Climate Change Security: Adapting to a warming Arctic

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The Race To
THE HIGH NORTH
Journal of European Security and Defense Issues
VOLUME 11, ISSUE 3, 2021
n THE ARCTIC’S ACHILLES’ HEEL
Russia’s ambitions and Svalbard
n CLIMATE CHANGE AND SECURITY
The consequences of a warming planet
n NAVIGATING NEW FRONTIERS
Great power competition heads north
n THE FUTURE IS WIDE OPEN
Can the U.S., Russia and China cooperate?
PLUS
A melting ice cap presents challenges and opportunities
Comparing Russia’s words with its deeds in the Arctic
China bolsters its High North strategic interests

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PER CONCORDIAM ILLUSTRATION
Climate Change
SECURITY
Adapting to a Warming Arctic
By Dr. Alexandra Middleton

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bout 4 million people live permanently in the
Arctic region, of whom 10% are Indigenous
peoples. The Arctic is warming twice as fast as
the rest of the planet. Climate change represents
a security challenge because of its overarching
impact on the economy, human livelihoods and biodi-
versity in the Arctic. How are the Arctic states cooperat-
ing via institutions such as the Arctic Council and Arctic
Economic Council to create solutions to address these
climate change security challenges? Are Arctic states adher-
ing to their climate change commitments of the 2015 Paris
Agreement and is climate change viewed as an integral
part of the Arctic strategies of the eight Arctic states?
An existential threat
Security is the condition of being protected from or not
exposed to danger. Climate change is a security concern
of existential scale since it threatens the existence of
entire nations, affects water and food security, biodiversity,
and results in forced migration and potential conflicts.
Climate change security is tightly linked to sovereignty
and control over resources. For instance, when sea levels
rise, resulting in loss of territory, or when land becomes
hostile to life and agriculture, it creates threats to a
nation’s wealth and military security. Climate change
inevitably affects the socioeconomic situation of a coun-
try and its population, especially the economic, health
and food pillars of human security. The consequences
of climate change create inequalities and expose people
to new diseases. Climate change security is paramount at
global, national, community and individual levels.
Arctic amplification
The Arctic has multiple definitions, but often it is referred
to as the land and sea areas of eight Arctic states:
Canada, Denmark (via Greenland), Finland, Iceland,
Norway, Russia, Sweden and the United States. One
common definition of the Arctic is the area beyond the
Arctic Circle, the parallel of latitude located at 66.33N.
Additionally, the Arctic includes the territory of the High
Arctic Seas, that is, the international waters of the Arctic
Ocean at least 200 nautical miles away from the shores of
the Arctic coastal states.
The Arctic is especially vulnerable to climate change.
As per the U.S. National Snow and Ice Data Center,
over the past 30 years the Arctic has warmed at roughly
twice the rate of the entire globe, a phenomenon known
as Arctic amplification. The Arctic Ocean has lost more
than 40% of its summer sea ice since the 1980s and is
expected to be ice-free as early as the summers of the
2030s. According to the “Arctic Report Card 2020,”
produced by the U.S. National Oceanic and Atmospheric
Administration, the Arctic experienced exceptionally
warm spring air temperatures across Siberia and the
lowest June snow cover across the Eurasian Arctic in the
past 54 years. In 2020, extreme wildfires in the Sakha
Republic of northern Russia were caused by unparal-
leled warm air temperatures and record snow loss for the
Arctic region.
Hence, climate change in the Arctic is not a distant
prospect, but a phenomenon experienced and felt by
local communities and Indigenous peoples. There have
been occurrences of collapsing infrastructure as a result
of permafrost thaw and landslides. Indigenous peoples
suffer from losses of traditional livelihoods because of the
rising temperatures that interfere with reindeer herding
and other activities.
Protecting the environment
It was 30 years ago that the Arctic states recognized the
protection of the environment as an imminent concern.
In 1991, the Arctic Environmental Protection Strategy
(AEPS) was signed by ministers of all the Arctic coun-
tries in Rovaniemi, Finland. Environmental concerns,
being a politically neutral topic, were mutually accepted
by all parties and required collaborative actions to
solve. Cooperation under AEPS subsequently led to the
formation of the Arctic Council, an intergovernmental
forum for promoting cooperation among Arctic nations,
A
Sea ice is visible from a NASA Operation IceBridge research aircraft off the
northwest coast of Greenland. GETTY IMAGES

