Chapter

Mixed Agreements

January 2021

DOI:10.1093/oso/9780198869481.003.0004

In book: The Law of EU External Relations (pp.102-127)

Authors:

KU Leuven

This chapter provides an overview of the development of the phenomenon of mixed agreements. It explains the legal and political reasons for the emergence and perseverance of mixed agreements. The chapter also analyses the legal limits to the use of mixed agreements, and discusses salient legal issues that arise with regard to their signature, conclusion, implementation, and interpretation. The above are introduced in the context of specific bilateral and multilateral mixed agreements. References and excerpts from the latest jurisprudential developments in this area feature prominently in the chapter.

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