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Socio-Emotional
Skills, Quality,
and Equity:
The
Multilevel Person-in-Context
~neuroperson
(MPC
n
) Framework
QTURN WHITE PAPER #1
A Framework for Socio-Emotional Skills, Quality, and Equity | 2
Contents
Summary
3
I. Introduction
4
II. The Neuroperson
7
Schemas
8
Beliefs
9
Awareness 10
Agency
11
III. SEL History, Quality, and Equity
13
IV. Conclusions
14
References
15
End Notes
17
Citation: Peck, S. C., & Smith, C., (2020). Socio-Emotional Skills, Quality, and Equity: The Multilevel
Person-in-Context~neuroperson (MPCn) Framework. [White Paper #1]. QTurn.
A Framework for Socio-Emotional Skills, Quality, and Equity | 3
Summary
Evaluation evidence about the relations among children’s1
prior history, engagement in program settings, resulting SEL
skill growth, and the ultimately desired transfer outcomes (e.g.,
agency to succeed in other settings) has been sporadic and
fragmented. One reason for this may be that the positivist
theory and methodology2 used by most researchers and
evaluators is poorly suited to the formative explanations3 that
guide continuous quality improvement (CQI) processes. As a
result, we lack nuanced impact models that address questions
about how and how much, or the information necessary for
organizational decision-making. QTurn’s Quality-Outcomes
Design and Methods (Q-ODM) toolbox (Peck & Smith, 2020)
was created to address these fundamental problems in the
evaluation of education settings, with a specific focus on out-
of-school time (OST; afterschool, child care, drop-in, mentoring,
tutoring, etc.) programs.
In this white paper, we introduce a theoretical framework
designed to describe the integrated set of mental and
behavioral parts and processes (i.e., schemas, beliefs, and
awareness) that are socio-emotional skills and that produce
both basic and advanced forms of agency. With improved
definitions and understanding of SEL skills, and the causes of
SEL skill growth, we hope to improve reasoning about
programs and policies for socio-emotional supports in any
setting where children spend time. Perhaps most importantly,
we hope to inform policy decisions and advance applied
developmental science by improving the accuracy and
meaningfulness of basic data on children’s SEL skill growth.
Building from the socio-emotional skills framework
presented herein, extension to issues in assessment are
covered in QTurn’s White Paper #2, Measuring Socio-Emotional
Skills in Out-of-School Time Settings (Smith & Peck, 2020a). The
extension of SEL theory and measurement to CQI cycles and
impact evaluation is covered in QTurn’s White Paper #3, The
Quality-Outcomes Design and Methods (Q-ODM) Toolbox (Peck
& Smith, 2020). Finally, in White Paper #4, Citizen Science for
Out-of-School Time Evidence and Advocacy (Smith & Peck,
2020b), we describe an alternative pathway for improving
evidence about both the impact and equity of OST investments.
This paper is part of a
series: White Paper 1 –
Socio-Emotional Skills,
Quality, and Equity
(Peck &
Smith, 2020b) – provides a
translational framework for
understanding the key
parts of an SEL skill set.
White Paper 2 –
Measuring
Socio-Emotional Skill,
Impact, and Equity
Outcomes
(Smith & Peck,
2020a) – provides guidance
for selecting feasible and
valid SEL skill measures.
White Paper 3 –
Realist(ic)
Evaluation Tools for OST
Programs
– integrates the
SEL framework and
measures with a pattern-
centered approach to both
CQI and impact evaluation.
White Paper 4 –
Citizen
Science and Advocacy in
OST
(Smith & Peck, 2020b)
– presents an alternative
evidence-based approach
to improving both the
impact and equity of OST
investments.
A Framework for Socio-Emotional Skills, Quality, and Equity | 4
I. Introduction
A recent review found over 100 different frameworks describing socio-emotional learning (SEL)
supports and skills (Berg et al., 2017). This cacophony of words and concepts undermines the shared
understanding and language necessary for coordinated action, both within organizations doing the work
and among evaluators producing the evidence.4 Confusion about what constitutes SEL skill, and how
“skill” may or may not differ from many other concepts – such as, competence, abilities, traits, attitudes,
and mindsets – undermines scientific progress and slows policy processes that rely on at least
approximate consensus around shared meanings and objects of measurement.
