ArticlePDF Available

Abstract

Judgments about the self compared to internalized standards are central to theoretical frameworks of social anxiety. Yet, empirical research on social comparisons-how people view themselves relative to others-and social anxiety is sparse. This research program examines the nature of everyday social comparisons in the context of social anxiety across 2 experience-sampling studies containing 8,396 unique entries from 273 adults. Hypotheses and analyses were preregistered with the Open Science Foundation (OSF) prior to data analysis. Study 1 was a 3-week daily diary study with undergraduates, and Study 2 was a 2-week ecological momentary assessment (EMA) study with a clinical sample of adults diagnosed with social anxiety disorder (SAD) and a psychologically healthy comparison group. In both studies, social anxiety was associated with less favorable, more unstable social comparisons. In both studies, favorable social comparisons were associated with higher positive affect and lower negative affect and social anxiety. In both studies, social comparisons and momentary affect/social anxiety were more strongly linked in people with elevated trait social anxiety/SAD compared to less socially anxious participants. Participants in Study 2-even those with SAD-made more favorable social comparisons when they were with other people than when alone. Taken together, results suggest that social anxiety is associated with unfavorable, unstable self-views that are linked to compromised well-being. (PsycInfo Database Record (c) 2021 APA, all rights reserved).
Social Comparisons and Social Anxiety in Daily Life:
An Experience-Sampling Approach
Fallon R. Goodman
1
, Kerry C. Kelso
2
, Brenton M. Wiernik
1
, and Todd B. Kashdan
2
1
Department of Psychology, University of South Florida
2
Department of Psychology, George Mason University
Judgments about the self compared to internalized standards are central to theoretical frameworks of social
anxiety. Yet, empirical research on social comparisonshow people view themselves relative to othersand
social anxiety is sparse. This research program examines the nature of everyday social comparisons in the con-
text of social anxiety across 2 experience-sampling studies containing 8,396 unique entries from 273 adults.
Hypotheses and analyses were preregistered with the Open Science Foundation (OSF) prior to data analysis.
Study 1 was a 3-week daily diary study with undergraduates, and Study 2 was a 2-week ecological momentary
assessment (EMA) study with a clinical sample of adults diagnosed with social anxiety disorder (SAD) and a
psychologically healthy comparison group. In both studies, social anxiety was associated with less favorable,
more unstable social comparisons. In both studies, favorable social comparisons were associated with higher
positive affect and lower negative affect and social anxiety. In both studies, social comparisons and momentary
affect/social anxiety were more strongly linked in people with elevated trait social anxiety/SAD compared to
less socially anxious participants. Participants in Study 2even those with SADmade more favorable social
comparisons when they were with other people than when alone. Taken together, results suggest that social
anxiety is associated with unfavorable, unstable self-views that are linked to compromised well-being.
General Scientific Summary
Social anxiety is characterized by persistent and excessive concerns about making an undesirable social
impression. This study supports the notion that for people with social anxiety disorder, these concerns
may be due to self-views of being inferior or decient compared to others. These self-views, however,
are relatively unstable, suggesting that they may be amenable to change with targeted interventions.
Keywords: social anxiety, social comparisons, experience-sampling, evaluation, affect
Supplemental materials: https://doi.org/10.1037/abn0000671.supp
A core symptom of social anxiety disorder (SAD) is fear of social
evaluation (DSM5, 2013), so much so that fear of (negative) evalua-
tion measures are sometimes used as proxies for the disorder itself (e.
g., Brief Fear of Negative Evaluation Scale; Leary, 1983). People
with SAD believe that when interacting with other people, they will
be evaluated poorly and rejected (Hofmann & Barlow, 2002). Thus,
they exert considerable effort to avoid opportunities for scrutiny (e.
g., restricting self-disclosure). But what, specically, do people with
SAD fear exposing? That iswhy is social evaluation so
distressing?
Moscovitch (2009) proposed that the core fear for people with
SAD is exposing self-attributes that they perceive as inferior rela-
tive to other people. He wrote: ... individuals with social phobia
are uniquely and primarily concerned about characteristics of self
that they perceive as being decient or contrary to perceived soci-
etal expectations or norms (p. 125).
With this framework, people with SAD make unfavorable social
comparisons (Festinger, 1954). Social comparisons involve making
judgments about social information (how is everyone else doing?),
gauging ones own standing (how am I doing?), and then calibrating
ones own standing relative to other peoples standing (how do I com-
pare relative to other people?). The degree to which a person makes
favorable self-evaluations depends on their judgments of other people
on a given attribute.
Fallon R. Goodman https://orcid.org/0000-0002-1115-1467
Brenton M. Wiernik https://orcid.org/0000-0001-9560-6336
Data collected for Study 2 was supported by a National Institutes of
Health grant awarded to Fallon R. Goodman (F31-AA024372). Ethics
committee approval for both studies was granted by George Mason
University (Study 1 004337; Study 2 717881). We have no known conicts
of interest to disclose. Study hypotheses and analysis plan were registered
with the Open Science Foundation (10/25/2019) prior to data analysis.
Dissemination of study hypotheses or results has not occurred elsewhere.
We thank Ameena Ashraf, Bradley Brown, David Disabato, James
Doorley, Emily Geyer, Saitejaswi Kanuri, Aslıhan _
Imamo
glu, Maria
Larrazabal, Thien-Kim Luong, Salma Osman, and Shannon Schrader for
assisting with data collection.
Correspondence concerning this article should be addressed to Fallon R.
Goodman, Department of Psychology, University of South Florida, 4202
East Fowler Avenue, PCD 4121, Tampa, FL 33620, United States. Email:
fgoodman@usf.edu
468
Journal of Abnormal Psychology
©2021 American Psychological Association 2021, Vol. 130, No. 5, 468489
ISSN: 0021-843X https://doi.org/10.1037/abn0000671
This document is copyrighted by the American Psychological Association or one of its allied publishers.
This article is intended solely for the personal use of the individual user and is not to be disseminated broadly.
Despite the central role of negative self-perceptions in cognitive
models of social anxiety (Clark & Wells, 1995;Hofmann, 2007;
Rapee & Heimberg, 1997), there is a surprising lack of empirical
research on social comparisons. We know relatively little about
how people with SAD compare themselves to other people,
including how these judgments change over time and their links to
daily emotional experiences. To this end, in our research, we
examined the nature of everyday social comparisons in the context
of social anxiety across two experience-sampling (ESM) studies.
An Evolutionary Framework of Social Comparisons in
Social Anxiety
For most primates, group cohesion is maintained by members
recognizing and acting in accordance with their role in a social hi-
erarchy (see Tone et al., 2019 for an overview). Two psychologi-
cal systems govern this social order: social rank (a focus on power
and dominance) and afliation (a focus on reciprocity and inti-
macy). The primary goal of the social rank system is to monitor
the social hierarchy for potential dangers when trying to access -
nite resources (e.g., food, allies, romantic partners). The primary
goal of the afliation system is to facilitate social connectedness
and intimacy. Effective social functioning depends on group mem-
bersability to exibly shift between social rank and afliative
modes in response to changing situational demands.
Gilbert and colleagues (Gilbert, 2001,2014;Trower & Gilbert,
1989) suggest that social anxiety is an adaptive mechanism that
maintains social order via the social rank system. Thousands of
years ago, when humans lived within tight-knit social groups with
limited access to information and health care, group membership
was required for survival. Ostracism increased the probability of
death. Accordingly, it behooves people to monitor their status
within the social hierarchy to ensure they are not violating norms
that could lead to being ousted from their social group. Social anx-
iety protects against social rejection by increasing attention to
signs of social threat (e.g., disapproval) and concern for social ac-
ceptance (e.g., rejection sensitivity), which facilitates behavioral
modications to avoid challenging more dominant group members
(e.g., submissive behaviors) (Trower & Gilbert, 1989). When
functioning as intended, social anxiety helps maintain social hier-
archies and decrease stress among group members (Sapolsky,
2005).
People with elevated social anxiety, however, overutilize the
social rank system and underutilize the afliation system (e.g.,
Aderka et al., 2013;Peschard et al., 2019). Social rank theory sug-
gests that people with concerns about undesirable self-attributes
perceive themselves as lower in social rank (Gilbert, 1992,2000).
When encountering more dominant group members, lower status
individuals believe they are unlikely to achieve the social rank sys-
tems primary goal of maximizing resources because they cannot
compete with higher status individuals who have more power and
thus greater access to nite resources; therefore, they defer to a
secondary goal of the social rank system: avoid social rejection
and, ultimately, losing resources (Aderka et al., 2009). People
with elevated social anxiety view interpersonal situations as more
competitive than afliative (Tone et al., 2019) and overestimate
the likelihood of rejection (Leary & Jongman-Sereno, 2014). They
vigilantly scan for signs of social threat and show elevations in
threat detection of ambiguous stimuli (e.g., Gilboa-Schechtman et
al., 1999). They engage in submissive social behaviors to avoid
rejection because they perceive themselves as lower in social sta-
tus (involuntary subordinate self-perception;Gilbert, 1992;
Weeks et al., 2011). This is consistent with Moscovitchs (2009)
framework, where social rejection is feared because of self-attrib-
utes perceived as decient relative to others. In both models, the
core assumption is that people high in social anxiety make unfav-
orable social comparisons about self-attributes.
A small body of research offers preliminary support. In two survey
studies, trait social anxiety symptoms were associated with less
favorable social comparisons (Aderka et al., 2009;Gilbert, 2000).
These results were replicated in a survey study, where people diag-
nosed with SAD reported less favorable social comparisons than peo-
ple with other anxiety disorders and psychologically healthy controls
(Weisman et al., 2011). In an experimental study, college undergrad-
uates were randomly assigned to read (bogus) accounts of either high
achieving or normativeachieving fellow students (Mitchell &
Schmidt, 2014). Across both conditions, trait social anxiety symp-
toms were associated with a more negative appraisal of onesown
personality compared to the study proxy. Taken together, people
with elevated social anxiety are more likely to make less favorable
social comparisons than those low in social anxiety.
Social Comparisons and Emotional Well-Being
Beyond the favorability of social comparisons, there are impor-
tant questions to answer about the emotional impact of social com-
parisons. Self-enhancement theories suggest that people compare
themselves to lower status targets (downward social compari-
sons) to feel better about their current situation (e.g., Wills, 1981;
Wood et al., 1985). Downward social comparisons can be a form
of coping with stressors, colloquially referred to as at leaststate-
ments (e.g., at least I am not as impaired as those people). For
example, one study found that breast cancer patients beneted
when they made strategic downward comparisons, such as There
are days when I look in the mirror and I am upset with the scar
under my arm and I think to myself, You are upset with that; how
would you feel with a mastectomy scar?’” (Wood et al., 1985;p.
1174). Indeed, downward social comparisons are associated with
higher positive and lower negative affect (and greater life satisfac-
tion and self-esteem; Dufner et al., 2019;Zell et al., 2020; see also
Alicke & Govorun, 2005). The psychological benets of perceived
higher social status might explain the better-than-average effect”—
despite the fact that only half of a given population can be above av-
erage on any characteristic (assuming a normal distribution), a recent
meta-analysis of nearly 1 million people found that most people tend
to rate self-attributes as above average (Zell et al., 2020).
1
Social comparison favorability may also relate to social anxiety.
Based on Moscovitchs (2009) and Gilberts(Gilbert, 2001,2014;
Trower & Gilbert, 1989) models, fear of negative social evaluation
is a consequence of perceived self-deciency. As such, we would
expect more unfavorable social comparisons to be related to
1
A smaller body of work suggests that rating oneself as relatively
lower/worse at times may be benecial (Suls et al., 2002). People may
intentionally compare themselves to superior others as a form of
motivation to improve. This self-improvement hypothesis suggests that
upward comparisons can lead to hope and inspiration that one can attain a
similar level of status (Collins, 1996;Wood, 1989).
SOCIAL COMPARISONS IN SOCIAL ANXIETY 469
This document is copyrighted by the American Psychological Association or one of its allied publishers.
This article is intended solely for the personal use of the individual user and is not to be disseminated broadly.
greater social anxiety, even among those low in social anxiety
(e.g., Hirsch et al., 2006). For people with elevated social anxiety,
who are vigilant to loss of social standing (Gilboa-Schechtman et
al., 1999), links between unfavorable social comparisons and neg-
ative emotional experiences might be especially strong. Although
no study has tested this hypothesis with social comparisons,
research on broader negative self-perceptions offers ancillary sup-
port. Negative self-perceptions are associated with greater nega-
tive emotionality in people with SAD than in healthy controls
(e.g., Goldin et al., 2009); partially explain relationships between
trait social anxiety with lower positive affect (Alden et al., 2008);
and contribute to greater social anxiety for people with SAD than
healthy controls (Hirsch et al., 2003). Taken together, this research
suggests that social comparison favorability is positively associ-
ated with positive affect and negatively associated with negative
affect and social anxiety, and this relationship is stronger for peo-
ple with elevated social anxiety symptoms relative to those with
lower social anxiety symptoms.
An Experience-Sampling Approach to Understanding
Social Comparisons
One challenge to understanding the nature and impact of social
comparisons is the time course in which they are typically studied.
Most research has assessed social comparisons retrospectively
using global self-report measures. Single time point questionnaires
lack sensitivity to uctuations (e.g., variability; situational differ-
ences) and potentially introduce recall bias (Shiffman et al., 2008).
For social comparisons in particular, people are likely making
comparisons throughout the day (consciously or not), and these
comparisons may vary in favorability and inuence. Indeed, one
of the few ESM studies on social comparisons found that people
varied considerably in favorability of social comparisons and
inuence of proximal emotional experiences (Wheeler & Miyake,
1992).
To our knowledge, only one study has used ESM to study
social comparisons and social anxiety. Antony and colleagues
(2005) employed an event-contingent design, in which partici-
pants were instructed to initiate a survey response each time
they drew a social comparison. Relative to healthy controls,
people with SAD perceived proxies as faring better than them-
selves more often and to a greater degree. Following upward
comparisons, people with and without SAD reported worse
general affect (composite score of positive and negative affect),
suggesting that rating oneself as lower in social status might
adversely impact mood.
Our study builds off this work in four ways. First, we employed
two types of signal-contingent designs, in which participants are
prompted to make social comparisons at scheduled times each
day. This approach might be advantageous over an event-contin-
gent approach because it allows for tests of temporal relationships
of social comparisons and emotional experiences (i.e., lagged anal-
yses). Daily diary ratings (study 1) allowed for tests of how a per-
sons perceptions of their social status that day, as a whole, related
to their affect/social anxiety, and if these perceptions predict spill-
over effects on mood the following day. Ecological momentary
assessment (EMA) ratings (study 2) allow for tests of how a per-
sons social comparisons in the moment they are assessed relate to
affect at the same and subsequent time points. Second, we
included separate positive and negative affect ratings. Positive and
negative affect are not on opposite ends of the same continuum
and are best studied as separate (often inversely correlated) con-
structs (e.g., Tellegen et al., 1999;Watson & Tellegen, 1985). Pos-
itive affect is particularly important to distinguish from negative
affect in research on social anxiety, as people with SAD display
chronic and pervasive positivity decits (Kashdan, 2007;Richey
et al., 2019). Third, we included state measures of social anxiety.
Social anxiety differs from general anxiety or negative affect in
that it involves unique evaluative concerns and worries. Assessing
state social anxiety in tandem with trait symptoms may offer
greater precision in understanding relationships with social com-
parisons (e.g., Schulz et al., 2008). Fourth, we examined the stabil-
ity of social comparisons. Research on temporal dynamics suggests
that instability of emotional experiences might characterize psycho-
logical disorder (Trulletal.,2015;Wichers et al., 2015), where
higher levels instability are associated with lower psychological well-
being (Houben et al., 2015), mood disorders (e.g., depression
Thompson et al., 2012), and anxiety disorders (e.g., SADFarmer
& Kashdan, 2014). In addition to stability of affect, it is worthwhile
to explore stability of peoples social comparisons. Theoretical mod-
els suggest that people with SAD display unstable, uncertain self-
concepts (Clark & Wells, 1995). Empirical research offers prelimi-
nary supportwhen describing their personality traits, people high in
social anxiety reported less condence and took longer to do so than
those lower in social anxiety (Stopa et al., 2010). For research on
social comparisons, it is important to examine stability by quantify-
ing daily reports rather than global trait judgments, as self-concept
ratings may be minimally related to measures indexed from repeated
assessments (e.g., Kernis et al., 1992).
