan 2008;Gleditsch, Salehyan, and Schultz 2008;Mumford 2013a;Groh
2019), a growing body of scholarship deals with proxy war as a separate research
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ABBAS FARASOO 1837
topic in contemporary war, security, and strategic studies (Mumford 2013b;Rauta
2020a). Therefore, one can consider “proxy war studies” as the subfield of interna-
tional security and strategic studies that needs further theorization and conceptual
clarity. Different attributes are used for proxy actors, supporting states, and target
countries in proxy war scholarship. Proxy actors are labeled as the “client,” “subordi-
nate,” “pawn,” “tool,” or “satellite” (Dunér 1981,353;Rauta 2018, 457). These labels
are used to indicate the subordination of proxy actors to great powers to show how
the former are used as “instruments” for the latter’s political purposes. Supporting
actors are labeled as “activator” and “patron”(Bar-Siman-Tov 1984), “principal” ac-
tor (Salehyan, Siroky, and Wood 2014), “benefactor” (Mumford 2013a), and “ben-
eficiary” (Rauta 2018). These attributes demonstrate a principal-centric and one-
sided conceptualization rather than considering the generative mechanism behind
the proxy alignment. However, this paper prefers to use terms with less ideological
and political connotations. Therefore, I will primarily use the terms “supporting”
and “proxy” actors and understand that both of them are beneficiaries in a war.
Proxy war literature mainly draws on principal–agent theory (PAT) because it
remains focused on principal actors’ motivations. PAT in proxy war refers to a re-
lationship wherein principal actors delegate tasks to proxy actors (agents) to im-
plement such tasks in the target country on behalf of the principal actor (Byman
and Kreps 2010;Rittinger 2017). This theoretical base has led the literature to focus
largely on principal actors’ roles and their power of manipulation. Particularly dur-
ing the Cold War, states in the international system, such as the United States and
Soviet Union, have mainly been considered as principal actors in proxy wars. This
approach simply says that rival powers drives the proxy relations wherein powerful
actors mostly use non-state actors to impact a conflict or challenge its competitors
(Mumford 2013a). The deployment of PAT has largely produced a state-centric ap-
proach in proxy war studies (Byman and Kreps 2010;Innes 2012;Groh 2019), which
is a one-sided theorization. Even those who considered client states in the develop-
ing countries as proxies still focus on principle actors instead of theorizing the gen-
erative mechanism behind the alignment (Rittinger 2017;Berman et al. 2019). For
principal–agent theorists, the generative mechanism of alignment in proxy war is
conceivable through principal actors’ motivation and power (Fox 2019b)—it is the
principal actor who defines the “enemy,” “friend,” and “alignment.” A constructivist
variation of PAT focuses on identity, socialization, and discourse in principal–agent
relationships (Rittinger 2017), however it still largely remained principal-centric
with less focus on the generative mechanism of alignment.
This paper aims to offer an innovative conceptualization of the generative mech-
anism of proxy war to explain the deeper causal structure of proxy war in interna-
tional politics. To do this, this paper takes a critical approach to PAT to provide
a deeper understanding of proxy alignment to explain the dynamics of security
complexity and mutual collaboration in proxy wars. Among classics, in analyzing
war, we learned from Clausewitz (2007, 14) that “hostile feelings and hostile inten-
tions” as two main motives “make men fight one another.” Hostility drives warring
parties toward an extreme, and therefore, a war emerges from “the most extreme
emergency” situation (Daase and Davis 2015, 26), whether it is perceived or real.
Within this situation, each party drives “its opponent toward extremes” (Clausewitz
2007, 14). However, when it comes to proxy war, a direction toward extremes (as
observed by Clausewitz) drives actors to make alignments as well. The relationship
between supporting states and proxy actors is proxy alignment, which works as a
mechanism of empowerment that enhances, legitimizes, and enforces emergency
actions against an enemy as a mutual collaboration. According to Clausewitz (2007,
20), this situation encompasses “the law of extremes, the will to overcome the en-
emy and make him powerless.” “The law of extremes” is a condition that requires
emergency action. However, this paper examines the condition that drives “the law
of extremes” in the context of a proxy war wherein actors align themselves against
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1838 Rethinking Proxy War Theory in IR
an enemy. The argument is that proxy alignment needs a generative mechanism
to be formed instead of reducing it to merely delegated tasks and power of manip-
ulation. Although analyzing proxy war according to PAT offers significant insight
about task delegation and power of manipulation, it does not explain the gener-
ative mechanism of proxy war and mutual collaboration between supporting and
proxy actors in the war. This paper argues that the generative mechanism enforces
alignment and justifies violent strategies in a war, on the one hand, and works as a
central force of mobilization in the war, on the other. By focusing on the generative
mechanism, the contribution of this paper is to theorize the deeper dynamics of
proxy alignment, which is crucial in exploring the deeper causal structure of proxy
war alignment in security and war studies.
Generative mechanisms refer to “conditions which produce the events” (Sayer
2010, 91). Scholars such as Collier argues that a generative mechanism relates to
those aspects of “the structure of a thing by virtue of which it has a certain power”
(Collier 1994, 62). McWherter defined generative mechanism in a metaphorical
way as “the earth’s gravitational pull” (McWherter 2013, 99), which is what Clause-
witz called “the law of extremes” in war. Philosophers such as Bhaskar consider the
generative mechanism as the power that is “forming the real basis of causal laws”
(Bhaskar 2005, 10). Perhaps a robust theory is not to claim causal analysis right
away between problem and result or between assumptions and conclusions, but to
explain mechanisms that work as underlying causal power to generate the results
(Wight 2004). Therefore, this paper aims to explore the generative mechanism of
proxy alignment to unpack the driving forces behind it, rather than conceptual-
izing the nature of proxy relation in terms of manipulation and task delegation.
Although the importance of practical aspects of proxy war such as military doctrine
and tactics are significant for further studies (see especially Fox 2019b), this paper
exclusively focuses on the generative mechanism of proxy war to examine its deeper
security dynamics.
The deeper security dynamics of alignment in proxy war should explain the con-
ditions of the war, which drive “the law of extremes” and force actors to forge an
alignment. This goes beyond the “principal–agent” relationship and considers the
processes of interactions that constitute alignments. Although there is power asym-
metry between supporting states and proxy actors, the whole alignment is not based
just on one-sided decision-making or total manipulation (Rittinger 2017). Instead,
proxy war is a mutual collaboration with a wide range of varieties in terms of de-
liberation, bargaining, and mutual commitment between the aligned actors. It is
crucial to be aware of variations and nuances in proxy wars; however, exploring the
generative mechanism of alignment will significantly contribute to a theoretical gen-
eralization. A focus on generative mechanisms enables one to consider the deeper
security dynamics rather than power relations among principal and proxy actors.
Focusing only on power relations and task delegation, the PAT has underestimated
the deeper generative mechanism of proxy alignment. Thus, there is a need to ask
fundamental questions about what drives proxy alignment. Socialization, identity,
and ideologies are essential factors to tightens proxy relation through forming a
sense of friendship, comfortability, and legitimacy (see, e.g., Rittinger, 2017;Saad,
2019), but these all should be conceivable in the context of war and security threat
to explain the generative mechanism of alignment.
I draw on securitization theory, originally developed by the Copenhagen School,
and argue that the generative mechanism in proxy war alignment is the conflu-
ence of threat definition between actors from domestic to international levels. Se-
curitization refers to a process that “constructs a narrative of existential threat and
the necessity of extraordinary measures in response” to protect the referent object
(Wilkinson 2015, 34). A referent object can be anything valuable enough for secu-
ritizers who are ready to defend it and forge alignment. In this context, war is an
emergency action by a securitizing actor to protect its referent object. Securitization
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ABBAS FARASOO 1839
is different from the traditional military sense of security; instead, it is a process of
threat definition that urges actors to undertake emergency measures. Securitization
“generates endorsement of emergency measures beyond rules that would otherwise
bind” (Buzan, Wæver, and De Wilde 1998, 5). In proxy war, actors align their se-
curitizations by way of constructing a path for collaboration and alignment beyond
the boundaries of a single level of analysis. The idea of “level of analysis” in secu-
rity studies centers on individuals, states, and the international system (Waltz 2001).
