“It’s Not in Your Head”: Gaslighting, ‘Splaining, Victim Blaming, and Other Harmful Reactions to Microaggressions

Abstract

Secondary microaggressions refer to the ways in which people of historically dominant groups negate the realities of people of marginalized groups. Gaslighting describes the act of manipulating others to doubt themselves or question their own sanity; people confronted for committing microaggressions deny the existence of their biases, often convincing the targets of microaggressions to question their own perceptions. ‘Splaining (derived from mansplaining/Whitesplaining) is an act in which a person of a dominant group speaks for or provides rationale to people of marginalized groups about topics related to oppression or inequity. Victim blaming refers to assigning fault to people who experience violence or wrongdoing and is used as a tool to discredit people of marginalized groups who speak out against microaggressions or any injustices. Finally, abandonment and neglect refer to a bystander’s failure to address or acknowledge microaggressions. Although these terms are commonly known among marginalized communities (and frequently used in popular media), there is a dearth in academic literature that substantiates these phenomena and relates them to microaggressions. The purpose of this article is to review these concepts in the psychological literature and to demonstrate the psychological harm caused by these behaviors on interpersonal and systemic levels.

Full text

https://doi.org/10.1177/17456916211011963
Perspectives on Psychological Science
2021, Vol. 16(5) 1024 –1036
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DOI: 10.1177/17456916211011963
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ASSOCIATION FOR
PSYCHOLOGICAL SCIENCE
Microaggressions are subtle, nuanced forms of discrimi-
nation that are experienced by racial and ethnic minori-
ties, women, LGBTQIA+ people, religious minorities,
individuals with mental illnesses, and people of other
historically marginalized groups (Torino etal., 2018);
the term itself has been used so much that it has been
integrated into our country’s everyday lexicon, even
entering the Merriam Webster dictionary in 2017 (Nadal,
2018). The commonplace use of the term—fueled by
the vast amount of research produced on the topic—has
increased our understanding of microaggressions and
ability to recognize them. As this awareness grows, so
does the opportunity to confront and disrupt microag-
gressive behavior. However, attempts at exposing
microaggressions can leave targets vulnerable to further
harm. In this article, we explore harmful responses to
calling attention to microaggressive behavior, which we
deem secondary microaggressions. We specifically
focus on concepts such as gaslighting, ‘splaining, victim
blaming, and abandonment and neglect as terms that
warrant greater attention in academic discourse.
A Brief Overview of Microaggression
Theory and Research
Sue et al. (2007) defined microaggressions as “brief and
commonplace daily verbal, behavioral, and environ-
mental indignities, whether intentional or unintentional,
that communicate hostile, derogatory, or negative racial
slights and insults to the target person or group”
(p. 273). Originally used to describe experiences Black
1011963PPSXXX10.1177/17456916211011963Johnson et al.Harmful Reactions to Microaggressions
research-article2021
Corresponding Author:
Veronica E. Johnson, Department of Psychology, John Jay College of
Criminal Justice, City University of New York
Email: vjohnson@jjay.cuny.edu
“It’s Not in Your Head”: Gaslighting,
‘Splaining, Victim Blaming, and Other
Harmful Reactions to Microaggressions
Veronica E. Johnson, Kevin L. Nadal, D. R. Gina Sissoko, and
Rukiya King
Department of Psychology, John Jay College of Criminal Justice, City University of New York, and the
Graduate Center, City University of New York
Abstract
Secondary microaggressions refer to the ways in which people of historically dominant groups negate the realities
of people of marginalized groups. Gaslighting describes the act of manipulating others to doubt themselves or
question their own sanity; people confronted for committing microaggressions deny the existence of their biases, often
convincing the targets of microaggressions to question their own perceptions. ‘Splaining (derived from mansplaining/
Whitesplaining) is an act in which a person of a dominant group speaks for or provides rationale to people of
marginalized groups about topics related to oppression or inequity. Victim blaming refers to assigning fault to people
who experience violence or wrongdoing and is used as a tool to discredit people of marginalized groups who speak
out against microaggressions or any injustices. Finally, abandonment and neglect refer to a bystander’s failure to address
or acknowledge microaggressions. Although these terms are commonly known among marginalized communities (and
frequently used in popular media), there is a dearth in academic literature that substantiates these phenomena and
relates them to microaggressions. The purpose of this article is to review these concepts in the psychological literature
and to demonstrate the psychological harm caused by these behaviors on interpersonal and systemic levels.
Keywords
microaggressions, discrimination, racism, mansplaining, Whitesplaining, gaslighting, victim blaming, transphobia

Harmful Reactions to Microaggressions 1025
people commonly had when interacting with Whites
(Pierce, 1970), microaggressions have been linked to
the experiences of people from various marginalized
identities such as religious minorities (Nadal et al.,
2010), women (Lewis etal., 2016), queer and trans
people (Nadal, 2013; Nadal etal., 2012), and other
people of color, including those with intersecting mar-
ginalized identities, such as Black women (Williams &
Lewis, 2019).
Microassaults refer to verbal and nonverbal attacks
intended to hurt a target through name-calling, avoidant
behavior, or purposeful discriminatory actions; micro-
insults refer to subtle verbal or nonverbal behavior that
conveys rudeness, insensitivity, and insulting messages
about one’s identity; and microinvalidations include
communications that exclude, negate, or nullify the
psychological thoughts, feelings, or experiences of
members of marginalized groups (Sue etal., 2007).
