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COVID-19 Case Rates in the UK: Modelling Uncertainties as Lockdown Lifts

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Background: The UK was one of the countries worst affected by the COVID-19 pandemic in Europe. A strict lockdown from early 2021 combined with an aggressive vaccination programme enabled a gradual easing of lockdown measures to be introduced whilst both deaths and reported case numbers reduced to less than 3% of their peak. The emergence of the Delta variant in April 2021 has reversed this trend, and the UK is once again experiencing surging cases, albeit with reduced average severity due to the success of the vaccination rollout. This study presents the results of a modelling exercise which simulates the progression of the pandemic in the UK through projection of daily case numbers as lockdown lifts. Methods: A simulation model based on the Susceptible-Exposed-Infected-Recovered structure was built. A timeline of UK lockdown measures was used to simulate the changing restrictions. The model was tailored for the UK, with some values set based on research and others obtained through calibration against 16 months of historical data. Results: The model projects that if lockdown restrictions are lifted in July 2021, UK COVID-19 cases will peak at hundreds of thousands daily in most viable scenarios, reducing in late 2021 as immunity acquired through both vaccination and infection reduces the susceptible population percentage. Further lockdown measures can be used to reduce daily cases. Other than the ever-present threat of the emergence of new variants, the most significant unknown factors affecting the profile of the pandemic in the UK are the length and strength of immunity, with daily peak cases over 50% higher if immunity lasts 8 months compared to 12 months. Another significant factor is the percentage of unreported cases. The reduced case severity associated with vaccination may lead to a higher proportion of unreported mild or asymptomatic cases, meaning that unmanaged infections resulting from unknown cases will continue to be a major source of infection. Conclusions: Further research into the length and strength of both recovered and vaccinated COVID-19 immunity is critical to delivering more accurate projections from models, thus enabling more finely tuned policy decisions. The model presented in this article, whilst by no means perfect, aims to contribute to greater transparency of the modelling process, which can only increase trust between policy makers, journalists and the general public.
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Systems2021,9,60.https://doi.org/10.3390/systems9030060www.mdpi.com/journal/systems
Article
COVID19CaseRatesintheUK:ModellingUncertainties
asLockdownLifts
ClaireBrereton
1,
*andMatteoPedercini
2
1
ChildHealthResearchCentre,UniversityofQueensland,Brisbane,QLD4101,Australia
2
MillenniumInstitute,2200PennsylvaniaAveNW,Washington,DC20037,USA;
mp@millenniuminstitute.org
*Correspondence:claire.brereton@uq.edu.au;Tel.:+61419901107
Abstract:Background:TheUKwasoneofthecountriesworstaffectedbytheCOVID19pandemic
inEurope.Astrictlockdownfromearly2021combinedwithanaggressivevaccinationprogramme
enabledagradualeasingoflockdownmeasurestobeintroducedwhilstbothdeathsandreported
casenumbersreducedtolessthan3%oftheirpeak.TheemergenceoftheDeltavariantinApril
2021hasreversedthistrend,andtheUKisonceagainexperiencingsurgingcases,albeitwithre
ducedaverageseverityduetothesuccessofthevaccinationrollout.Thisstudypresentstheresults
ofamodellingexercisewhichsimulatestheprogressionofthepandemicintheUKthroughprojec
tionofdailycasenumbersaslockdownlifts.Methods:AsimulationmodelbasedontheSusceptible
ExposedInfectedRecoveredstructurewasbuilt.AtimelineofUKlockdownmeasureswasusedto
simulatethechangingrestrictions.ThemodelwastailoredfortheUK,withsomevaluessetbased
onresearchandothersobtainedthroughcalibrationagainst16monthsofhistoricaldata.Results:
ThemodelprojectsthatiflockdownrestrictionsareliftedinJuly2021,UKCOVID19caseswill
peakathundredsofthousandsdailyinmostviablescenarios,reducinginlate2021asimmunity
acquiredthroughbothvaccinationandinfectionreducesthesusceptiblepopulationpercentage.
Furtherlockdownmeasurescanbeusedtoreducedailycases.Otherthantheeverpresentthreat
oftheemergenceofnewvariants,themostsignificantunknownfactorsaffectingtheprofileofthe
pandemicintheUKarethelengthandstrengthofimmunity,withdailypeakcasesover50%higher
ifimmunitylasts8monthscomparedto12months.Anothersignificantfactoristhepercentageof
unreportedcases.Thereducedcaseseverityassociatedwithvaccinationmayleadtoahigherpro
portionofunreportedmildorasymptomaticcases,meaningthatunmanagedinfectionsresulting
fromunknowncaseswillcontinuetobeamajorsourceofinfection.Conclusions:Furtherresearch
intothelengthandstrengthofbothrecoveredandvaccinatedCOVID19immunityiscriticalto
deliveringmoreaccurateprojectionsfrommodels,thusenablingmorefinelytunedpolicydecisions.
Themodelpresentedinthisarticle,whilstbynomeansperfect,aimstocontributetogreatertrans
parencyofthemodellingprocess,whichcanonlyincreasetrustbetweenpolicymakers,journalists
andthegeneralpublic.
Keywords:COVID19;UK;vaccination;immunity;policy;systemdynamics;modelling;uncertainty
1.Introduction
TheCOVID19pandemicisanunprecedentedglobalcrisis.Theunusualnatureof
theSARSCoV2virus,whichcanbedeadlyforonepersonwhilsthavingnosymptoms
foranother,wasmisunderstoodbyscientistsandpolicymakersduringtheearlystages
ofthepandemic,leadingtounderestimationofcasenumbersandfocusoncontrolof
symptomaticinfections[1].Modellingstudies[2,3]andresearchontheprevalenceof
COVID19antibodiesintheUKpopulation[4]indicatedearlyonthatconfirmedcases
werelessthanhalfoftrueinfectionestimates,andthisrealityisreflectedinglobal
Citation:Brereton,C.;Pedercini,M.
COVID19CaseRatesintheUK:
ModellingUncertaintiesas
LockdownLifts.Systems2021,9,60.
https://doi.org/10.3390/
systems9030060
AcademicEditors:OzSahin
andRussellRichards
Received:10May2021
Accepted:21July2021
Published:6August2021
Publisher’sNote:MDPIstaysneu
tralwithregardtojurisdictional
claimsinpublishedmapsandinstitu
tionalaffiliations.
Copyright:©2021bytheauthors.Li
censeeMDPI,Basel,Switzerland.
Thisarticleisanopenaccessarticle
distributedunderthetermsandcon
ditionsoftheCreativeCommonsAt
tribution(CCBY)license(http://crea
tivecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/).
Systems2021,9,602of24
pandemicplanningguidance[5]andinthecontinuinguseofmeasuressuchaslock
downs,whichrestrictsocialcontactirrespectiveofknowninfectionstatusacrossanentire
population.