Drawing on Waltz’s idea of the level of analysis, Buzan and Wæver looked at secu-
rity as a cross-level phenomenon that crosses national, regional, and international
boundaries (Buzan 1983;Buzan, Wæver, and De Wilde 1998;Buzan and Wæver
2003). In proxy war, the confluence of securitizations among actors from different
levels constitutes proxy alignment in internal conflicts.
Securitization at different levels happened through practices (discursive and non-
discursive) and associations (Léonard and Kaunert 2019). For example, a speech act
is a discursive form of securitization, which has been highlighted by the first gener-
ation of securitization theorists (Buzan, Wæver, and De Wilde 1998;Wæver 2007).
However, the non-discursive forms of securitization related to policies, context,
memories, interventions such as proxy wars (Bigo 2002;McDonald 2008;Balzacq
2011b;Mucha 2016;Adamides 2020;Kaunert and Wertman 2020). As Léonard and
Kaunert (2019) argue, securitization also occurs through association, where actors
define security threats based on actors’ connections. In this context, actors not only
securitize a particular issue as a threat or another actor as an enemy but also se-
curitize them through their association with other issues and actors that have al-
ready been securitized. In the case of Afghanistan, the Afghan government not only
securitized the Taliban because of its fight against the government and terrorist
attacks but also securitized the group through its relationship with Pakistan and
Al-Qaeda. The Taliban’s association with Pakistan creates a confluence of securiti-
zation between Afghanistan and India just as the association between the Taliban
and Al-Qaeda has formed a confluence of securitization between the United States
and the Afghan government. Given the Afghanistan and India relationship, a simi-
lar logic is operating in the confluence of securitizations between Pakistan and the
Taliban (this will be detailed later). I argue that a confluence of securitization cre-
ates the generative mechanism of proxy alignment, in which actors pursue their
interests through alignment and collaboration rather than just task delegation and
manipulation. Thus, this paper attempts to theorize the generative mechanism of
proxy war as securitization alignment, which gives meaning to other concepts such as
“enemy” and “friend.”
This paper is divided into the following sections to develop this argument and
provide a critical analysis of the current proxy war theorization. In the first section
of the article, I examine the conceptual logic and theoretical debates in proxy war
studies. I examine the logic of “my enemy’s enemy is my friend” to show that ab-
stracts such as “enemy” and “friend” are not self-serving concepts to explain the
generative mechanism in proxy alignment. Then I examine two central concepts in
proxy war theorization, principal–agent relations and power asymmetry, and argue
that these concepts cannot fully explain generative mechanisms and proxy align-
ment. Following this, I explore the generative mechanism in proxy alignment be-
yond a single level of analysis, and argue that the confluence of securitizations from
domestic to regional and international levels helps actors build alignment. In this
section, I suggest a way forward to theorize the generative mechanism in proxy
war analysis, which contributes to considering conditions, mechanisms, and pro-
cesses in proxy war and international security studies. Finally, the paper explores
Afghanistan and Syria as two typical proxy war cases to illustrate its key argument
about the alignment of securitizations between actors as generative mechanisms of
proxy wars.
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1840 Rethinking Proxy War Theory in IR
Conceptual History of Proxy War and a Critical Analysis of the Principal–Agent
Relations Theory
Proxy war is as old as political philosophy. The Arthashastra, a treatise on statecraft
written in the fourth century BC, is best known for the maxim: “my enemy’s enemy
is my friend” (Hughes 2012,2;Biberman 2019, 14), which is the core concept in to-
day’s proxy war analysis. The author of The Arthashastra, Kautilya, was Chandragupta
Maurya’s adviser, the Maurya Empire founder, to gain more lands, organize admin-
istration and economics, and deal with rivals and enemies. Kautilya advised the king
to use his resources to make a friend of his enemy’s enemy. The king should “sell the
gain to the enemy’s enemy; [and] give it away to an ally or to a disgruntled prince
of the enemy’s family; [and] use it to drive a wedge between the enemy and his ally”
(Rangarajan 1992, 635–6). Kautilya’s core assumption is that “The enemy, however
strong he may be, becomes vulnerable to harassment and destruction when he is
squeezed between the conqueror and his allies” (Rangarajan 1992, 542). Among the
classics on war studies, we have Sun Tzu who advices for deception and disruption of
the alliance of enemies, Thucydides who provides instruction for alliance manage-
ment, and Clausewitz who gives direction to attack the enemy’s alliance (Handel
2005;Clausewitz 2007;Griffith 2010;Mynott 2013). However, The Arthashastra is
the very first recorded guide on proxy alignment, in which Kautilya classified wars
into three categories: open wars, secret wars, and undeclared wars. Open war is a
conventional war that occurs in a specific time and place with an explicit declara-
tion. In contrast, secret and undeclared wars include attacks by surprise and secret
agents in war with “occult practice” (Rangarajan 1992, 548). Kautilya’s description
of terrorization and occult practice as parts of secret and undeclared wars without
declaration is like today’s proxy warfare.
Perhaps, since The Arthashastra, the concept of “my enemy’s enemy is my friend”
has been taken for granted as alignment logic. However, it has been neither the-
orized further to explain a generative mechanism of alignment in wars nor has it
offered explanatory logic per se to depict mechanisms. “My enemy’s enemy is my
friend” is not a self-serving concept for causal analysis because of two reasons. First,
notions such as “enemy” and “friend” are not eternal and fixed; therefore, they do
not necessarily constitute an emergency action. Rather, “enemies,” “my enemy’s en-
emies,” and “friends” have to be defined in a particular way in a process to constitute
alignment and action. Second, “enemies” and “friends” are socially constructed phe-
nomena. Paraphrasing Wendt (1992), enemies and friends are what actors make of
them; however, their socio-political mechanism needs explanation. One can ques-
tion how the configuration of “my enemy’s enemy is my friend” can emerge and
what constitutes it. The underlying point is that no one should assume that enemies
and friends are eternal and apparent.
PAT extensively linked the enemies’ and friends’ interactions in proxy war with
power. During the Cold War, proxy war was theorized as an instrument for super-
powers’ foreign policy, which has widely led toward a one-sided theorization with the
main focus on great powers’ rivalries. It has been assumed that superpowers could
choose a “friend against an enemy” any time they want. This implies that proxy war
is a military doctrine defined by a superpower, which is not entirely inaccurate, but it
does not tell us much about the generative mechanism of proxy alignment. Also, in
this theoretical assumption, the dynamics of internal conflict, roles of regional pow-
ers, and non-state actors have been underestimated (Phillips and Valbjørn 2018).
For example, Deutsch (1964) has defined proxy war as an indirect war between two
superpowers in a third country:
An international conflict between two foreign powers, fought out on the soil of a
third country; disguised as conflict over an internal issue of that country; and using
some or all of that country’s manpower, resource and territory as means for achieving
preponderantly foreign goals and foreign strategies (Deutsch 1964, 102).
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ABBAS FARASOO 1841
Deutsch’s definition of proxy wars is “state-centric” (Mumford 2013a, 13), ne-
glecting non-state actors’ roles in the conflict. Although states are still the primary
actors in international politics, the state-centric approach underestimates three crit-
ical issues. First, since World War II, interstate wars between national armies have
declined, but significant threats have emanated from non-state actors such as in-
surgents and terrorist groups (Salehyan 2010). Second, considering the impacts of
proxy wars, the target states are not the only referent objects of security; individual
citizens also greatly bear the consequences of war (Barthwal-datta and Basu 2017).