Mismatches between what we think should be taught and assessed, what we actually teach and
assess, and the actual nature of SEL skills, translate into wasted time and resources. This is perhaps
nowhere more evident than in education fields, where the obvious injustice of ignoring SEL skills (e.g.,
how individual students, teachers, and administrators think and feel about their own daily situation) is
rarely addressed by most SEL tools and methods. Many perfectly well-skilled students and staff do not
like their situation, but confusion about SEL skills prevents solutions to this fundamental SEL problem.
For example, curriculum conversations may feel productive while creating misunderstandings that are
exacerbated by poor measurement choices and misspecified theoretical, statistical, and measurement
models. The resulting pattern of failure to tangibly improve the quality of instructional services at scale,
and deliver obvious and visible improvements in child outcomes, is not surprising, but it can be
addressed.
In this white paper,5 we draw upon a translational framework (Peck, 2007; Peck et al., 2019; Roeser
et al., 2006; Roeser & Peck, 2009; Smith et al., 2016) to define SEL skills and describe how to support
children and adults to grow them. This sorting out of the parts of SEL skill – the objects of measurement
– can also show us how to measure real changes in SEL skills, how to measure the critical qualities of SEL
supports, and ultimately, how to model equity effects and the impact of educational interventions on
SEL skill growth. In subsequent white papers, we take up the related issues of selecting measures and
evaluation designs necessary to detect impact and equity effects. Throughout this work, we hope to
clarify how traditional psychometric and counterfactual ways of thinking about how to measure and
evaluate impacts are also part of the problem we are trying to solve.
The Multilevel Person-in-Context~neuroperson (MPCn) framework (Peck et al., 2019; Smith et al.
2016) clarifies the nature, functioning, and growth of SEL skills within a cascade of causal effects that
flow into and through the individuals who participate in OST settings. Importantly, it achieves this clarity
by relying minimally on inherently ambiguous terms like emotion, motivation, and cognition.6 For
example, the MPCn framework describes:
a. the mental (or psychological) parts and dynamics that govern SEL skill growth (e.g., what
happens in individuals’ mind/brain before, during, and after SEL skill growth)
b. how different types of behavioral SEL skill come from more fundamental mental SEL skills
c. the need to consider the baseline SEL skills (e.g., attachment styles) and prior stress/trauma
experiences of children and adults when they enter a program setting
d. the causal pathways from baseline skills, through point-of-service (POS) quality, to SEL skill
growth, and ultimately, transfer outcomes in multiple settings
e. SEL “equity effects” in programs where vulnerable children experience growth in SEL skills
similar to or exceeding their more typically-developing peers
A Framework for Socio-Emotional Skills, Quality, and Equity | 5
The MPCn framework provides a generic theory of change applicable to most childhood settings,
including the OST field, which is of specific relevance to our work. Figure 1 shows the nesting of children
and program offerings within organizations, communities, and regions. The arrows linking each context
indicate that quality in a given context (e.g., the community) influences the quality of settings nested
within it (e.g., organizations). For example, in communities with a larger population of trained youth
workers, organizations will find it easier to hire more qualified staff, and in organizations with higher
wages where qualified staff are retained,
more youth will experience high-quality
instruction.
Figure 1 shows a multilevel cascade of
causal effects across levels of context and
highlights the extent to which causal
processes at the POS (e.g., the effects of
staff practices on youth engagement)
depend on program staff enacting different roles at different levels of context. For example, program
managers and staff plan with data during team meetings at the organization level, and then staff enact
intended improvement practices at the POS level.
The reciprocal interactions between staff and youth at the POS are at the center of this cascade of
causes and effects. Where staff practices at the POS are of sufficiently high quality during each program
session, children’s mental and behavioral SEL skills are engaged and grow. As children move from OST
settings to other social contexts (i.e., the near transfer of SEL skills to family, school, peers, and the far
transfer of SEL skills to subsequent life course achievements, such as early adulthood health, education,
and employment), they apply and further develop their growing SEL skills during the many personal and
social challenges of daily living. Figure 1 also suggests that children’s past experiences and pre-program
SEL skills must be understood for staff to successfully translate curricula into high-quality practices that
engage children’s SEL skills at program entry.
Figure 1. Multilevel Person-in-Context~neuroperson (MPCn) Theory of Change.
