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Final Two Communications from MH370 Supports Controlled Eastward Descent Scenario

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Abstract and Figures

Update: 11 June 2024. The paper was Accepted by the Journal of Navigation and is now In Production. Official interpretations of Doppler Shifts from the final satellite communications of missing Malaysian Airlines MH370 were based on a motion-decoupled “Up-Down Model”. That model predicted an uncontrolled high-speed gravitationally accelerated dive following fuel starvation. Here, I challenge that model using a more-realistic motion-coupled “Declination Model”. Aerial, satellite, and underwater searches failed to find the predicted official violent crash-site near the 7th arc. Meticulous re-examination of debris damage by air-crash investigator Larry Vance concluded that the aircraft glide-landed under power with extended wing-flaps. The trailing-edges was then damaged, broke off their mountings, flailing about, and retracted along the guides to cause the observed wing-flap damage. Larry’s conclusions complement interpretations from the “Declination Model” which we demonstrate here with three example flight tracks. Our revised Doppler-Shift analyses support the hypothesis of a controlled eastward descent. We conclude that the official theory of fuel starvation and a high-speed dive are fundamentally flawed.
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Final Two MH370 Communications Suggests Controlled
Eastward Descent
Vincent Lyne 1*
1 Retired Scientist
University of Tasmania
Hobart. Tasmania. Australia
* Correspondence: Vincent.lyne@utas.edu.au
Abstract
Official interpretations of Doppler Shifts from the final satellite communications of missing
Malaysian Airlines MH370 were based on a motion-decoupled “Up-Down Model”. That model
predicted an uncontrolled high-speed gravitationally accelerated dive following fuel starvation.
Here, I challenge that model using a more-realistic motion-coupled “Declination Model”.
Aerial, satellite, and underwater searches failed to find the predicted official violent crash-site
near the 7th arc. Meticulous re-examination of debris damage by air-crash investigator Larry
Vance concluded that the aircraft glide-landed under power with extended wing-flaps. The
trailing-edges was then damaged, broke off their mountings, flailing about, and retracted along
the guides to cause the observed wing-flap damage. Larry’s conclusions complement
interpretations from the “Declination Model which we demonstrate here with three example
flight tracks. Our revised Doppler-Shift analyses support the hypothesis of a controlled
eastward descent. We conclude that the official theory of fuel starvation and a high-speed dive
are fundamentally flawed.
Keywords: Burst Frequency Offset; Burst Timing Offset; MH370; Doppler Shift
1. Introduction
Malaysian Airlines MH370, a Boeing 777-200ER equipped with the Inmarsat Classic Aero
system went missing on the 8th of March 2014 with 239 people on board (ATSB, 2017). As
described by Ashton et al. (2014), the Inmarsat Classic Aero system Satellite Data Unit (SDU)
used several different communication frequencies determined by the data rate plus an
allowance for environment and instrument errors. The transmitted frequency is altered by the
SDU which internally compensates for expected horizontal Doppler Shifts so that signals arrive
at the expected frequency. However, compensation errors arise from several factors, including:
the simplified satellite model used; aircraft location; track angle; and ground velocity.
Importantly, Doppler Shifts from vertical motions are uncompensated. Significant remnant
discrepancies, after all other factors are accounted for, as found for the last two MH370 satellite
communications, may be due to vertical motions—which are the core subject of this paper.
Our aim here is to provide a plausible reinterpretation of Doppler Shifts from those two signals.
They were so different and uncertain that various conflicting interpretations have been offered.
Indeed, as we discuss later, they were discarded as erroneous from the Bayesian model used to
guide the failed first search. Corrections to uncertainties in those data then led to an official
high-speed dive interpretation using a motion-decoupled model. This was used in part to guide
the failed second search based on revised fuel loads and drift model studies. But officials still
insist that the model and interpretations are correct. My aim here is to provide context for the
official theory so that we have a clear understanding of failures in the theory, model, and
interpretations. I demonstrate that there is a far more physically reasonable interpretation using
a motion-coupled model. Three possible tracks for the aircraft are then used to compare and
contrast interpretations from these competing models. An underlying key message I want to
make is that the wrong MH370 theory led to “irrational exuberance” by some experts/scientists.
Their interpretations, not just for the problem at hand, defy the laws of physics, and in some
cases common sense. At times, I will use the problem at hand to identify how such
“exuberance” was used to justify, what now appears to be, the wrong official theory. There is
no defying the Science Principle that analyses purporting to support a wrong theory are most
likely also wrong. That was indeed the impetus that led me to this reluctant investigation to set
the Science record straight. But first, let’s review the background context for later analyses and
comparisons.
As noted in the official report (ATSB, 2017), along its planned fight from Kuala Lumpur to
Beijing, MH370 was in normal flight up to the transition between Malaysian and Vietnamese
airspaces. The now infamous Good Night, Malaysian Three Seven Zero” sign-off by one of
the pilots to Malaysian Air Traffic Control (ATC) marks the turning point for the most baffling
modern aircraft disappearance. Minutes later, before control passed to Vietnamese ATC,
MH370 disappeared from civilian radar screens. Malaysian military radar tracked the aircraft
for another hour, as it deviated westwards from its planned flight path and crossed the Malay
Peninsula and Andaman Sea. After rounding Penang Island from the east and south—which
some interpreted as a hometown “farewell” by the pilot—it left radar range at 18:22
Coordinated Universal Time (UTC) as it headed north-west along the Malacca Strait. Ground-
to-air telephone calls went unanswered, although at the request from Vietnamese ATC, a call
from a nearby aircraft heard mumblingand static (Campbell, 2014).
Inmarsat engineers identified regular monitoring “Log-on Interrogation” communications with
the Inmarsat satellite I-3F1 after each hour of inactivity, and two phases of specific “Log-on
Requestsfrom the aircraft near 18:25 and 00:19 UTC (Ashton et al., 2014). The relative
motion between satellite and aircraft caused Doppler Shifts in the satellite communication
frequency as signals travelled between aircraft, Inmarsat satellite, and Perth Ground Station.
The aircraft Satellite Data Unit (SDU) compensated Doppler Shifts from the horizontal aircraft
motion but small biases (from drift and ageing) and a track-dependent error, primarily due to
the SDU assuming a geostationary satellite (rather than geosynchronous), remained (Ashton et
al., 2014). Following correction procedures by Ashton et al. (2014), Holland (2018) (Figure 4)
determined aircraft speeds and track angles that minimized this error. Other uncertainties, such
as temperature variations within the satellite, and biases, were also carefully calibrated out
(Ashton et al., 2014). Detailed analyses of Burst Timing Offset (BTO distance-based
measurement) and Burst Frequency Offset (BFO relative speed-based Doppler Shift
measurement between satellite and aircraft) resulted in seven distance-based BTO global arcs
(Zweck, 2016) along which the aircraft was located at different times, centered around the
Inmarsat satellite undergoing a “teardrop” shaped geosynchronous orbit; located nominally
above the equator at 64.5oE (Ashton et al., 2014).
BFO data from a "Log-on Request" at 18:25:27 UTC indicated the aircraft continued along the
north-west Malacca track. But data from an unanswered telephone call at 18:40 UTC suggested
that it was travelling south. So, between those communications, the aircraft turned south. A
similar request occurred at 00:19:29 UTC at the 7th arc, followed 8 seconds later by a "Log-on
Acknowledgement" at 00:19:37 UTC. This was the last communication as there was no
response to three handshake requests from Inmarsat at 01:15 UTC (ATSB, 2014).
Signals at 18:25:27 UTC and 00:19:37 UTC were part of a Log-on Exchange(LOE), whilst
other messages were part of a standard “Log-on Interrogation(LOI) asking for a response.
Official interpretations of the two LOEs was that the first (18:25:27 UTC) preceded a track
change, but the second (00:19:37 UTC) was from the aircraft running out of fuel and crashing.
ATSB acknowledged that it could be due to the aircraft being readied for a “very unlikely”
controlled ditching (ATSB, 2017) (page 101). Our revised model and interpretation is that the
latter Log-on Requests reflect the aircraft being readied for a controlled descent and later
ditching.
Here, we compare BFO interpretations from Holland’s motion-decoupled model with our
model which couples horizontal and vertical motions. We aim to show that the fuel-starvation
model is incorrect, and that the decoupled model defies physics as it fails catastrophically into
a singular solution for finite declinations. Three example flight tracks are used to compare and
contrast the models.
In what follows, I describe official interpretations of BFO signals from the last two satellite
communications. I then explain why the first official search failed, and what went wrong with
the second search. These two theories are also differentiated by fuel-starvation and flaps-up”
(Holland’s model) versus “fuel-available and flaps-extended” (our model and Larry Vance’s).
Hence context to the alternate “controlled ditching” theory is presented in relation to debris
damage and flap position by Larry Vance. I then describe the Penang Longitude Theory and
controlled ditching which complements the work of Larry. This theory’s prediction of MH370
veering eastward and descending by the 7th arc, also challenges the official high-speed dive. I
first discuss a surprising “break-through” development (since manuscript submission) of
riddles hidden in the Pilot-In-Command (PIC) home simulator track, which were discarded by
FBI and official investigators as “irrelevant” (ATSB, 2017).
The resolved riddles uncovered the probable very accurately planned flight track of MH370
(Lyne, 2023b; Lyne, 2023c). This track is now included belatedly as a third example track for
this study. However, it deviates marginally from the “Adelaide Track” (described later) so
conclusions are not critically altered. In yet another follow-up of this study (Lyne, 2022a), I
demonstrate that not only is our “Declination Model” capable of explaining the BFO signals
but it also demonstrates that Holland’s vertical death-defying gravitational-dive acceleration is
nothing more than apparent vertical acceleration from simple rotational-changes in declination
angle.
Potential flight paths from arc timings and BFO-estimated speeds/directions generally
supported a persistent southerly track down to the 6th arc (Ashton et al., 2014; Davey et al.,
2016). At the 7th arc, BFO anomalies remained after extrapolation of a statistical fit to previous
BFOs (Ashton et al., 2014) and resolved errors (Holland, 2018). However, for the first search,
the Bayesian model ignored Log-on Exchange BFOs (at 18:25:27 UTC, 00:19:27 UTC,
00:19:37 UTC) as settling errors could not be resolved and statistically assimilated into their
horizontal flight model (Davey et al., 2016)(Table 10.1). These deleted communications,
particularly the final two, allowed the Bayesian model aircraft to wrongly continue southerly
at the 7th arc. This resulted in a “heat map” crash region about 39oS. Searches of that area failed
(ATSB, 2017). Retrospectively (after search failure), the fuel model was also wrong, so Boeing
revised the fuel calculations and moved the Second Search further north.
For the Second Search, Holland (2018) (Bayesian-study co-author) carefully bounded errors
from power-up settling anomalies. Holland’s excellent work should have been used to update
the Bayesian flight model (assuming it had the correct flight dynamics that included vertical
motions). Instead, Holland used the Inmarsat decoupled BFO (not absolute velocity) model
(Ashton et al., 2014) for a solo effort to interpret the last two communications. We are here to
challenge these interpretations.
At the 7th arc discrepancies remained between a predicted BFO of 260 Hz and nominal
observed BFOs of 182 Hz and -2 Hz respectively at the last two communications 8 seconds
apart (Holland, 2018). Hypotheses on whether the SDU was started up from a power-off-on
engine-flame-out event (Hypothesis 1 fuel-starvation scenario, long cold-start settling
behavior) or a warm-reboot electronic event (Hypothesis 2 electronic switching, short-reboot
settling behavior as per the log-on BFO at 18:25:27 UTC) led to extended and extreme BFO
ranges (Holland, 2018). The extreme range produced unrealistic descent rates, so mid-point
values were used for the assumed-southerly track at the 7th arc.
