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The Epidemiology of Financial Constraints
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Causal inference models, like regression discontinuity (RD) design, rely upon some variation of the no-interference assumption, where peer effects or spatial spillovers are null. Given the increased application of network, spatial, and peer effects models, this paper reconsiders RD design when this assumption is not satisfied, yielding indirect effects of the treatment in addition to the traditionally measured direct effects. Using a combination of residualization and numeric integration we develop a method—using the Spatial Durbin Framework—which retains the full adjacency matrix and allows for a full accounting of these cross-sectional interactions. As an application, we revisit a well-known RD design using U.S. House of Representatives election results from 1945–1995, finding close election wins have substantial indirect effects which previously were unaccounted.
We document the importance of covenant violations in transmitting bank health to nonfinancial firms. Roughly one‐third of loans in our supervisory data breach a covenant during the 2008 to 2009 period, allowing lenders to force a renegotiation of loan terms or to accelerate repayment of otherwise long‐term credit. Lenders in worse health are more likely to force a reduction in the loan commitment following a violation. The reduction in credit to borrowers who violate a covenant can account for the majority of the cross‐sectional variation in credit supply during the 2008 to 2009 crisis.
We study games in which a network mediates strategic spillovers and externalities among the players. How does a planner optimally target interventions that change individuals' private returns to investment? We analyze this question by decomposing any intervention into orthogonal principal components, which are determined by the network and are ordered according to their associated eigenvalues. There is a close connection between the nature of spillovers and the representation of various principal components in the optimal intervention. In games of strategic complements (substitutes), interventions place more weight on the top (bottom) principal components, which reflect more global (local) network structure. For large budgets, optimal interventions are simple—they essentially involve only a single principal component.
We examine the influence of peer firms on trade credit policies of listed firms in the United States. We posit and find evidence that firms mimic their peers in formulating trade credit policies. The findings are more pronounced for firms that operate in highly competitive product markets and an uncertain information environment. Our results show that firms not only mimic peers in similar circumstances but also imitate their more and less successful peer firms. We find that the benefits of mimicking peers' trade credit policies increase initially, but for firms that already maintain high levels of trade credit, these benefits diminish faster as the intensity of mimicking increases. Our results are robust to different methods of selecting peers, sampling, different proxies, and estimation techniques.
Change of management restrictions (CMRs) in loan contracts give lenders explicit ex ante control rights over managerial retention and selection. This paper shows that lenders use CMRs to mitigate risks arising from CEO turnover, especially those related to the loss of human capital and replacement uncertainty, thereby providing evidence that human capital risk affects debt contracting. With a CMR in place, the likelihood of CEO turnover decreases by more than half, and future firm performance improves when retention frictions are important, suggesting that lenders can influence managerial turnover, even outside of default states, and help the borrower retain talent.
We develop a tractable model of endogenous production networks. Each one of a number of products can be produced by combining labor and an endogenous subset of the other products as inputs. Different combinations of inputs generate (prespecified) levels of productivity and various distortions may affect costs and prices. We establish the existence and uniqueness of an equilibrium and provide comparative static results on how prices and endogenous technology/input choices (and thus the production network) respond to changes in parameters. These results show that improvements in technology (or reductions in distortions) spread throughout the economy via input–output linkages and reduce all prices, and under reasonable restrictions on the menu of production technologies, also lead to a denser production network. Using a dynamic version of the model, we establish that the endogenous evolution of the production network could be a powerful force towards sustained economic growth. At the root of this result is the fact that the arrival of a few new products expands the set of technological possibilities of all existing industries by a large amount—that is, if there are n products, the arrival of one more new product increases the combinations of inputs that each existing product can use from 2ⁿ⁻¹ to 2ⁿ, thus enabling significantly more pronounced cost reductions from choice of input combinations. These cost reductions then spread to other industries via lower input prices and incentivize them to also adopt additional inputs.