Third, the impacts of arming and supporting local actors are not limited to the tar-
get state’s territory anymore. Rather, internal conflict is “a significant transnational
phenomenon, reflecting and shaping various aspects of global politics” (Bleiker
2000, 2). Given that non-state actors in both domestic and transnational levels are
on the rise, a state-centric approach will not sufficiently explain all dimensions of
proxy war and alignment.
Again, the state-centric approach is rooted in PAT in proxy war analysis, which
considers the state as the “principal” actor with the ability to manipulate and per-
suade. Recently, proxy war scholars such as Hughes (2012) and Mumford (2013a)
have tried to place non-state actors in proxy war studies. Hughes describes proxy
war as “a non-state paramilitary group receiving direct assistance from an external
power” (Hughes 2012, 11). Mumford similarly defines proxy war as “the indirect en-
gagement in a conflict by third parties wishing to influence its strategic outcome”
(Mumford 2013a, 1). These definitions narrowly focus on proxy intervention in the
target country instead of defining the proxy war as a collaboration by the aligned
actors. As such, proxy war studies’ central focus has remained on principal actors’
intention and power asymmetry in proxy alignment, which enforces the epistemol-
ogy of the PAT in proxy relations. Before suggesting a way forward for theorizing
the generative mechanism and providing empirical examples, it is important to of-
fer a detailed review of PAT limitation and its potential for misleading in proxy war
studies.
The Principal–Agent Theory and Its Limitations
Although PAT does not explain the generative mechanism of proxy war, there are
two main reasons why PAT has been widely deployed in recent proxy war analysis.
First, during the Cold War, wars around the world were assumed as affairs among
superpowers (principal actors) because of the Western-centric approach in interna-
tional relations (IR). In the Western-centric approach in IR, war and peace in the
international system have been viewed largely from Western superpowers’ points of
view (Acharya 2014;Buzan 2018;Acharya and Buzan 2019). Indeed, the Cold War
manifested many conflicts in developing countries (Hironaka 2005), which reduced
conflicts with proxy dimensions into merely a competition between superpowers.
This epistemology has largely influenced proxy war literature; as Beehner (2015)
argues, the term proxy war “conjures” the image of the Cold War. This epistemolog-
ical context paved the way for the deployment of PAT, which changed to a paradigm
in proxy war studies (Bar-Siman-Tov 1984;Byman and Kreps 2010;Salehyan, Siroky,
and Wood 2014;Sozer 2016;Berman and Lake 2019;Groh 2019;Fox 2019b).
Second, significant attention to proxy relations neglected the generative mech-
anism of proxy war and diverted the focus toward power relations in proxy war-
fare. The power asymmetry between supporting and proxy actors created the im-
pression that “principal” actors are using proxy actors through reward and punish-
ment mechanisms (Berman et al. 2019). And thus, local proxy actors are merely
the agents of the external actors. As Groh argues, “Without control, the proxy will
likely pursue its own agenda with little regard for the costs to the intervening state”
(Groh 2019, 8). Despite considering proxy actors’ “agency,” PAT gives principal ac-
tors a greater role in controlling the proxy agent. Only if proxy actors gain more
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1842 Rethinking Proxy War Theory in IR
power, the base of the relationship will change. According to Fox, “the principal
possesses power of the proxy, or agent, insofar as it can make it do something it
would not otherwise do” (Fox 2019a,61).
For scholars such as Fox, the principal–agent approach is a theory of power: “The
relationship between principal and agent is bound by a power-dynamic” (Fox 2019b,
32). However, he postulates that “nations or countries may no longer be the sole
proprietor of warfare today [because] in the absence of strong bonded interests,
power unifies the principal and its agent” (Fox 2019b, 36). According to this ap-
proach, the power-dynamic defines who has the “agency” to make the decisions,
leaving little opportunity for proxy actors’ autonomy. In such a view, proxies have
no choice but to fulfill the will of the principal actor. This goes against what Dunér
(1981, 356) coined as the “compatibility of interests” in proxy alignment. Drawing
on Durer, Mumford also argues that compatibility of interest is “the foundation of
the benefactor–proxy relationship, as it reveals the perceived mutual benefit that
the intervention reaps if the strategic goal motivating the proxy war is achieved”
(Mumford 2013a,17).
PAT justifies the theory of power relations rather than explaining the generative
mechanism. It reinforces the idea that proxy war is merely a task delegation activity,
from principal actor to agent or proxy. Groh argues that “Proxy war entails a hier-
archical relationship between an intervening state and its proxy—in more formal
terms, a principal–agent relationship. Proxy war requires a higher level of involve-
ment from the intervening state” (Groh 2019, 3). Similarly, Byman and Kreps assert
that “Without the practice of delegation, no principal–agent relationship would ex-
ist” in proxy war (Byman and Kreps 2010, 3). In his edited volume, Making Sense of
Proxy Wars,Innes (2012) also considers proxy war as a principal–agent relationship.
Principal–agent scholars also insist on proxy actors’ agency in the war. According
to Groh, “an important aspect of proxy war – the fact that a proxy retains some de-
gree of its agency, even though it enters into a principal–agent relationship” (Groh
2019, 28). In literature thus far, there is no clear theoretical indication of a mutually
enforcing mechanism of alignment, whereas proxy alignment without a generative
mechanism is not conceivable.
Although considering levels of agency for proxy actors is critical, the PAT still
cannot give us a new perspective on how to go beyond proxy relations and concep-
tualize proxy war as a collaboration process. It is a question as to what degree of
“agency" an actor should preserve to be nominated or considered a “proxy actor”
or vice versa. In theory, there is no such qualification to modify the levels of agency
in proxy actors (if one defines the proxy relation as a principal–agent one). This ap-
proach has two implications. First, proxy war is a state-centric phenomenon, where
non-state actors are used as an instrument by rival states to achieve their strategic
objectives (this is not entirely problematic). Second, proxy wars thus seem one-sided
decision-making procedures (this is problematic). This second one is largely prob-
lematic because it overlooks proxies’ roles and their preferences and, in most cases,
their ideological inflexibilities. In the worst-case scenarios, “the empowered [proxy]
nonstate groups may turn into their sponsor’s gravediggers, or new militant forces
may rise in reaction to the abuses perpetrated by the proxies” (Biberman 2019,4).
This implies that there must be an enforcing–endorsing mechanism to operate as a
generative mechanism to bound supporting and proxy actors together.
The prevalence of PAT in the literature has led to the widespread view that proxy
relations are akin to a master–servant relationship, whereby proxy clients have no
agenda and autonomy beyond the will of their masters. Bar-Siman-Tov, a principal–
agent theorist, argued that in proxy wars, “one actor has been asked by another to
fight for him” (Bar-Siman-Tov 1984, 265). However, when actors are solely using for-
eign support to pursue their own interests in a conflict, according to Bar-Siman-Tov,
this is not a proxy war. His approach does not consider proxy war as a collaboration
because it largely does not consider the generative mechanism that constitutes the
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ABBAS FARASOO 1843
proxy alignment. As a result, proxy war scholarship has focused largely on principal
actors’ strategies, motivations, and interests alone (Moghadam and Wyss 2020;Fox
2019a,2019b). However, focusing only on the principal actor in a proxy war risks
reducing proxy war to be a mere instrument for external power, which leaves little
room for assessing generative mechanisms.