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Indigenous communities and other Arctic inhabitants.
The Arctic Council, founded in 1996 by the Ottawa
Declaration, is composed of eight member nations,
six permanent Indigenous groups and observers (non-
Arctic states, intergovernmental and interparliamentary
organizations and nongovernmental organizations). The
Ottawa Declaration provided the opportunity for non-
Arctic countries and governmental and nongovernmental
organizations with Arctic interests to participate actively,
as observers, in the work of the council, and to draw on
their experiences.
The work of the Arctic Council was originally orga-
nized into four working groups that originated from the
AEPS: the Arctic Monitoring and Assessment Program
(AMAP), Conservation of Arctic Flora and Fauna
(CAFF), Protection of the Arctic Marine Environment
(PAME), and Emergency Prevention, Preparedness
and Response (see Figure 1). In 1998, the Sustainable
Development Working Group (SDWG) was founded to
address the human dimensions of the Arctic, focusing
on the three pillars of sustainable development: social
equity, economic development and environmental protec-
tion. The sixth working group, the Arctic Contaminants
Action Program (ACAP), was originally founded as an
Arctic Council plan to address pollution sources identified
through AMAP. It became the sixth permanent working
group in 2006, aimed at providing a strengthening and
supporting mechanism to encourage national actions to
reduce emissions and other releases of pollutants.
Since their formation, the Arctic Council working
groups have facilitated over 100 projects with significant
contribution to the understanding of environmental and
human change in the Arctic. All working groups have had
projects that studied climate change. The SDWG has led
four projects directly addressing climate change: Arctic
Adaptation Exchange: Facilitating Adaptation to Climate
Change; Arctic Indigenous Youth, Climate Change and
Food Culture; the Economy of the North; and the Arctic
as a Food Producing Region. AMAP’s work on climate
change has been contributing to Intergovernmental
Panel on Climate Change reports. Among others, the
AMAP working group led a project titled Climate Issues:
Snow, Water, Ice and Permafrost in the Arctic. ACAP
contributed with work on phasing out ozone-depleting
substances and fluorinated greenhouse gases at fish and
seafood processing enterprises. PAME’s work on Specially
Source: Arctic Council
Protection of the
Arctic Marine
Environment (PAME)
Sustainable
Development Working
Group (SDWG)
Arctic Monitoring and
Asse ssmen t Progr am
(AMA P)
Conservation of
Arctic Flora and
Fauna (CAFF)
Emergency Prevention,
Prepar ednes s and
Response (EPPR)
Arctic Contaminants
Action Program
(ACAP)
Figure 1: Arctic Council Working Groups
Source: Emissions Database for Global Atmospheric Research (EDGAR)
Figure 2: Arctic states’ share of global CO2 emissions, 2019
U.S.
Russia
Canada
Norway
Sweden
Finland
Denmark
Iceland
0% 14%12%10%8%6%4%2%
13.43
4.71
1.54
0.13
0.12
0.11
0.08
0.01

A Russian man checks a reindeer's halter in the tundra region north of
Naryan-Mar, Russia. Climate change has affected the traditional lifestyles
of the Arctic’s Indigenous peoples. REUTERS
Designated Arctic Marine Areas has been influential for
climate change science. CAFF’s work focused on climate
change impact on Arctic biodiversity.
The work of the Arctic Council is organized on a
rotational, two-year cycling chairmanship principle, with
each Arctic country taking its turn. At the end of each
chairmanship, Arctic states sign joint declarations reaf-
firming the Arctic states’ commitment to the well-being of
the inhabitants of the Arctic, to sustainable development
and to protecting the Arctic environment. Since 1996,
10 joint declarations have been signed, each including
climate change as one of the focal points of coopera-
tion. However, during the last ministerial meeting in
Rovaniemi in 2019, at the end of the Finnish chairman-
ship, the Arctic states failed to sign a joint declaration
due to the U.S. representatives’ diverging view of climate
change issues. Instead, all eight foreign ministers signed
the Joint Ministerial Statement 2019, which did not
mention climate change.
Scientific and practical knowledge generated by the
Arctic Council resulted in three international agreements
on oil spill response, search and rescue, and scientific
cooperation in the Arctic. Commitments addressing
climate change, however, remained a matter of national
choice for each country.
CO2 emissions
The Arctic, represented by eight Arctic states, is not a
homogeneous area. It is very diverse in terms of politi-
cal systems and economic and social development. The
Arctic states collectively contributed 20.13% of global
CO2 emissions in 2019 (see Figure 2), with the highest
individual share by the U.S. (13.43%), followed by Russia
(4.71%) and Canada (1.54%), reflecting higher emission
levels by industrialized countries.
Apart from gross CO2 emissions, another way to
look at climate change commitments by countries is to
trace their CO2 emissions per capita. Carbon emissions
per capita are measured as the total amount of carbon
dioxide (in tons) emitted by the country as a consequence
of all relevant human activity, such as production and
consumption activities, divided by the population of the
country. The Arctic states had high CO2 emissions in
2019 per capita when compared to the global average of
4.93 tons CO2 per capita (see Figure 3).
While most Arctic countries have decreased their levels
of CO2 emissions (in tons) per capita as compared to 1990,
there is still a long way to go. Denmark, Finland and Sweden
on average reduced their emissions by 40%. Sweden’s