Empirical work in regional science has seen a growing interest in causal inference, leveraging insights from econometrics, statistics, and related fields. This has resulted in several conceptual as well as empirical papers. However, the role of spatial effects, such as spatial dependence (SD) and spatial heterogeneity (SH), is less well understood in this context. Such spatial effects violate the so-called stable unit treatment value assumption advanced by Rubin as part of the foundational framework for empirical treatment effect analysis. In this article, we consider the role of spatial effects more closely. We provide a brief overview of a number of attempts to extend existing econometric treatment effect evaluation methods with an accounting for spatial aspects and outline and illustrate an alternative approach. Specifically, we propose a spatially explicit counterfactual framework that leverages spatial panel econometrics to account for both SD and SH in treatment choice, treatment variation, and treatment effects. We illustrate this framework with a replication of a well-known treatment effect analysis, that is, the evaluation effect of minimum legal drinking age laws on mortality for US states during the period 1970–1984, a classic textbook example of applied causal inference. We replicate the results available in the literature and compare these to a range of alternative specifications that incorporate spatial effects.
Social and economic networks can be a channel of negative shocks and thus deteriorate resilience and sustainability in societies. This study focuses on supply chains, or supplier–customer networks of firms and examines how these supply chains enable production losses caused by natural disasters to propagate and persist in regions not directly affected by the disaster. We apply an agent-based model to the actual supply chains of nearly one million firms in Japan to estimate the direct and indirect effects of the 2011 Great East Japan earthquake. We then employ the same model to predict the effect of the Nankai Trough earthquake, a mega earthquake predicted to hit major industrial cities in Japan in the near future. We find that the indirect effects of the disasters on production due to propagation (10.6% of gross domestic product in the case of the Nankai earthquake) are substantially larger than their direct effects (0.5%). Our simulation analyses to compare the actual network with hypothetical networks suggest that these indirect effects are more prominent and persistent when supply chains are characterized by scale-free properties, difficulty in substitution among intermediate products, and complex cycles in networks. The diffusion of economic shocks from earthquakes is simulated at the firm level in Japan, using an agent-based model and the supply chains of nearly one million firms. Indirect losses to production are significantly larger and more persistent than direct ones.
Using a network approach that circumvents well-known challenges in estimating peer effects, we show that interactions with a firm’s geographic neighbors play a significant causal role in corporate investment behavior and a modest role in financial policies and firm performance. Moreover, these geography network effects are almost entirely driven by propagation effects through product market and supply chain networks. We corroborate our findings in a quasi-experimental framework that allows for spillovers in treatment effects. Our findings help rationalize industrial clusters (e.g., Silicon Valley), as they illustrate that agglomeration economies are substantial and operate predominantly within industry boundaries.
This paper was accepted by David Simchi-Levi, finance.
We present a spatial econometrics framework for estimating peer effects in capital structure. This approach exploits the heterogeneous and intransitive nature of peer networks to identify economically informative structural coefficients. In models of leverage levels, we detect significant peer-effect leverage coefficients that are on the order of 0.20, indicating a moderate but substantive level of strategic complementarity in capital structure decisions. We argue that prior estimates in the literature substantially overstate the magnitude of the underlying relation. Our evidence is robust to a wide variety of model modifications and supports the hypothesis that leverage is an important strategic choice variable.
Using a structural model, we estimate the liquidity multiplier of an interbank network and banks’ contributions to systemic risk. To provide payment services, banks hold reserves. Their equilibrium holdings can be strategic complements or substitutes. The former arises when payment velocity and multiplier are high. The latter prevails when the opportunity cost of liquidity is large, incentivising banks to borrow neighbors’ reserves instead of holding their own. Consequently, the network can amplify or dampen shocks to individual banks. Empirically, network topology explains cross-sectional heterogeneity in banks’ systemic-risk contributions while changes in the equilibrium type drive time-series variation.
Despite their importance, the discussion of spillover effects in empirical research often misses the rigor dedicated to endogeneity concerns. We analyze a broad set of workhorse models of firm interactions and show that spillovers naturally arise in many corporate finance settings. This has important implications for the estimation of treatment effects: i) even with random treatment, spillovers lead to a complicated bias; ii) fixed effects can exacerbate the spillover-induced bias. We propose simple diagnostic tools for empirical researchers and illustrate our guidance in an application.