Microaggressions are theorized to exist on a continuum
ranging from overt, intentional, and explicit to subtle,
unintentional, and implicit. Unintentional and/or subtle
microaggressions are often outside of the awareness of
the perpetrator and/or target. Even when perpetrators
are aware of their intention, they may deny malicious
intent when confronted. Therefore, all forms of micro-
aggressions have some degree of invisibility but are far
from innocuous.
The extant literature shows that the impact of these
microaggressions is anything but micro—as some critics
have misunderstood—and is associated with a number
of adverse physical and psychological consequences.
Racial and ethnic microaggressions have been associ-
ated with declining physical health, depression, exces-
sive substance use, lowered self-esteem, suicide
ideation, and somatic complaints (for a review, see
Nadal, 2018). Researchers have also linked microag-
gressions to trauma-related symptoms in people of
color (Moody & Lewis, 2019; Nadal etal., 2020; Torres
& Taknint, 2015). Queer populations appear to suffer
increased anxiety and stress, decreased self-esteem, and
detrimental therapeutic outcomes as a result of micro-
aggressive experiences (Johnson, 2014; Shelton &
Delgado-Romero, 2013; Torres & Taknint, 2015). Some
researchers have also demonstrated that microaggres-
sions targeting trans people are associated with nega-
tive affect, emotional withdrawal, and suicide-related
behaviors (Howe, 2019).
Responding to microaggressions
As Sue et al. (2007) discussed in their foundational
article, recognizing and responding to microaggressions
puts the target in a catch-22. The target is first presented
with attributional ambiguity (e.g., questioning if the
microaggression resulted from race, gender, both, or
some other combination of one’s identity groups).
Despite the cognitive and emotional energy expended
by targets in identifying microaggressions (Pitcan etal.,
2018), studies suggest that marginalized individuals
regularly experience and identify microaggressions;
more than 90% of most study samples report having
experienced microaggressions on a regular basis
(Barber etal., 2020; Woodford etal., 2014). Therefore,
if targets can overcome this ambiguity and identify the
microaggression, they are left to either sit and ruminate
on the matter or confront the person. As Sue et al.
(2007) noted, both options can leave targets vulnerable
to further harm.
Targets of microaggressions show a pattern of quietly
shouldering the impact of microaggressive behavior out
of fear of retaliation from the perpetrator or others
involved and/or reinforcing negative stereotypes about
their group if they choose to confront the perpetrator
(Sue etal., 2008). However, this latter choice comes at
the expense of their own well-being. Targets report
feelings of guilt, embarrassment, shame, regret, and
remorse after unconfronted microaggressive behavior.
Furthermore, the internalization of these feelings has
long-lasting effects on the target’s self-confidence, work
performance, and mental and physical health (Holder
etal., 2015; Lewis etal., 2013).
If targets choose confrontation, they externalize
blame for the incident onto the perpetrator, potentially
mitigating their own feelings of shame, blame, and guilt.
However, they do so at varying levels of risk to them-
selves in other ways. Targets frequently have to circum-
vent fears of being further invalidated or reinforcing
negative stereotypes about their own group (e.g., being
seen as an angry Black woman) when confronting
microaggressions. Empirical evidence supports this
notion; targets report that using confrontation opened
them up to further microaggressive experiences (e.g.,
being further invalidated, being called “oversensitive”
and “paranoid”; Nadal etal., 2013; Sue etal., 2009). As
Minikel-Lacocque (2013) noted, it is the aftermath of the
original microaggressive act, as opposed to the initial
microaggression itself, that carries most of the weight.
Epistemic injustice and
microaggressions
Some scholars have suggested that targets should give
the offender “the benefit of the doubt” in the face of
microaggressive behavior (Haidt, 2017). However, this
suggestion ignores the harm that often befalls targets
after microaggressive experiences go unadressed (e.g.,
internalizing negative emotions such as anger, guilt,
and shame; Sue etal., 2019; Williams, 2020). On the

1026 Johnson et al.
other hand, active forms of coping (e.g., confrontation)
may raise levels of anxiety for targets who may fear
retaliation or backlash in particular settings (e.g., work
or school; Sue etal., 2019). Still, challenging microag-
gressive behavior (e.g., confrontation) may disrupt the
internalization of anger and other negative emotions
and increase self-efficacy in the aftermath of microag-
gressive experiences for targets (Brondolo etal., 2009;
Sue etal., 2019). Further, confronting microaggressions
serves as an important intervention in raising awareness
of microaggressions and reducing perpetration on a
societal level. However, there are a number of barriers
to disrupting microaggressions.
Epistemic injustice provides a useful framework for
understanding how and why microaggressions are
resistant to disruption both interpersonally and on sys-
temic levels. Epistemic injustice refers to the tendency
in society to not believe speakers as a result of implic-
itly or explicitly prejudicial thinking (Fricker, 2007).
Specifically, hermeneutical injustice refers to instances
in which someone’s experiences are not well under-
stood by themselves and/or by others because these
experiences do not fit any concepts known to them or
others. This lack of knowledge is due largely to historic
exclusion of some groups of people from societal activi-
ties (e.g., scholarship, journalism) that shape which
concepts become well known. Microaggressions, we
argue, are particularly susceptible to hermeneutical
injustice because of their subtlety and invisibility to the
perpetrator.
On a systemic level, there is perhaps no clearer
example of hermeneutical injustice with regard to
microaggressions than the critiques of the microaggres-
sions research program (MRP). Critics undermine the
MRP by emphasizing the common lack of intentionality
of the perpetrator, as well as a perceived oversensitivity
of the target and subjectivity of the assessment of
microaggressions (for a review, see Torino etal., 2018).