TheUnitedKingdom(UK)wasoneofthecountriesworstaffectedbyCOVID19in
thedevelopedworld,characterizedbyaslowinitialresponse,lackofbordercontrols,
changingregionalguidanceandeaseofmovementbetweenregions[6].TheUKismade
upoffourcountries—England,Scotland,WalesandNorthernIreland,eachwiththeau
tonomytoestablishtheirownCOVID19controls—butas84%ofthepopulationresides
inEngland,theprofileofthepandemicinEnglandandthemeasurestakentherearethe
mostsignificantdriveroftheUK’sCOVID19statistics.Theescalatingnumberofcases
anddeathsintheUKledtotheirbeingthefirstcountrytogiveauthorisationforemer
gencyuseofthePfizer/BioNTech(PB)vaccine.Thevaccinationprogrammestartedon8
December2020andcommittedfundsforaninitial30milliondoses[7].TheAstraZeneca
(AZ)vaccinewasauthorisedonthesamebasisforrolloutcommencing4January2021,
with100milliondosesordered.Thesevaccinesdeliveredthecapabilitytoimmunise50
millionpeople,effectivelycoveringtheentireeligiblepopulationoftheUKfortwodoses
each[8].ByendJune2021,78millionvaccinationshadbeenadministered,with33million
peoplefullyvaccinated.TheModernavaccinewasalsoapprovedbytheUKGovernment
[9],andinmidApril2021,itstartedrollingouttounder30yearoldsasanalternativeto
AZ.
Massvaccinationhastwomainobjectives:toprotectindividualsfromdeathandse
vereillnessandtoincreasethenumberofimmuneindividualstothepointwhereenough
peopleareprotectedfromthevirustoprotectthepopulationasawhole(herdimmunity).
Forbothvaccinatedandrecoveredindividuals,thelongevityofprotectionfrominfection
andthedegreeofprotectionconferredarestilluncertain.Thelevelofpopulationprotec
tionrequiredforherdimmunityintheUK,oranyothercountry,hasbeenestimatedbut
isasyetunknown.
AstheCOVID19pandemichasevolved,newstrainshaveemerged,andintheUK,
theAlphavariantandDeltavarianthavesuccessivelybecomedominant.Eachofthese
strainshavebeenmoreinfectiousthantheirpredecessors,increasingthechallengesto
healthsystems.
Modellingstudieshavereachedanewlevelofpublichealthimportancein2020/2021
aspolicymakershaveseentheirvalueforpredictingandanalysingthefutureprogression
oftheCOVID19pandemicandallowingacomparisonofinterventionsandpolicydeci
sions.Therearebroadlytwomodellingapproachesbeingused.Mechanistic(dynamic)
modelssuchastheImperialCollegeLondon(ICL)model[10]reflecttheunderlyingtrans
missionprocessandcontainnonlinearfeedbackloopsanddelays,enablinglongerterm
projectionandinferenceoftheresultsofchangingassumptionsorscenarios[11].Statisti
calmodels,forexampletheInstituteforHealthMetricsandEvaluationmodel[12],use
regressionbasedormachinelearningmethods.Thesemodelsdonotaccountforhow
transmissionoccursandarethereforenotsowellsuitedforlongtermprojectionsabout
epidemiologicaldynamics.TheScientificAdvisoryGroupforEmergencies(SAGE)inthe
UKusesanumberofmodelstoinformitsadvice[13].Inordertosupportabroadpublic
debateontheupcomingprecautionarymeasuresagainstCOVID19,wedevelopasimu
lationmodelwiththreepurposes:
1. toinvestigatethelikelyeffectsoflockdowneasingontheUKpandemic,exploring
theremaininguncertaintiesonvaccineefficacyandpostinfectionimmunity;
2. toestimatetheunknownproportionofCOVID19casesintheUKandtheroleof
unknowncasesinthespreadofthedisease;
3. toincreasethetransparencyofthemodellingandanalysisprocess,byfocusingon
containingthemodeldetailcomplexityandclearlyestablishingtheimplicationsof
differentassumptions.
Systems2021,9,603of24
2.Background
2.1.RecoveredandPostVaccinationImmunity
AstheCOVID19epidemiccontinuesintheUK,recoveredpopulationimmunityis
building.Thereisgrowingconsensusamongstresearchersthatrecoveredimmunitywill
notbelifelongandmaybeineffectiveagainstnewstrains.Seasonalcoronavirusessuchas
COVID19,whichinfectmucosalsurfacesanddonothaveaviremicphase,typicallyre
sultinantibodyresponsesthataredetectedformonthsorafewyears[14].Estimatesof
thelongevityofrecoveredimmunityrangefromatleast5monthstomorethan12months
[15–17].Thelongevityandlevelofprotectionofpostvaccinationimmunityisnotneces
sarilythesameasthatofrecoveredimmunityandwillalsobecomebetterunderstood
withelapsedtime,aswilltheprotectionwhichitgivesagainstemergingvariants.The
firststudiesspecifictoCOVID19reportedthatintheshortterm,recoveryfrominfection
gave83%protection(95%CI76–87%)fromreinfectionforatleast5months[18,19].Results
fromnewerUKpopulationresearchreleasedinApril2021showed70%(95%CI62–77%)
protectionfromreinfectionaftereitherinfectionorvaccination[20].Clinicaltrialscon
tinuetoinvestigatevaccineefficacy,theprotectiveeffectofpastinfectionandtheeffec
tivenessofbothvaccinesandpastinfectionagainstemergingCOVID19strains.
2.2.TransmissibilityafterVaccination
Vaccineefficacyhasthreecomponents:preventionofinfection,reductionofdisease
severityandpreventionoftransmission[21].Resultsfromclinicaltrialsfocusonpreven
tionandseverityofinfection,whichisdirectlymeasurable,ratherthanonpreventionof
transmission.Forthisstudy,therelevantcomponentofvaccineefficacyisitseffectiveness
inprotectingagainstonwardstransmissionofthevirus.ResearchshowsthattheUK’s
vaccinationprogrammehasresultednotonlyinprotectionfrominfectionbutalsoina
lowerviralburdenifinfected,leadingtoamuchhigherproportionofasymptomaticand
mildinfections.Comparisonofviralburdeninvaccinatedandunvaccinatedgroups
showsa65%decreasethreeweeksafteronedoseofeitherAZorPB,anda70%decrease
1weekafteraseconddose[20].Viralburdencanbeusedasaproxyforpostvaccination
transmissibilitydecrease,whichisnotdirectlymeasurable.
2.3.Known,UnknownandAsymptomaticCases
AsymptomatictransmissionisrecognisedasasignificantcontributortotheCOVID
19pandemic,bothfrompresymptomaticindividualsandfromthosewhoneverdevelop
symptoms[22,23].Theeffectofvaccinesinreducingtheseveritytoasymptomaticormild
diseasemayalsomeanthatmorecasesgoundetectedinthecommunity,contributingto
increasedtransmission[24].Atleast50%ofnewinfectionsareestimatedtohaveorigi
natedfromexposuretoindividualswithinfectionbutwithoutsymptoms[25].Evidence
suggestsa42%lowertransmissionrateforasymptomaticcases[26,27].Itisbroadly
acknowledgedthatthereismassiveglobalunderreportingofsymptomaticCOVID19
casesformanyreasonsrangingfromperceptionoflowpersonalriskfromCOVID19in
fectiontolackoftrustinhealthservices,lackoftestingcapacityandadesiretoavoidthe
negativeconsequencesofenforcedisolation[28].Theunknownproportionofcasesisthus
likelytobehigherthanthetrulyasymptomaticproportionandthemodellingexercise
usesoptimisationtechniquestoestimatethisunknownproportion.
