Analysis of Russia's Approach to Kyoto Protocol: Russia's Withdrawal from Second Commitment Period (2013-2020)

Abstract

In 2004 Russia ratified the Kyoto Protocol, one of the
international agreements which focus on climate change
mitigation. Russia officially participated in the Kyoto
Protocol's first commitment period in 2005 after ensuring the
benefits by doing so. Entering the second commitment
period, in 2011, Russia decided to withdraw. In consideration
of Russia's position as the most abundant fossil fuel energy
exporter and as a country whose economy is in restoration.
This paper analyzes Russia's withdrawal from the second
commitment period of the Kyoto Protocol through the
perspective of offensive realism with a qualitative
methodology. This paper finds that foreign policy and, in a
more modern sense, a need to take "good Samaritan," a
politically correct role for the global community, was the
main reason of Russia‟s' withdrawal from the Protocol.

Full text

Nur Yasmin Ghafiel, Paramitaningrum | Analysis Of Russia’s Approach To Kyoto
Protocol: Russia’s Withdrawal From Second Commitment Period (2013-2020)
Andalas Journal of International Studies| Vol IX No 2 Nov 2020
116
DOI: https://doi.org/10.25077/ajis.9.2.116-130.2020
Article
Analysis Of Russia’s Approach To Kyoto Protocol: Russia’s Withdrawal From Second
Commitment Period (2013-2020)
Nur Yasmin Ghafiel1, Paramitaningrum2
1 Ilmu Hubungan Internasional,Bina Nusantara University, Indonesia
INFORMATION
SUBMISSION TRACK
Recieved : 06 March 2020
Final Revision : 05 October 2020
Available Online : 30 November 2020
KEYWORD
Kyoto Protocol, Russia, Offensive Realism
KATA KUNCI
Protokol Kyoto, Rusia, Realisme ofensif
CORRESSPONDENCE
E-mail : : paramitaningrum@binus.edu
A B S T R A C T
In 2004 Russia ratified the Kyoto Protocol, one of the
international agreements which focus on climate change
mitigation. Russia officially participated in the Kyoto
Protocol's first commitment period in 2005 after ensuring the
benefits by doing so. Entering the second commitment
period, in 2011, Russia decided to withdraw. In consideration
of Russia's position as the most abundant fossil fuel energy
exporter and as a country whose economy is in restoration.
This paper analyzes Russia's withdrawal from the second
commitment period of the Kyoto Protocol through the
perspective of offensive realism with a qualitative
methodology. This paper finds that foreign policy and, in a
more modern sense, a need to take "good Samaritan," a
politically correct role for the global community, was the
main reason of Russia‟s' withdrawal from the Protocol.
A B S T R A K
Pada tahun 2004 Rusia meratifikasi Protokol Kyoto, salah
satu perjanjian internasional yang berfokus pada mitigasi
perubahan iklim. Rusia secara resmi berpartisipasi dalam
periode komitmen pertama Protokol Kyoto pada 2005 setelah
memastikan keuntungan yang akan didapat setelahnya.
Memasuki periode komitmen kedua, pada 2011 Rusia
memutuskan untuk mundur. Mempertimbangkan posisi
Rusia sebagai pengekspor energi bahan bakar fosil terbesar
dan sebagai negara yang ekonominya dalam pemulihan.
Makalah ini menganalisis faktor-faktor di balik penarikan
Rusia dari periode komitmen kedua Protokol Kyoto melalui
perspektif realisme ofensif dengan metodologi kualitatif.
Penelitian ini menemukan bahwa di balik alasan penarikan
Rusia, langkah negara itu sangat dipengaruhi oleh kebijakan
luar negeri dan, dalam pengertian yang lebih modern,
kebutuhan untuk mengambil peran "orang Samaria yang baik
hati” dan yang benar secara politis bagi komunitas global