Children’s past experiences and pre-
program SEL skills must be understood
for staff to successfully translate curricula
into high-quality practices that engage
children’s SEL skills at program entry.
A Framework for Socio-Emotional Skills, Quality, and Equity | 6
SEL skills have a compounding effect on many developmental outcomes that has been described as
dynamic complementarity (Heckman, 2007); that is, SEL skills beget other types of skills. Specifically, the
ability to use SEL skills (i.e., self-regulation, in its general sense) makes lots of good things happen.
Children and adults operating at high levels of SEL skill can more easily get on to the business of learning
what the context has to offer, rather than being triggered by, and/or exiting, that context. Staff in
educational settings that are “ready for children” understand that children and adults enter their
classrooms with a wide range of background experiences, and it is the business of educators to directly
address those social and emotional needs and strengths in each moment. Ignoring the background
experiences of children and adults, and how they feel in the moment, perpetuates inequity because
people operating at high socio-emotional skill levels tend to more easily engage task content and
corresponding relationships, whereas those operating at lower SEL skill levels are typically less able to
productively engage tasks and/or relationships that are critical for learning.
A Framework for Socio-Emotional Skills, Quality, and Equity | 7
II. The Neuroperson
In Figure 1, the icons depicting a brain between staff and youth behaviors at the POS indicate that
mental skills are causes of behavior. For example, encouraging children to plan how they will complete
an activity requires forethought on the part of staff and prompts youth to devote attention to the task,
set goals, and solve problems. Figure 2 represents a close-up of these mental processes and their
relation to behavior; that is, it depicts the neuroperson part of the MPCn framework,7 simplified and
tuned for use in OST settings (but applicable to all other childhood settings).
We use the term neuroperson to
emphasize how SEL skills can be
defined and understood in terms of
several mental parts and processes
characterizing the human brain. As
shown in Figure 2, these
qualitatively different parts of
mental skills are centered in
different regions of the brain (i.e.,
the limbic system, the neocortex,
and the prefrontal cortex) and have
different implications for the nature
and growth of SEL skills. For
simplicity, we refer to Schemas,
Beliefs, and Awareness.8 Similar to dual-process9 approaches to psychological functioning (e.g., Deutsch
& Strack, 2006; Hofmann et al., 2009; Kahneman & Frederick, 2007), these three terms denote three
different information storage and processing systems typical of all developing humans, each of which
has been described in detail within multiple clinical and experimental literatures (Berntson & Cacioppo,
2003; Bowlby, 1988; Derryberry & Tucker, 1991; Epstein, 2003; Lewis & Todd, 1997; MacLean, 1990;
Roeser & Peck, 2009).
Figure 2 also reflects a somewhat
atypical use of the emotion concept. Rather
than referring to the neurobiological parts
and processes that we think of as emotion
(e.g., physiological processes mediated by
peptides, like oxytocin, and
neurotransmitters like dopamine,
epinephrine, and serotonin), we focus
instead on three different ways emotions
influence, and are influenced by, schemas,
beliefs, and thoughts. Specifically, emotions
influence (a) schemas by imprinting them
with affective charges, (b) beliefs by
imprinting them with valences, and (c)
thoughts by imprinting them with feelings.
Conversely, schemas, beliefs, and thoughts
Rather than referring to the
neurobiological parts and processes that
we think of as emotion, we focus instead
on three different ways emotions relate to
schemas, beliefs, and thoughts: Emotions
influence (a) schemas by imprinting them
with affective charges, (b) beliefs by
imprinting them with valences, and (c)
thoughts by imprinting them with
feelings.
Figure 2. The Neuroperson Model.
A Framework for Socio-Emotional Skills, Quality, and Equity | 8
influence emotions only when activated and according to, respectively, their affective charges, valences,
and feelings. In this way, we hope to clarify how all SEL skills involve emotional energies of some sort,
whether or not they are acknowledged as such by practitioners or researchers (e.g., belief measures are
often treated as if they have nothing to do with emotion). In our view, activating any belief (or schema)
is likely to cause an emotional response, whether or not that response is noticed consciously as a
feeling.
