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Defeating A Super Power: Challenges That Can Emerge Against American
Conventional Warfare in an Age of Fog of Technology
Nobuhide Mert Matsumoto / 145114080
Marmara Üniversitesi / İletişim Fakültesi – Gazetecilik / Siyasal Bilgiler Fakültesi –
Siyasal Bilimler ve Uluslararası İlişkiler İngilizce / jptrgsm@hotmail.com
Abstract
The Iraqi War in 2003, made a historical triumph for American conventional
warfare strategy, which also referred as assurance for incoming American century or so-
called ‘Pax-Americana’ (American Peace) that will rule the anarchical world. These
hypotheses however, were shortcomings of the people with short memories. After the
America’s endless wars in Iraq and Afghanistan or in other name ‘Global War On Terror’
make American peace is not on going. This led us to a situation of so-called ‘Cold War
Version 2’ where Russia and China evolve as main challengers of US conventional
power. As a mentality of a Cold War type arms race, those countries want and planning
to challenge American power in unconventional means simply on terms of Fourth
Industrial Revolution that based on artificial intelligence, information technologies and
robotics. This article will evaluate the challenges that these new kind of unconventional
strategies of Russia and China that posed against American conventional warfare. This
will push us to a position where technological advancements can create a fog of
technology where conventional forces can face ‘technological curse’.
Key Words: Industry 4.0, War, China, Hybrid Warfare, Artificial Intelligence
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Introduction
Since the first war between the human communities, technology always effected
the war fighting capabilities of the human groups and then their fates. As we observed
with the use of rifle and horse by the European Armies in 15th Century changed the fate
of the world while in 1945 triumph of the ballistic blast capacity with the use of atomic
bomb by American military changed the face of wars drastically. Despite these
revolutions within the military field, basic notion and concept of the war preserved itself.
German war theoretician Carl von Clausewitz defined the ‘war’ as continuation
of politics for achieving political motives in his book ‘On War’, (Clausewitz, 2015) all
revolutionary military technological developments, which also named by Andrew
Krepinevich, change the course of the war but not its political nature. (Krepinevich, 1994)
The term American conventional power triumphed after the end of the Second
World War. Conventional power means use of classic ballistic weapons as military
doctrine rather than atomic weapons which usually called as unconventional ones. As
George Friedman argued in his book ‘Future of War’, American conventional power
highly took a blow after the introduction of Massive Retaliation, Nuclear Deterrence and
Mutually Assured Destruction (MAD) as basic doctrines that managed its military
strategy. (Friedman, 2015) These strategies crippled the conventional power of the
American military in Korean War where military is not really enthusiastic for destroying
Pyongyang in return for New York or Washington. This strategy gives the privilege of
using military power to Communist alliance on the Korean War campaign. This desperate
situation however, eased by the indoctrination of Flexible Response Strategy, which
created a blend between use of conventional and unconventional force that American
military had.
It is problematic that technological revolutions, can backfire with false
indoctrinations and can undermine the firepower of the conventional forces within a real-
life war situation. This is why conventional weapons not become obsolete with the use of
nuclear weapons. (Cohen, 1991)
War is still changing by the changes in the industrial capacities of nations since
19th Century, as Kenneth Waltz’s Neo-Realist Theory argues the concept of ‘combined
capabilities of the states’ which claim that military, economic, social and technological
capabilities of states cannot separable from each other. (Waltz, 1979) This push us to the
point where states that shift to the Industry 4.0 will also adapt their military technologies
to such kind of industrial capacity. In latest years, more and more state that include US,
China, Russia, Japan, India and etc., see artificial intelligence (AI), information
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technologies (IT) and robotics as important source for furthering national military
capacity.
Industry 4.0, has a velocity to evolve faster and potential to produce growth in less
cost and time, potential to develop algorithms that can help the people for improving their
skills and can produce change in employment type (substitution and slowing the aging
problem). (Schwab, 2016) As we can see these new industrial characteristics that
provided by the Fourth Industrial Revolution, invite the military-industry complex to
evolve in terms of better skills (AI can help target systems to be more accurate and
usable), cheaper prices (developments like 3D painting made production cheaper and
faster) and use of robotics can help these military-industry complex to overcome the
human costs and aging problem (specially for US’s irreplaceable manpower losses that
create political pressures over the Government and over the countries that facing aging
problem like Japan). This make these developments as one possible military technological
revolution if they can adapt to the military instrument for achieving the political purposes.
(Cohen, 1991)
In terms of conventional warfare, the US has enormous power to defeat its
enemies and to achieve its political goals since 1990s to the start of the 2000s. This push
its rivals like China and Russia to find new technological field that they can level US
conventional power. Until 2020, Pentagon could make good use of the full $733 billion
budget while with its 1,3 million manpower (Miller & O'Hanlon, 2019), 13.393 plane
(which is larger than Russia, China, India, South Korea and Japan combined) and 415
ships (with 24 aircraft carriers and seven carrier groups) made it the biggest and most
powerful conventional force on earth. (Global Firepower, 2019)
Until here everything looks perfect and unmatchable when we compare the
American conventional military with its rivals. When we look the enormous budget of
the American military it will be the most advanced country in terms of military
technologies. However, Fog of the Technology, which is a result of uncertainties that
caused by newly adopted technologies and its indoctrination – absorption process, was
one of the biggest challenge that can exploit by the rivals of the US.
This article will evaluate the challenges that American conventional force can face
due to rising asymmetrical threats that started with America’s War On Terror in 2001
after the 9/11 attacks. After that we will focus on two more unconventional military
doctrines that developed and being developed by the Russia and China who were
searching a way to challenge and level American conventional power in their geographic
sphere of interest. At the last part we will focus on possible American responses to these
new threats that can be directed from this new unconventional challenges. With this we
will be able to understand what is Fog of Technology and Technology Curse can cause
to the American conventional power.
