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White Water Navy: Defining a Naval Task Force for Geopolitical ‘Cold’-Spots
Nobuhide Mert Matsumoto
Marmara Üniversitesi / İletişim Fakültesi – Gazetecilik / Siyasal Bilgiler Fakültesi –
Siyasal Bilimler ve Uluslararası İlişkiler İngilizce
Abstract
Acceleration of the global climate change caused a fastened process of polar ice
cap melting. This made the Arctic Sea or the Arctic Ocean as a new potential geopolitical
hot-spot for great power competition. Despite being geopolitically hot-spot, Arctic is still
a cold-spot for conducting naval operations even the rise of temperatures. This requires a
new military task-force in-between a Blue Water Navy and Green Water Navy but with
entirely different features and capabilities. This article will briefly introduce the concept
of the White Water Navy and what motivates great powers to achieve one of them. It will
also underline the current developments in creating a White Water Navy and on its
problematic features.
Key Words: War, Arctic Region, Navy, Polar Strategy, Security, Geopolitics
Beyaz Deniz Donanması: Jeopolitik ‘Soğuk’ Noktalar için Bir Deniz Görev
Gücünün Tanımlanması
Özet
İklim değişikliği sürecinin hızlanmasıyla buzullarda ki erimede yaşanan artışın da
hızlanmasına yol açtı. Bu durum Arktik Denizi veya Arktik Okyanusu’nun süper güç
yarışı için bir potansiyel sıcak nokta olma ihtimalini ortaya çıkardı. Jeopolitik olarak
‘sıcak nokta’ olmasına ve hava sıcaklıklarının yükselmesine rağmen Arktik bölgesi
donanma operasyonları için hala bir soğuk nokta olmayı sürdürüyor. Bu durum Mavi
Deniz Donanması ve Yeşil Deniz Donanmasının ortasında yer alan, ancak tamamen farklı
özelliklere ve yeteneklere sahip, yeni bir deniz görev gücünün kurulmasını zorunlu
kılıyor. Bu makale, Beyaz Deniz Donanması kavramını açıklarken, neden süper güçlerin
buna sahip olmak istediğini de açıklamak istiyor. Makale aynı zamanda bir Beyaz Deniz
Donanması kurma yolunda atılan adımları ve buna engel olabilecek nedenleri de
aydınlatmak istiyor.
Anahtar Kelimeler: Savaş, Donanma, Arktik Bölgesi, Kutup Stratejisi, Güvenlik,
Jeopolitik
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Introduction
Since the acceleration of the climate-related problems and warming, water and air
temperatures, started to melt in a faster way. This problem brings new surrounding
geopolitical problems due to rising economic activities and commercial sea routes.
Current water temperatures in the Arctic exceeded more than 0.5°C/1°F when compared
with the 20th Century temperatures. (Huebert, Exner-Pirot, Lajeunesse, & Gulledge,
2012) This process followed by rising economic interactions like drilling for oil and
natural gas resources or establishing polar sea routes like The Great Northern Passage.
As human history shows, since if there would be an economic interaction, military build-
up would follow.
This article will focus on defining a White Water Navy, which will have to be
organised for establishing a successful Arctic sea control. As being a mostly, sea
dominated territory Arctic region requires naval planning more than other domains. It
will be clear that heightened tensions in the Arctic region could help naval forces to re-
attain its position in the military planning of Arctic states.
John Keegan put forward in his book ‘A History of Warfare’ that, the war was
always limited throughout history due to geographical constraints, where regions like
Antarctica and Arctic were usually named as civilian regions of the world where a war
has not occurred.’ (Keegan, 2019) However, current developments show us that the on-
going climate crisis has the potential to militarize the region of Arctic this put us to a
position where combined military build-up that capable to operate mild-harsh
environment is key in near future.
The first part of this article will continue on the question of ‘why we need a White
Water Navy (WWN)?’. This part will focus mainly on the changes that occurred in the
Arctic region. These changes will be based on four categories; the first one was the
environmental ones; the latter one will be economic ones; the third one will be political
and diplomatic reasons and the last one will be on strategic or militaristic reasons. This
part will simply focus on introducing why ‘Arctic Eight’ (the United States, Russia,
Canada, Denmark, Finland, Iceland, Norway, and Sweden) and non-circumpolar states
like China increased their ambitions on the region. (Rainwater, 2013)
The second part of this article, will focus on defining ‘what is a WWN?’. This
question will be based on the classical definition of naval strategies and doctrines. As
A.T. Mahan argued, a naval power should develop sea domination, which means a party
should have total-control over a sea for its own use also means that no one could access
it with-out prior notification. (Kane & Lonsdale, 2016) But Bernard Brodie argued that
‘sea domination’, which is not possible, it could mean a ‘sea control’. (Brodie, 2011) As
Kane and Lonsdale argued ‘sea control’ is a less certain version of sea domination in
terms of time and place. (Kane & Lonsdale, 2016) This part will answer the question of
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defining whether WWN is sea-domination or sea-control strategy by comparing it with
the Blue Water Navy and Green Water Navy.
The third part will deal with a more technical question which is ‘how to develop
a WWN?’. As the US Navy’s Arctic Strategy defines operating in the Arctic requires new
necessary capabilities, strategy, policy, plans, and requirements. (US Navy, 2014) We
will try to define these requirements from the perspective of Bernard Brodie. As in
modern warfare, with-out unifying an air and missile technology, it is impossible to
establish and sustain a sea-control with solely focusing on naval forces. (Brodie, 2011)
These technical questions also could help to understand which actors could successfully
develop a WWN that could maintain a sea-control in the Arctic.
The following part will evaluate existing developments on the building of a WWN
of three Arctic states (the US, Russia, and Canada) and a non-circumpolar state (China).
The reason why I choose these states were due both the US and Russia had an ambition
of having a Blue Water Navy and they are primary powers in Arctic strategy. While in
the case of Canada it is a moderate power with a Green Water Navy with littoral sea
control ambitions. The last case of China, which is the most important and striking one,
not only because of being a rising global power but because of being subjected most to
Brodie’s hardships of sea control. In this article, we will see that establishing a WWN for
China is highly hard due to political reasons rather than economic or military ones.
The last part will focus on the risks and problems of developing a White Water
Navy in the Arctic region. Just like in the first part, in this part, the article will focus on
four categories that problems and risks can occur. White Water Navies could have
significant impacts on environmental problems, economic life, political - diplomatic
relations, and strategic – militaristic balances and paradigms in the Arctic region.
Just like every military build-up, building a White Water Navy is not the desired
action but inevitability if necessary political steps could not be taken. Defining High-
North as a ‘globalized space’ like Antarctica could help for scientific research could help
to overcome the geopolitical problems. (Heininen, 2011) But as you would see in the
upcoming sovereign status in the Arctic and the climate change will make it unlikely. A
White Water Navy is unavoidable when we look to the current status and developments
in the Arctic region.
Why we need a WWN?
Before defining a White Water Navy, we have to look at the main conditions that
require an entirely new naval force. For understanding this situation, we have to go
deeper, in four categories of environment, economy, politics and diplomacy, and military.