Inmarsat’s decoupled BFO model (Ashton et al., 2014) assumes remnant anomalies are from
uncompensated up-down motions. This led Holland to conclude that, discounting the
unrealistic extreme range, a 0.68g (g is Earth’s surface gravitation acceleration constant)
acceleration took place during the 8 seconds leading to a nominal high-speed drop of 10,700
fpm (feet per minute). These conclusions, and the Boeing-revised fuel-starvation endpoints,
appeared to be supported by highly promising drift model analyses of recovered debris (Griffin
and Oke, 2017; Griffin, Oke and Jones, 2017). However, that driftmodel was in physically
impossible “sailing” perpetual motion in the turbulent open ocean (Lyne, 2023a). Extensive,
and highly detailed searches around these bounded locations were unsuccessful; with not even
a scrap of debris found (ATSB, 2017).
A significant positive outcome for ocean research was the huge volume of seafloor data
collected across 120,000 km2. Ocean Infinity donated this to the Nippon Foundation–GEBCO
Seabed 2030 Project, to update the global ocean seafloor map (Orr & Associates, 2018). It still
remains the most intensely mapped seafloor area of our Planet. MH370 was simply not there!
The scenario of powered glide-landing with extended flaps is supported by comprehensive
finite-element modelling and simulation analyses by France’s MH370-Captio group (MH370-
Captio, 2019; Kamoulakos, 2020). These simulations used add-on models of realistic ocean
swell, waves, and wind. Predictions from these studies matched observed damage to trailing-
edges of the flaperon, and complement investigations by Vance (2018). These investigations
suggest the following evidence-based events at landing:
During the powered level glide-landing with extended flaps, the right wing contacts a
wave, ripping off its engine (as per US Airways 1549 (Lyne, 2024b)).
The trailing extended edges of the flaps and flaperon were then hydrodynamically
damaged (again, as per US Airways 1549).
Downward crushing forces were created across the wing and rearward crushing from
frontal and upward impact with the wave. The fuselage is breached at the wing root
(Vance, 2018), indicating much greater forces at play than US Airways 1549.
This crushed the inboard-end wing-flap seal-pan with the outboard end of the flaperon.
The combined crushing forces breaks off the flaperon and the flap off their supports.
As shown in Lyne (2024b), this mimics damage to US Airways 1549 from a
controlled ditching”—providing further support to interpretations by the Captio-
group and Larry Vance.
The flaperon breaks away but the flap flails about whilst loosely attached to its internal
support track.
Witness marks made by the support track inside the flap-pan suggest that the flap
retracted back beyond its fully retracted position before it was pulled back free of the
support arm and pulled through the front of the flap.
The thorough and meticulous examination of Larry Vance firmly refutes the incomplete and
inaccurate “flaps up” damage investigation of the ATSB. Further, the opposite finding of “flaps
down” also invalidates the ATSB theory of an uncontrolled crash because the aircraft could
only attempt a controlled ditching under full engine power (Vance, 2018) with flaps and
flaperon in extended positions; which then damaged the trailing edges (Vance, 2018; MH370-
Captio, 2019; Lyne, 2024b; Kamoulakos, 2020). Here, we show that official interpretations of
the satellite communications, which hinged critically on a “flaps-up” “Up-Down Model”, and
fuel-starvation, are all flawed. I demonstrate this using a much more plausible and realistic
alternative “Declination Model” to reinterpret the BFO signals.
Before we describe the MH370 tracks for the demonstration, one track was uncovered recently,
hidden in riddles in the Pilot-In-Command simulation track as shown in Figure 1. Details of
these riddles, one set for the northern PIC track and another for the southern, can be found in
(Lyne, 2023b; Lyne, 2023c). Those tracks were simulated most likely for very careful
calculations of fuel consumption (Lyne, 2023c) and to leave riddles to torment investigators;
who obliged and discarded the tracks as irrelevant (ATSB, 2017). Resolution of the riddles
showed simple waypoints and precise planning. Even the Decoy Tracks were chosen to reflect
a fictitious ending not just in Perth but at Perth Airport runway. JORN’s corner was cut to save
fuel. But here again, there was knowledge of the 3D dome nature of JORN’s range, because 10
km altitude at that location was above the 3D dome (Harris, 2017). Resolution of the northern
PIC track riddle, shown in Figure 1, involved simple measurement of planned and simulated
track lengths. An elementary task that could have been accomplished quickly in Google Earth.
Admittedly the southern track riddles were less obvious, but still solvable with critical thought
from the world’s most eminent analytical minds, who instead threw it all away. Suffice to note
that the PIC Track is similar to the “Adelaide Track” shown in Figure 2. Hence, findings
reported originally are not materially altered, but the mastermind careful planning did save
~100 km flight distance.
Two of the three tracks shown in Figure 2 concord with the PL Theory’s requirement to stay
outside the western boundary of the Australia’s Jindalee Over-the-Horizon Radar Network
(JORN) (Harris, 2017); the exception is the South Track. Further, no other theory has an
explanation for the inferred southerly tracks other than the utterly unbelievable official
explanation of an autopilot track with everyone onboard hypoxic (ATSB, 2017), and with no
reference to JORN at all. The aircraft had to stay outside JORN range (despite JORN not being
on at the time) if it was on a secret mission to not be detected in-flight or found. This implies
an eastward descent track at the 7th arc, heading towards the ultra-deep hole at the Penang
Longitude (PL) Location, which would be filled with sediments many hundreds of meters deep
(NCEI, 2021). A “perfect” hiding place.
Figure 1. Figure adapted from (Lyne, 2023c) comparing the respective northern and southern Pilot-In-Command
(PIC) simulated tracks (left-side purple labels) with the planned tracks (right-side green labels). The PL Hole is
near where the 33oS latitude intersects the longitude of Penang (thin brown vertical line) at a 6000 m deep hole.
The Decoy Tracks (to Southern Ocean and Perth Airport runway) were not executed but merely to cause confusion.
Track lengths are noted in the labelled track boxes. The Jindalee-Over-the-Horizon Radar Network (JORN) range
and southern boundary from Laverton are drawn in purple. The Decoy Track to Perth is inferred from the other in
the Simulator Track. Note that the map is not in equi-distance projection.
The example tracks in Figure 2 were derived with simple waypoints. In the “Adelaide Track”,
Adelaide is chosen as a waypoint past the southern boundary of JORN at (92oE, 31oS). This
path crosses precisely over the PL location and minimizes distance travelled to avoid JORN.
The “South Track” was southerly (up to 6th arc) for compatibility with the fuel-starvation theory
southerly tracks. This track cuts deeply into the south-west corner of JORN. The “PIC Track”
closely resembles the “Adelaide Track” except the JORN corner-cutting is further east and
north (92.5oE, 30oS) and more than 100 km shorter—a mastermind at work saving fuel.
Without this “safe” corner cutting (Harris, 2017), the hidden riddles cannot be solved exactly
as all planned lengths were very precise. However, for resolving BFO signals, deviations from
the Adelaide Track are minor.
For bearings, at the 6th arc, the South Track bearing is less than 6o east from due-south. The
BFO residual from a track variation, relative to southerly, of under 6o is under 1 Hz (Holland,
2018) (Figure 4). At the 6th arc, the Adelaide Track and PIC Track veer east and cross at
bearings of 108.8o and 116.6o respectively, which potentially adds ~7 to 5 Hz (respectively)
BFO error.
Figure 2. Map features and example flight tracks. White curves are the 7 arcs. The purple curve and
inclined horizontal line are the Jindalee Over-the-Horizon Radar Network (JORN) range boundaries
(but ignore the curve past the southern boundary). Three flight tracks are shown: 1) in yellow (1: “South
Track”) the southerly track intersects the 6th arc near 94oE, then veers to 33oS, 95oE at the 7th arc, and
then proceeds east to the “Penang Longitude” Location (red circle); 2) in green (2: “Adelaide Track”)
the southerly path veers east towards Adelaide at 92oE and 31oS; in red (3: “PIC Track”), shown as a
dashed red line, is the Pilot-In-Command (PIC) track where the southerly track along 92.5oE veers
south-east once past the JORN southern boundary at 30oS. The bearing to the satellite is shown by the
light green northwest line. The light orange line running northwest is one of the simulation tracks from
the pilot’s home simulator. Other place marks are referred to in the main text, or for general background
information.
Our analyses will be as per Holland (2018) on the two final 7th-arc BFOs. We focus on alternate
explanations for anomalies from the “warm start” Hypothesis 2. The “warm start” refers to a
warm reboot from a power switching which is more compatible with the PL Theory’s
prediction that the aircraft was being prepared for descentwhich the ATSB acknowledges
was possible (ATSB, 2017)(pg. 101). Precedence for this power-glitch assumption was
established by a previous such event (at 18:25:27 UTC) when the aircraft turned south, and
clearly did not run out of fuel. We will now analyse interpretations from the respective models.
2. Method
In our proposed analysis we allow the aircraft track to vary, and veer eastwards to the PL
Location. This contrasts with the fuel-starvation theory which, by extrapolation, required the
aircraft to maintain its southerly track (Ashton et al., 2014). We will also use a motion-coupled
flight descent model, where the aircraft descends at a declination angle to the horizontal plane.
This avoids the trap of assuming that the horizontal motion is compensated for by the SDU,
and hence need not be further considered. We add the appropriate small BFO differences due
to the horizontal deviation from a southerly track at the 6th arc as discussed above.
These changes are incorporated into the standard Doppler Shift model of equation (1) that
defines the frequency change observed from a moving electromagnet source:
=
( )
(1)
where speeds are in kilometers per hour (kph); frequencies are in Hertz (Hz); is the speed
of light (1,079,252,848.8 kph); V is the speed component of the aircraft velocity vector (kph)
that is aligned with the vector from the aircraft to the Inmarsat satellite (positive towards the
satellite); F is the uplink frequency from the aircraft to the satellite (1646.6525 MHz); and
is the received Doppler-shifted frequency (assuming no compensation).
The magnitude of velocity V was calculated from the aircraft track, heading, and elevation to
the Inmarsat satellite, and an assumed declination angle according to equation (2).
= cos( ) cos (
)
(2)
Where, heading and track angles are measured clockwise from North in a 3D axis system; S is
the ground speed of the aircraft; is the aircraft to satellite elevation angle from horizontal
(positive and set to 38.8o for the 7th arc following Holland [4]); is the aircraft declination
angle (positive for descent); and and are heading angles at ground level for the satellite
and aircraft respectively (so 0o is a Northerly track, and 180o is a Southerly track).
The calculated velocity magnitude (V) is used in equation (1) following appropriate sign
conventions. The first cosine-term in equation (2) accounts for the satellite elevation angle
modulated by the aircraft declination, so when these angles are the same, the frequency offset
is at an absolute maximumbecause the aircraft is proceeding directly to the satellite or away
from it. Likewise, for alignment of the satellite and aircraft headings in the second cosine term.
The two equations represent the model we used to calculate expected uncompensated BFOs
for various combinations of aircraft track angle () and declination angle (). Other
parameters were fixed as listed and referenced in Table 1.
Table 1 Ancillary parameters for the BFO calculations.