Schemas, beliefs, and awareness are the raw material from which all mental SEL skills (by whatever
name) are constructed; that is, when considered together, they are mental skills. In addition, Figure 2
distinguishes explicitly between mental skills and behavioral skills, helping us to focus on the extent to
which mental skill growth promotes behavioral skill growth. Finally, the neuroperson model integrates
and extends previous SEL frameworks by clarifying two different kinds of human agency (described
below) that result from the integration of mental and behavioral skills, focusing especially on children’s
emerging capacity to intentionally author their own development.
Schemas
We use the term schema to describe how information (e.g., knowledge, memory) about the self and
world is stored, organized, and processed in a particular area of the brain: the limbic system. The term
schema refers to non-verbal, non-symbolic, affectively-charged representations of the self and world
(Peck, 2007; Peck et al., 2019),10 as in attachment schemas (Bowlby, 1988). As relatively-enduring parts
of the person, attachment schemas act like set points for the way children initially engage in and
respond to program offerings; for this reason, we refer to them as basic regulation skills. For example,
some youth enter OST programs having had adverse childhood experiences (Carlson et al., 2019;
Merrick et al., 2018) that can often result in poor basic regulation skills. ‘Meeting children where they
are at’ means being sensitive to their current thoughts and feelings and understanding that they may be
emotionally triggered in ways that make it difficult to be mentally present and engaged in the current
program offering.
Schemas are formed and elaborated automatically,
especially during child-caregiver interactions during infancy
and early childhood. Their behavioral implications have been
described in terms of four primary attachment styles (i.e.,
secure, insecure [anxious, or avoidant], and disorganized).
Roughly speaking, this means that the “emotions” generated
during social interactions are imprinted onto the schema for
that person in the form of affective charges in long-term
memory. Future encounters with that person automatically
activate the schema, such that relevant memories and feelings
are more accessible to both the behavioral response system
and conscious awareness.
Past experiences that were stored in long-term memory as schemas are typically activated
automatically in response to environmental triggers, without the need for conscious awareness or
planning. The schemas children develop tend to be specific to particular people but can also reflect
social roles (e.g., caregiver, teacher), types of people (e.g., a “good” person), events (e.g., bedtime),
Schemas, beliefs, and awareness are the raw material from which all mental SEL
skills are constructed; that is, they are mental skills.
Attachment schemas act
like set points for the way
children initially engage in
program offerings; for this
reason, we refer to them
as basic regulation skills.
A Framework for Socio-Emotional Skills, Quality, and Equity | 9
objects, and situations. Where they encounter a person or situation with which they have had past
experiences, children’s schemas tend to unconsciously influence their thoughts, feelings, and behavior.
For example, if a child’s schema for “caregiver” was formed through past encounters with a negligent
caregiver, future encounters with caregivers may evoke thoughts, feelings, and behaviors reflecting past
trauma. Conversely, if early caregiver experiences were generally positive, this may make it easier for
the child to quickly build trust and relationships with other adults.
Including schemas as a core feature of the MPCn framework is intended to help practitioners
understand and address the current effects of children’s (as well as practitioners’ own) past experiences.
For practitioners, a critical issue is that children’s schemas operate very quickly (i.e., in milliseconds),
often translating an initial environmental cue (i.e., a trigger) into strong emotional and behavioral
responses that may never enter the child’s conscious awareness. This means, among other things, that
expecting children to consistently control their feelings and behavior, and reacting critically when they
do not, is tantamount to blaming and punishing children for things that have happened to them (and
that may take them years to understand and manage). Learning to recognize and manage such
emotional episodes is a major challenge for both children and adults, but understanding the nature and
functions of schemas, as core elements of everyone’s self-system, can help smooth and accelerate that
learning process.
Beliefs
We use the term belief to describe how information
(e.g., knowledge, memory) about the self and world is
stored, organized, and processed in a second area of the
brain: the neocortex. The term belief refers to verbal-
symbolic representations of the self and world.11 Basic
beliefs (i.e., beliefs in and beliefs about a thing; Fishbein &
Raven, 1962) are the most fundamental unit of information
in the neocortex and are stored as long-term memory. Basic beliefs differentiate and integrate across
time to form higher-order belief systems, such as attitudes (i.e., a belief in a thing integrated with a
belief about the goodness or badness of that thing) that combine to form goals that combine to form
plans. For example, goals can be defined as a system of beliefs about some end-state (e.g., the goal to
graduate can be described in terms of a vast range of beliefs about the self and world, such as
‘graduating requires good grades’ and ‘good grades require studying’). During childhood, and beyond,
beliefs are formed automatically during social interactions but, also, intentionally during self-reflection
(particularly, during and after adolescence).