Exploiting the exogenous and regional nature of the Great East Japan Earthquake of 2011, this paper provides a quantification of the role of input-output linkages as a mechanism for the propagation and amplification of shocks. We document that the disruption caused by the disaster propagated upstream and downstream along supply chains, affecting the direct and indirect suppliers and customers of disaster-stricken firms. Using a general equilibrium model of production networks, we then obtain an estimate for the overall macroeconomic impact of the disaster by taking these propagation effects into account. We find that the earthquake and its aftermaths resulted in a 0.47 percentage point decline in Japan’s real GDP growth in the year following the disaster.
There is a great deal of literature regarding use of nongeographically based connectivity matrices or combinations of geographic and non-geographic structures in spatial econometric models. We focus on convex combinations of weight matrices that result in a single weight matrix reflecting multiple types of connectivity, where coefficients from the convex combination can be used for inference regarding the relative importance of each type of connectivity in the global cross-sectional dependence scheme. We tackle the question of model uncertainty regarding selection of the best convex combination by Bayesian model averaging. We use Metropolis–Hastings guided Monte Carlo integration during MCMC estimation of the models to produce log-marginal likelihoods and associated posterior model probabilities. We focus on MCMC estimation, computation of posterior model probabilities, model averaged estimates of the parameters, scalar summary measures of the non-linear partial derivative impacts, and their associated empirical measures of dispersion.
We study whether, how, and why the investment of a firm depends on the investment of other firms in the same product market. Using an instrumental variable based on the presence of local knowledge externalities, we find a sizeable complementarity of investment among product market peers, holding across a large majority of sectors. Peer effects are stronger in concentrated markets, featuring more heterogeneous firms, and for smaller firms with less precise information. Our findings are consistent with a model in which managers are imperfectly informed about fundamentals and use peers’ investments as a source of information. Product market peer effects in investment could amplify shocks in production networks.
This paper was accepted by Gustavo Manso, finance.
We study the relation between investment behavior and competitor financial constraints. Using interfirm patent citations and text-based product market similarities to identify intransitive competitor networks, we find that firms increase investment spending, patenting activity, and opportunistic hiring when competitor constraints become more binding. In addition, firms shift their investment composition (product market and patent portfolios) to compete more aggressively with relatively constrained competitors. To mitigate endogeneity concerns, we exploit the 2004 AJCA tax holiday and the 1989 junk bond crisis as exogenous shocks to competitor constraints, and we find similar effects.
Received August 11, 2017; editorial decision November 6, 2018 by Editor David Denis. Authors have furnished an Internet Appendix, which is available on the Oxford University Press Web site next to the link to the final published paper online.
Many developing economies adopt industrial policies favoring selected sectors. Is there an economic logic to this type of intervention? I analyze industrial policy when economic sectors form a production network via input-output linkages. Market imperfections generate distortionary effects that compound through backward demand linkages, causing upstream sectors to become the sink for imperfections and have the greatest size distortions. My key finding is that the distortion in sectoral size is a sufficient statistic for the social value of promoting that sector; thus, there is an incentive for a well-meaning government to subsidize upstream sectors. Furthermore, sectoral interventions’ aggregate effects can be simply summarized, to first order, by the cross-sector covariance between my sufficient statistic and subsidy spending. My sufficient statistic predicts sectoral policies in South Korea in the 1970s and modern-day China, suggesting that sectoral interventions might have generated positive aggregate effects in these economies.
We examine the determinants of vertical acquisitions using product text linked to product vocabulary from input-output tables. We find that the innovation stage is important in understanding vertical integration. R&D-intensive firms are less likely to become targets of vertical acquisitions. In contrast, firms with patented innovation are more likely to sell to vertically related buyers. Firms’ R&D intensity is a more important deterrent to their vertical acquisitions when the provision of innovation incentives by potential acquirers is more difficult. The role of patents in fostering vertical acquisitions is more prevalent when potential buyers face a higher risk of holdup. (JEL G32, G34, L22, L25, O34)
We examine empirically and theoretically the relation between firms’ risk and distance to consumers in a production network. We document two novel facts: firms farther away from consumers have higher risk premiums and higher exposure to aggregate productivity. We quantitatively explain these findings using a general equilibrium model featuring a multilayer production process. The economic force is “vertical creative destruction,” that is, positive productivity shocks to suppliers devalue customers’ assets-in-place, thereby lowering the cyclicality of downstream firms’ values. We show that vertical creative destruction varies with competition and firm characteristics and generates sizable cross-sectional differences in risk premiums.