Nur Yasmin Ghafiel, Paramitaningrum | Analysis Of Russia’s Approach To Kyoto
Protocol: Russia’s Withdrawal From Second Commitment Period (2013-2020)
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.25077/ajis.9.2.116-130.2020
Introduction
Russia had a crucial role in the
ratification of Kyoto Protocol, especially
since this country is one of the most
significant carbon emission contributors. At
the same time, other countries that also falls
in the same category (the United States and
China) refused to ratify. Thus, Russia has a
bargaining position
1
Due to that, the
Protocol needs at least 55 ratifying
countries or 55% of 1990 emission
contributors to be enforced, and Russia
represents 17,4% of total carbon emissions
in said year. Such a position creates a
mixed impact for Russia. The government
was split into two sides on Kyoto Protocol
ratification, noting that Russia's growing
economy could strongly be affected.
Although it is internally opposed, Russia
gained support from the European Union
(EU) to become a member of the World
Trade Organization (WTO) in return for
Russia's ratification to the Kyoto Protocol.
Aside of that tempting promise, by
ratifying the Kyoto Protocol and noting that
it is a binding agreement, Russia then
commits to abide by the terms.
Consequently, Russia must fulfill the given
targets and requirements. In addition to
that, Russia must have a specific policy
which specifically made to internalize the
Protocol domestically. Efforts done by
Russia included but were not limited to
participation in the Joint Implementation
(JI) mechanism, the formation of the
legislative framework and The Action Plan
on the Kyoto Protocol, and national climate
policy, Climate Doctrine.
2
However, while
being implemented, those efforts did not
work as expected.
Entering the Kyoto Protocol's second
commitment period in 2013-2020, Russia
1
in negotiations, according to his ability to achieve
a goal or agreement under their wishes.
2
Anna Firsova, Taplin, R., “A Review of Kyoto
Protocol Adoption in Russia: Joint Implementation
in Focus”, Transition Studies Review 15 (Germany:
Springer-Verlag, 2008), 480–498.
announced their withdrawal from the
Protocol at COP 17 in Durban, South
Africa, in 2011. As said by Russian
Climate Change Envoy, Alexander
Berditsky, "Russia will not participate in
the Kyoto Protocol's second commitment
period."
3
This announcement indicated a
change in Russia's stance to the Protocol
from active participation to the opposite.
It is interesting to discuss the
causative factors that made Russia
withdraw from the global climate change
agreement, which is very crucial for global
security to which Russia acknowledged.
While other research circulate Russia's first
period in the Protocol, there is a limited
analysis of Russia's withdrawal from the
second period. Considering Russia's
national interest and position as both the
most significant world's fossil fuel exporter
and the world's biggest carbon emitter,
surely the energy sector is very keenly
observed. Therefore, it is also necessary to
see the factors of why Russia withdrew
from the second commitment period of the
Protocol.
Research Method
This issue is discussed through the theory
of offensive realism by John J.
Mearsheimer from his book, “The Tragedy
of Great Power Politics”
4
. Mearsheimer
argued that: first, the international system is
anarchy; second, the great powers have
offensive military power; third, states will
never be certain of other states' intentions;
fourth, survival is the main purpose of great
power states; and fifth, the great powers are
rational actors.
Furthermore, Mearsheimer argued that
states would depend on themselves to
3
Suzanne Goldenberg, "Cancun Climate Change
Conference: Russia Will Not Renew Kyoto
Protocol", The Guardian, December 10 2010,
www.theguardian.com/environment/2010/dec/10/ca
ncun-climate-change-conference-kyoto.
4
John J. Mearsheimer, The Tragedy of Great Power
Politics, (New York: Norton, 2001)

Nur Yasmin Ghafiel, Paramitaningrum | Analysis Of Russia’s Approach To Kyoto
Protocol: Russia’s Withdrawal From Second Commitment Period (2013-2020)
Andalas Journal of International Studies| Vol IX No 2 Nov 2020
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.25077/ajis.9.2.116-130.2020
ensure the safety of their country, hence the
best strategy for states to achieve that is by
power maximization
5
. Also emphasizing
on Russia‟s national interest conception,
which according to the National Security
Concept of the Russian Federation, is “a
totality of balanced interests of the
individual, society and the state in
economic; domestic political, social,
international, informational, military,
border, environmental and other fields." It
is stated that in "Ensuring national security,
the Russian Federation involves the
following main tasks:
- Developing the country's economy
and pursuing independent and
socially oriented economic policies;
- Radically improve the ecological
situation in the country;
- Ensuring national security and
protecting Russian interests in the
economic sphere are the priority
thrusts of state policy."
6
Regarding this case, Russia's national
interest, especially in the economic and
environmental fields, will be touched. In
the economic field, it was said that Russia's
national interest was "sustainable economic
development." The threats to this interests
are, among other things: "a substantial
contraction in the gross domestic product
(GDP); a drop in investment and innovation
activities; the dwindled scientific and
technological potential ... the tendency for
the prevalence in exports supplies of fuels,
raw materials, and energy components, and
5
Colin Elman, “Realism”, International Relations
Theory for the Twenty-First Century, Oxon:
Routledge, 2007) p. 18; John J. Mearsheimer,
"Structural Realism", in T. Dunne, M. Kurki, S.
Smith, International Relations Theory: Discipline
and Diversity Ed.3, pp. 77-93, (Oxford: Oxford
University Press, 2012)
6
Russian Federation, National Security Concept of
the Russian Federation (Moscow: Russian
Federation, 2000)
http://www.mid.ru/en/foreign_policy/official_docu
ments/-
/asset_publisher/CptICkB6BZ29/content/id/589768
in imports supplies - food and consumer
items, including articles of prime
necessities.".
7
Then, it is reasonable why
the economy is the top priority of Russian
policy. The economic sector will support
other sectors such as security and the
military, politics, society, and others. Thus,
Russia needs a strong and stable economy.
In the field of environment, it was stated
that "The threat of a deteriorating
environmental situation in this country and
the depletion of its natural resources
depend directly on the state of the economy
and the society's willingness to grasp the
globality and importance of these issues.
For Russia, this threat is enormous because
of the preferential development of fuel and
energy industries, the lack of development
in the legislative framework for
environmental activities, the absence or
limitations of resource conservation
technologies, and low environmental
awareness. There is a tendency for Russia
to be used as a place to reprocess and bury
materials and substances that are harmful to
the environment.".
8
From the
abovementioned paragraph, it was
concluded that Russia recognized the
existence of flaws in the legislative
framework for environmental activities.
From this point of view, it appears that
Russia handled environmental threats in its
country into the hands of its people. It also
appears that there is no specific vision to
deal with this problem. Such a condition
shows Russia's position on climate change
and has consequences for its position on the
regime of this issue.
Hence, this research would discuss the
reason behind Russia's withdrawal by
identifying the threats and interests or
benefits to Russia by being in Kyoto
Protocol through the offensive realism
perspective variables: power maximization
and cost and benefit calculation. The first
section explains the Kyoto Protocol and the
7
Russian Federation, 2000
8
Russian Federation, 2000

