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North Korea Revelations from the Polish Archives: Nukes, Succession and, Security (Wilson Center's North Korea International Documentation Project)

April 2019

Project: Relations between Poland and North Korea 1948-1989.

Authors:

Marek Hańderek

Jagiellonian University

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North Korea Revelations from the Polish Archives:

Nukes, Succession and, Security

(Wilson Center’s North Korea International Documentation Project)

Communist-ruled Poland was one of the first states to recognize the Democratic People’s

Republic of Korea (DPRK) in 1948. Less than two years later, Poland (together with other

countries from the Eastern Bloc) joined the Korean War effort by assisting the DPRK and

spreading anti-American propaganda domestically. After the war, Poland supported the

reconstruction of North Korea and received 1,200 orphans as well as a considerable number of

students.

These efforts were typical for all European communist countries under Moscow’s domination,

but Poland’s involvement with Korea did have several distinguishing characteristics. One was

Poland’s participation in the Neutral Nations Repatriation Commission (NNRC) and Neutral

Nations Supervisory Commission (NNSC). Both bodies were established by the Korean

Armistice Agreement, and Poland (as well as Czechoslovakia) was selected to become a

communist member of the commissions.

The Neutral Nations Repatriation Commission

The NNRC existed for less than one year, and the majority of POWs from North Korea and

China decided not to return to the DPRK or communist China. A similar stance on repatriation

was presented by a small group of POWs from the United Nations side, who declared that they

wished to stay in communist custody.

Despite the official name of the commission, Polish delegates were far from “neutral.” They

followed the instructions relating to repatriation that they received from Chinese officials.

Moreover, they used the NNRC as a covert institution for the activities of intelligence officers.

One of the officers that worked for Polish intelligence was Władysław Tykociński. In 1965,

after long service as a Polish diplomat, he fled to the West and asked the Americans for asylum.

In April 1966, he stood before the Committee on Un-American Activities of the House of

Representatives and shared with the Americans significant information on the operations and

the scope of interest of Polish intelligence, also recalling some of the activities in Korea.

The Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission

While the NNRC was short lived, the Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission still exists

today—although it has evolved over the decades. Between August 1953 and mid-1956, the

NNSC was an extremely important body. Its members were obliged to monitor 10 ports of entry

in both Koreas in order to avoid rearmament of the peninsula. Furthermore, mobile inspection

teams of the NNSC were allowed to supervise other locations in the North and the South, if

violations of the armistice had been reported.

Similar to their behavior in the NNRC, the Poles did not maintain neutrality. They used the

commission to collect intelligence in South Korea and helped North Korea to avoid unexpected

inspections. Such an attitude facilitated the introduction of new weapons on North Korean soil.

Under pressure from South Korea, in mid-1956, inspection teams were withdrawn from its

territory and soon the DPRK demanded the same treatment. The significance of the NNSC soon

thereafter decreased, and members of the NNSC could work only in the narrow Demilitarized

Zone. Nevertheless, Polish representatives stayed in the northern part of the DMZ until early

1995, when they were forced by the DPRK authorities to leave North Korean territory.

Trends in Polish-North Korea Relations

In general, Polish-North Koran relations during the Cold War were strongly influenced by

Soviet-DPRK ties.

Poland was a satellite state subordinate to Moscow and obediently followed the Soviet Union’s

instructions in foreign policy. Consequently, when North Korean-Soviet relations reached their

lowest point in the first half of the 1960s, it was also the worst time for contacts between Poland

and the DPRK. The Soviet Union and its satellites were perceived as “revisionist” and

unreliable partners, mainly because of Khrushchev’s criticism of Stalin’s crimes and the cult of

personality.

In the second half of the 1960s, mutual relations warmed. It could be said that for almost the

next two decades, Polish-North Korean relations were cordial but not very close. The Poles,

following Soviet steps, criticized the DPRK for its self-reliance politics and for not discussing

its internal and foreign policies with Moscow.

The Sino-Soviet Split

Another factor that affected mutual relations was the Sino-Soviet split. North Korea tried to

balance between the two conflicted communist states, but there were periods when it seemed

to have better relations with Beijing than with Moscow (and vice versa). Consequently, because

Poland sided with the Soviet Union, its relations with North Korea declined whenever

Pyongyang moved closer to China. For instance, in September 1978, Poland, East Germany,

and Czechoslovakia postponed a visit of the North Korean Minister of Defense, initially

planned for October 1978, due to Soviet pressure. The Soviets explained to their satellites that

the DPRK acted hostilely toward the USSR by publishing the Chinese stance on Sino-Soviet

border clash of May 1978.

