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Purifying the Religion: An Analysis of Haram Targeting among Salafi Jihadi Groups
Abstract
Islamic law denotes as haram any forbidden behavior, object, beverage, or food. Despite subscribing to a similar Salafi ideology, very few jihadi groups use violence against haram targets (e.g., brothels, casinos, statues, liquor stores, mixed sex schools, and gay clubs). This study argues that haram-centered violence unites ethnically-mixed jihadi groups by fostering a superordinate Islamic identity that enables them to overcome their collective action problems. As a result, ethnically-mixed Salafi jihadi groups deploy haram targeting much more than homogenous ones. Using new disaggregated group-level data, our analyses demonstrate that the ethnic structure of Salafi jihadi groups shapes haram targeting, both in Dagestan and on a global scale. The article discusses these findings and directions for future research on religious violence.
... Other scholars seem to agree. For instance, Siroky et al (2022) find that "haram" (locations where certain behaviors are interpreted as being forbidden by Islam) targeting is a mechanism for overcoming collective action problems among mixed-ethnicity Salafists, while enhancing internal cohesion on the basis of the religion as a superordinate guiding force. This is supported by Braun and Genkin's (2014) finding that collectivist culture reduces the cost of suicide bombing. ...
The following dissertation considers variations in the use of suicide bombing by Non-State Armed Groups (NSAGs), at the organizational level of analysis. It is both a quantitative and qualitative assessment of the conditions under which insurgents that accept the practice’s legitimacy have applied it to a range of specified target sets. The broad focus of this endeavor centers on unpacking insurgent groups’ behaviors across a number of unique battlespaces, but the main question I seek to answer is: what decision dynamics accompany violent non-state actors’ use of suicide bombing and how do we interpret their behavioral interaction across various conflict zones, so as to better illuminate why they continue to attack in this way? Put differently, what does suicide bombing, as an operational-level tactic as opposed to a presumably fully developed strategy, reveal about NSAGs who use it? I also explore a more narrowly tailored sub-set of questions that aim to uncover why insurgents that do use it, do so in different ways, which also entails an analysis of non-suicide bombing attacks against the same range of target sets. To that end, I explore the ways suicide bombing is used by several organizations, within a variety of combat venues, as a means for better understanding its uses; namely, adapting to and shaping, unique battlespaces. I find that organizations such as al-Qa’ida (AQ) are more sensitive to branding/re-branding dynamics associated with the targeting of civilians, while others such as Islamic State (IS) incorporate suicide bombing as a key component of their war arsenal against civilian, security, and competitor target sets. This may explain why it generally tended to be the case in multiple venues that AQ didn’t practice suicide bombing against IS, but IS did so against AQ. The exploratory nature of my work can be seen in the methodological approach I take, which extracts data points and re-forms them as variables that can be scrutinized further. This has implications for policy, theory, and epistemology. In policy terms, I elucidate the need to consider suicide bombing as an instrumental means for achieving objectives that are positioned below the threshold of a fully developed strategy. Theoretically, in contrast to a leading explanation for the practice, I am able to say with some confidence that the presence of foreign militaries has had little to no impact on the use of suicide bombing. Epistemologically, disaggregating target types, based on the dataset’s existing narratives, is a viable path for better understanding how suicide bombing violence is used by non-state actors.
How can researchers obtain reliable responses on sensitive issues in dangerous settings? This Element elucidates ways for researchers to use unobtrusive experimental methods to elicit answers to risky, taboo, and threatening questions in dangerous social environments. The methods discussed in this Element help social scientists to encourage respondents to express their true preferences and to reduce bias, while protecting them, local survey organizations, and researchers. The Element is grounded in an original study of civilian support for the jihadi insurgency in the Russian North Caucasus in Dagestan that assesses theories about wartime attitudes toward militant groups. We argue that sticky identities, security threats, and economic dependence curb the ability of civilians to switch loyalties.
This study examines the role of ideology on terrorist groups' choice of targets. Using the dataset based on the Global Terrorism Database, advanced by Ahmed, 2018, Journal of Applied Security Research, the study seeks to examine the variation in target choice by group type. Six target types are considered in this study: (a) political, (b) civilian, (c) security, (d) business, (e) rival, and (f) infrastructure. The study finds that there are differences in target selection based on ideology, and that over time, all group types are attacking civilian and security targets more often.
The phenomenon of outbidding, in which terrorist groups escalate their attacks in response to competition from other groups, has long been studied in a domestic terrorism context. If groups exist in the same state, they may compete with one another for the same resources from civilians of that state. This article argues this outbidding logic also exists in a transnational context. Leveraging a sample of Salafi-jihadist groups that are in competition for resources based on shared ideology, this article explores the full effects of this competition on the quantity and severity of groups’ attacks. Building on this outbidding logic as a theoretical lens, Salafi-jihadist groups adjust their attack profiles in response to competition from other groups following this same ideology. This effect is particularly evident among groups that pledge allegiance to al-Qaeda or ISIS. Once pledged, affiliates must now compete with other affiliates for the additional potential resources and recruits who follow the ‘brand’ of al-Qaeda or ISIS. Consistent with this theory, after examining the attacks of all Salafi-jihadist groups from 2001 to 2014, this article finds increased competition among groups results in more attacks and a selection of more severe targets and types of attacks. Affiliate groups respond to competition to the greatest degree.