The Problem of the Power Asymmetry Issue in Principal–Agent Theory
As mentioned, in proxy war studies, scholars such as Fox paid significant attention
to power and its role in proxy alignment (Fox,2019a, 2019b). According to Fox,
power asymmetry is critical in proxy relations and, if there are no strong bonded
interests, power “unifies the principal and its agent” (Fox 2019b, 36). However, the
exercise of power in proxy relations is for control of proxy actors, which is signif-
icant, but it is not the generative mechanism of proxy alignment to explain the
deeper security dynamics of proxy war. Power ranges from military and coercive
actions to wealth and influence on opinion and political agendas and can impact
proxy relations in different ways. In the context of alignment, power benefits the
aligned actors in implementing their strategies more effectively, or the powerful
party can use it as a factor of influence and control over the other party. However,
I will show in this section that considering power in the context of PAT has serious
shortcomings in explaining the mutual dependency, the limitation of power exer-
cise, and the generative mechanism of proxy war termination and continuation.
Power asymmetry is real in proxy relations, but it is not equivalent to having to-
tal control over proxy actors. Craig argues that “power relations between alliance
partners [in proxy war] may not be a useful way of creating a coherent category for
further study” (Craig 2010, 7) in proxy war analysis. Power asymmetry exists in most
human interactions from the individual level to an interstate one. Power relations
are not the only factor in the proxy war dimension to assume a practice of full con-
trol over a proxy’s activities; instead, the exercise of power over proxies is the main issue
(see, e.g., Dunér, 1981). In this case, power could be used for control rather than
operating as a generative mechanism of alignment. By considering proxy war as mu-
tual collaboration, not only a principal–agent relationship, the exercise of power by
the stronger party will be restricted through dependency. Different examples from
Afghanistan to Syria show that besides power asymmetry, there are levels of consent
and dependency between actors in proxy wars. Although power asymmetry gives
more authority to the supporting states, the interests of a proxy actor and its local
knowledge restrict the power of the principal actor. As Bellows argues:
Proxy is not simply a deputized substitute for the sponsor power, though the proxy
cannot pursue military objectives that conflict with its patron’s objectives. The prin-
cipal power is the sponsor because its material, logistical, and limited manpower sup-
port makes the military struggle possible over an extended period of time. (Bellows
1979, 143)
Bellows’ argument suggests that, theoretically, two levels of control should be dis-
cussed. First, the level of total control that supporting states may have over proxies.
In this case, supporting states not only can control activities and political agendas
on the ground but can also shut down the proxy entities at the strategic level. Again,
this will only happen if there are no longer any driving forces of alignment to op-
erate as a generative mechanism (this will be detailed later). If supporting states re-
move sanctuaries, training centers, logistical support, and capture proxies’ leaders
and personnel, there is no longer proxy war. Second, relative levels of control mean
that supporting states do not want to have full control over proxy actors’ political
agendas and activities on the ground. Supporting actors could implement control-
ling measures to keep the proxy actors aligned instead of controlling every activity
during the war. The reason is that the proxy war is about empowerment to enforce
a political agenda and impact the conflict and its outcome, which is not possible
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1844 Rethinking Proxy War Theory in IR
without levels of autonomy. In cases such as Syria after 2011 and Afghanistan in the
1980s, proxy actors were supported by several external parties, which significantly
reduced the possibility of effective control. In scenarios such as these, proxy actors
have more autonomy, and they also have a wider range of options for alignment.
During bargaining over war termination, the supporting actors will tend to exercise
more control to preserve the alignment with proxy actors to impact the outcome.
Maintaining this alignment is important for supporting actors who want to ensure
that their interest is secure after the war.
Furthermore, the complexity of proxy wars makes it difficult for supporting states
to exercise full control over their proxies. Given this, one can divide proxy wars into
two types: one-sided and two-sided proxy wars. In a one-sided proxy war, a proxy is
supported to attack a common enemy. In a two-sided proxy war, “the proxies attack
one another on behalf of their sponsors” (Allison 2018, 7). In this case, two or more
rival external powers support different proxies against each other. External powers
support proxies to fight against the target state or fight against a rival power in the
target states. In the 1980s, the United States and Pakistan supported the Afghan
mujahideen to fight both the Soviet military and the Afghan government (Hughes
2012;Yousaf and Adkin 2001). Proxy war itself can pave the way for multiple proxy
relations, which connects a civil war to international politics and complicates the
war. In Syria, sponsoring proxy actors to fight against the Syrian regime paved the
way for other actors to develop proxy relations. The complexity of proxy war makes
the control for supporting actors difficult. In the case of Hezbollah and the Taliban
that have primarily one strategic supporter (e.g., Iran and Pakistan, respectively),
the alignment seems stronger because of mutual dependency and empowerment
needs, not because of the stronger level of control (Akbarzadeh 2019a;Akbarzadeh
and Ibrahimi 2020).
Therefore, focusing only on the principal–agent dimension and not on the col-
laborative nature of proxy war increases the risk of analytical fallacy. It is also the
case that despite interdependency and collaboration, the supporting states can shut
down proxy bases on their soil. India’s action against its proxy, the Liberation Tigers
of Tamil Eelam (LTTE), is a well-known example of this outcome (Destradi 2012).
Despite having levels of autonomy, it would be hard for proxy actors to maintain
the war independently (Mumford 2013a). However, both the exercise of power and
collaboration by themselves are not the generative mechanism of proxy alignment.
To understand the termination and continuation of proxy war, it is critical to con-
ceptualize the generative mechanism behind the alignment in the war. The exercise
of power in proxy relations is deeply related to the broader generative mechanism
of the war and alignment that constituted the enmity and amity patterns among ac-
tors. Therefore, in alignment analysis, the roles of both sides and the circumstances
they are operating in have to be taken into account. Focusing on the generative
mechanism enables one to understand the very nature of alignment and collabo-
ration, rather than exploring proxy war only through levels of control over proxy
actors.
Illustration I: The Analytical Shortcomings of Principal–Agent Theory in Practice
The PAT has led to conceptual and analytical fallacy in some cases in proxy war stud-
ies, highlighting the need to go beyond PAT and understand proxy war as a mutual
collaboration that is constituted by a deeper generative mechanism. To illustrate
this argument, I focus here on Amal Saad research about Iran–Hezbollah’s relation-
ship. Although Iran–Hezbollah is a well-known case of proxy relations (Akbarzadeh
2019a;Rauta 2018;Sozer 2016), Saad (2019) denies the proxy nature of Iran–
Hezbollah’s relationship because it does not fit into the principal–agent defini-
tion of proxy war. Saad critiques proxy relations based on three criteria: first, if
the relationship is based on historical, religious, cultural, or political ties, it is
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ABBAS FARASOO 1845
not a proxy relationship because such characteristics create a “reciprocal influ-
ence” (Saad 2019, 632). Focusing on these historical ties, she goes back to the pre-
Westphalia paradigm in the age of empires, such as in the Safavids era of the early
sixteenth century, to dispel proxy links in today’s context of the interactions be-
tween Iran and Hezbollah. Second, according to Saad, the shared ideology among
actors dispels proxy relations. Unlike Mumford (2013a, 11, 27), who argues that
rival powers try to maximize or spread their ideological influence, Saad insists that
shared ideology between actors can dispel the proxy attribution. According to Saad,
“shared ideology changes the nature of the relationship from one characterised
by dependency and subjection, to one bound by solidarity and comradeship” (Saad
2019, 632–3). However, historically, the proxy relationship has mostly been defined
as “friendship,” although there is dependency and exploitation (Hughes 2012;Coll
2004;Mumford 2013a).
