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Abstract
Radical realism is distinguished in part from other forms of political realism by its more explicit anti-status quo objectives. In particular, radical realists generally reject the legitimacy of liberal political institutions, and often defend some version of Marxism or anarchism. However, critics of radical realism sometimes argue that radical realist's aversion to certain kinds of normative theorising hinders their capacity to criticize the status quo. This objection may therefore be best understood as one of “self-frustration,” rather than “status quo bias.” According to the objection, radical realists want to criticise the status quo, but their own methodological positions prevent them from doing so effectively. I have three aims in this article. First, I will clarify the kinds of normativity which radical realists do (and do not) object. Second, I will then show how this enables us to see that the self-frustration objection fails. Third, I will suggest that it is not radical realism but its critics who may have a problematic relationship with the status quo.
... Another strand of critical thought comes from political theorists who instead wish to ground political theory in epistemic normativity (and thus epistemic norms). Theorists identifying as 'radical realists' have insisted that political theorists do not need any moral normativity (and thus moral norms) to conduct ideology critique, because epistemic normativity may provide action-guidance for political theory (Geuss 2008;Aytac 2022;Aytac and Rossi 2022;Cross 2022Cross , 2023Prinz 2016;Prinz andRossi 2017, 2021;Raekstad 2021;Rossi 2019Rossi , 2023Burelli 2022;Burelli and Destri 2022). 3 As will be discussed below, ideology critique for radical realists is an epistemic method of unmasking illusions and unwarranted belief. ...
... Hence, to the extent Blair's support of the invasion was motivated by the 'evilness' of Saddam Hussein rather than factual analysis of the situation in Iraq, his action depended on an ideological account which "ideology critique would strongly counsel against" (Cross 2022(Cross : 1118. Now, in order for epistemic normativity to sufCice to play the role typically given to moral normativity (in the broad sense speciCied in the previous section), it must be able to guide practical decision-making. ...
... A recent exception is Ben Cross, who claims that epistemic norms may guide us to unique actions. While Cross argues that a general demand for clear guidance in the sense of "in the sense of telling people what they ought to do" conClates "what is desirable with what is possible" (Cross 2022(Cross : 1118, he nonetheless goes on to claim that the method of ideology critique may "provide us with a way of evaluating the … normative ideas we have", and "sometimes provide clear practical guidance" (Cross 2022(Cross : 1120, by which he 9 explicitly means "that P should do X" (Cross 2022(Cross : 1118. 9 As an example of such guidance -referring to Rossi (2019) as well as Prinz and Rossi (2017) -Cross states that "[i]deology critique may also point in favour of a particular course of action by providing some kind of vindicatory analysis of its supporting legitimation narratives and/or by revealing greater epistemic deCiciencies in the narratives supporting alternative courses of action" (Cross 2022(Cross : 1118. ...
One recent debate in political theory centers on the question of whether there is a distinctively political normativity. According to an influential view, there is a distinctive set of norms that applies specifically to political actions and decisions, which are not grounded in moral normativity. On one version of this non-moral view, political theory is grounded in epistemic normativity (and thus epistemic norms). Theorists identifying as “radical realists” insist that political theorists do not need any moral normativity (and thus moral norms), because epistemic normativity may provide action-guidance for political theory. In this article, we take our point of departure in a critical analysis of this epistemic version of the non-moral view, with the overall aim of analyzing the importance and limitation of epistemic norms in political theory. We argue that epistemic norms are necessary—since a political theory should not rely on empirical falsities—but not sufficient for a successful account in the political domain. Two claims are made: moral norms are essential in the process of political theorizing, both in the form of pre-epistemic norms and in the form of post-epistemic norms. More specifically, we contend, first, that we need moral norms to identify and justify which practices to study when conducting political theorizing, and second, that we need moral norms to tell us how to act in light of our investigation of warranted and unwarranted beliefs.
... One of the most distinctive features of recent political realist literature has been the reemphasis on ideology critique as a valuable tool for doing political theory (Cross, 2021(Cross, , 2022Finlayson, 2016;Geuss, 2008;Prinz & Rossi, 2017Raekstad, 2021;Rossi, 2019;Rossi & Argenton, 2021). Broadly speaking, ideology critique seeks to unmask certain beliefs, desires, practices, and/or other forms of consciousness as epistemically dubious for reasons other than the fact that they might be propositionally false. ...
... At most, it might point us towards one policy option by default if all its alternatives are revealed to depend on ideological narratives. In general, however, the purpose of ideology critique is to resource political decision-making, rather than determine it (Cross, 2022(Cross, , p. 1119Kreutz & Rossi, 2022). It can do this by redirecting our attention away from narratives, which present a distorted version of reality. ...
... A third position committed to the non-moral view is the epistemic approach, which has become increasingly popular in the last couple of years. This approach is inspired by both Williams' and Geuss' emphasis on the importance of "accuracy" in the political domain, that is, of basing our political evaluations on accurate factual information about "how things really stand" (Geuss, 2008, p. x). 8 This focus is especially present among so-called "radical realists," who take ideology critique to be a central task in political theory (Cross, 2021;Duff, 2017;Finlayson, 2017;Raekstad, 2021;Rossi, 2019). Radical realists believe that many of our normative ideas in the political sphere are inaccurate, distorted by illusions. ...
... Various historical factors such as power relations and wishful thinking have made our normative values defunct and formed normative intuitions that are based on falsities (Geuss, 2008;Prinz & Rossi, 2017). Moreover, it is argued that mainstream political theorists have neglected to investigate the practical consequences of pursuing arguably noble normative goals (Cross, 2021). ...