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emissions of 4.45 tons CO2 per capita were the lowest
among the Arctic countries and below the world average of
4.49 tons CO2 per capita in 2019. How much each country
has achieved in terms of reduction of tons CO2 per capita
depends on many factors, such as pace of industrial develop-
ment, historically determined energy mix and investments
into renewable energy sources. In Russia, for instance, the
recession that resulted from the dissolution of the Soviet
Union had already caused a reduction in CO2 emission
during the 1990s. At the same time, Iceland, with 11.53 tons
CO2 per capita in 2019, was the top CO2 emitter per capita
in the European Union, with emissions mainly driven by air
transport and metal production. In Sweden, low emissions
stem from 80% of electricity being produced from nuclear
and hydroelectric power. Moreover, in Sweden wind power
has been the fastest-growing source of renewable energy.
Paris Agreement
In 2015, world nations agreed to commit to and unite
efforts to combat climate change by signing the Paris
Agreement. According to the Paris Agreement, parties
should limit their emissions to secure a global tempera-
ture rise this century well below 2 degrees Celsius. The
Paris Agreement replaced the Kyoto Protocol, an earlier
international treaty designed to curb the release of green-
house gases. The Paris Agreement entered into force in
2016 and was signed by 195 countries and ratified by 190
as of January 2021. Under the agreement, each country
sets its own emission-reduction targets, known as nation-
ally determined contributions (NDCs).
As of 2021, all Arctic countries are committed to
the Paris Agreement goals. The U.S. withdrew from
the agreement during Donald Trump’s presidency but
rejoined in 2021 under Joe Biden’s presidency. The
level of ambition to curb emissions differs significantly
among Arctic states (see Table 1). The Nordic Arctic
countries have by far the most ambitious goals. Finland,
for example, plans to become carbon neutral by 2035.
The long-term target for Sweden is net zero green-
house gas emissions by 2045, and the latest midterm
targets include emissions, as compared to 1990, to be
40% lower by 2020 and 63% lower by 2030. In 2020,
Norway submitted an enhanced climate target under
the Paris Agreement: to reduce emissions by at least
50%, and to 55% by 2030 compared to 1990 levels.
Iceland is aiming for a 55% reduction in greenhouse
gas emissions by 2030 and to achieve carbon neutral-
ity before 2040. Canada and Denmark have identical
goals of 70% emissions reductions by 2030 and climate
neutrality by 2050.
Russia submitted its first NDC in 2021. It aims for
70% emissions reductions by 2030 relative to the 1990
level, considering the maximum possible absorptive
capacity of forests and other ecosystems, which translates
into 30% reductions by 2030. This target allows emissions
to rise significantly, as Russia’s emissions decreased drasti-
cally after the collapse of the Soviet Union and remain
at about half the level they were in 1990. Four long-term
scenarios allow Russia to reach carbon neutrality closer to
the end of the century.
Source: Emissions Database for Global Atmospheric Research (EDGAR)
Figure 3: Tons CO2 emissions in Arctic states, 1990 and 2019
20
15
10
5
0
U.S. Canada Russia Finland Iceland Norway SwedenDenmark
tons CO2 emissions per capita 1990 tons CO2 emissions per capita 2019