Nur Yasmin Ghafiel, Paramitaningrum | Analysis Of Russia’s Approach To Kyoto
Protocol: Russia’s Withdrawal From Second Commitment Period (2013-2020)
Andalas Journal of International Studies| Vol IX No 2 Nov 2020
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.25077/ajis.9.2.116-130.2020
dynamics in Russia's ratification process.
The second section discusses the efforts
done by Russia in internalizing the Protocol
and the outcomes. The third section
analyzes Russia's withdrawal through the
provided perspective. The final section
provides a concluding statement on this
issue.
Result and Discussion
1. Protocol Kyoto and Russia’s
Ratification
The Kyoto Protocol is one of the
mechanisms under the United Nations
Framework Convention on Climate Change
(UNFCCC) created in 1997 in Kyoto,
Japan. This Protocol contains an outline of
the necessary actions needed to deal with
climate change and strengthen the
UNFCCC to achieve its objectives. This
Protocol is legally binding. It sets targets
for each Annex I member country,
consisting of 41 industrialized countries, to
reduce greenhouse gas emissions by at least
5% of the emission level in 1990 and to
help developing countries overcome
climate change. Such an arrangement is
because of the shared understanding that
industrialized countries are important actors
responsible for climate change through
industrial emissions. The Countries which
fail in meeting their emission targets are
required to cover the difference between
the emission targets and their actual
emissions, plus a 30% penalty for the
following period. The country cannot
participate in the emissions trade until
considered to comply with this Protocol.
Russia signed the Kyoto Protocol in
1999 and ratified it in 2004. This
ratification also complemented the
requirement that the Protocol came into
force in 2005. There was a long process to
ratify the Kyoto Protocol, due to several
problems and circumstances. Under the
Kyoto regulation, Russia needs to reduce
its emissions by a target of 0%, which
means it should not exceed its emission
level in 1990 or around 3000 million tons
of CO2. By ratifying this Protocol, Russia
has also committed to formulate and
implement national actions and policies to
reduce greenhouse gas emissions. In this
effort, the Kyoto Protocol has provided
three mechanisms, namely: (1) emissions
trading; (2) joint implementation (JI), and
(3) the Clean Development Mechanism
(CDM). Russia itself hoped to play a
significant role in these mechanisms,
especially emissions trading and JI.
2. Pre-ratification Debate
Domestically, there was a debate on
the issue of the Kyoto Protocol's
ratification. Legislation of the State Duma
generally supports, except Andrei
Illarionov, the President's economic
adviser, who rejects Russia to ratify it.
Illarionov rejected the idea added that
Russia would experience an economic
recovery and would exceed its emissions
quota. Russia also must comply with the
commitment to reduce emissions, which
would cause the country to limit industrial
activity and energy use, which will have an
impact on economic growth. He had a
negative view of the Kyoto Protocol's
ratification, mainly because it would
hamper Russia's economic growth.
Illarionov himself was a member of the
Advisory Board of the Russian Academy of
Sciences. The agency examined the Kyoto
Protocol and revealed that it would have
several negative impacts on Russia, such as
the main points of his arguments:
a. The Kyoto Protocol does not have a
scientific or scientific basis;
b. The Kyoto Protocol will not be
effective in achieving the objectives
of the UNFCCC;
c. The warmth of the climate for cold
Russia can have positive effects
such as reduced energy uses for
heating and increased food
production;

