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Teamwork in health care and medical malpractice liability: an experimental investigation

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Dylan Martin-Lapoirie at Paris 1 Panthéon-Sorbonne University
Dylan Martin-Lapoirie
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Abstract and Figures

The treatment of a patient often implies consultations with different health care professionals. This complex health care pathway raises the issue of the regulation of health care quality. In this study, we explore how teamwork among health care professionals affects the precaution behavior of each one depending on the liability regime. To this end, we develop a theoretical model that is tested in a controlled laboratory experiment. Each health care professional chooses the precaution level invested to treat the patient. His decisions have real consequences outside the lab for charities dealing with real patients. Experimental conditions vary the number of involved health care professionals and the liability regime. Contrary to theory, we show that the negligence rule and strict liability do not provide optimal incentives to take care. The negligence rule is more efficient than strict liability to reduce the absolute deviations from optimal precaution level. Moreover, under both liability rules, teamwork decreases the health care professionals’ precaution levels.
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Vol.:(0123456789)
European Journal of Law and Economics (2022) 54:251–282
https://doi.org/10.1007/s10657-021-09708-3
1 3
Teamwork inhealth care andmedical malpractice liability:
anexperimental investigation
DylanMartin‑Lapoirie1
Accepted: 12 August 2021 / Published online: 8 September 2021
© The Author(s), under exclusive licence to Springer Nature B.V. 2021
Abstract
The treatment of a patient often implies consultations with different health care
professionals. This complex health care pathway raises the issue of the regulation
of health care quality. In this study, we explore how teamwork among health care
professionals affects the precaution behavior of each one depending on the liability
regime. To this end, we develop a theoretical model that is tested in a controlled
laboratory experiment. Each health care professional chooses the precaution level
invested to treat the patient. His decisions have real consequences outside the lab
for charities dealing with real patients. Experimental conditions vary the number
of involved health care professionals and the liability regime. Contrary to theory,
we show that the negligence rule and strict liability do not provide optimal incen‑
tives to take care. The negligence rule is more efficient than strict liability to reduce
the absolute deviations from optimal precaution level. Moreover, under both liability
rules, teamwork decreases the health care professionals’ precaution levels.
Keywords Laboratory experiment· Liability· Medical malpractice· Multiple
injurers· Teamwork
JEL Classification K13· C72· C91· I10
1 Introduction
The treatment of a patient often requires medical consultations with several Health
care professionals (HCPs). In each consultation, HCPs take precautions to treat the
patient and these precautions influence the patient’s health status. Health care qual‑
ity thus depends on the safety implemented by each HCP in his consultation with the
patient, a lack of security leading to medical damage. In this article, we study how
HCPs behave whether they work in a team and we are interested on how regulating
* Dylan Martin‑Lapoirie
dylan.martin@univ‑lorraine.fr
1 Université de Lorraine, Université de Strasbourg, CNRS, BETA, 54000Nancy, France
Content courtesy of Springer Nature, terms of use apply. Rights reserved.
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