“Pure nonsense,” “ridiculous,” and “irrational” have all
described critics’ reactions to microaggression research
(Sue etal., 2008). In addition, critics routinely attempt
to challenge the legitimacy of microaggression research
by offering alternative explanations for microaggressive
experiences ranging from miscommunication to psy-
chopathology of the target. Further, they suggest micro-
aggressions do not occur more often, or amount to
more harm, than the everyday hassles or indignities
people of any race, gender, sexual orientation, or reli-
gious affiliation might face (Lukianoff & Haidt, 2015).
However, these criticisms prove to be microaggressions
themselves in that they invalidate and deny the lived
experiences of marginalized peoples, who are more
likely to recognize microaggressions because they are
targets of such experiences. On the contrary, people of
dominant groups (e.g., White people, men, cisgender
people) often discount the account of people of mar-
ginalized groups because they do not experience the
world in the same way and thereby may not even real-
ize that discrimination is a typical and salient everyday
experience for people without power or privilege. In
this way, people with privilege are like fish in water,
in that they do not recognize the water until (or unless)
they are removed from it (Brown etal., 2003).
On individual levels, testimonial injustice—instances
in which a person’s credibility is diminished as a result
of prejudice, often unknown and unrecognized by the
perpetrator—leads to further invalidation and harm of
targets in the aftermath of microaggressive experiences.
Virtually all qualitative examinations of microaggres-
sions reveal people of color, queer and trans people,
and women’s fears of being further invalidated if they
were to contest microaggressions (Nadal etal., 2013;
Pitcan etal., 2018; Sue etal., 2009). Further, denial from
perpetrators is thought to come in various forms, rang-
ing from simple denial of intentionality (“I didn’t mean
it like that!”) to shifting responsibility for the target’s
harm back onto the target (“You’re so sensitive!” or
“You’re paranoid”). These reactions become particularly
dangerous when perpetrators weaponize already widely
held negative stereotypes about marginalized groups
against targets (e.g., Black women are angry).
The main purpose of this article is to focus on sec-
ondary microaggressions, or harmful reactions to micro-
aggressions that then become microaggressions
themselves. We focus specifically on four main con-
cepts: victim blaming, gaslighting, ‘splaining, and aban-
donment and neglect. Although these secondary
microaggressions have been introduced to the Ameri-
can lexicon via mainstream and social media, they have
received minimal attention in academic discourse. Fur-
ther, we situate these terms in our understanding of
hermeneutical and testimonial injustice and provide
recommendations for future directions for researchers
who hope to further investigate these experiences.
Statement of Reflexivity and
Theoretical Underpinnings
Before we delve into our proposed model of secondary
microaggressions, it is crucial that we examine how our
identities and experiences may influence our under-
standings and personal connections to the topics we
discuss (Fine, 2013). Authors V. E. Johnson, D. R. G.
Sissoko, and R. King identity as Black women, and
author K. L. Nadal identifies as a Brown Asian man;
accordingly, our experiences as people of color inform
the ways we understand these concepts both academi-
cally and personally. In fact, throughout this article we

Harmful Reactions to Microaggressions 1027
offer both empirical evidence and anecdotal examples
of how secondary microaggressions may be manifested
to demonstrate what we know from academic literature
as well as what we know from our lived experiences.
Further, we understand that we each have other unique
identities that influence our lens. Collectively, we iden-
tify as academics, New Yorkers, able-bodied, and
people with access to education and other economic
resources; individually, some of us identify as American-
born, immigrants, queer, working class, upwardly mobile,
and so forth. Thus, we acknowledge how our multiple
identities, individually and collectively, influence our
framework.
Relatedly, we center our models through the lens of
intersectionality theory, which Crenshaw (1989) initially
proposed as a way of understanding how Black women
navigate multiple forms of systemic oppression. We
understand that, in the context of intersectionality the-
ory, whereas people of one marginalized group are
harmed by secondary microaggressions, people of mul-
tiple marginalized groups (e.g., Black women, LGBTQ
people of color) may encounter secondary microag-
gressions in even more deleterious ways. Further, we
also recognize that people of multiple privileged identi-
ties (i.e., White cisgender heterosexual men) may com-
mit microaggressions that could result in increased
harm or impact given their compounded privileged
identities (Collins, 1990; Crenshaw, 1989; Wang, 2012).
Forms of Secondary Microaggressions
When people who commit microaggressions respond
in ways that further invalidate or deny the target’s expe-
rience of the microaggression, they exacerbate the
given situation and inflict even more harm on the target.
In agreement with Sue and colleagues’ (2007) defini-
tions of microinvalidations, or “communications that
exclude, negate, or nullify the psychological thoughts,
feelings, or experiential reality” (p. 274), we focus on
three types of secondary microaggressions that can be
expressed verbally (i.e., victim blaming, gaslighting,
and ‘splaining) and one type of secondary microaggres-
sion that can be expressed behaviorally (i.e., abandon-
ment and neglect). See Fig. 1 for an example of primary
and secondary microaggressions.
Victim blaming
The phrase “blaming the victim” was coined by sociolo-
gist William Ryan in response to the Moynihan report
(Moynihan, 1965), which posited that racial econo-
mic disparities—and poverty in Black communities
specifically—resulted from the of rise of single-parent
households in Black families. Ryan’s (1976) book
Blaming the Victim critically analyzed how the dismissal
of racism and the social environment as determinants
of racial disparities results in the faulty logic of victim
blaming. Since then, the term has been applied to a
variety of areas and gained particular traction in the
areas of gendered violence and racism (Dressel, 1994;
Dukes & Gaither, 2017; Eigenberg & Policastro, 2017;
George & Martínez, 2002; Saucier etal., 2010).