Recent years' literature on distinctively political normativity raises methodological and meta‐theoretical concerns of importance for political theory. The aim of this article is to identify and critically examine the main positions in this debate as well as to analyze problems and promising ways forward. In brief, we argue that the predominant “non‐moral view” of distinctively political normativity (i.e., the view that political normativity is independent of moral normativity), is problematic in all its three versions. Further, we suggest that a reasonable approach to political normativity should adopt a “moral view” (i.e., the view that political normativity is not independent of moral normativity) and investigate two such approaches: the so‐called “filter approach” and the “role approach.” Although still much in need of further development in political theory, both of them bear promise as accounts which preserve the distinctness of the political domain while acknowledging its status as a moral kind.
... (4, on the complexity of the relationship between conceptual, normative, and contextual elements in Williams' schema, see Cross, 2019Cross, , 2021Cross, , 2022. For him, "we can recognize such a thing [the normativity of the BLD,] because in the light of the historical and cultural circumstances [. . . ...
... Williams expands by modifying Hobbes' 'state of nature' thought experiment (2005,3). The establishment of politics depends on a claimant to authority "meeting the BLD[, which] implies a sense in which the state has to offer a justification of its power to each subject" (4, on the complexity of the relationship between conceptual, normative, and contextual elements in Williams' schema, see Cross 2019Cross , 2021Cross , 2022. For him, "we can recognize such a thing [the normativity of the BLD,] because in the light of the historical and cultural circumstances [...] it MS [makes sense] to us as a legitimation" (11). ...
... The book's contribution to methodological debates in political theory can be most clearly discerned if one views it as aiming for interdisciplinary diagnosis and evaluation-at the same time as engaging in a revisionist social and intellectual history, and in a (conceptual) genealogy to furnish us with better tools for understanding and assessing political claims offered by activists to a wider audience. Engagement with recent methodological literatures, e.g., recent radical realist projects in political theory and their connection to critical theory (Cross, 2021;Prinz & Rossi, 2017), could have helped bolster this contribution. ...
Advocates of radical realist theories of legitimacy propose that political legitimation narratives are often void where they show signs of motivated reasoning. In a recent critique of the method, example cases have been put forward in which an analysis and critique of flawed justification narratives seems urgently called for, and yet motivated reasoning is absent. This, critics suggest, should deflate the prominence of motivated reasoning within the radical realism. I argue here that those cases are misconstrued. Motivated reasoning can either be easily identified therein, or the cases are irrelevant to begin with. The issue with realism’s motivated reasoning connection is another: the explanatory direction of fit between epistemic circularity and motivated reasoning. The former explains the normative salience of the latter. Hence, I hope this intervention clarifies a misunderstood and underexplored aspect of contemporary radical realist theory and adds to the contextualisation of the psychology of motivated reasoning within normative social theory more broadly.
Is it possible to do ideology critique without morality? In recent years a small group of theorists has attempted to develop such an account and, in doing so, makes claim to a certain sort of “radical realism” distinguished by the ambition to ground political judgments and prescriptions in nonmoral values, principles, or concepts. This essay presents a twofold critique of this realist ideology critique (RIC) by first offering an internal critique of the approach and then arguing that the very attempt to do political theory generally—and ideology critique more specifically—in a way that abjures morality is misguided. In doing so, I contribute both to current debates around “new” ideology critiques and to contested questions about what it means to do political theory realistically.
This paper examines how radical realism, a form of ideology critique grounded in epistemic rather than moral normativity, can illuminate the relationship between ideology and political power. The paper argues that radical realism can have both an evaluative and a diagnostic function. Drawing on reliabilist epistemology, the evaluative function shows how beliefs shaped by power differentials are often epistemically unwarranted, e.g. due to the influence of motivated reasoning and the suppression of critical scrutiny. The paper clarifies those mechanisms in order to address some recent critiques of radical realism. The paper then builds on those clarifications to explore the how tracing the genealogy of legitimation stories can diagnose the distribution of power in society, even if ideology does not play a direct stabilising role. This diagnostic function creates a third position in the debate on ideology between culturalists and classical Marxists, and it can help reconciling aspects of structural and relational theories of power.
The present article is a sympathetic critique of the most prominent contemporary articulations of family abolitionism. It examines whether queer communist family abolitionism is successful in linking an account of reasons for abolition, with an account of the means of abolition, and finally with an account of the ends of abolition in the form of speculation on a possible world without families. Recent work by M.E. O’Brien has developed these connections in ways that have never been done so thoroughly before; but the rejection of states as an institutional form of political power leaves it unclear what forms of equality we could expect in such a world, and why coercive power would be unnecessary there. Family abolition is a utopian political agenda; but that utopianism needs to be constrained by a realist concern with issues of power, resources, and human capacities. This will require confronting trade-offs and imperfections within possible worlds without families. The recognition that there are many paths to a world without families, and many possible such worlds, is the first step towards aligning reasons, means, and ends and confronting the social and political trade-offs that this entails.
In the recent debate on political normativity in political philosophy, two positions have emerged among so-called political realists. On the first ‘non-moral’ view, political normativity is understood as orthogonal to moral normativity. On the second ‘filter view’, moral norms and prescriptions may be ‘filtered through’ the realities of politics such that they are altered by politics’ constitutive features. While the former has been severely criticized, the latter has remained underdeveloped and vague. To take the debate on political normativity forward, the aim in this paper is to explore what it could reasonably mean to claim that moral norms are filtered through politics and are aligned with its constitutive features. More specifically, we explore the role of moral norms in political theory. We take our starting-point in Larmore’s work and make two claims. First, we argue against Larmore’s claim – following political realists – that because political philosophy is concerned with the regulation of basic institutions and legal-political orders, it should primarily focus on political legitimacy rather than justice and always focus on legitimacy before justice. In our view, nothing in the constitutive features of politics supports such a conclusion. Second, we argue that any reasonable political theory relies on at least one moral premise, constituted by foundational principles (or values), which are independent of a society or polity. These are more basic than political principles in the sense that they put up the normative boundary conditions for such principles.
