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Prior research highlights substantial beneficial effects of political user-generated content (UGC) in society, such as diversifying political viewpoints, mobilizing the electorate, and fostering citizens’ civic engagement. However, important user asymmetries exist when creating political content. Gender, age, media uses, and skills gaps have been identified as key variables predicting UGC. This study addressed the political UGC gender gap from a political perspective. We build on previous theory about feminist media studies, political polarization, and cultural backlash theory to disentangle whether hostile sexism predicts UGC creation. Drawing on online survey data from four well-established democracies, we find that those individuals holding hostile sexist views are more likely to generate political content online. Further implications for democracy and the role of women in the digital sphere are discussed.
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Online cultural backlash? sexism and political
user-generated content
Isabel Inguanzo, Bingbing Zhang & Homero Gil de Zúñiga
To cite this article: Isabel Inguanzo, Bingbing Zhang & Homero Gil de Zúñiga (2021): Online
cultural backlash? sexism and political user-generated content, Information, Communication &
Society, DOI: 10.1080/1369118X.2021.1962940
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Published online: 20 Aug 2021.
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Online cultural backlash? sexism and political user-generated
Isabel Inguanzo
, Bingbing Zhang
and Homero Gil de Zúñiga
Department of Political Science and Administration, University of Salamanca, Salamanca, Spain;
P. Bellisario College of Communications, Pennsylvania State University, State College, PA, USA;
Facultad de
Comunicación y Letras, Universidad Diego Portales, Santiago, Chile
Prior research highlights substantial benecial eects of political
user-generated content (UGC) in society, such as diversifying
political viewpoints, mobilizing the electorate, and fostering
citizenscivic engagement. However, important user asymmetries
exist when creating political content. Gender, age, media uses,
and skills gaps have been identied as key variables predicting
UGC. This study addressed the political UGC gender gap from a
political perspective. We build on previous theory about feminist
media studies, political polarization, and cultural backlash theory
to disentangle whether hostile sexism predicts UGC creation.
Drawing on online survey data from four well-established
democracies, we nd that those individuals holding hostile sexist
views are more likely to generate political content online. Further
implications for democracy and the role of women in the digital
sphere are discussed.
Received 20 November 2020
Accepted 24 July 2021
User-generated content;
sexism; polarization; cultural
backlash; gender gap
Previous literature on digital content creation suggests that women are less likely than
men to create and share certain types of online content, which is in part due to media
and technological skills gaps (Bode, 2017; Hargittai & Shaw, 2015). Even when women
do raise their voices in the digital sphere, they are at times confronted with oensive
comments, harassment, and hostile sexism (Chen et al., 2020; Searles et al., 2020;
Sobieraj, 2018). It is unclear whether womens participation in online content creation
is deterred precisely by this hostile and sexist digital entourage, or whether sexism
play a part in men and womens likelihood to produce online political content, thus con-
tributing to the gender gap in UGC. Indeed, to our knowledge, no study has yet explored
the role of sexism as an important individual antecedent predicting online political con-
tent creation. Does hostile sexism inuence UGC creation? And if so, how?
To answer these questions, we build up on three strains of research: (1) feminist media
studies, (2) political polarization, and (3) the cultural backlash thesis. We argue that since
gender equality and womenrights have become a salient issue both in the public and the
political agenda, certain politized individuals might want to share their own views on the
topic. But who is creating and sharing more online content? Those who are more
© 2021 Informa UK Limited, trading as Taylor & Francis Group
CONTACT Isabel Inguanzo
Supplemental data for this article can be accessed doi:10.1080/1369118X.2021.1962940.
polarized on gender issues or just those with more hostile sexist views? The literature
suggests two competing hypotheses to answer this question.
Drawing on polarization literature, we should expect that ideologically divergent indi-
viduals, and those polarized over gender equality, should produce more online political
content. Alternatively, and following the literature on cultural backlash, traditionalist and
sexist individuals might be perceiving a strong bias towards gender equality in society
institutions, media, and elites. Since these individuals do not nd conrmatory news
or messages for their prior beliefs on mainstream media and political institutions, they
have more incentives to search and create new content online aligned with their sexist
The present study aims at solving this puzzle by relying on online survey data from
four countries Germany, Spain, UK and USA, which have undergone processes of
polarization and cultural backlash, and share similar levels of quality of democracy, gen-
der equality and human development. Overall, ndings suggest that in Western democ-
racies ideological polarization is not directly related to UGC creation. In contrast, and
while we nd some support for polarization over sexism and UGC creation, sexist atti-
tudes per se are a more robust predictor of online political content creation, lending sup-
port to a deleterious linear association between unfavorable attitudes towards women
and their political role in the digital sphere.
Literature review
Contemporary technologies provide broader channels and opportunities for citizens to
generate news content which blurs the boundaries between news consumption and
news production (Dylko & Mccluskey, 2012), especially when it comes to online news.
Prosumers of news are known as user-generated content (UGC) creators (Holton
et al., 2013). Broadly speaking, any practice of producing and circulating content related
to public aairs and news may be regarded as political UGC. But who is creating and dis-
seminating this online content? Are all segments from society equally participating in the
creation of political UGC?
Interestingly, research has consistently found dierences across demographics regard-
ing UGC creation and sharing (Ardèvol-Abreu et al., 2018). Men are usually more
engaged in political content creation than women, which is reected on studies showing
that the blogosphere is dominated by male-created content (Meraz, 2008; Wall, 2015)
and that the gender gap may be bigger in platforms with weak-tie networks (Koc-
Michalska et al., 2021). According to this well-established literature, we expect:
H1: Women will generate less political UGC.
Some authors have explained this UGC gender gap based on internet and technologi-
cal skills (Hargittai & Shaw, 2015). Others, according to socialization theory, suggest this
might be due to women engaging in less visible political activities, and then abiding with
patriarchal norms that keep women away from the public space (Bode, 2017;Coé & Bol-
zendahl, 2010). In the present research, we approach this gender gap on political UGC by
looking at its potential political antecedents. We contend that dierences in UGC cre-
ation might be the result of dierent processes of polarization between men and
women over ideology (Harteveld et al., 2019) and sexism (Kunst et al., 2019). While
polarization can be approached through dierent dimensions and measures (DiMaggio
et al., 1996) here we adhere to Layman et al. (2006) and we consider polarization as the
increasing distance between the poles of one or more policy dimensions. Empirically, this
is usually measured by capturing the absolute distance to the average position (Thomsen,
2014; Wagner, 2021).