In psychological literature, victim blaming is usually
defined as fully or partially blaming people for their
misfortunes (Harber etal., 2015). However, victim blam-
ing can occur on an individual level (e.g., blaming a
woman for getting sexually assaulted) and collective
social identity level (e.g., blaming African American
culture for economic disparities; Mekawi & Todd, 2018;
Ryan, 1976). Victim blaming can be conceptualized as
a form of testimonial injustice in which the victim’s
credibility may be undermined by preconceived notions
based on negative stereotypes. This process results in
the placement of responsibility about an objectively
negative outcome onto the victim. In the context of
hermeneutical injustice, victim blaming may occur
when a victim is unable to coherently label or identify
their experience and the listener is unfamiliar with the
subject matter (e.g., subtle racism, systemic oppres-
sion), which may result in blaming victims for their
interpretation of the interaction.
Victim blaming not only affects individuals but also
has the potential to undermine the credibility of a col-
lective as a whole (e.g., racial minority groups, women,
LGBTQIA+ communities). Popular stereotypes that
result in victim blaming include gender-based violence
myths (e.g., “If she had not had too much to drink, she
would not have been raped”; Sleath & Bull, 2012) and
generalizations of behavior based on race (e.g., “Black
people are more likely to engage in criminal activity”;
Dukes & Gaither, 2017). These stereotypes lead to the
diminished credibility of victims, and the overassign-
ment of responsibility for negative outcomes (e.g.,
sexual assault, racial disparities) is placed on the victim.
People with intersecting marginalized identities are par-
ticularly vulnerable to victim blaming (Dotson, 2011;
Stewart, 2019). For example, stereotypes have rendered
Black women’s social identity as “epistemologically dis-
advantaged” (p. 245), whereby the audience does not
recognize the victim as a credible source of knowledge
(Dotson, 2011).
Stewart (2019) argued that affective responses to
victim blaming can lead to a feedback loop, whereby
the victim’s display of emotions is used to justify the
undermining of the victim’s credibility—which may lead
to further victim blaming by reinforcing that the victim
is “too emotional” or “too angry.” Furthermore, emo-
tions are used to create new stereotypes that affect

1028 Johnson et al.
credibility and result in repeated testimonial injustice
(e.g., the trope of the angry Black woman; Stewart,
2019). Dismissing victims’ challenges to oppression
because of their communication style and emotionality
has colloquially been referred to as tone policing—and
can lead to hypervigilance and self-policing in targets
(Davis & Ernst, 2019). Thus, Black women in academia
report filtering their communication or self-silencing to
avoid the social cost of being perceived as angry and
evade being revictimized through victim blaming
(Corbin etal., 2018; Dotson, 2011).
In the context of microaggressions, victim blaming
has already been understood as a primary microaggres-
sion, or statements/behavior that denigrate or blame
people and cultures for disparities (Mekawi & Todd,
2018). For example, victim-blaming microaggressions
may include statements implying that Black people
use slavery as an excuse for “their problems,” Latinx
Americans would have an easier time finding jobs if
they learned to speak English, or trans people would
not face violence if they decided to remain in their
“real” bodies. Although explicit literature on victim
Primary Microaggression
Secondary Microaggression
“Basically, What She
Is Saying and Why
She Is Upset Is Because…”
“Wow, You People
Always Make
Everything About Race!”
Victim Blaming
‘Splaining Gaslighting
Primary/Secondary Perpetrator Bystander Response
Abandonment
“Yes, This Was
Offensive, But I
Did Not Want to
Get Involved.”
“Wow, You Are So Well
Spoken!”
Confrontation: “You Are Assuming
That It’s Unusual for People of My
Race to Be Well-Spoken.”
“Please Calm Down.
This Was Not About
Race. You Are Overreacting.
Avoidance: Leaving the Situation
Clarification: “Can You Explain
What You Mean by That
Statement?”
Inaction: Ignoring
the Comment Protection: “Thank You.”
Victim Reaction
Neglect
“Oh, I Did Not
Realize That
What They Said
Was Offensive to You.”
Fig. 1. Conceptual map of primary and secondary microaggressions.

Harmful Reactions to Microaggressions 1029
blaming and microaggressions is scarce, victim blaming
is an implicit part of existing microaggressions theory.
For example, the myth-of-meritocracy microaggression
suggests that racism is not a factor in determining socio-
economic life-course outcomes despite ample evidence
suggesting otherwise (Shapiro etal., 2013). Myth-of-
meritocracy microaggressions (e.g., “Everyone can suc-
ceed in this society if they work hard enough”) implicitly
blame economic racial disparities on individuals as
opposed to systemic racism, which is consistent with
Ryan’s findings (1976, p. 276).
As a secondary microaggression, perpetrators may
engage in victim blaming in response to being “called
out” for committing a microaggression or in response
to a collective uprising challenging broader systemic
violence. On an individual level, a microaggression per-
petrator may respond by blaming the victim after being
made aware of the transgression. Given the frequent
unintentional nature of microaggressions, the victim
may be painted as overly sensitive or aggressive (e.g.,
“You are too sensitive; you don’t have to get that angry
about it”). The perpetrator may also double down on
a previous microaggression (e.g., “Black people always
make everything about race”). Victim blaming has his-
torically been used as a common tactic to discredit
oppressed groups and justify violence, oppression, and
disparities (Schoellkopf, 2012). For example, the upris-
ings following the police killings of Michael Brown in
2014 and George Floyd and Breonna Taylor in 2020
triggered widespread national victim blaming against a
number of protestors who engaged in property damage
and looting. These incidents—most accurately described
as secondary macroaggressions—were used to justify
escalating police violence against protesters and to
question the overall legitimacy of the protests (“After
Curfew,” 2020; Sharma, 2020) while ignoring how sys-
temic oppression, an overtly racist administration, a
serious economic crisis, and a pandemic may have
fueled nonpeaceful aspects of the protests.