The Present Research
Addressing knowledge gaps in social comparisons is important
for understanding social anxiety. First, experience-sampling stud-
ies can clarify if, how (e.g., concurrently vs. prospectively), and
for whom (e.g., people with SAD vs. healthy controls) unfavorable
social comparisons are associated with greater social anxiety. In
this way, the current studies offer an empirical test of one mecha-
nism of cognitive (Moscovitch, 2009) and evolutionary (Trower &
Gilbert, 1989) theories that suggest self-perceptions underlie social
anxiety. Second, unfavorable social comparisons may perpetuate
low positive emotionality, a characteristic feature of SAD (Brown
et al., 1998;Watson et al., 1988) even after controlling for depres-
sion (Kashdan, 2007;Kashdan et al., 2013). Positive emotions are
critical for social bonding and connectedness (Ramsey & Gentzler,
2015), and decits may perpetuate relationship difculties for peo-
ple with elevated social anxiety (Kashdan & Roberts, 2004;Taylor
et al., 2017). Findings from our research can extend social anxiety
research suggesting that social rank concerns are linked with
diminished positive affectivity (e.g., Weeks & Howell, 2012).
Third, psychotherapeutic treatment research has shown that reduc-
tions in negative self-perceptions are correlated with changes in
social anxiety symptoms (Hofmann, 2000;Hofmann et al., 2004).
A stronger understanding of the nature of social comparisons (e.g.,
favorability to the self, stability) throughout the daily lives of peo-
ple with SAD can increase precision by which negative self-per-
ceptions are targeted in psychotherapy.
470 GOODMAN, KELSO, WIERNIK, AND KASHDAN
This document is copyrighted by the American Psychological Association or one of its allied publishers.
This article is intended solely for the personal use of the individual user and is not to be disseminated broadly.
Across two studies, we examined the nature of social compari-
sons made in daily life and relationships with momentary affect
and social anxiety. In study 1, college undergraduates (N= 186)
completed daily diary surveys for 21 days measuring social com-
parisons and affect (3,837 reports). We compared effects for peo-
ple high versus low in social anxiety. In study 2, we employed a
two-week ecological momentary assessment (EMA) to examine
ner-grained changes by measuring social comparison ratings and
affect at ve randomly selected time points throughout the day.
Participants were a clinical sample of community adults diagnosed
with SAD (N= 42) and a comparison group of psychologically
healthy adults (N=45) who completed 4,559 reports. Multilevel
power simulation studies suggest that designs with at least 80
Level 2 units (e.g., participants) and 14 Level 1 units (e.g., obser-
vations) are sufcient to detect effect sizes greater than .20
(Nezlek, 2011,2012;Raudenbush & Liu, 2000). We preregistered
our study hypotheses and analytical plan with the Open Science
Foundation (OSF) prior to data analysis for this article (https://osf
.io/f8xw5/) and after data for both studies were collected; all ana-
lytical code is available on this project page.
2
Study 1
Hypotheses
We hypothesized that daily social comparison favorability would
be positively associated with daily positive affect and negatively
associated with daily negative affect and social anxiety (Hypothesis
1); trait social anxiety would moderate within-person relationships
between social comparison favorability and positive affect, negative
affect, and social anxiety, such that social comparison favorability
would be more strongly associated with affect and social anxiety for
people high compared to low in social anxiety (Hypothesis 2); and
trait social anxiety symptoms would be inversely associated with
social comparison stability (Hypothesis 3).
Method
Participants and Procedure
Undergraduate students were recruited from a northeastern uni-
versity through an online portal. They were compensated with
course credit and rafe tickets for $25 gift cards. The nal sample
included 186 participants (133 female) with a mean age of 24.04
years (SD = 9.14; range 1863). Racial/ethnic composition was
57.8% White, 12.7% Latino/Hispanic, 12.1% Asian, 7.5% African
American, 1.7% Middle Eastern, 1.2% Native American, and
6.9% reported other.
Participants had to be at least 18 years of age and procient in
English. During a 90-minute laboratory session, participants pro-
vided informed consent and completed baseline questionnaires.
Research assistants trained participants to complete daily surveys
on social anxiety, affect, and social comparisons using a secure
website. For at least 21 days, participants completed daily surveys
each night before bed; some participants completed over 21 days
to ensure three weekends of daily surveys were gathered. They
received weekly reminders encouraging compliance and empha-
sizing condentiality of their data.
Measures
Baseline Social Anxiety Symptoms. The 20-item Social
Interaction Anxiety Scale (SIAS; Mattick & Clarke, 1998)
measures fear and avoidance of social interactions (e.g., I
have difculty talking with other peopleand I worry about
expressing myself in case I appear awkward). Items were
rated from 0 = not at all characteristic of meto4=extremely
characteristic of me. Scale validity has been established in
clinical, undergraduate, and community samples (Heimberg
et al., 1992;Mattick & Clarke, 1998;Rodebaugh et al.,
2006). Per Rodebaugh and colleagues(2007) recommenda-
tion, the 17 nonreverse-coded items (straightforward SIAS or
SIAS-S) were retained for scoring. SIAS scores reliably dis-
criminate between people with and without SAD (cutoff score
for 17-item SIAS is 28; Rodebaugh et al., 2011).
Daily Measures.
Affect. Affect was measured with 10 emotion adjectives
from the Positive and Negative Affect ScheduleExpanded
Form (PANAS-X; Watson & Clark, 1994). The PANAS-X
scales exhibit good internal consistency and strong correlations
with other measures of mood states. Emotions were selected to
reect the four quadrants of the emotion circumplex (i.e., high-
low arousal × positive-negative valence; Russelletal.,1989).
Five items measure positive affect (enthusiastic,calm,happy,
satised,excited), and ve items measure negative affect
(embarrassed,disappointed,bored,anxious/nervous, sad).
Items were rated from 1 = not at all to7=very much. Averages
of each subscale were computed.
Social Anxiety. Social anxiety was assessed with a three-
item state measure of social anxiety (Kashdan & Steger, 2006).
The three items are drawn from validated social anxiety scales
(e.g., brief fear of negative evaluation scale [BFNE]; Leary,
1983); the items are: I am worried that I will say or do the
wrong things”“I am worried about what other people think of
me,and I am afraid that others do not approve of me.This
measure has demonstrated acceptable reliability in prior ESM
studies with clinical (Kashdan et al., 2014) and nonclinical
(Goodman et al., 2018) samples and convergent validity via
positive associations with trait social anxiety and discriminant
validity via associations with experiential avoidance (Kashdan
et al., 2014;Kashdan & Steger, 2006). Items were rated from 1
=notatallto7=very much and averaged together.
Social Comparisons. The social comparison scale (SCS)
measures self-perceptions of social rank on various dimensions
(Allan & Gilbert, 1995). Participants are prompted to compare
themselves to other people using 10-point bipolar scales. The SCS
exhibits good internal consistency and demonstrates moderate to
large correlations with measures of psychopathology. Four dimen-
sions from the original SCS were chosen that are most relevant to
social anxiety: inferior-superior, incompetent-competent, left out-
2
Preregistration of research plans includes two broad types: preregistration
of study design and preregistration of data analysis plan. We preregistered our
data analysis plan (i.e., hypotheses, conrmatory analyses, exploratory
analyses) after data were collected but before analyses were conducted for this
manuscript. We did not preregister our study design prior to data collection.
See Nosek et al. (2015) and Nosek et al. (2018) for detailed discussions of
transparent research practices.
SOCIAL COMPARISONS IN SOCIAL ANXIETY 471
This document is copyrighted by the American Psychological Association or one of its allied publishers.
This article is intended solely for the personal use of the individual user and is not to be disseminated broadly.
accepted,andunlikeable-likeable.
3
At the end of each day, partici-
pants rated how they felt on each dimension relative to other people
that day (e.g., In comparison to others, today I felt [Inferior] ...
[Superior]). Items were presented via dimensional bipolar scales,
where 1 indicated an unfavorable rating on each dimension (i.e., infe-
rior;incompetent;unlikeable;left out) and 10 indicated a favorable
ratingoneachdimension(i.e.,superior;competent;likeable;
accepted). Scores for each dimension were averaged to create one
social comparison score. We chose this more parsimonious total
score rather than using single-item scores for each dimension to
reduce the number of tests and remain consistent with prior use of
the SCS. Items demonstrated strong positive bivariate within- and
between-person correlations (rs between persons = .82.94; rs within
person = .48.68). Adequate multilevel reliability (R
CN
= .79) sug-
gests these dimensions can be combined into one total score.
Analyses
Variable Scaling. To aid in interpretability and comparability
of regression coefcients across measures and studies with varying
response scales, we POMP-scored (percent of maximum possible;
Cohen et al., 1999) all continuous variables. POMP scores range
from 0 (minimum possible value on the response scale) to 100
(maximum possible value on the response scale); unstandardized
regression coefcients for POMP scores can be interpreted as the
expected percentage increase on the criterion response scale for a
1% increase on the predictor response scale. POMP scores have
interpretational advantages over standardized scores for multilevel
models because it is unclear which standard deviation (i.e.,
between-person, within-person, overall) should be used to stand-
ardize (Nezlek, 2011,2012).
Descriptive Statistics. All analyses were conducted in R(Ver-
sion 4.2; R Core Team, 2020). We present within- and between-per-
son components for all bivariate correlations between daily
measures. We estimated reliability for multiitem daily measures
using R
CN
, an index of the reliability of within-person variations in
scale total scores (averaged across items) over time (i.e., time
nested within persons; see Shrout & Lane, 2012). We also present
values for between-person reliability (R
KR
), which is an index of
the reliability of average time points across all items. We computed
these reliability indices using the mlr() function in the psych pack-
age (Version 1.9.12.31; Revelle, 2019)inR.
Multilevel Models. To test Hypotheses 1 and 2, we t multile-
vel linear models to accommodate hierarchical nesting, with days
(Level 1) nested within persons (Level 2). Continuous Level 1 pre-
dictors were group-mean centered (centered within persons), contin-
uous Level 2 predictors were grand-mean centered, and categorical
variables were uncentered. We estimated models using restricted
maximum likelihood (REML) in the lme4 package (Version 1.123;
Bates et al., 2015)inR. For each model, we report unstandardized
xed effects coefcients and random effects variance components,
along with prole likelihood condence intervals. We also com-
puted marginal R
2
m
(proportion of the total variance explained by
xed effects) and conditional R
2
c
(proportion of the total variance
explained by both xed and random effects, i.e., the variance
explained by the entire model; Nakagawa et al., 2017;Nakagawa &
Schielzeth, 2013) along with empirical parametric bootstrap con-
dence intervals. The statistics can be interpreted similarly to adjusted
R
2
in single-level models (as the proportion of the variance in the
response variable accounted for by modeled predictors; Johnson,
2014). In the present analyses, the random effects include only ran-
dom intercepts (i.e., accounting for individual differences in
response means). These individual differences likely account for a
large proportion of variance in the response variable across occa-
sions, but variation accounted for by measured person- and state-
level features (i.e., the xed effects parts of the model) are likely to
be more theoretically relevant. Thus, evaluating overall predictive
power of predictors should likely focus on the marginal (xed-
effects only) R
2
m
. The appropriate denominator degrees of freedom
for multilevel models with unbalanced clusters is unclear, so we rely
on prole likelihood condence intervals (CI) for inference (Bates,
2006); effects are statistically signicant at the traditional p,.05
threshold if the CI excludes zero (cf. Amrhein et al., 2019).
Single-Level Models. For Hypothesis 3, all variables were at
the person level (Level 2), so we t a single-level linear model
predicting social comparison stability using the SIAS total score.
We indexed social comparison stability using the root mean
squared successive difference (RMSSD) in uncentered social com-
parison POMP scores (von Neumann et al., 1941).
4
RMSSD can
be interpreted as a persons average difference in social compari-
son scores from one day to the next. Larger RMSSD indicates
greater instability. For this model, we report regression coef-
cients and noncentral-tcondence intervals, along with the Pear-
son correlation (with Fisher zcondence interval) and R
2
(with
empirical bootstrap condence interval).
Results
Descriptive Statistics
Participants reported 3,837 daily entries that included social
comparison items with an average of 20.63 entries (SD = 4.88) per
participant. Only eight participants reported fewer than 10 surveys.
The average SIAS score was 16.02 (SD = 10.93; POMP M=
23.56; POMP SD = 16.08). Means, SDs, ICCs, and bivariate corre-
lations of study 1 daily variables are presented in Table 1.
Contemporaneous Analyses: Social Comparisons, Affect,
and Social Anxiety
As predicted (Hypothesis 1), daily social comparison favorabil-
ity was associated with much higher daily positive affect (b= .52
[95% CI .48, .56, t=25.42], R
2
m
= .083 [95% CI .069, .097]),
much lower daily negative affect (b=.43 [95% CI .46, .40,
t=25.26], R
2
m
= .092 [95% CI .077, .107]), and somewhat lower
3
To prevent data quality issues resulting from lengthy experience-
sampling surveys (e.g., careless responding, lower compliance; see Eisele
et al., 2020), we selected a subset of dimensions from the original SCS
questionnaire that are most relevant to social anxiety. We selected items
that reected broader cognitive judgements rather than those seemingly
focused on physicality (unattractive-more attractive;weaker-stronger;
undesirable-more desirable) or potentially better suited for specic
domains rather than daily assessment (untalented-talented). We also
excluded dimensions that were redundant with chosen dimensions
(outsider-insider;different-same).
4
A typo in the analysis preregistration indicated we would use the mean
squared successive difference (omitting the word root). The root mean
squared difference is preferred because it is on the same scale as the
scale scores, whereas the mean squared difference is on a squared unit scale
(cf. standard deviation versus variance).
472 GOODMAN, KELSO, WIERNIK, AND KASHDAN
This document is copyrighted by the American Psychological Association or one of its allied publishers.
This article is intended solely for the personal use of the individual user and is not to be disseminated broadly.
daily social anxiety (b=.28 [95% CI .32, .24, t=13.10],
R
2
m
= .022 [95% CI .015, .028]); see Table 2.
Consistent with prior research, people with higher trait social anxi-
ety reported somewhat less favorable social comparisons (b=.24
[95% CI .38, .11, t=3.48], R
2
m
= .040 [95% CI .017, .073]);
see Table 3. As predicted (Hypothesis 2), trait social anxiety moder-
ated the relationship between daily social comparison favorability
and daily social anxiety (b
Int
=.0033 [95% CI .0060, .0006;
t=2.37]; simple slopes b=.23 at 1SD SIAS, b=.28 at
mean SIAS, b=.33 at þ1SD SIAS), though this effect was some-
what small. Contrary to prediction (Hypothesis 2), trait social anxiety
did not substantially moderate the relationships between daily social
comparison favorability and daily positive affect (b
Int
= .0018 [95%
CI .0008, .0044;t=1.38]; simple slopes b=.48at1SD SIAS,
b=.51atmeanSIAS,b=.54atþ1SD SIAS) or daily negative
affect (b
Int
=.0014 [95% CI .0035, .0007;t=1.29]; simple
slopes b=.40 at 1SD SIAS, b=.42 at mean SIAS, b=.45
at þ1SD SIAS); see Table 4. Therefore, although daily social com-
parison favorability predicted daily positive affect and negative
affect, the strength of these relationships did not differ meaningfully
across levels of trait social anxiety.
