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The Influence of Outcome Knowledge: Hindsight Bias in the Context of a Suicide

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T
HE
I
NFLUENCE OF
O
UTCOME
K
NOWLEDGE
:
H
INDSIGHT
B
IAS IN THE
C
ONTEXT OF A
S
UICIDE
Hailey BeBeau and April Bleske-Rechek
Department of Psychology, University of Wisconsin-Eau Claire
Please cite as:
BeBeau, H., & Bleske-Rechek, A. (2021). The influence of outcome knowledge: Hindsight bias
in the context of suicide. Academia Letters, Article 2649. https://doi.org/10.20935/AL2649.
Author Note
The authors declare no conflicts of interest. This research was funded by faculty/student
collaborative research grants from the Office of Research and Sponsored Programs at the
University of Wisconsin-Eau Claire.
The authors thank Samuel Rechek for comments on previous drafts of this article.
Correspondence concerning this article should be addressed to April Bleske-Rechek, PhD,
Department of Psychology, University of Wisconsin-Eau Claire, 105 Garfield Avenue, Eau Claire,
WI 54702, United States. Phone: 715-836-4641, Email: bleskeal@uwec.edu
Abstract
Suicides are often followed by intense blame of self and others, such that those who are left behind
feel they or others should have been able to see the signs. What may seem clear in hindsight,
however, is often unclear in foresight. In Study 1, we investigated the effect of outcome knowledge
on college students’ (N=345) perceptions of a suicide. Students attending a public U.S. university
first read a hypothetical conversation between a student and her professor. Then, they received an
outcome knowledge manipulation: They either read that the student went on to die by suicide or
they read a sentence that had no mention of suicide. Afterwards, participants evaluated the
likelihood of suicide, the student’s depression severity, and the student’s and professor’s
behaviors. Analyses revealed that outcome knowledge influenced participants’ judgments; most
notably, participants who received outcome knowledge of the suicide viewed the professor more
negatively: as doing too little, too late. In Study 2, we replicated the basic study design with an
online sample of adults from the U.S. and U.K. (N=237). In this sample, knowledge of a suicide
produced more negative evaluations of the student and resulted again in less favorable evaluations
of the professor. Our findings imply that hindsight bias may lead individuals to engage in
unwarranted blame of suicide survivors.
Keywords: hindsight bias, outcome knowledge, depression severity, suicide, blame,
suicide risk, suicide survivors
The Influence of Outcome Knowledge: Hindsight Bias in the Context of a Suicide
Suicide has tremendous emotional
impact on those who are left behind (“suicide
survivors”),
1
who experience enduring guilt,
shame, anger, and sadness.
2-7
Some of this
shame and guilt is rooted in feelings that
suicide survivors should have been able to
predict or prevent the suicide.
8
This feeling of
“they should have known” is a manifestation
of hindsight bias, the tendency to perceive an
event as more likely and obvious after it has
occurred.
9
As people struggle to make sense
of an event, they search and update their
memories, taking note of antecedent causes
that fit the event, thereby modifying their
recollection of what they knew before the
event occurred and overestimating—in
hindsight—its foreseeability.
10
The issue with suicide, of course, is
its unpredictability. Although there are
identifiable factors that distinguish
individuals of lower versus higher suicide
risk—such as having plans of suicide,
11
a
desire to die,
12
hopelessness,
13
anhedonia,
14
and perceived burdensomeness
15
—suicide is
still difficult to predict at the individual
level.
16
Positive prediction rates are low, and
false positive rates are high.
17
Moreover,
false negative rates are also high: In one
study, nearly half of people who went on to
die by suicide had been rated as low risk for
suicide by both their general practitioner and
mental health specialist within the 12 months
prior to the suicide.
18
It appears the signals
that suicide survivors attend to in hindsight
are unlikely to have allowed for prediction of
the suicide in foresight, and this may account
for the blame they experience.
We know of just one study that has
investigated this idea systematically.
19
In that
study, participants read a vignette of a girl
who displayed signs of suicide risk and then
were either told or not told that the girl
subsequently died by suicide. Those
participants who were told of the suicide
viewed a suicide as more expected and placed
more blame on the girl’s immediate family
members.
19
In the current studies, we utilize
a between-subjects experimental design to
elucidate the effect of suicide knowledge on
outsiders’ judgments of a suicide event.
STUDY 1
Method
Participants
Participants were 345 undergraduate
college students (M
age =
19.54 ± 1.37; 210
women, 115 men, 20 other/unreported) from
a public university in the Midwestern U.S.,
where 88% of enrollment is White. They
participated voluntarily through a pencil and
paper class activity devoted to obtaining
“responses to symptoms of depression.”