Just as attitudes, goals, and plans can be viewed as increasingly complex belief systems, there are
many other mental constructs that can be defined in terms of belief systems (e.g., values, opinions,
mindsets, self-concepts, social identities). From an MPCn framework perspective, most (and usually all)
of the terms for mental skills used by typical SEL frameworks and available SEL measures can be defined
in terms of beliefs about the self and world. For example, both perspective-taking (e.g., the ability to
distinguish another person’s perspective from one’s own perspective) and theory of mind (e.g., the
ability to understand that other people have their own intentions and feelings) can be defined in terms
of beliefs about others’ goals, intentions, and feelings.
Basic beliefs differentiate
and integrate across time to
form higher-order belief
systems, such as attitudes
that combine to form plans.
A Framework for Socio-Emotional Skills, Quality, and Equity | 10
In contrast to schemas (which are relatively stable and
change mainly as a result of many direct and repeated social
interactions), beliefs are relatively malleable and can be
modified as a result of even a single indirect social interaction
(e.g., vicarious learning, or learning by observing something that
happens to someone else) or simply by reflecting on previous or
anticipated social interactions. Including beliefs as a core feature
of the MPCn framework is intended to help practitioners
address things like children’s specific subject-matter knowledge
(e.g., what youth need to know to complete a homework
assignment) and more general personal and social identity
issues (e.g., goals, values, self-concepts, self-efficacy, and social
roles).
Also, in contrast to the “affective” information that is part of
schemas (i.e., we use the term affect where referring to the
emotional-state information stored in schemas), beliefs are
characterized by positive and negative “valences” (i.e., we use
the term valence [or evaluative] where referring to the
emotional-state information stored in beliefs). This means that
the “feelings” generated during interactions with the self and
world can be encoded into belief systems in the form of beliefs
about the goodness or badness of features of the self and world.
Future encounters with similar features of the self and world will
tend to automatically activate those valenced beliefs, such that
relevant memories and feelings are more accessible to both the
behavioral response system and conscious awareness.
The mistaken conceptualization of SEL mental skills solely in
terms of valenced beliefs about the self and world was one of
our primary motivations for selecting a framework that places
belief systems within the larger context of the entire mental life
of a person, characterized by schemas and awareness in
addition to beliefs. It is important to understand that both
schemas and beliefs tend to (a) be relatively enduring, (b) exist
and function outside of conscious awareness, and (c) influence
feelings and behavior only after being activated (e.g., by an
environmental trigger or self-reflection). This means, for
example, that modifying children’s schemas and beliefs
generally requires practitioners to prompt and sustain their
activation during program activities. In addition, it is also
important to understand that beliefs are more easily described,
formed, accessed consciously, and modified than schemas. This
means, for example, that beliefs tend to be easier targets for
modification than schemas, which may help explain why beliefs
often become the sole focus of intervention efforts.
The mistaken
conceptualization of
SEL mental skills solely
in terms of beliefs was
one of our primary
motivations for
selecting a framework
that places belief
systems within the
larger context of
schemas and
awareness.
A Framework for Socio-Emotional Skills, Quality, and Equity | 11
Awareness
The term awareness (or executive functions) refers specifically to consciously controlling the focus of
awareness in relation to immediate thoughts and feelings (i.e., currently-activated schemas and beliefs).
Executive functions (e.g., shifting and focusing awareness) operate on thoughts and feelings to provide
the basis for all forms of self-reflection (e.g., secondary appraisal,12 planning, and the effortful control of
impulses). In this view, executive functions are the mental skills that allow individuals to participate
intentionally in their own learning and development.