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The change in presidential administrations in the U.S.
is expected to bring a shift in climate change policy. Biden
announced plans to restore the U.S. as a world leader in
climate action and appointed former Secretary of State
John Kerry as a special climate envoy.
Arctic strategies
Arctic strategies are represented in documents in which
Arctic states outline their priorities, initiatives and actions
regarding the Arctic. Strategies serve as guiding docu-
ments for short- and midterm development of the Arctic
region. People, peace and the climate are at the center
of Sweden’s strategy for the Arctic region (2020). The
Norwegian government’s Arctic Policy (2020) takes a
broad-based approach to climate change, stating that
“climate change presents unprecedented global challenges
with a particularly strong impact in the Arctic, but this is
also accompanied by widespread opportunities for reform
and adaptation to a new reality.” In the draft of its Arctic
strategy, Finland envisages a pioneering role in climate
change mitigation and abandoning the use of fossil fuels
through the development of decentralized, renewable
energy production. Overall, Arctic strategies incorporate
climate change, and in the newer strategies the states also
recognize the Arctic’s role in climate change adaptations
and solutions that can benefit the rest of the world.
Arctic Council observers
Since its formation, the Arctic Council has accepted 13
non-Arctic states as observers. Observers are accepted
if they fulfill a set of criteria determined by the Arctic
Council (see Table 2). As seen from the table, observ-
ers need to have, among other attributes, the political
willingness and financial ability to contribute to the work
of the Arctic Council.
During the ministerial meeting in Kiruna, Sweden, in
2013, five major Asian economies (China, India, Japan,
Singapore and South Korea) were granted observer
status. The total of all non-Arctic observer states’ CO2
emissions equals 47.9% of total global emissions (see
Figure 4). Jointly, eight Arctic states and 13 non-Arctic
states contribute to 68.02% of total global CO2 emissions.
Hence, shared knowledge and solutions as part of Arctic
cooperation become significant on the planetary scale.
A way forward
The scientific and international cooperation record
of the Arctic Council gives hope that this cooperation
can broaden in addressing the climate change security
of the Arctic in a more concrete way, including joint
commitments and international agreements as part of
Arctic Council work. There are already some tangible
examples of such cooperation. Russia, as chair the Arctic
Council from 2021-2023, is leading a project to open
the year-round research station Snowflake, fully powered
by renewables. It will offer a platform for testing and
demonstrating environmentally friendly energy solutions
for remote Arctic communities and will serve as a hub for
international cooperation toward a sustainable Arctic.
Furthermore, the Arctic Council leads a project on
Sources: NDCs, government publications. Compiled by the author.
Table 1: Paris Agreement commitments by Arctic states
*The U.S. plans to develop a nationally determined contribution (NDC), which is required for parties to the Paris Agreement.
**provisional
Country
Midterm Goal
Net Zero Emissions
Finland
Sweden
Norway
Denmark
Iceland
Canada
U.S.
Russia
39% emissions reductions by 2030 compared to 2005 levels.
63% emissions reductions by 2030 compared to 1990 levels.
55% emissions reductions by 2030 compared to 1990 levels.
70% emissions reductions by 2030 compared to 1990 levels.
40% emissions reductions by 2030 compared to 1990 levels.
70% emissions reductions by 2030 compared to 1990 levels.
N/A*
30% emissions reductions by 2030 compared to 1990 levels.
by 2035
by 2045
by 2050
by 2050
by 2040
by 2050
by 2050**
Four Scenarios

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Source: Arctic Council Rules of Procedure, Annex 2
Table 2: Criteria for Observer’s admittance to Arctic Council
Observer Criteria Description
Accepts and
supports • The objectives of the Arctic Council dened in the Ottawa Declaration.
Recognizes • The Arctic states’ sovereignty, sovereign rights and jurisdiction in the Arctic,
and an extensive legal framework applied to the Arctic Ocean.
Respects
• The values, interests, cultures and traditions of Arctic Indigenous peoples and other
Arctic inhabitants.
Demonstrates
• A political willingness, as well as a nancial ability, to contribute to the work of the
council’s permanent participants and other Arctic Indigenous peoples.
• Interests and exper tise relevant to the work of the Arctic Council.
• An ability to suppor t the work of the Arctic Council, including through partnerships
with member states and permanent participants.
Source: Emissions Database for Global Atmospheric Research (EDGAR)
Figure 4: Non-Arctic observer states’ share of global CO2 emissions
China
India
Japan
Germany
South Korea
United Kingdom
Italy
Poland
France
Spain
Netherlands
Singapore
Switzerland
0% 5% 10% 15% 20% 25% 30% 35%
30.3
6.8
3.0
1.9
1.7
1.0
0.9
0.8
0.8
0.7
0.4
0.1
0.1