Lagged Analyses: Social Comparisons, Social Anxiety,
and Affect
As a robustness check of the same-day contemporaneous rela-
tionships reported above, we also estimated lagged models predict-
ing daily positive affect, daily negative affect, and daily social
anxiety using previous-day social comparison favorability and cri-
terion values. These models estimate the degree to which social
comparison favorability predicts change in affect or social anxiety,
while accounting for criterion autocorrelation and stable person
random effects (Zyphur et al., 2020). We additionally estimated
models with daily social comparison favorability as the criterion
variable and previous-day social comparison favorability and
affect/anxiety as predictors.
5
Daily social comparison favorability did not predict next-day
positive affect (b= .013 [95% CI .038, .063, t=.49]) or social
anxiety (b=.010 [95% CI .058, .038, t=.41]); see Table 5.
The coefcient for social comparison favorability predicting next-
day negative affect was statistically signicant though small in
size (b=.047 [95% CI .090, .005, t=2.17]). Next-day
social comparison favorability was not substantially predicted by
positive affect (b=.0013 [95% CI .030, .027, t=.09]), neg-
ative affect (b=.012 [95% CI .046, .022, t=.67]), or social
anxiety (b=.009 [95% CI .035, .018, t=.63]).
Social Comparison Instability
Contrary to prediction (Hypothesis 3), trait social anxiety was not
substantially related to social comparison instability (b= .050 [95%
CI .023, .123, t= 1.342]). The estimated correlation was weak with
awidecondence interval (r= .10 [95% CI .05, .25]).
6
Discussion
Study 1 results partially supported our preregistered hypotheses.
As expected, on days when participants made more favorable social
comparisons, they reported higher positive affect and lower negative
affect and social anxiety. Social comparison favorability also
Table 1
Study 1: Descriptive Statistics and Correlations
Variable SC PA NA SA
Social comparison favorability (SC) 0.39 0.39 0.21
Positive affect (PA) 0.45 0.40 0.06
Negative affect (NA) 0.37 0.33 0.30
Social anxiety (SA) 0.31 0.25 0.60
Mn 20.64 20.65 20.62 21.04
SD n 4.88 4.82 4.84 4.54
Grand mean 61.64 51.78 24.65 19.80
SD of means 14.87 14.95 10.84 16.81
Pooled within-person SD 11.51 16.24 13.63 14.71
ICC 0.57 0.42 0.36 0.48
Between-person reliability (R
KR
) 0.99 0.98 0.97 0.99
Within-person reliability (R
C
) 0.79 0.63 0.34 0.76
Note. ICC = intraclass correlation; between-person correlations below the diagonal; within-person correlations
above the diagonal; 95% confidence intervals for between-person correlations 6.12 (all p#. 001), for
within-person correlations 6.03 (all p,.001); full confidence intervals for correlation in the online
supplemental materials.
5
We inadvertently omitted the lagged analyses from the preregistered
analysis plan. This was an oversight. They are included here for
consistency with Study 2 (for which the analyses were included in the
preregistration).
6
A reviewer raised an important point that low between-person variance
in social anxiety might limit the ability to detect effects. The SIAS is
designed to measure symptoms indicative of SAD and reliably discriminates
between people with and without SAD. An alternative way to index trait
social anxiety is to average a persons daily social anxiety; this is congruent
with Fleesons (2001) model that suggests individual differences can be
conceptualized as density distributions of states. Our daily social anxiety index
maybebettercalibratedtothissample,andanICCof.48suggestssizable
between-person variance. Thus, we conducted an exploratory follow-up
analysis to examine how social comparison instability predicted average
(daily) social anxiety. Consistent with our conceptual hypotheses about
instability, participants who reported more unstable social comparisons
reported higher social anxiety throughout the study (b= .46 [95% CI 0.14,
0.77, t= 2.81], R
2
m
= .021).
SOCIAL COMPARISONS IN SOCIAL ANXIETY 473
This document is copyrighted by the American Psychological Association or one of its allied publishers.
This article is intended solely for the personal use of the individual user and is not to be disseminated broadly.
predicted lower next-day negative affect but was unrelated to next-
day positive affect and social anxiety. Prospective ndings are some-
what consistent with previous research demonstrating social compari-
sons impact how a person later feels (Wheeler & Miyake, 1992).
Lagged analyses in the opposite direction showed that affect did not
predict next-day social comparison favorability.
Consistent with our prediction, trait social anxiety moderated
the relationship between daily social comparison favorability
and daily social anxiety. Relative to people with low levels of
trait social anxiety, for people high in trait social anxiety, the
relationship between daily social comparison favorability and
daily social anxiety was slightly stronger. This nding is con-
sistent with research demonstrating that people with elevated
social anxiety feel more anxious around unfavorable social
comparisons (Antony et al., 2005). Conversely, trait social anx-
iety did not moderate relationships between daily social com-
parison favorability and positive or negative affect. Participants
in this sample reported relatively mild social anxiety symptoms
(SIAS-S M=16.02,SD = 10.93), with approximately 15%
scoring at or above the cutoff for clinically elevated social
anxiety (Rodebaugh et al., 2011). Although this is higher than
what we might expect based on prevalence rates (12-month
prevalence rate: 6.8%; Kessler et al., 2005), social anxiety
symptoms may have not been severe enough to capture the
emotional disturbances observed in people with SAD, and con-
sequently, not alter the impact of social comparisons on posi-
tive and negative affect. Study 2 aimed to address this
limitation by assessing social comparisons in adults diagnosed
with SAD and a healthy comparison group.
People with higher average daily social anxiety made more unstable
social comparisons than those with lower average daily social anxiety,
but this was not true of people with higher versus lower trait social
anxiety symptoms. Participants in study 1 summarized their evalua-
tions at the end of each day, which prohibits examination of proximal
predictors and consequences of momentary social comparisons. Study
2 addresses this limitation by using an EMA design where participants
provide reports about their current state during the moment they
receive the prompt. Because participants responded to prompts several
times each day, we examined predictors and consequences of social
comparisons within a single day. We also examined the stability of
Table 2
Study 1: Daily Social Comparison Favorability Predicting Affect and Social Anxiety
Positive affect Negative affect Social anxiety
Term b95% conf. int. tb95% conf. int. tb95% conf. int. t
(Intercept) 51.74 49.59 53.90 47.18 24.64 23.07 26.21 30.80 19.79 17.34 22.24 15.89
SC favorability 0.52 0.48 0.56 25.42 0.43 0.46 0.40 25.26 0.28 0.32 0.24 13.10
s
00 Person
14.48 13.00 16.14 10.47 9.38 11.68 16.52 14.84 18.39
r
res
15.54 15.18 15.90 12.94 12.65 13.25 16.37 16.00 16.75
Marginal R
2
0.083 0.069 0.097 0.092 0.077 0.107 0.022 0.015 0.028
Conditional R
2
0.510 0.463 0.559 0.451 0.408 0.500 0.515 0.467 0.571
Npeople 185 185 185
Ndays 3,801 3,796 3,819
Note. Focal parameter estimates shaded in gray. SC = social comparison; b= unstandardized regression coefficient; conf. int. = confidence (compatibil-
ity) intervals constructed using profile likelihood for b,s, and rand empirical parametric bootstrap for R
2
; for single-level models, R
2
is adjusted R
2
and
confidence intervals constructed using pivots for band rand bias-corrected accelerated nonparametric bootstrap; SC favorability scaled as POMP scores;
s
00
= random effects standard deviation; r= residual standard deviation.
Table 3
Study 1: Trait Social Anxiety Predicting Daily Social Comparison Favorability and Instability
Social comparison favorability Across-days social comparison instability
Term b95% conf. int. tb95% conf. int. t
(Intercept) 61.20 59.05 63.34 55.90 14.20 13.04 15.35 24.22
SIAS 0.24 0.38 0.11 3.48 0.05 0.02 0.12 1.34
s
00 Person
14.01 12.51 15.61
r
res
12.74 12.44 13.05 7.64 6.87 8.50
Marginal R
2
0.040 0.017 0.073 0.011 0.000 0.070
Conditional R
2
0.566 0.509 0.619
Npeople 171 170
Ndays 3,538
Note. Focal parameter estimates shaded in gray. SIAS = Social Interaction Anxiety Scale; b= unstandardized regression coefficient; conf. int. = confi-
dence (compatibility) intervals constructed using profile likelihood for b,s, and rand empirical parametric bootstrap for R
2
; for single-level model, R
2
is
adjusted R
2
and confidence intervals constructed using pivots for band rand bias-corrected accelerated nonparametric bootstrap [zero-order r= .10, 95%
CI [.05, .25]; SC favorability scaled as POMP scores; s
00
= random effects standard deviation; r= residual standard deviation.
474 GOODMAN, KELSO, WIERNIK, AND KASHDAN
This document is copyrighted by the American Psychological Association or one of its allied publishers.
This article is intended solely for the personal use of the individual user and is not to be disseminated broadly.
social comparisons within a single day to identify ne-grained uctua-
tions and their links with emotional well-being.
Study 2
Adults were recruited from the community and completed diagnos-
tic interviews to identify a clinical sample of people diagnosed with
SAD and a psychologically healthy control group. Participants com-
pleted ve surveys each day across a two-week sampling period that
assessed social comparison favorability, positive and negative affect,
and social anxiety. They were also asked if they were with other peo-
ple at the time of the survey, which allowed us to examine how social
comparison ratings differed between social versus nonsocial settings.
Hypotheses
We hypothesized that people with SAD would make less favorable
(Hypothesis 4a) and less stable social comparisons (Hypothesis 4b)
than healthy controls; social comparison favorability would be asso-
ciated with concurrent affect (Hypothesis 5); social comparison
favorability would be associated with next time point increases in
positive affect and decreases in negative affect and social anxiety
(Hypothesis 6a), but the reverse direction would not be signicant
(i.e., affect/social anxiety would be unrelated to next time point social
comparison stability; Hypotheses 6b); social comparison stability
would be associated with same-day affect (Hypothesis 7); and the
relationships between affect and social comparison favorability (Hy-
pothesis 8a), and affect and stability (Hypothesis 8b) would be stron-
ger for people with SAD than controls (i.e., moderation by diagnostic
group). We preregistered exploratory analyses examining how the
presence of other people when a social comparison is made (i.e.,
measured at the same time point) predicts social comparison favor-
ability, and how relationships between social comparison favorability
and affect/social anxiety differ when made alone versus with other
people. Given the limited literature on social comparisons and social
anxietyand no prior research on the inuence of other people
when social comparison judgments are madewe have no a priori
hypotheses and consider these analyses exploratory.
Method
Participants and Procedure
Participants were recruited from a large northeastern city and
surrounding suburbs through yers, online forums (e.g., Craigs-
list), and social media (Facebook, Instagram). Trained research
assistants at the postbaccalaureate level conducted phone screens
with potential participants. Following informed verbal consent,
research assistants administered a semistructured interview to
assess for symptoms of social anxiety, generalized anxiety, depres-
sion, panic, and psychosis. Participants with evidence of social
fears or the absence of mental illness symptoms were invited to a
laboratory session. At this stage, inclusion criteria were daily
access to the Internet on personal mobile phone, age 18 years or
older, and prociency in English; exclusion criteria were prior par-
ticipation in a research study in our lab and current pregnancy (as
our study included several questions about alcohol use).
After completing an initial phone screen, 111 participants attended a
baseline session. In the laboratory, participants provided informed con-
sent, completed a baseline questionnaire containing self-report surveys,
and participated in a negative life events interview with a trained
research assistant. Clinical psychology doctoral students administered
the Structured Clinical Interview for DSM5(SCID-5) to assess for
anxiety, mood, substance, obsessivecompulsive and related, trauma
and stressor-related, and psychotic disorders (personality disorders
were not assessedsee DeYoung et al., 2020;Wright & Kaurin,
2020). Eligibility for the SAD group required SAD as a primary diag-
nosis and the absence of a psychotic disorder; eligibility for the healthy
control group required absence of any current or past mental disorder.
Table 4
Study 1: Trait Social Anxiety Moderating Daily Social Comparison Favorability Relationships With Affect and Social Anxiety
Positive affect Negative affect Social anxiety
Term b95% conf. int. tb95% conf. int. tb95% conf. int. t
(Intercept) 51.55 49.25 53.84 44.03 24.71 23.10 26.32 30.10 20.14 17.65 22.62 15.88
SC favorability 0.51 0.47 0.55 24.17 0.42 0.46 0.39 24.15 0.28 0.32 0.24 12.60
SIAS 0.02 0.17 0.12 0.32 0.21 0.10 0.31 3.99 0.32 0.16 0.47 3.95
SC Favorability 3SIAS 0.002 0.001 0.004 1.38 0.001 0.004 0.001 1.29 0.003 0.006 0.001 2.37
Simple slopes for SC favorability across SIAS levels
1SD SIAS 0.48 0.42 0.54 15.58 0.40 0.45 0.35 15.63 0.23 0.29 0.16 7.00
Mean SIAS 0.51 0.47 0.55 24.17 0.42 0.46 0.39 24.15 0.28 0.32 0.24 12.60
þ1SD SIAS 0.54 0.48 0.59 18.77 0.45 0.49 0.40 18.69 0.33 0.39 0.27 10.97
s
00 Person
14.88 13.26 16.60 10.31 9.17 11.53 16.14 14.39 18.00
r
res
15.43 15.07 15.81 12.91 12.60 13.22 16.43 16.0 16.83
Marginal R
2
0.081 0.058 0.094 0.125 0.087 0.154 0.068 0.017 0.103
Conditional R
2
0.524 0.473 0.574 0.466 0.418 0.518 0.526 0.474 0.583
Npeople 171 171 171
Ndays 3,520 3,515 3,538
Note. Focal parameter estimates shaded in gray. SC = social comparison; SIAS = Social Interaction Anxiety Scale; b= unstandardized regression coeffi-
cient; conf. int. = confidence (compatibility) intervals constructed using profile likelihood for b,s, and rand empirical parametric bootstrap for R
2
; for sin-
gle-level models, R
2
is adjusted R
2
and confidence intervals constructed using pivots for band rand bias-corrected accelerated nonparametric bootstrap;
SC favorability scaled as POMP scores; s
00
= random effects standard deviation, r= residual standard deviation.
SOCIAL COMPARISONS IN SOCIAL ANXIETY 475
This document is copyrighted by the American Psychological Association or one of its allied publishers.
This article is intended solely for the personal use of the individual user and is not to be disseminated broadly.
Half (N= 56) of all SCIDs were randomly selected and coded; inter-
rater reliability was excellent for all diagnoses (js=.811.00).
Based on SCID-5 diagnoses, 45 participants qualied for the
SAD group, 49 qualied for the healthy control group, and 17 were
excluded. Seven eligible participants declined to participate in the
ESM portion. Due to a technological glitch, baseline survey data for
one participant in the SAD group was completed but never recorded
and stored; however, this participant still completed the SCID and
ESM portion. Given that the research questions outlined in this arti-
cle do not include baseline survey data, this participant was retained
in analyses. Our nal sample contained 42 participants with SAD
and 45 healthy controls. In terms of diagnoses in the SAD group,
11 had major depressive disorder, 2 persistent depressive disorder,
9 generalized anxiety disorder, 7 alcohol use disorder, 6 posttrau-
matic stress disorder, 3 panic disorder, and 2 agoraphobia. Self-
reported race/ethnicity was 48.3% white, 19.5% black/African
American, 13.8% Asian/Pacic Islander, 6.9% Latino/Hispanic,
2.3% Arab/Middle Eastern, and 9.2% other. Average participant
age was 30.3 years (SD = 9.63), and 62% were female.
Doctoral students in clinical psychology trained eligible and interested
participants on completing the daily surveys. Participants completed two
types of surveys each day: morning and EMA survey. The morning sur-
vey was sent once per day at 9:00am. The afternoon surveys were sent
5 times per day between the hours of 12:00pm and 8:00pm. They were
sent at random intervals each day, with all surveys sent at least 30
minutes apart. The morning survey contains questions about the prior
day, and the EMA surveys contain questions about the current moment.