Nur Yasmin Ghafiel, Paramitaningrum | Analysis Of Russia’s Approach To Kyoto
Protocol: Russia’s Withdrawal From Second Commitment Period (2013-2020)
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.25077/ajis.9.2.116-130.2020
d. Due to the rapid growth of GDP in
Russia, the Kyoto Protocol can
provide serious economic risks and
eventually limit GDP growth.
The industrial sector in Russia also
believes in this. They see the excellent
prospect of the JI project, namely
technology the modernization, and project
financing related to energy efficiency. The
industrial sector had a significant
contribution to the Russian economy,
especially the energy industry sector, such
as the Gazprom company and OAO RAO
UES (OAO Unified Energy System of
Russia). This is because Russia has 58% of
the total JI market with potential emissions
reductions of more than 150 Mt CO2e.
On the other hand, the main
argument of the supporters is that Russia
has an opportunity to increase its economy
with its emission surplus quota and joint
implementation. By regulating emission
reduction, Russia could reduce the intensity
of energy use and save state revenues and
double its GDP. For example,
environmental NGOs see that by ratifying
the Kyoto Protocol, Russia will have a
mechanism that regulates greenhouse gas
emissions produced by its domestic
activities, extraordinarily inefficient
industries. WWF Russia is one of the
international NGOs that supports the
ratification of the Kyoto Protocol.
However, NGOs in Russia have a limited
role in influencing the Russian government
due to the country's political atmosphere, in
which the non-state actors are not one of
the main actors. Therefore, the negative
opinion about the Kyoto Protocol is still
more reliable.
Despite all the debate, Russia saw
that the Kyoto Protocol's ratification is
strategic for its international exposure.
Russia was offered to be a member of
WTO and was given strong support from
the EU if this country is willing to ratify the
Kyoto Protocol. Russia has been aspiring to
join WTO since 1992.
9
The initial
negotiation process has been postponed for
a while because of the Russian Ruble crisis
in 1998.
10
When Vladimir Putin came to
power in 2000 as a president, the prospect
of Russian membership in the WTO
became crucial.
For Putin, the consideration of
facilitating Russia becoming a member of
the WTO is an excellent opportunity to be
gained from ratifying it, and that Putin
takes this into account as a political
advantage for Russia and an achievement
for him as President. WTO‟s membership
will affect the growth of the Russian
economy. According to World Bank, WTO
membership in Russia will provide 3%
GDP growth in the medium term and 11%
in a long time, especially with improved
service quality and reduced prices in the
domestic market.
Furthermore, Russia has a decisive
role in this Protocol that gives Russia
image elevation in the international
community. As the European Union
strongly supports and seeks to implement
the Kyoto Protocol, Russia's refusal to
ratify would strongly affect its relationship
with Europe. Russia will also be deemed
not to support a shared agenda aimed at the
safety of the world. Conversely, if Russia
ratifies, Russia will be considered a 'savior'
which helps the environmental plan. It will
also show that Russia is cooperative with
the European Union, one of the
distinguished global environmental actors.
Putin himself would be seen a good person.
Thus, on October 22 2004, the State
of Duma voted 334-73 and approved the
treaty. It can be argued that Russia's
9
Yasin, Yevgeny (2002), Russia and the WTO, in
Barysch, Katinka, Cottrell, Robert, Frattini, Franco,
Hare, Paul Lamy Pascal, Medvedkov, Maxim, and
Yasin, Yevgeny, “Russia and the WTO” Centre for
European Reform 2012,
https://www.cer.eu/sites/default/files/publications/at
tachments/pdf/2011/p394_russia_wto-1663.pdf:
page 5
10
Ibid

Nur Yasmin Ghafiel, Paramitaningrum | Analysis Of Russia’s Approach To Kyoto
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.25077/ajis.9.2.116-130.2020
participation in the Kyoto Protocol's first
commitment period was then due to
opportunities that would benefit Russia,
which later became an interest in making
such decisions, including:
- Economic benefits: Russia's
potential to sell its 'hot air' will
contribute significantly to the
Russian economy. The potential for
carrying out joint implementation
(JI) projects is also significant so
that participating in Russia can
attract investors for the JI project.
- Political advantage: The European
Union's support for Russia‟s
membership in the WTO will be a
good step for the Russian economy.
Russia will have a say in
international trade negotiations.
WTO membership will also help
Russia to conduct its economic
reform.
11
It also shows that Russia
– EU‟s good interaction.
- Elevation of image: Russia's
participation in the Kyoto Protocol
and its ratification will improve
Russia's image as the largest carbon
emitter country in the world. With
veto rights obtained by Russia after
the United States refused to
participate, Russia would be
considered as the 'savior.'
Therefore, the Russian
government's move will be seen
positively by the international
community.
3. Russia’s Participation and
Protocol’s Internalization
With the Kyoto Protocol's
ratification, Russia needs to prepare a
legislative and institutional framework to
implement mechanisms within the Kyoto
Protocol domestically. From 2006 to 2009,
11
Ibid
as many as 5 (five), legislative actions were
born
12
:
a. Government Regulation (Order) of
the Russian Federation concerning
the establishment of a Russian
carbon unit registry to fulfil
commitments under the Kyoto
Protocol (2006);
b. Government Regulation (Order) of
the Russian Federation concerning
the establishment of a system for
anthropogenic emissions assessment
based on its source and elimination
by the removal of greenhouse gases
not regulated by the Montreal
Protocol on ozone-depleting
substances to fulfill commitments
under the Kyoto Protocol Article 5,
paragraph 1 (2006);
c. Government Regulation of the
Russian Federation concerning
procedures for the acceptance and
control of the progress of project
implementation under Articles 6
and 17 of the Kyoto Protocol
(2007);
d. Government Regulation (Order) of
the Russian Federation concerning
the simplification of procedures for
the acceptance, implementation, and
control of projects under Articles 6
and 17 of the Kyoto Protocol
(2009).
e. Government Regulation (Order) of
the Russian Federation regarding
the assignment of the Savings Bank
of Russia Joint Stock Company as
an entity with the power to
participate in the trade of
greenhouse gas emissions with the
aim of fulfilling the commitment of
the Russian Federation on the
limitation and reduction of
measured greenhouse gas emissions
(2009).
12
Federal Service for Hydrometeorology and
Environmental Monitoring. 2014. First Biennial
Report of The Russian Federation. Moscow: Russia.