Materials and Procedure
Participants read a hypothetical
conversation between a struggling student,
“Jordan,” and her professor. There were two
manipulated variables, procuring four
versions of the conversation. The first
manipulation was suicide risk: at one level,
Jordan’s responses reflected symptoms
associated with high suicide risk (such as
hopelessness); at the other, her symptoms
reflected low suicide risk (such as
loneliness). Table 1 shows excerpts of the
conversation in which Jordan’s response
differed as a function of suicide risk. The
second manipulation, our principal variable
of interest, was outcome knowledge. As
shown in Table 2, some participants read a
final sentence that Jordan died by suicide
soon after the conversation with her
professor, while other participants read a
sentence that did not mention a suicide. Then,
participants were asked to consider the
conversation they had read and evaluate the
likelihood of a suicide. They also responded
to several statements about Jordan and her
professor (see Table 3). Complete materials
and datasets are available at
https://osf.io/4ynsw/.
Results and Discussion
Table 3 shows descriptive statistics
for the effects of suicide risk and outcome
knowledge on participants’ judgments. Table
3 also shows the inferential statistics for these
effects and the interactive effect of suicide
risk and outcome knowledge. Suicide risk
had a prominent effect: participants who read
a conversation with symptoms implying high
suicide risk rated a suicide as more likely,
more obvious, and less surprising than did
those who read the conversation implying
low suicide risk.
Regarding our principal research
focus, there was an effect of outcome
knowledge for eight of 16 primary outcome
variables. Compared to participants who
were not informed of the suicide, participants
who were informed of the suicide rated a
suicide as more likely. They also agreed more
that Jordan’s depression was severe and that
she should have sought professional help
sooner. As shown in Figure 1, the largest
effects of outcome knowledge were in
judgments of Jordan’s professor: Those who
learned of the suicide agreed more that the
professor could have done more and should
have intervened sooner, and they agreed less
that the professor handled the situation well.
Outcome knowledge affected judgments
consistently whether Jordan’s symptoms
suggested low risk or high risk for suicide.
We predicted that outcome
knowledge would not affect responses to two
validity check items that pertained to
Jordan’s specific behaviors as described in
the scenario, and it did not (see Table 3).
Across conditions, participants agreed
strongly with the facts of the case, which
reassures us that participants did read the
conversation.
Overall, the findings of Study 1
showed that outcome knowledge affected
judgments of suicide likelihood as well as
judgments of the person who died by suicide
and their suicide survivors (in this case, the
professor). Because the study was a between-
subjects design in which participants were
randomly assigned to conditions, participants
who learned of the suicide had no way of
knowing there was another possible outcome
(i.e., no suicide) and they evaluated the
situation in light of the outcome knowledge
they were given. In other words, with the
same conversation in mind that others were
given, but knowledge of a suicide at hand, the
suicide seemed more likely to occur, the
depression seemed more severe, and Jordan’s
professor was perceived as doing too little,
too late. If these effects are real, they have the
weighty implication that all else equal,
knowledge of a suicide outcome can lead to
negative evaluations of the person who died
as well as their survivors, and therefore that
hindsight bias may underly the guilt and
shame suicide survivors face.
Table 1
Excerpts of the Conversation between Jordan and her Professor, as a Function of Suicide Risk
Jordan’s Responses in Study 1 Jordan’s Responses in Study 2
In response to professor
saying…
Low Suicide Risk
High Suicide Risk
(Moderate Suicide Risk)
…how is college going
otherwise?
I honestly have been struggling
feeling a little sad here and
there… I have been managing it
okay I think. I still finish most of
my homework on time.”
I honestly have been struggling
with being really frustrated and
sad… It is really draining so I
haven’t been able to do a lot of
homework.”
Well, I have been pretty lonely
and sad so far… I still finish most
of my homework on time, but it's
hard and I need to force myself to
do it.”
Have you been able to talk
to any friends from your dorm
about this?
“I don’t know… My family and
friends from home are telling me
that it will get better…but I
don’t know if I necessarily
believe that right now.”
“…I don’t think feeling this way
is ever going to get better … so
why try to connect with people
when I might not be around for
that long anyway.”
“…People from home are telling
me that it will get better by the end
of the semester, but I don’t know if
I necessarily believe that – so why
even try to connect.”
Are you afraid you won’t
connect with them in the time
you have left for the semester?
Or would you rather just be
alone because you think you are
the only one feeling this way?
“…This is a long time for me to
be in a bad mood and it is really
preventing me from being
social. I haven’t felt like that
before and I am starting to get
really upset about it.”