Ideological polarization & UGC creation
One of the most well-known gender dierences in political behavior is voting. The litera-
ture on political science has established that men are more likely to vote for radical par-
ties while women vote for more moderate ones (Harteveld et al., 2019). However, it is
unclear whether these dierences in party preferences reect dierent ideological pos-
itions or dierent political motivations (Harteveld & Ivarsaten, 2018).
Alike voting, the relationship between individual ideological polarization and politi-
cal UGC creation is also contested. For instance, while men are more likely to share
UGC from populist parties as compared to women, gender dierences were not signi-
cant between radical and moderate parties (Bobba et al., 2018). Conversely, recent
studies have shown that grassroot party activists, from new parties with more radical
ideologies, are over-represented when it comes to create and share online content on
social media (Koiranen et al., 2020; Lobera & Portos, 2021). Others suggest that new
digital media and peoples news platform preferences fuel political
engagement (Bachmann & Gil de Zúñiga, 2013), but also ideological binaries fostered
by populist actors (Rensmann, 2017). But why would these radical partiessupporters
be more likely to engage in UCG creation? Here, explanations from the supply and
demand side provide dierent responses.
On the one hand, from the supply side, alternative online news sites have been showed
to be partisan and niche-oriented instead of balanced and mass public oriented (Baum &
Groeling, 2008), which may reect that online prosumers have incentives to create and
disseminate partisan online content among audiences that are small but loyal. Coupled
with usersselective exposure (Garrett, 2009), homogenous group discussions, (Dvir-
Gvirsman, 2017), and online echo-chambers where trench warfare dynamics take
place (Karlsen et al., 2017), individuals reinforce their previous attitudes and ideological
positions. The result would be a vicious cycle between polarization, consumption and
creation of online partisan content. Additionally, internet and social media lower
entry barriers for new and ideologically extremer parties and opinion leaders, who
were previously marginalized by mainstream media editorial lters (Hopster, 2020;Gil
de Zúñiga et al., 2020). Therefore, internet incentivizes polarized individuals to oer
ideologically polarized content to the digital audience.
On the other hand, an ideologically polarized environment increases the demand for
ideologically polarized content. In the age of populism, ideologically polarized individ-
uals are more skeptics towards traditional media (Krämer, 2017). In turn, media skeptics
and political cynics are less likely to actively seek traditional news (Song et al., 2020), and
more likely to trust citizen media news as opposed to traditional media (Carr et al., 2014).
Indeed, more polarized and fragmented audiences are less likely to think professional
news editors perform well in selecting news publication (Steppat et al., 2021), and
while trust in traditional media does not directly predict the creation and sharing of
UGC, trust in citizen and social media news is positively associated with UGC (Ardèvol-
Abreu et al., 2018).
A joint observation of the arguments displayed above makes us believe that ideologi-
cally radical positions will be positively associated to UCG creation. More formally:
H2: Ideological polarization is positively associated with political UGC creation.
The saliency of gender issues
Although we expect a general connection between ideological radicalism and UGC, indi-
vidualspolitical ideology is composed of diverse preferences on dierent issues, and not
all issues are equally salient across groups (Layman et al., 2006). It is reasonable to expect
that as gender issues become more salient and polarized, they will inuence the gener-
ation and dissemination of online UGC.
Throughout the twentieth century, the world has witnessed a exibilization of tra-
ditional gender roles, and also a gender equality improvement across elds such as
health, education, job market and career opportunities, and politics. Although usually
at dierent rates across regions, this trend is linked to changes in cultural attitudes, gen-
erally towards greater support of gender equality (Inglehart et al., 2002; Inglehart & Nor-
ris, 2001). In parallel, post-materialist social movements and parties have brought to a
public political agenda issues related to environmental concerns, human rights, econ-
omic redistribution, minorities civil rights, and also gender equality (Oe, 1985). Main-
stream media has also engaged in certain attempts to improve media coverage and
perspectives of women issues (Minic, 2008), paving the way to policies promoting gender
equality such as armative action programs (Beloshitzkaya, 2020).
As a result, dierences between men and women on sexism are relatively constant but
in general moving towards a liberal-egalitarian direction (Bolzendahl & Myers, 2004;
Clark, 2017). Successive waves of feminist movements have rendered other women
more feminist. Feminist women in turn, have resulted increasingly empowered, and
are willing to politically participate both oine and online (Heger & Homann, 2021).
In response, traditionalists, perceiving a threat to their values and status, which were
once predominant, have responded negatively to these advancements, in what has been
called a cultural backlash (Norris & Inglehart, 2018). Studies indicate that while general
support for gender equality has increased over past decades, gaps in support of gender
equality are increasing between men and women. For example, men socialized after
the third wave of feminism when conventional wisdom suggested that gender equality
was on the verge to be achieved show a higher level of gender resentment (Jennings,
2006). As a result, some studies have found that hostile sexism dened as negative atti-
tudes towards gender equality not only predicts increased levels of political partici-
pation in opposition to female candidates (Cassese & Holman, 2019) but also predicts
increased levels of online political expression in opposition to online feminist campaigns
(Benton-Greig et al., 2018; Kunst et al., 2019).
Therefore, the literature agrees the current polarization over gender equality is a pro-
duct of a cultural backlash process under the auspices of populism success and radical
political parties. However, less is known about how this polarization translated into
the online public sphere and UGC creation.
Competing hypotheses for the sexism and UGC relationship
Although feminist movements and cultural backlash trends have cohabited for decades,
they are becoming electorally relevant in recent times (Norris & Inglehart, 2018). If we
focus on the virtual sphere, the accounts collected in the above sections should lead us
to think that those on both extreme poles of sexism might be more active UGC creators.