These four reasons were the main ones that also used by other scholars who work on
Arctic politics and also by the US Navy and other naval powers like Russia, Canada,
China and etc.
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For a start, we have to look for environmental issues. As we told, John Keegan
argued that the Arctic is a civilian zone due to its environmental and geographic
characteristics. Over history, the Arctic climate known as cold, windy, permafrost, and
24-hour winter darkness which combined with sea ice cap that surrounds sea between the
Barents Sea and Bering Strait. (Åtland, 2010) Despite this situation, human military
activity sustained with frequent nuclear submarine patrols and nuclear bomber squadron
patrols, which are limited in their nature. The main air, sea, and land warfare components
of states were still aimed at classical battlegrounds around warmer and shallow waters of
continental Europe and the Americas as Keegan argued. (Keegan, 2019)
Since the 1880s, temperatures had risen between 0.8°C – 1.5°C due to climate
change while in the Arctic region the change was more drastic because of its darker land
and ocean surfaces that absorb solar light more. (Titley & John, 2010) This resulted in a
higher and faster ice-cap melting. Estimates show that from 2013 to 2030 the Arctic
region will partly be free from ice-caps while also in 2060 it will entirely be free from
summer ice. (Titley & John, 2010) This shows us the changing conditions for naval
accessibility of the Arctic region both from commercial ships and military ones. As US
Navy predicts, the Bering Strait will see 160 accessible days per year, with excisable 35-
40 days and The Great Northern Sea Route could see 30 days in 2020 while in 2030 it
could be lengthened to 50-60 days with delays. (US Navy, 2014)
Rapid environmental changes in unfriendly conditions could create further
economic changes in the Arctic region. As we will see changes in the environment could
lead to chain reactions that will also provide changes in economic, political, and
militaristic conditions in the Far-North. Generally, the Arctic economy is usually
affiliated with indigenous communities like Sami, Inuit, and other people who are
sustaining their lives with fishery and reindeer cultivation. Natural resource exploitation
in the Arctic region remained highly limited due to the costs of production that arisen
from special demands on technology, equipment, and routines. (Åtland, 2010)
Again estimates show that 10 percent of the world’s known petroleum reserves
and approximately 25 percent of its undiscovered reserves are contained under the Arctic
region. (Titley & John, 2010) Russia is one of the key countries that holds the biggest
stake in the Arctic oil, with the %60, that located on the continental shelves of the Sea of
Kara and Barents. (Antrim, 2010) This makes Russia one of the most assertive power in
the region who wants to achieve sea-control power. Meanwhile, the US, invested for 2,6
billion$, to research and extract oil and natural gas in the Chukchi Sea which is in-
between Russia. (Titley & John, 2010)
In 2019, Russia announced that ‘it will seek to encourage its gas deliveries from
the Yamal Peninsula’ where is located in the Arctic region while %25 of its stakes were
owned by a Chinese company. (The Moscow Times, 2019) While not only in the Yamal
Peninsula, China sees the Arctic as a potential to overcome its resource or energy stress.
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As A. T. Mahan argued ‘the ability to protect commerce by engaging naval forces in
decisive battle has always been a determining factor in world history.’ (Rainwater, 2013)
It is clear that as Mahan argued, China seeks a sea-control for securing its energy
resources, and the Arctic is one opportunity for both importing and commercializing that
energy with-out the risk of interference in Strait of Hurmuz or Malacca. 2008 Defence
White Paper also underlined the importance of a ‘far-sea’ defence concept which is more
likely to sea control notion with a large Blue Water Navy. (Rainwater, 2013)
For this reason, China introduced its own concept of Polar Silk Road, with high
ice-capable ships that can transfer the liquefied natural gas shipments which will end in
the Chinese market. While the Great Northern Sea Route was already being used by heavy
Arktika class and two of the shallow-draft Taymyr class ice breakers, while also since
2009, Russian Norilsk Nickel MMC is using its own fleet in the Arctic region. (Antrim,
2010) Again in 2019, Danish logistic firm Maersk signed a deal for searching the transfer
of more goods with Russia via Northern Sea Route. (Reuters, 2019) Despite these
developments, however, the US navy did not predict a huge amount of commercial
shipping will shift to this route, between 2020 to 2030 less than 2 percent of global
maritime traffic will be done from this route. (US Navy, 2014)
The process of commercialization and industrialization of the Arctic region will
inevitably push further politicization of the region between both Arctic states and non-
circumpolar states. Not like Antarctica, where is protected by a Treaty of Antarctica that
signed in 1961, the Arctic region is under the full sovereignty of Arctic states. However,
the region was organised an Arctic Council, for solving common scientific problems and
creating cooperative relations within and beyond the region. These attempts, however,
fell short due that the organisation itself was focused on capacity building and fact-finding
rather than solving and mitigating politically contested issues related to the regulation of
economic or military activity in the region. (Stokke, 2007)
The political landscape in the Arctic is highly contested due to the narrow
continental shores of the region which cause a problem of overlapping and contested
continental shelves and territorial waters. As having longest shores in the region, Russia,
self-proclaimed itself as the true ‘Arctic state’ and intends to take control of a shelf area
of some 1.2 million square kilometres between the outer limit of the country’s 200-mile
economic zone. (Åtland, 2010) This could lead to more inter-polar state tensions which
can make the Arctic Ocean as the northern equivalent of South China Sea.
Russia, Canada, and Denmark proclaim the Lomonosov Ridge as their own parts
of the Arctic continental shelf while both Canada and Denmark also increased their
military build-up’s in the region. (Åtland, 2010) Not only, these countries Russia had
some problems with Norway, where increased Russian naval presence in the region and
Russian commercial shipping creates tensions in the region. 30 November 2018, the US,
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protested the Russian LNG shipments through the Norwegian ports and waters. (Reuters,
2018)
Also, a non-polar or non-circumpolar state China, want to take more place in
Arctic political great-game. China, self-proclaim itself as a ‘Near-Arctic state’, and
underline the importance of cooperation over confrontation over the Arctic region.
(Rainwater, 2013) This shows us that, China, is a status-quo country that defends its own
way of freedom of navigation in the Arctic Ocean. For this reason, it establishes
constructive relations with lesser powers like Greenland and Norway. Chinese rear
admiral Yin Zhuo vocalized that “the Arctic belongs to all the people around the world
as no nation has sovereignty over it.” (Rainwater, 2013) It is clear that China’s approach
shows us that as being an emerging great power, it concerns heavily that Arctic states will
take the high stake while they could take nothing. (Rainwater, 2013)
For the last step of the chain reaction, we will focus on changing military and
strategic dynamics. The Arctic has attracted the attention of strategy planners due to its
extreme and deserted nature. This courage the bipolar superpowers, the US, and the
USSR, to develop their monitoring activities under the context of nuclear deterrence.
(Huebert, Exner-Pirot, Lajeunesse, & Gulledge, 2012) In the post-Cold War environment,
the USSR leader, Mikhail Gorbachev launched a series of Arctic co-operation initiatives
that tied together with a wide array of security, economic, environmental, and other
issues. (Åtland, 2010)
These efforts, however, fell short after the restart of rivalries between the US and
Russia since 2014. Russia re-located its military presence in the region while it also re-
activated its military bases in the polar circle. Russia deployed Sopka-2 radars, Bastion-
P, and Pantsir-S1 systems to Kotelny Island and Novaya Zemlya. (Melino & Conley,
2020) What makes these developments important that all of those systems are anti-
access/area-denial (A2/AD) systems that target ground-to-sea and ground-to-air assets.