“…This is a long time for me to
be like this and I’m done trying
to fix it. I sometimes think I
could just end it all, and I feel
okay with that.”
“…I haven’t felt like this before
and I am starting to get really
upset about it. This is a long time
for me to be like this and I’m done
trying to fix it.”
After you finish the quiz,
let’s take a walk over to
counseling services. I think it
would be good for you to get
connected to some resources to
help you through this.
“…I’m not one to ask for help,
but it might be helpful I guess.”
“I guess.” “…I’ll think about it.”
Table 2
The Outcome Knowledge Manipulation Used in Study 1 and Study 2
Final segment
No Suicide
Suicide
The next day:
Jordan shows up to take her quiz. She and her
professor walk over to counseling services to find
help.
Jordan never shows up to take her quiz. Her
professor finds out from the Dean of Students that
she died by suicide the night before.
Table 3
Study 1 Descriptive and Inferential Statistics: Effects of Suicide Risk and Outcome Knowledge on College Students’ Ratings
Suicide Risk
Outcome Knowledge
Main Effect
of Suicide
Risk
Main Effect
of Outcome
Knowledge
Interactive
Effect
Low
High
Suicide
M
(
SD
)
M
(
SD
)
M
(
SD
)
M
(
SD
)
p
(ω
2
)
p
(ω
2
)
p
(ω
2
)
Ratings of Suicide
:
Suicide likelihood
32.10 (19.08)
50.46 (22.07)
38.46 (21.41)
44.99 (23.40)
<.001 (.17)
.003 (.02)
.330 (.00)
Jordan too stable to die by
suicide
4.01 (1.60)
3.03 (1.42)
3.47 (1.56)
3.56 (1.61)
<.001 (.09)
.610 (.00)
.515 (.00)
Suicide would be obvious
1.78 (0.82)
2.53 (1.10)
2.15 (0.99)
2.17 (1.09)
<.001 (.13)
.799 (.00)
.605 (.00)
Suicide would be surprising
3.50 (1.00)
2.47 (0.98)
2.90 (1.09)
3.06 (1.14)
<.001 (.21)
.175 (.00)
.883 (.00)
Ratings of the Student:
Jordan’s depression was
severe
3.09 (0.71)
3.74 (0.80)
3.24 (0.75)
3.60 (0.85)
<.001 (.16)
<.001
(.05)
.405 (.00)
Jordan felt hopeful
2.49 (1.35)
2.00 (1.36)
2.39 (1.31)
2.10 (1.42)
<.001 (.03)
.038 (.01)
.611 (.00)
Jordan was trying to find
solutions
3.82 (1.56)
3.54 (1.52)
3.85 (1.56)
3.51 (1.52)
.095 (.01)
.044 (.01)
.988 (.00)
Jordan should have taken
better care of herself
4.21 (1.34)
4.36 (1.43)
4.23 (1.39)
4.35 (1.38)
.319 (.00)
.428 (.00)
.295 (.00)
Suicide Risk
Outcome Knowledge
Main Effect
of Suicide
Risk
Main Effect
of Outcome
Knowledge
Interactive
Effect
Low
High
Suicide
M
(
SD
)
M
(
SD
)
M
(
SD
)
M
(
SD
)
p
(ω
2
)
p
(ω
2
)
p
(ω
2
)
Jordan should have sought
professional help
4.91 (1.44)
5.38 (1.35)
4.75 (1.44)
5.54 (1.28)
<.001 (.03)
<.001 (.08)
.463 (.00)
Jordan is a positive person
3.24 (1.19)
2.81 (1.12)
3.13 (1.15)
2.91 (1.19)
<.001 (.03)
.061 (.01)
.001 (.03)
Jordan could have tried harder
to make friends
4.38 (1.41)
4.31 (1.34)
4.30 (1.32)
4.39 (1.43)
.670 (.00)
.562 (.00)
.391 (.00)
Jordan had an accurate
perception of her
circumstances
2.91 (1.45)
3.29 (1.42)
3.20 (1.41)
3.00 (1.47)
.015 (.01)
.198 (.00)
.332 (.00)
Ratings of Others:
Others should have tried
harder to connect with Jordan
4.60 (1.43)
4.54 (1.36)
4.47 (1.35)
4.66 (1.43)
.696 (.00)
.228 (.00)
.791 (.00)
Ratings of the Professor:
Jordan’s professor could have
done more to help
3.42 (1.36)
4.11 (1.60)
3.24
(1.30)
4.29 (1.55)
<.001 (.05)
<.001 (.12)
.649 (.00)
Jordan’s professor should have
intervened sooner
3.56 (1.34)
3.82 (1.48)
3.27 (1.28)
4.10 (1.43)
.072 (.01)
<.001 (.08)
.649 (.00)
Jordan’s professor handled the
situation well
5.56 (1.13)
5.09 (1.42)
5.88 (0.97)
4.78 (1.36)
<.001 (.03)
<.001 (.18)
.088 (.00)
Suicide Risk
Outcome Knowledge
Main Effect
of Suicide
Risk
Main Effect
of Outcome
Knowledge
Interactive
Effect
Low
High
No
Suicide
Suicide
M
(
SD
)
M
(
SD
)
M
(
SD
)
M
(
SD
)
p
(ω
2
)
p
(ω
2
)
p
(ω
2
)
Validity Checks (no effects predicted):
Jordan was not sleeping well
6.45 (0.57)
6.51 (0.74)
6.47 (0.66)
6.49 (0.66)
.430 (.00)
.759 (.00)
.584
(.00)
Jordan missed class a few
times
6.25 (0.96)
6.06 (1.25)
6.22 (1.01)
6.10 (1.22)
.110 (.00)
.302 (.00)
.264 (.00)
Note. ω
2
indicates variance accounted for (effect size). All items began with the phrase, “Think back to the conversation Jordan and