Realist ideology critique (RIC) is a strand of political realism recently developed in response to concerns that realism is biased toward the status quo. RIC aims to debunk an individual's belief that a social institution is legitimate by revealing that the belief is caused by that very same institution. Despite its growing prominence, RIC has received little critical attention. In this article, I buck this trend. First, I improve on contemporary accounts of RIC by clarifying its status and the role of motivated reasoning. Second, I show that realist ideology critics face a dilemma: either their account makes deeply implausible epistemological assumptions, or they temper its epistemology at the expense of rendering it toothless. I argue for each horn in turn before revealing the dilemma to be a false one by making a novel distinction between varying strengths of RIC based on their underlying epistemological assumptions. I propose Moderate RIC as a solution: upon discovering that one reason for your belief that a social institution is legitimate is likely malignantly epistemically circular, the belief should undergo further epistemic testing. I respond to three potential objections and suggest that Moderate RIC would make a fruitful addition to political theorists' methodological toolkit.
Most realist theories of legitimacy are internalist theories, meaning that they regard legitimacy as a function of how subjects view their own rulers. However, some realists seek to qualify their internalism by holding that legitimacy is not simply a matter of whether subjects accept their rulers’ exercise of power. According to one such view, legitimacy requires that rulers’ power be ‘acceptable’ to subjects, in the sense that it can be justified on the basis of values that they accept. Call this acceptability internalism. In this article, I argue that realists should reject acceptability internalism. I first argue that acceptability internalism has the disadvantage of separating the concept of legitimacy from the interests of rulers. I then consider two arguments in favour of acceptability internalism, and argue that both should be rejected.
Feminist legal theory has contested rape laws and notions of sexual consent to better reflect the experiences of survivors and address power distortions in legal frameworks that perpetuate women’s subordination. In this paper, I explore an alternative form of criticism to consent-based rape laws and biases within legal systems. I argue that the justifications that are used to select and weigh evidence in rape cases are epistemically suspect because of the unreliability of their epistemic sources. My argument, building on radical realist social analysis in political theory, aims to unveil an epistemic defect in rape evidentiary procedures, which I call epistemic partiality. I suggest that this epistemic defect brings salient reasons to challenge rape laws based on ideals of consent. I hope to show that a radical realist approach may bring reasons to challenge rape laws and flaws in evidentiary systems without the need to centrally agree with or rely on feminist commitments and political goals. This type of criticism may effectively bypass certain limitations of feminist theory and potentially add to discussions focused on power distortions within legal systems.
This contribution probes the relationship between two prominent approaches in contemporary political theory – namely, the one between political realism and agonistic democracy – and its relevance for the (as the editors of this special section dub it) ‘new realities’ of our age. The point of this article is not to deny that agonism and realism share several core concepts. The point, rather, is that if we analyze these core concepts in more detail we will discover that they play out quite differently in the two approaches and pull agonism and realism in different directions. In many respects, then, agonism and realism are ‘false friends’: their parallels exist only on a superficial level, which renders an ‘assumption of friendship’ theoretically flawed and practically counterproductive. One aim of this paper, therefore, is to lay bare the divergences between realism and agonism on a deeper level. The second purpose, however, is to show that a ‘fusion of horizons’ of the two approaches is by no means impossible. Despite – or rather, because of – the fact that agonism and realism pull in different directions, we can bring them closer together and remedy the weaknesses of the superior approach (i.e. agonism) by supplementing it with elements of realism.
Radical realists criticise the role that moral intuitions play in moralist political philosophy. However, radical realists may also rely on certain epistemic intuitions when making use of their theories of ideology critique. Hence, one might wonder whether radical realists’ criticism of moralists’ intuition-dependence is hypocritical. Call this the intuition asymmetry objection . My aim in this article is to show that the intuition asymmetry objection fails. After examining the basis of objections by radical realists to the role of moral intuitions in moralist political philosophy, I show that the presence of intuitions in radical realist theories of ideology critique is consistent with their criticism of moralism.
In the last two decades, Anglophone political theory witnessed a renewed interest in social-scientific empirical findings – partly as a reaction against normative theorising centred on the formulation of abstract, intuition-driven moral principles. This brief article begins by showing how this turn has taken two distinct forms: (1) a nonideal theoretical orientation, which seeks to balance the emphasis on moral principles with feasibility and urgency considerations, and (2) a fact-centric orientation, which seeks to ground normative conclusions in empirical results. The core of the article then compares and contrasts three variants of fact-centric political theory: normative behaviourism, grounded normative theory and radical realism. The upshot: normative behaviourism achieves focus on observable behaviour at the cost of status quo bias, grounded normative theory achieves radicalism at the cost of endorsing an activist orientation to theorising and radical realism combines a non-activist orientation with the potential for far-reaching critique of the status quo.
Political realists have argued that ‘the political’ is an autonomous domain with its own distinctive concepts, distinctive methodology, and distinctive ‘source of normativity’. I here explore the metanormative commitments of realism (of the radical realist branch, in particular) and question the viability of exploring the ontology of the normative altogether. I argue that the escape into the metanormative realm was something of a wrong turn within the realism debates – an intellectual error. My central argument, building on recent metatheoretical work on normativity, is meant to discredit the sheer possibility of metanormative distinctness. If realists can neither prove metanormative, nor traditional, nor methodological distinctness, there is a valid question as to its standing. I speculate, perhaps realism is little more than a new semantic label for ‘continental’ practices of social analysis as they leak into the analytic tradition. But then again it can be argued that most contemporary continental thought, and certainly much of what passes as critical theory these days, is thoroughly moralist, anti-positivist, and postmodern, and those sentiments are not shared by radical realists, who are, or so I’ll argue, far more faithful to the modernist tradition of social theory.