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American Military Power Since the Iraqi War
Iraqi War in 2003 seemed as a first test for the Pax-Americana where the US tried
to put its own agenda on the world while using coercion against the possible challengers
to their moves. This war seemed as the triumph of the American conventional power
where Iraqi forces, who were equipped with old Soviet weapons, experienced a rapid
defeat due to American satellite systems, UAVs and its advanced cruise missile capacity.
This victory postponed the revisionist dreams of the possible challengers of the Pax-
Americana.
This conventional war however changed and evolved to a counter-insurgency
operation (COIN) that had political motives rather than militaristic ones. Conventional
warfare entails fighting distinct, identifiable, and unambiguous military forces, whose
defeat (as well as the destruction of their infrastructure) is a well-studied problem for
conventional forces: identify centres of gravity and apply firepower. (Jogerst, 2009)
However, in a COIN campaign it is not easy to determine the gravity point of the enemy
which can create endless campaigns with politicization of a foreign force like American
military as one of the domestic political actor which made it as a possible gravity point
of the one side. It is not conventional power that make US conventional forces as a target
of terrorist organizations like Taliban, Al-Qaeda and ISIS but its political role as assisters
of the newly established governments in Iraq and Afghanistan. COIN experiences of the
US military become more and more costly than traditional conventional warfare both in
economic and political terms as we see in Vietnam, Afghanistan and Iraq.
The US Army lost 450,000 active personnel in military since 2018, or 30,000
personnel fewer than prior to 9/11, while Bernard Brodie wrote that Washington is paying
for less capability relative to the threats it faces than at any time in decades. (Brands &
Edelman, 2017) This show us that technological victory in Iraqi War and following 2008
Economic Crisis give the US the confidence of renewing its conventional capacity with
new technologies while reducing the upkeep costs with reducing already established
conventional forces. This period followed by the return of the great power competition
where China and Russia started to increase their both conventional and unconventional
war capabilities, nuclearization of weaker states like North Korea and Iran who become
more powerful after they witnessed the example of fall of Iraq, spread of asymmetrical
threats like cyber weapons and satellites both vertically and horizontally also challenged
the US conventional forces and finally grew in the number of asymmetrical threats make
operating the American conventional power costly and risky. (Brands & Edelman, 2017)
Space technologies and cyber capabilities were the first contributions of the late
Industry 3.0 technologies. High technology is a buyers’ market today, so it is difficult for
the supplier to refuse such deals for fear of being beaten by the competition. (Mallık,
2004) Introduction of cyber capabilities like spywares, DDoS attacks and malwares
threaten American warplanes and war systems in an age of electronic warfare, use of
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advanced cruise missiles that can threaten American aircraft carriers or billion dollars
costed Aegis destroyers and use of UAVs that can locate the American conventional units
will threaten the use of the classical American firepower. This also encourage the great
power competition where China and Russia bid for developing of new weapons system
and can push the US military to a spending spree that can challenge its domestic economy
and already established conventional program.
When we approach war from the Clausewitzian perspective and accept war as the
continuation of politics every conventional warfare strategy attached to the political
motives of the warring or strategist state. Military means are proportional to the political
objective sought; thermonuclear weapons are not used against insurgency. (Record, 2005)
This new conventional feature of the warfare will base on proportionality. This
proportionality rule of warfare takes more and more important part in the future of war.
It is important to understand Chinese and Russian interests and motives on the possible
contribution of Industry 4.0 technologies in political grounds first than define it in military
doctrine terms. It is clear that Russia and China will try to push the US to a conventional
wisdom which is narcissistic where it completely ignores the enemy, assuming that what
we do alone determines success or failure. (Record, 2005) This will be one of the greatest
threat that can American conventional military face in near future.
Shift of Conventionality of War: New Asymmetries and Small Scales
Since 2003, American military is more reluctant to involve in crisis that happening
in Middle East. Enduring COIN operations, weakened and degenerated American
conventional forces and their public support in homeland were in decrease. This situation
pushed the US to take some small scale operations in Yemen and Syria where American
military find itself in a grey zone where its conventional rivals like Russia and Iran
succeeded in answering and countering American strategy.
Rather than nuclear warfare in 21st Century, tactics for conventional warfare and
other kind of new generational warfare capabilities were developing faster. This show us
that the revolutionary military technological developments were moving to a more
sophisticated, sensitive and lethal nature than notion of total destruction. This show itself
in American military’s “targeted killings strategy” which take an important part in
counter-terrorism operations, since 9-11 the US armed forces have “developed the fusion
of operations and intelligence for the purpose of hunting high-value targets into a high
art. (Voelz, 2015) This led us to a point where American conventional power focussed on
small scale special operation with using new generational technologies rather than using
symmetrical war tactics.
One other important new tool for a small scale operations were cyber-attacks or
cyber strategies that target enemy conventional forces or cyber civil-military systems.