This shows us that the Russian strategy in the Arctic also focuses on the sea-control
notion.
In 2008-2009, Russia deployed heavy nuclear-powered missile cruisers, the
Admiral Lazarev, the Admiral Nakhimov, and the Admiral Ushakov to the Northern
Fleet. (Heininen, Sergunin, & Yarovoy, 2014) While also, the US Navy, planned to
improve its capabilities by participating in increasingly complex exercises and training
with regional partners. (US Navy, 2014) This shows us that, there is an increasing build-
up in the region.
But this not show us that whether both parties have enough capabilities to operate
a White Water Navy that can establish sea-control in the Arctic region. Despite the
changing climate and environment of the Arctic, it is still geographically hostile region,
with specific hardships and issues. This means existing naval task forces will fell-short in
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these hardships. In the next part, we will see what is a White Water Navy and how it
differs from Blue and Green Water ones.
What is the White Water Navy?
What we define as a White Water Navy is different when compared with the Green
and Blue Water ones. For two decades, the US Navy enjoyed global sea control with its
highly capable open sea ships and bases that host them around the globe. (Rubel, 2010)
But operating in the Arctic region requires, different kind of watercolour, which can be
capable to attain a sea-control in all-hostile geography. An ideal WWN should be between
a Blue Water Navy and a Green Water Navy and could be consist of ice-going ships.
For defining a White Water Navy, we have to conceptualize the Blue and Green
ones first, then we have to define what an Arctic sea-control can mean? A Blue Water
Navy, which is an oceangoing and capable of more than purely littoral operations. (Rubel,
2010) It usually affiliated with the 19th Century Royal Navy of Britain and post-WWII
US Navy who have extensive reach to global high seas and oceans. A Blue Water Navy,
usually affiliated with the nuclear aircraft carriers and nuclear submarines, whose fuel
capabilities have a far great reach when compared with the conventional ones. These
navies are not only naval formations that not only relying on defensive firepower and
electronic countermeasures but also manoeuvre to defeat attacks. (Rubel, 2010)
While a Green Water Navy is less capable when compared to the Blue Water ones.
A GWN is oceanic littoral ships that have capabilities of hiding, deception, counter-
targeting, ambushing, and also, conversely, reconnaissance, targeting, and
communicating. (Rubel, 2010) It is smaller and contains less high-value units and mostly
focussed on littoral sea-control based on the principle of anti-access/area-denial (A2/AD)
capability. Simply, the Chinese and Russian Navy can be categorized as GWNs. Both
countries, despite their efforts to be a BWN, mostly focus on limiting the global reach of
the US Navy in their sphere of influence. But being a Blue Water Navy does not differ
from being a Green Water Navy, the US Navy, also has a capacity to operate in its oceanic
littoral waters while also having the ability to navigating beyond them.
So a White Water Navy is also both require a Green Water Navy and a Blue Water
Navy capacity for achieving an excessive sea-control in the Arctic region. A WWN
should have high-value units, which are nuclear-icebreakers underlines its main
difference from a Blue Water Navy. A White Water Navy also has to have the ocean-
going capacity for controlling the High-North while also team-up with building A2/AD
capacity. This shows us that a White Water Navy, would have nation-specific
characteristics but which will at the same time having similar features.
For this reason, we have to define a sea-control understanding of the Arctic region.
As we mentioned earlier, sea-control means using the seas and oceans for your own
interests while also limits the others’ use. It contains blockade, local sea-control, air-sea
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control, commerce raiding, delaying, disrupting, denying, and demoralizing as its tool for
achieving it. (Rubel, 2010) It all remains the same for the Arctic region.
While A.T Mahan underlined that geographical location, environmental
conditions, size of the area, population, character of people, and character of governments
are some important factors that can affect establishing a sea-control. (Mahan, 2013) For
understanding a sea-control in the Arctic region we will look for the geographical
location, environmental conditions, size of the area, and character of governments for
understanding Arctic sea-control.
Geographically, the Arctic is an important region with increasing
commercialization trends. It hosts the Northern Sea Route while also being an energy-
hub especially for the Asia. As A. T. Mahan argued expanding maritime commerce and
the associated growth of navies led to the acquisition of secure bases along the major
trade routes. (Blunden, 2010) Not only being economically important, geopolitically it is
important as it was the High-North of the Earth and take an important part in world
politics. As we see, even non-Arctic states like China, India, and Japan wants to take more
part in regional dynamics Also, historically, it can be considered as an inner-water
between two super-power the US and Russia. This made sea-control important for both
two countries and for their military postures in the region.
As we mentioned earlier, the Arctic is an unfriendly region, for sustaining
militaristic practices. It contains permafrost conditions, ice-cap coverage, 24-hour winter,
and harsh water-air conditions. A sea-control in the Arctic requires not only summertime
navies but also winter navies that powered by high-class nuclear icebreakers. As we see
the Russian Northern Fleet is supposed to be an ‘Arctic fleet’, but the problem is that the
majority of its assets are not Arctic-specific, operating beyond the region and in other
strategic directions. (Boulègue, 2019) This shows us the importance of a White Water
Navy for achieving a sea-control in the region.
Arctic Ocean or Sea, when it compared to the other high-seas, is highly narrow
and split-off between territorial waters and continental shelves among the circumpolar
states. This shows us that territorial disputes and effective sea-control in the Arctic is
highly hard due to this reason. A. T. Mahan argues that what is crucial for countries’ naval
forces is not its territories but its shores to a sea and ports located along with it. (Mahan,
2013) For this reason, Russia has a strategic advantage when compared to the other Arctic
states, which courage Moscow to declare itself as Arctic’s exceptional state. Also from
geopolitical lenses, some strategists argued that a more navigable Arctic can mean better
access to Russian inland river systems but also a new window for accessing high-seas of
the world. (Antrim, 2010)
For the last criterion, we will look to the character of governments of circumpolar
Arctic states and a non-circumpolar Arctic state (China). According to Mahan,
government types, ideologies, and institutions can have a significant effect on naval
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policies. (Mahan, 2013) This is the primary reason why different countries, could need
and organize different White Water Navies. As a first example, we will take the US,
which already has a significant Blue Water Navy. For understanding an American type
of WWN we have to analyse the goals of the US Navy in the Arctic region. The US Navy
could face problems if they will insist on relying on a BWN in the Arctic which is not
capable enough to drive American interests. The US Navy set maritime security, sea-
control, power projection, freedom of navigation as its basic Arctic strategy objectives.
(US Navy, 2014) These objectives show that a total Russian sea-control in the Russian
Arctic could harm the US naval power in the region. Again the US Arctic strategy
underlines that the Navy may employ ice-strengthened Military Sealift Command (MSC)
ships to conduct Navy missions while preparing new operational risk assessments. (US
Navy, 2014) But also the US Navy is planning to employ its Blue Water Surface Navy
with its ice-capable fleet, which underlines that the US WWN will be a combination of a
Green and Blue Water Navy.