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The Action Plan on the Kyoto
Protocol was made and agreed with the
leading agencies appointed by Russia to be
responsible for handling the
implementation of the Kyoto Protocol,
namely the Ministry of Natural Resources
(MNR) and the Russian Federal Service for
Hydrometeorology and Environmental
Monitoring (Roshydromet). Russia also
created a national system to monitor
greenhouse gas emissions and policies that
have been poured into the Socio-Economic
Development Program for the Medium-
Term Perspective. The website containing
the Russian Carbon Unit Registry was also
built for the transparency of the carbon
registry data collection.
13
In 2009, Russia
formulated Climate Doctrine, which
contained domestic climate policy to pay
more attention to its carbon emissions. It is
seen that Russia was already in the process
of institutionalizing its commitment to
implementing the Kyoto Protocol.
Furthermore, The Russian
government and Russian business
community had very high expectations of
the Kyoto Protocol's mechanism,
specifically the implementation of the JI
project in Russia. The biggest energy
companies in Russia, namely OAO RAO
UES and Gazprom, supported the Kyoto
Protocol's ratification because they saw the
potential of the JI project, which was
expected to improve energy efficiency and
technology exchange.
14
To implement the Doctrine, Russia
needs to have an institutional and
legislative framework so that successful
project implementation efforts attract
investors. Therefore, a collaboration with
the business community is significant.
However, Russia failed to develop an
adequate framework, starting from the
agency responsible for implementing the
Kyoto Protocol to the uncertainty of the
13
Website could be accessed via
http://www.carbonunitsregistry.ru/
14
Firsova and Taplin, 2008.
administrative system, including unclear
incentive system, which led to fraud and
corruption.
There is no clear division of
responsibility between Russian national
bodies. The project administration process
does not channel funds directly to the
project investment's recipient body, but
through agency authority in person. The
unclear legislative mechanism makes a
complicated registration process. Anna
Korppoo identified problems that hampered
the running of the JI project in Russia in
three aspects: institutional and legislative
frameworks, readiness for implementation,
and project funding from local co-funding.
15
as a result, more than 100 JI projects
failed to be completed in 2009, with
potential emissions reductions of around
240 million tons of CO2e. More than 40
plans that have registered have also not
been followed up until the end of 2009.
16
Then, the most substantial reason
for ratifying is the potential profit from the
sale of Russian 'hot air'. Nevertheless, the
income earned from emissions trading is
not as high as predicted. "Potential hot air"
buyers turned out to choose to buy other
countries' carbon credits other than Russia.
One of them is the European Union, which
stated that they are more inclined to buy
surplus AAUs that do not originate from
'hot air,' which is a surplus obtained
through concrete greening emissions
projects. In contrast, Russia's surplus is a
result of its economic transition from
Soviet times.
In the announcement of Russia's
withdrawal in 2010, it was officially stated
that the main reason was the lack of
15
Anna Korppoo, "Russian energy efficiency
projects: lessons learned from Activities
Implemented Jointly pilot phase". Energy Policy 33
(2008), 113–126.
16
Shishlov I. (2011). Joint Implementation in
Russia: on track to overtake Brazil as the third-
largest supplier of Kyoto offsets.
http://www.cdcclimat.com/Climate-Brief-no8-
Joint.html

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participation in other primary greenhouse
gas producer states. It also said that
countries committed in the second
commitment period had non-environmental
reasons such as promoting
clean technology standards. Russia
said it would join an environmental
agreement which is covering all major
emitters of greenhouse gases. The United
States has withdrawn from the Kyoto
Protocol. When Russia did the same, it
shows that the Kyoto Protocol loses another
world's largest polluter. Therefore, the
mitigation rate could be affected. This
situation also stops Russia from
participating in mechanisms the Kyoto
Protocol provides, such as emissions
trading and JI.
Table 1. Expectation and Reality of the
Kyoto Protocol Implementation
Source: Authors
The table shows the expectations
and reality of the Kyoto Protocol after
being implemented. When what was
allegedly potential to benefit Russia was
not achieved, it was a rational action for
Russia to withdraw. In the absence of
significant profits, while remaining within
the Kyoto Protocol, Russia has resigned
and focused on what becomes its national
interest.
Table 2. Cost and benefit to settle in
second commitment period of Kyoto
Protocol
Cost
Benefit
Emissions need to be
controlled so that it
will have an impact on
economic growth;
Emissions Need to
Be controlled to
boost the efficient
Energy sector.
„Hot air' from the first
commitment period
cannot be sold when it
enters the second
commitment period;
The IET mechanism
could encourage
domestic climate
policy;
Cannot utilize the
mechanisms in the
Protocol;
It can still use the
mechanisms. But
looking at the results
of the joint
implementation,
Russia needs an
adequate domestic
legal framework;
Russia will be bound
by the rules of the
Kyoto Protocol,
limiting its emissions
income, which
hampers its economy,
which is dominated by
the fossil fuel of
energy sector.
Russia will be
considered as a
country concerned
with the issue of
climate change in the
international arena.
Source: Authors
The table above shows a cost and
benefit calculation if Russia stays to
participate in the Kyoto Protocol's second
commitment period. Another additional
impact on the economy is Russia would
also become an industrial country that is
under commitment to limit its emissions.
The United States, China, Canada, and
other industrialized countries did not
participate, and they have withdrawn from
the Kyoto Protocol. Therefore, if Russia
No
.
Expectation
Reality
1.
Gaining benefit
from emission
trading
Buying countries are
uninterested
Low carbon unit price
2.
Gaining
investments from
JI project
Domestic legislative
framework is inadequate;
thus, investors choose the
other countries
3.
Having a bigger
role in Protocol
Kyoto negotiation.
Gains bigger
responsibility and burden
in climate change
mitigation
4.
Emission limit is
far enough to be
reached; hence
there's no need for
change in the
economy.
The second commitment
period increased the
emission reduction target
to 18%. The first
commitment period (%)
was already concerning
for economic growth.