These cyber capabilities bring flexibility, using minimal cost with achieving maximum
strategic ends and minimizing the potential loss of man and equipment that can cause
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from full-scale conventional attack. Cyber enabled special warfare is the answer in an
increasingly interconnected global environment in which physical infrastructure is
rapidly being assigned Internet Protocol addresses for assimilation into an “Internet of
things.” (Duggan, 2015) Such kind of possible cyber-revolution in a military can re-shape
the classical conventional power and strategy. As I noted in my earlier article, rising cyber
war capabilities and its potential due to reducing the costs and required profession created
new problems to conventional American military force with its dangers that posed by
both vertical and horizontal spread of such capabilities among other powers and non-state
actors. (Matsumoto, 2019)
Rise of the advanced cruise missile capabilities in American military also shows
the will of the American conventional power to reduce the scale of aerial and naval
conventional operations. These new percussive capabilities of American military helped
it in Gulf and Iraqi War to increase its volume and direct hit capability. As George
Friedman wrote in his book, American Tomahawk missiles with its Terrain Contour
Matching (TERCOM) System, Digital Scene-Mapping Area Correlator (DSMAC)
System and with its 500kg capacity of explosives seemed as possible alternative for costly
piloted air force planes. (Friedman, 2015) However, such kind of military revolution
followed by the rivals of the US; Iran with its Scud missiles, (Pasandideh, 2019) Russia
with its 9M730 Burevestnik hypersonic missiles (ABC News, 2019) and Chinese YJ-
63/AKD-63 and YJ-62 missiles. (Gormley, Erickson, & Yuan, 2014) In March 2015, Iran
unveiled a cruise missile named the Soumar, which is derivation of the KH-55 which was
derived from KH-55 that purchased by the Ukrainian black market. (Pasandideh, 2019)
Such kind of risk of black market is one of the biggest challenge that can challenge
American conventional forces. Russia and China, or even Iran and North Korea, are not
powerless to respond to US capability enhancement, and there may come a time when
Washington simply cannot preserve the desired level of overmatch at an acceptable cost.
(Brands & Edelman, 2017)
Rising robotic and autonomous weapon technologies in military help US
conventional forces to allow the military to operate increased numbers of systems
simultaneously, in different areas, with minimal human involvement at the tactical level;
the communications infrastructure required to operate remotely controlled UCAVs is
“highly vulnerable to electronic countermeasures or kinetic attacks on the infrastructure
which sustains them”; given the compressed decision-cycles of advanced AIs in
comparison with a human decision-maker, autonomous gathering and collation of
battlefield intelligence, as well as algorithm-based data analysis, manoeuvre and target
selection, could provide crucial tactical and, by extension, strategic advantages and an
algorithm-based analysis of battlefield intelligence as a basis for targeting decisions could
also potentially make strikes more accurate, thereby minimizing collateral damage and
the ensuing public backlash. (Haas & Fischer, 2017)
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However, as we noted earlier revolutionary military technologies were always
tending to spread both to other states and non-state violent groups. Every military
technological development has a risk of harming the already existed conventional forces.
False indoctrination of tank by the British Army, or strategic bombardment aircrafts in
Vietnam and over linkage to the nuclear weapons after the WW2 make conventional
forces weaker until the right use of these new technological developments. War’s essence
as politically directed violence will remain its most enduring aspect, even if more
machines are involved at every level. (Hoffman, 2018) Without determining the political
purpose of these new technological developments these technological developments were
has a risk of harming a nation’s conventional force by an other party who can use it
properly for political purposes.
What is Fog of Technology and the Risk of Technological Curse?
Fog of Technology is a derivate concept that I created from the Carl von
Cluasewitz’s concept of fog and friction. Fog of Technology is a problem of integrating
a new technology to military doctrines and strategies for creating desired political and
military objective. As Barry D. Watts underlined in his article, in Post-Cold War Era
American Air Force had a gap between ‘technical feasibility’ and ‘operational utility’
which caused a failure of meeting the demands of actual combat. (Watts, 1996) It is key
to understand that all new technologies have a fog where its optimal benefits and effects
are volatile, uncertain, complex and ambiguous which make its users physically
impediment due to their lack of information about what they have. This show us that
technology is one of the most important war fog or friction that can challenge the military
decision-making system. (Clausewitz, 2015)
Figure 1 Understanding the concept of Fog of Technology and Technology Curse in Military
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Fog of Technology is one of the riskiest concept that can threaten the conventional
militaries. Failure of indoctrination of use of tanks by British and French made Germany
advantageous, American dependence on nuclear bombs in immediate Post-WWII environment
and again it’s too much dependence on air force in Vietnam War make it vulnerable against pro-
Communist conventional strategy. It is clear that in a time of war these new technologies created
a strategic importance where they failed to fulfil the political goals that military means should
make. This can be called as technology curse where conventional militaries suffer from the
attribute of lengthened endless wars of erroneous strategic decisions. As again Barry Watts
claimed; ‘technology is important but doctrine is so, but the most important one is harmonious
fit between them’. (Watts, 1996)
Figure 2: Three possible ends of Fog of technology and its possible ramifications that can end with technology curse.
Fog of Technology is a one of the riskiest concept that can harm the conventional
militaries in both war and peace time. In a peace time, Fog of Technology can cause unmatched
challenges from rivals as an end product of uncontrolled spread of technology. Uncontrolled
spread of nuclear weapons to the states like India, Pakistan and North Korea can be an example
of this. The second peacetime effect of it was possible budgetary problems that caused by the
upkeep costs of that technology which can end with budgetary cuts from conventional forces.
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France’s failure to stop the French Revolution due to its engagement in American Civil War,
Russian and German Empire’s bankruptcy in the WWI and Japanese over spending for levelling
American Navy in Pacific in WWII were some examples of this. Its war time effect is due to its
risk of wrong indoctrination, like France and Britain’s failure to use of submarine and tank in
WWII, or absorption problems like Ottoman Janissaries and Japanese Samurai’s denial of firearm
technologies. This can end with a strategic impotence which can easily evolve to technology
curse in a possible conflict or war.
Figure 3: A life cycle of a revolutionary military technology.
As we can see in this chart every military technology has life circle that first start
with a demand for military technology. This demand than met with research and
development efforts that made the technology possible, this process can only end with
doctrination of the technology to the related military fields which it can create opportunity
to bring political goals. Such kind of technology now can be called as a revolutionary
military technology. A RMT however, is prone to spread quickly to the potential rivals
or militaries due to its strategic impact. This unstoppable spread of technology end with
a strategic impotence where this RMT lost its revolutionary character and create a new
demand for a new technology.