3.MethodandDataSources
3.1.ModelDevelopment
WedevelopedadynamicmodeloftheCOVID19pandemicbasedontheestablished
SusceptibleExposedInfectedRecovered(SEIR)compartmentalinfectiousdiseasemodel
structure[29].Themodel,showninFigure1,wasconstructedusingStellaArchitectsoft
waresuppliedbyiseesystems,Lebanon,NH,USA.
Systems2021,9,604of24
Figure1.SEIRmodelofCOVID19pandemicinUK.
Systems2021,9,605of24
TheSEIRsystemstructureisbasedonareinforcingfeedbackloopofexponentially
growinginfectionsovertime,balancedbyaneventualreductionofsusceptibleindividu
alsduetodeathorincreasingpopulationimmunity.Speedoftransmissionistrackedby
thecalculatedreproductionnumber,Rt,withdailycasenumbersreducingwhenRtfalls
below1(R0,initialreproductionnumber,isoftenusedincorrectlyinplaceofRt).
Themodelincludestheeffectsofthesocialdistancingandinfectionspreadmeasures
usedtocontrolthespreadofCOVID19.Infectionsareclassifiedasknownorunknown,
withtheparametersassociatedwithcontactratesgivendifferentvaluesdependingon
known/unknownstatus.Theeffectsofavaccinationprogramme,whichreducesthesus
ceptiblepopulation,andtheeffectsofrecoveredimmunitydropoff[30],whichincreases
thesusceptiblepopulation,arealsoincluded.
Themodelconsistsofstocks,flowsandauxiliaryvariablesincludingintermediate
calculationsforthedeterminationofflows.Stocksrepresentlevelsorstatevariables,in
cludingthenumbersofpeopleinthedifferentinfectiousstatesorthenumbersofvaccine
dosesavailable;thesearerepresentedbyrectangles.Flowsrepresenttheratesatwhich
peopleanddosestransitionbetweenstatesandarerepresentedbyvalvesymbols.These
ratesaredeterminedbytimeconstantsorprobabilityestimatesofmovingtoonestateor
another.ThemodelcapturesthefundamentaldriversoftheCOVID19pandemicand
doesnotprovidespatialorindividualleveldisaggregation.Itslackofdetailcomplexity
ismeanttoprovidetransparencyinthemodellingandanalysisprocess,whilstallowing
theexplorationofabroadrangeofalternativescenarios.
Themodelrunsfrom1February2020,whenthetotalpopulationissusceptible,to31
December2021,withatimestepof6h.Individualsacquiretheinfection,incubatethe
diseaseduringaninitiallatentperiodandthenbecomeinfectious.Eachstageintroduces
adelayintothesystem.Anindividual’sinfectiousstateisatfirstunknown,then,asthe
diseasebecomessymptomatic,itbecomesknowninaproportionoftheinfectedpopula
tion.Someindividuals’infectiousstateisneverknowntohealthauthorities,eitherbe
causetheyareasymptomaticorbecausetheydonotrecognizeorwishtodisclosetheir
symptomsforvariousreasons.Mostinfectedindividualsrecover,withaproportionof
knowninfectedindividualsdying.Recoveredindividualsacquirealevelofprotectiveim
munity,whichreducesthesusceptiblepopulation.Themodelalsoprojectstheeffectsof
potentialfutureUKGovernmentinterventionsbysimulatingincreasedlockdownswhen
knowndailycasesriseabovethresholdlevels.Allequations,auxiliaryvariablevaluesand
initialvaluesofstocksarelistedinSupplementaryTableS1.
3.2.ModelDataSources
Theinfectionrateinthemodeliscalculatedfromthesusceptiblepopulationandthe
dailyinfectingcontactrate,whichisaffectedbysocialdistancing,hygieneandlockdown
measuresandissignificantlylowerforknowninfectedindividuals.Infectivityinthe
modelincreasesfrom5December2020andagainfrom13April2021,reflectingtheemer
genceofthe‘UKvariant’B.1.1.7,nowknownastheAlphavariant,whichwasmeasured
as35%morecontagious(95%CI2–69%)[31,32]andthenthe‘Deltavariant’,assumedto
betwiceascontagiousastheoriginalvirus.ThemodelusesdataforthePBandAZvac
cinesonly,astheModernavaccinehasnotyetbeendeployedinquantityintheUK.
Thevaluesoftheparametersusedinthemodel,showninTable1,wereestablished
intwoways:
1. Forparameterswherereliabledatawasavailablefrompublishedresearch,e.g.,virus
incubationtime,themedianvaluesfromtheresearchwereused;
2. Forparameterswheredatawaseitherunavailableorconsideredunreliable,thePow
elloptimisationmethodwasusedtocalibratethemodelandconfirmanarrow
spreadof95%confidenceintervals.

Systems2021,9,606of24
Table1.Majorparametervaluesusedinmodel.
ParameterValueUnitSource
Incubationduration(noninfectiouslatentperiod)3.5Days[33]
Diseasedurationstage1unknown2Days[33,34]
Diseasedurationstage2known 8Days[33,34]
Diseasedurationstage2unknown 5Days[33,34]
Timefromknowndiseasetilldeath11Days[34]
VaccinerolloutspeedPB/AZ130,000/380,000Doses/day[35,36]
Vaccineprotectionagainstonwardstransmission
21daysafterdose1PB/AZ65%$‐[20]
Vaccineprotectionagainstonwardstransmission7
daysafterdose2PB/AZ70%$‐[20]
Lengthofimmunityaftervaccinationorrecovery 8$Months[15]
Maximumpopulationimmunity 70%‐[37]
Averageimmunityprotectionpostrecovery70%$‐[20]
Unknowninfectiousnessratio*72%$‐[5,26,27,38–40]and
modeloptimisation
Unconstrainedinfectingdailycontactrateun
known0.56$‐modeloptimisation
Unconstrainedinfectingdailycontactrateknown0.14$‐modeloptimisation
KnownproportionestimateFebruary202121%$‐[2]andmodeloptimisation
Relativeinfectivityafteralphavariantidentified1.32$‐[32]andmodeloptimisation
Relativeinfectivityafterdeltavariantidentified2.0$ [41]
*StartingpointwasthebestestimateusedbyCenterforDiseaseControlandPreventionbasedonmultipleassumptions
andconflictingresearchpapers.$Valueusedforbasecaseofmodel.
3.3.LockdownEffectivenessTimelineEstimation
Associaldistancingandlockdownshaveproventobeoneofthemosteffectiveways
ofcombatingthespreadofthevirus[42],acompositemeasureoflockdowneffectiveness
basedonthetimelineofthevariousrestrictionsandtheireasingmeasureswasakeypart
ofthemodel.Thismeasureisknownasthe‘lockdownpercentage’.Itvariesthroughout
thelifeofthemodelandmeasuresthetimelineofsocialdistancing,maskwearingand
movementrestrictionmeasuresandvariesbetween0%and100%,where0%represents
societywithnorestrictionsinplaceand100%ahypotheticaltotalrestrictionscenariowith
nocontactandthereforenotransmissionofthevirus.