Nur Yasmin Ghafiel, Paramitaningrum | Analysis Of Russia’s Approach To Kyoto
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settled, it reduces its competitiveness to
grow its economy.
The consideration of prioritizing the
country's agenda to continue to use its
fossil fuel commodities is a manifestation
of efforts to power maximization. Russia
still needs to rebuild its economy since its
downfall in the Soviet Union era. For that
reason, the Russian government relies on
the oil and gas sector. Russia's energy and
raw materials sector covered 50% of its
budget revenues, more than 70% of
Russia's exports, contributed 100% to
Russian stabilization funds, and around 5%
employment.
17
Meanwhile, there was a fluctuation
of revenue from oil and gas, due to some
external and internal problems: (1)
international scale conflict – Iraq -Kuwait
War 1990s and Iraq– US conflicts in the
year of 2000s, which affected world oil
prices. (2) Other countries‟ domestic
political crisis such as Venezuela‟s unrest
in 2002 - 2003; (3) 1998‟s Financial Crisis
which affected three Asian countries: South
Korea, Thailand and Indonesia and
influence their purchasing power for oil and
gas. (4). Russia‟s territorial dispute with
Georgia in 2008.
The Iraq-Kuwait war in 1990
caused another oil shock across the globe.
The Soviet Union's GDP during that shock
equaled about 776.8 billion dollars, and the
country was the world's seventh economy.
However, the economic programs of the
Soviet Union's leaders failed at that point,
and the Soviet Union's society faced many
difficulties. Asian tigers and the Russian
Federation's financial crisis caused the next
oil price shock in 1998. On the one hand,
Thailand, South Korea, and several other
East Asia countries decided on changing
the nature of their currency, imposing a
severe shock on the financial markets.
17
Balov VN “The role and the place of the mineral
sector in socio-economic development of Russia”
(in Russian). Bulletin „Ispolzovanie i ochrana
prirodnich resursov v Rossii‟ 6:52–54.
On the other hand, Russia devalued
its currency as an OPEC nonmember. As a
result, the petroleum price in 1998 sank to
12 dollars per barrel. In other words,
petroleum prices fell to its lowest level
since 1972. The Russian Federation's GDP
growth per year turned -5.8%, and the
value of this country's petroleum exports
dropped to 14.5 billion US dollars. Another
oil price shock took place in 2003, due to
Venezuela's unrest and the Second Persian
Gulf War (the US- Iraq war). The Iraq
crisis, which was one of the OPEC's
petrostates, created disorder in the supply
of petroleum across the globe. The internal
turmoil in Venezuela during 2002 and 2003
imbalanced petroleum and gasoline
production in this country. As a result,
petroleum prices took a sudden rise from
about 25 dollars in 2002 to 38.3 dollars by
the end of 2003. The oil price increase
during this period brought about a
remarkable increase in government
revenues for Russia. The vast budget was
used for the reconstruction and
modernization of this country's economy
(Bochkarev, 2006). According to the
statistics by the Energy Information
Administration, Russia increased its
petroleum production during that shock
from 7,6 -9,2 million barrels per day from
2002 to 2004.
18
The volume of petroleum
exports of the Russian Federation also rose
from 291 billion dollars in 2002 to 590
billion dollars in 2004, respectively.
Meanwhile, another oil price
fluctuation happened during the years 2007
to 2009, following the downturn in world
oil production and the conflict in oil
demand, due to Russia's domestic issues
and some other global unrest. In this
period, the world oil prices rose from 50
dollars per barrel at the beginning of 2007,
18
Ludmila Popova, Farkhondeh Jabalameli, and
Ehsan Rasoulinezhad, Oil Price Shocks and Russia‟s
Economic Growth: The Impacts and Policies for
Overcoming Them, Journal of World Sociopolitical
Studies, Vol. 1, No. 1, 2017, pp. 1-31