We can see that technology is one of the key demand of the militaries from their
military-industry complex. However, every new technology brought its risks and dangers
with it. It is a double-edged sword due to its risk of technological curse or unstoppable
spread among these actors. It will continue in Fourth Industrial Revolution and its
affiliated technologies which can challenge both the American and its challenging rival
powers. If we have to underline a point it is clear that technological progress can be able
to manipulate friction but it can still dominate the battle field with enduring and well-
planned doctrine. (Watts, 1996)
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Backfiring of Scorched Earth Strategy Against Terror: War Against War
It can be senseless that counting America’s War on Terror as one of the challenge
that caused by the revolutionary military technologies. First problem, since terrorist have
less chance to reach technologies that can brought by Industry 4.0 and usually these
organizations were non-state actors that cannot compare with state-created conventional
forces. However, the story is a little bit different than reaching this conclusion. Since the
Global War on Terror was the only war that American military experienced since Iraqi
War, the challenge that caused from other powers like China and Russia started right after
the America’s failure to conduct and end this campaign with achieving its political
motives.
For 15 years from 2001 to 2016, the Global War on Terror costs to the United
States include 6,874 service members killed, 2.5 million Americans sent to fight, and an
estimated $4.4 trillion dollars spent. (Goepner, 2016) It was the last and latest almost-
total war that American conventional forces fought. In terms of conventional warfare,
American military succeeded its campaigns in Afghanistan and Iraq where it defeated the
al-Qaeda and ISIS in battlefield. Despite this conventional victory than what caused this
endless war and prevented the return of American military personnel to home. One of the
first problem were caused by the President Bush’s wrong doctrine on the War on Terror
which targeted protecting Americans, preventing terror attacks, defeating specific terror
groups, and diminishing the conditions that fuel terrorism through promoting democracy.
(Goepner, 2016) Since first three target were can see as traditional military objectives,
the following one was limitless political objectives that changed conventional warfare to
a COIN campaign.
As Mearsheimer and Stephan Walt underlined that the process after the Iraqi War
with lengthened campaign in the form of high U.S. casualties, significant civilian deaths,
a heightened risk of terrorism, or increased hatred of the United States in the Arab and
Islamic world can cause a war that the Bush administration chose to fight but did not have
to fight. (Rojecki, 2008) The War on Terror, despite the success of the American
conventional forces spilled over to a War on Minds with the spread of information
technologies that undermined the prestige of the American military.
Essentially, counter-terrorism measures demand a victory in the War of Ideas
which will go hand-to-hand with conventional war. In his article Antony J. Blinken
underlined the importance of creation of a marketplace of ideas where the United States
should deploy technology and trade as strategic weapons in the war to win hearts and
minds around the world. (Blinken, 2002) As Goepner noted the causes of terrorism are
unresolved, and the factors associated with it are often contested. (Goepner, 2016) This
contestation created incompetency between the mean and ends of this warfare and its
political goals.
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American use of new technologies with more autonomy and smaller scales created
a hope for American military to reduce the cost and rising the effectiveness of the strike
capabilities. Despite the President Bush’s democratic motives, this RMA damaged the
political goal of the warfare and attracted more negative attention to the United States due
to its prominence on the world’s stage, its declarations of support for human rights and
democratic freedoms, and rule-of-law issues, all which appear violated by such strikes.
(Kennedy, 2013) In Afghanistan – Pakistan border, some critics ask whether relying on
technological supremacy and drone attacks is helpful in these asymmetric engagements
but it might prove counterproductive by creating a ‘siege mentality’, with ‘public anger’
ultimately solidifying the power of the extremists, thus protracting the conflict rather than
bringing it to a swifter and less bloody end. (Sauer & Schörnig, 2016)
Opening of new mass media channels like Al-Jazeera and introduction of social
media networks created a fragmented, polarised, and opinionated coverage as outlets have
multiplied. (Gilboa, Jumbert, Miklian, & Robinson, 2016) This increased the range of
media available to actors trying to mobilise responses to a crisis, but decreasing the ability
of any one group to influence public and political awareness, precisely because of the
diffusion of media outlets and the fragmentation of audiences. (Gilboa, Jumbert, Miklian,
& Robinson, 2016) As we can see American conventional warfare with using more and
more incompetent conventional equipment started to conduct a war against the media in
global, local and non-conventional media terms.
The War on Terror show us that both spread of technologies and too much
emphasize on using new technologies can cause a military incompetency which could
lessen classical conventional power. As in Vietnam, in Afghanistan and Iraq, 54% of
American public opinion in 2013 supported that ‘the US should look its own way and
should let other states to look its own relations’. (Nye, 2015) In 2016, the Army chief of
staff General Mark A. Milley, said in his speech that; “Today, a major in the Army knows
nothing but fighting terrorists and guerrillas, because he came into the Army after 9/11
but as we get into the higher-end threats, our skills have atrophied over 15 years.” (The
New York Times, 2016)
This create a problem that in case of a super-power competition or possible
conventional warfare with advanced technologic weapons between these powers can
cause a defeat that world’s biggest conventional power cannot predict. Lengthening War
on Terror, cannot left on its own way however the risks that we underlined can harm
American conventional power more in incoming years. This will cause a problem for
American strategy makers who should develop a counter-terrorism doctrine that merge
the use of adequate level of technology and competent political – military goals. Without
this American military is tend to fall in a technological curse where its conduction of war
will undermine its political motives and international position against the terror.