The morning surveys were not analyzed for this article.
Participants were contacted four times during the study (beginning
and end of the rst and second weeks) to provide compliance updates
including the number of surveys completed and current study earn-
ings. Participants could earn up to $75 for their participation: $40 for
the baseline session and up to $35 for the experience-sampling por-
tion. Participants earned $.25 for each afternoon survey, $.50 for
each morning survey, and compliance bonuses. For answering 80%
or more surveys in a week, they received bonus payments of $5 bo-
nus and $5.50 for rst and second week, respectively.
Measures
Affect. Affect was measured with 12 emotion adjectives to
reect the four quadrants of the emotion circumplex, as in study 1.
Six adjective items measured positive affect (enthusiastic,content,
joyful,proud,interested,relaxed), and six items measured nega-
tive affect (angry,sluggish,anxious,sad,irritable,guilty).
7
Items
Table 5
Study 1: Lagged Analyses: Predicting Next-Day Affect, Social Anxiety, and Social Comparison Favorability
Positive affect Negative affect Social anxiety
Term b95% conf. int. tb95% conf. int. tb95% conf. int. t
Predicting next-day affect/anxiety
(Intercept) 51.89 49.71 54.06 46.87 24.32 22.71 25.93 29.70 19.55 17.06 22.04 15.43
Lagged SC favorability 0.01 0.04 0.06 0.49 0.05 0.09 0.005 2.17 0.01 0.06 0.04 0.41
Lagged affect/anxiety 0.14 0.10 0.18 6.94 0.10 0.06 0.14 5.08 0.10 0.06 0.14 5.32
s
00 Person
14.36 12.84 16.06 10.49 9.34 11.76 16.62 14.89 18.56
r
res
16.40 15.98 16.82 13.79 13.44 14.15 16.48 16.06 16.90
Marginal R
2
0.011 0.004 0.016 0.010 0.003 0.014 0.005 0.001 0.008
Conditional R
2
0.440 0.386 0.495 0.372 0.320 0.423 0.507 0.451 0.564
Npeople 184 184 184
Ndays 3,133 3,127 3,168
Predicting next-day social comparison favorability
(Intercept) 61.99 59.82 64.16 56.08 61.98 59.81 64.15 56.12 61.99 59.82 64.16 56.08
Lagged SC favorability 0.15 0.12 0.19 8.18 0.15 0.11 0.19 7.86 0.15 0.12 0.19 8.53
Lagged affect/anxiety 0.001 0.03 0.03 0.09 0.01 0.04 0.02 0.67 .009 0.04 0.02 0.63
s
00 Person
14.63 13.15 16.29 14.62 13.14 16.28 14.63 13.15 16.29
r
res
12.06 11.76 12.38 12.07 11.78 12.38 12.06 11.76 12.38
Marginal R
2
0.010 0.004 0.014 0.010 0.005 0.014 0.010 0.004 0.014
Conditional R
2
0.599 0.549 0.652 0.599 0.548 0.656 0.599 0.549 0.652
Npeople 184 184 184
Ndays 3,135 3,131 3,135
Note. Focal parameter estimates shaded in gray. SC = social comparison; b= unstandardized regression coefficient; conf. int. = confidence (compatibil-
ity) intervals constructed using profile likelihood for b,s, and rand empirical parametric bootstrap for R
2
; SC favorability scaled as POMP scores; s
00
=
random effects standard deviation, r= residual standard deviation.
7
Affect items differ slightly across studies. We aimed to rene our
affect measures in Study 2 by replacing highly abstract terms with more
straightforward, conceptually similar albeit distinct terms. For positive
affect, we used joyful instead of happy;relaxed instead of calm; and
content instead of satised. We also wanted to capture a wider breadth of
positive affect by replacing excited (which is conceptually similar to joyful)
with interested and adding pride. For negative affect, we replaced bored,
embarrassed, and disappointed with sluggish,irritable, and angry.
Although affect measures across our two studies are conceptually similar,
reect the four quadrants of the emotion circumplex (i.e., high-low arousal
x positive-negative valence; Russell et al., 1989), and demonstrate
adequate psychometric properties, they do not include identical discrete
emotions and should be interpreted accordingly.
476 GOODMAN, KELSO, WIERNIK, AND KASHDAN
This document is copyrighted by the American Psychological Association or one of its allied publishers.
This article is intended solely for the personal use of the individual user and is not to be disseminated broadly.
were rated on a 5-point Likert scale from 1 = not at all to 5 =
extremely. Averages of each subscale were computed. Instructions
were adapted to the EMA design, such that participants were
instructed to indicate how they felt right now, in the present
momentrather than for today.
Social Anxiety. This measure is identical to study 1, except
with similar adjustments to instructions (i.e., Todaychanged to
Right now, in the present moment), and items were rated on a 5-
point Likert scale from 1 = not at all to 5 = extremely.
Social Comparisons. This measure is identical to that in study
1, except that participants were instructed with the prompt: Right
now, compared to other people, I feel . . .and then provided a rating
for each dimension. Again, these items were combined in a single
social comparison favorability score. As with study 1, items demon-
strated strong positive bivariate within- and between-person correla-
tions (rs between persons = .80.97; rs within persons = .49.69) and
adequate multilevel reliability (R
cn
= .73).
Presence of Other People. Participants responded to a single
item to indicate (yes or no) if they were with another person or
persons at the moment they completed the prompt.
Analyses
We conducted variable scaling, descriptive statistics computa-
tion, and results interpretation as in study 1, and the general analy-
sis plan was similar to study 1.
For hypotheses involving momentary social comparison favorabil-
ity (Hypotheses 4a, 5, and 6, and corresponding components of
Hypotheses 8 and 9), we t 3-level models, with measurement occa-
sions nested within days nested within persons. Lagged analyses
(Hypothesis 6) predicted social comparison favorability, positive
affect, negative affect, and social anxiety variable at measurement
occasion tusing previous occasion (t1) values for social compari-
son favorability and affect/anxiety.
For hypotheses involving social comparison instability (Hypoth-
eses 4b and 7, and corresponding components of Hypothesis 8),
we t 2-level models, with days nested within persons. We
indexed social comparison instability using the within-day
RMSSD of measurements taken on the same day. We included
person-level mean within-day social comparison instability as a
covariate to effectively person-mean-center the instability vari-
able. For comparison with study 1, we also computed an across-
day index of social comparison instability as the RMSSD of a per-
sons day-level mean social comparison favorability, which we
examined using a single-level regression model.
For interaction models (Hypotheses 8 and 9), we included interac-
tion terms of the proposed moderators (SAD diagnosis, presence of
people) with the focal variable and each covariate in the model.
Results
Descriptive Statistics
Participants provided 4,559 reports, with an average of 52.40
reports per person (SD = 15.24). Participants submitted at least 1
entry on average during 13.07 of 14 study days (SD = 2.16). The
modal number of active study days was all 14 days; 66 (75.86%)
participants completed surveys on all 14 days, and only 6 partici-
pants completed surveys on fewer than 10 days (minimum 4
days). Participants completed all ve EMA prompts on nearly half
(44%) of the study days and at least four of ve surveys 73% of
study days. Means, SDs, ICCs, and bivariate correlations of study
2 within-day variables are shown in Table 6.
Participants reported that they were with other people at the
time of the prompt approximately half of the time (47.2%; 2152
prompts), providing sufcient data to compare prompts during
social and nonsocial interactions.
Group Differences in Social Comparison Favorability and
Instability
Hypothesis 4 predicted that people diagnosed with SAD would
show lower average social comparison favorability and greater
social comparison instability. As predicted (see Table 7), people
with SAD made much less favorable social comparisons than
healthy controls (b=17.69 [95% CI 23.77, 11.60, t=
5.69], R
2
m
= .193 [95% CI .073, .299]). As predicted, people with
SAD made less stable social comparisons than healthy controls
within-day (b= 3.03 [95% CI .72, 5.43, t=2.57], R
2
m
= .029 [95%
Table 6
Study 2: Descriptive Statistics and Correlations
Variable SC PA NA SA
Social comparison favorability (SC) 0.42 0.40 0.32
Positive affect (PA) 0.73 0.46 0.17
Negative affect (NA) 0.48 0.42 0.36
Social anxiety (SA) 0.47 0.26 0.69
Mn 52.40 52.40 52.40 52.40
SD n 15.24 15.24 15.24 15.24
Grand mean 61.68 39.52 12.31 15.44
SD of means 16.88 19.88 9.82 17.04
Pooled within-person SD 9.77 13.81 9.20 11.61
ICC 0.71 0.64 0.48 0.57
Between-person reliability (R
KR
) 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00
Within-person reliability (R
C
) 0.73 0.72 0.51 0.84
Note. ICC = intraclass correlation; between-person correlations below the diagonal; within-person correlations
above the diagonal; 95% confidence intervals for between-person correlations 6.15 (all p,. 001), for
within-person correlations 6.03 (all p,.001); full confidence intervals for correlation in the online
supplemental materials.
SOCIAL COMPARISONS IN SOCIAL ANXIETY 477
This document is copyrighted by the American Psychological Association or one of its allied publishers.
This article is intended solely for the personal use of the individual user and is not to be disseminated broadly.
CI .024, .057]) and, to a lesser degree, across-days (b= 2.85
[95% CI .17, 5.52, t=2.12], R
2
m
= .039 [95% CI .000, .159]).
Most (85.7%) participants with SAD reported at least one shift in
favorability of their social comparison rating (i.e., from relatively bet-
ter to worse off than others, or vice versa) from one time point to the
next on a given day (compared to 53.3% of controls). Similarly,
examining day-level averages, half (50%) of participants with SAD
reported at least one shift in favorability of their social comparison
rating from one day to the next day (compared to 27% of controls).
Contemporaneous Analyses: Social Comparison Favorability
and Instability Predicting Affect and Social Anxiety
Social Comparison Favorability. Hypothesis 5 predicted that
momentary social comparison favorability would predict momentary
affect and social anxiety. As predicted (see Table 8), social compari-
son favorability was strongly related to higher positive affect (b=.56
[95% CI .52, .60, t=30.48], R
2
m
= .059 [95% CI .045, .072]), lower
negative affect (b=.37 [95% CI .39, .34, t=28.13], R
2
m
=
.078 [95% CI .061, .092]), and lower social anxiety (b=.39 [95%
CI .43, .36, t=21.13], R
2
m
= .037 [95% CI .026, .045]).
Social Comparison Instability. Hypothesis 7 predicted that
greater within-day social comparison instability would predict daily
affect and social anxiety. As predicted (see Table 9), on days when
people were more unstable in their social comparisons, they tended to
experience more social anxiety (b= .20 [95% CI .11, .28, t=4.53],
R
2
m
= .041 [95% CI .053, .076]). The size of this effect was small
when considering how much people tended to vary in their social com-
parison instability across days. In a random-intercepts model predicting
within-day social comparison RMSSD, the residual within-person
standard deviation of RMSSD was r
res
= 7.06 [95% CI 6.77, 7.39].
Accordingly, on days when a person was 2 standard deviations above
their mean in terms of social comparison instability (indicating an
atypically tumultuous day), they tended to be 2.8 POMP points [95%
CI 1.54, 3.92] higher on social anxiety. As predicted (see Table 9), on
days when people were more unstable in their social comparisons,
they tended to experience somewhat more negative affect (b=.09
[95% CI .03, .15, t=2.86], R
2
m
= .064 [95% CI .036, .116]); the
magnitude of effect was approximately half the size of social compari-
son instability effects on social anxiety. The relationship between
social comparison instability and positive affect was negligible (b=
.09 [95% CI .19, .01, t=1.77], R
2
m
=.060[95%CI.040,
.113]). Estimated effects of social comparison instability were smaller
if we controlled for day-level mean social comparison instability, indi-
cating that overall social comparison level and instability overlap in
their contributions to predicting daily affect and social anxiety.
Moderation by SAD Diagnosis. Hypothesis 8 predicted that
within-person relationships of social comparison favorability and insta-
bility would be stronger among people diagnosed with SAD than con-
trols. As predicted (see Table 10), the relationship of social comparison
favorability with social anxiety was much larger among people with
SAD (b
Int
=.34 [95% CI .42, .27, t=9.24]; simple slope .55
[95% CI .60, .50, t=22.04]) than among healthy controls (simple
slope .21 [95% CI .26, .15, t=7.51]). Moderating effects were
also present, though smaller, for predicting negative affect (b
Int
=.12
[95% CI .17, .07, t=4.67]; b
SAD
=.42 [95% CI .45, .39,
t=24.05]; b
NoSAD
=.30 [95% CI .34, .26, t=15.49]) and
positive affect (b
Int
= .08 [95% CI .01, .15, t=2.14]; b
SAD
=.60[95%
CI .55, .64, t= 24.02]; b
NoSAD
= .52 [95% CI .46, .57, t= 18.90]).
Contrary to predictions, SAD moderation of within-day social
comparison instability relationships were smaller and had wide con-
dence intervals (positive affect: b
Int
=.03[95%CI.16, .23, t=
.32]; negative affect: b
Int
=.08 [95% CI .21, .04, t=1.35];
social anxiety: b
Int
= .11 [95% CI .06, .28, t=1.26]). Moderation
effects were similarly small if day-level mean social comparison
favorability was controlled (Table S3). Thus, relationships between
social comparison instability on affect and social anxiety tended to
be similar for people with and without SAD.
Lagged Analyses: Social Comparisons, Social Anxiety,
and Affect
Hypothesis 6a predicted that momentary social comparison favor-
ability would predict affect and social anxiety later the same day.
Table 7
Study 2: SAD Diagnosis Differences on Within-Day Social Comparison Favorability and Instability
Social comparison
favorability
Within-day social-
comparison instability
Across-days social-
comparison instability
Term b95% conf. int. tb95% conf. int. tb95% conf. int. t
(Intercept) 70.18 65.95 74.41 32.51 7.65 6.05 9.25 9.35 7.15 5.30 9.01 7.66
SAD diagnosis 17.69 23.77 11.60 5.69 3.03 0.72 5.34 2.57 2.85 0.17 5.52 2.12
s
00 Person
5.79 5.365 6.224 5.07 4.23 5.98
s
00 Day
14.31 12.229 16.586
r
res
9.39 9.172 9.616 7.06 6.77 7.39 6.26 5.39 7.27
Marginal R
2
0.193 0.073 0.299 0.029 0.024 0.057 0.039 0.000 0.159
Conditional R
2
0.782 0.741 0.833 0.360 0.269 0.443
Npeople 87 87 87
Ndays 1,137 1,088
Nobservations 4,559
Note. Focal parameter estimates shaded in gray. SAD = social anxiety disorder; SC = social comparison; b= unstandardized regression coefficient; conf.
int. = confidence (compatibility) intervals constructed using profile likelihood for b,s, and rand empirical parametric bootstrap for R
2
; for single-level
models, R
2
is adjusted R
2
and confidence intervals constructed using pivots for band rand bias-corrected accelerated nonparametric bootstrap; SC favor-
ability scaled as POMP scores; SC instability scaled as the RMSSD between successive within-day observations; s
00
= random effects standard deviation,
r= residual standard deviation; see Table S3 for results controlling for person-mean SC favorability.
478 GOODMAN, KELSO, WIERNIK, AND KASHDAN
This document is copyrighted by the American Psychological Association or one of its allied publishers.
This article is intended solely for the personal use of the individual user and is not to be disseminated broadly.
Social comparison favorability predicted slight decreases in negative
affect (b=.04 [95% CI .08, .01, t=2.45]); see Table 11.
Contrary to predictions, lagged relationships were negligible for posi-
tive affect (b= .04 [95% CI .01, .09, t=1.67]) and social anxiety
(b=.04 [95% CI .08, .005, t=1.76]).