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sustainable Arctic shipping, providing options for reduc-
ing black carbon emissions in the Arctic, such as a switch
to liquefied natural gas in the short run and a switch to
methanol, biofuels or hydrogen fuels in the long run.
Another pathway to address climate change security
in the Arctic is via the work of the Arctic Economic
Council (AEC). The AEC was established in 2014 to
facilitate Arctic business-to-business and economic devel-
opment and provide advice and a business perspective on
specific areas of cooperation in the circumpolar region
and the activities in the Arctic. The AEC comprises 42
representatives (each of the eight Arctic states and six
permanent participants of the Arctic Council is entitled
to name up to three business representatives to the AEC).
The AEC is composed solely of business representa-
tives. In 2019, the Arctic Council and the AEC signed a
memorandum of understanding to regularly exchange
information, to participate in each other’s projects and to
consider joint activities where appropriate.
The exchange of knowledge in trade and busi-
ness is essential for addressing climate change security.
Take China as an example. China is the world’s largest
greenhouse gas emitter and produces 30% of the world’s
CO2 emissions. It is also one of the largest steelmak-
ers in the world. In October 2020, China promised to
become carbon neutral before 2060 and to begin cutting
its emissions within the next 10 years. The actions taken
by China affect the entire world and the rapidly melting
Arctic in particular. Chinese interest in the Arctic and its
observer status in the Arctic Council provide opportuni-
ties for unique Arctic know-how and technologies to aid
Chinese climate change plans.
The Nordic regions of Norway, Sweden and Finland
already produce 85% of all of their electricity from
renewable sources, so China can learn how to fuel
industrial development using renewably generated
power. Companies that offer a transition to clean energy,
energy efficiency, and that are capable of exporting to
China would benefit the most. In the Swedish Arctic,
the HYBRIT project (a joint venture between util-
ity company Vattenfall, iron ore producer LKAB and
steelmaker SSAB) will use hydrogen in place of coal to
process iron ore and will ensure a completely fossil-free
process for steel making by 2035. The initiative has
the potential to reduce Sweden’s total carbon dioxide
emissions by 10%. If the same steel-making technol-
ogy is applied in China, it would reduce CO2 emissions
considerably.
So, what can Arctic Council and AEC cooperation
do to address climate security? Cooperation can be built
on knowledge exchange around climate change solutions.
Practically, it can include a platform for marketing Arctic
solutions, which would be available to Arctic Council
observers and other international players. Nordic Arctic
countries with ambitious Paris Agreement goals can share
their approaches and solutions to benefit other Arctic
countries and the international community.
In March 2021, Ruslan Edelgeriev, advisor to the
Russian president on climate change, held a video meet-
ing with John Kerry, the U.S. special climate envoy. They
stressed the importance of a nonpoliticized approach to
the Paris Agreement. They also discussed the importance
of considering the Arctic region as a territory for joint
application of efforts by Russia and the U.S. in combating
climate change.
Scientific and business cooperation on climate issues
within existing Arctic platforms benefits not only the
interests of big players such as Russia and the U.S., but
the entire world. Building on existing mechanisms and
continued dialogue, the Arctic cooperation model can
have a viable contribution to the achievement of Paris
Agreement goals worldwide.
Conclusions
The historically strong cooperation in the area of
environmental protection among Arctic states has
proved to be successful due to its neutral, nonpoliticized
nature. Climate change is an important issue on the
agenda of Arctic Council cooperation and in the Arctic
strategies of the Arctic states. Commitment to the Paris
Agreement by the Arctic states will affect the future of
climate change security. Collectively, Arctic states and
non-Arctic observer states to the Arctic Council contrib-
ute to nearly 70% of global CO2 emissions. While scien-
tific cooperation is important and will continue, adding
cooperation in the sphere of business, innovation and
climate change solutions within existing Arctic platforms
can yield significant reductions in the global emissions
driving climate change. o
A Canadian ice navigator, left, briefs the captain of the Finnish icebreaker MSV
Nordica while in the Bering Sea on an international research mission to record
environmental changes. THE ASSOCIATED PRESS