Third, Saad relies on Dunér’s argument, insisting that material support and com-
patibility of interests are “neither necessary nor sufficient conditions for the proxy
status” (Saad 2019, 637). Therefore, receiving material support from a supporting
actor is different from the exercise of power over the recipient actors. In other
words, proxy relations exist when there is the exercise of power by the supporting
actor to control its proxy subordinated actor. When the relationship is based on a
“socialising impact of a shared worldview,” it “obviates the need for political control”
(Saad 2019, 633). As argued prior, proxy actors have considerable autonomy in po-
litical and military actions to pursue shared objectives, but one could hypothesize
what would happen if proxy actors go against the strategic alignment with princi-
pal actors. In such a case, it is highly likely that the supporting state will exercise
its power to maintain its level of control over proxy actors. However, considering
proxy actors as having complete agency or an independent political agenda cannot
dispel asymmetric power relations existing between supporting and proxy actors.
Principal actors deploy ideology and identity as a discursive mechanism to tightness
their proxy actors’ alignment (Rittinger 2017). Saad’s argument is constrained by
PAT premises, which leads her to deny Hezbollah’s proxy attribute. Instead of offer-
ing a theoretical contribution, she tries to frame her case study on Iran–Hezbollah
ties beyond proxy relations. Proxy relations are dynamic and reciprocal regardless
of the power asymmetry. Scholars such as Dunér even said that because of mutual
dependency, “the two parties [supporting and proxy actors] could be each other’s
proxy” (Dunér 1981, 357). In Saad’s argument, the problem lies in a narrowly based
definition of the PAT of proxy war, which leads to a skeptical approach toward the
nature of proxy alignment in Iran–Hezbollah’s relationship.
The principal–agent approach has also underestimated the internal cleavages
within the target states that push actors to have external support. Historical soci-
ologists argue that anti-government parties effectively look for opportunities to en-
hance their chances of survival and revival during a conflict (McAdam, Tarrow, and
Tilly 2004;Conduit 2020;McAdam 1999). This could lead to an alignment with ex-
ternal powers. Regardless of whether “proxy war” is a positive or a negative concept,
proxy alignment contains both collaboration and power relations, with varieties and
nuances. Rauta conceptualizes proxy war “as a violent armed interaction resulting
from the polarisation of competing political goals between two organised parties,
a Beneficiary and a Target, in which at least one party engages the other indirectly
in sustained collective violence through a third party, the proxy” (Rauta 2018,457).
In this definition, polarization, as a situation that divides competing actors into two
hostile camps, takes place between proxy supporters and the target state. However,
there are two observations. First, it is not clear which kinds of “polarization” will
lead to proxy wars. Even if assuming that the “beneficiary” actor can delegate vio-
lent tasks to proxy actors, it is not clear how their relationship works. Second, Rauta
doesn’t take into account the polarization within the target state that creates cen-
trifugal tendencies. Therefore, his assessment has the same problem as Deutsch’s
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1846 Rethinking Proxy War Theory in IR
definition had in the Cold War context, as mentioned prior. A proxy war is not
always a form of dispute between a beneficiary and a target; rather, it can be be-
tween two external rival powers in a third country through alignment with local
hostile forces. Hughes conceptualizes proxy war as a situation where an actor helps
another one, “particularly if the latter is fighting an adversarial power (or target)”
(Hughes 2012,11).
At the same time, Rauta argues that “the choice of proxy is dependent on the tar-
get, and the willingness of the proxy to accept delegation of violence is formulated
by its preference, or lack thereof, for its supporter” (Rauta 2018, 453). Based on
this assessment, the proxy relationship has an “endorsement–enforcement” (Rauta
2018, 454) dynamic that varies from case to case. This argument opens the ground
for proxy actors’ choices. In PAT, proxy warfare has been assumed as a “physical
manifestation” of principal actors through proxy agents in proxy war environments
(Fox 2019a, 49). However, the “physical manifestation” of proxy war results from
collaborations between supporting and proxy actors, rather than a single actor’s
initiative and operation. Therefore, as argued, proxy war is a matter of alignment in-
stead of controlling proxy actors with daily base activities or just delegating tasks and
authorities. In the cases of Pakistan– (Afghan)Taliban and Iran–Hezbollah, both
sides do actively try to maintain their alignment at the strategic level to empower
each other (it will be detailed shortly). It means, violence is not only a delegated
task alone; instead, it is a mutual collaboration as a “strategic enterprise” (Rauta
2020b, 42). However, I come again to my primary question that what drives this
strategic enterprise? This question is central to understand the generative mecha-
nism that constitutes proxy wars, pushes actors to forge alignment, exercises power,
and fosters the adoption of ideological positions.
A Way Forward: Rethinking Proxy War
There are attempts in the current scholarship to depart from the PAT approach
or offer a modest version of principal–agent relations. Mumford argues that proxy
alignment is a “constitutive” relations based on “mutual benefit” (Mumford 2013a,
11, 17), whereas “mutual benefit” is not a self-serving and self-standing concept to
explain security mechanisms. There should be an enforcing factor to define and
align “mutual benefits” among actors. Rauta similarly argues that the proxy relation
dynamic is “the interactive and mutually constitutive nature of relationship” (Rauta
2018, 453). As mentioned before, for Rittinger, proxy relation is a “co-constitutive”
one that is formed through discourse and identity (Rittinger 2017). This indicates
that proxy actors play active roles in interactions with supporting actors, although
they have less power than, and are highly dependent on, their supporters. This
highlights the fact that proxy alignment goes beyond just task delegation and ma-
nipulation in proxy relations. But still, the constitutive nature of alignment in proxy
war needs further investigation and conceptualization.
In IR theories, traditionally, there are generally two main logics of alignment
between states: the balance of power (also the balance of threat) and bandwago-
ning (Walt 1985;Schweller 1994;David 1991;Kaufman 1992;Labs 1992;Walt 1987;
Selden 2016;Miller 2006). According to this logic, states in the international system
try to maximize their chances of survival through balancing power strategy. In the
logic of bandwagoning, states look for opportunities to maximize their chance to
be part of the gain in the future. As Schweller argues, “balancing is driven by the
desire to avoid losses; bandwagoning by the opportunity for gain” (Schweller 1994,
74). However, balancing and bandwagoning are not opposing behaviors: “Bandwag-
oning is commonly done in the expectation of making gains; balancing is done for
security” (Schweller 1994, 107). In both cases, actors try to secure their core inter-
ests. Although the alignment in IR is mainly theorized in state-to-state relations, in
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ABBAS FARASOO 1847
proxy war studies, the alignment between state and non-state actors has also been
examined through balancing behaviors.
Biberman argues that the alignment between state and non-state actors is based
on the balance of power and interest. Therefore, “state–nonstate alliances are a
product of the local balance of power and actors’ interests” (Biberman 2019,8).
Ek¸si (2017) considers proxy alignment according to the balance of power theory in
the context of seeking regional hegemony. For example, proxy wars between Iran,
Saudi Arabia, and Turkey in the Middle East are the strategy for regional hege-
mony through increasing their influence (Akbarzadeh 2019b). In South Asia, proxy
alignment is based on the balance of power and interests in the context of rivalries
between India and Pakistan (Biberman 2019). Similarly, proxy alignment is also
assessed according to securitization by focusing on threat definition that requires
emergency action to protect referent objects (Hanau Santini 2017). The balance of
power or response to threat induces a defensive mode of proxy alignment; however,
it is hard to draw a clear line between the defensive and offensive mode of proxy
alignments. Instead, it will be much more enlightening if one looks at the process
of securitization to understand why actors talk about security and threat. Hanau
Santini argues that proxy alignment is a “friend–enemy logic among both state and
non-state actors” (Hanau Santini 2017, 94). However, as argued before, the friend–
enemy logic does not tell much about the social process of threat definition and
why actors define each other as enemies or friends.