Hypothesis 6b predicted that momentary experiences of affect
and social anxiety would not predict same-day changes in social
comparison favorability. Consistent with this hypothesis (see Ta-
ble 11), estimated lagged relationships with positive affect (b=
.009 [95% CI .02, .03, t=.70]) and social anxiety (b=.02
[95% CI .05, .002, t=1.85]) were negligible. Contrary to pre-
dictions, negative affect predicted slight subsequent changes in
social comparison favorability (b=.05 [95% CI .09, .02, t=
2.84]), though the size of the effect was small (see Tryon, 2001;
for a discussion of equivalence testing using condence intervals).
Contrary to Hypothesis 8 (Table S4), SAD diagnosis did not mod-
erate relationships of social comparison favorability on subsequent
changes in positive affect, negative affect, or social anxiety. Lagged
Table 9
Study 2: Within-Day Social Comparison Instability Predicting Average Within-Day Affect and Social Anxiety
Positive affect Negative affect Social anxiety
Term b95% conf. int. tb95% conf. int. tb95% conf. int. t
(Intercept) 48.55 40.77 56.32 12.23 7.44 3.68 11.19 3.88 9.28 2.55 16.00 2.70
Within-day SC instability 0.09 0.19 0.01 1.77 0.09 0.03 0.15 2.86 0.20 0.11 0.28 4.53
Person-level mean within-day
SC instability
0.89 1.62 0.16 2.38 0.43 0.07 0.79 2.37 0.46 0.17 1.09 1.42
s
00 Person
19.06 16.27 22.11 9.11 7.75 10.60 16.48 14.05 19.12
r
res
11.12 10.65 11.62 6.99 6.69 7.30 9.78 9.36 10.22
Marginal R
2
0.060 0.040 0.113 0.064 0.036 0.116 0.041 0.053 0.076
Conditional R
2
0.761 0.704 0.831 0.653 0.582 0.730 0.750 0.695 0.815
Controlling for day-level mean SC favorability
(Intercept) 48.62 40.90 56.34 12.33 7.39 3.64 11.14 3.86 9.22 2.50 15.95 2.69
Within-day SC instability 0.02 0.07 0.11 0.48 0.02 0.04 0.08 0.70 0.12 0.03 0.20 2.80
Person-level mean within-day
SC instability
1.01 1.74 0.28 2.73 0.51 0.15 0.86 2.80 0.55 0.08 1.18 1.71
Within-day mean SC
favorability
0.64 0.55 0.72 14.71 0.40 0.45 0.35 14.69 0.47 0.55 0.40 12.11
s
00 Person
18.98 16.21 22.00 9.15 7.79 10.63 16.50 14.08 19.13
r
res
10.10 9.66 10.54 6.34 6.07 6.62 9.14 8.74 9.54
Marginal R
2
0.101 0.004 0.155 0.122 0.026 0.175 0.071 0.021 0.109
Conditional R
2
0.802 0.755 0.860 0.715 0.656 0.778 0.782 0.733 0.839
Npeople 87 87 87
Ndays 1,088 1,088 1,088
Note. Focal parameter estimates shaded in gray. SC = social comparison; b= unstandardized regression coefficient; conf. int. = confidence (compatibil-
ity) intervals constructed using profile likelihood for b,s, and rand empirical parametric bootstrap for R
2
; SC favorability scaled as POMP scores; SC
instability scaled as the RMSSD between successive within-day observations; s
00
= random effects standard deviation, r= residual standard deviation.
Table 8
Study 2: Social Comparison Favorability Predicting Affect and Social Anxiety
Positive affect Negative affect Social anxiety
Term b95% conf. int. tb95% conf. int. tb95% conf. int. t
(Intercept) 39.63 35.42 43.84 18.56 12.36 10.27 14.46 11.63 15.48 11.86 19.09 8.43
SC favorability 0.56 0.52 0.60 30.48 0.37 0.39 0.34 28.13 0.39 0.43 0.36 21.13
s
00 Person
8.19 7.67 8.74 4.83 4.46 5.21 7.20 6.68 7.74
s
00 Day
19.71 16.95 22.97 9.74 8.35 11.37 16.90 14.52 19.71
r
res
11.27 11.01 11.54 8.20 8.01 8.40 11.69 11.41 11.97
Marginal R
2
0.059 0.045 0.072 0.078 0.061 0.092 0.037 0.026 0.045
Conditional R
2
0.795 0.760 0.840 0.666 0.619 0.718 0.723 0.678 0.777
Npeople 87 87 87
Ndays 1,137 1,137 1,137
Nobservations 4,559 4,559 4,559
Note. Focal parameter estimates shaded in gray. SC = social comparison; b= unstandardized regression coefficient; conf. int. = confidence (compatibil-
ity) intervals constructed using profile likelihood for b,s, and rand empirical parametric bootstrap for R
2
; SC favorability scaled as POMP scores; s
00
=
random effects standard deviation, r= residual standard deviation.
SOCIAL COMPARISONS IN SOCIAL ANXIETY 479
This document is copyrighted by the American Psychological Association or one of its allied publishers.
This article is intended solely for the personal use of the individual user and is not to be disseminated broadly.
Table 10
Study 2: SAD Diagnosis Moderation of Social Comparison Favorability and Instability Effects
Positive affect Negative affect Social anxiety
Term b95% conf. int. tb95% conf. int. tb95% conf. int. t
(Intercept) 48.01 42.74 53.27 17.87 7.36 4.88 9.84 5.81 6.51 2.29 10.72 3.03
SC favorability 0.52 0.46 0.57 18.90 0.30 0.34 0.26 15.49 0.21 0.26 0.15 7.51
SAD diagnosis 17.35 24.92 9.77 4.49 10.35 6.78 13.92 5.68 18.56 12.50 24.62 6.00
SC Favorability 3SAD Diagnosis 0.08 0.01 0.15 2.14 0.12 0.17 0.07 4.67 0.34 0.42 0.27 9.24
Simple slopes for SC favorability
SAD diagnosis = No 0.52 0.46 0.57 18.90 0.30 0.34 0.26 15.49 0.21 0.26 0.15 7.51
SAD diagnosis = Yes 0.60 0.55 0.64 24.02 0.42 0.45 0.39 24.05 0.55 0.60 0.50 22.04
s
00 Person
8.19 7.66 8.74 4.72 4.35 5.10 6.92 6.40 7.46
s
00 Day
17.78 15.18 20.61 8.29 7.05 9.63 14.18 12.08 16.46
r
res
11.27 11.00 11.54 8.21 8.01 8.40 11.63 11.36 11.91
Marginal R
2
0.180 0.078 0.260 0.213 0.126 0.284 0.219 0.116 0.309
Conditional R
2
0.796 0.759 0.838 0.665 0.616 0.713 0.725 0.679 0.772
Npeople 87 87 87
Ndays 1,137 1,137 1,137
Nobservations 4,559 4,559 4,559
(Intercept) 53.96 44.95 62.98 11.59 3.94 0.22 8.10 1.83 3.77 3.52 11.05 1.00
Within-day SC instability 0.10 0.25 0.04 1.45 0.13 0.04 0.22 2.95 0.14 0.02 0.26 2.20
SAD diagnosis 19.00 33.97 4.03 2.46 11.88 4.96 18.79 3.33 19.88 7.78 31.98 3.18
Person-level mean within-day SC instability 0.67 1.64 0.30 1.33 0.32 0.14 0.77 1.35 0.21 0.58 1.00 0.52
Within-Day SC Instability 3SAD Diagnosis 0.03 0.16 0.23 0.32 0.08 0.21 0.04 1.35 0.11 0.06 0.28 1.26
Person-Level Mean Within-Day SC Instability 3SAD Diagnosis 0.33 1.07 1.73 0.46 0.22 0.87 0.43 0.66 0.36 1.49 0.78 0.61
Simple slopes for within-day SC instability
SAD diagnosis = No 0.10 0.25 0.04 1.45 0.13 0.04 0.22 2.95 0.14 0.02 0.26 2.20
SAD diagnosis = Yes 0.07 0.21 0.06 1.07 0.05 0.04 0.13 1.15 0.25 0.13 0.37 4.16
s
00 Person
17.66 14.87 20.25 8.04 6.74 9.25 14.23 11.97 16.34
r
res
11.13 10.65 11.62 6.98 6.68 7.29 9.78 9.35 10.21
Marginal R
2
0.169 0.040 0.254 0.202 0.089 0.294 0.228 0.104 0.328
Conditional R
2
0.764 0.708 0.822 0.657 0.587 0.723 0.752 0.698 0.808
Npeople 87 87 87
Ndays 1,088 1,088 1,088
Note. Focal parameter estimates shaded in gray. SAD = social anxiety disorder; SC = social comparison; b= unstandardized regression coefficient; conf. int. = confidence (compatibility) intervals
constructed using profile likelihood for b,s, and rand empirical parametric bootstrap for R
2
; SC favorability scaled as POMP scores; SC instability scaled as the RMSSD between successive within-
day observations; s
00
= random effects standard deviation, r= residual standard deviation.
480 GOODMAN, KELSO, WIERNIK, AND KASHDAN
This document is copyrighted by the American Psychological Association or one of its allied publishers.
This article is intended solely for the personal use of the individual user and is not to be disseminated broadly.
social comparison favorabilityaffect/anxiety relationships were uni-
formly small regardless of diagnosis. Similarly, SAD diagnosis did
not appreciably moderate affect/anxiety relationships with changes in
social comparison favorability; the predictive validity of affect and
social anxiety for later social comparisons was small regardless of
SAD diagnosis.
Exploratory Analyses: Presence of Other People
On an exploratory basis, as specied in our preregistered
analysis plan, we examined how the presence of other people
during the moment a social comparison was made (i.e., meas-
ured at the same time point) predicted social comparison favor-
ability. We found that the presence of other people was
associated with slightly higher social comparison favorability
(Table 12;b= 1.35 [95% CI .64, 2.07, t=3.70], R
2
m
= .001
[95% CI .0005, .002]), meaning that people made slightly
more favorable social comparisons when they were with
another person or persons than when they were alone. This
effect appeared to be somewhat larger among people without
SAD, but the condence interval for this interaction term was
wide and included zero (b
Int
=1.26 [95% CI 2.70, .18, t=
1.72]). We also examined if the relationships between social
comparison favorability and momentary affect/social anxiety
differed between social versus nonsocial contexts. These
effects were negligible to small (positive affect: b
Int
= .07 [95%
CI .00, .14, t=1.99]; negative affect: b
Int
=.04 [95% CI
.09, .01, t=1.51]; social anxiety: b
Int
=.03 [95% CI
.10, .04, t=.87]); see Table 13. Three-way interactions of
people presence with SAD diagnosis on these relationships
were all negligible (Table S5).
Discussion
We examined how people with SAD and psychologically
healthy adults made social comparisons in real-time and links
to daily well-being. Across groups, social comparison favor-
ability was associated with higher positive affect and lower
negative affect and social anxiety at the time the social compar-
isons were rated. Our EMA design allowed us to examine how
social comparisons and affect/social anxiety prospectively
relate to each other throughout the day. Using lagged analyses,
we found that social comparison favorability predicted later
decreases in negative affect, and negative affect predicted later
decreases in social comparison favorability, although these
effects were small. No prospective relationships (in either
direction) were found between social comparisons and positive
affect or social anxiety. In addition to within-person effects, we
identied differences between people with and without SAD.
People with SAD made less favorable, more unstable social
comparisons throughout the day and across days. Moderation
analyses found that relationships between social comparison
favorability and affect/social anxiety were stronger for people
with SAD than controls.
On an exploratory basis, we examined how being around
other people inuenced how people evaluated themselves.
When participants were with another person or persons, they
Table 11
Study 2: Lagged Analyses: Predicting Later Within-Day Affect, Social Anxiety, and Social Comparison Favorability
Positive affect Negative affect Social anxiety
Term b95% conf. int. tb95% conf. int. tb95% conf. int. t
Predicting later within-day affect/anxiety
(Intercept) 39.66 35.44 43.87 18.54 12.00 9.91 14.08 11.32 14.76 11.20 18.32 8.16
Lagged SC favorability 0.04 0.01 0.09 1.67 0.04 0.08 0.01 2.45 0.04 0.08 0.005 1.76
Lagged affect/anxiety 0.38 0.35 0.42 22.10 0.29 0.23 0.34 15.92 0.29 0.24 0.34 16.42
s
00 Person
0.00 0.00 3.08 2.16 0.00 3.13 4.35 3.05 5.42
s
00 Day
19.79 17.04 23.05 9.71 8.33 11.34 16.64 14.29 19.42
r
res
13.81 13.48 14.15 9.35 9.04 9.67 12.52 12.11 12.94
Marginal R
2
0.057 0.042 0.070 0.050 0.036 0.061 0.037 0.026 0.046
Conditional R
2
0.691 0.642 0.761 0.554 0.490 0.630 0.667 0.611 0.742
Predicting later within-day social comparison favorability
(Intercept) 61.83 58.24 65.41 34.02 61.82 58.24 65.40 34.00 61.82 58.24 65.40 34.02
Lagged SC favorability 0.32 0.27 0.37 17.50 0.31 0.25 0.35 16.67 0.32 0.26 0.36 17.94
Lagged affect/anxiety 0.009 0.02 0.03 0.70 0.05 0.09 0.02 2.84 0.02 0.05 0.002 1.85
s
00 Person
1.12 0.00 2.67 1.13 0.00 2.68 1.13 0.00 2.68
s
00 Day
16.84 14.50 19.61 16.84 14.50 19.62 16.84 14.50 19.61
r
res
10.36 10.01 10.66 10.34 10.00 10.64 10.35 10.00 10.65
Marginal R
2
0.030 0.020 0.038 0.031 0.020 0.039 0.031 0.020 0.038
Conditional R
2
0.735 0.685 0.801 0.736 0.685 0.802 0.735 0.684 0.801
Npeople 87 87 87
Ndays 1,088 1,088 1,088
Nobservations 3,422 3,422 3,422
Note. Focal parameter estimates shaded in gray. SC = social comparison; b= unstandardized regression coefficient; conf. int. = confidence (compatibil-
ity) intervals constructed using profile likelihood for b,s, and rand empirical parametric bootstrap for R
2
; SC favorability scaled as POMP scores; s
00
=
random effects standard deviation, r= residual standard deviation.
SOCIAL COMPARISONS IN SOCIAL ANXIETY 481
This document is copyrighted by the American Psychological Association or one of its allied publishers.
This article is intended solely for the personal use of the individual user and is not to be disseminated broadly.
made more favorable social comparisons than when they were
alone. This was true for people with and without SAD. In addi-
tion, the positive relationship between social comparison favor-
ability and positive affect was slightly stronger when people
were with other people than when alone, although this effect
was small. Nonetheless, these are exploratory analyses and
should be interpreted as such.
General Discussion
The purpose of this research program was to integrate rich
social psychological research on social comparisons to understand
links with social anxiety in daily life. Results from two experi-
ence-sampling studies suggest that social comparisons are relevant
to the phenomenology of social anxiety. Study 1 was a daily diary
Table 13
Study 2: Presence of People Moderating Social Comparison Favorability Relationships With Affect and Social Anxiety
Positive affect Negative affect Social anxiety
Term b95% conf. int. tb95% conf. int. tb95% conf. int. t
(Intercept) 38.53 34.35 42.71 18.17 12.65 10.55 14.76 11.83 13.79 10.12 17.46 7.40
SC favorability 0.52 0.47 0.57 21.10 0.35 0.38 0.31 19.48 0.38 0.43 0.34 15.22
People present 2.37 1.50 3.25 5.32 0.62 1.25 0.00 1.96 3.73 2.84 4.62 8.24
SC Favorability 3
People Present 0.07 0.00 0.14 1.99 0.04 0.09 0.01 1.51 0.03 0.10 0.04 0.87
Simple slopes for SC favorability
People present = No 0.52 0.47 0.57 21.10 0.35 0.38 0.31 19.48 0.38 0.43 0.34 15.22
People present = Yes 0.59 0.54 0.65 22.74 0.38 0.42 0.35 20.57 0.42 0.47 0.36 15.65
s
00 Person
8.25 7.72 8.80 4.84 4.47 5.23 7.14 6.61 7.68
s
00 Day
19.48 16.75 22.70 9.70 8.32 11.33 17.06 14.65 19.89
r
res
11.16 10.90 11.43 8.18 7.99 8.38 11.60 11.32 11.87
Marginal R
2
0.063 0.048 0.076 0.079 0.062 0.092 0.043 0.031 0.052
Conditional R
2
0.796 0.760 0.840 0.666 0.617 0.719 0.730 0.684 0.784
Npeople 87 87 87
Ndays 1,137 1,137 1,137
Nobservations 4,551 4,551 4,551
Note. Focal parameter estimates shaded in gray. SC = social comparison; b= unstandardized regression coefficient; conf. int. = confidence (compatibil-
ity) intervals constructed using profile likelihood for b,s, and rand empirical parametric bootstrap for R
2
; SC favorability scaled as POMP scores; s
00
=
random effects standard deviation, r= residual standard deviation.