The strength of contract enforcement determines how firms source inputs and organize production. Using microdata on Indian manufacturing plants, we show that production and sourcing decisions appear systematically distorted in states with weaker enforcement. Specifically, we document that in industries that tend to rely more heavily on relationship-specific intermediate inputs, plants in states with more-congested courts shift their expenditures away from intermediate inputs and have a greater vertical span of production. To quantify the effect of these distortions on aggregate productivity, we construct a model in which plants have several ways of producing, each with different bundles of inputs. Weak enforcement exacerbates a holdup problem that arises when using inputs that require customization, distorting both the intensive and extensive margins of input use. The equilibrium organization of production and the network structure of input-output linkages arise endogenously from the producers’ simultaneous cost-minimization decisions. We identify the structural parameters that govern enforcement frictions from cross-state variation in the first moments of producers’ cost shares. A set of counterfactuals show that enforcement frictions lower aggregate productivity to an extent that is relevant on the macro scale.
We explore the real effects of bank-lending shocks and how they permeate the economy through buyer-supplier linkages. We combine administrative data on all Spanish firms with a matched bank-firm-loan dataset of all corporate loans from 2003 to 2013 to estimate firm-specific credit supply shocks for each year. We compute firm-specific measures of exposure to bank lending shocks of customers (upstream propagation) and suppliers (downstream propagation). Our findings suggest that credit supply shocks have sizable direct and downstream propagation effects on employment, investment, and output, especially during the 2008–2009 crisis, but no significant impact on employment during the expansion. We provide evidence that both trade credit extended by suppliers and price adjustments in general equilibrium explain downstream propagation of credit shocks.
We examine the within-firm resource allocation and restructuring outcomes at firms violating debt covenants. Using establishment-level data from the US Census Bureau, we find that covenant violations are followed by reductions in employment, investment, and more frequent establishment closures among violating firms’ noncore business lines and less productive establishments. These changes are concentrated among establishments at which manager-shareholder agency costs are pronounced and when key lenders have industry experience. Our findings suggest that enhanced creditor control reduces managerial agency costs and encourages a more efficient allocation of resources within the boundaries of firms in technical default.
We survey the recent, fast-growing literature on peer effects in networks. An important recurring theme is that the causal identification of peer effects depends on the structure of the network itself. In the absence of correlated effects, the reflection problem is generally solved by network interactions even in nonlinear, heterogeneous models. By contrast, microfoundations are generally not identified. We discuss and assess the various approaches developed by economists to account for correlated effects and network endogeneity in particular. We classify these approaches in four broad categories: random peers, random shocks, structural endogeneity, and panel data. We review an emerging literature relaxing the assumption that the network is perfectly known. Throughout, we provide a critical reading of the existing literature and identify important gaps and directions for future research.
Expected final online publication date for the Annual Review of Economics, Volume 12 is August 3, 2020. Please see http://www.annualreviews.org/page/journal/pubdates for revised estimates.
Using confidential establishment-level data from the US Census Bureau’s Longitudinal Business Database, this paper documents how local shocks propagate across US regions through firms’ internal networks of establishments. Consistent with a model of optimal within-firm resource allocation, we find that establishment-level employment is sensitive to shocks in distant regions in which the establishment’s parent firm is operating, and that the elasticity with respect to such shocks increases with the firm’s financial constraint. At the aggregate regional level, we find that aggregate county-level employment is sensitive to shocks in distant counties linked through firms’ internal networks. (JEL D22, G32, L14, L22, R23, R32)
How do different bankruptcy approaches affect the local economy? Using US Census microdata, we explore the spillover effects of reorganization and liquidation on geographically proximate firms. We exploit the random assignment of bankruptcy judges as a source of exogenous variation in the probability of liquidation. We find that employment declines substantially in the immediate neighborhood of the liquidated establishments, relative to reorganized establishments. The spillover effects are highly localized and concentrate in nontradable and service sectors, consistent with a reduction in local consumer traffic and a decline in knowledge spillovers between firms. The evidence highlights the externalities that bankruptcy design can impose on nonbankrupt firms.