As I outline before, my argument is that the generative mechanism in proxy align-
ment is securitization, and here I will detail it. Scholars such as Guzzini (2011) con-
sidered securitization as a “causal mechanism” with the triggering capacity in social
processes. Drawing on this, I argue that securitization functions as a process of cre-
ating meaning and constituting alignment. It is critical to understand the generative
mechanism of enmity and amity patterns because abstracts such as security/threat
and enemy/friend are not self-serving analytical concepts. There should be pro-
cesses that constitute meaning for these concepts under certain circumstances. As
Wæver argues: “An abstract idea of ‘security’ is a nonanalytical term bearing lit-
tle relation to the concept of security implied by national or state security” (Wæver
2007, 68). Wæver goes further and argues that security should be studied as a “se-
curity problem,” which could be conceived through a process of securitization and
counter-securitization or de-securitization. Similarly, in proxy war alignment, secu-
rity problems are constituted through securitizations wherein actors define existen-
tial threats and try to take urgent actions against them. Proxy alignment is one of the
responses to security problems actors may deploy. However, as Mearsheimer argues,
“alliances are only temporary marriages of convenience: today’s alliance partner
might be tomorrow’s enemy, and today’s enemy might be tomorrow’s alliance part-
ner” (Mearsheimer 2001, 33). It means enemies and friends are not self-sustaining
and self-serving concepts, and they are not eternal. Mearsheimer is not in the con-
structivist’s camp of theorization, but the point is that “enemy” and “friend” are
related to other processes such as securitization around them.
The argument is that securitization, as an enforcing mechanism of alignment,
is not only about a situation when, for example, a “foreign army walks across the
border or tries to intimidate a country” (Wæver 2007, 76), but about possibilities.
Although “Securitization occurs in a field of struggles,” it is a “strategic process”
(Balzacq 2011a, 15, 1) that focuses on probabilities and possibilities in the future.
In the context of proxy war, actors think strategically about possibilities rather than
reacting when a “foreign army walks across the border” or there is already an un-
pleasant situation. Thinking about possible threats and enemies pushes actors to
securitize certain things, such as their rival neighbor’s military capabilities and their
friendship with other states (Kaunert and Wertman 2020). In the case of non-state
actors, they fight against a government based on ideological, territorial, and his-
torical disagreements and disputes. In such a context, securitization goes beyond
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1848 Rethinking Proxy War Theory in IR
speech acts and appears as an intersubjective reality that is constituted through a
combination of factors and processes (Kaunert and Wertman 2020). As Balzacq ar-
gues, “every securitization is a historical process that occurs between antecedent
influential set of events and their impact on interactions; that involves concur-
rent acts carrying reinforcing or aversive consequences for securitization” (Balzacq
2011a, 14). Thus, securitization legitimizes emergency action against an “existen-
tial threat” for a large segment of audiences and justifies alignment. At this point,
actors not only choose their enemies and friends but make them through a pro-
cess of threat definition and offering solutions. Therefore, enemies and friends are
process-dependent concepts, and as far as there is securitization, friend–enemy is
an objective phenomenon.
It is noteworthy that those who have deployed the securitization theory in proxy
war studies have still focused on principal actors’ studies rather than theorizing
proxy alignment (Kaunert and Wertman 2020;Hanau Santini 2017). This strand of
the scholarship looks at securitization through the lens of states at regional and in-
ternational competition, which again excludes the proxy actor and the dynamics of
conflict where a proxy actor operates. However, my argument is that it is the conflu-
ence of securitization processes and patterns that constitute the alignment between
friends against enemies. At the same time, securitization creates the possibilities of
transactional activities among actors or social sites, which makes the interactions
among actors more dynamic from domestic to regional and international levels. As
Léonard and Kaunert argue, “the securitization of a given issue in a policy venue
may lead to the securitization of another issue in an adjacent policy venue through
association” (Léonard and Kaunert 2019, 111), and this brings multiple actors into
transactional activities. Therefore, securitization “through association” can also lead
actors toward alignment and transactional activities to deal with threats and balance
threatening/securitized associations. The alignment can be against a common en-
emy or an association but not necessarily for a common goal. The Afghan proxy
war in the 1980s is a case in point wherein actors were fighting against Soviet forces,
but for different purposes. Therefore, alignment in proxy war happens through the
convergence of securitizations rather than defining a shared end. Its implication is
that the alignment between friends and enemies will disappear as far as there is no
securitization. As Wendt argues, “In an alliance states engage in collective action
because they each feel individually threatened by the same threat. Their collabora-
tion is self-interested and will end when the common threat is gone” (Wendt 1999,
301). Once actors realize the intersection of their threat definitions, they align their
narratives and activities.
Therefore, securitization operates as a generative mechanism by defining threats
and emergency actions, which forces actors to determine their relationship with oth-
ers and identify alignment opportunities. Based on this logic, proxy war is, to a large
extent, a mutual collaboration based on securitization alignment between local actors
and outside powers that are politically motivated to impact the conflict through war
empowerment activities to achieve their goals. Securitization alignment refers to a
strategic situation such as the confluence of securitizations, which has constituted
generative mechanisms that push actors toward collaboration. The confluence of
securitizations creates a structural condition of enforcement and endorsement
(causal structure), which push actors to forge alignments for collaboration against a
perceived or real threat. However, the levels of consultation within the collaboration
between supporting and proxy actors could be different from case to case. In some
cases, the supporting actor may exercise its power to lead proxy actors, but it does
not mean the whole proxy relationship could be handled only by power asymmetry.
Rather, the proxy relationship is an alignment based on other transactional mech-
anisms such as securitization. In such a context, “The chain reactions [between
actors] are more complicated because A might securitise B as a threat with the ef-
fect that C becomes worried and securitises A as a threat” (Buzan and Wæver 2003,
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ABBAS FARASOO 1849
72). Consequently, securitization alignment creates a process of sequential interac-
tions, wherein the aligned actors empower each other to impact the political land-
scape of the target state. Both supporting and proxy actors take emergency actions
together against threats to protect their referent objects. The convergence of inter-
ests (material or ideational) between supporting and proxy actors are significant
preconditions for their alignment, but it is securitization processes that function as
a generative mechanism that pushes warring parties and external powers to align
their actions and define the compatibility of interests. They enter into cooperation
to alter the dynamics of a conflict. In such a situation, parties build alignment to
empower each other against the real or perceived threat by collaborating in the war
and violence.
To make it simple, the process of proxy alignment is based on the alignment of
securitization patterns that could be traced through different phases: (1) Securiti-
zation patterns at different levels such as domestic, regional and international (cir-
cumstance and structural level); (2) the confluence of securitizations, which creates
alignment between actors against a common threat or enemy (securitization align-
ment as generative mechanisms); (3) practical collaboration to defend the referent
object(s) against threats (proxy war as a strategic collaboration between the aligned
actors); and (4) altering the situation to force the common enemy or to deter the
threat to impact the situation (the dynamics of proxy–civil war, and its impacts). It
is crucial to note that proxy alignment in a conflict also depends on the intensity of
securitization because the securitization process moves within a “continuum,” from
low intensity to a high level of an emergency situation (Léonard and Kaunert, 2019,
2020).
Therefore, proxy war is not a single-faced phenomenon, rather multilayered
mechanisms drive it, detailed in the next section. In this context, conceptualizing
proxy war in the context of alignment provides a quality of agency and autonomy
to proxy actors as well. In this context, the dynamics of violence include both “del-
egative and non-delegative” (Rauta 2016, 93) actions simultaneously, rather than
defining proxy war as a one-sided delegated task to proxy actors. As a collaboration,
proxy war is a consequential-oriented approach through which one can explore
the impacts of proxy war on civil war dynamics. In proxy war, supporting states are
trying to alter a civil war’s dynamics by empowering local proxy actors. Simultane-
ously, proxy actors enable the supporting state to fulfill its strategy through indirect
engagement in the war.