Anecdotally, victim blaming has affected all four
authors in our everyday lives. For instance, authors
D. R. G. Sissoko and R. King, both of whom are Black
female graduate students, recall incidents in which they
were challenged or discredited after acknowledging
racial microaggressions, particularly in classroom set-
tings. Whenever they pointed out racially biased com-
ments made by their White peers, they were deemed
“bullies,” particularly if and when their White class-
mates became defensive and/or emotional. Although
they were the targets of the hurtful comments, they
ended up taking blame for their actions. Such dynamics
mirror previous scholarship in which White women’s
tears are used to oppress Black women (Accapadi,
2007) or how Black people are wrongfully stereotyped
as “aggressive” instead of White people being viewed
as fragile (Jones & Norwood, 2016).
Gaslighting
As a secondary microaggression, gaslighting is a par-
ticularly common and harmful type of victim blaming.
The term gaslighting comes from the 1944 movie Gas-
light, in which a husband systematically lies and
deceives his wife to manipulate her into believing she
is going insane and to cover up his misdeeds. Gaslight-
ing is commonly discussed in popular and social media,
and scholarship, in the context of heterosexual roman-
tic relationships in which women are the victims of the
gaslighting tactics of their male partners. For example,
Huffington Post published an article entitled “Gaslight-
ing: It’s Really A Thing,” providing a definition and
examples of gaslighting specifically in romantic rela-
tionships (Rodman, 2017). In academic literature, there
also appears to be a focus on female victims of gaslight-
ing in various aspects of their personal and professional
lives (Stern, 2007).
Scholars in both psychology and sociology have
argued that the definition of gaslighting can be extended
to include a single act or series of acts perpetrated by
any person in a position of power designed to manipu-
late less powerful others to doubt themselves or ques-
tion their own sanity or memory (Davis & Ernst, 2019;
Tobias & Joseph, 2020). Sweet (2019) noted that gas-
lighting is embedded in a larger system of social
inequality and can take place in relationships that are
power laden. Gaslighting is used not only to maintain
or gain power in intimate relationships but also to
uphold power structures of White supremacy, patriar-
chy, heteronormativity, and transphobia. Therefore,
gaslighting applies to interactions between cis- and
transgender people, heterosexual people and LGBTQIA+
people, and Whites and people of color.
Scholars have discussed how stereotypes can be
used to make gaslighting even more effective on mem-
bers of marginalized groups. Although all gaslighting
has the potential to make the target question their
reality, Sweet (2019) discussed how gender stereotypes
can be wielded to make gaslighting tactics against
women particularly harmful. For example, in the 1944
film, the wife is made to believe she is losing her mind.
This concept of “losing one’s mind” or “going crazy” is
built into a larger system of patriarchy in which women
are frequently labeled “crazy” and “hysterical” (Sweet,
2019), all while also promoting ableist terminology. So
when gaslighting tactics are combined with these ste-
reotypes (e.g., “That’s not what I meant! You’re being
irrational!”) they have the potential to make the target
internalize societal assumptions about all women.

1030 Johnson et al.
Davis and Ernst (2019) defined racial gaslighting as
“the political, social, economic and cultural process that
perpetuates and normalizes a white supremacist reality
through pathologizing those who resist” (p. 763). In
this instance, stereotypes about particular racial and
ethnic groups are used to make the target and/or others
(e.g., bystanders) believe that the target’s reality cannot
be trusted. For example, one may argue that the target
is always making things about race, being oversensitive
or paranoid, or overly focused on the negatives. These
responses are rooted in larger societal stereotypes
about people of color, and specifically Black Americans.
In a particularly painful experience during graduate
training, author V. E. Johnson was yelled at on a col-
laborative library floor for talking while discussing a
group project with a White female peer. The perpetrator
loudly yelled at the first author (but not her White
peer), “Some of us are students here trying to study!”
The implications of this statement were clear to her.
Despite being located in a space accessible only to
students at the college, the perpetrator believed or—
wanted to insinuate—that V. E. Johnson could not have
possibly been a student. The comment likely revealed
the perpetrator’s own biases about Black people, in that
they were unintelligent, loud, and unruly. She con-
fronted the perpetrator, “So I’m not a student? Why are
you singling me out? This is a collaborative floor where
everyone is free to talk.” In response, the perpetrator
exclaimed, “Oh my God, you’re ridiculous! This is not
about race. You should have more respect for people
who are studying!”
In this example, gaslighting constitutes a form of
epistemic injustice and microaggressive behavior. The
perpetrator’s comment is best classified as a microinsult.
Although the comment was overtly aggressive, the
racial undertones (i.e., “You do not belong here”) are
subtle in nature. The perpetrator denies that their state-
ment was race-based and asserts their own perspective
as the “right” one. V. E. Johnson, then, not only was a
target of microaggressive behavior but also, after con-
fronting the perpetrator, was subjected to racial gas-
lighting. The perpetrator uses a racial stereotype of
Black people being overly sensitive about race to gas-
light her It is clear that the perpetrator’s intent was to
harm, but the racial undertone of the statement was
subtle and perhaps unknown to the perpetrator.
Although gaslighting is often discussed as intentional,
we contend that gaslighting as a microaggressive expe-
rience can also be unintentional.