Table 12
Study 2: Presence of People and People PresenceSAD Diagnosis Interaction Predicting Within-Day Social Comparison Favorability
Term b95% conf. int. tb 95% conf. int. t
(Intercept) 61.04 57.48 64.59 33.82 69.26 65.03 73.46 32.20
People present 1.35 0.64 2.07 3.70 1.94 0.97 2.91 3.91
SAD diagnosis 17.01 23.06 10.95 5.50
SAD Diagnosis 3People Present 1.26 2.70 0.18 1.72
Simple slopes for people present
SAD diagnosis = No 1.94 0.97 2.91 3.91
SAD diagnosis = Yes 0.68 0.39 1.74 1.25
Simple slopes for SAD diagnosis
People present = No 17.01 23.07 10.95 5.50
People present = Yes 18.27 24.34 12.19 5.89
s
00 Person
5.77 5.35 6.21 5.76 5.34 6.20
s
00 Day
16.62 14.30 19.36 14.17 12.10 16.42
r
res
9.38 9.16 9.60 9.38 9.16 9.60
Marginal R
2
0.001 0.0,005 0.002 0.120 0.078 0.302
Conditional R
2
0.779 0.736 0.834 0.780 0.739 0.831
Npeople 87 87
Ndays 1,137 1,137
Nobservations 4,551 4,551
Note. Focal parameter estimates shaded in gray. SAD = social anxiety disorder; b= unstandardized regression coefficient; conf. int. = confidence (com-
patibility) intervals constructed using profile likelihood for b,s, and rand empirical parametric bootstrap for R
2
; SC favorability scaled as POMP scores;
s
00
= random effects standard deviation, r= residual standard deviation.
482 GOODMAN, KELSO, WIERNIK, AND KASHDAN
This document is copyrighted by the American Psychological Association or one of its allied publishers.
This article is intended solely for the personal use of the individual user and is not to be disseminated broadly.
study with a nonclinical sample of college undergraduates, and
study 2 was an EMA study with a clinical sample of community
adults diagnosed with SAD and a psychologically healthy compari-
son group. In both studies, social anxiety was associated with less
favorable and more unstable social comparisons. In both studies,
social comparison favorability was associated with higher state pos-
itive affect and lower negative affect. Moderation analyses suggest
that relationships between social comparison favorability and state
affect/social anxiety differ as a function of trait social anxietyfor
people higher in social anxiety symptoms (study 1) and with SAD
(study 2), more favorable social comparisons were more strongly
linked to lower social anxiety. Similar relationships were found for
positive affect and negative affect in study 2. These results suggest
that social comparisons and affect are more closely tied to each
other in people with elevated social anxiety.
To determine the direction of these effects (i.e., does social
comparison favorability lead to changes in affect/social anxiety, or
does affect/social anxiety lead to changes in social comparison
favorability?), we conducted between-day lagged analyses in study
1 and within-day lagged analyses in study 2. Social comparison
favorability predicted slight decreases in next-day negative affect
in both studies. In study 2, we found a small bidirectional effect
for negative affect, such that social comparison favorability pre-
dicted slight decreases in negative affect, and negative affect pre-
dicted slight decreases in social comparison favorability. As in
study 1, there was no evidence of inuence or relationships over
time between social comparisons and positive affect or social anxi-
ety. In study 2, we found that across people with and without
SAD, social comparisons made around other people were more
favorable than those made alone.
Unstable Self-Concepts in Social Anxiety
Cognitive models of social anxiety suggest that mental self-con-
cepts are formed from negative beliefs about ones capabilities, per-
sonal attributes, and potential (Clark & Wells, 1995;Rapee &
Heimberg, 1997). Consistent with this body of work and our a priori
hypotheses, people with higher social anxiety/SAD made less favor-
able social comparisons. Nonetheless, negative self-concepts do not
necessarily imply rigid or stable concepts. Indeed, experimental stud-
ies have successfully manipulated self-images, and these changes in
self-images altered participantslevels of social anxiety (e.g., Hirsch
et al., 2003,2006). In both of the present studies, social anxiety was
associated with greater social comparison instability. These results
are consistent with research suggesting that people with elevated
social anxiety demonstrate less self-concept clarity (Stopa et al.,
2010). These ndings are also consistent with experience-sampling
research suggesting that people with SAD report (relatively) unstable
daily cognitive and affective experiences (Farmer & Kashdan, 2014).
One way to understand social comparison instability is to examine
the places on the bipolar scale at which a given person deviates. For
example, a person may draw unstable social comparisons at one end
of the scale (e.g., always rating themselves as worse off than others,
but to varying degrees) or draw unstable comparisons that uctuate
between relatively favorable and relatively unfavorable. In this study,
healthy controls (and to a lesser degree in study 1, those with lower
social anxiety) reported consistently favorable social comparisons. In
contrast, those with SAD (and to a lesser degree in study 1, those
with higher social anxiety), reported social comparisons that were
less favorable on average. Further, those with SAD more frequently
shifted between favorable (i.e., better off than others) and unfavora-
ble (i.e., worse off than others) ratings than healthy controls.
Still, ones level of social comparison stability is not inherently
good or bad. On one extreme, unstable social comparisons might
indicate emotional volatility, identity disturbance, or hyperreactiv-
ity. On the other extreme, albeit less convincing, unstable social
comparisons might indicate receptivity to feedback, realistic self-
evaluations, or psychological exibility. As a rst step, we
explored links between social comparison stability and affect. The
EMA methodology in study 2 allowed us to examine stability of
social comparison judgments each day and examine relationships
with average affect and social anxiety that day. Across people
with and without SAD, on days when people made more unstable
social comparisons, they experienced greater social anxiety and, to
a lesser degree, greater negative affect; social comparison stability
was unrelated to positive affect. These ndings suggest that at the
daily level, relatively unstable social comparisons are linked with
higher negative emotionality. These ndings are consistent with
research demonstrating that across days, self-esteem instability is
associated with greater social anxiety, more social avoidance, and
fewer social interactions (Kernis et al., 1992;Oosterwegel et al.,
2001). They also t with research suggesting that affective insta-
bility is elevated in people with SAD and other emotional disor-
ders (Trull et al., 2015). To date, most research on instability of
daily experiences has focused on affect; our research extends this
work and suggests that people with SAD may also demonstrate
unstable cognitive experiences and self-judgments that are linked
to distress.
Social Comparisons and Affective Experiences
If social comparisons demonstrate sensitivity to change, and
this sensitivity differs as a function of psychopathological symp-
toms, then a logical next line of inquiry is to determine how daily
affective experiences are associated with those changes. In both
studies, social comparison favorability was associated with higher
positive affect, lower negative affect, and lower social anxiety
(measured at the same time point), which is consistent with prior
research (e.g., Gibbons, 1986;Marsh & Parker, 1984;Tesser et
al., 1988). Similar to previous research (Antony et al., 2005),
social comparisons were more strongly linked to greater social
anxiety in people with elevated trait social anxiety or a SAD diag-
nosis. Thus, people with SAD were more fearful of otherssocial
evaluations when they made less favorable evaluations of them-
selves. These ndings are consistent with Moscovitchs (2009)
central hypothesis that people with SAD fear social evaluation
because they perceive their self-attributes as decient and likely to
cause social rejection. They are also consistent with Gilberts
(2001) social rank theory that suggests social anxiety occurs when
people perceive their self-attributes as inferior and lower in social
status, which leads to a hyper-focus on avoiding social rejection.
Taken together, while judging oneself as relatively worse off is
social anxiety provoking for most people, for those with SAD,
these judgments may represent a conrmation of their core fear
that they are, in one or more ways, inferior to othersand thus
exacerbate social anxiety.
SOCIAL COMPARISONS IN SOCIAL ANXIETY 483
This document is copyrighted by the American Psychological Association or one of its allied publishers.
This article is intended solely for the personal use of the individual user and is not to be disseminated broadly.
These experience-sampling studies are observational, not experi-
mental, and therefore no claims about causality can be made. Never-
theless, intensive repeated measurements allow for lagged analyses
that offer insight into directionality. Across both studies, less favor-
able social comparisons predicted slight increases in negative affect,
but not social anxiety or positive affect. Specically, using daily di-
ary ratings in study 1, relatively unfavorable judgments of ones
social status on a given day, as a whole, predicted slight increases in
next-day negative affect. Using momentary ratings in study 2, rela-
tively unfavorable judgments of ones social status predicted slight
increases in negative affect later that day. Although these effects
were relatively small, they are consistent with hypotheses and repli-
cated across both studies and thus warrant discussion. It is possible
that less favorable social comparisons have stronger emotional conse-
quences than more favorable ones. An unfavorable social comparison
may serve as a reminder or reinforce a persons low social status.
Although not a measure of rejection, it is possible that this type of
social comparison signals ostracism (e.g., I am inferior to others and
therefore not worthy of group membership), the emotional costs of
which have been well documented (Williams, 2007). More broadly,
our ndings may be more simply explained by a negativity bias,
where humans attend to and are more inuenced by negative stimuli
relative to positive stimuli (Cacioppo & Bernston, 1994). Despite
burgeoning research on positive emotions and other positiveexpe-
riences, many have argued that a negativity bias is evolutionarily
adaptive because it draws attention to potentially threatening stimuli
(e.g., Vaish et al., 2008). Although positive and negative emotions
are usually inversely correlated, they operate on separate continuums
rather than opposite ends of a single continuum (e.g., Tellegen et al.,
1999). Drawing a relatively unfavorable social comparison may lead
to increases in negative emotions, but drawing a relatively favorable
social comparison may not do the same for positive emotions. None-
theless, despite replication in two studies, we caution against overin-
terpreting null effects for positive emotions and encourage future
investigations.
Social Comparisons in the Presence and Absence of
Others
Participants in study 2 made more favorable social comparisons
when they were with other people than when alone. In the absence
of contextual information about these social interactions, we offer
a parsimonious explanation: increases in social connectedness.
Social scientists have long documented the fundamental need to
belong and the myriad benets of social connectedness (e.g., Bau-
meister & Leary, 1995). Perhaps merely being around other people
leads to more favorable self-concepts, an effect similar to social
facilitation ndings where, under certain conditions, task perform-
ance on simple tasks is improved when around others (Uziel,
2007). It is noteworthy that this effect was true even for people
with SAD. While in social interactionsthe very nature of their
pathologypeople with SAD had more positive self-concepts
than when they were alone. These ndings suggest that there
appears to be at least some cognitive benet from socializing.
Although people with SAD have considerable social evaluation
concerns, this does not preclude them from the opportunity to
derive benets when socializing. People with SAD strive to de-
velop and maintain intimate interpersonal relationships to the
same degree as healthy adults (Goodman et al., 2019). Social
situations may be both anxiety-provoking and rewarding. More-
over, a diagnosis of SAD does not mean that every social situation
will be anxiety-provoking; there is considerable heterogeneity in
the type and severity of feared social situations (e.g., public speak-
ing vs. interactional situationsStein & Deutsch, 2003; structured
vs. unstructured interactionsGlenn et al., 2019). It is plausible
that social comparison favorability differs between and within dif-
ferent types of social interactions. Nonetheless, this analysis was
exploratory from the outset and these explanations are only specu-
lations. Replication across samples is necessary before drawing
conclusions, including tests of specic mechanisms (e.g., social
connectedness) that explain these relationships.
Clinical Considerations
While these ndings offer additional support that socially anx-
ious people have uncertain self-concepts, they also demonstrate
sensitivity to change, offering potential promise as intervention
targets. Negative self-concepts depend on the availability and
accessibility of relevant stimuli (Mussweiler, 2003). For someone
with SAD, negative self-concepts might be more readily accessible
based on how they are processing their social environment. A host
of information-biases have been linked to social anxiety, including
overinterpreting ambiguous stimuli as threatening (Bantin et al.,
2016) and autobiographical memory biases (Morgan, 2010). Clini-
cians can help socially anxious clients identify the sources of in-
formation that they typically draw from when making less
favorable social comparisons and determine if/how they are prob-
lematic. If these information sources appear distorted, clinicians
can help clients restructure biases (cognitivebehavioral frame-
work) and/or detach from the emotional and social implications of
particular biases (acceptance and commitment framework).
Another potential intervention target could be modifying social
and performance expectations. People often construct social com-
parisons in ways that are consistent with their expectations (Suls et
al., 2002). People with elevated social anxiety overestimate the
likelihood of being evaluated unfavorably and rejected (Harb et
al., 2002)expectations that may be consistent with their social
comparisons. Prior to entering a social situation, if they anticipate
they will not be liked, they may be more likely to view themselves
as relatively unlikeable; if they anticipate they will not appear
competent, they may be more likely to view themselves as rela-
tively incompetent. It is plausible that altering expectations, partic-
ularly social expectations, can alter social comparisonsor the
reverse, such that altering social comparisons can alter social
expectations. Cognitivebehavioral psychotherapeutic approaches
for anxiety assess the validity of anxious anticipation and replace
overestimations of harm with more realistic reasoning. Clinicians
can help socially anxious clients modify expectations of poor
social performance, which may lead to the downstream conse-
quences of modifying social comparisons.
Limitations and Future Directions
Several study limitations warrant mention. First, participants
were asked to make social comparisons at each prompt (in the
moment or at the end of the day). This methodology forces partici-
pants to draw a social evaluation, which prohibits measurement of
how often people spontaneously draw social comparisons.
484 GOODMAN, KELSO, WIERNIK, AND KASHDAN
This document is copyrighted by the American Psychological Association or one of its allied publishers.
This article is intended solely for the personal use of the individual user and is not to be disseminated broadly.