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Social Media as New Battleground: Russia’s Hybrid War
In this two following cases we will focus on two examples that can create a Fog
of Technology which can challenge and harm American conventional forces. These two
strategies and technological advancement were produced after the US’s failure to use its
military capabilities to end the War on Terror in accordance with its political goals.
Hybrid War is a new concept that created by the Russia in its campaign against
Eastern Ukraine and Crimea. It is controversial that however some scholars called it as a
modified version of the concept of Information War concept. Russian Hybrid War
however distinguish in terms of ‘scale’, it gave nation-state the strategic capacity to use
a mix of hard and soft power instruments to isolate and coerce weaker neighbours, while
intimidating and deterring more distant and capable opponents. (Palmer, 2015)
Russia’s new military doctrine that published in 2015, claimed that ‘information
warfare’ (информационная война / informatsionnaya voyna ) means not so much for
change of conduct of war in theory, however, but it can affiliate with old methods like
sabotage, subversion, disinformation, state terror, manipulation and etc. (Giles, 2016)
This show us that despite the use and development of this new strategy by Russia, it is
primarily required the support of Russian conventional power for victory.
Despite the questions over its conduct, effectivity or its possible use for political
goals, its potential to disrupt targeted nations conventional forces make this new military
doctrine as one of the possible new military technology that can target American
conventional forces. Beside the old school information warfare, this new type used the
information technologies (IT) as its basic infrastructure to conduct. Development of
Internet technologies and increased use of social media helped Russian messages to
increase the visibility of the message with using automatically generated content and
spamming, using information environment and seizure of trending hashtags which make
the targeted audience vulnerable to the coercion and subversion. (Stratcom, 2016) This
can push us to a point of ‘contactless war’ where displays of ‘hard military power’ from
modern warfare, with ‘war’ becoming something fought ‘at arm’s length’ without the
need to engage with an adversary’s forces. (Thornton, 2015) This is one of the possible
threat that can it can bring against American conventional power.
This problem also come along with the danger of possible information warfare
that can be fought in the homeland and in the territories of the allies. Claims of American
election meddling by Russia in 2017 showed us that even the most conventionally
powerful country can be the target of such kind of hybrid warfare which is easier and
cheaper to conduct. It creates a fog of war that Clausewitz called in his book On War, war
in such kind of enormous amount of information and possible misinformation is almost
impossible to track and destroy by conventional forces. In Bosnian and Kosovan
Operations, American military targeted the Serbian state media HQs but such kind of
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information warfare conducted by the Russia in Western sourced IT platforms were
impossible to eliminate conventionally.
Second aspect of the Hybrid Warfare is its ability to use as targeting. Targeting is
one of the biggest risk that can be posed against American conventional forces. Social
Media can use for tracking and acquiring of key information about American
conventional forces. This can cause Western powers to ‘start thinking about security in a
much more ‘sophisticated way’ and ‘to craft a response as subtle as the onslaught’.
(Thornton, 2015)
Internet trolling is one of the problematic thing that can also create a fog of war
that can disrupt the information system between the public and military. Since the end of
the WWII, relationship between military and public is key to the continuation of the
warfare. In a lengthened warfare campaigns like COIN and other kind of costly wars can
disrupt the public will to the continuation of conventional warfare. The phenomenon of
imitating grass-roots actions using social media is known as ‘astroturfing’ but NATO’s
Strategic Communication Command of Excellence (STRATCOM) identified a new term
of ‘hybrid troll’ which is motivated to particular political and military agenda. (Stratcom,
2016)
Russian Chief of Staff General Valery Gerasimov said that; “the ‘rules of war’
have changed; thus, the Western powers must change their own rules and adopt a ‘new
thinking’ of their own. (Thornton, 2015) It is hard to conclude that Russian Hybrid
Warfare is capable enough to defeat American conventional power however it is clear
that war is spreading to a new space that impossible to answer solely by conventional
means. Russian Hybrid War Strategy or ‘Gerasimov Doctrine’ developed as an answer
for American military strategy that shown in Iraq, Afghanistan and Libya where official
war was never declared. It is a strategy that can operate both in peace and war time when
in a time where world is in ‘grey zone’ between war and peace. (Giles, 2016)
Many NATO strategists however claim that hybrid warfare cannot separate from
the conventional aspect of the war. They claim that Russian strategy were only tested
against the weaker states and in an area where NATO has a conventional force and
strategic depth gap where Russia located 300.000 troops and build-up of A2/AD
capabilities. (Tallis & Šimečka, 2016) These conventional strategists claim that Russian
hybrid threat can only be answered with better conventional balance in the European
continent.
It is clear that Russia’s current strategy lacks a clear, obvious path to victory,
absent escalation into a full-scale war with Ukraine. (Savage, 2018) It is still far from
testing against the real American or NATO’s allied conventional forces. However, it is
important to understand that Russia is one of the unique revisionist force that work for
using and indoctrination of technological developments for its political and militaristic
goals. It is still Russia’s conventional force that saved the separatist forces in 2014 as a
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result, conventional escalation, by proxies or direct intervention, remains central to
Russia’s unconventional warfare as Savage told in his article. (Savage, 2018)
However, Russian Hybrid Warfare is one of the most important example to
understand how technological advancements in IT field reduce the cost of the warfare in
its campaign against Eastern Ukraine and also in Crimea. Russia’s possible development
of its Industry 4.0 capabilities can help its military-industry complex to develop its Hybrid
Warfare capabilities further. But it is important to not to forget that Russian Hybrid
Warfare can spread to its rivals easily that can threaten also Russian interests and political
motives. So far, spread of hybrid warfare to non-state actors also can challenge the
powerful states and their conventional forces.
Hybrid Warfare is a one possible candidate for being a revolutionary military
technology with the use of IT technologies. However, until a full proof of it, it still has a
Fog of Technology inside it. It can both spread easily and also can create a strategic
impotence which should handicapped by the conventional military. Its disruptive effects
however can cause a technology curse to the parties who created it or subjected to it.