Parameter
Description
Value
Inmarsat Satellite Location (Ashton
et al., 2014)
Ground projected location of the Inmar-
sat Satellite at 00:19 UTC
0.5oN, 64.475oE
Inmarsat Satellite Elevation (Hol-
land, 2018)
Elevation angle from the aircraft location
to the satellite
38.8o
Heading of Aircraft Location to In-
marsat Location at the 7th arc.
(Note, this is not the aircraft track
heading)
Estimated by Ashton et al. (2014) Location: 34.70S, 93.0oE
Heading: 323.98o from North
According to the PL Theory
“South Track”
Location: 33.0oS, 95.0oE
Heading: 321.6o
“Adelaide Track”
Location: 32.13oS, 96.0oE
Heading: 319.8
o
Aircraft speed at 7th arc
In kph
“PIC Track”
Location: 31.72oS, 96.59oE
Heading: 319.03o
829 kph (Ashton et al., 2014)
First BFO at 7th arc: at 00:19:29
UTC (Holland, 2018)
Predicted for southerly track and ob-
served Predicted 260 Hz
Observed 182 Hz
Second BFO at 7th arc: at 00:19:37
UTC (Holland, 2018)
Predicted for southerly track and ob-
served
Predicted 260 Hz
Observed -2 Hz
BFO errors at the two times in Table 1 represent the difference between predicted BFO for a
frequency-compensated southerly track and measured SDU-frequency-compensated BFO.
Previous investigators interpreted the 7th arc mismatch as due to vertical motions, not accounted
for in the horizonal compensation by the SDU. This led to the official high-speed descent
conclusion (Holland, 2018). By contrast, in the PL Theory, BFO is not directly from vertical
motions, but from declination in the vertical plane. This also realigns the aircraft track more
closely with the aircraft to satellite direction (positive values implies the aircraft tracking away
from the satellite) and also affects the horizontal velocity component (hence SDU
compensation—wrongly assumed fixed in the decoupled dive-model).
Figure 3 schematically portrays motion-coupling differences between the Up-Down model and
the Declination model. In the Up-Down model the two components are decoupled based on the
assumption that there is no need to be concerned about the motion-compensated horizontal
track. However, in the Declination model, for finite declination, the horizontal compensation
varies. Therefore, the BFO horizontal-compensation deficit, plus the BFO from the vertical
motion, must be considered in explaining the overall BFO. Hence, the fundamental flaw in the
Up-Down model is exposed when the aircraft undergoes declination. Unless of course the
cruise speed is zero and then we have the valid but singular solution of Holland’s that depends
only on the gravitationally accelerated drop speed. This is the stopping in mid-flight and
dropping from the sky “solution” whose BFO only depends on the elevation angle to the
Inmarsat satellite as explained in considerable detail in Lyne (2022a).
Figure 3. Comparison of horizontal and vertical motion coupling between the Up-Down model of previous
investigators (left model) with the model of coupling between horizonal and vertical via a Declination Angle
from the horizontal (right model). The Up-Down horizontal Doppler Shift is assumed to be compensated by the
SDU, so BFOs are attributed solely to the vertical dive motion.
The uncompensated BFO was calculated by subtracting the compensated horizontal component
using equations 1 and 2 and the declination angle. For a level/horizontal flight with declination
angle = 0, this value is zero but with positive (or negative) declination the component due to
horizontal velocity (whose speed is the aircraft speed times cosine of declination angle) is
subtracted off the total BFO. Note, as discussed previously there are BFO discrepancies with
track angle due to incomplete horizontal BFO compensation by the SDU. These amounts are
to be added to the BFO errors shown in Table 1.
3. Results
BFO changes, compensated for horizontal motion, by track angle and declination angle are
shown in Figure 4 and Figure 5. With no declination (horizontal motion only), the difference
is zero and increases as the declination angle increases. For any declination, the BFO is
maximal at a track angle in-line with the direction of the satellite to the aircraft. These angles
are (141.6o, 139.8o, 139.03o) respectively for the tracks (South, Adelaide, PIC). For
convenience, the satellite track angle in Figure 4 of 141.6o should be shifted to align with the
respective satellite track.
For the South Track, the mismatch at the first 7th arc communication is approximately 80 Hz
(80 Hz = Predicted 260 Hz Observed approximate 180 Hz). The mismatch would require a
minimum declination of 6 o at the satellite track angle, and 8o at the southerly track. There is a
slight advantage in veering to the east but overall, the first BFO mismatch is explainable by a
declination of under 8o at the assumed cruise speed of 829 km/hr. The second communication
mismatch was nearly 260 Hz and again the minimum declination is where the aircraft track is
aligned to the satellite direction, for a declination of under 19o. The aircraft has veered to a
heading of about 123o at the 6th arc, so during the 8 seconds between communications at the 7th
arc, it needs 20o of declination to explain the BFO error. This demonstrates clearly that track
angle does matter in explaining the “vertical” component of the BFO changes as evident from
the curvature of the BFO contours (Figure 4). In the case of the first BFO error, the track angle
effect is small at about 2o declination, and it increases to 6o declination for the second BFO
error. For the Adelaide Track, the required declinations are 8o and 22o for the first and second
BFO errors respectively, and the PIC Track is slightly less for the first and about 20o for the
second.
Figure 4. Variation of BFO error (Hz), compensated for horizontal motion, with track angle in degrees
clockwise from North, and declination angle down from horizontal. The approximate aircraft to satellite
direction is at 141.6o track angle (and elevation angle of 38.8o) where BFO changes are at a maximum across
track angles for any given declination angle. At this track angle, BFO changes of over 325 Hz are possible for a
declination angle of 25 degrees. Dashed lines refer to the different tracks in Figure 2: yellow is the “South
Track”; green is the “Adelaide Track”; and, red is the “PIC Track”.
BFO (Hz)
Figure 5. Variation of BFO with declination angle. Black line is for a nominal flight track heading directly to the
Inmarsat satelliterepresenting the maximum BFO possible by track angle. Other tracks are as shown in Figure
2.
For comparison, at the satellite track, 19o of declination produces 260 Hz BFO decreasea
change that requires 15,300 fpm (280 km/hr) downward motion according to Holland’s Up-
Down model; a speed at which the entire aircraft would obliterate in well under one second.
This is higher than the nominal 10,700 fpm estimated by Holland to explain the nominal BFO
error at the last 7th arc communicationwhich requires just 14o declination. Finally note that
the Up-Down model requires the arcs seen in Figure 4 to be straight (horizontal) as vertical
motions in that model are independent of horizontal-compensated motions, and BFO error just
depends on vertical speed as calculated above. This is clearly not realistic, especially where the
track angle is closely aligned to the satellite track. To summarize this point, Figure 6 shows
how BFO errors are invariant with track angle, and further that there is difference of almost 75
Hz at the satellite track angle for a declination of 25 degrees.
0 5 10 15 20 25
050 100 150 200 250 300
Declination (degrees)
BFO (Hz)
Tracks
Inmarsat
South
Adelaide
PIC
Figure 6. Variation of BFO (Hz) according to the Up-Down model where horizontal speed is invariant with
track angle, hence horizontal compensation does not vary with track angle. For comparison with the Declination
model we used the horizontal speed at the 180o track (a track angle has to be chosen for comparison as the main
point of this comparison is that horizontal compensation in the Declination model does vary with track angle for
positive declination anglesFigure 4).
Differences between the two models are illustrated by variations in the speed factor applied to
the horizontal and vertical components in the Declination Model, shown in Figure 7. For
declinations up to 25o, horizontal speed varies with declination (~10% at 25o declination). For
the vertical component, declination contributes over 40% of the cruise speed. In 8 seconds, the
Up-Down aircraft falling out of the sky at 0.68g (Holland, 2018) reaches ~200 km/hr, whereas
the Declination model has a vertical speed component of 350 km/hr at 25o—under controlled
descent. Declination, achievable by manipulation of control flaps, under power, confers
vertical velocities and BFOs more than that achievable by stopping the aircraft in midair and
dropping it out of the sky. Further explanations of the mathematical and physics discrepancies
are detailed in Lyne (2022a), where I show that the 0.68g acceleration is simply explainable as
an aircraft in high-speed normal flight undergoing a declination change. This declination
rotation results in an apparent vertical acceleration of V), where ω is the declination rotation
rate and V is the aircraft speed; equivalent to: ω V = 0.7g for our example (Lyne, 2022a). This
about matches what Holland derived as “gravitational acceleration”.
Lastly, the different tracks are of different lengths between the 6th arc (at 00:10:58 UTC) and
the final communication (at 00:19:37 UTC). These horizontal lengths are:
Adelaide/PIC Track: 113 km
South Track: 110 km
Track Angle (degrees)
Descent Angle (degrees)
BFO (Hz)
Southerly Track: 147.5 km (southerly from South Track at 6th arc)
Implying that the horizontal speeds necessary to cross between the arcs are:
Adelaide/PIC Track: 783 km/hr
South Track: 762 km/hr
Fuel-starved Southerly Track: 1023 km/hr
Both PL tracks have the aircraft slowing down (horizontally) from the previous southerly track
cruise speed (necessary to cross the arcs at the right times but these horizontal speeds will
decrease with declination angle—as per Figure 7) of 829 km/hr (Table 1). However, the fuel-
starvation southerly track requires the aircraft to slow down (horizontally) to undertake the
vertical dive, but the track crossing requires the aircraft to in fact speed up to over 1000 km/hr
(horizontal) whilst it impossibly runs out of fuel. The only way for the aircraft to decrease its
speed is for it to veer east from the southerly track and it still needs a minimum speed of over
750 km/hr to cross the arcs at the right times. This compares to a speed of about 254 km/hr
before the aircraft stalls and drops (Marks, 2013). Realistically, this is not the scenario of an
aircraft stopping in mid-flight. There is no way for it to achieve that whilst it must cross the
arcs at the right times. The evidence is overwhelming that MH370 did not run out of fuel and
fall out of the sky. That scenario just simply does not fit the available evidence, nor physics.
By contrast, the PL tracks suggest slower horizontal speeds and eastward veering compatible
with the predictions of the PL Theory of an eastward turn and descent.
Figure 7. Variation of the speed multiplicative factor with declination angle. Horizontal speed varies simply as
the cosine of the declinaton angle, and vertical speed as the sine.
To bring this demonstration to a close, Figure 8 shows the horizontal compensation applied by
the SDU model for the declination model which varies with track and declination angles. As
shown previously, the greatest variations and compensations are applied at the satellite track
angle. To summarize, the coupled declination model is a more realistic and accurate model of
BFO changes due to changes in track and declination angles. Further we can explain the
apparent gravitational acceleration of Holland as merely due to declination rotation, and not
gravitational high-speed dive.
Figure 8. Variation of horizontal BFO (Hz) compensated by the Satellite Data Unit (SDU) (hence BFOs are
negative) for the Declination model. Some variation with declination angle is seen at the South track (180o) but
the greatest variation is at the satellite track angle (~141o).
The PL Theory predicts that at the 7th arc, there is about 30 minutes before landing on an
unfamiliar ocean surface where wind, waves, and swell, need to be monitored carefully to affect
a precise controlled-ditching. The landing time estimated by Lyne and Lyne (2021a) was about
0:53 UTC, and descent at 00:19 UTC was past sunrise estimated at 23:34 UTC (NOAA sunrise
calculator: https://gml.noaa.gov/grad/solcalc/sunrise.html). The final track was towards east to
southeast on a very cloudy day with limited visibility from standard altitude (Lyne, 2022b).
For secrecy the aircraft needed to descend as low as possible to just below, or within, the clouds.