Empowering activities occur in the context of securitization alignment to en-
hance the warring parties’ military and political capabilities, give them a sense of
victory, and increase their chance of survival. Supporting states provide proxy actors
with sanctuaries, resources, protection, political or diplomatic support to survive,
have a sense of victory, and participate in the conflict effectively. For example, sanc-
tuaries, advisory support, and network building enable proxy actors to participate
in the conflict effectively, with high-level commitment and with a sense of control
in violence intensity, territorial contestation, and political bargaining to impact the
war and gain legitimacy. In a formal setting, an ally is “a treaty-bound friend willing
to share in the blood cost of a war to achieve a shared strategic vision” (Mumford
2013a, 16). However, in proxy alignment, the supporting states engage in war mostly
indirectly and through covert actions to minimize the military and political costs of
the war and also to retain plausible deniability.
Illustration II: Case Studies of Afghanistan and Syria
Here the intention is not to offer a comparative or an in-depth case study; instead,
I focus on Afghanistan and Syria as two contemporary proxy wars to illustrate my
theoretical observation. Warring parties in Afghanistan and Syria fight for their in-
terests while simultaneously build relations with external powers to enhance their
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1850 Rethinking Proxy War Theory in IR
chances of success and survival. It is important to note that a growing body of litera-
ture focused on the impact of proxy alignment on military capabilities of proxy ac-
tors in war, highlining that external support in many cases makes a war unwinnable
for the local government (Paul, Clarke, and Grill 2010;Sawyer, Cunningham, and
Reed 2017;Reider 2014;Lockyer 2011). Proxy support significantly impacted the
war in Afghanistan and Syria as well. However, here I will illustrate the generative
mechanism of alignment as proxy war’s deeper security dynamics rather than elab-
orating on proxy war’s military aspects. Despite significant differences, proxy wars
in Afghanistan and Syria occur through similar generative mechanisms. In the case
of Afghanistan, the Pakistan–Taliban relationship is based on securitization conflu-
ence. After the 9/11 attack on the United States, the Taliban in Afghanistan defined
as an international security threat alongside al Qaeda (Hodges and Nilep 2007).
The attack on the Taliban regime was framed as the War on Terror, and the United
States announced that Washington “helped the innocent people of Afghanistan [to]
recover from the Taliban’s reign of terror” (U.S. Department of State 2001). The
United Nations Security Council declared terrorism as a major threat to interna-
tional security (Lenz-Raymann 2014). On September 20, 2001, Bush addressed a
joint session of Congress: “Our war on terror begins with Al Qaeda, but it does not
end there. It will not end until every terrorist group of global reach has been found,
stopped and defeated” (Bush 2001). This global level of securitization has been
massive and inclusive, and terrorism as a discourse “emerged as one of the most
important political discourses of the modern era, alongside climate change, human
rights, global poverty and arms proliferation” (Jackson 2007, 394). In this context,
countries around the world were pushed to cooperate with the United States. In
some cases, such as the European Union, this discourse pushed for “collective secu-
ritization” of terrorism (Kaunert and Léonard 2019;Sperling and Webber 2019).
In South Asia, as the principal supporter of the Taliban regime from 1994 to
2001, Pakistan had no choice but to cooperate with the United States; otherwise,
the United States threatened Pakistan that it would “be bombed back to the Stone
Age” (Musharraf 2006, 201). Although Pakistan cooperated with the United States
at the time to pass the 9/11 shock, its policy toward Afghanistan never changed
(Haqqani 2013;Khan 2018). Therefore, Islamabad provided sanctuaries for the
Afghan Taliban to counter the United States, the Afghan government, and India’s
perceived influence in Afghanistan (Waldman 2010;Giustozzi 2019;Gall 2014;Fair
2014;Fair and Oldmixon 2016). Most of the Taliban leaders and middle-level com-
manders moved to Pakistan in late 2001 and reorganized themselves in 2002 and
2003 (Giustozzi 2019;Alexander 2021;Coll 2018). Subsequently, the violence in-
tensified by 2005, and despite the US’ increasing military forces in the country,
Washington failed to defeat the Taliban largely due to their sanctuaries in Pakistan.
The “long-term and strategic partnership” between Pakistan and the Taliban
(Akbarzadeh and Ibrahimi 2020, 2) is based on the convergence of enduring se-
curitization patterns in the region. Security relations in South Asia have been
largely constituted through India–Pakistan’s historical disputes, which have pushed
both countries into conventional military confrontation three times (Buzan 2011;
Fair 2014). Since then, the India–Pakistan dispute, premised upon historical and
ideological foundations, polarized the region and constituted the major enmity
and amity pattern in South Asia (Ahmed and Bhatnagar 2015;Ahmed 2012;
Stewart-Ingersoll and Frazier 2010). Afghanistan and Pakistan’s contentious rela-
tions demonstrate another enmity–amity pattern that impacted the Afghan con-
flict (Nadiri 2014;Khan, 2007, 2012). The religious extremism in the region is an-
other pattern of friend–enemy patterns in South Asia since the Afghan war in the
1980s (Haqqani 2010). Therefore, India had securitized the Taliban against its in-
terests in Afghanistan and the region and thus supported the Afghan government
against the Taliban after 2001(Pant 2014). At the domestic level, as mentioned be-
fore, the Afghan government had securitized the Taliban as an existential threat and
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ABBAS FARASOO 1851
the Taliban did the same against the Washington-backed government in Kabul. The
securitization patterns extended to the presence of US-led forces in Afghanistan as
well. As an ideological movement, the Taliban securitized liberal values as threats
against “Islamic” and “Afghan culture” in the country. They also legitimized their
fight against the United States forces as “occupier” since 2001(Johnson 2017). As
Stritzel and Chang argue, “the war in Afghanistan is [since 2001] marked by a prin-
cipal security dynamic of securitization versus counter-securitization” (Stritzel and
Chang 2015,549).
At the same time, Pakistan securitized the new political setup in Afghanistan after
2001 as pro-India and anti-Pakistan, and hence, supported the Taliban to counter
it (Musharraf 2006;Nasr 2013;Fair and Oldmixon 2016;Fair 2014). Pakistan also
securitized the US presence in Afghanistan as a potential alignment with India and
Afghanistan in the future (Hamid 2009), which looks like a conspiracy theory but in-
dicates the significance of perception in politics. As Riedel argues, “Pakistan’s army
believes these surrogates are critical to its sixty-year-old campaign against India and
to securing Pakistan’s influence in Afghanistan” (Riedel 2008, 32). This complexity
is more than proxy war relations, which focuses on the dyad of supporting state,
proxy actors, and the target country (Rauta and Mumford 2017). In securitization,
actors define their friends and enemies within security patterns and form align-
ments. Subsequently, securitization alignment at the cross-level connects a war to
broader regional and global security dynamics. This is the pathway of proxy war.
In Afghanistan’s case, Kabul mainly relies on US-led coalition support to counter
the Taliban–Pakistan alignment. Although the United States tried to press Pakistan
to end its alignment with the Taliban, the war continued, and Washington failed
to change Pakistan’s policy. Warring parties in internal conflicts usually look for
external support and to define convergence of security interests to create securi-
tization confluence and alignment. Local actors’ strategic way is to align their se-
curity concerns with available securitization patterns at regional or global levels to
define a common cause and gain support. The Taliban aligned their war against
the Afghan government with Pakistan’s security concerns—as Islamabad defined
the Afghan government as pro-India and anti-Pakistan (Lynch III 2018). As a result,
the Taliban–Pakistan proxy alignment significantly enhanced the Taliban military
and political capabilities in war to effectively prolong the conflict and challenge
the Afghan government and the international coalition forces (Alexander 2021;
Livermore 2014).