China’s War: China vs US in an Age of Industry 4.0
China is one of the most important and challenging rising power who is rival and
has a will to level American global power. This will, however, simply require China’s
ability to respond American conventional power. Despite this, China is reluctant to
challenge American power solely in conventional grounds. This situation not only caused
due to the American supremacy that showed after Iraqi War but also came from China’s
desire for soft power and continuation of its economic miracle which was highly
demanded foreign markets. Chinese strategic planners see American conventional power
as one of the example of world class military who are technologically advanced,
professional, and have an operationally capable fighting force and also they see the US
defence technologies as many years ahead of their own, despite impressive improvements
in China’s own military technology over the past two decades. (Chase, Garafola, &
Beauchamp-Mustafaga, 2018)
Since the Gulf and Iraqi War, Chinese military strategists worked on various
doctrines that can counter possible American conventional intervention in its region.
These campaigns classically defined as, ‘sea-line protection campaign’ as a defensive
campaign “waged to ensure the safety of, and free passage along sea lines.” (Chase,
Garafola, & Beauchamp-Mustafaga, 2018) When we see this strategy, Chinese military
planners mostly planned defensive campaigns near their shores or territories rather than
globally offensive and cross-border strikes. This limited war strategy however, started to
change with Xi Jinping’s rise on power and his emphasize over more pro-active China in
global affairs both in terms of hard and soft power. This process led us to a maintaining
its military advantage in an era of rapid technological change, and preserving deterrence
15
against growing Chinese ambitions in the region. (Chase, Garafola, & Beauchamp-
Mustafaga, 2018)
China with its improving Fourth Industrial Revolution capabilities, with its
projects like Made in China 2025 Initiative, become one of the main challenger of the
American conventional force. When it compared to the other technological developments,
artificial intelligence is a domain where China can level American military technological
developments when it compared to cyber, seaborne, airborne, space, information and
ground warfare capabilities. China can push the US military to arms race that pushed by
a country who is other than US itself. This can harm American conventional forces
reputation as ‘technological leader who creates trends’. For this reason, we have to focus
on China due to its primacy to challenge the US with its military-industry, economic and
technological challenges who can create a Fog of Technology to American conventional
military.
In 2017, China issued the New Generation Artificial Intelligence Development
Plan (AIDP / (新一代人工智能发 展规划) where underlined the words of; “AI has
become a new focus of international competition. AI is a strategic technology that will
lead in the future; the world’s major developed countries are taking the development of
AI as a major strategy to enhance national competitiveness and protect national security.”
(Allen, 2019)
While China was working on a building up an AI industry of 1 trillion RMB (about
$150 billion) by 2030, this industry will try to create a strategy of a civil – military fusion.
(Horowitz, Allen, Kania, & Scharre, 2018) Chinese People’s Liberation Army (PLA),
since 1990, focused on exploiting potential American vulnerabilities and undermining its
advantages, with this focus they try to adapt a shift in revolutionary military technology
from today’s “informatized” (信息化) warfare to future “intelligentized” (智能化)
warfare. (Kania, 2019) However, we have to ask the question of where Chinese military
want to use its AI technology as a military doctrine.
Many military planners think AI is more akin to electricity, radios, radar and
C4ISR systems, than a “weapon” per se. (Johnson, 2019) However, PLA in 2011
announced a project for “AI weapon” (人工智能武器) as “a weapon that utilizes AI to
pursue, distinguish, and destroy enemy targets automatically (自动); often composed of
information collection and management systems, knowledge base systems, decision
assistance systems, mission implementation systems, etc. (Kania, 2019) As we can see
China focused on developing a weapon which can create a revolution in battlefield that
can threaten American conventional forces. This is clear that what China is searching is
a tool that can create political goal.
The greatest risk that can harm American conventional power is the continuous
development and application of AI weapons could, theoretically, erode the foundation of
16
strategic deterrence between China and the United States which can led to a lower
threshold of war between parties. (Zhu & Long, 2019) The ramification of the AI
technologies within the Chinese military can led to a ‘technological shock’ to the
American military in Asian theatre. This is a clearly fog of technology that can harm
American decision-making and war fighting capability. As Michael C. Horowitz noted
development of AI technologies will change the structure of militaries with its ability to
make war faster in terms of conduct making it more complex with the help of the
algorithms. (Horowitz, 2018) However, as we witnessed before, speed and complex
operations were harder to conduct to human-led militaries and can cause a planning and
conducting mismatch which can end with a fog of war and following technology curse
where militaries fail to take their political goals.
Since Chinese works on artificial intelligence continues with more monies that
spend and more scholarly research when it compared to the United States. (Horowitz,
2018) The US military does not currently have a structured national strategy for how to
approach artificial intelligence. (Horowitz, Allen, Kania, & Scharre, 2018) It was
generally driven by the contracts that American military made with private firms like the
Apple, Google and Amazon. Unlike China, in the US military-industry complex and
private firms direct the process of technological development of the AI capabilities. This
can end with an alienation of American conventional forces from newly acknowledged
technologies. This can end with a possible spending spree that end with a technology that
the US military never learned how to use it conventionally. For 2020, the US Defence
Department requested $268 million under the draft federal budget for the fiscal year that
began Oct. 1, roughly triple the figure from the previous year. (Nikkei Asian Review,
2019) When we look to the trends like, Russian technical university who signs a public-
private deal with Chinese Huawei to develop AI technologies (Defense One, 2019), the
US is pushed to spending spree which can end with a budgetary cuts from classical
conventional forces which can also end with a problem of ill-preparedness of already
existing US forces.