In a very recent update, I report the discovery of a 300 km trail of cloud anomalies that align
well with the expected final PIC track of MH370 (Lyne, 2024a). These anomalies were visible
in five satellite images from three satellite passes. These observations confirm the predictions
of our model, and the PIC Track flight path.
The observations also justify the aggressive nature of the descent predicted at the 7th arc.
Although an alternate explanation, proposed by Lyne (2023c), is that it may be near the end of
a controlled “glide phase” to conserve fuel so that, as concluded by (Vance, 2018), fuel would
remain for the failed (debris was emitted) powered near-level landing attempt in the wild
Southern Ocean. This strategy fits a mastermind plan, whereas others would assume the glide
occurs at the end. But in this case, the lack of fuel and engine power would make a “controlled”
ditching very difficult as the plane must be kept as level as possible as explained by Vance
(2018) and Captain Mike Glynn (pers. comm.).
A summary of the evidence against the high-speed crash and the evidence for the controlled
eastward descent is presented in Table 2.
Table 2 Summary evidence against high-speed crash (left column), and for controlled eastward descent (right column).
Evidence Against High-Speed Crash
Evidence for Controlled Eastward Descent
The aircraft did not run out of fuel (Vance, 2018)
Aircraft had fuel till landing (Vance, 2018)
The flaps and flaperon were extended, not retracted, at
landing (Vance, 2018)
Aircraft had functional flaps to veer and de-
scend (Vance, 2018)
Minimum stall speed was not reached (Marks, 2013)
Minimum eastward horizontal speed of 750 km/hr required
to traverse 6th and 7th arc
Aircraft was travelling at cruise speed eastward
and descending at 7th arc
Estimated horizontal speeds consistent with air-
craft travelling near cruise speed and descend-
ing
Eastward veering requires fuel and functional flaps
Controlled eastward veering and descent ex-
plains BFO discrepancies
Southerly track requires horizontal speed over 1000 km/hr
to traverse arcs with no fuel
Eastward track horizontal speeds consistent
with veering and calculated declination angles
Crash speed would be horizontal speed plus about 200
km/hr vertical speed (min 950 km/hr). At those speeds, air-
craft disintegrates within “the blink of an eye” (Vance,
2018)
No debris or aircraft discovered at 7th arc from
two extensive searches
Southerly track requires higher vertical speeds than east-
ward track, but Up-Down Model is incorrect and has them
the same
Calculated track and declination angles possible
in Declination Model with fuel and control of
flaps
No explanation possible for high-speed crash, or southerly
track past 7th arc
Aggressive descent was necessary as sun had
risen, or it was the end of a glide phase. East-
ward veering once past JORN necessary to
reach PL location
4. Discussion
Our revised model and analyses provide compelling evidence that MH370 did not run out of
fuel and fall out of the sky. This assessment is supported by the extensive failed searches that
did not find one shred of debris evidence within the hugely extended official crash zone.
Instead, careful detailed expert investigations by Vance (2018) confidently suggests a powered,
piloted, controlled landing, incompatible with a high-speed nosedive that would have crumpled
the leading-edge nose (MH370-Captio, 2019) and obliterated the aircraft into many pieces
within the blink of an eye (Vance, 2018). For example, the crash of Swiss Air Flight 111
resulted in over 2 million pieces of small debris—see pictures of such catastrophic devastation
in Figure 5 of Larry’s book (Vance, 2018).
A controlled landing at the 7th arc is also clearly at odds with the suggested uncontrolled high-
speed descent demanded to explain the BFO changes with the fuel-starved theory. Despite the
reconciliation of all other evidence by the PL Theory there were no previous analyses to support
the predictions of this theory that MH370 veered eastward at the 7th arc to follow an easterly
track. That however changed with the discovery of the hidden riddles in the PIC Track, and
more recent discovery of a cloud anomaly trail aligned with the final PIC Track.
Results of our coupled Declination Model for the three tracks suggests that the first BFO is
explainable with declination under 8o for the first BFO mismatch. The second communication
mismatch required a minimum declination of between 19o and 25o. Veering is completed by
the 6th arc for all tracks, so changes at the 7th arc were primarily to do with descending for the
landing, and possibly the end of a low-fuel-consumption glide-phase.
The Up-Down Model decouples horizontal and vertical velocities; hence it relies upon a
dropping-from-the-sky vertical velocity to explain BFO changes. But the Declination Model
shows that those changes are from a simple declination of the aircraft. We also demonstrate
that the track angle does matter, and more so with greater declination a point entirely missed
by the Up-Down model as further demonstrated by Lyne (2022a). This scenario also cannot
explain the large horizontal speeds necessary for the aircraft to cross the 6th and 7th arcs at the
correct time. We also now have a very plausible explanation for the “gravitational acceleration”
as being simply due to controlled declination rotation of a high-speed aircraft.
The other point to make is that in the most likely situation where the aircraft continued to glide
along, the velocity at the last communication will have a much larger component than the
vertical speedperhaps less than the assumed 829 km/hr (but not zero) versus 200 km/hr
vertical. How else can claims be made that the dive model was used to calculate bounds for the
7th arc? This combination, particularly the assumed vertical-drop speed, is unrealistic. Simply
put, the aircraft is not a gravitationally accelerated lead-weight when it runs out of fuel; despite
what a decoupled (BFO) model might lead some to believe. Yes, as far as BFOs are concerned
we do not need to worry about the compensated horizontal component, which changes because
the aircraft is now descending, not diving. Hence, for an actual dive scenario vertical velocity
is from momentum (and BFO) transferred from the horizontal cruise speed plus gravitational
acceleration. As I explain in Lyne (2022a), an air-crash in 2022 shows that under such
circumstances, which is facilitated by a belly-up dive (otherwise the controlled forward dive
levels out to a phugoid), speeds can approach supersonic levels, as lift forces are reversed and
now acts downwards with gravity. We do not need supersonic dive speeds to explain the BFOs
from MH370, nor does it explain why not one shred of debris was discovered within the
expansive 7th arc search zone. But it is a real worry that students can now read authoritative
out-of-context claims in an educational reference that the diving aircraft simply slipped without
trace into the ocean (Gregersen, 2021). Let them all prove this “blink of the eye”
disappearance!
There are two elements responsible for this: 1) the assumption that the aircraft ran out of fuel,
and 2) the mathematical independence afforded to analysts by the Up-Down model. These two
may have been the disastrous pairing that wreaked havoc in the search for MH370. But the
original culprit was the blinded conclusion that the recovered flap was retracted. No, they did
not see the obvious trailing-edge damage. Here’s a short list of the main potential disasters of
these incorrect assumptions, and irrationally-exuberant attempts by scientists to reconcile
evidence to the wrong theory:
1. Misled the excellent technical analyses of debris drift to a fictitious 7th arc location
(Griffin, Oke and Jones, 2017). The official drift model resorted to a misapplied added
10 cm/s perpetual motion, to in effect illegally (in Physics) and forcibly “sail” the
recalcitrant flaperon to Réunion Island on time from the 7th arcas explained by Lyne
(2023a). No such mysterious force was required from the PL Location (Lyne, 2023a)
using the same model with a standard drift formula (Lyne, 2023d). The implications
are obvious.
2. Misled the important hydroacoustic discoveries by Alec Duncan (Butler, 2014) and
Usama Kadri (Kadri, 2019). They tried hard but neither could find any 7th arc source
using either Duncan’s water-borne model, or Kadri’s novel, and very clever, hybrid
Acoustic Gravity Wave (AGW) model. Anomalous sound data comprised four very
accurate atomic-clock timings and two very accurate directions from two
Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT) International Monitoring System
hydroacoustic stations (HA08: Diego Garcia, HA01: Cape Leeuwin) and two marine-
life listening stations of Australia’s IMOS program (Perth Canyon, Scott Reef) (Lyne
and Lyne, 2021b). Precise resolution (within-seconds timing and one-degree
direction) of all data (4 timings and 2 directions) was only possible from the precise
PL Deep Hole location with sound propagating within the seafloor (the PL Hole is
about 1.5 km below the general seafloor level at that location) before emerging into
the ocean Sound Channel from special seamounts at the end of continental plates
(Lyne, 2022b)—the so-called “MH370 Mechanism” dedicated to MH370 victims.
Although for Diego Garcia the sound appears to have had an uninterrupted path all
the way as a seismic signal bouncing off the hard vertical plate structure of
Madagascar. Kadri thought Madagascar might have been the actual source, as he did
with the Batavia Seamount (using the AGW model). He proposed two separate
sources for the conflict. In fact Batavia was the seafloor exit point for sounds heard at
Perth Canyon and Cape Leeuwin as explained in Lyne (2022b). However, neither
Duncan nor Kadri could reconcile the Scott Reef sound which emerged from Exmouth
Plateau (shown in Figure 2). Paradoxically, the sound from there to the more distant
Scott Reef (at 1:32:49 UTC) arrived before the sounds heard at Perth Canyon (1:33:44
UTC) and Cape Leeuwin (1:34:50 UTC). This paradox can only be resolved by the
near-double speed of sound in the seafloor compared to the water-borne speed (Lyne,
2022b); a phenomena also noted for the ARA San Juan submarine where a precursor
implosion-sound propagated within the ice-shelf before exiting to the ocean 20
minutes before the arrival of the direct but slower water-borne sounds (Vergoz et al.,
2021). Here again, the wrong official theory led to failed interpretations by those
contracted to desperately search in vain along the 7th arc.
3. Misled the analyses of other debris damage reported in (ATSB, 2017) that was
corrected by Vance (2018) in his careful, competent, and thorough reassessment. Such
damage was visibly apparent in the damage to flaps and flaperons from hydrodynamic
forces as US Airways 1549 landed on the Hudson River (Lyne, 2024b), after its
engines were taken out by a bird-strike (see the film Sully (2016)). Evidence of
ditching-damage was there all along, as was Larry’s illustration of what a high-speed
dive did to Swissair 111. Compare and contrast which theory you would select after
seeing those images. Perhaps officials thought they could get away with the no-blame
fuel-starvation idea (possibly to minimize grief/trauma), despite obvious evidence to
the contrary, and rammed it into failed submission (Lyne, 2023a).
4. Most importantly, misled the second extensive search, and stymied hopes of a future
search. In science we make mistakes but we (some of us anyway) admit those mistakes
if we want to move forward with alternate explanations; as I did with my first
wayward explanation of the MH370 sound heard at Perth Canyon (Lyne and Lyne,
2021a). No admission, no progress.
5. Quashed other scenarios by insisting that only the official narrative is correct. “Due
diligence” of other theories, or a new search proposal, always finds its way back to
officials (my bitter experience). How these failed officials are able to do “due
diligence” credibility assessments on scientists and scientific analyses that go beyond
prevailing studies and expertise is beyond comprehension. Here, science journals must
play a part to set the record straight.
We also note that the short disturbance SDU power after the 6th arc (Hypothesis 2) may have
been from preparation for the descent, predicted to be underway by the end of the 7th arc.
Whereas the fuel-starvation theory assumes the power-up was from engines flaming out and
the cold SDU restarting sometime later the extreme Hypothesis 1 scenario. Vance (2018)
conclusively demonstrates that the aircraft did not run out of fuel, and our calculations also
imply that the aircraft was powered to affect the veering and aggressive declination.
To sum up, we can safely, with absolute confidence, say that the fuel-starvation high-speed
dive theory is not supported by the available evidence. We can also say that MH370 was most
likely in a controlled descent at the 7th arc along a very accurately planned and plausible
premeditated PIC Track, to its secret resting place in a deep hole at the PL Location.
