A preview of this full-text is provided by American Psychological Association.
Content available from Journal of Experimental Psychology: General
This content is subject to copyright. Terms and conditions apply.
How Selection in the Mind Is Different From Attention to the World
Garry Kong
1, 2
and Daryl Fougnie
1
1
Department of Psychology, New York University Abu Dhabi
2
Waseda Institute for Advanced Study, Waseda University
Attentional mechanisms allow us to focus on objects that would help us achieve our goals while ignor-
ing those that would distract us. Attention can also be focused internally toward specific items in mem-
ory. But does selection within memory work similarly to selection within perception? Perceptual
attention is fast and effective at selecting regions of space. Across five experiments, we used a memory
search task to investigate whether spatial selection is also efficient for selection in memory. Participants
remembered four items on a grid before being asked to access their memory of one item and update one
of its features. We found that it took longer to access an item when referenced by its spatial location
than by its color, despite memory accuracy for location being superior. We conclude that there must be
multiple, distinct memory representations in the brain and that selection in memory is different from
perceptual selection.
Keywords: visual working memory, attention, visual search
Supplemental materials: https://doi.org/10.1037/xge0001098.supp
Our visual world is often cluttered and chaotic, full of objects
that need to be identified and processed. Attentional mechanisms
help us deal with this overload of information by steering us toward
specific items or areas of interest at the expense of others. But how
does our visual system find and select objects that are relevant?
Several decades of research in visual search and attentional cuing
have revealed fundamental insights on what visual properties are ef-
ficient (or less efficient) for orienting attention, and these findings
have revealed basic properties of perceptual representations (Wolfe
& Horowitz, 2004,2017).
Critically, selection among competing representations occurs not
just during perception but can also occur once those representations
arestoredinourminds—for example, when information is kept online
in visual working memory. We can preferentially hold (Griffin&
Nobre, 2003;Landman et al., 2003), manipulate (Garavan, 1998;
Oberauer, 2002), and/or drop items from working memory (Williams
et al., 2013;Williams & Woodman, 2012) based on our current goals.
For example, after stimulus offset, if a cue indicates that a particular
item is more task relevant, then that item will be held in a preferential
status. Recent research has catalogued the behavioral and neural
consequences of selection (for a review, see Souza & Oberauer, 2016).
However, while the consequences of selective processes have been
well studied, how such selection processes arise is not well understood.
How are our minds able to find and select a single object representa-
tion among many? Does the ease of this selection depend on the repre-
sentational properties of the to-be-selected object? To put this another
way,howdowesearchinourmemories,andisthissimilartosearch
during perception?
While there are a number of paradigms demonstrating that we
can select information in working memory, only a paucity of
research has examined which representational properties assist or
hinder this selection process. This is unfortunate. In the same way
that the efficiencies of visual search have been leveraged to under-
stand perception and attention (Nakayama & Martini, 2011;Wolfe
& Horowitz, 2004,2017), the factors that afford efficient memory
access can tell us about the properties of memory representations
(at least at the level they are easily accessed in memory) and how
they may be similar to or different from those in perception. Fol-
lowing this logic, we recently developed a memory search para-
digm aimed at better understanding the extent to which memory
selection and visual search are influenced by common factors
(Kong & Fougnie, 2019). We identified what we believed to be
three fundamental findings in visual search that, together, reveal
and constrain theories on perceptual representation—conjunction
effects (Treisman & Gelade, 1980), target distracter similarity
effects (Duncan & Humphreys, 1989), and search asymmetries
(Treisman & Souther, 1985). We uniformly found similar selec-
tion properties in memory that are found during visual search, sug-
gesting that there is strong overlap in the representational
properties through which selection is enacted in the two processes.
Indeed, these findings are consistent with previous research and
theories that paint the two processes as necessarily intertwined
(Cowan, 1999;Oberauer, 2002).
This article was published Online First September 9, 2021.
Garry Kong https://orcid.org/0000-0002-6832-8016
We are grateful to Geoff Woodman for his helpful comments on an earlier
version of this article. Data collected and used in the reported experiments can
be found at https://osf.io/2qauv/?view_only=9b2b698a2e9d4e468ddc5bf3cbe
b78ec.
Correspondence concerning this article should be addressed to Garry
Kong, Waseda Institute for Advanced Study, Waseda University,
Nishiwaseda Building, 103 1-21-1 Nishiwaseda, Shinjuku, Tokyo 169-
0051, Japan. Email: kong.garry@aoni.waseda.jp
542
Journal of Experimental Psychology: General
©2021 American Psychological Association 2022, Vol. 151, No. 3, 542–554
ISSN: 0096-3445 https://doi.org/10.1037/xge0001098
This document is copyrighted by the American Psychological Association or one of its allied publishers.
This article is intended solely for the personal use of the individual user and is not to be disseminated broadly.