I show dividend policies have peer effects. My estimates indicate that firms speed up the time taken to make a dividend change by about 1.5 quarters and increase payments by 16% in response to peer changes. The peer effects matter in increases but not decreases. In contrast to dividends, repurchases show no peer effects. In addition, announcement returns indicate that investors partially anticipate the consequences of peer effects. Overall, peer interdependencies account for 12% of total dividend payments.
We investigate the strict-exogeneity assumption, a necessary condition for estimator consistency in many finance panel-data applications. We outline tests for strict exogeneity in both traditional (non–instrumental variable (IV)) and IV settings. When we apply these tests in common traditional finance panel regressions, we find that the strict-exogeneity assumption is often strongly rejected, suggesting large inference errors. We test for strict exogeneity in specific finance panel-data IV settings and illustrate the potential for these tests to help confirm, or rule out, the validity of common panel-data IV estimators. We offer recommendations to address the strict-exogeneity issue in finance research.
Using novel firm-level microdata and leveraging a natural experiment, this paper provides causal evidence for the role of trade and multinational firms in the cross-country transmission of shocks. The scope for trade linkages to generate cross-country spillovers depends on the elasticity of substitution with respect to domestic inputs. Using the 2011 TA-hoku earthquake as an exogenous shock, we structurally estimate production elasticities at the firm level and find greater complementarities in input usage than previously thought. For Japanese affiliates in the United States, output falls roughly one-for-one with declines in imports, consistent with a relationship between imported and domestic inputs that is close to Leontief. © 2019 The President and Fellows of Harvard College and the Massachusetts Institute of Technology.
We find that the number of independent directors on corporate boards increases by approximately 24% following financial covenant violations in credit agreements. Most of these new directors have links to creditors. Firms that appoint new directors after violations are more likely to issue new equity, and to decrease payout, operational risk, and CEO cash compensation, than firms without such appointments. We conclude that a firm's board composition, governance, and policies are shaped by current and past credit agreements.
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We develop a quantifiable multi-country sourcing model in which firms self-select into importing based on their productivity and country-specific variables. In contrast to canonical export models where firm profits are additively separable across destination markets, global sourcing decisions naturally interact through the firm's cost function. We show that, under an empirically relevant condition, selection into importing exhibits complementarities across source markets. We exploit these complementarities to solve the firm's problem and estimate the model. Comparing counterfactual predictions to reduced-form evidence highlights the importance of interdependencies in firms' sourcing decisions across markets, which generate heterogeneous domestic sourcing responses to trade shocks.
Using new data on entry plans into the American casino industry, I find that incumbent firms invest in physical capacity when threatened with a nearby entry plan, and these strategic investments deter eventual entry. Consistent with an entry-deterrence motive, incumbents respond to the threat of entry when entry is uncertain, but not when entry is assured. The average capacity expansion of 2,300 square feet is associated with a 6.8-percentage-point greater likelihood that the entry plan fails. These findings show that investments in deterrence are viable, especially when new entrants face other significant barriers to entry.
Data and the online appendix are available at https://doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.2017.2730.
This paper was accepted by Bruno Cassiman, business strategy.
This chapter develops a unified framework for the study of how network interactions can function as a mechanism for propagation and amplification of microeconomic shocks. The framework nests various classes of games over networks, models of macroeconomic risk originating from microeconomic shocks, and models of financial interactions. Under the assumption that shocks are small, we provide a fairly complete characterization of the structure of equilibrium, clarifying the role of network interactions in translating microeconomic shocks into macroeconomic outcomes. This characterization enables us to rank different networks in terms of their aggregate performance. It also sheds light on several seemingly contradictory results in the prior literature on the role of network linkages in fostering systemic risk.