5. Conclusions
Whilst valid for horizontal motions only, the official decoupled “Up Down” model fails
comprehensively and catastrophically by attributing vertical velocities from declination as
being due to a fictitious “gravitational acceleration” following fuel-starvation. Instead, the
baffling BFO changes at the final two communications from MH370 at the 7th arc are more
plausibly due to the aircraft veering eastward, in a controlled descent, and undergoing apparent
vertical acceleration from declination rotation. These revised interpretations accord with
predictions by the Penang Longitude theory which also uncovered the precise PIC Track hidden
in riddles in the Pilot-In-Command simulator track. These new interpretations of BFO changes
provide mutual support for the PIC Track taken by MH370 (presumed, till proven) to its precise
mastermind secret final location. We can now safely ditch the very troublesome official 7th arc
fuel-starvation high-speed dive theory, and all analyses supporting it.
Funding: This research received no external funding.
Acknowledgments: Many keen scientists indirectly contributed to this study, which would not have been possible without
their remarkable technical detective work on diverse aspects of finding MH370. We are all deeply indebted to all the brave
folks who took part in the search for MH370 in one of the most inhospitable, but ecologically unique, ocean environments on
the Planet. Despite not finding MH370 your work has contributed to detailed seafloor mapping and excluding vast areas of the
ocean from further searches. I am particularly indebted to Larry Vance for his advice and independent expert thorough inves-
tigations of debris damage; a quiet voice of reason lost in the cacophony of contrived misinformation. Thank you also to
Captain Mike Glynn (former RAAF and Qantas Pilot) for his expert thoughts on questions I had on the simulated flight tracks.
To the Editors and Reviewers of JN, thank you for your suggested improvements, and your valued indirect contribution to
finding MH370. Finally, a sincere thank you to the unknown voices for providing the insights. Rest in peace.
Conflicts of Interest: The author declares no conflict of interest.
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... A weakness of the PL theory analyses is that due to the unknown horizontal compensation for Doppler Shifts by the Satellite Data Unit aboard the aircraft, accurate track angles and velocities are not possible. However, the analyses by Lyne [4,5] strongly suggest an eastward trajectory and controlled descent at the 7 th arc. The PL theory is agnostic as to the precise track followed up to the 7 th arc, so Lyne [5] selected two contrasting tracks, of slightly differing lengths, one using a waypoint to Adelaide and another simplenavigation using the 33 o S latitude, to demonstrate similar aircraft dynamics at the 7 th arc. ...
... However, the analyses by Lyne [4,5] strongly suggest an eastward trajectory and controlled descent at the 7 th arc. The PL theory is agnostic as to the precise track followed up to the 7 th arc, so Lyne [5] selected two contrasting tracks, of slightly differing lengths, one using a waypoint to Adelaide and another simplenavigation using the 33 o S latitude, to demonstrate similar aircraft dynamics at the 7 th arc. ...
... For example, as will be shown later the turn to the east at the JORN southwest corner was very tight and considered the 3D domed nature of the JORN range. By contrast, the tracks chosen by Lyne [5], would have resulted in longer tracks consuming more fuel. ...
Technical Report
Full-text available
Update: Northern track riddle is solved in "Malacca Track Riddle" manuscript. A "Pilot-in-Command" (PIC) flight simulator for a "Long-Range" Boeing 777-200LR recovered by FBI and official MH370 investigators shows a track from Kuala Lumpur up the Strait of Malacca, followed by a sharp southward left turn well northwest of the northern turn estimated from satellite and phone communications (just west of Sumatra), and ending deep in the Southern Ocean, well past the fuel load aboard the shorter "Extended Range" MH370 Boeing 777-200ER. Whilst resembling the official track along the Malacca Strait, after the turnoff, the PIC track heads towards the southeast compared to the official southerly track. No significant official interpretation was therefore attached to this track, other than a fleeting suggestion, that was dismissed in the search for MH370 (based on a questionable retracted-flap theory, logically challenged, and rectified by Larry Vance), that it may reflect a "very unlikely" intention for "controlled ditching" in the Southern Ocean. In 2021, I showed that this track crossed over, or passed very near, the location predicted by the Penang Longitude theory (the PL location). Here, I reflect, as part of the "scenario backlash" process, on the PIC track assuming that it may be a riddle with hidden planning details such that the start of the southward track (at the northern left turn) and end point obfuscate simulation of flight path intentions. A three-part riddle was identified where the PL location, as the pivot point (Part 1), separated out a northern track (Part 2), and a southern track (Part 3). With Part 1 solved, the Part 2 northern track length of ~5000 km optimally fits the PL theory predicted track length, if the southeast turn to the PL location occurs tightly near the southwest corner of the Jindalee Over-the-Horizon Radar Network (JORN) range (a critical core feature of the PL theory). The Part 3 decoy southern track length (~1480 km) is precisely the same distance as the PL location to Perth Airport. I conclude that Part 1 and 2 were related to the intended flight path, and that Part 3 was a diversion; simply because a PIC track with just Part 1 and 2 may have been enough to solve the riddle. If this is indeed the resolution of the riddle, it is yet another confirmation added to the list of all valid evidence reconciled by the PL theory. The remaining unsolved riddles are whether the PL location is indeed the very precise final resting place of MH370; and why search investigators still insist on searching at or near the extensive mathematically flawed and failed 7 th-arc searches; or the very least why an international science review hasn't been instigated?
... 53 Importantly, the compensation does not account for Doppler Shifts from vertical motions. 54 Significant discrepancies that remained after all other factors were accounted for, as found 55 for the last two satellite communications were the subject of two contrasting studies (and 56 incidentally, ignored in the Bayesian analyses used for the first search [4] as explained by 57 Lyne [5]), which are described later: (1) "Up-Down" model: an official investigation by 58 the Defense Science and Technology Group (DSTG), using a BFO model developed by 59 Inmarsat that separated out horizontal and vertical motions, which concluded that MH370 60 ran out of fuel and was in a gravitationally-accelerated high-speed dive at the 7 th arc [6]; 61 and, (2) "Declination" model: a reanalysis by Lyne [5] where the 33 o S latitude intersects the longitude of Penang [7]. 69 Here, I extend the analyses by Lyne [5], to demonstrate that the Up-Down Model 70 suffers in its conclusions from significant hidden and ignored assumptions embedded 71 within the Inmarsat BFO model; which, while seemingly valid for explaining BFO, can 72 result in confounding estimates and seriously flawed conclusions of reconstructed esti-73 mated actual high-speed vertical motions (from BFO and non-BFO velocities). ...
... 53 Importantly, the compensation does not account for Doppler Shifts from vertical motions. 54 Significant discrepancies that remained after all other factors were accounted for, as found 55 for the last two satellite communications were the subject of two contrasting studies (and 56 incidentally, ignored in the Bayesian analyses used for the first search [4] as explained by 57 Lyne [5]), which are described later: (1) "Up-Down" model: an official investigation by 58 the Defense Science and Technology Group (DSTG), using a BFO model developed by 59 Inmarsat that separated out horizontal and vertical motions, which concluded that MH370 60 ran out of fuel and was in a gravitationally-accelerated high-speed dive at the 7 th arc [6]; 61 and, (2) "Declination" model: a reanalysis by Lyne [5] where the 33 o S latitude intersects the longitude of Penang [7]. 69 Here, I extend the analyses by Lyne [5], to demonstrate that the Up-Down Model 70 suffers in its conclusions from significant hidden and ignored assumptions embedded 71 within the Inmarsat BFO model; which, while seemingly valid for explaining BFO, can 72 result in confounding estimates and seriously flawed conclusions of reconstructed esti-73 mated actual high-speed vertical motions (from BFO and non-BFO velocities). ...
... 54 Significant discrepancies that remained after all other factors were accounted for, as found 55 for the last two satellite communications were the subject of two contrasting studies (and 56 incidentally, ignored in the Bayesian analyses used for the first search [4] as explained by 57 Lyne [5]), which are described later: (1) "Up-Down" model: an official investigation by 58 the Defense Science and Technology Group (DSTG), using a BFO model developed by 59 Inmarsat that separated out horizontal and vertical motions, which concluded that MH370 60 ran out of fuel and was in a gravitationally-accelerated high-speed dive at the 7 th arc [6]; 61 and, (2) "Declination" model: a reanalysis by Lyne [5] where the 33 o S latitude intersects the longitude of Penang [7]. 69 Here, I extend the analyses by Lyne [5], to demonstrate that the Up-Down Model 70 suffers in its conclusions from significant hidden and ignored assumptions embedded 71 within the Inmarsat BFO model; which, while seemingly valid for explaining BFO, can 72 result in confounding estimates and seriously flawed conclusions of reconstructed esti-73 mated actual high-speed vertical motions (from BFO and non-BFO velocities). 74 Lyne [5], should be consulted for detailed background on the two models. ...
Preprint
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Brilliant analyses by Inmarsat and official investigators, of satellite communications from missing Malaysian Airlines MH370, identified Doppler-shift related Burst Frequency Offsets (BFO), after every hour of inactivity. Inmarsat derived mathematical equations for BFO that separated out the horizontal velocity component, assumed to be compensated by the aircraft, from the vertical component, assumed to be uncompensated. However, a given BFO anomaly is due to a mix of velocity components, but critically, only those horizontal and vertical components that contribute to the BFO. Inmarsat's BFO formulations led investigators to plausible simulated flight paths, constrained by their theory of fuel-starvation resulting in a wide set of mathematically-optimized flight path ranges, all optimally simulated to run out of fuel near the 7 th satellite communication arc. Defense Science and Technology Group (DSTG) investigators used Inmarsat's equation ("Up-Down Model") to interpret warm-up affected BFOs from the final two satellite communications as due to the aircraft going into an uncontrolled high-speed vertical accelerated dive, at 0.68 times gravitational acceleration. These analyses, in combination with drifter simulations, defined the second extensive and expensive unsuccessful underwater search bounds for MH370. Recently I used an integrated (horizontal and vertical combined) "Declination Model" of aircraft dynamics and Doppler Shifts to conclude that MH370 veered eastwards and was descending at the 7 th arc. Here I show that stark contrasts with the DSTG analysis are due to the mathematical singular assumption of zero horizontal velocity in the Up-Down Model, such that the high-speed dive is independent of aircraft cruise speed, declination angle and track angle. For a reasonable cruise speed, required to cross the last two arcs, the Declination Model requires declination angles of less than 14 degrees to explain the Doppler Shifts from the last two communications. The Declination Model also shows an apparent acceleration of 0.7g resulting from declination rotation, and not from a vertical dive. I conclude sadly, that despite dedicated, and otherwise brilliant, work by investigators their high-speed dive conclusion misrepresented the actual controlled descent of MH370. Since much of the MH370 crash investigation, and fuel-starvation theory, relied heavily upon these DSTG conclusions, a robust international science review is recommended to urgently review all analyses and evidence before approving the next final search.
... Yet, the prevailing view is that the flap was retracted and the plane fell out of the sky when it ran out of fuel-as evident in, for example, Encyclopedia Britannica's version of events [11]. In a recent pre-cursor paper [12], I also firmly refute the fuel-starvation theory based on a much more plausible reanalysis of the Doppler Shifts from the final two satellite communications from MH370. Previous official analyses either rejected valid evidence or attempted to forcibly fit interpretations of evidence (implausibly) to the fuel-starvation theory's prediction of a high-speed nose dive [12]. ...