‘Splaining
‘Splaining (derived from mansplaining or Whitesplain-
ing) is an act in which a person of a historically
dominant group speaks for or provides rationale to
people of historically marginalized groups (e.g., people
of color, women, LGBTQIA+ people) about topics
related to oppression or inequity. Although these terms
have been commonly used among historically marginal-
ized communities and social-justice organizations, they
have also been used in social and popular media. For
example, Achola (2015) described an instance of
Whitesplaining in The Telegraph, in which actor Matt
Damon attempted to rationalize the lack of diversity in
Hollywood to Effie Brown, a successful Black woman
producer. Gupta (2018) defined Whitesplaining in The
Wellesley News as “when white people feel the need to
explain problems that are faced by people of color to
people of color themselves” (para. 3). Solnit (2012)
described how mansplaining existed at “the intersection
between overconfidence and cluelessness,” whereas
Lewis (2014) wrote in New Republic how mansplaining
transpires when women “have their expertise instantly
dismissed because of the lady-shaped package it came
in” (para. 3).
Despite the usage of the terms mansplaining and
Whitesplaining in everyday vernacular, there is a dearth
in the academic literature that describes the phenom-
ena. A search of PsychInfo in June 2020 found that
there is only one hit that mentions “Whitesplaining”
and one hit that mentions “mansplaining”; in both
sources, neither term is the main focus of the publica-
tion. However, outside of psychology, there has been
some academic literature in which scholars have
attempted to provide definitions and conceptualizations
for both terms. For instance, in examining mansplain-
ing, Deo (2014) shared:
Both inside and outside the workplace, a woman’s
ideas, suggestions, or observations may be ignored
until a man explains (or more frequently, simply
repeats) her thoughts; sometimes the man honestly
believes himself to be the one full of knowledge
and ideas, virtually unaware of the woman’s
comments before voicing them as his own. (pp.
976–977)
Likewise, Whitesplaining may occur when “White
validation [is given] more weight” than perspectives of
people of color (Deo, 2014, p. 978) and may be even
more complex and detrimental when people hold mul-
tiple marginalized identities (e.g., women of color,
LGBTQIA+ people of color). Goldberg (2014) described
‘splaining as “a general process by which a privileged
figure who is nevertheless an outsider ‘splains’ to a
marginalized insider the nature of the latter’s own expe-
rience” (p. 117). In this way, other terms that have been
used for this phenomenon include straightsplaining,

Harmful Reactions to Microaggressions 1031
heterosplaining, cissplaining, thinsplaining, and many
others. The common thread is that the person in privi-
lege (e.g., straight/heterosexual person, cisgender per-
son, or thin person) asserts their opinion about the
marginalized group (e.g, queer person, transgender
or genderqueer person, or fat person) as factual or
absolute.
‘Splaining is related to epistemic injustice because
perpetrators are unaware of the ways in which they
enact their power and privilege over persons with mar-
ginalized identities. To lack the knowledge or under-
standing of one’s own identities is, in itself, a privilege.
For example, when a White man Whitesplains or mans-
plains, he is oblivious of his identities and the impact
of his words, likely because of a lack of consequences
in the past or present. Meanwhile, when a woman of
color speaks on any topic, she may be hyperconscious
of her word choice, her tone, her volume, and the man-
ner in which she communicates her message because
she has suffered direct or indirect consequences of
having her opinions misinterpreted or pathologized.
Thus, women of color (and people of other marginal-
ized groups) navigate multiple oppressive dynamics
and environments, which may result in disparate psy-
chological and emotional labor that is not encountered
by people with privileged identities.
Although ‘splaining has not been explicitly tied to
microaggressions, the concept has existed in previous
microaggression literature. Sue and colleagues (2009)
discussed an incident which a Black woman was asked
a question in a classroom:
I started to explain, and the White girl said, “well,
what she means is”—and she tried to talk for me.
That I don’t know what I’m talking about. I can’t
even articulate my own, my own idea. And I had
to tell her, I can speak for myself, I can articulate
my idea better than you can, you know? And
only—I could not believe that she tried to speak
for me. (p. 186)
Further, utilizing Sue and colleagues’ (2007) original
taxonomy on racial microaggressions, it is evident that
‘splaining could be considered a form of microinvalida-
tion. The individual with power or privilege is negating
the perspective, reality, and lived experience of a per-
son of a historically marginalized group. By asserting
their opinion—which may or may not be accurate—
they fail to allow the historically marginalized person
to speak for themselves. They also use their privileged
voice to silence or drown out the perspectives of the
historically marginalized person. Matt Damon’s afore-
mentioned behavior toward Effie Brown could be
described as both a Whitesplaining or mansplaining
microinvalidation in that he negates her reality as Black
woman producer in Hollywood. The White student
in the classroom example is Whitesplaining to the
Black student, who was not given the opportunity to
speak for herself or share her own reality or lived
experience.
When a person with power and privilege ‘splains and
takes credit for something that a person of a historically
marginalized group has said or written before or
silences the input of marginalized individuals or groups,
their actions and statements may potentially be viewed
as microassaults or a microinsults. One example may
be a case in which a White person in an academic set-
ting or workplace interrupts, speaks over, or speaks for
people of color in discussions of racial discrimination.
This behavior might serve to distance the perpetrator
from the perspectives and contributions of people of
color (i.e., avoidant behavior as a feature of some
microassaults). In this same example, the ‘splaining may
serve to establish the perpetrator as the authority in
the subject matter and diminish the validity of the
contributions of people of color in the discussion
(i.e., microinsult).