While Russia prefers more regional sea-control especially within the Russian
Arctic continental shelf, territorial waters, and their access points. Interaction between the
Russian petroleum industry and the Northern Fleet has reached a point of an emerging
strategic partnership, where fleet also leases its port facilities in return for fuel supplies.
(Åtland, 2010) This shows that as Mahan argued this partnership will lead to a necessity
of a certain degree of sea-control for the Russian navy, especially, with A2/AD
capabilities. For ensuring these industries, the Russian Navy has to create its own White
Water Navy, mostly as capable as a Green Water Navy and should ensure a sea-control
in strategic chokepoints like Vilkitski Strait, Chukchi Sea, and the Barents Sea. (Antrim,
2010)
For Canada, a White Water Navy could be established through minimal strategic
goals. Canada underlines the importance of an ‘Arctic sovereignty’. (Carnaghan &
Goody, 2006) As we can see, Canada is looking for limited goals that concern its own
territorial interests in the Arctic. But their goals on ensuring Canadian sovereignty over
the parts of Northern Passage, the Hans Island and Lomonosov Ridge against Russia,
Norway, the EU countries, and the US. (Carnaghan & Goody, 2006) This also requires a
WWN that as capable as a Green Water Navy.
When we came to China, it’s a little bit confusing to define a White Water Navy
for them. As not being an Arctic country, they look at similar goals of freedom of
navigation in the Arctic region. This will require a capable Blue Water Navy and a White
Water Navy. As A.T. Mahan underlined, also Chinese academic Li Zhenfu argued that
China has to be more ambitious for the safety and convenience of Chinese ships operating
in the future in the ice-free Arctic. (Wright, 2011) But doing it with a naval force will be
hard due to the reasons that will explain in the latter part. For this reason, China as a non-
circumpolar state should have to focus on different strategies or simply taking allies from
regional states.
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How to develop a WWN?
Despite the different characteristics and necessities for a White Water Navy, as
both littoral and open-sea naval forces, it has to have similar combined capabilities and
features. For understanding it, this article will use Bernard Brodie’s book ‘A Guide to
Naval Strategy’, where he mentioned the importance of supporting a naval force with
bases and a sufficient air-power. (Brodie, 2011) We will also look at the necessary natural
and human-made needs of naval forces to operate within a certain period and location as
A. T. Mahan argued. (Mahan, 2013)
It is clear that, just like a Space Force, an Arctic Naval Force or a White Water
Navy both have to be capable of warfare/defence purposes while also being able for
experimental/scientific use in a region where lack of adequate information is still the
dominant characteristic. For many years, most Arctic and even non-Arctic states
developed their own scientific laboratory ships but what means a White Water Navy is
not only developing ice-going ships but also ice-going ships that can support naval power
of the subjected country for establishing a sea-control.
Robert C. Rubel argued that naval structures are organized around ‘high-value
units’. (Rubel, 2010) In a White Water Navy, such kind of HVU can be classified as a
nuclear-powered ice-breaker, which could ensure the continuation of operation even in
harder Arctic-winter conditions. As also Scott G. Borgerson argued Arctic-states protect
their national interests by employing armed icebreaker guards with sonar capabilities.
(Borgerson, 2008) What makes nuclear ice-breakers as different from the conventional
(diesel) ones are in their speeds and refuelling capacity. Nuclear powered ice-breakers
could get through 8-10 feet thick ice at speed up to 10 knots while could operate with-out
fuelling for 5 to 7 years, unlike the conventional ones. (Zerkalov, 2016) This makes them
truly high-value units that can be game-changers with their independence from coastal
waters.
But those ice-breakers are problematic that their nuclear power makes them too
costly to operate as a war-fighting unit. Those HVUs, like the nuclear aircraft carriers,
should be supported by a task force of surface vehicles that have firepower. As we can
see both Russia and the US are trying to increase their naval capabilities for conducting
operations. But this shows us that, even the climate change occurs, the High-North of the
Earth remains impossible for conventional warfare while sea routes like The Great
Northern Passage could be crucial for a White Water Navy to operate.
A White Water Navy, just like the others, requires enormously capable naval
bases that could be a supply base or a shelter (point d’appui) for a naval force. As Bernard
Brodie argued a naval base equally means a naval ship is also a true argument for an
Arctic Navy. (Brodie, 2011) A stationary naval base in the Arctic could mean a year-long
access and force deployment in a relatively hostile region. An operating or a supply base
can provide important supplies that feed the life-lane of a White Water Navy like fuel,
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provisions, and rotational man-power. Bernard Brodie again argued that a naval base
should be close to the naval theatre that subjected to a sea-control. (Brodie, 2011) This is
the main difficulty for a non-Arctic state to achieve on its pattern to create a White Water
Navy as we will see in the next part with the example of China.
Again Bernard Brodie underlined that, in a 21st Century naval force and sea
control, a power should develop necessary air power to control the upper-side of the
surface that should be controlled, without this it is impossible for a power to approach the
operation zone. (Brodie, 2011) This was firstly achieved through making littoral battles
around the coasts that surrounded by ground-based airbases. However, this trend shows
a change after the introduction of the aircraft carriers which are floating airbases. (Rubel,
2010) The hostile environment of the Arctic requires old-school ground-based air-sea
bases rather than aircraft carriers. This is partly due that, these ships have limited abilities
for manoeuvring and cannot tolerate any risk from sea-control threats. (Rubel, 2010) This
is the also reason that what made Russian Northern Fleet inappropriate to operate in a
whole-Arctic campaign.
But combining a sea-power with air-power is also crucial and important in an
Arctic White Water Navy. Since the need for extended reconnaissance from the air and
its ability to make raid-like attacks on relatively slower naval surface vehicles, as Brodie
argued, make them still appealing for the naval forces. (Brodie, 2011) Sustaining the air-
power is also one important reason that why we need an entirely different Arctic-naval
force structure since it is almost impossible to cease to rely on aircraft carriers as high-
value units that can bring change in a war.
Since the introduction of missile technologies, the notion of sea-control shows
great differences, which also effect the Arctic naval theatre. A White Water Navy could
be supported with ground-to-air, ground-to-sea, and sea-to-sea missiles. This also shows
us that Russian focus on developing more A2/AD missile capabilities in the Arctic, which
is an extension of Cold-War strategy ‘the Bastion’, is highly crucial to Russia for
achieving a White Water Navy that can provide sea-control. (Boulègue, 2019) Not only
in terms of air-power, Russia also empowers its Arctic-air-fleet with Tu-160 Blackjack
and Tu-22M Backfire Medium-Range bombers, which are highlighted by the NATO,
with their anti-ship capacities. (Lasserre, Roy, & Garon, 2012)
As we witnessed until here despite being differing from country-to-country, a
White Water Navy has similar characteristics. It requires different HVUs when it
compared to the Blue Water Navies. Despite could not be having adequate firepower, a
nuclear ice-breaker could mean access to the Arctic Ocean, which can also lead a naval
task force in an environmentally all-hostile region. Also, sufficient naval bases and
enormous air-sea power or missile capabilities are a pre-requisite for a WWN, just like
all naval forces. As Mahan argued, the power of a naval force, could not measure with
12
how many ships that it captured but with how much it can provide command of sea-
decisive. (Mahan, 2013)
Despite being less capable in terms of firepower, an Arctic White Water Navy,
that created with nuclear ice breakers and task forcing surface vessels could become more
in the Command of Sea-Decisive capabilities. In the upcoming part, we will focus on the
efforts of developing a WWN, of different countries with differing Arctic goals and
policies. In the end, we will try to analyse, how much these countries achieved in terms
of reaching being a navy that is the command of sea-decisive.