On the other hand, in less tense times, Poland tried to build links with North Korea in order to

strengthen its connection with the Soviet zone and weaken ties with China.

For example in January 1972, the Polish Foreign Minister Stefan Olszowski explained to Prime

Minister Piotr Jaroszewicz that the Polish Ministry of National Defense should meet DPRK

expectations and organize a visit of its Minister to North Korea. He stressed that the awaited

trip could be a good tool to strengthen North Korean ties with the Eastern Bloc and neutralize

Chinese influence in the DPRK. (It is worth mentioning that the invitation for the Defense

Minister was sent to Poland in 1967.)

Polish-North Korean Exchanges (and Non-Exchanges)

When it was useful, North Korea seems to have tried not to treat the whole Eastern Bloc as a

united structure. The DPRK made efforts to have close ties with certain countries when it could

profit from this type of contacts.

Poland, however, stayed loyal to the USSR and was not interested in sharing a special

relationship with Pyongyang. This kind of attitude among the Poles is suggested by its non-

response to the invitation sent in 1972 by Kim Il Sung to First Secretary of the Polish United

Workers Party, Edward Gierek. It was again extended in 1978 but Gierek did not travel to the

DPRK. The North Koreans had to wait until 1986 for the first visit of the leader of communist

Poland. General Wojciech Jaruzelski visited the DPRK, a return visit following the second trip

of Kim Il Sung to Poland in 1984 (his first visit was in 1956).

These exchanges by the leaders of both states lifted Polish-North Korean relations to their

highest levels. During Jaruzelski’s 1986 visit, a Declaration of Friendship and Cooperation was

signed.

Simultaneous with the deepening of political ties, North Korea wanted to develop economic

cooperation. Among others projects, the DPRK asked Poland to establish an Mi-2 helicopter

factory—although this never happened due to North Korea’s financial problems.

Intelligence Cooperation

In the second half of the 1980s, the DPRK also pursued closer collaboration between the Polish

and North Korean security institutions and intelligence services.

In mid-1989, the chief of Polish military intelligence, General Roman Misztal, visited

Pyongyang and received a list of wishes from his counterpart. Principally, they wanted the

DPRK’s intelligence officers to be free to operate against South Koreans in Poland, after the

expected recognition of ROK by the Polish government.

Moreover, the North Koreans wanted the Polish members of the NNSC and other Polish

representatives with access to South Korean territory to conduct intelligence operations in favor

of the DPRK. In his report to the chief of the General Staff, Misztal suggested accepting the

DPRK’s requests. We do not know what happened next because, by this time, the democratic

reforms in Poland had already begun, and documents subsequently produced by intelligence

services are still classified today.

North Korea probably felt betrayed by Poland’s democratization. However, both countries have

maintained mutual diplomatic relations at the Ambassador’s level. For 17 years, the post of the

DPRK Ambassador to Poland was even held by Kim Jong Il’s half-brother, Kim Pyong-il (from

1998 until 2015). Document No. 22 mentions his increasing role inside the ruling regime in the

late 1980s.

Searching for Korea-related Documents in Poland

I have selected 24 documents about North Korea from Poland’s Archive of the Ministry of

Foreign Affairs (14 of them) and the Archive of the Institute of National Remembrance (10

documents) for translation and publication on the Wilson Center’s Digital Archive.

The first institution preserves materials produced by the Polish diplomatic service after 1944.

The second archive contains documents produced by the communist security apparatus and

intelligence services between 1944 and 1990. In general, these two repositories are the most

meaningful Polish archives when it comes to searching for documents related to North Korean

affairs.

While selecting the documents, I assumed that the most interesting and informative documents

for readers were probably not those that solely dealt with Polish-North Korean relations. I strove

to select sources that presented a wider scope of events and facts. So only one document

exclusively concerns bilateral ties between the two states. It describes the DPRK attitude toward

the introduction of Martial Law in Poland in December 1981.