In some instances of ‘splaining, the perpetrator’s
actions demonstrate a belief in the superiority (i.e.,
more important or valid, logical, well articulated) of
their opinions or perspectives are than the person or
people of the historically marginalized group(s). In
other words, they believe (on a conscious or subcon-
scious level) that what they are sharing is more impor-
tant, more valid, more logical, or more well-articulated
than what the original speaker said. To this point, previ-
ous research has found that White people and men tend
to speak more in groups, even on topics in which they
may not be experts (Sue, 2004). Such behavior is often
learned through their socialization from being members
of privileged groups; some studies have found that boys
learn this behavior, in part, because of teacher bias in
the classroom (Beaman etal., 2006). Further, because
White people are taught implicitly and explicitly to
never think about their Whiteness (Sue, 2004), they may
continue to speak their opinions without understanding
racial dynamics or the damaging consequences of their
actions. Regardless of perpetrator awareness, ‘splaining
can be insulting and harmful to historically marginal-
ized people (e.g., your opinion or voice is not valu-
able)—which may then be internalized by the target
and result in an array of negative psychological out-
comes, such as depression, anger, anxiety, or trauma.
Author K. L. Nadal cited how he regularly encounters
‘splaining in his career. Although he is recognized as
one of the leading researchers in microaggression the-
ory and has published extensively on the topic, he is
frequently met with strangers (mostly older White men)

1032 Johnson et al.
who challenge his work and offer alternate explanations
to the theory. When he cites dozens of empirical studies
(which cumulatively comprise thousands of research
participants who have acknowledged the existence
and harmful impact of microaggressions), his chal-
lengers remain unmoved and insist their perspectives
are correct, without ever having conducted any research
on the topic themselves. In such experiences, it is evi-
dent that the challengers are unable to acknowledge
the validity of microaggressions because of a lack of
lived experience with racial in equity and a lack of
cultural humility for people who navigate racism in
their everyday lives. The inability to acknowledge or
understand racial microaggressions is particularly an
issue for White Americans, who have difficulty in
acknowledging the salience of race in society and
who often refuse to believe or accept the privilege
that their race affords them (Sue etal., 2007).
It is important to make the distinction between using
one’s privileged voice and crossing over into overt rac-
ism, transphobia, sexism, and so forth. When Jennifer
Schulte (known as “Barbecue Becky”) called the police
when a Black family was barbecuing at a public park
in Oakland in 2017 (Henderson & Jefferson-Jones,
2019) or when Amy Cooper called the police on Chris
Cooper (a Black man) in Central Park in 2020, falsely
accusing the Black man of assault, both perpetrators
used their racial privilege to weaponize racial stereo-
types of the dangerousness and criminality of Black
people (via psychological and physical harm to Black
people by members of law enforcement). Such behavior
would not be viewed as microaggressive but rather as
an overt act of racism.
Abandonment and neglect
Sue et al. (2019) defined allies as “individuals who
belong to dominant social groups (e.g., Whites, males,
heterosexuals) but actively work toward the eradication
of prejudicial practices they witness in both their
personal and professional lives” (p. 132). However,
research suggests targets often receive no support from
bystanders—whether they have claimed to be or have
been previously regarded as allies or not (Nelson etal.,
2011). In the context of microaggression theory, we
define abandonment as the bystander failure to act on
behalf of a target of microaggressions despite having
noticed the transgression. Microaggressive neglect refers
to the failure to act on behalf of a target because of a
failure to recognize that a microaggression took place.
The concepts of abandonment and neglect have not
been explicitly explored in the larger taxonomy of
microaggressions.
Researchers on antibias bystander behavior have
argued that these actions are incredibly important
because they have the potential to disrupt experiences
of bias, reduce their escalation, and mitigate the harm
that can be incurred by these experiences to the target
and other bystanders (Nelson etal., 2011). Czopp and
Monteith (2003) found that bystander action with
regard to racism was particularly powerful when the
bystander was White as opposed to a person of color.
Researchers found that White bystanders were more
successful than bystanders of the target’s same racial
group in taking antiracist action because racial/ethnic
minority bystanders were more likely to be seen
as overreacting (i.e., secondary microaggression)
and thus were less effective in inducing guilt or self-
criticism in perpetrators.
Bystanders encounter a number of barriers to
action, including the bystander’s own prejudicial
thinking, need and/or desire to maintain relationships
with perpetrators, and perceived risk of personal
harm by the perpetrator (Stewart etal., 2011). There-
fore, bystanders often miss or take no issue with the
behavior of the perpetrator, and when they do, they
still do not act (Nelson etal., 2011). Targets are then
left without support. No more recognizable quote can
be used to describe this experience for targets than
this one from Martin Luther King, Jr.: “In the end, we
will remember not the words of our enemies, but the
silence of our friends” (1967/2011). Targets of micro-
aggressions not only have to contend with the harm
done to them by perpetrators but also are often left
to wonder others noticed the microaggression as well.
If the bystander fails to notice the microaggression,
targets may ask themselves, “Why not?” If the bystander
did notice the microaggression, “Why did they not
speak up?” Perhaps adding insult to injury, a bystander
may offer support to the target in private, admitting
that they noticed the microaggression but subtly sug-
gesting the risk for them was too great to offer public
support.
Imagine a scenario in which two friends, one trans-
woman and one cisgender female, are on a crowded
train. The transwoman accidentally bumps into a cis-
gender woman, who in retaliation calls her a “tranny.”
The trans slur is delivered by the stranger; however,
the target finds herself more preoccupied with the inac-
tion of her friend than the slur itself. The inaction of
the cisgender female friend can be described as aban-
donment, whereas neglect refers to the failure to act
on behalf of a target because there was a failure to
recognize that a microassault took place. Consider a
less overt experience in which the same pair attend a
party together. The transwoman notices that many of
the partygoers do not make eye contact with her, have
their bodies turned away from her, and do not directly
respond to any of her input during group conversations.