her professor had. Based on their conversation,…” Ratings of suicide likelihood were on a 0 to 100% scale, ratings of depression,
surprise, and obviousness were on a five-point scale (1=Not at all to 5=Extremely), and all other ratings were on a seven-point scale
(1=Strongly Disagree to 7=Strongly Agree), where higher values represent more agreement.
STUDY 2
Method
Participants
In Study 2, we collected data from
middle-aged adults who were employed in
education to determine if, by virtue of their
age, vocation, and greater likelihood of being
a parent, they would be more likely to
identify with the professor than with the
student. Participants were recruited via the
online platform Prolific, which allowed us to
select participants by country (U.S. and
U.K.), age (30-70), and occupation
(education). The final sample included 237
adults (60 men, 175 women, 1
other/unreported; 74% White; M
age
= 41.49 ±
9.40). Of the sample, 57% were parents; 57%
taught primary school and 43% taught
college students.
Materials and Procedure
As in Study 1, participants read a
hypothetical conversation between a college
student and her professor. We again
manipulated outcome knowledge (No
Suicide or Suicide; see Table 2), but we did
not manipulate the student’s suicide risk,
which was presented as moderate in both
conditions.
Results and Discussion
Table 4 shows descriptive and
inferential statistics for the effect of outcome
knowledge on participants’ judgments.
Outcome knowledge had a significant effect
on some, but not all, judgments. Participants
informed of the suicide rated suicide as less
obvious and more surprising, and--perhaps as
an indication of their search for explanation-
-they also agreed more that Jordan seemed
too stable to die by suicide. Moreover, they
agreed more that Jordan should have sought
professional help sooner and less that she was
a positive person. Results for two of the three
original statements about the professor also
replicated in this educator sample: Those
who learned of the suicide agreed more that
the professor could have done more to help,
and they agreed less that the professor
handled the situation well (see Figure 1).
We probed effects of parental status.
Parental status did not interact with outcome
knowledge to predict ratings. Instead, it was
an independent predictor: averaged across
outcome knowledge conditions, parents rated
a suicide as more likely and less surprising
than non-parents did. They also agreed more
that Jordan could have taken better care of
herself and tried harder to make friends, that
she should have sought professional help
sooner, that the professor could have done
more, and that others should have tried harder
to connect with Jordan. Age was correlated
with parental status but not with responses to
these statements. These effects of parental
status deserve further study, as they imply
that parents may react to a depressed college
student with heightened perceptions of
suicide risk and negativity.
General Discussion
The human brain is well-designed to
make sense of events and seamlessly update
memory in light of new information.
20
One
byproduct of that capacity is hindsight bias—
the tendency to view the past differently once
an outcome is known. Hindsight bias may be
particularly likely when an outcome—such
as suicide—is impactful and when
individuals are motivated to make sense of
it.
20-22
In two studies, we have documented
evidence that hindsight bias occurs in this
context. All else equal, those who were
informed of an eventual suicide perceived the
circumstances surrounding it differently and
tended to place more negative judgment on
those involved. Indeed, mental health
practitioners might be particularly
susceptible to hindsight bias because their
expertise and experience may lead them to
feel like they know when a suicide is more or
less likely to occur.
23
We propose that
therapists be well-trained in the current low
predictive validity of various risk factors
17,18
and be warned that, in light of a suicide,
individuals are prone to reinterpret
circumstances that in foresight would have
been ambiguous.