Since American Government and military understand the importance of the
artificial intelligence in recent years. As the US Congressional Report mentioned there
are two possible effects of the AI over the American war fighting capacity;
1) Minimal Impact where AI’s risks can be more than its benefits;
2) Evolutionary Impact where it can be a disruptive technology that can change the
conduct of war but also which can be “less uncertain and more controllable” with not
being subjected to the human errors;
3) Revolutionary Impact which can become a seismic shift on the field of battle and
fundamentally transform the way war is waged where it become able to facilitate
information superiority and “purge combat of uncertainty” will be a decisive wartime
advantage, enabling faster and higher-quality decisions. (Hoadley & Lucas, 2018)
17
As we see American conventional forces has to adapt in three conditions before
facing with Chinese AI capacity. The possible incoming war between China and the US
will on ‘shock warfare’ where one party will shock and intimidate the other party that put
it immobilised. (Fitzsimonds, 1995) Kenneth Waltz argued that emulation of military
technologies happens quickly, however, subsequent research demonstrates that it is far
more complicated that the country that first implements will have a sustainable edge over
its competitors. (Horowitz, 2018)
The question is whether the US can be the first country that who will adopt a new
technology with most suitable doctrine as happened until now. This will need to answer
three questions whether the American military can know enough about the enemy;
whether can it become fast enough to counter them and whether how good America can
afford it. (Fitzsimonds, 1995) It is too dangerous that America’s inability to answer one
of these questions can end with a strategic impotence which can harm American
conventional power consequently.
It is not clear that whether China can develop its AI capacity and strategy fast
enough to challenge and even surpass the American conventional power. Since it is still
unclear that China’s over-state and economic boom depended military renovation can
absorb and let AI revolution to be happen. A possible disruption of Chinese economic
miracle, failure of Chinese state-financed companies to develop necessary capabilities in
enough time and possibility of PLA’s right indoctrination of the AI technologies were
one of the most important Fog of Technology that China can face.
It is clear that, however, same conditions were also applicable to the American
conventional power who even could not developed a necessary National AI Strategy
which will made them vulnerable to the what its military-industry complex that can
provide. It is clear that he rapid development of AI brings unknown prospects to mankind
and adds new uncertainties to international politics and Sino–US relations. (Zhu & Long,
2019) But we could not know how much this situation will effect which side until the first
usage of it in an actual battlefield, this show us that even how a technology is brilliant,
fog of technology as a part of the fog of war is undeniable part of the warfare. Since it
was a human activity, whether which parties use is not important, war is still
unpredictable and hard to control and this is the one of the biggest danger that even
world’s strongest conventional force can suffer.
US’s Response: Conservatives, Reformists and Futurists
Since Fog of Technology, like Fog of War, is inevitable due to the nature of the
warfare, the US conventional forces now focusing on three strategies that can solve the
problem with various views. It is important to understand that these three categories were
not solid and concrete categories that officially announced and with strict boundaries and
lines. It was a draft categorization of different views of how American conventional
power can simply deter or avoid from a ‘technological curse’.
18
The first group was the Conservative minded people who serve within or for the
American military. Conservatism, in military means, a group of people with military
minds and who employed ‘conservative Realism’ as a prospect for disciplined
organizations which rarely place a high value on new and untried ideas, concepts and
innovations. (Hill, 2015) As we can see in the example of the NATO Strategist’s
advocacies for improving the Alliance’s conventional capabilities for countering Russian
Hybrid War tactics is a simple example of military conservatism. It is simply possible
that Russian and Chinese efforts for creation of a new strategy can countered by the use
of classical conventional military means. An established sea control over the Arctic Ocean
or locating a firepower in Eastern Europe against Russia or as Andrew Krepinevich’s
strategy of Archipelagic Defence in China’s coastal waters (Krepinevich, Archipelagic
Defense, 2017) can coerce and deter China from having new strategies that can create a
Fog of Technology for American military. Simply, ‘timing’ is essential in using classical
conventional power against a new technology.
Once a new technology developed and spread in the military flanks, strategic
impotence and following technology curse is inevitable that made conventional victory
almost impossible without huge loss. Conservatism is problematic that however, any kind
of applied pressure over an enemy can easily retaliate to a full scale conflict or an arms-
race that can even make the development of new technologies even faster. For this reason,
if it is not the time of conventional response, demanding a new technology that can change
the battlefield is a key to survive. As British Navy’s rejection of submarine and tank in
the WWII or Ottoman Janissaries and Japanese Samurai’s rejection of fire arms show us
that conservative military thinking can easily be the source of Fog of Technology as it
may also become a solution of it.
Second group was the reformists who usually aligned themselves with the military
– industry complex and politicians. This group simply want to adopt every new
technology that can help the American conventional power to keep its primacy in a
challenging world. Simply this group focus on;
1) Education: Where the American military officers have to be ready for the future
of the warfare with frequent and qualified education over technologies and their
prospects.
2) Training: Beside from theoretical education, American military officers also have
to be trained for overcoming the Fog of Technology and for improving their ability
to take decisions in a war fog.
3) Doctrine: Since military – industry complex provide technologies US strategist
have to develop adequate military doctrines that will help these technologies to
achieve political objectives of the warfare.
4) Experience: American military have to use these weapon and technology systems
both in peace and war times for furthering its experience and sophistication over
them. (Tanner, 2018)
19
As we can see this group is dominant in American military that since the WWII,
American military is one of the unique power that opened itself for all new technologies.
However, the current doctrine and notion of conventionality of US military show us that
they are in lengthened and endless wars with incompatible political – military goals and
technological developments. Simply, the military – industry complex goes faster and gave
what they want to the military rather than what they demand which cause problem of
indoctrination. Complex technologies without doctrines or a simply spending spree is
current problem that the US face as fog of technology due to the Reformist’s agendas.