For example, the landmark judicial case of La Manadain Spain led to a massive digital
response both from feminist and anti-feminist positions (Idoiaga Mondragon et al.,
2020). Throughout the internet, people aligned with feminist and anti-feminist perspec-
tives, becoming more vocal on issues related to gender. We can easily nd examples of
digital feminist activism across the board #MeToo (Ringrose & Lawrence, 2018), as
well as the emergence of the manosphere, a digital anti-feminist activist sphere, that
has grown into the dominant arena for the communication of mens rights in Western
culture(Ging, 2019). In short, gender equality is far from being an uncontested issue in
the digital sphere. These recent developments suggest that polarization over specic
issues, specically gender equality, may predict online UGC:
H3: Holding extreme attitudes towards sexism will be positively associated to UGC creation
(U-shaped relationship)
H3a: Non-sexist views will be positively associated to UCG creation
H3b: Hostile sexist views will be positively associated to UGC creation
However, it is also possible that this is not a story of a balanced relationship. Radical
traditionalist groups and individuals are increasingly taking advantage of the UGC tools
to circulate their ideological precepts (Krämer, 2017; Rensmann, 2017), such as white
supremacy (Adams & Roscigno, 2005) or hostile sexism (García-Favaro & Gill, 2016).
Since most research that identies and analyzes online traditional-authoritarian UGC
is based on content and text analysis, the extension of traditional content throughout
the internet remains unclear. It could be that nowadays sexist and non-sexist individuals
are both actively creating more UGC than before, or it could be that today sexist individ-
uals are creating more online UGC than non-sexist individuals.
While nostalgia of traditional values and old social structures among certain sectors
of Western societies can be traced back to the seventies (Inglehart, 1990), it is also
true that the cultural backlash has been reinvigorated due to the emergence of radical
right parties and movements (Inglehart, 2018; Norris & Inglehart, 2018). Today,
whenever mainstream, alternative media, or even politicians take up the issue of gen-
der equality, it tends to be framed by radical right supporters as a gender ideology
(Kováts, 2018). Indeed, radical right members often condemn mainstream media as
well as social media for marginalizing their conservative voices (Knüpfer et al.,
2020; Lawson, 2018).
Previous studies have shown how the cultural backlash and social resentment, have
been able to mobilize individuals through digital networks, fostering dierent forms of
political behavior including protest, party activism and voting (Williamson et al.,
2011). We contend that following the cultural backlash theory, people who feel cultural
and social grievances as a result of a more globalized, liberal and post-materialist public
sphere (Sandel, 2018) will have more incentives to express themselves online, through the
creation of new UGC. To the extent, they perceive their grievances are being silenced by a
biased traditional media they have greater supply and demand incentives to create their
own content online (Rensmann, 2017). As mentioned before, it is particularly in the digi-
tal sphere where their cultural grievances easily resonate in online echo-chambers and
homogenous audience discussions, and they feel heard and understood by their peers.
Extreme forms of this pattern could explain online radical right movements such as
alt-right online communities (Ganesh, 2020), or the infamous incel movement
(Homan et al., 2020).
However, although there is a strong connection between hostile sexism, old tradition-
alist and radical right supporters, the gender divide is somehow transversal. First, the
gender equality issue is not equally salient for all conservatives, and not all self-identied
as conservatives hold sexist views. Similarly, people who self-identied as progressives
can still hold sexist views (Utych, 2021). Second, sexism is a dierent dimension, and
it has its own politically mobilizing capacity regardless of the general ideology of the indi-
viduals. For example, previous studies have shown that hostile sexism has been able to
politically mobilize electors towards particular party options (Valentino et al., 2018)or
policy options (Green & Shorrocks, 2021). So, Finally, certain political parties in the rad-
ical right have raised speeches of pretended gender equality as a strategy to oppose
migration or to attack ethnic minorities (Mot, 2017; Vochocová, 2021). So, stronger
sexist views on gender roles might have an independent eect on content creation,
regardless of the ideological position of the individual.
H4: Hostile sexism is positively associated to political UGC, beyond the eects of ideological
Survey procedure & sample
To address the hypotheses proposed above, the study relies on an original multi-country
cross-sectional data drawn upon Spain, Germany, UK, and USA. This project shared by
dierent research groups at University of Vienna and Massey University, conducted a
massive Digital Inuence World Project survey in dierent countries. The research
team partnered with Nielsen to get the nal sample in each country, following stratied
quota sampling techniques according to ocial demographic reported data from the
national census (Callegaro et al., 2014). The administration of the online survey was con-
ducted by the researchers with the support of Qualtrics in September of 2015.
To test whether the polarization hypothesis or the cultural backlash hypothesis was at
work, we focused on countries where the gender issue has become polarized. Thus, the
present study includes information from four countries: US (n= 1161), UK (n= 1064),
Spain (n= 1064) and Germany (n=-1053). These four countries have been experiencing
a cultural backlash in the last years while at the same time present similar levels of quality
of democracy, human development, and gender equality. It is noteworthy that responses
to the survey were collected in 2015, which was prior to massive feminist mobilization in
these countries such as the Women March in the US, and Women Strike in Spain both in
2017, as well as other worldwide online actions denouncing sexual violence against
women such as #MeToo.
Table 1 in the online appendix shows the descriptive data and reliability measures for the
main independent variable and the dependent variable, segmented by country.
Dependent variable
User-generated content. We follow previous research on online political content creation
(Bachmann et al., 2012) to construct an index on online political UGC creation. Three
items asked respondents how often they conduct the following activities including (1
=never,7=always): (a) upload my own news and public aair videos; (b) share news
links on sites like Facebook, Twitter, or Reddit; and (c) write comments on others
blogs or write posts on my own blog. The variable was standardized as it was eschewed
towards non UGC creation.
Independent variables
Hostile sexism. Our measurement on sexism is based on the short version of the Atti-
tudes toward Women Scale (AWS) which includes several items to measure sexism
(Spence et al., 1973). Since certain items might have turned obsolete (McHugh & Frieze,
1997, p. 7), AWS is now used as a measure of blatant and overt sexism as opposed to
other more subtle and covert forms of sexism (Swim & Cohen, 1997). Thus, our variable
measures hostile sexismwith ve items.
Respondents were asked whether they agree or disagree with the following statements
(1 = completely disagree,7=completely agree): (a) the husband should be regarded as the
legal representative of the family group in all matters of law; (b) women should be con-
cerned with their duties of childbearing and house-tending, rather than with the desires
for professional and business careers, which are best left to men; (c) Women should have
as much sexual freedom as men(reversed); (d) swearing and obscenity is more repulsive
in the speech of a woman than a man; and (e) the initiative in courtship, between a man
and a woman, should usually come from the man. As our dependent variable, hostile sex-
ism was also standardized.