Moralists and radical realists both seem to employ a division of intellectual labour to enable their theories to be action-guiding. Moralists typically distinguish between formulating normative principles and devising suitable means for implementing or approximating them. Radical realists, meanwhile, seem to distinguish between the findings of ideology critique and further political theorising informed by these findings. However, radical realist criticisms of the moralist division of labour may suggest a tu quoque objection to radical realism: if the moralist division of labour is defective, why does the same not also hold for the radical realist division of labour? My aim in this article is to answer this question. I identify two distinct radical realist objections to the moralist division of labour, which I refer to as the seminar room objection and the motivation objection respectively. I then argue that radical realists can deal effectively with these objections if they were to be turned against their version of the division of labour. Hence, radical realists can consistently criticise moralist versions of the division of labour while simultaneously employing their own version.
Using the discriminatory character of Israeli politics as our point of departure, this paper argues that for large numbers of Palestinian Israeli citizens, new realistic terms of collective engagement are attractive and possible. Based on analytical Marxism and writings about realist normative political theory, we contend that politicians can advance strategies that establishing foundations for resolving the minority’s trap. Meanwhile, constructing identities is always delimited by the capacity of politicians to meet material needs and preserve certain distinct elements of the old “trapped identity”. This framework guides elaboration of the recent political discourse and strategies of the Israeli Knesset members Ayman Odeh and Mansour Abbas. While Odeh is a radical realist, Abbas is a realistic realist, excluding arguments based on values that the Israeli state cannot accept. Nonetheless, Abbas’ project is not only fragile but has also demanded the substantial political and moral sacrifice.
The Palestinian people have fought for decades for their independence. However, the Palestinian area is being steadily reduced as a result of Israel's annexation efforts, therefore independence is not achieved. Political liberalism in the age of globalization is mostly ineffective, as international norms and regulations are unable to prevent Israel's annexation of Palestine. This study intends to investigate if international political realism still exists in the period of globalization, which is characterized by global political interdependence. In this work, a descriptive analytic approach with qualitative research and literature review approaches are utilized to collect data. The results demonstrate that the existence of realism may be demonstrated in the question of Israel's annexation of Palestine, where the use of force is still emphasized in order to further Israel's national interests. Israel continues to develop weapons technology in order to maintain control over Palestine as part of its annexation of the territory. In addition, Israel's alliance with Western nations, particularly the United States, and its noncompliance with international norms and laws demonstrate that political liberalism in the form of international organizations cannot be a solution to the Israeli occupation conflict in Palestine and a manifestation of realism in the age of globalization.
Do salient normative claims about politics require moral premises? Political moralists think they do, political realists think they do not. We defend the viability of realism in a two-pronged way. First, we show that a number of recent attacks on realism as well as realist responses to those attacks unduly conflate distinctly political normativity and non-moral political normativity. Second, we argue that Alex Worsnip and Jonathan Leader-Maynard’s recent attack on realist arguments for a distinctly political normativity depends on assuming moralism as the default view, which places an excessive burden on the viability of realism, and so begs the question. Our discussion, though, does not address the relative merits of realism and moralism, so its upshot is relatively ecumenical: moralism need not be the view that all apt normative political judgements are moral judgements, and realism need not be the view that no apt normative political judgements are moral judgements.
In this article I defend a new argument against moralist theories of legitimacy and in favour of realist theories. Moralist theories, I argue, are vulnerable to ideological and wishful thinking because they do not connect the demands of legitimacy with the interests of rulers. Realist theories, however, generally do manage to make this connection. This is because satisfying the usual realist criteria for legitimacy – the creation of a stable political order that transcends brute coercion – is usually necessary for rulers to preserve their rule.
To what extent are questions of sovereign debt a matter for political rather than scientific or moral adjudication? We answer that question by defending three claims. We argue that (i) moral and technocratic takes on sovereign debt tend to be ideological in a pejorative sense of the term, and that therefore (ii) sovereign debt should be politicised all the way down. We then show that this sort of politicisation need not boil down to the crude Realpolitik of debtor-creditor power relations--a conclusion that would leave no room for normative theory, among other problems. Rather, we argue that (iii) in a democratic context, a realist approach to politics centred on what Bernard Williams calls 'The Basic Legitimation Demand' affords a deliberative approach to the normative evaluation of public debt policy options.
In a recent article, Benjamin McKean defends utopian political theorising by means of an internal critique of realism, construed as essentially anti-utopian, in order to defend human rights against realist objections thereto. I challenge that argument in three steps, focusing on the realism of Raymond Geuss. First, I show that the realism of Raymond Geuss is not incompatible with utopianism, that Geuss never opposes realism to utopianism and that he frequently argues that political theory should be both more realistic and more utopian. Second, I show that McKean misconstrues Geuss’ opposition to human rights as anti-utopian. Neither Geuss’ opposition to ethics-first political theory nor his objections to human rights can accurately be explicated in terms of McKean’s ‘utopianism’. Finally, I show how this misconstruing of Geuss’ realism renders McKean’s critique of Geuss ineffective, as a result of which his defence of human rights against Geuss’ realist objections fails. I conclude with some reflections on the importance of this for methodological debates in political theory, the value of realistically utopian theorising and the ideological power of contemporary ethics-first approaches to political theory.
An “impure” realism that draws extensively on non-philosophical sources has challenged mainstream political theory in recent years. These “new realists” reject the “political moralism” of “ethics-first” approaches, holding that theory should start from disagreement and conflict. My basic thesis is that its focus on “the political” and its utopophobia prevent realism from developing normative foundations that can ground social criticism. Many realists, including one of its primary progenitors, Raymond Geuss, recognize this problem. Interestingly, Geuss turns to critical theory to address this concern. While I welcome realism’s desire to make political theory more relevant to politics, I argue that Geuss’s attempt to address the status quo bias by importing ideology critique from the Frankfurt School is ultimately unsuccessful. In my reading the critical theory of the Frankfurt School thus emerges as a more plausible approach to grounding critique of the pathologies of the present.