Thirdly and the last group was the Futurists, as in my naming. This group usually
believe in the continuation of the American Century or Pax-Americana at least until the
mid-21st Century. Their assumption of Pax-Americana depends upon their reliance on the
belief of American style of war, simply a war that be fought in the space. In his book,
George Friedman claimed that, the 21st Century will be the American Century with its
advanced capabilities in space warfare and reconnaissance technologies. (Friedman,
2015) American Anti-Satellite Warfare (ASAT) can blindfold its enemies and can over-
ride fog of war. Strategic Defence Initiative that created by the Ronald Reagan
Government, were seemed as a way of deterrence that can disrupt the Cold War balance.
However, it was seemed impossible due to its slowness and high budgetary costs that also
end with the collapse of the USSR.
Despite the collapse of the USSR, Pentagon and American politicians continued
to support the Star Wars Project in terms of smaller amounts and scales. In 2011, Pentagon
requested 9,9 billion$ for anti-ICBM technologies. (McCartney & McCartney, 2017) US
President Donald Trump’s decision to create a separate ‘Space Command’ is a sign that
US still not gave up the space race with its rivals. Use of new technologies like AI, IT
and others can strengthen the US conventional forces with the backing of solely American
dominated military domain.
However, it is still problematic that space is hostile in nature; yet, ubiquitous
within all other domains. (Westphall, 2015) This hostility shows us that, space deterrence
presents a new challenge — that of defining what deterrence in the space domain looks
like and how it might prevent conventional conflicts from starting in, or extending to,
space. (Boyce, 2019) It is purely about defining what space control means to the US; if it
is use of ASATs we can easily assume that US Space Power will be lack to contribute to
conventional forces in terms of fire power and it will be prone to risk of spreading of
these ASAT technologies; if it means the use of space weapons like in the SDI program
it is one of the hardest challenge that American military see due to its costs and hardness
to develop. Simply, without a clear understanding of what space warfare may contribute
towards, discussions regarding the strategic implications of space weapons (including
Earth and space-based kinds) will remain in a political vacuum, devoid of meaning and
insight for war plans that are focused on achieving political objectives on Earth. (Bowen,
2017)
20
As a result, America’s hopes on being an exceptional party in space domain is
highly problematic due to humanity’s inability to control it. Like all, other three military
cultures, those who advocate space domain as the one which can help American
conventional warfare, is far from projecting what outer space can bring and take from
already existing power share. This can lead us to again a spending spree with enormous
amounts in an age where the US lost its enormous economic growth. Space, like war’s all
domains is full of fog of war and fog of technology.
Figure 4: How to create a successful conventional warfare in an emerging multi-polarity.
This show us that the US military is still far from having an adequate conventional
strategy that can kept its military supremacy. It is key to understand that a successful
American conventional military need a well-planned symmetrical warfare with the
adequate use of conventional operations, strategic bombing, reconnaissance operations
and amphibic – airborne operation capabilities. It should also merge with asymmetrical
warfare capabilities of ability to conduct proxy wars, COIN operations, special targeting
missions, cyber wars and counter-terrorism operations.
These two warfare capabilities should develop hand-to hand with research and
development efforts. Development of industry 4.0 capabilities and special doctrines for
them that can address Russian and Chinese challenge. It is key that American military –
industry complex, Pentagon and political figures should work together for creating
working military doctrines to overcome the Fog of Technology. The only prospect for the
American conventional power in an age of emerging multi-polarity is to create well-
defined political goals that military can take it as guidance point. With-out this it is the
simply the political nature of the warfare that will defeat a super-power rather than solely
being defeated by its rivals.
21
Conclusion
In this article I tried to explain the possible risk and dangers that American
conventional power can face from its enemies and rivals. Since the Iraqi War and
extended the Global War on Terror, American conventional power faced a stagnation that
damaged and challenged its global prestige. Lengthened war processes, on-going COIN
operations with-out well defined and confusing political goals and military means show
us that the world’s strongest conventional forces have some problems.
Looking hand-to hand with these problems we simply focussed on the concepts
of Fog of Technology, which is an under branch of the Fog of War concept. It is clear
that lengthening wars and rising human and budgetary costs pushed the US military –
industry complex to create as much as technologies that can change the conduct of
warfare. This simply ended with, unstoppable spread of military technologies to the
rivals, risk of wrong indoctrinations and problems of absorbing capacity of the military
of the newly adopted technologies and budgetary deficits that can cause problems for the
American conventional forces which can led to a strategic impotence which can also led
to a technology curse, a concept that can even be a nightmare for the world’s biggest
military power.
Russian use of Hybrid Warfare and China’s quest to defeat the US in artificial
intelligence technologies show us that how American conventional power become more
and more challengeable. It is clear that warfare is evolving to a new phase with the
development of revolutionary military technologies. This show us that the characteristics
of the future battlefield are not predestined, but rather will depend upon specific choices
that we [the US] and other nations will be making from an expanding array of
technological, operational, and organizational options. (Fitzsimonds, 1995) It will again
be the Fog of Technology and Fog of War that will change the conduct of war.
It is clear that there is no adequate way to know how to use the new technologies
in the best way with-out using them in an actual battlefield or simply it is also impossible
to ignore the technological developments due to the its risk of creation of a strategic
impotence. It will be clear that the most challenging rivalry to the American conventional
military will be come from the war itself as being a human activity that done by the
humans for the political goals that again defined by humans itself. It is not solely will be
China or Russia or any other actor that will defeat the US conventionally but the
combination of a nature of the warfare and a rising rival that will defeat it. Simply, as a
last word it is important to understand that in a war nothing and no one is evil, but
everything is unintentionally evil.
22
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