Comparing WWNs of the US, Russia, Canada, and China
The United States
As being with a Blue Water Navy and having the goal of sustaining the freedom
of navigation in the Arctic region we will start our assessment with the US, who has the
biggest projected naval power. Despite all of these changes, the Arctic region’s status is
not the same when compared with the rest of the world seas and oceans. Until 2009, the
US was named as ‘reluctant Arctic power’, where neither the media nor the government
echoed the urgency of the Arctic as an immediate issue. (Lasserre, Roy, & Garon, 2012)
But since then we witness a changing US attitude towards the Arctic where Russia and
China increasingly become more and more active.
In 2019, the US Air Force General Terrence O’Shaughnessy, referred the US
NORTHCOM as the first line of defence for the US while urged for the development of
necessary technology, planning joint training and planning for working with North
American tribes in the region. (Defense News, 2019) We increasingly see American
efforts for developing a White Water Navy that can be capable enough to counter rising
Russian and Chinese presence in the region. However, all of these efforts were is still in
a primitive condition, due to the world’s strongest naval power’s delayed efforts over the
region in the 1990s.
When we came to, the high-valued units, the US Navy and Coast Guard are still
far from having a nuclear ice-breaker as Russians did. Both the US Navy and Coast Guard
do not have the capability to operate in long term normal Arctic conditions. (Guerrero,
2016) The US Navy currently operates three ships while another one as care-taker status;
while the ships the Polar Star and the Polar Seas are the most powerful conventional ice-
breakers in the world. (Zerkalov, 2016) However, they are much weaker, when compared
with Russian ones. Building nuclear-fuelled ice-breaker could help, the US Navy, to make
high-speed trips to different polar regions to respond to sudden situations without losing
time for refuelling. (Zerkalov, 2016)
Apart from it, existing the Blue Water Navy of the US could help to establish the
Arctic sea-control once the nuclear ice-breakers inaugurated by the US Navy. As many
of the naval surface vessels are able to operate up to the marginal ice zone in the Arctic
13
Ocean. (Titley & John, 2010) The US Navy underlines that boosted Arleigh Burke-class
guided-missile destroyers and San Antonio Class amphibious transports could reach to
ICE-1C equivalent capacity that can operate in the Baltic ice. (Guerrero, 2016) But it is
problematic that despite those polar adjustments not a single surface vessel of America’s
Blue Water Navy could be capable enough for operating in the High-North conditions.
This means that due to the hostile nature of the Arctic, a Blue Water Navy, could only be
operated in the entrance points of the region like the North Sea and in Bering Strait just
as made in the history.
This means especially in the winter conditions, a White Water Navy, requires
naval bases that can provide supply and maintenance for vessels. As Brodie argued a
naval base should have ‘safe’ access to the subjected waters while also having accessible
supply lines. (Brodie, 2011) For the US having ideal naval bases could create problems
due that its main Arctic bases could only be located to Alaska, where has direct access to
the Bering Sea which could penetrate by Russia while navigating through the Barents Sea
could require the consent of Canada. As we witnessed earlier, Canada prefers the concept
of Arctic sovereignty, where they increasingly become critical to their southern
neighbour. (Borgerson, 2008) While the US Navy uses Thule Air Base as its northern
furthermost base, which located in Greenland soil where is governed by a foreign
sovereign country. (Air Force Technology, 2019) This can create some problems for the
US Navy to sustain unilateral operations in the Arctic. Again in 2019, the US wanted a
new naval port in the Arctic as a “Northern Clover” with the features of missiles, radars,
and personnel. (Defense News, 2019)
As the capabilities of US open-sea fleet is not enough to protect the future nuclear
ice-breakers in the High-North, air power could mean much, for the US in the region. The
US Navy’s air power has the capability to operate in High-North but the lack of diverted
fields can affect the duration and ranges of them. (Titley & John, 2010) For increasing
the airpower of the US in the Arctic, the military takes important steps like empowering
the North American Aerospace Defence Command or NORAD. In 2020, the US Air
Force decided to relocate the first large group of F-35A Joint Strike Fighters to Alaska,
Fairbanks. (Defense News, 2020) The US could bring the Broad Area Maritime
Surveillance UAVs to the region for establishing maritime surveillance which could
contribute to Arctic sea-control. (Ohotnicky, Hisey, & Todd, 2012)
The US improved its naval capabilities in the Arctic since the year 2009. However,
establishing a White Water Navy is a highly hard thing for a country even who has a Blue
Water Navy. As we see, the US is still failed to obtain nuclear ice-breakers and support
vessels. But its capabilities on Arctic bases and air-sea capacity are increasing. But it is
definite that even the world’s most powerful naval force has much to achieve for the
creation of a White Water Navy. However, the US Arctic Strategy of the Navy clearly
underlines the importance of emerging issues in the Arctic due to climate change and the
14
necessity of addressing them. (US Navy, 2014) Without creating a proper White Water
Navy, the US will skip its chance to assert its sovereignty in the Arctic. (Borgerson, 2008)
Russia
When developing a White Water Navy, Russia settled its goals as resource
management and freedom of international navigation on the basis of off-shore
sovereignty but less on distant-water power projection. (Antrim, 2010) For this reason,
Russia’s White Water Navy should be capable enough to provide A2/AD capabilities for
establishing an off-shore sea-control. Russia’s Arctic military posture is increasingly
being assertive since it is in compliance with country’s new assertiveness in international
affairs. (Åtland, 2010) This shows that it’s White Water Navy also should be assertive
enough to carry Russian interests in the High-North.
When we look to Russia’s high-value units in the Arctic region until 2008, Russia
has a fleet of 18 icebreakers. (Borgerson, 2008) Not only in terms of conventional ice-
breakers, but Russia also has enormous historical experience in building nuclear ice-
breakers, even in 1987 Russian Arktika-class nuclear ice-breaker navigated near-
maximum thickness of Arctic sea-ice. (Brigham, 2010) In 2019, Russia launched its new
nuclear ice-breaker the Ural as the third one after Arktika and Sibir, which can able to
slice ice up to 3-meters. (Reuters, 2019) Also in 2020, two Russian company Atomflot
and Zvezda Shipyard agreed on building Lider-class icebreaker, which could slice ice up
to 4-meters and can reach 20 megawatts propulsion power. (Reuters, 2020) Russian
President Vladimir Putin underlined that, by 2035, Russia’s Arctic fleet would operate at
least 13 heavy-duty icebreakers, nine of which would be powered by nuclear reactors.