The distinctions between (a) awareness and both (b) relatively-enduring beliefs and schemas and (c)
immediate thoughts/feelings can be clarified by thinking about how the hundreds of beliefs and
schemas that we have accumulated across our lifespan tend to remain unconscious, in long-term
memory, most of the time. If any of these beliefs or schemas become activated, they are re-represented
in working memory as potentially consciously-accessible thoughts and feelings. In other words, the
subset of currently activated beliefs and schemas, in any given moment, reflect only a tiny proportion of
the total set of beliefs and schemas that could potentially be activated in any given moment. Immediate
thoughts and feelings reflect only currently-activated beliefs and schemas and are the contents of the
stream of consciousness. Awareness is the process of focusing consciously on only some of the thoughts
and feelings available in the stream of consciousness. In other words, activated thoughts and feelings do
not necessarily become the focus of awareness. Activated but nonconscious thoughts and feelings are
also referred to as impulses and can be a major influence on behavior.
Including awareness as a core feature of the MPCn framework is intended to help practitioners
address the most developmentally-advanced form of self-regulation: intentional agency. Unfortunately,
the many meanings assigned to the term agency, both within and across disciplines, has caused much
confusion. By distinguishing awareness from both beliefs/schemas and thoughts/feelings, we can define
the most advanced form of agency in terms of the dynamic relation between awareness and
thoughts/feelings. Consciously shifting and sustaining the focus of awareness on selective subsets of
thoughts and feelings allows individuals to actively curate their own identity; that is, to selectively
activate, create, elaborate, and encode into long-term memory some beliefs but not others.
When children and adults manage their own thoughts and feelings – for example, by consciously
deciding what to think, feel, or do – they have achieved a highly advanced state of self-regulation that
we refer to as intentional agency. These states tend to be fleeting and infrequent, but the advanced
regulation skills that influence them are malleable; that is, they can be learned, strengthened, and
practiced more frequently.
In our view, this kind of conscious participation in mental processing is necessary for achieving the
highest forms of human self-regulation. In line with the bourgeoning literature on mindfulness,
practitioners will benefit from a deeper understanding of awareness and its centrality to all forms of SEL
skill growth. In particular, we hope the MPCn framework will motivate practitioners to spend more time
helping children to develop their awareness skills and apply them intentionally to reflecting, evaluating,
planning, problem solving, inhibiting and redirecting impulses, and participating consciously in their own
personal and social identity development.
Awareness is the process of focusing consciously on thoughts and feelings.
A Framework for Socio-Emotional Skills, Quality, and Equity | 12
Agency
The concept of human agency can be described as the ability to act on the self or world in order to
change the self or world. The MPCn framework refers to two types of agency: automatic and intentional
(see Figure 3). All children and adults exhibit automatic agency (Type 1). Type 1 Agency is defined as a
primary appraisal process; that is, settings are interpreted automatically and unconsciously, based on
pre-existing beliefs and schemas. The integrated schema and belief systems that children bring to a
setting provide a set point for their basic regulation (i.e., Type 1 Agency) skills. The behavioral
consequences of these habitual ways of responding can often be detected by external observers, as
when a child appears to be interested and at ease with the setting versus bored or agitated.
Blair and Raver (2012) described
the automatic, primary-appraisal
processes characterizing Type 1
agency as "less effortful processes
associated with stress physiology,
emotional arousal, and attention
focusing” and “reactive, highly
automatic, and phylogenetically
older styles of response” (p. 648).
In practical terms, having
adaptive basic regulation skills
means that children’s beliefs and
schemas tend to be triggered in a
good way, such that they don’t have to think much about applying their skills because they just come
out effortlessly. This is often defined as mastery of a skill, and the more that a setting engages the child’s
current skill set (i.e., the setting is ready for the person), the more easily adaptive beliefs and schemas
are automatically activated, which leads to more frequent mastery experiences and skill growth.
In contrast, intentional agency (Type 2) involves the more subtle and intermittent process of
consciously shifting and focusing awareness among immediate thoughts and feelings, as in self-
reflection and secondary appraisal (e.g., reflecting on how current thoughts fit with goals and values).
Intentionally focusing awareness on specific thoughts and feelings (e.g., reflecting on behavioral
options) occurs best when children (a) have had their basic regulation needs met (e.g., they are calm,
focused, and understand the task content) and (b) are supported by staff (e.g., to reflect on task
content, past experiences, future plans, attributed meanings, and cause-effect relations as they emerge
during POS activities). However, even in the best of circumstances, strengthening the ability to focus
awareness requires practice and patience. Further, because a person’s focus of awareness cannot be
directly observed by others, children must be taught to recognize, monitor, and regulate their own focus
of awareness (e.g., notice when their mind has wandered and intentionally refocus).
