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Does Political Stability Lead to Economic Development? A Fixed Effect Panel Threshold Analysis for Selected Countries

Authors:
Emin Efecan Aktaş at Kirsehir Ahi Evran University
Emin Efecan Aktaş
  • Kirsehir Ahi Evran University
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The role of political stability on economic performance: The case of Bangladesh
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  • Sep 2013
Political stability generally plays pivotal role in the process of economic development of any country. In this paper, we investigated the direct effect of political stability on the economic performance of Bangladesh for the period of 1984-2009. Two different techniques of cointegration have been used to analyse the long run and short run effect. The EngleGranger method of cointegration did not find any cointegration while Bound Testing Approach did .Once cointegration is found the long run relationship as well as the short run relationship is established. Our findings indicate that political stability has negative effect on economic performance in long term while the short run effect is positive. This result is rare but not unique as it supports to the work of Goldsmith (1987) to shed light on Mancur Olson’s theory of political stability and growth.
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Poverty, The Coup Trap, and the Seizure of Executive Power
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The transfer of power through the use of military force is a commonplace event in world affairs. Although no two coups d'etat are alike, they all have a common denominator: poverty. We analyze political and economic data from 121 countries during the period 1950–1982 and find that the probability of a government's being overthrown by a coup is significantly influenced by the level of economic well-being. Thus, even authoritarian governments have powerful incentives to promote economic growth, not out of concern for the welfare of their citizens, but because poor economic performance may lead to their removal by force. When the simultaneity of low income and coups is accounted for, we find that the aftereffects of a coup include a heritage of political instability in the form of an increased likelihood of further coups. Although the effect of income on coups is pronounced, we find little evidence of feedback from coups to income growth.
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Democracy, Economic Development, and Income Inequality
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Most cross-national tests of inverse association between democracy and inequality have operationalized the concept of democracy by measuring its level at a single point in time. More compelling theoretical arguments can be made for causal relationships that operate over time between (1) a country's years of democratic experience and income inequality; and (2) income inequality and the stability of democracy. Continuous and qualitative measures of years of democratic experience are estimated to have a significant negative impact on income inequality independent of economic development and other control variables for a sample of 55 countries. A very strong inverse correlation is also observed between income inequality and regime stability for a sample of 33 democracies. This association holds independent of economic development, which is found to have no direct effect on democratic stability after controlling for income inequality.
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Resource Dependence, Economic Performance, and Political Stability
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In many resource-dependent states, elites may face an important trade-off between the economic benefits of diversification and the possibility for future political competition that diversification may engender. However, distinctive features of global resource markets and national political economies may make diversification more or less attractive to political elites. The author argues that in three cases which illustrate the equilibrium paths of the game-theoretic model developed here—postindependence Bostwana, Mobutu’s Zaire, and Suharto’s Indonesia—three variables influenced elites’ incentives for diversification and thereby shaped outcomes along the dimensions of political stability and economic performance: the world market structure for the resource, the degree of societal opposition to elites, and the prior development of the nonresource private sector. These countries’ varied paths from resource wealth to political and economic outcomes suggest the need for conditional theories of the resource curse.
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