Using a multisector general equilibrium model, we show that the interplay of idiosyncratic microeconomic shocks and sectoral heterogeneity results in systematic departures in the likelihood of large economic downturns relative to what is implied by the normal distribution. Such departures can emerge even though GDP fluctuations are approximately normally distributed away from the tails, highlighting the different nature of large economic downturns from regular business-cycle fluctuations. We further demonstrate the special role of input-output linkages in generating tail comovements, whereby large recessions involve not only significant GDP contractions, but also large simultaneous declines across a wide range of industries.
We study how firms differ from their competitors using new time-varying measures of product similarity based on text-based analysis of firm 10-K product descriptions. This year-by-year set of product similarity measures allows us to generate a new set of industries in which firms can have their own distinct set of competitors. Our new sets of competitors explain specific discussion of high competition, rivals identified by managers as peer firms, and changes to industry competitors following exogenous industry shocks. We also find evidence that firm R&D and advertising are associated with subsequent differentiation from competitors, consistent with theories of endogenous product differentiation.
Using a regression discontinuity design, we provide evidence that there are sharp and substantial employment cuts following loan covenant violations, when creditors gain rights to accelerate, restructure, or terminate a loan. The cuts are larger at firms with higher financing frictions and with weaker employee bargaining power, and during industry and macroeconomic downturns, when employees have fewer job opportunities. Union elections that create new labor bargaining units lead to higher loan spreads, consistent with creditors requiring compensation when employees gain bargaining power. Overall, binding financial contracts have a large impact on employees and are an amplification mechanism of economic downturns.
This article examines whether firm-level idiosyncratic shocks propagate in production networks. We identify idiosyncratic shocks with the occurrence of natural disasters. We find that affected suppliers impose substantial output losses on their customers, especially when they produce specific inputs. These output losses translate into significant market value losses, and they spill over to other suppliers. Our point estimates are economically large, suggesting that input specificity is an important determinant of the propagation of idiosyncratic shocks in the economy. JEL Codes: L14, E23, E32.
The propagation of macroeconomic shocks through input-output and geographic networks can be a powerful driver of macroeconomic fluctuations. We first exposit that in the presence of Cobb-Douglas production functions and consumer preferences, there is a specific pattern of economic transmission whereby demand-side shocks propagate upstream (to input-supplying industries) and supply-side shocks propagate downstream (to customer industries) and that there is a tight relationship between the direct impact of a shock and the magnitudes of the downstream and the upstream indirect effects. We then investigate the short-run propagation of four different types of industry-level shocks: two demand-side ones (the exogenous component of the variation in industry imports from China and changes in federal spending) and two supply-side ones (TFP shocks and variation in knowledge/ideas coming from foreign patenting). In each case, we find substantial propagation of these shocks through the input-output network, with a pattern broadly consistent with theory. Quantitatively, the network-based propagation is larger than the direct effects of the shocks. We also show quantitatively large effects from the geographic network, capturing the fact that the local propagation of a shock to an industry will fall more heavily on other industries that tend to collocate with it across local markets. Our results suggest that the transmission of different types of shocks through economic networks and industry interlinkages could have first-order implications for the macroeconomy. © 2016 by the National Bureau of Economic Research. All rights reserved.
Financial constraints are fundamental to empirical research in finance and economics. We propose two tests to evaluate how well measures of financial constraints actually capture constraints. We find that firms typically classified as constrained do not actually behave as if they were constrained: they have no trouble raising debt when their demand for debt increases exogenously and use the proceeds of equity issues to increase payouts to shareholders. Our evidence suggests that extant findings that have been attributed to constraints may instead reflect differences in the growth and financing policies of firms at different stages of their life cycles. © The Author 2015. Published by Oxford University Press on behalf of The Society for Financial Studies.
We measure the probability that a borrower will violate financial covenants in private debt contracts. We analyze hand-coded data and specify standard covenant definitions using Compustat data that minimize measurement error for all individual Dealscan covenants. We use these definitions to create a measure of aggregate probability of violation, which can be used across all covenants in a loan or among covenant subsets of interest. We provide evidence that our aggregate probability measure is superior to alternatives used in prior literature.