... In a recent pre-cursor paper [12], I also firmly refute the fuel-starvation theory based on a much more plausible reanalysis of the Doppler Shifts from the final two satellite communications from MH370. Previous official analyses either rejected valid evidence or attempted to forcibly fit interpretations of evidence (implausibly) to the fuel-starvation theory's prediction of a high-speed nose dive [12]. ...
... Lastly, we must not only be able to reconcile all evidence, but we should also be able to refute alternate implausible theories-what I term the Scenario Backlash. This Backlash is reported by Lyne [12] related to misguided mathematical analyses of the Burst Frequency Offset analyses that was the basis for the impossible official vertical high-speed crash conclusion. The fuel-starvation theory has been shown to be implausible, and as witnessed from the web, created a substantial destructive wake through the science domain, social media, news outlets, official narratives, and extended human grief. ...
Technical Report
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April 2023 Update*** Analyses of the hydroacoustic sounds were updated, with reviews of explosion(s) of Kursk and implosion of ARA San Juan submarines, to show seafloor propagation was possible and that implosion most likely was at 4300 m in 6000 m water depth. The review also shows dynamite fishing off Sumatra and West Java (near the 7th arc location) can propagate basin wide distances efficiently.*** The official narrative of Malaysian Airlines MH370, missing since 8th March 2014, is that it flew south, ran out of fuel, and crashed at high speed at or near the 7th arc. In a precursor publication, I refuted the implausible fuel-starvation narrative and 7th-arc crash theory. Instead, I proposed an alternate plausible reinterpretation of Doppler Shifts from the satellite communications, supported by Larry Vance’s careful review of debris evidence, that MH370 veered east and descended rather than crashed at the 7th arc. Here, I justify the “incubated reasoning” evidence-based narrative that once past the 7th arc, MH370 descended across the Broken Ridge, and expertly glide-landed under engine power very precisely over a unique ultra-deep hole 6000 m deep where the 33oS latitude intersects the longitude of Penang. The flight path secrecy, and glide landing, had to be meticulously planned and executed, thus enabling plausible unraveling of all valid evidence, including ones rejected by the fuel-starvation theory, once the location was identified. Unique facets, even at the scale of the Indian Ocean, of the topography and oceanography around the secret site at the eastern end of Broken Ridge were instrumental in more plausible/accurate reinterpretations of drifter simulations, all four previously-rejected hydroacoustic recordings (using the MH370 Mechanism interpretations), satellite data tracking of debris, and human factors. Innovative satellite analyses (using the MH370 MODIS Debris Algorithm), calibrated on other large debris (not from MH370) found by China’s Gaofen-1 satellite, show debris streaming out from the precise landing site and swirling around the deep hole location; this is the first “direct” confirmation of the precise landing site. Debris were tracked across the Indian Ocean and observed offshore of Saint André beach at La Réunion Island on the 14 July 2015, associated with a spectacular “Heart Recirculation”—a new oceanographic phenomenon previously described by Palau artisanal fishers to the late Dr. Bob Johannes. New algorithms, discoveries, and inspired interpretations of the “Heart Recirculation”, seen through personal grief, are devoted to comfort those who lost innocent loved ones in MH370. All sights and sounds point in unison to say, “There Lies MH370”, patiently waiting in an iconic deep-ocean environment.
... Dedicated extended searches of claimed debris origins around 7 th communication arc sites (7Arc theory) by satellite, aerial and underwater searches were unsuccessful. Recently underlying 7Arc analyses were challenged scientifically on multiple fronts by the Penang Longitude Theory (PL theory) [2][3][4][5][6][7], and by competent thorough reassessments of debris damage by Larry Vance [8]. All discarded evidence, new direct evidence of debris streaming out from the location, and discovery, plus resolution, of a four-part riddle in the Pilot-in-Command home simulator track are reconciled by the PL theory; but NONE of these by the 7 th arc theory. ...
... 2. 6.8 cm/s plus 1.9% windage (drift is at 1.9% of wind at 10m; adjusted R-squared 0.72 on 12 d.f.), 3. With a 10 cm/s offset, as used by CSIRO, the linear fit yields 1.33% windage (adjusted R-squared 0.82 on 13 d.f.). ...
Technical Report
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You Ain't From Around These Parts Are Ya?"-David Chaltas (2021). ------------Simulated drift of MH370's flaperon, discovered at Réunion Island, from the unsuccessfully-searched 7 th-arc location, and the unsearched Penang-Longitude (PL) location, are both deemed feasible using CSIRO's model with different drift formulations. Locations are 700 km apart, and 1800 km added drift is required from the heavily-handicapped 7 th arc. CSIRO's 7 th-arc model used a "10 cm/s plus 1.2% windage" formula, but PL drift was a standard 1.2% windage (drift speed as a percent of wind speed). Did one of these break the rules in the "Drift to Réunion Island"? Over 508 days, CSIRO's flaperon "drifted" nearly 4400 km extra to reach Réunion Island on time, but little speed up was required from PL. Flaperon (real-Boeing plus replicas) field trials by CSIRO were under light-moderate winds in a shallow semi-enclosed embayment, and another with just wood/steel replica flaperons, offshore under high-winds. But embayment light-wind perpetual-motion 10 cm/s speedup for the real flaperon, above offshore model-calibrated 1.2% windage for general drift, was statistically well supported! Data exploration of embayment field trials suggested that drift was affected by Wind speed and observed Windage (drift speed/wind speed) itself! In the embayment trials, Wind (standard % formula) dominated above 9 m/s when Windage gremlins are asleep, with sleepless exceptions that identify mischief makers. Windage gremlins awaken, with the asymmetric flaperon flipping into a fast-slow "break-dance", between 9 to 5 m/s Wind to transition, below 5 m/s, tail-up, hooning mischievously left-of-wind along the fast-lane, low-wind, low-roughness, uplifted, "10 cm/s plus 1.2% windage" formula of good statistical fit! The referee in the form of a new innovative "windage" diagnostic modelling algorithm confirms "windage stratification" (where gremlins hide) also affected non-flaperon drifters but only from exposed surface drag and strong current shear in the top meter-expected from past research on lakes/embayments and density-stratified environments. Significant flaperon performance boost was from wind-sailing pressure forces wedged under the tail-up "sail canopy", uplift from trailing-edge wind separation, direct wind pressure uplift, and hydroplane lift-the reverse effects of a "duck-tail spoiler" used by race car "drifters" for extra downward drag pressure. In effect the flaperon flies with lift in air but sails with lift upside-down in water (on calm seas that is!). The new statistical diagnostic algorithm (over 99% deviance explained) suggests these performance-enhancing stable-condition tail-up postures, and wind shear effects in the top meter, are not perpetually viable in unstable deep turbulent conditions, such as the wild Southern Indian Ocean-just as no ballerina can perform the same on a wobbly boat, let alone a small surfboard-stage, heaving on the wild Southern Indian Ocean. Disappointingly, after accounting for justifiable object-related open-ocean drift enhancement, the 7 th-arc embayment-formula flaperon simulation was deemed to have sailed at least 3000 km more than justified by open-ocean drift rules. As before, MH370 still lies waiting patiently at the Penang Longitude location; a location supported by new direct satellite evidence of debris trail from the location and reconciled-evidence rejected by the sleepless-gremlin-infested 7 th-arc theory. No 7 th-arc analysis past the 5 th arc has withstood the test of time. All that is doable there is Done! The misleading 7 th-arc theory is Done! Let's not be blindly misled to that disappointing place again, which has been more than desperately searched in confused science and sea. Give it a rest and give us all a break! In memory of MH370, the new diagnostic algorithm is named "MH370 Open-Ocean Drift Algorithm", or MOODA. Rest in peace, it won't be much longer now.
... Official analyses defining the two previous searches for MH370 were predicated on an underlying theory of fuel starvation plus high-speed-dive with retracted but fluttering flaps, that led brave searchers across two huge ever-expanding wild dangerous Southern Indian Ocean searches in, and extensively around locations at, or near, the 7 th arc, defined by the last satellite communications from MH370. Recently, mathematical analyses of Doppler Shifts from the final two satellite communications were shown to be more compatible with MH370 in a controlled descent rather than a high-speed dive at the 7 th arc [1]. Careful logical expert investigation of debris damage by Larry Vance and colleagues contradicts the high-speed dive with retracted flaps in favor of an attempted controlled ditching with violent destruction of extended flaps, fuselage breach(es) with possible broken right wing, in the wild seas of the Southern Ocean [2]. ...
Technical Report
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Update 22 May 2023: ==== A confidential image of the original towelette is described, along with a map and photo of the beach site (supplied by the Millers) where the towelette was found.==== On Wednesday 2nd of July 2014, nearly 4 months after MH370 disappeared, an unopened Malaysia Airlines (MAS) moist hand-wipe towelette 6 cm x 8 cm was found by retired couple Vicki and Kingsley Miller on a beach at Thirsty Point, Cervantes (named after a shipwreck) about 200 km north of Perth, Western Australia. The couple duly noted the "very unusual" find, in that "If it had been opened and found lying there it would have been completely different". When the find was eventually reported on 10 March 2015, no other parts, linked to MH370 had been found, leading a spokesperson for the Australian Transport Safety Bureau (ATSB) to remark on this “common item”: "It is unlikely, however, that such a common item with no unique identifier could be conclusively linked with MH370". At best this assessment is non-committal, and at worst, if from MH370, it should have been thoroughly investigated—the subject of this report, only made possible by the Millers, well done! Even after other parts were found in the latter half of 2015, drift modelling of possible crash sites officially specified to be at/near the 7th arc, conducted by Dr. David Griffin of CSIRO, concluded that a crash near 35oS was consistent with debris locations, and with no definitive MH370-debris finds on the coastline of Western Australia. Recently the new Penang Longitude Theory identified MH370 resting in a narrow 6000 m deep hole along the longitude of Penang and 1500 km west of Perth. Discarded evidence, new evidence, and a four-part riddle in the Pilot-In-Command simulator track were all reconciled to this precise location. If indeed true, ALL valid evidence MUST be reconcilable to this location for MH370. Here, I report that simulations using the CSIRO model of debris drift from this new MH370 location reveals that the MAS Towelette discovered at Thirsty Point most likely escaped from a sinking MH370 at that location. Integrated consideration of dynamic oceanography, storm dynamics, and geophysical features, suggests a coherent scenario that the MAS Towelette drifted from the PL Hole with other debris, but may have drifted slightly faster/differently than other debris due to positive buoyancy and structure. In late June 2014, it was ensnared and quickly advected along the swift northern edge of an intense low-pressure high-seas winter storm that tracked towards the West Australian continental shelf. The storm then merged and reinforced an intense swift coastal jetstream extending the breath of southern Western Australia from Exmouth Gulf to well south of Perth. Strong north-westerly onshore coastal storm currents, along and south of the isolated Abrolhos Islands, famed for the Batavia shipwreck and barbaric mutiny, then drove the towelette to beach at Thirsty Point headland (a site of five historical wrecks and numerous others nearby) most likely on or before the 1 July 2014; just a day or less before it was discovered. I conclude that drifter simulations from the PL Hole location, combined with extreme weather events, and the circumstantial context of the find on a stretch of treacherous coast, suggest that the MAS Towelette was almost certainly from MH370 and that it drifted from the Penang Longitude Hole (PL Hole). This is consistent with all other evidence that MH370 lies waiting in the PL Hole, rather than at/near the searched 7th arc region—specifically selected so that no simulated debris beached along the coast of Western Australian. No other 7th arc location can explain the MAS Towelette beaching at Thirsty Point before the time it was discovered, whilst also reconciling debris landings in western Indian Ocean and other evidence. Unfounded scenarios of the towelette flying with the wind, being dropped on the beach by a tourist, or being planted as false evidence were all carefully evaluated to be of fictitious probability. Our second conclusion is that MH370 is not at/near the 7th arc as the PL Hole is the only isolated location in the vast Indian Ocean that reconciles all evidence and all debris locations. This now includes the innocuous tough messenger towelette that drifted across wild seas for 116 days and over 2000 km to tell of its escape from the sinking MH370; still waiting, lost at sea, lost in confused science, conspiracies, and fictional “documentaries” of ill-repute.