The convergence of security created a similar proxy alignment in Syria. The
Syrian uprising in 2011 has turned into a bloody proxy war in which many dif-
ferent local, regional, and international actors have been involved in this conflict
(Phillips 2016;Conduit and Akbarzadeh 2018;Conduit 2019). Bashar Assad’s bru-
tal response to the uprising has pushed opponents toward armed conflict. How-
ever, some regional actors, such as Turkey, saw the conflict in Syria as a national
security concern, and they pushed Assad to step down. The conflict changed into a
source of tension and securitization, which then provided fertile ground for proxy
alignment (Çakmak 2016). Subsequently, Turkey, the United States, Saudi Araba,
Qatar, and European powers start arming and training the anti-Assad armed op-
position groups. As a main umbrella organization against the Assad regime, the
Free Syrian Army (FSA) was founded in Turkey in 2011 by a defected officer known
as Colonel Riyad al-Asad. The faction has been widely supported by Turkey, Saudi
Arabia, Qatar, and Western powers such as the United States, Britain, France, and
others for years (Manfreda 2019;Spyer 2018;Chulov 2012). However, Turkey has
remained the primary sanctuary provider and the hub for training and logistical
support for the armed opposition. Turkey, Saudi Arabia, Qatar, and the United
States have supported different factions and they largely failed to unify the anti-
Assad armed groups. Still, they supported various groups according to securitiza-
tion patterns, which significantly intensified the violence. Tens of armed groups on
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1852 Rethinking Proxy War Theory in IR
the ground established ties with the above-mentioned foreign countries and contin-
uously received training and weapons.
Although Turkey and Syria have a long history of securitization over water and
the Kurdistan Workers’ Party or PKK activities in Syria (Zahra 2017), they tried to
de-securitize their relationship and moved toward cooperation before the Syrian
crisis in 2011. As Çakmak (2016) argues, Turkey’s support of the anti-government
forces intensified the securitization process between actors in the region. Simul-
taneously, the local anti-Assad actors securitized the government as an existential
threat against themselves and were looking for support to fight back. This shows
that the cooperation between local actors and regional countries such as Turkey
has been formed based on securitization alignment. Saudi Arabia and Qatar were
securitizing the Syria–Iran relationship in the region for a long time, though they
have their own disputes. The increasing influence of Iran in the region pushed
them to support the anti-Assad forces to influence Syrian politics.
On the other hand, the anti-Assad campaign in Syria was perceived as a conspir-
acy plot by Iran. Tehran initiated massive support to protect the Assad regime as
its key ally in the region. For Iran, Syria is a regional ally and also a land bridge
to continue its support to Hezbollah in Lebanon. Once the war intensified against
Assad, Russia also entered the scene to protect Assad. The conflict has been con-
nected to geopolitical alignment and dispute through the securitization of the war
and interventions. Both lines of alignment (anti-Assad and pro-Assad) have formed
through securitization patterns where each actor has defined its security concerns
as emergency issues. Even non-state actors from outside, such as Hezbollah, partic-
ipated in the conflict based on securitization alignment with Iran. For a long time,
securitization patterns in the region have formed alignments and disputes beyond
Syria, and Tehran consistently framed its line of alignment with the Assad regime,
Hezbollah and its allies in Iraq and Yemen as an “Axis of Resistance” against the
United States and its clients in the region. As Phillips argues: “In a foretaste of what
was to come after 2011 [what was called the Arab Spring], Lebanon and Yemen in
particular emerged as low-level proxy conflicts between the Saudi-led pro-U.S. bloc
and the Iranian-led ‘Resistance Axis’” (Phillips 2019,38).
There are significant differences between Syria and Afghanistan in terms of the
historical context, the number of actors involved in each respective situation, and
geopolitical locations. However, proxy war in both countries illustrates how proxy
alignment took place in the context of securitization alignment, wherein actors de-
fined the confluence of security interests. This shows that securitization confluence
is the generative mechanism of proxy alignment in conflict and politics and, in
Clausewitz’s words, drives actors toward “the law of extremes.”
Conclusion
This paper has shown that proxy war is a crucial type of warfare and alignment
that has significantly impacted international security. However, it has largely been
understood through superpowers’ motivations and their indirect interventions in
developing countries. Greater attention to superpowers’ roles in international pol-
itics led to considering proxy wars based on the PAT. PAT has reduced proxy war
into task delegation and manipulation activities by superpowers, whereas proxy ac-
tors play a significant role in intensifying violence, undermining governments, and
proposing political agendas for bargaining. Considering the military role of proxy
actors and their political and ideological agendas, proxy war is a mutual collabo-
ration between supporting and proxy actors instead of merely task delegation or
manipulation.
This paper, however, aimed to theorize the generative mechanism of proxy align-
ment in a conflict to push the literature further by looking at the dynamic process
and the causal structure of proxy wars. To do so, the paper innovatively theorized
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ABBAS FARASOO 1853
the generative mechanism of proxy war as securitization alignment that is rooted in
the confluence of securitization patterns and practices at domestic, regional, and
international levels. The alignment of securitization practices and patterns push
actors toward alignment to deal with real or conceived threats as mutual collabo-
ration. This is significant in understanding proxy wars in the broader context of
international politics and security analysis, which helps researchers to consider the
structural condition of security and conflict in international relations. Although
military tactics and doctrine are significant in proxy war studies and could be dif-
ferent from one case to another, this paper has tried to conceptualize the gener-
ative mechanism of proxy alignment. The argument is that as far as the securi-
tization alignment exists between a warring party and its external supporter, it is
highly likely that the proxy alignment between them will continue. Although se-
curitization alignment as generative mechanism is significant for theoretical gen-
eralization, there are significant differences from one case to another one when it
comes to practical aspects. Therefore, the continuum of deliberations and bargain-
ing, and agreements and disagreements between supporting and proxy actors, and
their military doctrine in the conflict could be the topic for further empirical re-
search. This paper, rather, explored the generative mechanism of proxy wars that
constitutes key underlying concepts in wars such as friend, enemy, and alignment.
Therefore, through securitization alignment actors define or identify enemies and
friends, and forge alignment. Without considering securitization alignment as the
generative mechanism that serves as a larger social force in war and alignment, con-
cepts such as “enemy” and “friend” cannot explain alignment—they are the result of
securitizations.
Supporting states equip, train, and protect proxy actors in a war that has been
constituted through securitization alignment. Long ago, Machiavelli advised the
prince at the time that “if the people hate you, for once the people have taken up
arms, they never lack for foreigners who will assist them” (Machiavelli 2005,75).
However, this is just partially true. Foreign support to warring parties in today’s
world is much more complicated. Internal cleavages and conflict are just one di-
mension of proxy war, whereas external dynamics also significantly enforce, even
constitute, proxy wars. Considering the generative mechanism of proxy war and
the roles of both supporting and proxy actors in the war helps to avoid any one-
sided theorization about proxy alignment. This paper has shown the complexity of
the generative mechanism of proxy alignment to grasp the process of alignment
and enemy–friend formation. To summarize, I argued that the PAT does not fully
explain the generative mechanism of alignment. Also, “my enemy’s enemy is my
friend” is not a self-serving and self-standing conceptual explanation for a proxy
war alignment. Instead, proxy alignment, enemies and friends are socially consti-
tuted phenomena; therefore, I have tried to explain the constitutive processes of
friend–enemy patterns that function as the generative mechanism of proxy align-
ment. I argued that securitization alignment at the cross-level (from domestic to
regional and beyond) between actors paves the way for proxy alignment and con-
stitutes the foundation of friend–enemy relations. Therefore, proxy alignment is a
physical manifestation of securitization alignment, which connects state and non-
state actors in a conflict to wage war as a mutual collaboration.
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