(Reuters, 2019) As we can see when it compared it with the US, Russia has more capable
ice-going ships that have the capability of Polar Class ice-breakers.
But as having a Green-like Water Navy rather than a Blue one, limits the firepower
capability of Russian White Water Navy. Russian Northern Fleet’s 100 combat-ready
naval surface vessels fell to 40 today, which also made, such force even harder to achieve
Arctic naval superiority. (Boulègue, 2019) This shows us that, just like the US, Russian
conventional surface vessels are not capable enough to establish a sea-control. As
Chatham House report agreed, most of Russia’s nuclear-ice breakers are owned by
civilian companies like Rosatom, while the only entirely military-owned ice-breaker is
built in 2018 and named as Ilya Muromets but which is not enough provide complete
operational superiority. (Boulègue, 2019)
As we mentioned Russia has a 17.500km long Arctic coastline where it wants to
develop infrastructure, including ports, customs facilities, and marine checkpoints.
(Blunden, 2010) But for now, %97,5 of Russia’s northern coastline from the White Sea
to Chukotka has relatively limited military utility. (Åtland, 2010) But since 2014, 14
airbases have been opened or rebuild while Russia wants to utilize two bases that would
operate by Arctic Brigades in Pechenga and Alakurtti. (Boulègue, 2019) It is clear that
15
Russia is also improving its base capabilities in the region which could provide bot
tactical ability with A2/AD capabilities while also as supply and maintenance bases.
When we look to Russian air-sea power and missile capabilities there are also
many important improvements mostly focused on A2/AD. As we mentioned earlier, the
Arctic serves as both a strategic and tactical air zone, due to Bastion Strategy. Russia
locates anti-sea tactical bombers and Mig-31’s in the region for improving Russia’s air
capability. (Boulègue, 2019) Russia mostly focuses on ground-based air support power
rather than focusing on aircraft carriers. As we mentioned earlier, aircraft carriers are not
suitable enough to operate in the Arctic waters, while also Russian Northern Fleet have a
lack of air mobility assets and patrol aircraft that can limit its air support power for
controlling the above of the surface that will be subjected to sea-control strategy.
(Boulègue, 2019) For this reason, Russia also gave huge importance on A2/AD capable
missile and radar technologies, which are less limited by the harsh Arctic conditions.
Russia deployed S-400 air defence systems in the Kola region, while also deployed long-
range S-300 and S-400 systems, medium-range P-800 Oniks missiles, and K-300P
Bastion-P and 4K51 Rubezh coastal defence missiles in the islands of Alexandra Land
Island, Kotelny and Rogachevo Islands which can contribute for the notion of sea-control.
(Boulègue, 2019)
As we can see until now, Russia is speedily moving on the pattern of creation of
a White Water Navy, which could achieve a limited sea-control in Russian continental
shelf and territorial waters. One of the reasons of this is due for, old-school of thought of
Geopolitics, which underlines the importance of the Arctic region as an opportunity for
developing a maritime power that could connect to Mackinder’s geopolitical heathland
that can operate globally for Russia. (Antrim, 2010) Sovcomflot’s vessel Baltica made
the first high-tonnage voyage from Murmansk to Ningbo in China in 2011; while the
same company’s tanker Vladimir Tikhonov which carrying 120,000 tonnes of gas
condensate successfully crossed the Northern Sea Route. (Blunden, 2010)
It is clear that both commercially and in terms of HUVs Russian Arctic fleet is
increasing and make it able to sail in the unfriendly nature of the High-North. However,
it is clear that in complete military terms Russian White Water Navy is still constrained
by both political and technical constraints but developing commercial maritime
capabilities could also lead to the development of a successful White Water Navy as A.T.
Mahan argued.
Canada
As the Arctic increasingly becoming a geopolitical hot-spot for global
superpowers; lesser powers increasingly focusing on asserting their own sovereign rules
in their territories. This requires a Green and White Water Navy capabilities which can
ensure a limited level of sea-control on a particular territory. Understanding a Canadian
16
White Water Navy could also help us to other lesser regional actors like Norway, Finland
and etc.
Canada claimed the sector between 60°W and 141°W longitude as its own
Canadian Arctic and had a claim of sovereignty over them since 1925. (Åtland, 2010)
Canadian Arctic Sovereignty is an increasingly assertive and serious claim since the
Ottowa Administration sometimes takes a harder stance on the US. Canada’s former
Prime Minister Stephen Harper defined ‘Canadian Arctic Sovereignty’ as a concept that
should be elaborated under the principle of ‘use it or lose it’. (Borgerson, 2008) For that
reason, Canada increasingly wants to develop its naval power in the Arctic region.
In terms of HVUs, Canadian Coast Guard operates five icebreakers in 2006 while
also showed their interest to buy ‘polar class 8’ nuclear ice-breakers. (Carnaghan &
Goody, 2006) In 2019, Canada decided to replace the old Coast Guard fleet with six new
heavy ice-breakers and 16 multi-purpose vessels. (Naval News, 2019) It is clear that
Canada’s Arctic fleet is expanding steadily. But it is also problematic since most of these
ships commissioned for scientific and supply purposes for Canadian troops and local
indigenous people who take important place within Canada’s Arctic Strategy.
Other than ice-breakers, as being a lesser power, Canada has a relatively small
naval fleet. This can be acceptable since they don’t have a goal to achieve total sea-control
in the region. For this reason, Canada mostly focused on sub-surface vessels rather than
surface vessels. In 2011, however, Canada frustrated due to poor-performance of
Upholder/Victoria Class conventional submarines and showed its interest in buying
nuclear ones. (Lasserre, Roy, & Garon, 2012) Between 2005 – 2007 Canada deployed
HMCS Fredericton and HMCS Montreal for Arctic mission which was constrained by
seasonal and supplementary limitations. (Dittmann, 2009)
In terms of military naval bases, the Canadian Navy has a better opportunity for
creating naval bases for a White Water Navy. However, climate-related constraints, make
Canadian Arctic islands almost impossible to use as proper open-sea naval bases. Canada
opened a training base at Resolute in 2007; a naval supply base at Nanisivik in 2007 and
a transport air hub at Rankin Inlet in 2011 which later increased to the five by the opening
of the Forward Operating Locations, or seasonal airfields in Inuvik decided in 1987,
Yellowknife, Rankin Inlet, and Iqaluit. (Lasserre, Roy, & Garon, 2012) Nanisivik Base
has the ability to provide a deep-sea docking, refuel, and resupply capabilities.
(Lackenbauer, 2009)
In terms of air – sea capabilities, Canada uses modernized Aurora sea patrol planes
and F/A 18 Hornets as main fighter aircraft. (Dittmann, 2009) Except for this, Canada
created some military air bases that could use in some periods during the year. Again in
Nanisivik and Baffin Island, Canada opened air-strips, that can be used for mostly
logistical purposes for five Globemaster and 17 modern C-130 Hercules planes.