... As before, methods and background information rely heavily on previous publications [1][2][3][4] and will not be repeated here. Here, we compare the northern simulated PIC track (red track in Figure 1) with the planned northern MH370 track (light green in Figure 1). ...
Technical Report
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Previously I unraveled the southerly track of the “Pilot-in-Command“ (PIC) flight simulator to show that it was composed of three parts where the final location of MH370 at the Penang Longitude (PL) deep hole (PL Hole) was a pivot point (Part 1) that separated out a northern track (Part 2), and a southern track (Part 3). The Part 2 northern track length of under ~5000 km optimally fitted the PL theory predicted MH370 track length with a tight turn near the southwest corner of the Jindalee Over-the-Horizon Radar Network (JORN) range. Part 3 was an unexecuted decoy track (~1480 km) of precisely the same distance as the PL location to Perth Airport. Given the obsessive precise planning that went into this track, here I ask whether the northern straight PIC-simulated Malacca Strait track from Kuala Lumpur International Airport (KLIA) to waypoint (DOTEN) well northwest of Sumatra also held a riddle? I found that the PIC-simulated Malacca Strait track length of ~1563 km precisely fitted the planned MH370 track starting from KLIA proceeding northeast to just past waypoint (IGARI) at the boundary between Malaysian and Vietnamese ATC (Air Traffic Control space), followed by a sharp southwest turn to just south of Penang airport (PEN), before heading along the Malacca Strait to a turnoff just west of Sumatra for the start of the southward track, described previously. There is remarkable precise agreement between the respective track lengths of ~1563 km, and as before the turnoff to the southward track was at a simple latitude/longitude waypoint. The MH370 track overshot IGARI, possibly to allow for the turn from northeast to southwest and agreed closely with the ATSB track. I conclude that the simulation was to enable an accurate calculation of the fuel load required to reach the PL Hole and that the simulation with a Boeing 777-200LR, not part of Malaysia Airlines’ fleet, was to cause confusion. This adds yet another confirmation of the PL theory and suggests an obsession with precise track planning and execution. In the end, this obsession with precision was a critical element in unravelling all evidence and finding new evidence in support of the PL theory. There can be very little doubt now that MH370 lies waiting at the PL location as all discarded evidence are now reconciled, plus new insights and evidence complete a coherent integrated interpretation of MH370’s entire flight, landing and location.
Technical Report
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Aircraft are well known to leave contrails at high altitude, or “holes” in thick billowing lower-level clouds from hot exhaust turbulence and cooling of air over the wings. These can last for several hours. The day MH370 disappeared was a very cloudy day, especially during its final descent phase. The ocean had to be surveyed (at least that is what I thought) before reaching the landing site, so it’s reasonable to assume that it punched through the clouds near the 7th arc; a point at which it was in a proven, controlled but steep descent for the landing phase. Is it possible to verify that it did punch through the clouds? As a precautionary study, I investigated the Terra/MODIS cloud data and found not just a hole, but very surprisingly, an apparent trail of cloud anomalies in the Corrected Reflectance (True Color) image. Despite 2 hours and 48 minutes elapsing since the 7th-arc descent, the cloud imprint was obvious and consistent with what I expected to find from MH370 flying within the clouds. In retrospect, it was an obvious tactic to avoid detection and to minimize time to the landing location. An overlay of the “Cloud Top Height” data showed a very remarkable, unmistakable, and isolated trail of very anomalous height-fluctuations from 4 km (general height) to over 10 km (very abnormal height), associated (in an unknown way) with the trail punching through the clouds intermittently and leaving imprints within the clouds and an apparent signature above. The distance from source (at the event time), directions, wind speed/direction, and length of anomaly-trail, are all very consistent and plausible with the trail being made from the 7th-arc. This trail ends precisely very near the final destination at the Penang Longitude Deep Hole. The observed average north-eastward cloud drift speed of about 104 km/hr also matches a theoretically predicted wind-profile drift speed of ~96 km/hr. Nearly 7 hours later, the trail was still obvious in 3 additional images from two satellites. This trail was apparent in both the Reflectance and Cloud Top Pressure data. I conclude that from the 7th arc, MH370 was flying within the clouds and punching through it occasionally and leaving a distinct trail along its final descent to its precise planned landing site. This observation, if correct, is a second direct confirmation of MH370’s path, added to the previous direct confirmation of a MODIS-satellite-observed debris trail from the landing site (another deceived algorithm).
Technical Report
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Against cautionary advice from colleagues, I sought to provide much-needed support to veteran skipper Kit Olver for his claim in September-October 2014 that he had snagged in his trawl net what may have been a “wing” from a commercial jet airline off Robe, South Australia. Oceanographically the only way for that “wing” or other large debris from MH370 to reach that location was via the swift Leeuwin Current. I developed a novel guided-drift algorithm (named MH370 Drift Algorithm) to concord with our best understanding of how drifters behave in the open ocean and within swift currents like the Leeuwin Current. Simulations with the algorithm provided sound confirmation that the drift was indeed possible all the way from the only location which reconciles all MH370 evidence: the Penang Longitude Deep Hole. This is a very surprising and remarkable finding! Analyses of past drifters suggests that during early winter, the western and eastern segments of the Leeuwin Current which are nominally segregated, were joined temporarily to enable drift from west to east. NOAA Drifter 55600502 provided the observational support for such a drift. Another Drifter 55600557 was fortuitously located near the landing site on the 8th March 2014 but its sensors were failing and it eventually terminated in May 2014, but its drift provided confirmation of the simulated drift pattern after landing. Taking all these findings into consideration, I conclude that there is more than sufficient evidence for a precautionary investigation to be conducted of Kit Olver’s find. Further information is required of the find. But the debris item is likely to be still near where Kit left it (easy search), or at the bottom of the continental slope of a nearby canyon (much much more difficult search).
Technical Report
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You Ain't From Around These Parts Are Ya?"-David Chaltas (2021). ------------Simulated drift of MH370's flaperon, discovered at Réunion Island, from the unsuccessfully-searched 7 th-arc location, and the unsearched Penang-Longitude (PL) location, are both deemed feasible using CSIRO's model with different drift formulations. Locations are 700 km apart, and 1800 km added drift is required from the heavily-handicapped 7 th arc. CSIRO's 7 th-arc model used a "10 cm/s plus 1.2% windage" formula, but PL drift was a standard 1.2% windage (drift speed as a percent of wind speed). Did one of these break the rules in the "Drift to Réunion Island"? Over 508 days, CSIRO's flaperon "drifted" nearly 4400 km extra to reach Réunion Island on time, but little speed up was required from PL. Flaperon (real-Boeing plus replicas) field trials by CSIRO were under light-moderate winds in a shallow semi-enclosed embayment, and another with just wood/steel replica flaperons, offshore under high-winds. But embayment light-wind perpetual-motion 10 cm/s speedup for the real flaperon, above offshore model-calibrated 1.2% windage for general drift, was statistically well supported! Data exploration of embayment field trials suggested that drift was affected by Wind speed and observed Windage (drift speed/wind speed) itself! In the embayment trials, Wind (standard % formula) dominated above 9 m/s when Windage gremlins are asleep, with sleepless exceptions that identify mischief makers. Windage gremlins awaken, with the asymmetric flaperon flipping into a fast-slow "break-dance", between 9 to 5 m/s Wind to transition, below 5 m/s, tail-up, hooning mischievously left-of-wind along the fast-lane, low-wind, low-roughness, uplifted, "10 cm/s plus 1.2% windage" formula of good statistical fit! The referee in the form of a new innovative "windage" diagnostic modelling algorithm confirms "windage stratification" (where gremlins hide) also affected non-flaperon drifters but only from exposed surface drag and strong current shear in the top meter-expected from past research on lakes/embayments and density-stratified environments. Significant flaperon performance boost was from wind-sailing pressure forces wedged under the tail-up "sail canopy", uplift from trailing-edge wind separation, direct wind pressure uplift, and hydroplane lift-the reverse effects of a "duck-tail spoiler" used by race car "drifters" for extra downward drag pressure. In effect the flaperon flies with lift in air but sails with lift upside-down in water (on calm seas that is!). The new statistical diagnostic algorithm (over 99% deviance explained) suggests these performance-enhancing stable-condition tail-up postures, and wind shear effects in the top meter, are not perpetually viable in unstable deep turbulent conditions, such as the wild Southern Indian Ocean-just as no ballerina can perform the same on a wobbly boat, let alone a small surfboard-stage, heaving on the wild Southern Indian Ocean. Disappointingly, after accounting for justifiable object-related open-ocean drift enhancement, the 7 th-arc embayment-formula flaperon simulation was deemed to have sailed at least 3000 km more than justified by open-ocean drift rules. As before, MH370 still lies waiting patiently at the Penang Longitude location; a location supported by new direct satellite evidence of debris trail from the location and reconciled-evidence rejected by the sleepless-gremlin-infested 7 th-arc theory. No 7 th-arc analysis past the 5 th arc has withstood the test of time. All that is doable there is Done! The misleading 7 th-arc theory is Done! Let's not be blindly misled to that disappointing place again, which has been more than desperately searched in confused science and sea. Give it a rest and give us all a break! In memory of MH370, the new diagnostic algorithm is named "MH370 Open-Ocean Drift Algorithm", or MOODA. Rest in peace, it won't be much longer now.
Technical Report
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Previously I unraveled the southerly track of the “Pilot-in-Command“ (PIC) flight simulator to show that it was composed of three parts where the final location of MH370 at the Penang Longitude (PL) deep hole (PL Hole) was a pivot point (Part 1) that separated out a northern track (Part 2), and a southern track (Part 3). The Part 2 northern track length of under ~5000 km optimally fitted the PL theory predicted MH370 track length with a tight turn near the southwest corner of the Jindalee Over-the-Horizon Radar Network (JORN) range. Part 3 was an unexecuted decoy track (~1480 km) of precisely the same distance as the PL location to Perth Airport. Given the obsessive precise planning that went into this track, here I ask whether the northern straight PIC-simulated Malacca Strait track from Kuala Lumpur International Airport (KLIA) to waypoint (DOTEN) well northwest of Sumatra also held a riddle? I found that the PIC-simulated Malacca Strait track length of ~1563 km precisely fitted the planned MH370 track starting from KLIA proceeding northeast to just past waypoint (IGARI) at the boundary between Malaysian and Vietnamese ATC (Air Traffic Control space), followed by a sharp southwest turn to just south of Penang airport (PEN), before heading along the Malacca Strait to a turnoff just west of Sumatra for the start of the southward track, described previously. There is remarkable precise agreement between the respective track lengths of ~1563 km, and as before the turnoff to the southward track was at a simple latitude/longitude waypoint. The MH370 track overshot IGARI, possibly to allow for the turn from northeast to southwest and agreed closely with the ATSB track. I conclude that the simulation was to enable an accurate calculation of the fuel load required to reach the PL Hole and that the simulation with a Boeing 777-200LR, not part of Malaysia Airlines’ fleet, was to cause confusion. This adds yet another confirmation of the PL theory and suggests an obsession with precise track planning and execution. In the end, this obsession with precision was a critical element in unravelling all evidence and finding new evidence in support of the PL theory. There can be very little doubt now that MH370 lies waiting at the PL location as all discarded evidence are now reconciled, plus new insights and evidence complete a coherent integrated interpretation of MH370’s entire flight, landing and location.