FromJanuary2021,theUKGovernmentimplementedasetofcountrylockdown
planswhichspecifiedstagedstepdownsseparatedbyaminimumoffiveweeks,with7
day’snoticeofeachchange[43]toenabletheobservationofthedatabeforeproceeding.
Thedatesofthemostsignificantmeasurestakenandthefutureplans[43]areshownin
Table2.Thelockdownpercentagetimelinewasestimatedfromthistableandcompared
withdatafromaUKsocialdistancingmeasuresadherencestudy[44].
Table2.Datesofsignificantmeasures.
Event Date
FirsttwoUKCOVID19casesconfirmed1February2020
UKGovernmentCoronavirusactionplan3March2020
FirstCOVID19death3March2020
Contacttracingabandoned12March2020
UKwidelockdowneffected26March2020
PrimeMinisteradmittedtohospitalwithCOVID19symptoms4April2020
COVID19alertlevelssystemannounced1May2020
Systems2021,9,607of24
Lockdowneased,workersreturn,outdoorexercisewithanother13May2020
Lockdowneased,nonessentialshopsreopen15June2020
Restaurantsandpubsopen4July2020
Restaurant‘eatouttohelpout’campaign3August2020
Oneofeverythreecasesin20–29yearolds,fastgrowthinyoungerpeople7September2020
England—‘RuleofSix’announcedtocurbsocialgatherings14September2020
England—threetieralertframeworkimplemented14October2020
NorthernIreland—4week‘circuitbreaker’lockdownstarts16October2020
Wales—3week‘firebreak’lockdownstarts23October2020
Scotland—5tieralertsystemstarts2November2020
England—4weeknationallockdownstartsatnewtier45November2020
NewCOVID19strain(Alphavariant)B.1.1.7detectedinUK13November2020
England—4weeklockdownends3December2020
PBimmunisationrolloutstarts8December2020
LondonandScotland,newtier4lockdown 20December2020
Christmasonedaylockdownrelaxation25December2020
AZimmunizationrolloutstarts4January2021
England,Scotland—tier5lockdownto22February6January2021
England—lockdownextendedto8March27January2021
Schoolsreturn8March2021
Nonessentialretail,outdoorhospitalityandattractionsreopen12April2021
NewCOVID19strain(Deltavariant)B.1.617.2detectedinUK15April2021
Indoorhospitalityandsportingeventswithlimitedcapacityreopen 17May2021
PlannedEnglandandScotland‘Freedomday’21Junedeferredto19July14June2021
FUTURECHANGES: 
England—mandatorymaskruleslifted,nightclubsreopen,fullcapacityevents19July2021
Scotland—levelzero,upto10peoplemeetindoors,nightclubsremainclosed 19July2021
3.4.ModelCalibrationandOptimisation
ThemodelwascalibratedagainsthistoricalUKCOVID19case,deathandvaccina
tiondataupto12July2021sourcedfromJohnsHopkinsUniversity[36].Calibrationwas
doneusinganoptimisationprocesstofindthemodelvariableswhichproducedthebest
fittothehistoricaldata.Thevariableswhichwereusedforoptimisationwere:theknown
andunknowninfectingcontactrates,theinfectiousnessratioofunknowntoknowncases
andtheknownproportionofcases.Thisoptimisationproducedthemodel‘basecase’
whichwasusedasthestartingpointforvaryinguncertainties.Optimisationwasalsoper
formedfordifferingimmunitylengthscenarios.TherelativeinfectivityoftheAlphavar
iantandtheDeltavariantwerecalibratedbylateroptimisations.
Aftercalibration,thefollowingvalidationcheckswereperformed:
The‘newsusceptible’and‘recoveredsusceptible’stocksinthemodelwerevalidated
againstUKCOVID19antibodyprevalencestudiestoensurethatthepopulation
fractionofpeoplewithantibodies,whocanbepresumedtohaverecoveredfrom
COVID19,alignswiththemodelledfraction[4];
ModelledUKcasefatalityrateswerecomparedwithhistoricaldatatoensurebroad
alignment[36];
ThereproductionnumberRt,calculatedbythemodelovertime,wascomparedwith
studiesoftheinitialR0andtheongoingCOVID19Rtvaluestocheckconsistency
[45];
Theunknowninfectiousnessratiowascomparedwithpreviousresearchtoensure
thatitwasatleastashighastheestimatedasymptomaticinfectiousnessratio[26,27].
Themajorassumptionsmadeinthemodelinadditiontotheassumedparametervalues
were:
Systems2021,9,608of24
TherelativeinfectivityincreasesattwopointsintimeduetothenewAlphaandDelta
variants;
Vaccinationproceedsatasteadydailyrateinallscenariosandisofferedtothetotal
eligiblepopulationirrespectiveofwhetheranindividualisknowntohaverecovered
fromCOVID19;
Themaximumachievablepopulationimmunityfractionof70%iscappedbyineligi
blepopulationsectors(pregnantwomenandmostchildrenunder18),vaccinehesi
tancy[37]andlogisticaldifficulties;
Theseconddoseofavaccineisgiven12weeksafterthefirstdose;
Theprotectiveeffectofthefirstdoseofthevaccineisestablished21daysafterad
ministration,andincreasedprotectionisestablished7daysaftertheseconddose;
Theaveragetimelagbetweensymptomonsetandthereportingofapositivecaseto
thedatasourceis4days.
3.5.UncertaintyModelling
Havingestablishedthemodel‘basecase’throughcalibrationandvalidation,uncer
tainparametersinthemodelwerethenvariedbetweenthe95%CIsreportedinclinical
trials,enablingtheexplorationoftheeffectonfuturedailycaserates.Asummaryofthe
areasofuncertaintyinvestigatedisshowninTable3.
Table3.Scenariossimulatedinmodel.
Scenario
Immunity
LengthPost
Vaccination
andPost
Recovery
ProtectionFrom
InfectionGiven
byRecovered
Immunity
VaccineProtec
tion3Weeksaf
ter1stDose
VaccineTransmis
sionProtection1
Weekafter2nd
Dose
FutureKnown
Proportionof
Cases
LockdownChar
acteristics
BaseCase8months[15]70%[20]PB/AZ65%[20]PB/AZ70%[20]50%‐
Recoveredimmunity
protectionvariations8months62%/70%/87%
[15–17,19,20]PB/AZ65%PB/AZ70%50%‐
Vaccineprotectionvari
ations8months70%
PB/AZ
60%/65%/70%
[20]
PB/AZ
62%/70%/77%[20]50%‐
Knownproportionof
casesvariations 8months70% PB/AZ65%PB/AZ70%50%/37.5%/25%/
12.5%
‐
Lockdownsensitivity
variations8/12months70%PB/AZ65%PB/AZ70%50%
Delaysfrom3.5
to21days,
Casethresholds
from5000to
25,000,
Lockdownin
creasefrom25%
to50%
Thereisnopublishedresearchdataavailableforpostvaccinationimmunitylength,sothiswasassumedtobethesame
aspostrecoveryimmunity.TheproportionofknownCOVID19casesmayreduceduetolowereddiseaseseverity;the
modelwasrunusingvaluesof0%,25%,50%and75%reductionintheabsenceofpublishedresearch.