We use separate models to test hypothesis 3 and 4. Since our hypothesis 3 expects a U
-shape curvilinear relationship between sexism and UGC creation, to measure the Polar-
ization over hostile sexism we obtain the absolute values of the standardized measure of
sexism. Consequently, those individuals with mean values of hostile sexism would be
assigned a value of 0 and those at 1 standard deviation and +1 standard deviation
would both be assigned a value of 1. For testing hypothesis 4, we just include the stan-
dardized measure of hostile sexism.
Ideological polarization. Following Castles and Mair (1984) ideology is measured on a
scale 010 where 0 = strong conservative and 10 = strong liberal. Since we are interested
in ideological polarization we follow Thomsens work (2014) and construct this variable
by obtaining the absolute standardized values of ideology.
Control variables
We include two sets of control variables. The rst is standard media-related predictors
based on previous studies on online citizen journalism and media use. Previous studies
have shown that media use and media trust in alternative media positively predict online
news creation and in turn news creation positively predicts online and oine political
participation (Ardèvol-Abreu et al., 2018). Second, skepticism of professional journalism
decreases the perception of mainstream journalism credibility but increases the perceived
credibility of citizen-generated news (Carr et al., 2014; Finn & Gil de Zúñiga, 2011).
Media consumption. Building on prior research (Diehl et al., 2019), respondents were
asked how often (1 = never,7=always) they get news from the Traditional oine news
(a) TV, (b) printed newspapers; and (c) radio; and from Virtual News, including: (d)
online news sites (e) social media; and (f) citizen journalism sites (non-professional jour-
nalism, e.g., blogs).
General internet use. According to previous studies on internet skills and inequalities in
creating UGC, we include this control variable as an antecedent of internet skills (Har-
gittai & Shaw, 2015). Following Hargittai (2010) respondents were asked how many
hours per day they stay online.
Trust in media. Following previous research (Ardèvol-Abreu et al., 2018) we separately
ask respondents how much they trust (1 = do not trust at all, 7 = trust completely) (a)
news from mainstream media (e.g., newspapers, TV)and (b) news from alternative
media For the latter, we construct and index averaging scores of two items: how
much would you trust news from alternative news media (e.g., blogs, citizen journalism)
and how much would you trust news from social media.
The second set of control variables relate to standard demographics: Gender (54.2%
female), Age (M= 46.7; SD = 15.5), level of educational attainment (High School or
less: 41.5%; Some College: 20.8%, Bachelors Degree: 23.5%, Graduate Degree or Higher:
14.2%) and perceived own wealth (M=5.54; SD = 1.91). This last variable measures com-
parative perceptions of economic status (1 = being the people that are the least well oin
society;10=being people who are the most well oin society).
We run dierent OLS regressions, rst with the four countries pooled together, and then
country by country. To explore link between sexism and online content creation and
sharing, we run OLS regressions estimating both curvilinear and linear eects of sexism
to identify which one explains this relationship. We also performed several robustness
checks. First, we retest our hypothesis including ideology as opposed to ideological polar-
ization. Furthermore, we performed several robustness checks with a randomized sample
of democratic countries.
While the main variables of interest show a similar distribution in the four countries, cer-
tain dierences are nonetheless noteworthy. As depicted in Table 1 of the supplementary
material, both UGC and sexism do not follow a normal distribution. Both are eschewed
towards lower levels of UGC and sexism, respectively. Furthermore, there are important
countries and dierences (tested though Kristal Wallis and Mann Whitney U tests
respectively). Figure 1 shows UGC by country and gender. Individual outliers are labeled
by their values on sexism.
Figure 1 shows that Spanish people are more likely to post and share online content as
compared to Germany, UK or US citizens. Spanish and German women are less likely
than men to create and share online content, however, the opposite is true for UK and
US women. Regarding really creative outlierswe can see a variety of sexist attitudes.
However, these outliers hold in general more sexist views on gender roles. Figure 2
shows levels of sexism by country and gender. In this case, the most sexist outliers are
labelled by their level UGC.
Figure 2 shows that both men and women tend to have egalitarian views on gender
roles in the four countries analyzed here. This is especially true for Spain where both
men and women have the lowest level of sexism when compared to the average of the
other countries. However, there are statistically signicant dierences between men
and women in their median level of sexism (Mann Whitney Up < 0.001), for all countries
except for the US (marginally, p= 0.053). Again, dierences are especially signicant in
Spain. Spanish men, although relatively egalitarian when compared to the rest of the
countries, hold signicantly more sexist views than Spanish women. In general terms,
men hold more sexist views than women. What is interesting here is that when looking
at the sexist outliersthese seem to produce less online content.
To better understand these relationships, we performed several OLS regression
models including media and politically related variables (see Table 1).
Preliminary results when the four countries are taken all together show that once sex-
ism is considered, there are no longer dierences between men and women in relation to
UGC creation against H1. Similarly, there is no consistent signicant relationship
Figure 1. Box-plots of UGC creation distribution by country and gender.
between ideological polarization and UGC once controlling for sexism (against H2).
However crucially, model 1 suggests that hostile sexism has a signicant curvilinear
(u-shaped) eect on UGC creation (supporting H3).
Figure 3 shows, however, that the curve is asymmetrical. Those holding radical egali-
tarian views on gender roles are creating less content than those having radical hostile
Figure 2. Box-plots of sexism distribution by country and gender.
Table 1. OLS Regression models for all countries pooled together.
Model 1 Model 2
UGC Curvilinear UGC Linear
All countries All countries
Block 1 Socio-demographics
Gender (Female = 1) .018 .004
Age .074*** .091***
Education .027* .012
Income .002 .009
ΔR ² (%) 9.89.8
Block 2 Media use
Traditional oine news .004 .011
Virtual news 409*** .429***
General Internet use .015 .016
Trust in mainstream media .078*** .078***
Trust in alternative media .239*** .233***
ΔR ² (%) 26.326.3
Block 3 Ideological Polarization
Ideological polarization .021 .036**
ΔR ² (%) 0.10.1
Block 4 Sexism
Polarization over sexism .114***
Hostile sexism .146***
ΔR ² (%) 1.22.1
N= 3811. Note: *Statistically signicant at p0.05; **Statistically signicant at p0.01; ***Statistically signicant at p
sexist views. Indeed, as depicted in Model 2 hostile sexism is positively associated with
UGC creation, even when controlling for ideological polarization (supporting H4).