This paper outlines an account of political realism as a form of ideology critique. Our focus is a defence of the normative edge of this critical-theoretic project against the common charge that there is a problematic trade-off between a theory’s groundedness in facts about the political status quo and its ability to consistently envisage radical departures from the status quo. To overcome that problem we combine insights from three distant corners of the philosophical landscape: theories of legitimacy by Bernard Williams and other realists, Frankfurt School-inspired Critical Theory, and recent analytic epistemological and metaphysical theories of cognitive bias, ideology, and social construction. The upshot is a novel account of realism as empirically-informed diagnosis- critique of social and political phenomena. This view rejects a sharp divide between descriptive and normative theory, and so is an alternative to the anti- empiricism of some approaches to Critical Theory as well as to the complacency towards existing power structures found within liberal realism, let alone mainstream normative political philosophy, liberal or otherwise.
Raymond Geuss has been viewed as one of the figureheads of the recent debates about realism in political theory. This interpretation, however, depends on a truncated understanding of his work of the past 30 years. I will offer the first sustained engagement with this work (in English and German) which allows understanding his realism as a project for reorienting political theory, particularly the relationship between political theory and politics. I interpret this reorientation as a radicalization of realism in political theory through the combination of the emphasis on the critical purpose of political theory and the provision of practical, contextual orientation. Their compatibility depends on Geuss’ understanding of criticism as negative, of power as ‘detoxified’ and of the critical purchase of political theory as based on the diagnostic engagement with its context. This radicalization particularly challenges the understanding of how political theory relates to its political context.
According to what has recently been labeled ‘political realism’ in political theory, ‘political moralists’ such as Rawls and Dworkin misconstrue the political domain by presuming that morality has priority over politics, thus overlooking that the political is an autonomous domain with its own distinctive conditions and normative sources. Political realists argue that this presumption, commonly referred to as the ‘ethics first premise’, has to be abandoned in order to properly theorize a normative conception of political legitimacy. This article critically examines two features of political realism, which so far have received too little systematic philosophical analysis: the political realist critique of political moralism and the challenges facing political realism in its attempt to offer an alternative account of political legitimacy. Two theses are defended. First, to the extent that proponents of political realism wish to hold onto a normative conception of political legitimacy, refuting wholesale the ethics first premise leads to a deadlock, since it throws the baby out with the bathwater by closing the normative space upon which their account of political legitimacy relies. This is called the ‘necessity thesis’: all coherent and plausible conceptions of political legitimacy must hold onto the ethics first premise. Secondly, accepting this premise – and thus defending an ethics first view – does not entail that the political domain must be seen as a subordinate arena for the application of moral principles, that political normativity is reduced to morality or that morality trumps other reasons in political decision making, as claimed by political realists. Rather, the ethics first view is compatible with an autonomous political domain that makes room for an account of political legitimacy that is defined by and substantiated from sources of normativity specifically within the political. This is called the ‘compatibility thesis’.
This paper provides a critical overview of the realist current in contemporary political philosophy. We define political realism on the basis of its attempt to give varying degrees of autonomy to politics as a sphere of human activity, in large part through its exploration of the sources of normativity appropriate for the political and so distinguish sharply between political realism and non-ideal theory. We then identify and discuss four key arguments advanced by political realists: from ideology, from the relationship of ethics to politics, from the priority of legitimacy over justice and from the nature of political judgement. Next, we ask to what extent realism is a methodological approach as opposed to a substantive political position and so discuss the relationship between realism and a few such positions. We close by pointing out the links between contemporary realism and the realist strand that runs through much of the history of Western political thought.
This article explains and defends a novel idea about how people can be misled by a discussion topic, even if the discussion itself does not explicitly involve the making of false claims. The crucial aspect of this idea is that people are liable to infer, from the fact that a particular topic is being discussed, that this topic is important. As a result, they may then be led to accept certain beliefs about the state of the world they consider necessary for the topic’s importance. What the article calls “importance misrepresentation” occurs when these beliefs about the state of the world are false or otherwise mistaken. The article explores different ways in which importance misrepresentation can occur, and it uses this idea to help clarify and strengthen some well‐known criticisms of the topic choices of academic philosophers.
In this article, I aim to bring apocalypticism and radical realism into conversation, with a view to their mutual interest in prefigurative politics. On one hand, radical realists may worry that an apocalyptic approach to prefigurative politics may be marred by wishful thinking. On the other hand, radical realists can (and sometimes do) acknowledge that wishful thinking is sometimes desirable. I argue that an apocalyptic approach to prefigurative politics suggests one way of guarding against the dangers of wishful thinking, while allowing space for its potential benefits; prefigurativists have reason to pay at least some attention to what Bernard Williams calls ‘The First Political Question’. I will argue for this claim with reference to the case of Omar Aziz, a Syrian activist who played a pivotal role in the construction of local councils in the aftermath of the 2011 protests.
For realists, political theories exhibit an anti‐moralist character when their normativity stems from an appraisal of the value and the specificities of real political practices. While realists agree on such a characterisation of the realist project, they split when it comes to explaining to what extent realist political normativity can provide us with a critical perspective on the status quo. The most recent contributions on this topic are polarised. Some contributors interpret political realism as an approach to politics that leads to an affirmation of the status quo. Others suggest that political realism might lead to radical transformations of the status quo. In this paper, I argue that it is possible to identify a consistent middle ground between these alternative interpretations: the interpretation of political realism as a form of reformist conservatism. Moreover, I defend the reformist‐conservative interpretation of political realism as superior to the extant ones. Contrary to the rival interpretations, I show that the reformist‐conservative interpretation consistently reconciles all the fundamental tenets of political realism. Furthermore, I explain that while the conservatist interpretation risks undermining the normative commitment of realism and the radical interpretation leans towards an irresponsible form of political theorising, the reformist‐conservative reading avoids these pitfalls.