A Brief Look at the Documents

Because of the fact that the civil intelligence of communist Poland did not have a station in

North Korea, from time to time the stations in Japan and China were ordered to write reports

concerning Korean affairs.

In the case of Document No. 14 the situation was very specific, because an analysis of Hua

Guofeng’s visit to Pyongyang in May 1978 was written by a Polish intelligence officer in Tokyo

at the request of the KGB resident. Document No. 15, produced by an intelligence station in

Beijing, deals with the simultaneous visits of North Korean and Cambodian delegations to

China in the summer of 1978—apparently to ease any concerns both countries had about the

planned signing of Chinese-Japanese treaty.

On the other hand, Poland’s military intelligence had representatives in North Korea: the

military attaché and his subordinate officers, and some officers under the cover of the NNSC.

Several of the documents in this collection are reports written by military attaches during the

so called Second Korean War. They do not refer only to North-South tensions (Document No.

8) and its consequences for the Korean People’s Army (Document No. 10), but also mention

the DPRK’s nuclear ambitions (Document No. 4 and Document No. 7) and North Korea-China

relations (Document No. 5 and Document No. 9). The last document produced by a Polish

military attaché in Pyongyang (Document No. 11) is a record of a conversation between

Marshal Matvei Zakharov and Kim Il Sung during Zakharov’s visit to the DPRK in June 1970.

They mainly discussed DPRK-China relations.

China is prominently discussed in many published documents produced not only by the above

mentioned military attaches, but also by Poland’s diplomats. Document No. 12 concerns Kim

Il Sung’s visit to Beijing in April 1975. Document No. 20 depicts the temporary cooling of

DPRK-China relations in late 1980s, mostly because of China’s openness for contacts with

South Korea. And last but not least, Document No. 24 describes the North Korean leaderships’

opinion about the Tiananmen Square protests and crackdown.

Another issue explored in several translated documents is DPRK-USSR relations. Document

No. 1 and Document No. 3 refer to the early 1960s, when mutual relations declined and the

Soviets were perceived as “revisionists.” Document No. 19 describes talks between Kim Il

Sung and Soviet officials during Kim’s visit to USSR in May 1984, when bilateral contacts

were definitely much better than two decades earlier.

As mentioned above, dependence on the USSR also influenced Polish foreign policy.

Sometimes this resulted in asking Soviet officials about its assessment of the situation on the

Korean Peninsula, such as in April 1976 (Document No. 13) or February 1984 (Document No.

18).

Two documents provide some information on North Korean contacts with the Middle East in

the final period of the Cold War. Document No. 21 deals with Yasser Arafat’s trip to the DPRK

in mid-1989 and his wish to strengthen ties with North Korea. Document No. 23 comments on

Kim Yong-nam’s visit to Iran and its possible consequences (such as the import of oil) and also

cooperation in uranium exploration in North Korea.

Finally I would like to underline, that this is only a fraction of the valuable Polish documents

touching upon North Korean affairs. There are many more of them, especially in the Archive

of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. During the Cold War, Polish diplomats in Pyongyang as

well as officers serving in the NNSC and intelligence officers carefully monitored the situation

in North Korea. This resulted in numerous reports and records that are unknown, but relatively

easily accessible, to the majority of researchers interested in North Korea.

List of Documents

Document No. 1

E. Sagała, 'Record of Conversations conducted on 4 April of This Year at a Reception to

Celebrate the National Holiday of the People's Republic of Hungary,' 7 April 1962

[Source: AMSZ, Department II, 10/66, w. 3. Obtained by Marek Hańderek and translated by

Jerzy Giebułtowski.]

Document No. 2

Embassy of the People's Republic of Poland in Pyongyang, 'Report regarding the Current

DPRK Policy concerning the Reunification of the Country,' 10 April 1962

[Source: AMSZ, Department II, 10/66, w. 3. Obtained by Marek Hańderek and translated by

Jerzy Giebułtowski.]

Document No. 3

Józef Dryglas, 'Record of Conversation with USSR Ambassador V. Moskovsky,' 1 November

1962

[Source: AMSZ, Department II, 10/66, w. 3. Obtained by Marek Hańderek and translated by

Jerzy Giebułtowski.]

Document No. 4

Lt. Col. J. Załuska, 'Report: Information from GDR Military Attaché Lt. Col. Schafer,' 14

January 1968