This asymmetric U-shaped curve is also found when we perform a country-by-
country analysis (Tables 2 and 3). Both tables show how ideological polarization is
Figure 3. Curvilineal relationship between sexism and predicted standardized values of UGC creation
in the four countries.
Table 2. OLS Curvilinear regressions in four countries.
Model 3 Germany U-
Model 4 Spain U-
Model 5 UK U-
Model 6 USA U-
Block 1 Socio-demographics
Gender (Female = 1) .028 .027 .016 .015
Age .045 .022 .128*** .092**
Education .014 .045 .019 .035
Income .003 .008*** .013 .031
ΔR ² (%)
Block 2 Media use
Traditional oine news .036 013 .028 .014
Virtual news .322*** .417*** .379*** .371***
General Internet use .021 .019 .020 .022
Trust in mainstream media .111*** .047 .075** .053
Trust in alternative media .210*** .206*** .306*** .213***
ΔR ² (%) 21.825.625.022.6
Block 3 Ideological
Ideological polarization .061* .014 .007 .059*
ΔR ² (%)
Block 4 Sexism
Polarization over sexism .133*** .153*** .082*** .117***
ΔR ² (%)
Germany N= 936; Spain N= 893; UK N= 942; USA N= 1040. Note: *Statistically signicant at p0.05; **Statistically
signicant at p0.01; ***Statistically signicant at p0.001.
positively associated with UGC creation only in Germany and the US once sexism is
included in the analysis. Therefore, H2 is only partially supported at the country level.
However as shown in Table 2, polarization over sexism, is still signicantly and positively
associated with UGC creation in all countries. This nding suggests there is a u-shaped
relationship between hostile sexism and UGC (supporting H3).
Moreover, as depicted in Table 3 hostile sexism in its linear form is still statistically
and positively associated with UGC creation, even when controlled for ideological polar-
ization (supporting H4). Furthermore, Betas and the explained variance are higher in
Table 3 as opposed to Table 2 in all countries but the US.
Everything else held constant, hostile sexism is able to explain around 1% of the
observed variance in online content creation, but interesting country dierences remain.
While hostile sexism explains 4.4% of variation in UGC creation in Spain, it is able to
explain a limited 0.9% of the variance in UGC creation in the US. In fact, as depicted
in Figure 4, the US U-shape curve is a little more pronounced.
Figure 4 shows the unbalance between the non-sexist and the hostile sexist voices in all
countries. It also shows that patterns of UGC creation vis a vis sexism are quite similar in
the UK and the US while in Germany and Spain, not only individuals create in general
terms more UGC, but especially hostile sexist individuals create much more UGC than
hostile sexists in the UK and the US.
As a robustness check for the eects of hostile sexism, we repeat the analysis using pol-
itical ideology (0 = strong conservative; 10 = strong liberal) as opposed to ideological
polarization. In this case, the inuence of conservatism is uneven throughout the
countries: in Spain, UK, and Germany it is not signicant, while in the US, progressive
people are more likely to create online content (see supplementary material). In all four
cases, H3 and H4 are supported.
Table 3. OLS Linear regressions in four countries.
Model 7 Germany
Model 8 Spain
Model 9 UK
Model 10 USA
Block 1 Socio-demographics
Gender (Female = 1) .015 .008 .009 .020
Age .054 .035 .147*** .101***
Education .008 .024 .010 .025
Income .008 .063 .003 .028
ΔR ² (%)
Block 2 Media use
Traditional oine news .041 .015 .013 .006
Virtual news .324*** .417*** .399*** .392***
General Internet use .024 .034 .017 .027
Trust in mainstream media .103*** .063* .070* .051
Trust in alternative media .195*** .206*** .274*** .211***
ΔR ² (%) 21.825.625.022.6
Block 3 Ideological
Ideological polarization .078** .017 .016 .076**
ΔR ² (%)
Block 4 Sexism
Hostile sexism .166*** .218*** .195*** .097***
ΔR ² (%)
Germany N= 936; Spain N= 893; UK N= 942; USA N= 1041. Note: *Statistically signicant at p0.05; **Statistically sig-
nicant at p0.01; ***Statistically signicant at p0.001;
Marginally signicant at p0.1
While many scholars have showed a gender gap in UGC creation, most studies have cen-
tered around the role of media and technological skills and socio-psychological traits in
explaining these disparities. Less attention has been paid to political antecedents that
might also aect the gender gap on UGC. This paper investigated how hostile sexism
aects online UGC, in a context of cultural backlash and increased political polarization.
By analyzing the dierent drivers of UCG creation, and considering sexist attitudes in
dierent countries, we uncover a consistent, positive, and statistically signicant relation-
ship between sexism and UGC creation. Specically, individuals with higher levels of
hostile sexism are more likely to create and share their own online political content. Sex-
ism reveals to be a dierent phenomenon from classical conservatism.
These ndings suggest strong support for the cultural backlash hypothesis. At odds
with previous literature, we do not nd consistent evidence that ideologically polarized
individuals are more likely to create their own online content (only Germany and the
US follows this U-shaped pattern). We do nd an asymmetric U-shape curvilinear
relationship between sexism and political UGC creation in all countries where hostile
sexists create much more content than non-sexist individuals. Individuals holding sexist
attitudes are statistically signicantly most vocal at creating online political content. A
possible explanation for this, is that sexist individuals believe their hierarchical views
Figure 4. Curvilinear relationship between sexism and predicted standardized values of UGC in each
of society are marginalized from the ocial discourse of political correctness(Haller &
Holt, 2018; Kováts, 2018) and therefore, they engage more frequently in online content
creation, as a way of scaping ostracism. Due to asymmetry of the curvilinear eect in our
data, results suggest that feminist and anti-feminist voices are not equally active in the
digital sphere. Sexists prevail.
Second, although we found the same general pattern between hostile sexism and UGC
creation in all four Western countries analyzed here, there are still interesting dierences
between countries, endorsing comparative strategies on these issues to properly assess the
extent to which these results could be generalizable to other Western societies. For
example, the ideological polarization hypothesis works only for Germany and the US,
but not for Spain and the UK. Another interesting dierence is that the curve is more
symmetric in the US than in the other countries. This means that in Spanish, British
and German UGC ecologies, sexist voices are more present than non-sexist opponents
and that in the US non-sexists individuals are relatively more active in the creation of
political UGC as opposed to their counterparts in other countries. Several possible expla-
nations might be behind these dierences such as the distinct levels of society polariz-
ation (both ideological and over gender) in each country, the visibility of women in
politics as candidates and political oce holders, the diverse media structures and its
ideological polarization, and the dierent scope of each national feminist movement.