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to 140 dollars per barrel in summer 2008. After that, it decreased to about 70 dollars
in 2009. At the same time, Russia had a
significant recession because of its military
dispute with Georgia and the decrease in
the substantial Urals crude oil prices.
According to the statistics from Russia's
central bank, the volume of crude oil
exports reached from 121 billion dollars per
day in 2007 to 161 billion dollars in 2008
and 100 billion dollars in 2009. Several
global unrests in the first half of 2011
influenced world oil prices due to various
reasons, such as earthquakes, tsunamis, the
nuclear power plant explosion in Japan, the
Arab Spring, Libya's civil war, and as the
terror of Bin Laden. Here, the world oil
prices reached from approximately 80
dollars per barrel to 120 dollars. Those
issues contributed to Russia's increasing
income. The customs' data of the Russian
Federation shows that the revenue from
petroleum exports of the country increased
from 135 billion dollars in 2010 to about
181.8 billion dollars in 2011. Moreover, the
oil export revenue shares equaled 53.1% of
19
Russian Federation, Federal Service for
Hydrometeorology and Environmental Monitoring
of the Russian Federation, First Biennial Report of
the Russian Federation (for UNFCCC) (Moscow,
2014).
Russia's total exports in 2011. In sum,
Russia has been focusing on its oil capacity
to stabilize its economy, since it influences
Russia's power performance.
Furthermore, Russia's oil capacity
correlates with Russia's position by
remaining within the Kyoto Protocol.
Therefore, Russia needs to develop better
mechanisms to limit its greenhouse gas
emissions to meet the Kyoto Protocol
targets. By the time of this research, Russia
is still classified as critically insufficient
20
in handling climate change. Below is the
data on emissions produced by Russia in
the period before and entering the second
commitment period of the Kyoto Protocol;
they are as follows:
20
. The Climate Action Tracker defines the term
"critically insufficient" is one of the lowest groups
in the commitment to be far outside the range of fair
and inconsistent doses to maintain heating levels
below 2 degrees Celsius from the limit of 1.5
degrees Celsius from the Paris Agreement. If all
government targets are at this level, hating will
exceed 4 degrees Celsius
Figure 1. Russian emission data 1990-2011
Source: Federal Service of Hydrometeorology and Environmental Monitoring of the Russian
Federation, 201419

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The Kyoto Protocol bound the figure
above shows that Russia's emissions did not
experience significant changes in the period
before, during, and after Russia. That figure
also describes that it would not be any
significant differences even when this
country withdrew from the Protocol. In the
first commitment period, Russia was not
needed to reduce emissions and instead had a
surplus of 'hot air' due to its economic
transition. Nevertheless, in the second
commitment period, the surplus was no
longer used, and the emission reduction
target was further increased, from 5% to 18%
from 1990 levels. Thus, Russia would need
to limit its energy use and fossil energy
extraction, while these commodities were the
main supporters of the economy Russia
Russia has the highest energy use
projection, poured through its "Russian
Energy Strategy until 2035" indicating that
Russia will continue to use existing
resources for its economic growth.
22
Therefore, Russia's involvement in the
Kyoto Protocol will affect its industrial
capacity. Later on, it also hampers Russia's
economic growth, mainly because Russia is
bound to commit to meet its emission
reduction targets. Russian emissions have
continued to grow since 1998 by as much as
15% until 2006. In the same year, a 6.7%
GDP growth helped increase greenhouse gas
emissions by 2.6%. In 2000, President
Vladimir Putin had set a target to double
GDP by 2010, a target that would hamper
21
International Energy Agency (IEA), World Energy
Outlook 2016,
http://www.iea.org/newsroom/news/2016/november/
world-energy-outlook-2016.html
22
Alexey Kokorin, Korppoo, A., “Russia‟s Ostrich
Approach to Climate Change and the Paris
Agreement”, CEPS Policy Insights No. 2017-40
(Brussels: CEPS, 2017)
Russia to reduce its emissions.
23
Consequently, commitments with regimes
such as the Kyoto Protocol will be a barrier
for Russia.
Figure 3. Increased GDP and CO2
emissions in Russia 1990-2010
Source: Sharmina et al, 2013
24
23
Anna Korppoo, Moe, A. “Russian Climate Politics:
Light at the End of the Tunnel?”, Climate Strategies
Briefing Paper, (Oxford Climate Policy, 2007)
http://climatestrategies.org/wp-
content/uploads/2007/04/russia-politics-bp.pdf
24
Maria Sharmina, Anderson, K., Larkin, A.,
“Climate Change Regional Review: Russia”, (WIREs
Figure 2. Projection of fossil fuel energy consumption in industrial countries 2014-2040
Source: International Energy Agency, 201621