(Dittmann, 2009) However, in terms of air fire-power, Canada has a lesser capability to
17
strengthen its muscles. In 2009, Canada started to use space-capabilities, where Canada
established a RADARSAT-2 information satellite that monitors the northern shores of
Canada and the United States. (Carnaghan & Goody, 2006)
As we can see, Canada is also slowly creating a defensive White Water Navy in a
region where is becoming more and more tensioned due to super-power interactions. But
lesser powers like Canada and other regional states could see some obstacles to create
necessary military capabilities which could lead them to use alliance systems or
bandwagoning. As Borgerson argued, Canada would necessarily combine their resources
to help police thousands of miles of Arctic coastline (NORAD System is one example of
such kind of cooperation among two states) or simply using the NATO as main defence
and security provider in the region. (Borgerson, 2008)
It is clear that for lesser powers creating a large White Water Navy, that can
establish a sea-control, is illogical or impossible since the traditional security schools
showed us. But increasing Arctic naval capabilities or creating alliances and
bandwagoning are necessities for lesser powers due to the weakness of regional
governance in the region. Since, even in its own chairmanship, Canada failed in
consensus-building over Kiruna Declaration on Environmental Issues this show that for
lesser powers like the super-powers power and capability is the only currency in the High-
North. (Fenge, 2013)
China
Like Canada, China is an also important example for analysing as a model, as a
non-Arctic country, China has different political motives which also create a necessity
for a White Water Navy. Despite being a non-Arctic state, China is highly interested in
the Arctic region as a rising power, they even name themselves as “near-Arctic state or
jin beiji guojia” (近北极国家) and as “Arctic stakeholder or beiji lihaiguanxguo” (北极
利害关系国). (Ping & Lanteigne, 2015) Under these circumstances, the Beijing
Administration wants to refer to the Arctic as a ‘global commons’. that should be in
benefit for the world.
Under these conditions, China set two goals as its primary national Arctic goals
which are ensuring freedom of navigation for Chinese ships and creating equal
opportunities for Chinese companies over the Arctic natural resources. In 2013, Chinese
ship Yongsheng which is operated by the COSCOL, reduced travel times and completed
its trans-Arctic voyage from China to Rotterdam in the Netherlands. (Sun, 2017) While
Li Zhenfu argued that China should act more on developing and improving ice-resistant,
ice-breaking, and liquefied natural gas (LNG) vessels. (Wright, 2011) As we mentioned
earlier in 2013, Chinese CNPC, bought %20 stake of Novatek’s LNG facility in the
Yamal Peninsula. (Sun, 2017) As we can see, as Mahan argued, the increased commercial
naval activity requires increasing naval presence which is already concerning the US and
Western countries.
18
First Chinese ice-breaker Xueolong is launched in 2014 and solely designed for
conducting polar and scientific explorations. (Rainwater, 2013) But as we can see, China
is also highly motivated for building nuclear-capable ice-breakers which are still for
scientific and expeditionary characteristics rather than naval presence. In 2016, Chinese
Jiangnan Shipyard started its project of developing a new ice-breaker class that has an
ability to break 1.5m of ice at 2 to 3 knots. (Kirchenberger, 2016) Unlike Russia and
circumpolar states, China is highly depending on foreign assistance and know-how to
build its own ice-breakers. China’s Xuelong was built by the Ukrainian company and its
projected new ice-breaker would build by the know-how of Finnish shipbuilding firm
Aker Arctic. (Kirchenberger, 2016)
Not only in terms of icebreakers, but China could also have some troubles with its
naval power projection since its navy is still in a transition period in-between a Blue and
Green Water Navy. Reaching High-North with navigation through the sea from China
depends on many waterways like the Sea of Japan and the Bering Strait which is under
the dominance of the US Navy through its powerful Third Fleet. Naval power projection
in far and open seas requires a Chinese naval fleet that can go beyond the Second Island
Chain which is not quite possible with current resources. (Storey & Ji, 2004) But despite
this, China’s naval capabilities and its surface vessels are increasing, many of these navy
vessels are tasked in surrounding seas like South and East China Seas against the US and
its allies. It is also important to remember that this situation mostly become possible, as
we have seen in China’s ambitions for creating ice-breaker, with reverse-engineering
which takes time and create costs. (Storey & Ji, 2004)
From the 1980s to 2020, they’re really rare cases that Chinese naval ships
navigated through the Northern Pacific Ocean. In 2015, five Chinese navy ships sailed
through the Bering Strait which is the first case of such a scenario. (Financial Times,
2015) One of the most important reasons for this is due that as a non-Arctic state China
experience a lack of naval bases in a hostile region. The only Chinese stationary presence
in the Arctic region is Yellow River Station (Huanghe zhan 黄河站) for scientific
research at Ny-Ålesund on the Norwegian islands of Svalbard. (Ping & Lanteigne, 2015)
Which is primarily for ‘civilian’ purposes despite the contradiction over it. A Chinese
state-owned firm offered for building an airport in Nuuk and Ilulissat which is later
withdrawn due to both local and international complaints. (Reuters, 2019) It is clear that
China’s naval presence could only use friendly bases of Russia and other friendly nations
which is the biggest obstacle for China to develop a White Water Navy.
In terms of air-sea support, as China does not have military bases in the region,
conducting air operations on the Arctic for ensuring the security of naval units is highly
hard to achieve. Relying on Russian bases, as a regional ally will limit China’s ability to
develop a White Water Navy since they have different ambitions on the future of the
region. China has J-20 and J-10C fighter jets which are not tested relevantly for the Arctic
conditions. (US Secretary of Defence, 2019)
19
It is clear that due to this reason China has significant obstacles to develop a White
Water Navy. With-out developing necessary strategic conditions a stationary Chinese
naval presence is impossible to obtain; if it would not achieve to obtain a naval base,
freedom of navigation in North Pacific and actionable air power. For this reason, China
mostly focuses on non-military tools like multilateral cooperation, diplomacy, and
economic infrastructure investments. In 2013, China obtained observes status in the
Arctic Council and set the need for “respect, cooperation, win-win result and
sustainability” as fundamental principles. (Hong, 2018)
***
As we looked for all White Water Navies, it is clear that we are far from defining
a state’s navy as a proper White Water Navy. Since it is clear that all these powers are
from being a Navy that can be in the command of the sea decisive in the Arctic region as
Mahan argued. This due to the national character of navies and environmental hardships
makes the Artic almost impossible to attain a sea-control. It is clear that, for now, the
Arctic is still a civilianized region as Keegan argued. But this not means, in the future
there would be no White Water Navy, it is clear that rising commercialization and trade
routes will inevitably lead to the development of a naval force that displaying the force
of its country.
Risks and Problems of a WWN
Since the development of fully capable White Water Navy is still far from reach
but it is possible to make predictions over its possible impacts hypothetically. For
understanding the risk and problems of a White Water Navy we will again four categories,
as we did in the first part of the article, it will generally be environmental, economic,
political/diplomatic and military/strategic ones.
As we mentioned, even since the 20th Century, the Arctic region faces drastic
environmental changes and challenges. Every harmful effect of climate change affects
the Arctic region as multiplied due to the sensitive nature of it. Increased naval transits
and traffic by both commercial and military ships could increase black carbon emissions
that can accelerate the polar ice-cap loss. (Arctic Council, 2009) This can end with
unpredictable levels of ice-loss due to the lack of environmental researches over it.