All these elements can impact the relationship between sexism and UGC creation.
Further research should shed more light on the specicinuence of these elements on
the relationship between sexism and UGC.
To do so, up-to-date data would be certainly needed. Indeed, one important limitation
in this research is that data was collected in 2015. Readers need to be aware that at the
time, in the US Hillary Clinton was already the front runner candidate for the Demo-
cratic nomination, and she ran specically on a gender equality discourse. So, the appar-
ent more moderate relationship between sexism and UGC creation in the US was maybe
inuenced by the casuistry of that election. Another potential caveat we must consider is
that the most recent wave of online and oine feminism has emerged after the data for
this study was collected. It is evident that online actions such as #MeToo in the Anglo-
sphere, #WomensMarch in the US, #8M in Spain or # aufschrei in Germany might have
increased the voices of feminist women throughout the world and the World Wide Web
(Drüeke & Zobl, 2016; Heger & Homann, 2021; Mendes et al., 2018). Perhaps, with
some of these visible feminist movements transpiring into society, future studies on
this topic may showcase a more pronounced symmetric curvilinear eect than the one
we have found with 2015 data. Anyhow, we are condent about the robustness of the
uncovered relationship between sexism and UGC since the basic underlying mechanisms
and motivations inuencing UGC creation have remained stable over the years (Ardèvol-
Abreu et al., 2018).
Furthermore, although time and the existence of feminist movements can re-shape the
relationship between sexism and UGC into a more curvilinear fashion, the fact that we
have found a greater linear relationship across the dierent countries gives interesting
and generalizable information about the original connection between sexism and UGC.
The fact that the survey was conducted in 2015 can give us therefore insight into whether
the polarization over gender in the digital sphere followed the same temporal sequence as
in the oine public sphere mainstream egalitarian discourse followed by a sexist
backlash or whether on the internet, sexists were mainstream, whereas egalitarian voices
became the alternative minority. Our ndings suggest the latter tends to be the case.
If new research nds a more symmetric representation of voices in the digital sphere
this will be good news for egalitarian views on gender roles in general, and it will also
show the inuence of online and oine activism on reducing sexist bias within the digital
sphere. But based on our data, we should take with a grain of salt the oftentimes argu-
ment of the digital sphere serving as a representative arena to dierent political and gen-
der attitudes.
These ndings shed important implications for democratic theory, specically for the
debates over the digital sphere as a democratic deliberative space. Previous studies found
that UGC creation fosters civic engagement (Kaufhold, et al., 2010; Nah et al., 2014), but
future research should more deeply scrutinize potential asymmetries in digital partici-
pation that seem to reinforce privileged individuals with more hierarchical views of gender
relations. Furthermore, since sexist online UGC has been found to foster exclusionary
practices online (Drakett et al., 2018), and reinforce sexism among its own creators (Fox
et al., 2015), the implications for the world wide web as a participatory, deliberative and
civic sphere that fosters democracy and emancipation should in any event be taken with
prudence, at least with regard to gender equality issues. All in all, the present study claries
important issues revolving the role of sexism in hindering a more equalitarian development
of digital political spaces, where women tend to be less represented.
The authors are grateful to James Liu and everyone involved in the Digital Inuence World Pro-
jectwho helped collecting these data. This research was supported by Grant FA2386-15-1-0003
from the Asian Oce of Aerospace Research and Development. Responsibility for the information
and views set out in this study lies entirely with the authors.
1. We test our model in other countries that either have similar levels of gender equality, devel-
opment and democracy (New Zealand, Italy, Japan, South Korea and Taiwan) or do not pre-
sent similar level of democracy and gender equality however where processes of cultural
backlash have been documented at some point between 2015 and 2020 (Argentina, Brazil
and Chile).
2. Additionally, after randomly applying the model to other countries, H4 is supported in 7 out
of 8: New Zealand, Italy, South Korea, Taiwan, Argentina, Brazil and Chile. However, H3
was only supported in New Zealand, Argentina and Chile.
Disclosure statement
No potential conict of interest was reported by the author(s).
This work was supported by Asian Oce of Aerospace Research and Development: [grant number
Notes on contributors
Isabel Inguanzo is a sociologist and holds a Ph.D. in political science. She is an Assistant Professor
at the University of Salamanca. Prior to that she was Assistant Professor at Universidad Loyola
Andalucía (20162020) and worked at the UNESCO Regional Oce for the Pacic States in
Samoa (20142015). She has also worked as a consultant, for the European Parliament. Her
research is primarily on Comparative Politics, Social Movements and Minoritiesstudies, with a
particular focus on Gender and Ethnic studies. She has published JCR peer-reviewed journal
articles (i.e., Contemporary Politics) [email:].
Bingbing Zhang is a doctoral student in Mass Communications at the Donald P. Bellisario College
of Communications from the Pennsylvania State University in the United States. She obtained a
masters degree on Mass Communications from Texas Tech University and a masters degree on
Journalism and Communications from Jinan University in China. Her research interests focus on
political communication and media eects on individualspolitical beliefs, attitudes, and
behaviors [email:].
Homero Gil de Zúñiga holds a Ph.D. in Politics at Universidad Europea de Madrid and a Ph.D. in
Mass Communication at the University of Wisconsin Madison, serves as Distinguished Research
Professor at the University of Salamanca where he directs the Democracy Research Unit (DRU), as
Professor at Pennsylvania State University, and as Senior Research Fellow at Universidad Diego
Portales, Chile. His research addresses the inuence of new technologies and digital media over
peoples daily lives, as well as the eect of such use on the overall democratic process. He has pub-
lished nearly a dozen books/volumes and over 100 JCR peer-reviewed journal articles (i.e., Journal
of Communication, Journal of Computer-Mediated Communication, Political Communication,
Human Communication Research, New Media & Society, Communication Research, etc)
Isabel Inguanzo
Bingbing Zhang
Homero Gil de Zúñiga
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... Recent studies show that radical activists on both sides of a divisive issue are more frequently engaging in internet political discussions, and creating their own online content (Idoiaga Mondragon et al., 2019;Inguanzo et al., 2021). However, the fact that radical activists are more present in online political discussions does not mean they are talking to one another. ...