Despite the rapidly growing literature on realism, there’s little discussion of the ideology critique of John Rawls offered by one of its leading lights, Raymond Geuss. There is little understanding of what (most of) this critique consists in and few discussions of how Rawls’ approach to political theorising may be defended against it. To remedy this situation, this article reconstructs the realist ideology critique of Rawls advanced by Raymond Geuss, which has three prongs: (1) Rawls’ political theory offers insufficient tools to uncover and address distortions of our political values, beliefs, and intuitions; (2) it unacceptably reinforces these distortions by unduly legitimating them; and (3) it diverts attention from important features of real politics. With this done, I finish by considering how Rawlsians can respond, chiefly by employing a wide reflective equilibrium that includes different forms of genealogy and ideology critique.
A new volume of philosophical essays by Bernard Williams. The book is a successor to Problems of the Self, but whereas that volume dealt mainly with questions of personal identity, Moral Luck centres on questions of moral philosophy and the theory of rational action. That whole area has of course been strikingly reinvigorated over the last deacde, and philosophers have both broadened and deepened their concerns in a way that now makes much earlier moral and political philosophy look sterile and trivial. Moral Luck contains a number of essays that have contributed influentially to this development. Among the recurring themes are the moral and philosophical limitations of utilitarianism, the notion of integrity, relativism, and problems of moral conflict and rational choice. The work presented here is marked by a high degree of imagination and acuity, and also conveys a strong sense of psychological reality. The volume will be a stimulating source of ideas and arguments for all philosophers and a wide range of other readers.
The revival of realism in political theory has included efforts to challenge realism’s conservative reputation and argue that radical forms are possible. Nonetheless these efforts have been criticised as insufficient to overcome realism’s inherent conservatism. This article argues that radical forms of realism can be better appreciated by considering the application of the realist perspective within an existing radical ideology: anarchism. This may seem an unusual choice, considering anarchism’s standard representation as naïvely idealistic and paradigmatically non-realist. However, attention to the breadth of diversity in anarchist theory reveals a collection of positions that together represent a ‘realist anarchism’ which not only challenges anarchism’s reputation as uniformly committed to unrealistic and idealistic utopianism but also demonstrates the existence of genuinely radical forms of realism.
The Practical Turn in Political Theory sounds like the monograph political theorists have been waiting for – a monograph that identifies ‘practices’ as a uniting theme that runs through several recently influential debates on non-ideal theory, practice dependence, realism and pragmatist theories of legitimacy and democracy, and then discusses the promise and limits of this uniting theme for the future of political theory. However, The Practical Turn is driven by selective portrayals, omissions and misrepresentation, and hence is not a good source to turn to for understanding the debates it surveys or whether they manifest a ‘practical turn in political theory’ or not; rather, it serves as a warning of how struggles over power can influence and even structure seemingly the most purely intentioned of practices.
Several critics of realist theories of political legitimacy have alleged that it possesses a problematic bias towards the status quo. This bias is thought to be reflected in the way in which these theories are more willing to accommodate potentially severe injustices which may exist in real societies. In this article, I focus on the most widely discussed realist theory of legitimacy, namely that of Bernard Williams. I argue that it is not only free of such status quo bias; it also has considerably more radical, anti-status quo potential than what is commonly thought and, indeed, what Williams himself may have thought.
Realists in normative political theory aim to defend the importance of ‘distinctively political thought’ as opposed to the applied ethics they believe characterizes much contemporary political theory and causes it to misunderstand and make mistakes about its subject matter. More conventional political theorists have attempted to respond to realism, including Jonathan Leader Maynard and Alex Worsnip, who have recently criticized five supposedly realist arguments for a distinctive political normativity. However, while Leader Maynard and Worsnip’s arguments are themselves less decisive than they suppose, the problem with their response may lay elsewhere. Their response supposes that more conventional political theory could, in principle, be defended at an abstract general level. This may not be possible though, given the difficulty of arriving at agreed interpretations of the concepts involved and the desiderata for a successful normative political theory. It also risks missing the point of realism, which is to use different forms of normative inquiry to explore questions which have not always been central to conventional normative political theory. Judith Shklar’s excellent work on vices and the liberalism of fear nicely illustrates this problem.
A slew of recent political theorists—many taking their cue from the political writings of Bernard Williams—have recently contended that political normativity is its own kind of normativity, distinct from moral normativity. In this article, we first attempt to clarify what this claim amounts to and then reconstruct and interrogate five major arguments for it. We contend that all these arguments are unconvincing and fail to establish a sense in which political normativity is genuinely separate from morality.
The familiar irony of ‘real existing socialism’ is that it never was. Socialist ideals were used to legitimize regimes that fell far short of realizing those ideals—indeed, that violently repressed anyone who tried to realize them. This paper suggests that the derogatory concept of ‘the criminal’ may be allowing liberal ideals to operate in contemporary political philosophy and real politics in a worryingly similar manner. By depoliticizing deep dissent from the prevailing order of property, this concept can obscure what I call the ‘legitimation gap’. This is the gulf between (a) liberal accounts of state legitimacy, and (b) the actual functioning of liberal states. Feminists have long pointed out that the exclusion of what is deemed ‘personal’ from political consideration is itself a political move. I propose that the construction of the criminal as a category opposed to the political works similarly to perpetuate unjust forms of social power.