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The graph above shows an increase
in GDP accompanied by CO2 emissions in
Russia. Russia's energy activity is the most
significant contributor to emissions and GDP
in Russia (See Figure 1). For that reason,
restrictions on emissions will have an impact
on Russia's GDP growth.
It can be concluded that based on the
offensive realism assumption that the state
will maintain its survival by increasing its
power capability. The state will tend to direct
its policies of power maximization and self-
help, in response to an international system
of anarchy so that the state needs to improve
its competitive capabilities. For Russia,
following what is stated in its national
interest official documents, economic
strength is the country's top priority that
needs to be maintained and maximized.
Thus, the utilization of energy resources is
intensified to strengthen The Russian
economy, since that is a major element in
Russia's power maximization efforts. While
energy resources are Russia's primary
sources of wealth, therefore, Russia will
allocate all resources to secure this sector,
including on how to gain more benefits from
Russia's international partnership.
By participating in the Kyoto
Protocol's second commitment period, those
above-mentioned interests will be threatened
because Russia will need to limit its carbon
emissions. This limitation will affect Russia's
oil production process and the consumption
or utilization of oil resources for
development and export activities. Oil, like
nature, gas is an essential revenue for Russia.
Therefore, Russia's national interests in the
energy sector would be above the global
agenda of climate change and the self-help
principle.
Furthermore, Russia already got its
membership in the WTO, with the EU full
supports. Being part of global and
international trade arrangements such as
Clim Change 4, 2013) pp. 373-396, doi:
10.1002/wcc.236
WTO is contributed to the creation of a right
image of the Russian economy and Russia's
international posture. Russia gained global
recognition as a new and rising economy
actor and beneficial to support Russia's
economy. Such recognition also helped
Russia power maximization efforts because
indirectly will support Russia's economic
development. Furthermore, Russia's
participation in WTO and its system would
become the priority. Russia's commitment to
the Kyoto Protocol is considered less
important because it will not have similar
recognition that Russia gained from WTO.
Conclusion
Russia, under President Vladimir
Putin's administration, sought to restore
Russia to become a world power.
Participating in the Kyoto Protocol was
expected to be one of the steps to realize this
ambition. However, Russia's ratification into
the Kyoto Protocol was not because of the
environmental reasons, which are to protect
the planet and mitigate climate change, but
rather to gain profits. Russia hoped-for
benefits from its ratification, starting from
the ease of joining the WTO to increasing
revenues from trading in carbon emissions.
Russia's withdrawal from the second
commitment period was following the
assumption of offensive realism. Russia has
an ambition for power maximization through
its economic growth; hence the Russian
government protects its main economic
supporting commodities-fossil fuel energy.
The state as a rational actor will prioritize the
decision that is more profitable for their
country, and involvement in environmental
negotiations will only be used as a tool to
achieve his interests. The Kyoto Protocol, as
stated by Berditsky, was no longer in the
interests of Russia, so Russia decided to
withdraw. Additionally, numerous factors
that also contribute to this are:
- Changes in regulation and
mechanisms in the Kyoto Protocol's
second-period commitment did not

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put Russia in an advantageous
position.
- The dependency of the Russian
economy to fossil fuel energy export.
- Lack of contingency and certainty
within the government that there
were different opinions regarding the
Kyoto Protocol ratification.
- No public pressure to the Russian
government to enforce the Protocol
and climate policy in general.
- Russia's perception of climate change
that it would not affect their country
negatively and would rather be
beneficial for their economy.
For Russia, national interest is to
increase its power capacity in the form of
military capabilities and economic
improvement. Besides that, other supporting
factors are Russian expectations that are not
in line with reality. Domestically, the
Russian government has not prepared an
adequate framework for implementing the
Kyoto Protocol mechanism. Thus, investors
tend to choose to invest in other countries.
Emissions trading also produces no results as
expected, mainly because of the buyer's
country preferences and the decline in the
price of carbon credits on the international
carbon market. Then, the absence of internal
pressure or government interest in climate
change makes this issue less prioritized and
considered in Russia. With the risks to the
Russian economy, especially in the energy
sector, Russia's decision to back down is no
other to safeguard its national interests.
Russia's withdrawal from the Kyoto
Protocol's second commitment period was
mainly due to Russia's prioritization of
national interest over global interest.
Presumably, climate change is a threat to the
whole world, but it has not been a major
concern for Russia. When scientific findings
show that climate change is advantageous for
Russia, this country applied a self-help
approach to this issue. Thus, the authors
conclude that the issue of climate change,
including the Kyoto Protocol, has not been a
top priority in policy orientation and part of
Russia's national interests. Until then, Russia
will continue to maximize its economic
growth even though it means that Russia
must continue to use fossil energy.
Russia's dependence on its energy is
detrimental to this country in the long run.
Thus, actions need to be anticipated, such as
the provision of energy diversification,
energy efficiency, and specifically the
development of renewable energy.
Therefore, slowly, Russia can help the
international community by reducing
greenhouse gases in the design of a
mechanism that is in line with its domestic
situation and does not hurt the economy.
Russia's decline and these factors did
not make Russia abstain entirely from the
issue of climate change. Russia still has a
crucial role to play in the future of
international climate governance. Because
Russia is a country with abundant fossil
energy reserves, the most significant fossil
energy exporter, and a country with
extensive blue carbon reserves. By
developing adequate forestry and energy
policies, Russia could have a major influence
on global climate change mitigation efforts.

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