Full-text available
In a world of polarized societies and radical voices hogging the public digital sphere, this thematic issue aims at identifying the different strategies of old and new social movements in the extremes of the political debates by focusing on the interplay between polarization, uses of the internet, and social activism. In order to disentangle these interactions, this thematic issue covers a wide range of political settings across the globe. It does so by studying: (a) how opposing activists discuss politics online and its implications for democratic theory; (b) how social media uses and online discussions foster offline protests; (c) how the media and state-led-propaganda frame disruptive and anti-government offline protests and how this situation contributes to polarization in both democratic and non-democratic regimes; and finally (d) how civil society uses digital tools to organize and mobilize around sensitive issues in non-democratic regimes.
... Recent studies show that radical activists on both sides of a divisive issue are more frequently engaging in internet political discussions, and creating their own online content (Idoiaga Mondragon et al., 2019;Inguanzo et al., 2021). However, the fact that radical activists are more present in online political discussions does not mean they are talking to one another. ...
Full-text available
In a world of polarized societies and radical voices hogging the public digital sphere, this thematic issue aims at identifying the different strategies of old and new social movements in the extremes of the political debates by focusing on the interplay between polarization, uses of the internet, and social activism. In order to disentangle these interactions, this thematic issue covers a wide range of political settings across the globe. It does so by studying: (a) how opposing activists discuss politics online and its implications for democratic theory; (b) how social media uses and online discussions foster offline protests; (c) how the media and state-led-propaganda frame disruptive and anti-government offline protests and how this situation contributes to polarization in both democratic and non-democratic regimes; and finally (d) how civil society uses digital tools to organize and mobilize around sensitive issues in non-democratic regimes.
... Recent studies show that radical activists on both sides of a divisive issue are more frequently engaging in internet political discussions, and creating their own online content (Idoiaga Mondragon et al., 2019;Inguanzo et al., 2021). However, the fact that radical activists are more present in online political discussions does not mean they are talking to one another. ...
Full-text available
In a world of polarized societies and radical voices hogging the public digital sphere, this thematic issue aims at identifying the different strategies of old and new social movements in the extremes of the political debates by focusing on the interplay between polarization, uses of the internet, and social activism. In order to disentangle these interactions, this thematic issue covers a wide range of political settings across the globe. It does so by studying: (a) how opposing activists discuss politics online and its implications for democratic theory; (b) how social media uses and online discussions foster offline protests; (c) how the media and state-led-propaganda frame disruptive and anti-government offline protests and how this situation contributes to polarization in both democratic and non-democratic regimes; and finally (d) how civil society uses digital tools to organize and mobilize around sensitive issues in non-democratic regimes.
... Pertaining to this, journalism professionals are required to handle the basic fundamentals around the treatment of information, plus a series of tools and technologies that allow them to improve the final product. This gives added value to the story and also stimulates the interest of the audience, so, for example, user-generated content highlights substantial beneficial effects in society as diversifying political viewpoints, mobilizing the electorate or fostering citizens' civic engagement (Inguanzo et al., 2021). New narratives based on innovative formats (Lawrence et al., 2018) that also entail high levels of audience involvement in the construction process become a path worth exploring, especially for new teams of professionals whose mission is tracking the consumer's digital footprint in real time. ...
Digital journalism is seeking to redefine its role in the communicative ecosystem in the network society of the third decade of the 21st century. This has been made through innovation processes that entail renewed narratives and formats, greater user involvement, and advanced dissemination strategies. Thousands of digital native media, most of which have come to prominence in last ten years, have undertaken this process of adaptation and reinvention. It has happened during a period of intense media coverage and constant technological changes. Based on the most recent research in the journalistic field, and on an empirical study of the most innovative digital native media within reach from an international perspective (n = 26; 20 digital native media + 6 traditional newspapers), this text reflects on current trends and the likely consequences of the changes underway within journalism, the journalistic profession, and research in the journalistic field. The results are structured according to the three assessed areas: mobile narratives, diffusion strategies, and user involvement.
... The final four papers depict different aspects of online harassment. Inguanzo et al. (2021) examine the effect of sexist sentiments on individuals' propensity to generate online content (UGC) in Spain, Germany, the UK, and the USA. The results indicate that those who hold egalitarian views on gender are less likely to engage in content creation. ...
In the early days of the internet it was hoped that going online would bring communities together, help people find each other and that social media would become a powerful advocacy tool as communities could better campaign for the causes they believed in. Instead, gender discrimination, trolling and abusive behavior are rife on the internet. This introduction provides context on women in the digital world. The papers in this special issue include research on gender and politics from political actors’ and citizens’ perspective, they examine the importance of the online access to information, the role of women within the tech industry, they look at online harassment, at how women are treated online, and how NGOs deal with evidence of mistreatment of women.
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One of today’s most controversial and consequential issues is whether the global uptake of digital media is causally related to a decline in democracy. We conducted a systematic review of causal and correlational evidence (N = 496 articles) on the link between digital media use and different political variables. Some associations, such as increasing political participation and information consumption, are likely to be beneficial for democracy and were often observed in autocracies and emerging democracies. Other associations, such as declining political trust, increasing populism and growing polarization, are likely to be detrimental to democracy and were more pronounced in established democracies. While the impact of digital media on political systems depends on the specific variable and system in question, several variables show clear directions of associations. The evidence calls for research efforts and vigilance by governments and civil societies to better understand, design and regulate the interplay of digital media and democracy.
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Previous research posits that individual predispositions play an essential role in explaining patterns of selective exposure to political information. Yet the contextual factors in the political information environment have received far less attention. Using a cross-national and quasi-experimental design, this article is one of the first to investigate how political information environments shape selective exposure. We rely on a unique two-wave online survey quasi-experiment in five countries (Switzerland, Denmark, Italy, Poland and the United States) with 4349 participants to test the propositions that (a) the level of polarization and fragmentation in information environments and (b) the type of media source used affect selective exposure. Our results reveal that selective exposure is slightly more frequent among regular social media users but is less common among users of TV, radio and newspapers; crucially, it is more common in information environments that are highly fragmented and polarized. Nevertheless, news users from less fragmented-polarized media landscapes show one surprising yet intriguing behaviour: in a quasi-experimentally manipulated setting with more opportunities to self-select than they may be accustomed to, their coping strategy is to pick larger amounts of congruent news stories. All our findings imply that contextual factors play a crucial role in moderating individuals’ tendency to select information that aligns with their political views.