This essay reconstructs the place of utopia in realist political theory, by examining the ways in which the literary genre of critical utopias can productively unsettle ongoing discussions about “how to do political theory.” I start by analyzing two prominent accounts of the relationship between realism and utopia: “real utopia” (Erik Olin Wright et al.) and “dystopic liberalism” (Judith Shklar et al.). Elaborating on Raymond Geuss’s recent reflections, the essay then claims that an engagement with literature can shift the focus of these accounts. Utopian fiction, I maintain, is useful for comprehending what is (thus enhancing our understanding of the world) and for contemplating what might be (thus nurturing the hope for a better future). Ursula K. Le Guin’s novel The Dispossessed deploys this double function in an exemplary fashion: through her dynamic and open-ended portrayal of an Anarchist community, Le Guin succeeds in imagining a utopia that negates the status quo, without striving to construct a perfect society. The book’s radical, yet ambiguous, narrative hence reveals a strategy for locating utopia within realist political theory that moves beyond the positions dominating the current debate. Reading The Dispossessed ultimately demonstrates that realism without utopia is status quo–affirming, while utopia without realism is wishful thinking.
This paper provides a critical overview of the realist current in contemporary political philosophy. We define political realism on the basis of its attempt to give varying degrees of autonomy to politics as a sphere of human activity, in large part through its exploration of the sources of normativity appropriate for the political, and so distinguish sharply between political realism and non-ideal theory. We then identify and discuss four key arguments advanced by political realists: from ideology, from the relationship of ethics to politics, from the priority of legitimacy over justice, and from the nature of political judgment. Next, we ask to what extent realism is a methodological approach as opposed to a substantive political position, and so discuss the relationship between realism and a few such positions. We close by pointing out the links between contemporary realism and the realist strand that runs through much of the history of Western political thought.
Many political realists reject the idea that the first task for political philosophy is to justify the existence of coercive political institutions (CPIs). Instead, they say, we should begin with the factual existence of CPIs, and ask how they ought to be structured. In holding this view, they adopt a form of political naturalism that is broadly Aristotelian in character. In this article, I distinguish between two forms that this political naturalism might take ‐ what I call a ‘strong’ form, and a ‘weak’ form ‐ and argue that both ought to be rejected.1
1 I would like to thank Enzo Rossi for his helpful and generous feedback on earlier drafts of this article.
A common trait of all realistic political theories is the rejection of a conception of political theory as applied moral philosophy and an attempt to preserve some form of distinctively political thinking. Yet the reasons for favouring such an account of political theory can vary, a point that has often been overlooked in recent discussions by realism’s friends and critics alike. While a picture of realism as first-and-foremost an attempt to develop a more practical political theory which does not reduce morality to politics is often cited, in this paper we present an alternative understanding in which the motivation to embrace realism is grounded in a set of critiques of or attitudes towards moral philosophy which then feed into a series of political positions. Political realism, on this account, is driven by a set of philosophical concerns about the nature of ethics and the place of ethical thinking in our lives. This impulse is precisely what motivated Bernard Williams and Raymond Geuss to their versions of distinctively realist political thought and is important to emphasise because it demonstrates that realism does not set politics against ethics (a misunderstanding typically endorsed by realism’s critics) but is rather an attempt to philosophise about politics without relying on understandings of morality which we have little reason to endorse.
A cryptonormative judgment, roughly speaking, is a judgment that is presented by the agent who makes it as non-normative (either generally or in some particular respect), but that is in fact normative (either generally or in that particular respect). The idea of cryptonormativity is familiar from debates in social theory, social psychology, and continental political philosophy, but has to my knowledge never been treated in analytic metaethics, moral psychology or epistemology except in passing. In this paper, I argue, first, that cryptonormative judgments are pervasive: familiar cases from everyday life are most naturally diagnosed as cryptonormative judgments. Secondly, they reveal that normative judgment is a state that can be quite deeply non-transparent to its bearer, in a way that is not, for example, assimilable to the phenomenon of self-deception. Thirdly, they shed light on debates over amoralism and lend some support to a picture of normative psychology that links normative judgment constitutively to motivation. In the conclusion, I make some remarks about the social and political insidiousness of cryptonormativity, looking forward to future work.
Contemporary politics is often said to lack utopias. For prevailing understandings of the practical force of political theory, this looks like cause for celebration. As blueprints to apply to political practice, utopias invariably seem too strong or too weak. Through an immanent critique of political realism, I argue that utopian thought, and political theory generally, is better conceived as supplying an orientation to politics. Realists including Bernard Williams and Raymond Geuss explain how utopian programs like universal human rights poorly orient their adherents to politics, but the realists wrongly conclude that utopias and other ideal theories necessarily disorient us. As I show through an analysis of utopian claims made by Michel Foucault, Malcolm X, and John Rawls, utopias today can effectively disrupt entrenched forms of legitimation, foster new forms of political identity, and reveal new possibilities within existing institutions. Utopias are needed to understand the political choices we face today.
One of the more debated topics in the recent realist literature concerns the compatibility of realism and utopianism. Perhaps the greatest challenge to utopian political thought comes from Bernard Williams' realism, which argues, among other things, that political values should be subject to what he calls the ‘realism constraint’, which rules out utopian arguments based on values which cannot be offered by the state as unrealistic and therefore inadmissible. This article challenges that conclusion in two ways. First, it argues that the rationale for accepting Williams' original argument for the ‘realism constraint’ fails. Secondly, it argues that there is at least one genuinely political value of liberty available which is both compatible with realism and something that cannot be offered by the state, namely that of the political anarchist. This opens the way for far more ambitious and utopian forms of realist political thought and implies that the arguments of what we call political anarchists must be met by (realist) political argumentation, not simply ruled out by methodological stipulation.