Systems2021,9,609of24
4.Results
4.1.ModelFittoActuals
Figure2showsthereportedhistoricalandmodelled7dayaveragesfortheUK’snew
knowndailyCOVID19casesfrom1February2020to12July2021.Theerrorstatistics
calculations(R2:=0.97,RMSPE=3.6%andTheil’sinequalitycoefficient=0.07)confirma
goodfitofthesimulatedresultstohistoricalactuals.Thelockdownpercentageisrepre
sentedasablacklinewithitsscaleontherightaxis.Theleftaxisshowsthescalesforthe
actualandmodellednewknowndailycasesanddeaths,withcasesclimbingto60,000in
January2021.Thexaxismarkingsshowthebeginningofeachmonth.
Figure2.DailyUKreportedCOVID19cases1February2020to12July2021.
TheeffectofthefirstUKwidelockdown,whichwasestimatedas75%effective[44],
canbeseeninApril2020,withknowncasenumberspeaking16dayslater.Thegradual
easingofthelockdownfrom5July2020resultedinanincreaseinknowncasesfromAu
gust2020,withtheUKGovernment‘Eatouttohelpout’schemeestimatedtohaveraised
infectionratesby8to17%[46].ThelockdownpercentageincreasedfrommidOctober
2020inresponsetorisingratesastheEnglishtieredalertsystemstartedandNorthern
IrelandandWalesimposed‘firebreaklockdowns’,followedbyregionalrestrictionsin
ScotlandandafourweekEnglishlockdownstarting5Novemberinanattempttoreduce
casenumbersbeforetheChristmasperiod.Theeffectoftheseconsolidatedlockdowns
wastoreducetheknowncasenumbersfrommidNovember2020for16days,onlyfor
themtoclimbfrom5December2020onwardsastheUKmovedintoitsholidayperiod.
TheemergenceofthemorecontagiousAlphavariantinDecember2020acceleratedthe
newcaserateandmadeastrictlockdowninJanuary2021necessarytocontainthe‘second
wave’.Thelockdownwaseffectiveinreducingcases,whichpeakedat60,000perday12
daysaftertheChristmaslockdownrelaxationandthenfellbelow2000perdayinMay
2021.However,theDeltavariant,whichbecamedominantintheUKinApril2021,com
binedwitheasingoflockdownrestrictionsinAprilandMay,reversedthedownwards
trendandcasesclimbedtoover30,000perdayinJuly2021.
TheoptimisationprocessdescribedinSection3.2calculatedarelativeinfectiousness
valueof72%forunknowncases,whichisintherangesupportedbytheresearch[5].The
Systems2021,9,6010of24
knownproportionof21%ofcasesattheendofJanuary2021wasalsoobtainedthrough
optimisation,assumingalogarithmicgrowthratefromthebeginningofthemodel’s
timeframe.Thisisintherangesupportedbyothermodels[2]andhelpstoexplainwhy
nondiscriminatorylockdownswereadoptedastheonlyeffectivemeansofcontrolling
thespreadofCOVID19beforevaccinesweredeveloped.Theknownproportionwasas
sumedtoincreaseto50%byendMarch2021ascasesfell,testingcapabilityimprovedand
selftestingbecamemandatoryforcertainprofessions,e.g.,teaching.Thisassumptionwas
validatedbyacomparisonofreportedcasesagainstrandompopulationsampling.
4.2.ExploringUncertainty
ThescenariosidentifiedinTable3weresimulatedbyvaryingtheselectedvariables
whilstkeepingothervariablesat‘basecase’levels.
4.2.1.UncertainImmunityLength
The‘basecase’definedinTable3assumes8monthsaverageimmunity,eitherafter
vaccinationorrecoveryfrominfection[15],a65%reductionintransmissionprotection
afteronedose,a70%reductionaftertwodosesofeitherthePBorAZvaccineand70%
protectionfromreinfectionafterrecoveryfromCOVID19[20].Researchtodatereports
thatimmunityislikelytovarybetween5and12months[15–17,19],andTable4shows
thesimulatedscenarios.Immunityagainstemergingvariantsmaybedifferentandisnot
accountedforinthismodel.
Table4.Varyingimmunityscenarios.
ScenarioImmunity
Length
RecoveredImmun
ityProtection
VaccineProtection3
Weeksafter1stDose
VaccineProtection
1Weekafter2nd
Dose
FutureKnown
Cases
Immunitylengthvaria
tions 5/8/12months70%PB/AZ65%PB/AZ70%50%
Themodelwasrunfrom1February2020to31December2021tosimulatethe‘base
case’of8monthsimmunityandshorterandlongeraverageimmunitylengthsof5and12
months.Figure3showstheprojecteddailyknowncasesforthethreescenarios,assuming
asteppedlockdownpercentagedecreasefromMarch2021onwards,whichreducesto
20%inmidJuly2021accordingtothecurrentUKGovernmenttimelines[43].Thefigure
of20%assumesthatsomedistancingrestrictionsarestillinplaceuntiltheendof2021,
thatpeoplewillcontinuetoexercisecautionandthatbusinesseswillcontinueriskreduc
tionpoliciessuchasdisinfectionandmanagementofcrowds.
Systems2021,9,6011of24
Figure3.DailyUKCOVID19casesprojectedtoend2021withvaryingimmunitylengths.
Forthe‘basecase’,thesolidredlineinFigure3showsthemodel’sprojectionofa
continuingrapidincreaseinknowndailycases,drivenbyincreasedtransmissionoppor
tunitiesandanincreasedsusceptiblepopulationpercentageasthoseinfectedinearly2021
losetheirimmunity.ThispeaksinSeptember2021at260,000dailyknowncaseswhen
populationimmunitycreatedbybothvaccinationandrecoveryfrominfectionreduces
thesusceptiblepercentageandnumbersstarttofall.Thisprojectionisstarklydifferent
fromthepreDeltavariantscenario,whichisrepresentedbythedottedredline.Inthis
scenario,immunityfrombothvaccinationandrecoverywouldhavecontaineddaily
knowncasesbelow3000fromMay2021.Increasingtheaverageimmunitylengthto12
monthsisprojectedtocontainthesurgeto160,000dailyknowncases,peakinginOctober
2021.Ifimmunityonlylastsfor5months,thesurgeishigherandapeakof430,000daily
knowncasesisreachedinAugust2021.A5monthimmunityscenarioassumingnoDelta
variantwouldalsoseecasesrisingmoreslowly,peakinginDecember2021.The5month
immunityscenarios,however,seemunlikelyasactualknowndailycasesarenotsurging
fastenoughinJuly2021toalignwiththemodel’sprojections.
TheresultsshowninFigure3arebasedontheassumptionthatfromMay2021on
wards,50%ofcasescontinuetobedetectedduetoincreasedtestingcapability.However,
thisdetectionratemaywellbeunachievableatthesehighcaselevels,inwhichcasere
portedresultswouldshowlowernumbersthanthoseprojectedinthesimulation.