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In a recent contribution to this journal Paolo Gerbaudo has argued that an ‘elective affinity’ exists between social media and populism. The present article expands on Gerbaudo’s argument and examines various dimensions of this affinity in further detail. It argues that it is helpful to conceptually reframe the proposed affinity in terms of affordances. Four affordances are identified which make the social media ecology relatively favourable to both-right as well as left-wing populism, compared to the pre-social media ecology. These affordances are neither stable nor uniquely fixed: they change in concordance with ongoing technological developments and in response to political events. Even though these dynamics can be quick-moving, a fairly stable alliance of interests between social media and populism seems to have emerged over the last decade. This raises the plausibility that as long as the current social media ecology persists, populist tendencies will remain prevalent in politics.
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Considerable research has examined the role of sexism and vote choice, especially within the context of the 2016 presidential election. These findings are clear, consistent, and unequivocal – sexism hurt Hillary Clinton at the ballot box. However, the 2020 presidential primary provides an opportunity to examine sexism's effects on candidate favorability among a broader range of candidates. Using data on candidate favorability from the 2019 VOTER survey, I find that sexism is unsurprisingly predictive of lower favorability of women running for the Democratic nomination. However, I also find that sexism influences support for men running for the nomination, in a way that is statistically indistinguishable from its effect on support for women. This effect persists even among only Democratic respondents.
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Recent studies suggest that new parties display new patterns of digital mobilization. We shed light on this debate: do new party supporters engage in online political activities to a greater extent during electoral campaigns? Do they share political images or quotes on social media, participate in political forums, or exchange political messages with their friends more often than supporters of traditional parties? No. Drawing on a post-electoral survey dataset in Spain, we find that offline extra-institutional political activities are key predictors of the level of online political engagement. Even in the context of a polarized electoral campaign and the emergence of new electoral forces such as Podemos, extra-institutional political participation drives digital activism to the detriment of institutional variables, such as turnout or partisan preferences. Thus, all parties depend on extra-institutional activists to boost their online campaigns. Since grassroots activists increasingly influence the communicative strategy of all political parties, we interpret this process within a long-term digital-based post-material transformation of the political culture, with major implications for partisan organization, mobilization, and polarization in many democracies. We contend that the overrepresentation of grassroots activists in producing and disseminating political content in social media may have favored an increase of the visibility and public support of political outsiders in several countries.
This article presents discursive strategies of sexual othering aimed at excluding the alleged European proponents of immigration from the ‘domestic’ culture and sexual norms and representing them as traitors of Europe driven by their sexual attraction to immigrants. A qualitative analysis of comments related to mainstream online news articles on gender aspects of immigration reveals how sexism and both old and new forms of racism intersect in online debates on the topic. The anti-immigration discussants express worries about the endangering of the European sexual and gender norms and define themselves in opposition not only to immigrants but also to European actors perceived as pro-immigration. While representing their gender culture as superior to the gender culture of immigrants, as based on respect towards women, they express openly disrespectful and sexist thoughts, treat women as inferior, and justify and normalize sexual violence and verbal sexual abuse.
This paper presents a case study of a digitally enabled mode of transnationally networked framing by far-right actors. We analyze the reach and strategic aims of the '120 decibels' campaign, launched by members of the Austrian Identitarian Movement via social media in early 2018 in an attempt to latch onto the prominence of the MeToo hashtag (#MeToo). We argue that this constituted a form of discursive 'hijacking,' marked by a narrowing of the scope of the problem definition and a reformulation of the political demands. We draw on user-generated Twitter data and focus on geolocation markers and language clusters in order to investigate the transnational scope of these coordinated efforts. We employ content analysis to investigate the campaign's strategic use of #MeToo. Our findings show distinct clusters of German-Austrian-and UK-US-based user groups, from which we infer directionalities in the transnational spread of the campaign. We demonstrate how the initial dissemination of the hashtag was driven by influential individual nodes within their respective networks and tied to #MeToo. The results point toward transnational networking activities among the far right and illustrate emerging dynamics between progressive and reactionary forms of digitally enabled networked framing. ARTICLE HISTORY
Affective polarization captures the extent to which citizens feel sympathy towards partisan in-groups and antagonism towards partisan out-groups. This is comparatively easy to assess in two-party systems, but capturing the pattern of affect towards multiple parties is more complex in multiparty systems. This article first discusses these challenges and then presents different ways of measuring individual-level affective polarization using like-dislike scores, a widespread measure of party sympathy. Using data for 51 countries and 166 elections from five modules of the Comparative Study of Electoral Systems, I then show that affective polarization adds to existing concepts as a way of understanding political participation and democratic orientations. Studying affective polarization outside the US could therefore have important consequences for our understanding of citizen perceptions of politics as well as citizen behaviour, but we need the appropriate measures to do so.
In recent years, increasingly serious incidents of violence have been committed by young men predominantly in the United States and Canada who self-identify as incels (involuntary celibates). Although these attacks often specifically target women, the principal source of their animus, men as well as children have been among the casualties in the series of shootings and vehicular homicides that have occurred at universities, high schools, and on city streets. Although, the incel worldview is not obviously political, its core ethos entails the subjugation and repression of a group and its violence is designed to have far-reaching societal effects. Accordingly, incel violence arguably conforms to an emergent trend in terrorism with a more salient hate crime dimension that necessitates greater scrutiny and analysis—especially as it spreads to Europe and shows similarities to and has nascent connections with other terrorist movements.
What affects the adoption of affirmative gender equality measures across Central and Eastern European (CEE) countries, given that the European Union directives do not require them? Drawing on mandate theory of democracy and using original data on party positions on gender equality in eight postcommunist countries observed over 25 years, I argue that CEE political parties and their position on the issue are the answer to this empirical puzzle. Contrary to the earlier scholarship on new democracies that finds only limited mandate fulfillment (Roberts 2010; Stokes, 2001), the study shows that parties in government act responsively when it comes to gender equality promotion. My findings also demonstrate that it is parties, not feminist movements that drive the adoption of affirmative action policies in the region