Drawing on unique interviews with former jihadists from Russia's autonomous republic of Dagestan, this article is the first to examine the impact of ethnicity on jihadist groups' methods of organization and operations, primarily in terms of their target selection, local support, and recruitment and leadership policies. It distinguishes between largely monoethnic rural jamaats—or jihadist groups—and multiethnic urban jamaats, pointing to the contested nature of ethnicity, particularly in the latter group. It examines the steps taken by the leadership of urban jamaats to overcome ethnic cleavages and avoid interethnic tension both within the jihadists' ranks and with regard to the local population. The article illustrates that, as a divisive phenomenon in multiethnic urban jamaats, ethnic identity has been deliberately downplayed by the leadership of these groups at the expense of strengthening supra-ethnic Salafi-jihadist identity. The article also highlights the significance of ethnic identity in jihadist groups, in spite of it being contradictory to Salafi-jihadist doctrine.
This article looks into the dangers posed by the return of the North Caucasus militants in Syria and Iraq to the security of the Russian Federation. The article first divides the recruitment of North Caucasian foreign fighters in Syria and Iraq into two distinct waves. I argue that the first wave of North Caucasus foreign fighters (2011–2013) chose Syria because they could not fight in the North Caucasus. By contrast, the second wave (2014–2016) openly decided not to fight in their own region, preferring to join an international jihadist front. I then build on the literature about the impact of foreign fighters on domestic insurgencies to analyse the potential impact of these returnees on the regional insurgency in the North Caucasus. I identify four factors conditioning the motivations to return and returnee impact on domestic insurgency: a favourable context for return, an existing network in the region, resonance of the militants’ ideology with the local population, and the will to return to the region. I argue that the greater threat will come from the field commanders from the Second Chechen war exiled in Syria, rather than the more numerous second wave foreign fighters integrated into ISIS.
Does a state's use of indiscriminate violence incite insurgent attacks? The conventional wisdom suggests that it does—Stathis Kalyvas cites dozens of studies and historical cases where collective targeting of the noncombatant population provoked greater insurgent violence. But others have pushed back against this claim. These scholars have made significant advances that allow us to understand and explain when, why, and how the world's militaries have used indiscriminate violence against noncombatants with shocking regularity. This study builds on these contributions. We use interviews we conducted with ex-combatants and eyewitnesses of the Chechen wars to provide a critical reexamination of the current theoretical debate concerning indiscriminate violence. In doing so, we argue that treating the concept of indiscriminate violence as an essentially random counter-insurgency tactic obscures the important distinction between random and retributive indiscriminate violence deployed against civilians. The distinction raises crucial questions of location and timing that have hindered efforts to evaluate the efficacy of indiscriminate violence in irregular war.
While terrorist and insurgent groups have often combined anti-state subversion with ‘purely‘ criminal activities in order to obtain the financial means to wage their ideological struggle, little is known about the transformation of such groups into non-ideological organised crime groups (OCG) with close links to authorities. This holds particularly for jihadist groups that have on ideological grounds ruled out collaboration with their archenemies – ‘infidels’ and ‘apostates’. Using unique ethnographic data from Russia’s Dagestan, this article explores the causes and contexts of the gradual transformation of some of Dagestan’s jihadist units – jamaats – into organised crime groups collaborating with local authorities.
This article utilizes Bayesian Poisson changepoint regression models to demonstrate how transnational terrorists adjusted their target choices in response to target hardening. In addition, changes in the collective tastes of terrorists and their sponsorship have played a role in target selection over time. For each of four target types- officials, military, business, and private parties-the authors identify the number of regimes and the probable predictors of the events. Regime changes are tied to the rise of modern transnational terrorism, the deployment of technological barriers, the start of state sponsorship, and the dominance of the fundamentalists. The authors also include two sets of covariates-logistical outcome and victim's nature-to better explain the dynamics. As other targets have been fortified and terrorists have sought greater carnage, private parties have become the preferred target type. In recent years, terrorists have increasingly favored people over property for all target types. Moreover, authorities have been more successful at stopping attacks against officials and the military, thereby motivating terrorists to attack business targets and private parties.
This article posits that the remnants of archaic sociocultural norms, particularly the honour-imposed custom of retaliation, play a crucial role in the process of insurgent engagement in Russia's autonomous republic of Dagestan. Through a series of interviews with former insurgents, this study outlines two retaliation-centred mechanisms: “individual retaliation” and “spiritual retaliation” in order to explain the microcosm of motives behind insurgent activity in Dagestan. In doing so, this study problematizes the role of Salafi/Jihadist ideology as the main impetus for insurgent violence. Reversing the traditional causal link between violence and religion, this study also demonstrates that the development of Jihadist ideology is a by-product of insurgent mobilization rather than its cause.
This article introduces the Terrorist Attack Complexity Index, a framework to measure the complexity of terrorist attacks. This measurement takes place on the basis of 16 characteristics of terrorist attacks. The framework is applied to jihadist terrorist attacks in Europe during the period 2004–2011 to find perpetrator characteristics that are related to attacks with a high degree of complexity. The findings suggest that complex attacks are more likely to be carried out by perpetrators, who have gained expertise by visiting training camps outside Europe or participated in actual jihad, worked in large groups, and are acting on instructions from other terrorist groups. Simple attacks are generally carried out by perpetrators who have none of these characteristics.
This essay shows how the various Islamic communities or jamaats that emerged in the Muslim republics of the Russian North Caucasus during the early 1990s have evolved since then. Originally conceived as peaceful religious organisations embracing strict Islamic Salafi principles, many of these communities have transformed themselves into fighting units sharing many of the traits of jihadist Islamic movements worldwide. By analysing the radical Islamic discourse and the strategies of leading jihadist fighters in the Russian North Caucasus, this essay also illustrates how their views, ideas and tactics have become similar, if not identical, to the beliefs that are being held and thepractices that are being conducted by fighters of global and regional jihadist movements worldwide.