4.2.2.UncertainImmunityEffectiveness
Researchhasproducedarangeofeffectivenessresultsandconfidenceintervalsfor
bothrecoveredandvaccinatedimmunity.Table5showsthevaryingimmunityeffective
nessscenariossimulated.Thescenariosreflectthe95%CIrangeofpostvaccinationand
postrecoveryimmunityprotectionfromtheresultsofclinicalresearch[20],assumingthe
‘basecase’forothervalues[15–17,19,20].The95%CIrangesforrecoveredandvaccinated
immunityaredifferent,andthisisreflectedinthescenariosused.Figure4showsthe
modelledprojectionsforthesescenarios.
Systems2021,9,6012of24
Table5.Varyingimmunityeffectivenessscenarios.
ScenarioImmunity
Length
RecoveredIm
munityProtection
VaccineProtection3
Weeksafter1stDose
VaccineProtection1
Weekafter2ndDose
Future
Known
Cases
Vaccineprotectionvar
iations 8months70%PB/AZ60%/65%/70% PB/AZ62%/70%/77%50%
Recoveredimmunity
protectionvariations 8months62%/70%/87% PB/AZ65%PB/AZ70%50%
Figure4.Dailyknowncaseprojectionswithvaryingimmunityprotection.
Figure4aprojectsthatifpostvaccinationprotectionfrominfectionisatthelower
boundaryof62%aftertwodoses,knowninfectionswillbuildto320,000inSeptember.
Usingthehigherboundaryof77%protectionaftertwodoses,themodelprojectsthat
knowndailycaseswillpeakat210,000beforedroppingasherdimmunityfrombothvac
cinationandrecoveryreducesthesusceptiblepercentage.
Figure4bshowstheprojectedrangeofknowncasesforrecoveredimmunityvaria
tion.Themodelprojectsthatthelowervalueofrecoveredimmunityof62%willresultin
adailyknowncasesurgeto280,000inSeptember2021,reducingto215,000withthe
highervalueof87%.AsdescribedinSection4.2.1,50%detectionatthesehighdailycase
numbersmaybeunachievable,whichwouldreducethereportedcasepeaks.
4.2.3.UncertainKnownProportion
TheresultspresentedsofarshowonlytheknownproportionofCOVID19casesin
theUK.Asvaccinationreducesnotonlythecasenumbersbutalsotheaveragecasese
verity,theunknownproportionmayincreasefurtherastheproportionofmildorasymp
tomaticcasesgrows,evenwithincreasedeaseandavailabilityoftesting.Table6shows
thescenariosmodelled.
Systems2021,9,6013of24
Table6.Varyingknownproportionscenarios.
ScenarioImmunity
Length
RecoveredIm
munityProtection
VaccineProtection3
Weeksafter1stDose
VaccineProtection1
Weekafter2ndDose
FutureKnownCases
Knownpro
portionvaria
tions
8months70%PB/AZ65%PB/AZ70%50%/37.5%/25%/12.5
%
Figure5a,bprojectthedailyknownandtotalcasesfor2021forthe‘basecase’sce
nariowiththepercentageofknowncasestounknownrangingfrom50%to12.5%.The
basecaseassumesthat50%ofcasesareknown.
Figure5.DailyknownandunknownUKCOVID19casesin2021withvaryingknownproportionassumptions.
Asexpected,theprojectedknowncasenumbersdropastheunknownproportion
rises.Theprojectedtotalcaseswouldbeexpectedtoincreasewhenalowerpercentageof
thecasesareknownbecausetransmissionisnotbeingmanagedthroughisolationofin
fectedindividuals.However,becauseunknowncasesareassumedtobelessinfectious
andofashorterdurationthanknowncases[26,27],a75%reductionintheproportionof
knowncases(from50%to12.5%)generatesonlya40%increaseintotalcasenumbers.
4.2.4.ModellingtheEffectofInterventions
TheUKGovernment’splannedlandmarkdateof21June2021,‘Freedomday’,when
maskscouldberemovedandothersignificantrestrictionswouldbelifted,wasmovedto
19JulyasdailycasenumbersstartedtoriseinMay2021[47].Thisrise,drivenbythemore
transmissibleDeltavariantandtheeasedrestrictions,raisesthequestionofwhetherfur
therlockdownsshouldbeconsidereddespitetheincreasingvaccinationnumbers.From
theresultsshowninFigures3–5,itcanbeseenthatvaryingimmunitylengthhasalarger
impactoncasenumberprojectionsthanvaryingvaccinationandrecoveredimmunity
protectionwithintheirlikelyranges.Therefore,potentiallockdownscenarioswereex
ploredwithdifferingimmunitylengthassumptions,asshowninTable7.
Systems2021,9,6014of24
Table7.Varyinglockdowninitiationscenarios.
ScenarioImmunity
Length
Recovered
Immunity
Protection
VaccinePro
tection1st
Dose
VaccinePro
tection2nd
Dose
Future
Known
Cases
Lockdown
DailyCase
Threshold
Lockdown%
Lockdowneffects
forvaryingimmun
itylengths
5/8/12
months 70%PB/AZ65%PB/AZ70%7days50,00020%addition
Figure6a,bsimulatetheeffectsofaGovernmentpolicywhichreactstodailyknown
casesrisingabove50,000byincreasinglockdownlevelsby20%.The20%isatheoretical
numberwhichcouldbemadeupofanumberofdifferentmeasures,e.g.,selfisolation
restrictions,masks,numberlimits.A7dayreactiontimeisbuiltintothesimulation,in
linewithcurrentGovernmentpolicy.
Figure6.Lockdowninterventionswhencasesriseabove50,000.
Figure6aprojectsthatforan8monthimmunitylength,a3monthlongreturntothe
40%lockdownlevelwouldberequiredfromlateJuly2021toreturncasestobelow50,000.
Fora12monthimmunitylength,a2monthreturntothe40%lockdownlevelwouldbe
required,startingatasimilartime.Figure6bprojectsthatfora5monthimmunitylength,
the50,000casethresholdwillbebreachedinJulyandcontinuinglockdownattheJuly
levelswouldreducethepeakdailynumbersto250,000beforetheydropdowninNovem
ber2021.
4.2.5.LockdownPolicySensitivities
ThescenariosshowninTable8wereusedtosimulatethesensitivityofthelockdown
policytothelengthoftimebeforeinitiatinglockdown.
Systems2021,9,6015of24
Table8.Varyinglockdowninitiationdelayscenarios.
ScenarioImmunity
Length
RecoveredIm
munityProtection
VaccineProtec
tion1stDose
VaccineProtec
tion2ndDose
DelayBefore
Lockdown
LockdownDaily
CaseThreshold
Lock
down%
Lockdownde
layvariations
8months70%PB/AZ65%PB/AZ70%
3.5,7,10.5,
14,17.5,21
days
500025%addi
tion
5months70%PB/AZ65%PB/AZ70%
3.5,7,10.5,
14,17.5,21
days
500025%addi
tion
Figure7projectstheresultsofvaryingthelockdownnoticeperiodbetween3.5and
21daysafterknowncasesreach50,000.Figure7ashowsthatthe8monthimmunity‘base
case’witha20%increaseinlockdownpercentageresultsinashorterdelayandalower
peakincases.Thehighestpeakisprojectedforthe21dayleadtime.Figure7bshowsthe
samepatternforthe12monthimmunityassumption,withmaximumdailyinfections
reaching96,000fora3.5dayleadtimeand136,000fora21dayleadtime.