Technical Report
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Update: Northern track riddle is solved in "Malacca Track Riddle" manuscript. A "Pilot-in-Command" (PIC) flight simulator for a "Long-Range" Boeing 777-200LR recovered by FBI and official MH370 investigators shows a track from Kuala Lumpur up the Strait of Malacca, followed by a sharp southward left turn well northwest of the northern turn estimated from satellite and phone communications (just west of Sumatra), and ending deep in the Southern Ocean, well past the fuel load aboard the shorter "Extended Range" MH370 Boeing 777-200ER. Whilst resembling the official track along the Malacca Strait, after the turnoff, the PIC track heads towards the southeast compared to the official southerly track. No significant official interpretation was therefore attached to this track, other than a fleeting suggestion, that was dismissed in the search for MH370 (based on a questionable retracted-flap theory, logically challenged, and rectified by Larry Vance), that it may reflect a "very unlikely" intention for "controlled ditching" in the Southern Ocean. In 2021, I showed that this track crossed over, or passed very near, the location predicted by the Penang Longitude theory (the PL location). Here, I reflect, as part of the "scenario backlash" process, on the PIC track assuming that it may be a riddle with hidden planning details such that the start of the southward track (at the northern left turn) and end point obfuscate simulation of flight path intentions. A three-part riddle was identified where the PL location, as the pivot point (Part 1), separated out a northern track (Part 2), and a southern track (Part 3). With Part 1 solved, the Part 2 northern track length of ~5000 km optimally fits the PL theory predicted track length, if the southeast turn to the PL location occurs tightly near the southwest corner of the Jindalee Over-the-Horizon Radar Network (JORN) range (a critical core feature of the PL theory). The Part 3 decoy southern track length (~1480 km) is precisely the same distance as the PL location to Perth Airport. I conclude that Part 1 and 2 were related to the intended flight path, and that Part 3 was a diversion; simply because a PIC track with just Part 1 and 2 may have been enough to solve the riddle. If this is indeed the resolution of the riddle, it is yet another confirmation added to the list of all valid evidence reconciled by the PL theory. The remaining unsolved riddles are whether the PL location is indeed the very precise final resting place of MH370; and why search investigators still insist on searching at or near the extensive mathematically flawed and failed 7 th-arc searches; or the very least why an international science review hasn't been instigated?
Technical Report
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April 2023 Update*** Analyses of the hydroacoustic sounds were updated, with reviews of explosion(s) of Kursk and implosion of ARA San Juan submarines, to show seafloor propagation was possible and that implosion most likely was at 4300 m in 6000 m water depth. The review also shows dynamite fishing off Sumatra and West Java (near the 7th arc location) can propagate basin wide distances efficiently.*** The official narrative of Malaysian Airlines MH370, missing since 8th March 2014, is that it flew south, ran out of fuel, and crashed at high speed at or near the 7th arc. In a precursor publication, I refuted the implausible fuel-starvation narrative and 7th-arc crash theory. Instead, I proposed an alternate plausible reinterpretation of Doppler Shifts from the satellite communications, supported by Larry Vance’s careful review of debris evidence, that MH370 veered east and descended rather than crashed at the 7th arc. Here, I justify the “incubated reasoning” evidence-based narrative that once past the 7th arc, MH370 descended across the Broken Ridge, and expertly glide-landed under engine power very precisely over a unique ultra-deep hole 6000 m deep where the 33oS latitude intersects the longitude of Penang. The flight path secrecy, and glide landing, had to be meticulously planned and executed, thus enabling plausible unraveling of all valid evidence, including ones rejected by the fuel-starvation theory, once the location was identified. Unique facets, even at the scale of the Indian Ocean, of the topography and oceanography around the secret site at the eastern end of Broken Ridge were instrumental in more plausible/accurate reinterpretations of drifter simulations, all four previously-rejected hydroacoustic recordings (using the MH370 Mechanism interpretations), satellite data tracking of debris, and human factors. Innovative satellite analyses (using the MH370 MODIS Debris Algorithm), calibrated on other large debris (not from MH370) found by China’s Gaofen-1 satellite, show debris streaming out from the precise landing site and swirling around the deep hole location; this is the first “direct” confirmation of the precise landing site. Debris were tracked across the Indian Ocean and observed offshore of Saint André beach at La Réunion Island on the 14 July 2015, associated with a spectacular “Heart Recirculation”—a new oceanographic phenomenon previously described by Palau artisanal fishers to the late Dr. Bob Johannes. New algorithms, discoveries, and inspired interpretations of the “Heart Recirculation”, seen through personal grief, are devoted to comfort those who lost innocent loved ones in MH370. All sights and sounds point in unison to say, “There Lies MH370”, patiently waiting in an iconic deep-ocean environment.
Technical Report
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Note (9 May 2022): Much of the analyses in this report is superseded by the revised publication: "There Lies MH370" available at: https://www.researchgate.net/publication/360454688_There_Lies_MH370_Sights_and_Sounds_Point_to_Iconic_Deep_Ocean_Site ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ Note (11 February 2022): As noted in the Comments, a paper will be submitted shortly for peer review which updates the analyses presented in this report. The paper will update the drifter analyses through comparisons with the Global Drifter Program drifters, and with satellite anomalies which, although confounded by anomalies from other ocean debris, could be plausibly tracked from the landing site across the Indian Ocean to La Reunion Island, Madagascar and beyond. The hydroacoustic analyses were also updated to reconcile the sound heard at Scott Reef, and to highlight the mechanisms by which sounds at all stations were heard. I also propose a similar mechanism by which the Black Box pings may have been heard. A revised final (equilibrium) descent speed of the aircraft through the water column was also derived. The analyses taken together suggest a precise highly plausible final resting place for MH370. ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- We conclude our thought review by showing that the bewildering array of MH370 sound anomalies, including lack of triangulation is however explainable and entirely consistent with deep-water sound injection from MH370 at a precise location that coincides with our theory—which also reconciles the detailed divergent hydroacoustic interpretations by Usama Kadri (2019). Triangulation is not possible as two acoustic stations receive an emitted water-borne signal from a seamount, whilst another receives a mysterious “seismic” signal. We review the Pilot’s home simulator track and find that it crosses precisely over our location – indicating that the track was for planning purposes, rather than the assumed ditching in the Southern Ocean. Recovered debris and their locations on the aircraft suggest a glided landing with major impact to the right, and later dislodgement of fore and aft internal parts from possible implosion(s) at depth. Highly unusual anomalies identified in MODIS images for April and June 2014 are consistent in location, drift direction and drift speed with debris/material from the final location. All evidence therefore confirms the postulated scenario and the final location of MH370 near where the longitude of Penang intersects the Broken Ridge. All other possible locations are ruled out, including the Batavia Seamount, following derivation of a detailed flight path that matches our scenario and explains the persistent southerly path (to avoid JORN) that veered eastward before the 7th arc to an attempted glide landing at the final location.
Technical Report
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This report is the first (incorrect) iteration in explaining the sound heard at Perth Canyon. The version that explains all sounds can be found at: -------------------------------------------------- https://www.researchgate.net/publication/360454688_There_Lies_MH370_Sights_and_Sounds_Point_to_Iconic_Deep_Ocean_Site ---------------------------------------------- A preprint of the article that debunks the fuel-starvation-at-the-7th-arc scenario is at: --------------------------------------------- https://www.researchgate.net/publication/355242503_Final_Two_Communications_from_MH370_Supports_Controlled_Eastward_Descent_Scenario ----------------------------------------- Short Summary (note theory reported here is incorrect) The final hydroacoustic message from MH370 provides a vital 8th arc from the Perth Canyon that signals a narrow landing range along the Broken Ridge near where the 33S latitude is intersected by the longitude of Penang at an ultra-deep hole approximately 6000 m deep.
Article
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On November 15, 2017, an event related to the disappearance of the Argentine military submarine ARA San Juan was detected by two hydrophone triplet stations of the IMS network, established to enforce the nuclear test ban treaty (CTBT). From the two direct hydroacoustic arrivals recorded at 6000 and 8000 km from the localized wreckage, calculated location based on hydroacoustic data only is poorly constrained, and the associated uncertainties are large. In an attempt to interpret the recorded signals, an air dropped calibration grenade was conducted by the Argentine Navy two weeks later, on December 1, 2017, near the last known position of the submarine. From the comparison of temporal and spectral features of both events, we confirm the impulsive nature of the San Juan event. Array processing was performed with a progressive multi-channel correlation method (PMCC). Fine propagation details of direct arrivals are very well resolved in time-frequency space and thirteen secondary arrivals are revealed for the San Juan event, within the fifteen minutes following direct arrivals. The detections presented in this paper were calculated with DTK-PMCC software embedded in the NDC-In-A-Box virtual machine, and can be reproduced by any CTBTO principal user (Member State user which can access raw waveform data and data bulletins). All the identified late arrivals are associated to reflections or refractions from seamounts, islands and the South American continental Slope. The accurate identification of all the reflectors allows to significantly improve the source location accuracy: 95% confidence ellipse area has been reduced by a factor of 100 compared to location obtained from direct arrivals only, and the estimated location is 3.5 km from the known location of the wreckage. The originality of the relocation method is that it is based on the joint inversion of both San Juan and calibration events unknown parameters, and from the selection of only a well-chosen subset of secondary arrivals. Its calculation did not require either the need of advanced oceanographic specifications, or sophisticated methods requiring heavy computational means. Finally, a detailed cepstral analysis of the direct and secondary arrivals has allowed to detect the existence of a second impulse (doublet) in the signals associated to both San Juan and calibration events. Unlike the calibration event, the anisotropic character of the delays measured from the San Juan cepstra suggests that the 15 November signal was generated by two impulsive acoustic sources closely separated in space and time over scales comparable to the size of the submarine. This study demonstrates the capability of the hydroacoustic component of the IMS network to accomplish its mission of Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty monitoring.
Conference Paper
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In the wake of the disappearance of the MH370 Boeing 777 and the recovery of the right wing flaperon debris, a ditching scenario has been envisaged by the investigating authorities. In this respect, this paper attempts to assess the forces exerted by fluid-structure interaction upon a guided-ditching flaperon both through analytical and numerical means and compare the results with the evidence. The author presents a modified version of the Karman wedge water impact theory, suitably adapted for a single flat panel ditching case, which leads to a simple analytical relation for the total hydrodynamic force as a function of the flaperon horizontal and vertical speeds and its angle of impact. Validation of the analytically obtained force to that obtained by Smoothed Particle Hydrodynamics (SPH) water simulations is presented. An extension of the analytical relation is made for the flaperon section failure stresses as a function of velocity vector and angle of impact with the perspective towards areas containing fastened parts. A basic Finite Element Model (FEM) of the flaperon is then conceived from available geometric and material data and subjected to a typical ditching impact. The type and place of failure of the flaperon (notably its trailing edge) appears in accordance with the analytically obtained upper bounds and with the state of the recovered flaperon.