As again Arctic Council argued, increasing maritime navigation could disrupt
wildlife migration habits and could cause vessel strikes to marine mammals. (Arctic
Council, 2009) So it is clear that accelerated human maritime activity both in terms of
civilian and military purposes will have many harmful effects on the wildlife in the Arctic.
The establishment and maintenance of radar stations, airfields, naval bases, and other
military installations and making military manoeuvres generate air-, soil-, and water-
pollution and also contribute to the pressures on the local wildlife. (SIPRI, 1980)
20
Nuclear ice-breakers underlined as the most important HVUs of a White Water
Navy due to its capabilities. But they can harm marine wildlife due to their loud noises
and the trail of open water that left astern which can create traps due to their confusion
over them as polynyas and can get trapped too far from the ice edge as the channel
eventually refreezes. (Arctic Council, 2009) Also, nuclear-powered ice-breakers create
another kind of danger due to the possibility of damage in its nuclear reactor or a nuclear
meltdown which is the worst-case scenario for the region. In 1985, the Russian Echo-II
type nuclear submarine experienced a steam explosion that caused the 12t upper lid and
fuel assemblies were blown out from the reactor compartment in the northern city of
Vladivostok. (Takano, ve diğerleri, 2001) Even now, the existing radioactive
contamination of the Arctic regions is almost entirely of military origin. (SIPRI, 1980) It
is clear that such kind of nuclear contamination and accident will mean a true disaster
within a region where is hostile due to environmental conditions that make the cleaning
process almost impossible.
When it comes to the economic process it is blurrier and harder to define the
potential effects of a WWN. But it’s main effects will be on national budgets Building
even a conventionally-powered ice-breaker would approximately cost around $1.6-1.9
billion in a time when the US military budget enters in a period of cuts. (Zerkalov, 2016)
It is clear that unlike Russia, who has a primary interest in the Arctic, the US is looking
for a burden-sharing with allies rather than a mostly U.S.-supported military posture in
the future due to the reason that operating even a Blue Water Navy around the world
become costlier and costlier. (Burke & Matisek, 2019)
A WWN can cause huge political and diplomatic problems within a region where
overlapped claims have been made and free from regional governance under the power
of the Arctic Council. The UNCLOS is cannot applicable due to the region’s unique
geographic circumstances. (Borgerson, 2008) Tiny Hans Island that located in an
important geopolitical position on the Great Northern Seaway and Lomonosov Ridge
increasingly become a contested region where sovereign rights were violated by passing
commercial and military ships. A zone of ‘peace’ or a security community under the
Arctic Council, have not been developed and there are no special arrangements for
security co-operation in the circumpolar north have emerged, or are expected to emerge
in the near future. (Åtland, 2010) Under these conditions, the Arctic states will
increasingly move on bilateralism or sustaining self-help capabilities with developing
WWNs in a frozen but anarchical region.
For the last category, we will focus on military and strategic implications and risks
of the possible development of White Water Navies. However, such kind of trend could
harm the established balance in the High-North. Throughout the Cold-War, nuclear
balance among two superpowers in the Arctic region dominated the strategic
understanding of the region. However, current developments create a need for new
strategic and tactical understanding since the environmental conditions were in change
21
and new actors like China and even lesser powers become more active in the region.
Despite this trend, researches show that even increasing the rhetorical arms race in the
Arctic, budgetary investment on creating a White Water Navy hardware is still highly
limited whereas even the Russian budgetary increase like other Arctic states based on
equipment replacement, rather than expansion. (Lasserre, Roy, & Garon, 2012) But the
rhetorical increase could always bring a material increase in military culture as we can
see the Arctic is increasingly getting securitized.
Increasing militarization and military presence in the Arctic could also create
problems over the local indigenous people who mostly sustain their lives in peaceful
means. As we seemed earlier both Canada and the US, want to deepen its knowledge
within the region by deepening their interactions with local people. In the Aleuts Islands,
a small native population experienced 1000 casualties while faced with forced deportation
during World War II. (SIPRI, 1980) Also in the Winter War between Finland and the
USSR, many indigenous Sami people were militarized for fighting against the Red Army
which caused the disruption of the civilian life culture of the Arctic communities. A
remilitarization with WWNs could again re-militarize the local population which is not
the desired option for the future of these communities.
Conclusion
Changing environmental conditions due to climate change creates new
opportunities for commercializing and using the Arctic as a maritime sea-road. For this
reason, both Arctic states and non-Arctic states like China change its perspective and
stance over the High-North. Increasing stationary economic activities could lead to
increased stationary military deployment that aims at a sea-control principle. As we
argued earlier, a White Water Navy would be a navy composed of ice-going ships and
supportive surface vessels.
Sea-control is not an end but a means for achieving the bigger strategic goal of
emphasizing sovereignty and national interests over a specific region. (Kane & Lonsdale,
2016) It is clear that even in the icy waters of the Arctic, naval force is still the sign of
floating national interests and power projection. Due to this reason, a White Water Navy
would be the sign of sovereignty, power, and deterrence capability of a nation where
increasingly become contested.
A White Water Navy would consist of a high-value unit, mostly referred to as
nuclear-powered icebreakers and supportive Green or Blue Water Navy capability. For
that reason, as we witnessed both Russia, deployed Northern Fleet to Murmansk, and the
US re-oriented its carrier strike group (CSG) and other surface ship package deployments
to the polar regions. (Burke & Matisek, 2019) It is clear that a White Water Navy like all
other naval task forces should have to maintain logistics, defence, firepower, flexibility,
and retaliation superiority. (Kane & Lonsdale, 2016)
22
This means a White Water Navy should also create necessary supportive supply
and maintenance capabilities and air-sea power that can control the upper side of the
surface. Without this, it is impossible to create ‘command in sea decisive’ naval task force
as A.T. Mahan argued. This is one of the reasons why since the US, Russia, China, and
no other polar power succeeded in developing the full White Water Navy. The issue of
whether, how, how much, and how soon security dynamics, security politics, and
interstate relations in the Arctic will be affected by the process of climate change which
will also determine the future of the WWNs. (Åtland, 2010)
Not only due to structural and technical reasons but also environmental, economic,
and political hardships could also undermine the future development of the Arctic naval
force. In a fully anarchical region, relying on a naval power that is self-sufficient will
eventually produce positive strategic outcomes. It is clear that without a functional
consensus building in the region a WWN will be an unavoidable necessity for floating
national interests and sovereignty over the icy waters of the Arctic.
There are regional institutions which are in the development since the Cold War,
like the Arctic Council and Barents Euro-Atlantic Council, produced scientific
assessment like Climate Impact Assessment (2005) and the Arctic Marine Shipping
Assessment (2009) that have a global and regional impact and in 2009 the Arctic Council
agreed on multinational Arctic Offshore Oil and Gas Guidelines. (Åtland, 2010)
However, it is still strange that many Arctic states are passive when it comes to creating
global cooperation in the Arctic region. It is clear that the future of the Arctic region and
future naval militarization of it is navigating ‘into the unknown’ in recent years; and what
determines the future of the Arctic as whether being remain civilianized region or a
militarized ‘cold-spot’ will base on nation’s own cost and benefit calculations over the
creation of WWN.
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