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Social perception and influence of lies vs. bullshit: a test of the insidious bullshit hypothesis

DOI:10.1007/s12144-021-02243-z
Authors:
John V. Petrocelli at Wake Forest University
John V. Petrocelli
Haley E. Silverman
Haley E. Silverman
Haley E. Silverman
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Samantha X. Shang
Samantha X. Shang
Samantha X. Shang
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Abstract and Figures

Although a ubiquitous social behavior, little is known about bullshitting (i.e., communicating with no regard for truth and/or evidence) and its effects on social perception and influence. Although bullshit and lies are viewed as undesirable, the distinction may have important implications for social influence. Frankfurt’s (1986) insidious bullshit hypothesis (i.e., bullshitting is evaluated less negatively, but more insidious, than lying) is examined in light of social perception (i.e., evaluation and perceived motives; Experiment 1) and social influence (Experiment 2). Results suggest bullshitting is evaluated less negatively than lying and identifies ignorance, dishonesty, and opinion expression as mediators of a bullshit/lie-evaluation link. Furthermore, relative to lies, bullshit appears to have a more potent impact on that which is perceived to be true as well as attitudes formed for novel attitude objects.
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Social perception and influence of lies vs. bullshit: a test
of the insidious bullshit hypothesis
John V. Petrocelli
1
&Haley E. Silverman
1
&Samantha X. Shang
1
Accepted: 17 August 2021
#The Author(s), under exclusive licence to Springer Science+Business Media, LLC, part of Springer Nature 2021
Abstract
Although a ubiquitous social behavior, little is known about bullshitting (i.e., communicating with no regard for truth and/or
evidence) and its effects on social perception and influence. Although bullshit and lies are viewed as undesirable, the distinction
may have important implications for social influence. Frankfurt’s (1986) insidious bullshit hypothesis (i.e., bullshitting is
evaluated less negatively, but more insidious, than lying) is examined in light of social perception (i.e., evaluation and perceived
motives; Experiment 1) and social influence (Experiment 2). Results suggest bullshitting is evaluated less negatively than lying
and identifies ignorance, dishonesty, and opinion expression as mediators of a bullshit/lie-evaluation link. Furthermore, relative
to lies, bullshit appears to have a more potent impact on that which is perceived to be true as well as attitudes formed for novel
attitude objects.
Keywords Bullshit .Bullshitting .Lying .Social perception .Attitude .Persuasion
Bullshitting involves intentionally or unintentionally, con-
sciously or unconsciously, communicating with little to no
regard or concern for truth, genuine evidence, and/or
established semantic, logical, systemic, or empirical knowl-
edge (Frankfurt, 1986; Petrocelli, 2018). As such, bullshitting
is often characterized by, but not limited to, using rhetorical
strategies designed to disregard truth, evidence and/or
established knowledge, such as exaggerating or embellishing
one’s knowledge, competence, or skills in a particular area or
talking about things of which one knows nothing about in
order to impress, fit in with, influence, or persuade others.
Frankfurt (1986) surmised that bullshit is unavoidable
whenever circumstances require one to talk about things he/
she knows little to nothing about. When a person’s obligations
to speak about a topic are more extensive than his/her knowl-
edge of the facts relevant to that topic, bullshit is often the
result. In fact, it is well established that people are perfectly
willing to offer judgments and opinions about that which they
could not possibly know anything about (e.g., Herr, Sherman,
& Fazio, 1983). Although people appear to feel obligated to
have an opinion about everything, they cannot possibly have
an informed opinion about everything, and therefore, bullshit
is continually produced (Petrocelli, 2018). Given that
bullshitting is almost unavoidable (Allen, Allen, & McGoun,
2012; Frankfurt, 1986; Morgan, 2010), it is surprising that
little empirical knowledge about the behavior exists.
Although it appears to be an inevitable social behavior and
a salient feature of our culture (Law, 2011;Penny,2005), and
bullshit can be misperceived as something profound
(Pennycook, Cheyne, Barr, Koehler, & Fugelsang, 2015;
Pfattheicher & Schindler, 2016; Sterling, Jost, & Pennycook,
2016), the potential utilities of bullshitting remain unexam-
ined. A better understanding of the social perception of bull-
shit, and its influence on attitudes relative to lies, sheds im-
portant light on the potential antecedents and communicative
functions of bullshitting behavior. The current investigation
examines potential consequences of bullshitting relative to
lying and the effects they have on social influence.
Bullshitting Vs. Lying
Bullshitting is distinct from lying (Frankfurt, 1986). The liar
knows the truth and communicates with respect to the goal of
detracting others from the facts. On the other hand, the bullshitter
has no regard for evidence in support of what he/she believes to
be true. In fact, what the bullshitter communicates may be true,
but the bullshitter wouldn’t know whether or not he/she is
*John V. Petrocelli
petrocjv@wfu.edu
1
Department of Psychology, Wake Forest University, P.O. Box 7778,
Winston-Salem, NC 27109, USA
https://doi.org/10.1007/s12144-021-02243-z
/ Published online: 3 September 2021
Current Psychology (2023) 42:9609–9617
Content courtesy of Springer Nature, terms of use apply. Rights reserved.
... Although bullshitting is not regarded as negatively as lying (Frankfurt, 1986;Petrocelli, Silverman, & Shang, 2020), bullshitting is still a socially undesirable behaviour. Why, then, do people appear to engage in the behaviour so frequently? ...
... However, not only do social perceivers appear to recognize essential differences between bullshitters and liars and respond to bullshitters with much less disdain, social perceivers tend to view bullshitters as relatively more ignorant, likely expressing their opinions, and trying to impress others than they do liars (Petrocelli et al., 2020). Bullshitters also avoid the judgements of dishonesty and untrustworthiness that liars inherit (Frankfurt, 1986;Petrocelli et al., 2020). ...
... However, not only do social perceivers appear to recognize essential differences between bullshitters and liars and respond to bullshitters with much less disdain, social perceivers tend to view bullshitters as relatively more ignorant, likely expressing their opinions, and trying to impress others than they do liars (Petrocelli et al., 2020). Bullshitters also avoid the judgements of dishonesty and untrustworthiness that liars inherit (Frankfurt, 1986;Petrocelli et al., 2020). Furthermore, Petty (1997) and Petty and Wegener (1999) have argued persuasively that variables affecting motivation and/or ability to process a message in a relatively objective manner can do so by either enhancing or reducing argument scrutiny. ...
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