Frequency of social comparisons may provide information about a
persons emotional well-being. For instance, someone with ele-
vated social anxiety will be overly concerned about other peoples
evaluations, which may lead to excessive monitoring of their
social behavior and attempts to decipher their standing (Leary &
Jongman-Sereno, 2014). A more negative self-view may increase
the salience of ones social standing and lead to more frequent
social comparisons. The reverse may also be true, where the more
often a person compares themselves to other people, the less favor-
able they view themselves as they accumulate multiple data points
of other peoples superiority. Nonetheless, social comparisons
likely occur rapidly and often outside of a persons conscious
awareness. To best assess social comparisons in real-time,
researchers must weigh the tradeoffs of methodologies that offer
stable assessment of social comparison versus relying on partici-
pants to initiate prompts when they make a comparison (i.e.,
event-contingent responding). Second, our measure of social com-
parisons did not specify comparison targets. Although a specic
person or group in mind is not necessary to make a social compari-
son (Wheeler et al., 1997), people may evaluate themselves differ-
ently across proxies. In the broadest sense, social comparisons are
people's representation of their relative social worth (Goethals et
al., 1991); and specifying different targets can answer interesting
questions about the information people use to make these determi-
nations. The mechanisms underlying differences in social compari-
son across proxies are unclear and might depend on features of the
proxy (e.g., nature of relationship with proxy, importance of relation-
ship with proxy) (Suls et al., 2002). Future investigations that differ-
entiate between proxies should compute separate favorability and
stability ratings for each proxy to understand if and how ratings differ
across proxies. Third, in study 2, we only assessed if participants
were with other people and did not ask questions about the nature of
the social interaction. Future research can answer numerous questions
about why, under which conditions, and for whom socializing leads
to more favorable social comparisons by assessing variables such as
who is present, how long the interactions last, whether interactions
are obligatory or freely chosen (e.g., work meeting vs. social), and
who initiates the interaction. Fourth, we chose social comparison
dimensions most relevant to social anxiety, but there are likely other
relevant dimensions. These may be specictoalifedomain(e.g.,
physical health), career (e.g., achievement), or general social standing
(e.g., wealth, privilege). Future research can assess social compari-
sons across different domains, including those included in Allan and
Gilberts (1995) original work that were not assessed in this study (e.
g., unattractive-attractive), by establishing a predetermined set of
dimensions or asking participants to identify specicdimensionson
which they compare themselves to others. Fifth, we examined social
comparison favorability on a continuum, and it is possible that differ-
ences between scale points are not uniform. The extremity of social
comparisons may relate to affect above and beyond the level of social
comparison (Gerber et al., 2018). For example, downward compari-
sons about a person who is much worse off may improve mood
because the rater recognizes their level of superiority; conversely, if
the rater perceives themselves as only slightly better than the proxy,
they might feel worse because they recognize they are not as
advanced or superior as they previously thought. When a person
makes a comparison with a similar other, they may feel differently
about themselves than when drawing a comparison with an extreme
other. Sixth, although we found some support for bidirectional effects
between social comparison and negative affect, bidirectionality can
be inuenced by time-based designs, especially if the sampling fre-
quency is much higher than dynamics of interest. Given the limited
number of EMA studies on social comparisons, we know little about
within-day and between-day dynamics in ratings. Seventh, in study
2, we compared people with SAD to a healthy control group, not a
clinical control group. Our goal was to better understand the phenom-
enology of SAD and determine whether the effects in study 1 repli-
cated. Following these two studies, researchers can move to
additional questions such as whether any effects uncovered are rele-
vant to other emotional disorders. Although social evaluation con-
cerns are a dening feature of SAD, other internalizing disorders
may share common features relevant to social comparisons (e.g.,
rejection sensitivityMarston et al., 2010). Future research can com-
pare individuals with different mental health diagnoses to determine
the degree of specicity for people with SAD. Eighth, while we
chose to run and transparently report on numerous analyses to
strengthen the empirical base of the theories discussed in this article,
one tradeoff is potential ination of type I error rates. Replication is
needed prior to extensive interpretation. To aid in this effort, our ana-
lytical code is freely available on OSF.
Conclusion
In his seminal theory of social comparisons, Festinger (1954) pro-
posed that there exists, in the human organism, a drive to evaluate
his opinions and abilities(p. 117). Nearly 70 years later, psychologi-
cal scientists have produced a corpus of important insights about
social cognition. These two experience-sampling studies extend this
work by examining individual differences in social comparisons and
their links with emotional well-being. We demonstrated that people
with SAD draw potentially problematic social comparisons through-
out their daily lives, characterized by relatively unfavorable and
unstable self-views that are strongly linked with negative emotions.
We also demonstrated that when people with SAD make less favor-
able social comparisons, they are especially fearful of otherssocial
evaluationssuggesting that unfavorable social comparisons may be
one contributor of daily experiences of social anxiety. These ndings
offer support for central assumptions of prevailing cogniti-
vebehavioral (Moscovitch, 2009) and evolutionary (Gilbert, 2001)
frameworks that suggest unfavorable self-evaluations are an impor-
tant marker for social anxiety symptoms. Together, our results gener-
ate a number of important questions about how social comparisons
vary across individual differences in social anxiety and other emo-
tional disturbances.
References
Aderka, I. M., Haker, A., Marom, S., Hermesh, H., & Gilboa-Schechtman,
E. (2013). Information-seeking bias in social anxiety disorder. Journal of
Abnormal Psychology,122(1), 712. https://doi.org/10.1037/a0029555
Aderka, I. M., Weisman, O., Shahar, G., & Gilboa-Schechtman, E. (2009).
The roles of the social rank and attachment systems in social anxiety.
Personality and Individual Differences,47(4), 284288. https://doi.org/
10.1016/j.paid.2009.03.014
Alden, L. E., Taylor, C. T., Mellings, T. M., & Laposa, J. M. (2008).
Social anxiety and the interpretation of positive social events. Journal of
Anxiety Disorders,22(4), 577590. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.janxdis
.2007.05.007
SOCIAL COMPARISONS IN SOCIAL ANXIETY 485
This document is copyrighted by the American Psychological Association or one of its allied publishers.
This article is intended solely for the personal use of the individual user and is not to be disseminated broadly.
Alicke, M. D., & Govorun, O. (2005). The better-than-average effect. In
M. D. Alicke, D. A. Dunning, & J. I. Krueger (Eds.), The self in social
judgment (pp. 85106). Psychology Press.
Allan, S., & Gilbert, P. (1995). A social comparison scale: Psychometric
properties and relationship to psychopathology. Personality and Individual
Differences,19(3), 293299. https://doi.org/10.1016/0191-8869(95)00086-L
Amrhein, V., Greenland, S., & McShane, B. (2019). Scientists rise up
against statistical significance. Nature,567(7748), 305307. https://doi
.org/10.1038/d41586-019-00857-9
Antony, M. M., Rowa, K., Liss, A., Swallow, S. R., & Swinson, R. P.
(2005). Social comparison processes in social phobia. Behavior Ther-
apy,36(1), 6575. https://doi.org/10.1016/S0005-7894(05)80055-3
Bantin, T., Stevens, S., Gerlach, A. L., & Hermann, C. (2016). What does
the facial dot-probe task tell us about attentional processes in social anx-
iety? A systematic review. Journal of Behavior Therapy and Experimen-
tal Psychiatry,50,4051. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jbtep.2015.04.009
Bates, D. (2006). [R] lmer, p-values and all that [Listserv message].
R-Help Listserv. https://stat.ethz.ch/pipermail/r-help/2006-May/094765
.html
Bates, D., Mächler, M., Bolker, B., & Walker, S. (2015). Fitting linear
mixed-effects models using Ime4. Journal of Statistical Software,67(1),
148. https://doi.org/10.18637/jss.v067.i01
Baumeister, R. F., & Leary, M. R. (1995). The need to belong: Desire for
interpersonal attachments as a fundamental human motivation. Psycho-
logical Bulletin,117(3), 497529.
Brown, T. A., Chorpita, B. F., & Barlow, D. H. (1998). Structural relation-
ships among dimensions of the DSMIV anxiety and mood disorders
and dimensions of negative affect, positive affect, and autonomic
arousal. Journal of Abnormal Psychology,107(2), 179192. https://doi
.org/10.1037/0021-843x.107.2.179
Cacioppo, J. T., & Berntson, G. G. (1994). Relationship between attitudes
and evaluative space: A critical review, with emphasis on the separabil-
ity of positive and negative substrates. Psychological Bulletin,115(3),
401423. https://doi.org/10.1037/0033-2909.115.3.401
Clark, D. M., & Wells, A. (1995). A cognitive model of social phobia. In
R. G. Heimberg, M. R. Liebowitz, D. A. Hope, & F. R. Schneier (Eds.),
Social phobia: Diagnosis, assessment, and treatment (pp. 6993). Guil-
ford Press.
Cohen, P., Cohen, J., Aiken, L. S., & West, S. G. (1999). The problem of
units and the circumstance for POMP. Multivariate Behavioral Research,
34(3), 315346. https://doi.org/10.1207/S15327906MBR3403_2
Collins, R. L. (1996). For better or worse: The impact of upward social
comparison on self-evaluations. Psychological Bulletin,119(1), 5169.
DeYoung, C. G., Chmielewski, M., Clark, L. A., Condon, D. M., Kotov,
R., Krueger, R. F., Lynam, D. R., Markon, K. E., Miller, J. D., Mullins-
Sweatt, S. N., Samuel, D. B., Sellbom, M., South, S. C., Thomas, K. M.,
Watson, D., Watts, A. L., Widiger, T. A., Wright, A. G. C., & the
HiTOP Normal Personality Workgroup. (2020). The distinction between
symptoms and traits in the Hierarchical Taxonomy of Psychopathology
(HiTOP). Journal of Personality. Advance online publication. https://
doi.org/10.1111/jopy.12593
Dufner, M., Gebauer, J. E., Sedikides, C., & Denissen, J. J. (2019). Self-
enhancement and psychological adjustment: A meta-analytic review.
Personality and Social Psychology Review,23(1), 4872. https://doi
.org/10.1177/1088868318756467
Eisele, G., Vachon, H., Lafit, G., Kuppens, P., Houben, M., Myin-Germeys,
I., & Viechtbauer, W. (2020). The effects of sampling frequency and ques-
tionnaire length on perceived burden, compliance, and careless responding
in experience sampling data in a student population. Assessment. Advance
online publication. https://doi.org/10.1177/1073191120957102
Farmer, A. S., & Kashdan, T. B. (2014). Affective and self-esteem instabil-
ity in the daily lives of people with generalized social anxiety disorder.
Clinical Psychological Science,2(2), 187201. https://doi.org/10.1177/
2167702613495200
Festinger, L. (1954). A theory of social comparison processes. Human
Relations,7(2), 117140. https://doi.org/10.1177/001872675400700202
Fleeson, W. (2001). Toward a structure-and process-integrated view of
personality: Traits as density distributions of states. Journal of Personal-
ity and Social Psychology,80(6), 10111027. https://doi.org/10.1037/
0022-3514.80.6.1011
Gerber, J. P., Wheeler, L., & Suls, J. (2018). A social comparison theory
meta-analysis 60þyears on. Psychological Bulletin,144(2), 177197.
https://doi.org/10.1037/bul0000127
Gibbons, F. X. (1986). Social comparison and depression: Companys
effect on misery. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology,51(1),
140148. https://doi.org/10.1037/0022-3514.51.1.140
Gilbert, P. (1992). Depression: The evolution of powerlessness. Erlbaum.
Gilbert, P. (2000). Overcoming depression (rev. ed.). Robinson Publishing.
Gilbert, P. (2001). Evolution and social anxiety: The role of attraction,
social competition, and social hierarchies. Psychiatria Clinica,24(4),
723751.
Gilbert, P. (2014). Evolutionary models: Practical and conceptual utility
for the treatment and study of social anxiety disorder. In J. W. Weeks
(Ed.), The Wiley Blackwell handbook of social anxiety disorder (pp.
2452). Wiley-Blackwell.
Gilboa-Schechtman, E., Foa, E. B., & Amir, N. (1999). Attentional biases
for facial expressions in social phobia: The face-in-the-crowd paradigm.
Cognition and Emotion,13(3), 305318. https://doi.org/10.1080/026999
399379294
Glenn, L. E., Keeley, L. M., Szollos, S., Okuno, H., Wang, X., Rausch, E.,
Deros, D. E., Karp, J. N., Qasmieh, N., Makol, B. A., Augenstein,
T. M., Lipton, M. F., Racz, S. J., Scharfstein, L., Beidel, D. C., & De
Los Reyes, A. (2019). Trained observersratings of adolescentssocial
anxiety and social skills within controlled, cross-contextual social inter-
actions with unfamiliar peer confederates. Journal of Psychopathology
and Behavioral Assessment,41(1), 115. https://doi.org/10.1007/s10862
-018-9676-4
Goethals, G. R., Messick, D. M., & Allison, S. T. (1991). The uniqueness
bias: Studies of constructive social comparison. In J. Suls & T. A. Wills
(Eds.), Social comparison: Contemporary theory and research (pp.
149176). Erlbaum, Inc.
Goldin, P. R., Manber-Ball, T., Werner, K., Heimberg, R., & Gross, J. J.
(2009). Neural mechanisms of cognitive reappraisal of negative self-
beliefs in social anxiety disorder. Biological Psychiatry,66(12),
10911099. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.biopsych.2009.07.014
Goodman, F. R., Kashdan, T. B., Stiksma, M. C., & Blalock, D. V. (2019).
Personal strivings to understand anxiety disorders: Social anxiety as an
exemplar. Clinical Psychological Science,7(2), 283301. https://doi
.org/10.1177/2167702618804778
Goodman, F. R., Stiksma, M. C., & Kashdan, T. B. (2018). Social anxiety
and the quality of everyday social interactions: The moderating influ-
ence of alcohol consumption. Behavior Therapy,49(3), 373387.
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.beth.2017.10.002
Harb,G.C.,Heimberg,R.G.,Fresco,D.M.,Schneier,F.R.,&Liebowitz,
M. R. (2002). The psychometric properties of the Interpersonal Sensitivity
Measure in social anxiety disorder. Behaviour Research and Therapy,
40(8), 961979. https://doi.org/10.1016/s0005-7967(01)00125-5
Heimberg, R. G., Mueller, G. P., Holt, C. S., Hope, D. A., & Liebowitz,
M. R. (1992). Assessment of anxiety in social interaction and being
observed by others: The social interaction anxiety scale and the social
phobia scale. Behavior Therapy,23(1), 5373. https://doi.org/10.1016/
S0005-7894(05)80308-9
Hirsch, C. R., Clark, D. M., Mathews, A., & Williams, R. (2003). Self-
images play a causal role in social phobia. Behaviour Research and Ther-
apy,41(8), 909921. https://doi.org/10.1016/s0005-7967(02)00103-1
Hirsch,C.R.,Mathews,A.,Clark,D.M.,Williams,R.,&Morrison,J.A.
(2006). The causal role of negative imagery in social anxiety: A test in
486 GOODMAN, KELSO, WIERNIK, AND KASHDAN
This document is copyrighted by the American Psychological Association or one of its allied publishers.
This article is intended solely for the personal use of the individual user and is not to be disseminated broadly.
confident public speakers. Journal of Behavior Therapy and Experimental
Psychiatry,37(2), 159170. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jbtep.2005.03.003
Hofmann, S. G. (2000). Self-focused attention before and after treatment
of social phobia. Behaviour Research and Therapy,38(7), 717725.
https://doi.org/10.1016/S0005-7967(99)00105-9
Hofmann, S. G. (2007). Cognitive factors that maintain social anxiety disor-
der: A comprehensive model and its treatment implications. Cognitive
Behaviour Therapy,36(4), 193209. https://doi.org/10.1080/165060707
01421313
Hofmann, S. G., & Barlow, D. H. (2002). Social phobia (social anxiety dis-
order). In D. H. Barlow (Ed.), Anxiety and its disorders: The nature and
treatment of anxiety and panic (Vol. 2, pp. 454476). Guilford Press.
Hofmann, S. G., Moscovitch, D. A., Kim, H. J., & Taylor, A. N. (2004).
Changes in self-perception during treatment of social phobia. Journal of
Consulting and Clinical Psychology,72(4), 588596. https://doi.org/10
.1037/0022-006X.72.4.588
Houben, M., Van Den Noortgate, W., & Kuppens, P. (2015). The relation
between short-term emotion dynamics and psychological well-being: A
meta-analysis. Psychological Bulletin,141(4), 901930. https://doi.org/
10.1037/a0038822
Johnson, P. C. (2014). Extension of Nakagawa & SchielzethsR2GLMMto
random slopes models. Methods in Ecology and Evolution,5(9), 944946.