19
Helping suicide survivors
see that hindsight bias can induce
unwarranted blame may facilitate a healthy
healing process.
Table 4
Study 2 Descriptive and Inferential Statistics: Effects of Outcome Knowledge on Community Adults’ Ratings
Outcome Knowledge
Main Effect of Outcome Knowledge
Suicide
M
(
SD
)
M
(
SD
)
M
diff
[95% CI]
p
(ω
2
)
Ratings of Suicide:
Suicide likelihood 26.52 (19.33)
25.41 (17.11)
1.11 [-3.55, 5.78] .639 (.00)
Jordan too stable to die by suicide
3.69 (1.47)
4.21 (1.27)
-
0.53 [
-
0.88,
-
0.17]
.004 (.03)
Suicide would be obvious 1.63 (0.72)
1.43 (0.66)
0.21 [0.03, 0.38] .020 (.02)
Suicide would be surprising
3.01 (1.11)
3.43 (0.97)
-
0.43 [
-
0.69,
-
0.16]
.002 (.04)
Ratings of the Student:
Jordan’s depression was severe
2.93 (0.71)
3.02 (0.75)
-
0.09 [
-
0.28, 0.09]
.324 (.00)
Jordan felt hopeful 2.41 (1.03)
2.18 (0.95)
0.23 [-0.02, 0.48] .077 (.01)
Jordan was trying to find solutions 4.23 (1.38)
3.86 (1.59)
0.37 [-0.01, 0.76] .054 (.01)
Jordan should have taken better care of herself 4.28 (1.25)
4.16 (1.34)
0.12 [-0.21, 0.45] .468 (.00)
Jordan should have sought professional help 4.63 (1.24)
5.17 (1.28)
-0.54 [-0.86, -0.22] .001 (.04)
Jordan is a positive person 3.33 (1.14)
2.83 (1.29)
0.50 [0.19, 0.81] .002 (.04)
Jordan could have tried harder to make friends 4.43 (1.08)
4.16 (1.37)
0.28 [-0.04, 0.60] .084 (.01)
Jordan had an
accurate perception of her circumstances
3.62 (1.21)
2.91 (1.44)
0.71 [0.37, 1.05]
<.001 (.06)
Outcome Knowledge
Main Effect of Outcome Knowledge
Suicide
M
(
SD
)
M
(
SD
)
M
diff
[95% CI]
p
(ω
2
)
Ratings of Others:
Others should have tried harder to connect with Jordan
4.65 (1.06)
4.66 (1.05)
-
0.01 [
-
0.28, 0.26]
.932 (.00)
Ratings of the Professor:
Jordan’s p
rofessor could have done more to help
2.71 (1.23)
3.18 (1.40)
-
0.47 [
-
0.81,
-
0.13]
.007 (.03)
Jordan’s professor should have intervened sooner 3.10 (1.33)
3.32 (1.40)
-0.22 [-0.57, 0.14] .228 (.00)
Jordan’s professor handled the situation well 6.10 (0.90)
5.50 (1.03)
0.60 [0.36, 0.85] <.001 (.08)
Jordan’s professor overstepped
interpersonal boundaries
1.85 (0.80)
1.95 (0.92)
-
0.10 [
-
0.32, 0.12]
.379 (.00)
Validity Checks (no effects predicted):
Jordan was not sleeping well 6.63 (0.64)
6.74 (0.46)
-0.10 [-0.24, 0.04] .165 (.00)
Jordan missed class a few times 6.28 (0.68)
6.27 (0.73)
0.01 [-0.18, 0.19] .952 (.00)
Note. ω
2
indicates variance accounted for (effect size). All items began with the phrase, “Think back to the conversation Jordan and
her professor had. Based on their conversation,…” Ratings of suicide likelihood were on a 0 to 100% scale, ratings of depression,
surprise, and obviousness were on a five-point scale (1=Not at all to 5=Extremely), and all other ratings were on a seven-point scale
(1=Strongly Disagree to 7=Strongly Agree), where higher values represent more agreement.
Figure 1
Judgments of Jordan’s Professor (±2 SEM) as a Function of Outcome Knowledge Condition
Study 1: College Student Sample
Study 2: Middle-Aged Adult Sample
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
Jordan's professor could
have done more to help her
Jordan's professor should
have intervened sooner
Jordan's professor handled
the situation well
Disagreee -----------------------------Agree
No Suicide Suicide
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
Jordan's professor could
have done more to help her
Jordan's professor should
have intervened sooner
Jordan's professor handled
the situation well
Disagreee -----------------------------Agree
No Suicide Suicide
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