For OST (and all other) educators, these two types of agency
are recognizable in the philosophical purposes of programs and
curricula. Type 1 Agency is reflected in standards for program and
classroom quality – typically discussed in terms of intrinsic
motivation – that are designed to promote feelings of safety and
interest in the setting and its content. Type 2 Agency, which is
especially important for adolescents, is reflected in definitions of
quality that emphasize voice, autonomy, planning, reflection,
mindfulness, and other forms of advanced regulation.
Immediate thoughts
and feeling are the
contents of the stream
of consciousness.
Figure 3. Type 1 and Type 2 Agency.
A Framework for Socio-Emotional Skills, Quality, and Equity | 13
III. SEL History, Quality, and Equity
Socio-emotional learning is an iterative process of growing basic and advanced self-regulation skills
that promotes children’s agency. A person’s SEL history reflects all of the things the person has
experienced and stored in long term memory, including intense positive and negative emotional
experiences. These emotion-laden links to ongoing experience are stored in memory as valenced beliefs
and affectively-charged schemas, and re-activating these beliefs and schemas (e.g., via environmental
triggers or self-reflection) influences ongoing thoughts, feelings, and behavior. Being sensitive to each
and every child’s schemas and beliefs is particularly important where serving children who have
experienced chronic stress or trauma. These children are likely to respond unintentionally to setting
features, in ways that can be misunderstood. This is the case, for example, when a well-studied test
taker is so fearful of testing conditions that they make more mistakes than usual. The at-ease state of
basic psychological safety has not been achieved. OST educators can benefit from guidance on practices
that are responsive to children’s specific SEL histories; such as, acknowledging children’s thoughts and
feelings; being supportive and responsive but not intrusive or dismissive; and helping children express
what their current feelings and prior experiences mean for their ability to engage.
Figure 4 presents the alignment of widely shared standards for SEL quality in the OST field with the
parts of SEL skill. In the OST field, program quality standards are already designed to activate the parts of
SEL mental skill that produce SEL behavioral skills. Settings that activate children’s secure attachment
schemas and personal goals, at the “first look” or on the “second take,” are much more likely to
promote engagement and skill learning. This is just a different way of saying that high-quality settings
cause positive development by responding to children’s unique SEL skills and histories.
Finally, we use the term SEL
equity where referring to situations
in which the SEL quality of OST
contexts has been improved to
support children who have had
difficult SEL histories. Because SEL
skills are critical learning skills, they
have a compounding effect on many
developmental outcomes (e.g.,
academic achievement). This
process is called dynamic
complementarity (Heckman, 2007),
meaning SEL skills beget other types
of skill. Both how well a setting
scaffolds children’s existing SEL skills, and how much they learn to manage those skills autonomously in
that setting, matter decisively for SEL skill development and both the near and far transfer of these skills
to other life settings. Although there are many ways to define and operationalize the term equity, we
use a relatively generic working definition of SEL equity effects in our impact models: Equity effects
occur where children who enter a setting with low SEL skills grow those skills at the same or higher rates
than their higher-skilled peers. Equity effects also occur where children who enter a setting with higher
SEL skills retain or increase those skills over time (i.e., the setting does not undermine their skills).
Figure 4. SEL Skills and SEL Quality Standards.
A Framework for Socio-Emotional Skills, Quality, and Equity | 14
IV. Conclusions
Focusing on schemas, beliefs, awareness, and agency – in contrast to terms like cognition, emotion,
and motivation (which tend to be ambiguous) – draws attention to, and helps demystify, some of the
key challenges faced by OST (and all other) educators, such as: (a) how to understand and respond to
children (and adults) who have had adverse life experiences and whose corresponding attachment
schemas are triggered while participating in OST services (creating basic regulation issues), (b) how to
understand the bulk of terms used in the many SEL frameworks as different words (e.g., knowledge,
mindsets, values) for the same things (i.e., beliefs about the self and world), and (c) how to understand
the critical role that conscious awareness plays in promoting the highest forms of human agency (e.g.,
allowing youth to become intentional authors of their own identity and development). Harmonization of
these neuroperson systems in pursuit of life goals (e.g., developing an integrated identity, graduating
from school, and keeping a good job) can be viewed as the main point of focusing on SEL skill growth.