Kashdan, T. B. (2007). Social anxiety spectrum and diminished positive
experiences: Theoretical synthesis and meta-analysis. Clinical Psychol-
ogy Review,27(3), 348365. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.cpr.2006.12.003
Kashdan, T. B., Adams, L. M., Farmer, A. S., Ferssizidis, P., McKnight,
P. E., & Nezlek, J. B. (2014). Sexual healing: Daily diary investigation
of the benefits of intimate and pleasurable sexual activity in socially
anxious adults. Archives of Sexual Behavior,43(7), 14171429. https://
doi.org/10.1007/s10508-013-0171-4
Kashdan,T.B.,Farmer,A.S.,Adams,L.M.,Ferssizidis,P.,McKnight,
P. E., & Nezlek, J. B. (2013). Distinguishing healthy adults from people
with social anxiety disorder: Evidence for the value of experiential avoid-
ance and positive emotions in everyday social interactions. Journal of
Abnormal Psychology,122(3), 645655. https://doi.org/10.1037/a0032733
Kashdan, T. B., & Roberts, J. E. (2004). Social anxietys impact on affect,
curiosity, and social self-efficacy during a high self-focus social threat
situation. Cognitive Therapy and Research,28(1), 119141. https://doi
.org/10.1023/B:COTR.0000016934.20981.68
Kashdan, T. B., & Steger, M. F. (2006). Expanding the topography of
social anxiety: An experience-sampling assessment of positive emo-
tions, positive events, and emotion suppression. Psychological Science,
17(2), 120128. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-9280.2006.01674.x
Kernis, M. H., Grannemann, B. D., & Barclay, L. C. (1992). Stability of
self-esteem: Assessment, correlates, and excuse making. Journal of Person-
ality,60(3), 621644. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-6494.1992.tb00923.x
Kessler, R. C., Chiu, W. T., Demler, O., Merikangas, K. R., & Walters,
E. E. (2005). Prevalence, severity, and comorbidity of 12-month
DSMIV disorders in the National Comorbidity Survey Replication. Ar-
chives of General Psychiatry,62(6), 617627. https://doi.org/10.1001/
archpsyc.62.6.617
Leary, M. R. (1983). A brief version of the Fear of Negative Evaluation
Scale. Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin,9(3), 371376.
https://doi.org/10.1177/0146167283093007
Leary, M. R., & Jongman-Sereno, K. P. (2014). Social anxiety as an early
warning system: A refinement and extension of the self-presentation
theory of social anxiety. In S. G. Hofmann & P. M. DiBartolo (Eds.),
Social anxiety: Clinical, developmental, and social perspectives (pp.
579597). Elsevier Academic Press.
Marsh, H. W., & Parker, J. W. (1984). Determinants of student self-con-
cept: Is it better to be a relatively large fish in a small pond even if you
dont learn to swim as well? Journal of Personality and Social Psychol-
ogy,47(1), 213231. https://doi.org/10.1037/0022-3514.47.1.213
Marston, E. G., Hare, A., & Allen, J. P. (2010). Rejection sensitivity in late ado-
lescence: Social and emotional sequelae. Journal of Research on Adoles-
cence,20(4), 959982. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1532-7795.2010.00675.x
Mattick, R. P., & Clarke, J. C. (1998). Development and validation of
measures of social phobia scrutiny fear and social interaction anxiety.
Behaviour Research and Therapy,36(4), 455470. https://doi.org/10
.1016/S0005-7967(97)10031-6
Mitchell, M. A., & Schmidt, N. B. (2014). An experimental manipulation
of social comparison in social anxiety. Cognitive Behaviour Therapy,
43(3), 221229. https://doi.org/10.1080/16506073.2014.914078
Morgan, J. (2010). Autobiographical memory biases in social anxiety.
Clinical Psychology Review,30(3), 288297. https://doi.org/10.1016/j
.cpr.2009.12.003
Moscovitch, D. A. (2009). What is the core fear in social phobia? A new
model to facilitate individualized case conceptualization and treatment.
Cognitive and Behavioral Practice,16(2), 123134. https://doi.org/10
.1016/j.cbpra.2008.04.002
Mussweiler, T. (2003). Comparison processes in social judgment: Mecha-
nisms and consequences. Psychological Review,110(3), 472489.
https://doi.org/10.1037/0033-295x.110.3.472
Nakagawa, S., Johnson, P. C., & Schielzeth, H. (2017). The coefficient of
determination R
2
and intra-class correlation coefficient from generalized
linear mixed-effects models revisited and expanded. Journal of the
Royal Society, Interface,14(134), 20170213. https://doi.org/10.1098/rsif
.2017.0213
Nakagawa, S., & Schielzeth, H. (2013). A general and simple method for
obtaining R2 from generalized linear mixed-effects models. Methods in
Ecology and Evolution,4(2), 133142. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.2041
-210x.2012.00261.x
Nezlek, J. B. (2011). Multilevel modeling for social and personality psy-
chology. SAGE Publications Ltd.
Nezlek, J. B. (2012). Multilevel modeling analyses of diary-style data. In
M. R. Mehl, T. S. Conner, & M. Csikszentmihalyi (Eds.), Handbook of
research methods for studying daily life (pp. 357383). Guildford Press.
Nosek, B. A., Alter, G., Banks, G. C., Borsboom, D., Bowman, S. D.,
Breckler, S. J., Buck, S., Chambers, C. D., Chin, G., Christensen, G.,
Contestabile, M., Dafoe, A., Eich, E., Freese, J., Glennerster, R., Goroff,
D., Green, D. P., Hesse, B., Humphreys, M., . . . Yarkoni, T. (2015).
Promoting an open research culture. Science,348(6242), 14221425.
https://doi.org/10.1126/science.aab2374
Nosek, B. A., Ebersole, C. R., DeHaven, A. C., & Mellor, D. T. (2018).
The preregistration revolution. Proceedings of the National Academy of
Sciences of the United States of America,115(11), 26002606. https://
doi.org/10.1073/pnas.1708274114
Oosterwegel, A., Field, N., Hart, D., & Anderson, K. (2001). The relation
of self-esteem variability to emotion variability, mood, personality traits,
and depressive tendencies. Journal of Personality,69(5), 689708.
https://doi.org/10.1111/1467-6494.695160
Peschard, V., Ben-Moshe, S., Keshet, H., Restle, H., Dollberg, D., &
Gilboa-Schechtman, E. (2019). Social anxiety and sensitivity to social-
rank features in male faces. Journal of Behavior Therapy and Experimental
Psychiatry,63,7984. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jbtep.2018.10.005
Ramsey, M. A., & Gentzler, A. L. (2015). An upward spiral: Bidirectional
associations between positive affect and positive aspects of close rela-
tionships across the life span. Developmental Review,36,58104.
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.dr.2015.01.003
Rapee, R. M., & Heimberg, R. G. (1997). A cognitive-behavioral model of
anxiety in social phobia. Behaviour Research and Therapy,35(8),
741756. https://doi.org/10.1016/S0005-7967(97)00022-3
Raudenbush, S. W., & Liu, X. (2000). Statistical power and optimal design
for multisite randomized trials. Psychological Methods,5(2), 199213.
https://doi.org/10.1037/1082-989x.5.2.199
SOCIAL COMPARISONS IN SOCIAL ANXIETY 487
This document is copyrighted by the American Psychological Association or one of its allied publishers.
This article is intended solely for the personal use of the individual user and is not to be disseminated broadly.
R Core Team. (2020). R: A language and environment for statistical
computing. R Foundation for Statistical Computing. https://www.R-project
.org/
Revelle, W. (2019). psych: Procedures for personality and psychological
research. Northwestern University. https://CRAN.R-project.org/package=
psychVersion=1.9.12
Richey, J. A., Brewer, J. A., Sullivan-Toole, H., Strege, M. V., Kim-
Spoon, J., White, S. W., & Ollendick, T. H. (2019). Sensitivity shift
theory: A developmental model of positive affect and motivational defi-
cits in social anxiety disorder. Clinical Psychology Review,72, 101756.
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.cpr.2019.101756
Rodebaugh, T. L., Heimberg, R. G., Brown, P. J., Fernandez, K. C.,
Blanco, C., Schneier, F. R., & Liebowitz, M. R. (2011). More reasons to
be straightforward: Findings and norms for two scales relevant to social
anxiety. Journal of Anxiety Disorders,25(5), 623630. https://doi.org/
10.1016/j.janxdis.2011.02.002
Rodebaugh, T. L., Woods, C. M., & Heimberg, R. G. (2007). The reverse
of social anxiety is not always the opposite: The reverse-scored items of
the Social Interaction Anxiety Scale do not belong. Behavior Therapy,
38(2), 192206. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.beth.2006.08.001[
Rodebaugh, T. L., Woods, C. M., Heimberg, R. G., Liebowitz, M. R., &
Schneier, F. R. (2006). The factor structure and screening utility of the
Social Interaction Anxiety Scale. Psychological Assessment,18(2),
231237. https://doi.org/10.1037/1040-3590.18.2.231
Russell, J. A., Weiss, A., & Mendelsohn, G. A. (1989). Affect Grid: A sin-
gle-item scale of pleasure and arousal. Journal of Personality and Social
Psychology,57(3), 493502. https://doi.org/10.1037/0022-3514.57.3.493
Sapolsky, R. M. (2005). The influence of social hierarchy on primate health.
Science,308(5722), 648652. https://doi.org/10.1126/science.1106477
Schulz, S. M., Alpers, G. W., & Hofmann, S. G. (2008). Negative self-
focused cognitions mediate the effect of trait social anxiety on state anx-
iety. Behaviour Research and Therapy,46(4), 438449. https://doi.org/
10.1016/j.brat.2008.01.008
Shiffman, S., Stone, A. A., & Hufford, M. R. (2008). Ecological momen-
tary assessment. Annual Review of Clinical Psychology,4,132. https://
doi.org/10.1146/annurev.clinpsy.3.022806.091415
Shrout, P. E., & Lane, S. P. (2012). Psychometrics. In M. R. Mehl & T. S.
Conner (Eds.), Handbook of research methods for studying daily life
(pp. 302320). Guilford Press.
Stein, M. B., & Deutsch, R. (2003). In search of social phobia subtypes:
Similarity of feared social situations. Depression and Anxiety,17(2),
9497. https://doi.org/10.1002/da.10093
Stopa, L., Brown, M. A., Luke, M. A., & Hirsch, C. R. (2010). Construct-
ing a self: The role of self-structure and self-certainty in social anxiety.
Behaviour Research and Therapy,48(10), 955965. https://doi.org/10
.1016/j.brat.2010.05.028
Suls, J., Martin, R., & Wheeler, L. (2002). Social comparison: Why, with
whom, and with what effect? Current Directions in Psychological Sci-
ence,11(5), 159163. https://doi.org/10.1111/1467-8721.00191
Taylor, C. T., Pearlstein, S. L., & Stein, M. B. (2017). The affective tie that
binds: Examining the contribution of positive emotions and anxiety to rela-
tionship formation in social anxiety disorder. Journal of Anxiety Disorders,
49,2130. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.janxdis.2017.03.007
Tellegen, A., Watson, D., & Clark, L. A. (1999). On the dimensional and
hierarchical structure of affect. Psychological Science,10(4), 297303.
https://doi.org/10.1111/1467-9280.00157
Tesser, A., Millar, M., & Moore, J. (1988). Some affective consequences
of social comparison and reflection processes: The pain and pleasure of
being close. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology,54(1),
4961. https://doi.org/10.1037/0022-3514.54.1.49
Thompson, R. J., Mata, J., Jaeggi, S. M., Buschkuehl, M., Jonides, J., &
Gotlib, I. H. (2012). The everyday emotional experience of adults with
major depressive disorder: Examining emotional instability, inertia, and
reactivity. Journal of Abnormal Psychology,121(4), 819829. https://
doi.org/10.1037/a0027978
Tone, E. B., Nahmias, E., Bakeman, R., Kvaran, T., Brosnan, S. F., Fani, N.,
& Schroth, E. A. (2019). Social anxiety and social behavior: A test of pre-
dictions from an evolutionary model. Clinical Psychological Science,7(1),
110126. https://doi.org/10.1177/2167702618794923
Trower, P., & Gilbert, P. (1989). New theoretical conceptions of social
anxiety and social phobia. Clinical Psychology Review,9(1), 1935.
https://doi.org/10.1016/0272-7358(89)90044-5
Trull, T. J., Lane, S. P., Koval, P., & Ebner-Priemer, U. W. (2015). Affec-
tive dynamics in psychopathology. Emotion Review,7(4), 355361.
https://doi.org/10.1177/1754073915590617
Tryon, W. W. (2001). Evaluating statistical difference, equivalence, and inde-
terminacy using inferential confidence intervals: An integrated alternative
method of conducting null hypothesis statistical tests. Psychological Meth-
ods,6(4), 371386. https://doi.org/10.1037/1082-989X.6.4.371
Uziel, L. (2007). Individual differences in the social facilitation effect: A
review and meta-analysis. Journal of Research in Personality,41(3),
579601. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jrp.2006.06.008
Vaish,A.,Grossmann,T.,&Woodward,A.(2008).Notallemotions
are created equal: The negativity bias in social-emotional develop-
ment. Psychological Bulletin,134(3), 383403. https://doi.org/10
.1037/0033-2909.134.3.383
Von Neumann, J., Kent, R. H., Bellinson, H. R., & Hart, B. T. (1941). The
mean square successive difference. Annals of Mathematical Statistics,
12(2), 153162. https://doi.org/10.1214/aoms/1177731746
Watson, D., & Clark, L. A. (1994). The PANAS-X: Manual for the positive
and negative affect schedule-expanded form. The University of Iowa.
Watson, D., & Tellegen, A. (1985). Toward a consensual structure of
mood. Psychological Bulletin,98(2), 219235. https://doi.org/10.1037/
0033-2909.98.2.219
Watson, D., Clark, L. A., & Carey, G. (1988). Positive and negative
affectivity and their relation to anxiety and depressive disorders.
Journal of Abnormal Psychology,97(3), 346353. https://doi.org/
10.1037/0021-843x.97.3.346
Weeks, J. W., & Howell, A. N. (2012). The bivalent fear of evaluation
model of social anxiety: Further integrating findings on fears of positive
and negative evaluation. Cognitive Behaviour Therapy,41(2), 8395.
https://doi.org/10.1080/16506073.2012.661452
Weeks, J. W., Heimberg, R. G., & Heuer, R. (2011). Exploring the role of be-
havioral submissiveness in social anxiety. Journal of Social and Clinical
Psychology,30(3), 217249. https://doi.org/10.1521/jscp.2011.30.3.217
Weisman, O., Aderka, I. M., Marom, S., Hermesh, H., & Gilboa-
Schechtman, E. (2011). Social rank and affiliation in social anxiety dis-
order. Behaviour Research and Therapy,49(6-7), 399405. https://doi
.org/10.1016/j.brat.2011.03.010
Wheeler, L., & Miyake, K. (1992). Social comparison in everyday life.
Journal of Personality and Social Psychology,62(5), 760773. https://
doi.org/10.1037/0022-3514.62.5.760
Wheeler, L., Martin, R., & Suls, J. (1997). The proxy model of social com-
parison for self-assessment of ability. Personality and Social Psychology
Review,1(1), 5461. https://doi.org/10.1207/s15327957pspr0101_4
Wichers, M., Wigman, J. T. W., & Myin-Germeys, I. (2015). Micro-level
affect dynamics in psychopathology viewed from complex dynamical
system theory. Emotion Review,7(4), 362367. https://doi.org/10.1177/
1754073915590623
Williams, K. D. (2007). Ostracism. Annual Review of Psychology,58,
425452. https://doi.org/10.1146/annurev.psych.58.110405.085641
Wills, T. A. (1981). Downward comparison principles in social psychol-
ogy. Psychological Bulletin,90(2), 245271. https://doi.org/10.1037/
0033-2909.90.2.245
Wood, J. V. (1989). Theory and research concerning social comparisons of
personal attributes. Psychological Bulletin,106(2), 231248.
488 GOODMAN, KELSO, WIERNIK, AND KASHDAN
This document is copyrighted by the American Psychological Association or one of its allied publishers.
This article is intended solely for the personal use of the individual user and is not to be disseminated broadly.