Figure7.Effectofvaryingtimetoinitiatelockdown.
ThescenariosshowninTable9wereusedtosimulatethesensitivityofthelockdown
policytothecasethresholdbeforeinitiatinglockdown.
Table9.Varyinglockdowncasethresholdscenarios.
ScenarioImmunity
Length
RecoveredIm
munityProtec
tion
VaccineProtec
tion1stDose
VaccineProtec
tion2ndDose
DelayBeforeLock
down
Lockdown
DailyCase
Threshold
Lockdown%
Lockdown
casethresh
oldvariations
8months70%PB/AZ65%PB/AZ70%7days
25,000,50,000,
75,000,
100,000
20%addition
12months70%PB/AZ65%PB/AZ70%7days
25,000,50,000,
75,000,
100,000
20%addition
Systems2021,9,6016of24
Figure8projectstheresultsofvaryingthedailyknowncasethresholdforinitiating
lockdownbetween25,000and100,000,assuminga7dayleadtimeasperthecurrentUK
Governmentpolicy.Figure8ashowsthat,forthe8monthimmunity‘basecase’,thelower
thecasethreshold,thelowerthepeakofdailycases.Inallscenarios,casesfallrapidlyas
thesusceptiblepercentagereducesduetoincreasingpopulationimmunityfromthelarge
numbersofrecoveredinfectionsandvaccinations.Figure8bshowsthesamepatternfor
the12monthimmunityscenariowithlowerpeaksbecauseofthegreaterlevelofretained
recoveredpopulationimmunity.
Figure8.Effectofvaryingnumberofknowncasesrequiredtoinitiatelockdown.
ThemodelwasusedtosimulateextremelockdownscenariosasshowninTable10.
Table10.Testingextremelockdownscenarios.
FigureScenarioImmunity
Length
Recovered
Immunity
Protection
VaccinePro
tection1st
Dose
VaccinePro
tection2nd
Dose
DelayBefore
Lockdown
Lockdown
DailyCase
Threshold
Lockdown%
9a
Longdelay
&highcase
threshold
8/12months70%PB/AZ65%PB/AZ70%21days100,00020%addition
9bSeverelock
down8/12months70%PB/AZ65%PB/AZ70%7days50,00040%addition
Theextremeeffectsofahighthresholdof100,000casesanda21daydelaybefore
lockdowninitiationwereprojectedinFigure9a;forthe8monthimmunitybasecase,the
casethresholdisreachedinAugust2021andlockdownisinitiatedinearlySeptember
2021,continuingfor2monthswithdailyknowncasespeakingat250,000.Forthe12
monthimmunityscenario,ashorterlockdownstartinginSeptemberisrequired,anddaily
casespeakat160,000.Figure9bprojectstheeffectofa40%lockdownincreaseratherthan
the20%usedinotherscenariosandshowshow,forthe8monthimmunitybasecase,
reducedtransmissionopportunitylowersdailycasesfromapeakof107,000tobelowthe
50,000casethreshold,requiringanotherlockdownphaseinlate2021toreducecase
Systems2021,9,6017of24
numbersagain.The12monthimmunityscenarioonlyrequiresonelockdowntocontrol
casenumbersasongoingvaccinationscontinuetoreducethesusceptiblepercentage.
Figure9.Extremesimulationsforlockdowns.
4.2.6.ChangeinSusceptiblePercentage
InFebruary2021,100%oftheUKpopulationwassusceptibletoinfectionwith
COVID19.Thesusceptiblepercentagedroppedaspeoplebecameimmuneeitherthrough
infectionorvaccination.ThemovementofthesusceptiblepercentageisillustratedinFig
ure10forimmunitylengthvariationscenarios,withandwithoutnewlockdowninter
ventionsafterJune2021,asshowninTable11.
Table11.Susceptiblepercentageillustrations.
FigureScenarioImmunity
Length
Recovered
Immunity
Protection
VaccinePro
tection1st
Dose
VaccinePro
tection2nd
Dose
DelayBefore
Lockdown
Lockdown
DailyCase
Threshold
Lockdown%
10aImmunityvari
ations
5/8/12
months70%PB/AZ65%PB/AZ70%‐  ‐
10b
Immunityvari
ationswith
lockdowninter
vention
5/8/12
months70%PB/AZ65%PB/AZ70%7days50,00020%addi
tion
Systems2021,9,6018of24
Figure10.Susceptiblepopulationpercentagewithdifferingimmunityandinterventions.
Figure10showsthesusceptiblepercentagereducingasthepandemicprogresses.
Thesteeperdownwardslopescorrelatewithperiodsofhigherinfectionratesduring
whichmorepeopleacquirerecoveredimmunity.InFigure10a,forthe5monthimmunity
scenario,thesusceptiblepercentagedropsslowlythroughApriltoJuly2021asincreasing
numbersarevaccinated.Itthenfallssteeplyto13%becausetheinfectionsurge,whichis
seeninFigure3,generatesrecoveredimmunitybeforeincreasinginSeptember2021as
thisimmunityerodes.The8monthand12monthimmunityscenariosfollowasimilar
patternbutwithlesspronouncedslopechanges.
Figure10bshowsthesusceptiblepercentagesforthethreeimmunityscenarioswith
lockdowninterventionsimplemented.Forallscenarios,lockdownsasillustratedinFigure
6arerequiredtoreducedailyknowncasesbelow50,000.Thesehavetheeffectofslowing
thesusceptiblepercentagereductionbyreducingcasenumbersandhencegeneratingless
recoveredimmunity.
5.Discussion
5.1.ImplicationsofFindings
TheUKGovernment’sapproachtotheCOVID19pandemicintheUK,thoughini
tiallyhesitant,turnedaroundinearly2021whenstronglockdownmeasureswereputin
placeandanambitiousvaccinationprogrammewascommenced.TheUK’saggressive
pursuitofvaccinationispayingoff,withhalfthepopulationfullyvaccinatedatthebe
ginningofJuly2021.WereitnotfortheemergenceoftheDeltavariant,assumingthat
immunitygainedfromeitherinfectionorvaccinationlastsatleast8months,theUK
wouldbeassuredthatitcouldliftrestrictionsandkeepCOVID19casenumbersatalow
levelthroughouttheremainderof2021.However,sharplyrisingcasenumbersinJuly
2021arechangingthelandscape,withhealthworkersonceagainfearfulofbeingover
whelmedbyCOVID19cases[48].Thevaccinationprogrammehasreducedboththe
transmissionandseverityofthedisease,meaningthathospitalisationanddeathrateswill
begreatlyreduced,butwithhalfthepopulationstillunvaccinatedorincompletelyvac
cinated,andthescenariosprojectinghundredsofthousandsofdailycases,dailydeaths
arelikelytoreachintothehundreds[36]withoutcontainmentmeasures.