In politics, utopians do not have a monopoly on imagination. Even the most conservative defenses of the status quo, Raymond Geuss argues, require imaginative acts of some kind. In this collection of recent essays, including his most overtly political writing yet, Geuss explores the role of imagination in politics, particularly how imaginative constructs interact with political reality. He uses decisions about the war in Iraq to explore the peculiar ways in which politicians can be deluded and citizens can misunderstand their leaders. He also examines critically what he sees as one of the most serious delusions of western political thinking--the idea that a human society is always best conceived as a closed system obeying fixed rules. And, in essays on Don Quixote, museums, Celan's poetry, Heidegger's brother Fritz, Richard Rorty, and bourgeois philosophy, Geuss reflects on how cultural artifacts can lead us to embrace or reject conventional assumptions about the world. While paying particular attention to the relative political roles played by rule-following, utilitarian calculations of interest, and aspirations to lead a collective life of a certain kind, Geuss discusses a wide range of related issues, including the distance critics need from their political systems, the extent to which history can enlighten politics, and the possibility of utopian thinking in a world in which action retains its urgency.
Many contemporary political thinkers are gripped by the belief that their task is to develop an ideal theory of rights or justice for guiding and judging political actions. But inPhilosophy and Real Politics, Raymond Geuss argues that philosophers should first try to understand why real political actors behave as they actually do. Far from being applied ethics, politics is a skill that allows people to survive and pursue their goals. To understand politics is to understand the powers, motives, and concepts that people have and that shape how they deal with the problems they face in their particular historical situations. Philosophy and Real Politicsboth outlines a historically oriented, realistic political philosophy and criticizes liberal political philosophies based on abstract conceptions of rights and justice. The book is a trenchant critique of established ways of thought and a provocative call for change.
Many influential ethical views depend on the optimistic assumption that the human and natural world in which we live could, eventually, be made to make sense to us. In A World without Why, Raymond Geuss challenges the genesis and historical development of this optimism in ethical thought and reveals the ways in which it has shown itself to be unfounded and misguided. Discussions of Greco-Roman antiquity and of the philosophies of Socrates, Plato, Hegel, Marx, Nietzsche, and Adorno play a central role in many of these essays. Geuss also ranges over such topics as the concepts of intelligibility, authority, democracy, and criticism; the role of lying in politics; architecture; the place of theology in ethics; tragedy and comedy; and the struggle between realism and our search for meaning. Characterized by Geuss's wide-ranging interests in literature, philosophy, and history, and by his political commitment and trenchant style, A World without Why raises fundamental questions about the viability not just of specific ethical concepts and theses, but of our most basic assumptions about what ethics could and must be.
Marx's theory of alienation is of great importance to contemporary political developments, due both to the re-emergence of anti-capitalist struggle in Zapatismo, 21st Century Socialism, and the New Democracy Movement, and to the fact that the most important theorists of these movements single out Marx's theory of alienation as critical to their concerns. Despite this renewed practical and theoretical interest, however, these and other writers have been sparing in their accounts of the normative components which the theory of alienation incorporates. Along with many recent commentators, I argue that the normative components of the theory of alienation are to be found in a notion of human development, and that a conception of the particular importance of the human species-essence plays a critical role in this respect. However, I take a different, and somewhat more detailed, tack than these previous authors in presenting a more detailed conception of human development and flourishing on the basis of Marx's conceptions of powers and needs and comparing it to the most prominent non-Marxist theory of human development: the capabilities approach. I then show that this understanding of powers and needs, along with a notion of the particularly important human power of conscious self-directed activity, underpins the critique of capitalism Marx presents in his theory of alienation. This will allow us a better understanding of the normative components of Marx's theory of alienation and its potential relevance and plausibility to the theorists and movements it is influencing.
This paper offers a systematic examination of the political thought of Bernard Williams by explaining the relation between his political realism and critical assessment of modern moral philosophy and discussing how his work illuminates the debates about the nature and purpose of political theory. I argue that Williams’s realism is best read as an attempt to make ethical sense of politics, and as an attempt to explain how we can continue to affirm a kind of liberalism, without recourse to the moralized presuppositions that he insists we must jettison. I begin by outlining Williams’s claims about the limits of philosophy and his conception of confidence. I then address his understanding of the relationship between historical and philosophical inquiry and his contention that historical understanding can foster a kind of confidence in some of our contemporary commitments. I conclude by showing how this leads Williams to articulate a defense of liberalism that is compatible with his skepticism about modern moral philosophy and his ancillary critique of political moralism. In this sense, Williams’s work has important implications for political theory and the study of politics more generally because it enables us to articulate a defense of liberalism that has marked advantages over the “high liberalism” that most contemporary liberal political philosophers defend and shows how we might develop a political theory that does not begin by asserting universal moral foundations but which, despite this, avoids reverting to a crude postmodern antifoundationalism.
This paper attempts to get some critical distance on the increasingly fashionable issue of realism in political theory. Realism has an ambiguous status: it is sometimes presented as a radical challenge to the status quo; but it also often appears as a conservative force, aimed at clipping the wings of more ‘idealistic’ political theorists. I suggest that what we might call ‘actually existing realism’ is indeed a conservative presence in political philosophy, and that its ambiguous status plays a part in making it so. But I also argue that there is no necessary connection between realism and conservatism. This paper describes the three contingent and suspiciously quick steps which lead from an initial commitment to being attentive to the real world, via a particular kind of pessimism about political possibilities, to an unnecessarily conservative destination. In the process, I try to show how the ubiquitous trinity of realism, pessimism and conservatism might be pulled apart, thus removing the artificial tension between ‘being realistic’ and the demand for far-reaching social change.
The major theoretical presupposition of our model of foreign-policy decision-making is that the beliefs of the decision-makers are central to the study of decision outputs and probably account for much of the variance in international politics. Beliefs represent both the congealed experiences of the decision-maker and his expectations about the decision environment. In the former sense, they are his decisions about the significance of past "events". In the decision-making process the belief system as a whole acts like a template for receiving and channeling information, and for relating possible policy options to perceptions about the intentions and behavior of other nations, as well as to the policy objectives of the decision-maker.