A Framework for Socio-Emotional Skills, Quality, and Equity | 15
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End Notes
1 For simplicity, we generally use the term children where referring to children and youth, ages 5 to 18.
2 We refer to variable-centered theory and methods, in general, and generalized linear modeling strategies in
particular (e.g., ANOVA, regression), as positivist theory and methodology.
3 Formative explanations describe the specific causes and effects characterizing the dynamic interactions among
the objects of study (e.g., how different kinds of staff behavior at the point of service are expected to promote or
undermine different kinds of child mental and behavioral engagement at the point of service) as they apply to
specific individuals (e.g., staff person A in relation to child B during program-offering activity C).
4 Given the extent of diversity across SEL frameworks, Jones et al. (2019) developed resources to help stakeholders
understand the unique strengths of different frameworks as well as the alignment between core elements of these
different frameworks. The general conclusions from this work are (a) there is currently no single consensus
framework that is obviously more scientifically or practically valid than any or all of the others, and (b) the use of
the same terms by different frameworks where presumably referring to different things (i.e., jingle fallacies), and
the use of different terms by different frameworks where presumably referring to the same things (i.e., jangle
fallacies), are abiding challenges faced by stakeholders charged with making funding, evaluation, training,
performance, measurement, and analysis decisions.
5 The material summarized in this white paper draws heavily from an open source working paper by QTurn (Peck,
Smith, & Smith, 2019). The working paper provides more detailed definitions and discussion of the specific terms
and concepts summarized here (many of which may sound familiar but may not correspond to a given disciplinary
usage) and is accessible at: http://www.qturngroup.com/MPCn.
6 The inherently ambiguous meaning of terms like emotion, motivation, and cognition is described in many places
(e.g., Baars, 1986; Barrett, 2006; Roeser et al., 2006). We describe, below, how we use more specific terms where
referring to particular mental phenomena that are usually described generally in terms of emotion and cognition.
7 The neuroperson part of the MPCn framework (see Figure 2) is a practical simplification of the more detailed
Basic Levels of Self (BLoS) model (Roeser et al., 2006; Roeser & Peck, 2009).
8 The BLoS model uses similar but additional terms mapped onto to a more nuanced description of brain systems
(Peck, Smith, & Smith, 2019; Roeser et al., 2006; Roeser & Peck, 2009).
9 Dual-process (or, dual-systems) approaches to psychological functioning typically contrast a relatively-automatic,
fact-acting nonconscious experiential system with a relatively-controlled, slow-acting, conscious rational system
(e.g., Epstein, 2003; Kahneman & Frederick, 2007; Lieberman, 2003; Metcalfe & Mischel, 1999).
10 The schema system in the neuroperson model corresponds to what we have described elsewhere as the iconic
representation system (Peck, 2007, 2016, 2018; Peck et al., 2019; Roeser et al., 2006; Roeser & Peck, 2009; Smith
et al., 2016) and is similar to Barnard et al.’s (2007) implicational meaning system, Epstein’s (2003) experiential
system, Deutsch and Strack’s (2006) impulsive system, Kahneman & Tversky’s (1973) intuitive system, Bowlby’s
(1988) working model system, Baldwin’s (1992) relational schema system, and Izard’s (2009) emotion schema
system.
11 The belief system in the neuroperson model corresponds to what we have described elsewhere as the symbolic
representation system (Peck, 2007, 2016, 2018; Peck et al., 2019; Roeser et al., 2006; Roeser & Peck, 2009; Smith
et al., 2016) and is similar to Barnard et al.’s (2007) propositional meaning system, Epstein’s (2003) rational
system, Deutsch and Strack’s (2006) reflective system, Kahneman & Tversky’s (1973) reasoned system, Kosslyn &
Pomerantz’s (1977) conceptual system, Bruner’s (1964) symbolic system, and Schultheiss’s (2001) verbal-symbolic
system.
12 We use the term primary appraisal where referring to the first 300-400 milliseconds of the brain’s processing of
incoming sensory stimuli (i.e., before the effects of the stimuli can become objects of conscious awareness), and
we use the term secondary appraisal where referring to the conscious processing of incoming sensory stimuli (and
associated information) that becomes available to conscious awareness approximately 500 milliseconds after the
initiating stimuli.