Systems2021,9,6019of24
Themostsignificantinfluencerofongoinginfectionrates,otherthantheemergence
ofanothermoreinfectiousvariant,islikelytobethelengthofprotectionconferredby
vaccinatedandrecoveredimmunity.Immunitylengthisasignificantunknown,which
willonlybecomeclearerasresultsfromlongitudinalstudiesonvaccinatedandrecovered
individualsemerge.ThemodellingusedbytheUKGovernment’sSAGEadvisorygroup
[13]specificallyexcludeswaningimmunityandthefutureemergenceofvariants,sothese
aresignificantgaps.Therearenotoolstopredicttheprofileoffuturevariantsbutfurther
researchtounderstandimmunitylength,particularlyvaccinatedimmunity,whichhasa
moresignificantinfluenceintheUKthanrecoveredimmunity,iscriticalforinforming
policyandforreducingtheuncertaintysurroundingthevariousscenarios.
Ascasessurge,thevaccinatedsectorofthepopulationwillbeprotectedfromserious
illnessanddeathbutvaccinationstatusintheUKisuneven,withloweruptakeamongst
disadvantagedgroupsandethnicminorities,leavingthesegroupsvulnerable.Theunvac
cinatedpopulationwillonlybeeffectivelyprotectedthroughherdimmunity,whichre
searchindicateswillbereachedwithasusceptiblepercentageof30%orless[49,50].The
limitsonthepercentageofthepopulationabletobevaccinatedwillbecomethemain
constrainttoachievingherdimmunity.About22%oftheUKpopulationarenotcurrently
eligibleforvaccination(21%under18,0.7%pregnant),whichmeansthat90%ofeligible
adultsneedtobevaccinatedtoachievea70%total.Withthehighestinfectionprevalence
inteenagersand20–24yearolds[47],extendingvaccinationstochildrenisalogicalnext
steptoincreasingherdimmunity,andfurtherresearchandtrialsonthesafetyandefficacy
ofvaccinesforchildrenandpregnantwomenarerequiredtoinformpolicy.Continuing
educationandreassuranceforthevaccinehesitantsectorofthepopulationisalsore
quiredtoaddressresistance.Itseemslikelythatforherdimmunitytobemaintained,reg
ularboosterdosesofCOVID19vaccinationswillbeneeded;thepracticeofimmunizing
newlyeligiblepeoplewillbeinsufficienttocontrolthespreadofthevirus.
Casesarelikelytoshiftfromknowntounknownbecauseofthereductionininfection
severitypostvaccination.Asnothingotherthanlockdownappearstoworkwhenthere
aremanyunknowncases,acapabilitywhichmaintainsorimprovestheproportionof
knowncasesisimportant.Thepotentialformoreunknowncases,exploredinSection
4.2.3,isaconcernandstrengtheningpolicieswhichencourageroutinetestingmitigates
againstthegrowingunknownproportion,andthustheunseenburdenofdisease.The
projectionsforknowncasesinFigures3and4arebasedontheknownproportionremain
ingat50%,whichiswhytheyaresohighinsomescenarios.
ThecurrentGovernmentpolicyof7day’swarningofachangeinlockdownstatus
seemsareasonablebalancebetweenpeople’sneedfornoticeandtheinfectiongrowth
whichtakesplaceinthose7days,althoughthereisacaseforreducingnoticetocurb
growth.Anyargumentforalowlockdowncasethresholdtocurbgrowthhasbeenover
takenbyeventsinJuly2021,withover50,000dailycasesbeingreported.Theloadonthe
healthserviceswillbeacriticalconsiderationindecisionsaboutfurtherrestrictions;mod
ellingthatisoutsidethescopeofthisarticle.
5.2.ModellingDiscussion
TheUKGovernment’sSAGEadvisorygroupusesthreemodelsfromtheImperial
CollegeLondon,WarwickUniversityandtheLondonSchoolofMedicineandTropical
Hygienegroups[13].Theassumptionsusedbythemodelsaredocumented,butthepublic
cannoteasilyseeorunderstandthemodelsortheprocessbywhichtheresultsareob
tained.Thisgeneratesmistrustandskepticism,especiallyastheincorporationofnewfac
torssuchastheemergenceoftheDeltavariantcannotbedoneinstantaneously.
Thismodel,whilstithasmorelimitationsthanthelargermodels,hastheadvantage
ofbeingabletobedisplayedononepage,makingitpotentiallymoreaccessibleandtrans
parent.Itisanaggregatedmodel,withnosplitintoagebandswiththeirdifferingprofiles
andvulnerabilities.Itdoesnotaccountforurban/ruraldifferencesorforcountrydiffer
enceswithintheUK.Manyaspectsofthesimulation,forexample,vaccinerolloutramp
Systems2021,9,6020of24
upandtheemergenceoftheAlphaandDeltavariants,aresimplified.However,itisa
usefultoolforrepresentingCOVID19transmissionintheUKandcanbeusedtoproject
theeffectsofpoliciesandinterventionsacrossarangeofuncertainties.
5.2.1.Uncertainty
Themodelisbasedonasetofsignificantassumptionsbasedonevolvingclinical
researchwhichsuggestsarangeofscenarios.Ofparticularimportanceare:
lengthofrecoveredimmunity;
vaccineefficacyinreducingtransmission;
durationandrelativeinfectiousnessofasymptomaticandmildlysymptomaticcases;
ongoinguncertaintyontheproportionofunknowncaseswhichcontinuetodrive
infections.
ThestrategiesfordealingwithuncertaintyinCOVID19modellingproposedby
Wang/Flessa[51]havebeenfollowedforthismodellingexercise.Itisevidentbothfrom
theresultsandthediscussionthatchangesinkeyassumptions,includingfuturelock
downpercentages,canhavesignificantimpactsontheprojectionsinthemodel.Changes
inthevaccinemixmayalsochangethemodelprojections.Everymonththatthepandemic
progresses,newresearchwithadirectbearingonthemodelassumptionsisproduced,so
thereisanopportunityforongoingrefinement.
5.2.2.ConfidenceintheResultsforGivenAssumptions
Animportantdecisioninthemodellingprocessiswhichvaluestofixasconstants
andwhichtodeterminethrougha‘tryforfit’calibrationprocess.Ifoneattemptstovary
alloftheassumedvaluesinthemodel,therearetoomanydegreesoffreedomtobeable
toobtainmeaningfulresults.Itiscertainlypossibletoobtainsimilarresultswithdifferent
parametervalues,inlinewiththeconceptofequifiniality,whichdemonstratesthatdif
ferentsetsofparameterscanleadtothesameorsimilarresults[52].Thereisabalance
betweenfixingassumptionstoreducethenumberofvaluesinplay,enablingameaning
fuloptimizationprocesstoberun,andchoosingtofixassumptionswhicharenotcertain
enough,introducingerrorintothemodel.Themethodusedinthisexercise,whichrelies
onfixingvalueswhichhaveresearchbackingandcalibratingtheothervaluesagainsthis
toricaldatathroughacurvefittingexercise,hasintroducedalevelofrigourtotheprocess.
5.2.3.ComparisonwithOtherModels
Asignificantdifferencebetweenthismodelandmanyothermodelsproducedisthe
inclusionoflossofimmunity.MostoftheearlierCOVID19modelsexcludedlossofim
munity,althoughStrubenrecognisesitasafactorwhichwill