At the end of the evening, after the transwoman attempts

Harmful Reactions to Microaggressions 1033
to bring these incidents to their friend’s awareness, the
transwoman is left to question how her friend could
have missed these events that she saw as clear instances
of social exclusion.
Future Directions in Microaggression
Research and Training
The expansion of microaggression theory has enhanced
people’s ability to identify microaggressive experiences
in their everyday lives. Along with growth in under-
standing comes room to confront these experiences. At
the same time, further harm can come to individuals
who attempt to confront perpetrators of microaggres-
sions. Victim blaming, gaslighting, ‘splaining, abandon-
ment, and neglect are all secondary microaggressions
that can be additionally harmful or revictimizing to
targets of microaggressions. Just as Sue and colleagues
(2019) suggested that there is room for intervention,
we suggest there is also room for additional injury.
Table 1 includes definitions and examples of victim
blaming, gaslighting, ‘splaining, and abandonment and
neglect. This list is designed as a starting point, not an
exhaustive list, of the reactions that can occur when
confronting microaggressions.
To fully understand secondary microaggressions,
researchers should focus on understanding the fre-
quency of these incidents and their impact on targets,
perpetrators, and bystanders. In this way, quantitative
research could be used to develop measures of the
secondary microaggressions proposed in this article—
which could help measure the impact of such experi-
ences on a spectrum of outcomes, including mental
health, trauma, self-efficacy, and other variables. Fur-
ther research can also examine the process in which
people confront or address secondary microaggres-
sions, particularly understanding how power and inter-
sectional identities may influence decisions and actions.
For instance, Brondolo et al. (2009) concluded that
many people face discrimination but may not actively
confront perpetrators (even when they want to or
intend to). Both qualitative and experimental studies
can be used to understand the decision to confront
versus not, as well as the impact of that decision.
Training and awareness efficacy about microaggres-
sions can be increased by (a) expanding microaggression
research and awareness to include secondary microag-
gressions, including gaslighting, victim blaming, ‘splain-
ing, and microaggressive abandonment and neglect;
(b) educating all people as potential perpetrators of
microaggressions that a failure to respond proactively
(i.e., not catching and addressing one’s own microag-
gressive behavior or relying on the target to bring up the
microaggression) and inappropriately responding (e.g.,
anger, retaliation) to confrontation from targets after per-
petrating a microaggression often leaves targets silenced,
inflicts additional harm, and further perpetuates systems
of oppression; and (c) emphasizing the responsibility of
those who hold privileged identities to reduce, take
responsibility for, and mitigate harm done by microag-
gressions, including bystander action and deemphasizing
the responsibility of those who hold marginalized identi-
ties to bear these burdens.
To increase hermeneutical and testimonial justice,
targets cannot be solely responsible for confronting
microaggressive behavior and coping with its impact.
Table 1. Examples of Secondary Microaggressions
Terms Definition Example
Victim blaming Blaming marginalized groups for microaggressive
incident or the response to the incident
Blaming someone for being the target of a
microaggression (e.g., “I only assumed that you
were mad because Black women easily get
agitated”)
Gaslighting Manipulation with the goal of making victims
doubt their perception
Accusing someone of overreacting to a
microaggression (e.g., “It wasn’t such a big deal—
please calm down”)
Denying the implicit message of a microaggressive
act (e.g., “This was not about race”)
‘Splaining An outsider speaking for or providing rationale to
marginalized groups
Talking over a marginalized person to clarify a
point to the broader audience (e.g., “Well, what
[marginalized person] means is that. . .”)
Explaining a person’s lived reality to that person (e.g.,
telling a Black person how anti-Black racism is
manifested)
Abandonment Failure of a knowledgeable bystander to confront
microaggressions
Failure to intervene when a perpetrator tells an
immigrant to “go back to their country”
Neglect Failure of a bystander to recognize
microaggressions
Failure to recognize that someone calling a Latina
“exotic and fiery” is a microaggression

1034 Johnson et al.
In fact, encouraging targets to “simply speak up” or
“give the benefit of the doubt” is shortsighted and
ignores the potential for secondary microaggressive
experiences. Others have also recognized how contex-
tual factors (e.g., identity of perpetrator, access to
resources and social support) are important consider-
ations in training around confronting microaggressions
(Brondolo etal., 2009; Houshmand etal., 2019; Sue
etal., 2019). For instance, people who facilitate con-
versations about microaggressions must make con-
scious decisions to create spaces in which people of
historically marginalized groups do not experience sec-
ondary microaggressions in trainings that are meant to
be safe or validating spaces. Thus, efforts to further
understand secondary microaggressions reflect our col-
lective, ethical responsibilities to diligently and obses-
sively disrupt manifestations of racism, heteronormativity,
patriarchy, and so on because these systems are stub-
born and permeate much of everyday life.
Conclusion
The harmful impact of microaggressions on targets has
been well documented. It is our hope that researchers
use their scholarly and psychological interest in micro-
aggressions to critically examine and understand the
impact of secondary microaggressions. This work con-
tinues the microaggressions tradition of “making the
invisible visible” and providing epistemic justice for
those historically and unjustly silenced, blamed, and
pathologized for the impact of oppressive forces out-
side of their control. Readers may experience resistance
to this concept and question the existence/impact of
such incidents or fear backlash if they pursued this line
of research. These individuals may consider how epis-
temic injustice has privileged their own or others’ ability
to question, minimize, and deny the experiences of
others.
Transparency
Action Editor: Monnica T. Williams
Editor: Laura A. King
Declaration of Conflicting Interests
The author(s) declared that there were no conflicts of
interest with respect to the authorship or the publication
of this article.
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